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COMMENTARIES: SECRETARY GATES AND ADMIRAL MULLEN TESTIFY

Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen Testify

September 11, 2008

House Armed Services Committee

Hearing on Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Iraq

September 10, 2008

SKELTON:

Welcome, Secretary Gates.

Welcome, Admiral Mullen.

Welcome, Ambassador Edelman, General Winnefeld, for being with us today.

Where are they? Right behind you. Thank you so much.

We're pleased to have you with us today to discuss the way forward in Afghanistan and Iraq.

I would note, gentlemen, that your appearance today fulfills your obligation to brief this committee on force levels in Iraq under Section 1223 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009.

As it turns out, this hearing cannot be more timely. To talk about progress in Iraq and Afghanistan, it should talk about the tremendous Americans serving in uniform in those theaters. It's only appropriate to begin the hearing by paying tribute to them, to their service and to their families.

Admiral Mullen, about nine months ago you testified to this committee -- and let me quote you; we have discussed this since then -- "Our main focus militarily in the region and in the world right now is rightly and firmly in Iraq. It is simply a matter of resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must." And as you know, I have disagreed with you on that approach.

Given this, I find myself struggling with the president's announcement yesterday that nets one additional brigade to -- for Afghanistan and then not until this coming February. Almost all indicators of security and stability in Afghanistan are down this year.

General McKiernan continues to plead publicly and to members of Congress for additional troops -- specifically, three additional brigades. And the intelligence community and others like Admiral Mullen acknowledge that any future attack against our homeland is most likely to come from the safe havens that exist along the Afghanistan- Pakistan border.

No one's been more able to explain to me why Iraq is our first priority based on national security interests. How can it be, when those most likely to attack us are in Afghanistan?

How is it that the commander in Iraq was given every resource needed to achieve his goals and we're not doing the same for the Afghan commander?

Seven years ago -- after 9/11, when can we tell the American people we will be prepared to do what is needed to win in Afghanistan?

I know you both are spending an enormous amount of time in Afghanistan. But seven years on, I still do not see a well- coordinated, comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan that addresses all aspects of the mission there, such as training and equipping the Afghan national security forces, counternarcotics, reconstruction, improving governance and regional issues, including the border with Pakistan.

Such a strategy needs to marshal all our resources and lay out clearly what it will take to succeed. The fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act required such a strategy, yet the department's answer was delivered two months late with four-month-old data and did not include the required strategy.

It also did not include enough on specific measures of progress, a timetable for achieving goals or required budget information.

There are a lot of specifics I hope we can have an opportunity to discuss today, including the status and the capability of the Afghan national security force and the chronic shortfall of more than 2,500 trainers and mentors for that force.

We also must remember that we can only stabilize Afghanistan if we're able to handle its complex relationship with Pakistan. However, in April 2008 GAO reported that the U.S. lacks a comprehensive plan to eliminate insurgent safe havens in Pakistan's border region.

Another GAO report found significant oversight and accountability problems regarding DOD coalition support funds which have been used to reimburse Pakistan nearly $7 billion since 2002 for support of American operations.

Our policy on Pakistan, which has been largely shaped by the requirements of the war in Afghanistan, has not proven resilient in the face of changing circumstances in that country.

This all suggests that the U.S. has simply not devoted the focus or resources necessary to address the national security threats in Afghanistan and its border area.

I'm not discounting the gains made in Afghanistan since 2001. They're real and they are important successes. And of course, U.S. troops in Afghanistan continue to serve with excellence, with devotion, with patriotism. And we all take this for granted so much.

However, more must be done, and we've seen all too well this year any gains can quickly vanish if we don't capitalize on them.

Our NATO allies must also do much more. But we cannot expect our allies to step up if the U.S. itself has not demonstrated a strong commitment to the success of the Afghan mission.

In terms of Iraq, I applaud the military's successes there, but I remain concerned about the pace of political progress. The Iraqis still have not been able to even come to an agreement on holding provincial elections, much less address more fundamental questions like the future of Kirkuk.

Given this, I have a real question of why we are not redeploying additional forces both to bolster our efforts in Afghanistan and to keep the pressure on the Iraqis to come to a sustainable political accommodation.

So, gentlemen, I ask you, when you -- when will the conditions in Iraq be good enough, and when will the conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated enough to warrant the re-prioritization of focus and resources that's required to ensure the long-term success of the Afghanistan mission?

When will you be able to tell this committee with confidence that in Afghanistan we do what we must?

I now turn to my good friend, my colleague from California, the ranking gentleman, Mr. Hunter, Duncan Hunter.

HUNTER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing in a very timely way, especially timely in light of the president's announcement yesterday to remove some 8,000 American troops from Iraq by February.

I want to join with you in thanking our witnesses for being with us today and -- and for their testimony.

First, I think it's important with respect to Iraq to -- to point out that we are winning in Iraq. The United States is going to be leaving that theater in victory.

And the metrics that are moving us toward that goal are manifested in the 80 percent reduction in the number of attacks, the 70 percent reduction in IED -- that is, roadside bomb -- attacks, the fact that we found some 85 percent more caches this year than we did last year, with enormous cooperation now mobilizing the -- the citizenry of Iraq on our side, and also the increasing capability of the Iraqi security forces.

That -- that force is now standing up fairly robustly, the 130- plus battalions.

And, Mr. Chairman, I think it's -- it's clear now that the United States did the right thing in not trying to simply re-stand the -- the existing Iraqi army, which -- which included some 10,000-plus Sunni generals.

But we had to build that force from scratch, and all of that was -- that was difficult, and it's been a long process. I think that that's -- that's now paying off.

And finally, I think that -- I think we also need to -- to look at the leadership that's been manifested in this discussion over the last couple of days, with the books out about -- about the -- the American decisions that were made by the -- by President Bush, by the situation that surrounded the Iraq -- our Iraq policy over the last couple of years.

And you know, I noticed the president being criticized strongly by I think Mr. Woodward on a number of shows over the last couple of days, implicitly criticized.

But you know, he pointed out that this president in the -- in the Post yesterday gave this message to General Petraeus. He said, "I want you to win. Your mission is to win. And I will give you everything that you need to win."

Mr. Chairman, those words to the combatant commander in that theater are the most important words that an American president can deliver, and they're words that didn't go to the combatant commander in Vietnam many years ago when you had a president who literally decided which bridges were going to be bombed on a certain day and what result we hoped to expect from that -- that particular day's operations.

I think that this -- this operation in Iraq is going to be successfully concluded as the Iraq army continues to stand up.

But, Mr. Chairman, we now are focusing much more strongly than ever on Afghanistan. And -- and Afghanistan involves a very complicated situation, in some ways similar to Iraq, in many ways very difficult and very different from -- from the Iraq situation.

You've got the border lands now in Pakistan approaching a level at which they are becoming now the new sanctuary for Al Qaida and Taliban operations.

The political situation inside Pakistan complicates our ability to -- to interfere with this new sanctuary. It's going to provide a challenge for us for the next many years.

HUNTER:

I think, Mr. Chairman, it's important that we establish an ISR curtain on the border with Pakistan, that we utilize American capabilities with respect to reconnaissance and surveillance, so that regardless of what happens in Pakistan -- and that's a large question mark, where their politics are going to go, where their military's going to go -- that we have the ability to interdict operations emanating from that side of the border.

And that's going to be a challenge for our ability to field systems, but I think we've got to field a lot of new systems and utilize everything that we presently have in our inventory.

Obviously, another challenge is to bring this team, this NATO team, this ISAF team plus into a full coordinated operation, and this is a massive challenge for us, with the disparate directives that are coming down from our partners' governments, from their civil governments, with respect to conditions that are put on their troops, things they can do, things that they can't do.

We need to have a unified command and we've done that, to some degree, by giving this second hat to the American commander, General McKiernan. That's very important.

But unifying and coordinating the allies is going to be a continuing challenge and one that we must focus on.

So I know that this is -- the order of the day, Mr. Chairman, I think, over the next several years, is going to be making our operation in Afghanistan work, and I look forward to listening to the secretary and the chairman's ideas with respect to where we go from here.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I think that it is very important for us to look at the increased troop levels that are being -- that are taking place now and have taken place largely unnoticed over the last couple of years in Afghanistan and remember the fact that Afghanistan -- the Afghanistan operation serves another purpose right now.

It manifests in another important Western exercise, and that is bringing together these allies and the NATO nations and the newly freed nations that have come out from behind the iron curtain, which today comprise some of our strongest allies, bringing them together and training them to share this burden of fighting this war against terror with the United States.

And I think that one difficulty that we have is that a number of other nations have looked at us and said we're going to let Uncle Sam do it. And when they look at the price tags that attend deploying forces in a foreign country, supporting those forces, the logistics, especially with respect to aerial operations, they say it's going to be a lot easier to let the Americans pay for this.

And so part of your challenge, Mr. Secretary and to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, part of your challenge is to bring our allies with us.

And you've made statements like this in the past to the effect that it's only right that in these difficult and contentious areas, where we are taking KIAs and WIAs, it's not acceptable to have allies which have conditions and rules placed on them by their home governments that say that they can't leave the garrison, that they can't operate in difficult areas, that they can't get involved in firefights, when the American Marines and soldiers are carrying that burden.

So bringing them with us in this exercise in Afghanistan is, I think, a very major part of meeting this challenge.

So we've got a big spread of important issues and sub-issues here today.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your leadership, and the chairman, Admiral Mullen, thank you for your leadership here over the last year. I look forward to your testimony.

SKELTON:

Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, first, let me thank you for not just your appearance today, and, Admiral Mullen, thank you for your appearance today, it's critical that you be with us, but thank you fulfilling the section in the last year's defense bill regarding Iraq. We appreciate you doing that as part of this hearing.

Mr. Secretary?

GATES:

Mr. Chairman, Representative Hunter, members of the committee, thank you for inviting us to give you an update on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I would also like to express, at the outset, gratitude to the Congress for recently passing legislation to enhance the benefits of the GI bill. The department is very pleased with the outcome and I can tell you that our men and women in uniform are deeply appreciative.

Of course, this is just one example of the many ways in which you have supported our troops over the past years and, on behalf of all of them, I thank you.

Last week, General Petraeus made his recommendations on the way forward in Iraq. Separate recommendations were submitted by the commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, the commander of Central Command, the service chiefs, and the chairman.

Although each viewed the challenges from a different perspective, weighing different factors, all, once again, arrived at similar recommendations.

We have already withdrawn the five Army brigade combat teams, two Marine battalions, and the Marine expeditionary unit that were sent to Iraq as part of the surge.

The president announced yesterday that approximately 8,000 U.S. troops will be withdrawn from Iraq by February, without being replaced.

The withdrawal of approximately 3,400 noncombat forces, including aviation personnel, explosive ordnance teams, combat and construction engineers, military police and logistics support teams, all begin this month, will continue through this fall and winter, and will be completed in January.

In addition, a Marine battalion stationed in Anbar will return in November and another Army BCT will return by early February.

The bottom line point is that the draw-downs associated with the president's announcements do not wait until January or February, but, in fact, begin in a few days.

The continuing drawdown is possible because of the success in reducing violence and building Iraqi security capacity. Even with fewer troops, U.S. troops in Iraq, the positive trends of the last year have held and, in some cases, steadily continued in the right direction.

Our casualties have been greatly reduced, even though one is still too many. And overall violence is down 80 percent. The recent turnover of Anbar Province to Iraqi provisional control, the 11th of 18 provinces to be turned over, highlights how much the situation has improved.

My submitted testimony has more details on some of the other positive indicators, as well as serious challenges that remain. In short, Iraqi security forces have made great strides. Political progress has been incremental, but significant. And other nations of the region are increasingly engaged with Iraq.

That said, there are still problems, such as the prospect of violence in the lead-up to elections, worrisome reports about sectarian efforts to slow the assimilation of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi security forces, Iranian influence, the very real threat that Al Qaida continues to pose, and the possibility that Jaish al Mahdi could return.

Before moving on to Afghanistan, I would like to make a few general comments and put the successes of the past year and a half into some context. The president has called our reduction in troop numbers a "return on success." I, of course, agree, but I would expand further.

The changes on the ground and in our posture are reflective of fundamental change in the nature of the conflict. In past testimony, I have cautioned that no matter what you think about the origins of the war in Iraq, we must get the end game there right.

I believe we have now entered that end game and our decisions today and in the months ahead will be critical to regional stability and our national security interests for years to come.

When I entered this office, the main concern was to halt and reverse the spiraling violence in order to prevent a strategic calamity for the United States and allow the Iraqis to make progress on political, economic and security fronts.

Although we all have criticisms of the Iraqi government, there can be no doubt that the situation is much different and far better than it was in early 2007.

The situation, however, remains fragile. Disagreements in our country still exist over the speed of the draw-downs and whether we should adhere to hard and fast timelines or more flexible time horizons.

I worry that the great progress our troops and the Iraqis have made has the potential to override a measure of caution borne of uncertainty. Our military commanders do not yet believe our gains are necessarily enduring and they believe that there are still many challenges and the potential for reversals in the future.

The continuing, but carefully modulated reductions the president has ordered represent, I believe, not only the right direction, but also the right course of action, especially considering planned and unplanned redeployments by some of our coalition partners.

The planned reductions are an acceptable risk today, but also provide for unforeseen circumstances in the future.

The reductions also preserve a broad range of options for the next commander in chief, who will make his own assessment after taking office in January.

As we proceed deeper into the end game, I would urge our nation's leaders to implement strategies that, while steadily reducing our presence in Iraq, are cautious and flexible and take into account the advice of our senior commanders and military leaders.

I would also urge our leaders to keep in mind that we should expect to be involved in Iraq for years to come, although in changing and increasingly limited ways.

Let me shift to Afghanistan. There, we are working with the Afghans and coalition partners to counter a classic extremist insurgency fueled by ideology, poppy, poverty, crime and corruption.

My submitted statement details some positive developments, such as the increased commitment by our international partners on both the military and nonmilitary fronts, and the announcement yesterday to double the size of the Afghan army, which has demonstrated its effectiveness on the battlefield.

The statement also outlines in more detail some of the logistical challenges we still face and are working to improve, such as ISAF shortfalls and coordination problems between military forces and civilian elements, particularly the PRTs.

Persistent and increasing violence resulting from an organized insurgency is, of course, our greatest concern. The president has decided to send more troops to Afghanistan in response to resurgent extremism and violence reflecting greater ambition, sophistication and coordination.

We did not get to this point overnight. So some historical context is useful.

The mission in Afghanistan has evolved over the years since 2002 in both positive and negative ways. Reported insurgent activities and attacks began increasing steadily in the spring of 2006.

This has been the result of increased insurgent activity, insurgent safe havens in Pakistan, and reduced military pressure on that side of the border, as well as more international and Afghan troops on the battlefield, troops that are increasingly in contact with the enemy.

In response to increased violence and insurgent activity in 2006, in January of 2007, we extended the deployment of an Army brigade and added another brigade. This last spring, the United States deployed 3,500 Marines. In all, the number of American troops in the country increased from less than 21,000 two years ago to nearly 31,000 today.

At the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, ISAF allies and partners restated their commitment to Afghanistan. France added 700 troops in eastern Afghanistan. This fall, Germany will seek to increase its troop ceiling from 3,500 to 4,500. Poland is also increasing its forces by more than 1,000 troops.

The number of coalition troops, including NATO troops, has increased from about 20,000 to about 31,000, and it appears this trend will continue as other allies, such as the United Kingdom, add more troops.

In Bucharest in April, the president pledged the United States would send more troops to Afghanistan in 2009. Accordingly, we will increase U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan by deploying a Marine battalion this November and, in January 2009, an Army brigade combat team, both units that had been slated for Iraq.

As in Iraq, however, additional forces alone will not solve the problem. Security is just one aspect of the campaign, alongside development and governance.

We must maintain the momentum, keep the international community engaged and develop the capacity of the Afghan government. The entirety of the NATO alliance, the EU, NGOs and other groups, our full military and civilian capabilities must be on the same page and working toward the same goal with the Afghan government.

I am still not satisfied with the level of coordination and collaboration among the numerous partners and many moving parts associated with civilian reconstruction and development and building the capacity of the Afghan government.

We do face committed enemies, which brings me finally to the challenge of the tribal areas in Pakistan.

As in Iraq, until the insurgency is deprived of safe havens, insecurity and violence will persist. We are working with Pakistan in a number of areas and I do believe that Islamabad appreciates the magnitude of the threat from the tribal areas, particularly considering the uptick in suicide bombings directed at Pakistani targets.

During this time of political turmoil in Pakistan, it is especially critical that we maintain a strong and positive relationship with the government, since any deterioration would be a setback for both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The war on terror started in this region. It must end there.

Let me close by thanking, again, all members of the committee and the Congress as a whole for their support for our men and women in uniform. I have noted on a number of occasions how positive the public response has been to those who have volunteered to serve.

Our nation's leaders across the political spectrum have led the way in honoring our service-men and -women, not just by providing the funds they need for their mission, but also by publicly declaring their support and admiration of our troops.

GATES:

I thank you for your sentiment and I thank you for your leadership during these challenging times.

Mr. Chairman, before I close, I would like just to take a moment also to take this opportunity to share with the committee my decision to terminate the current Air Force tanker solicitation.

As you know, the department has been attempting over the past seven years to find a proper way forward on replacing the current fleet of U.S. Air Force KC-135 tankers.

Most recently, we have been engaged in discussions with the competing companies on changes to the draft RFP that would address the findings and recommendations of the GAO's review of the Boeing protest.

It has now become clear that the solicitation and award process cannot be accomplished by January. Thus, I believe that rather than hand the next administration an incomplete and possibly contested process, we should cleanly defer this procurement to the next team.

Over the past seven years, this process has become enormously complex and emotional, in no small part due to mistakes and missteps on the part of the Defense Department.

It is my judgment that in the time remaining to us, we cannot complete a competition that would be viewed as fair and competitive in this highly charged environment.

I believe that the resulting cooling-off period will allow the next administration to review objectively the military requirements and craft a new acquisition strategy for the KC-X as it sees fit.

I am assured that the current KC-135 fleet can be adequately maintained to satisfy Air Force missions for the near future. Sufficient funds will be recommended in the F.Y. '09 and follow-on budgets to maintain the KC-135 at high mission-capable rates.

In addition, the department will soon recommend to the Congress the disposition of the pending F.Y. '09 funding for the tanker program and plans to continue funding the KC-X program in the F.Y. '10 to '15 budget presently under review.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SKELTON:

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

Admiral Mullen, thank you for your appearance today, sir.

MULLEN:

Chairman Skelton, Representative Hunter, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and thanks as well for all you do to support our men and women in uniform and their families.

Having visited with our troops all over the world, I can tell you they are aware and appreciative of America's support, support which in so many ways emanates from this committee and from the Congress as a whole. So again, on their behalf, I thank you for that.

Let me begin today by also expressing my appreciation to the president and Secretary Gates for their support of our armed forces and of the family members of those who serve.

Today, on the eve of the 7th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, we are reminded again of just how critical that service really is and, consequently, in an all-volunteer force, where people have other choices, how absolutely vital is the recognition and support of the federal government for the needs of our service men and women.

On that note, I stand particularly grateful today for the president's support of the recommendations that Secretary Gates and I have made to him with respect to the way forward in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I need not recount for you here the details of those recommendations nor the circumstances that underpin them. Secretary Gates has just done that, and I'm in complete agreement with his views.

Today, rather, I wish to make the following points. First, the recommendations that went forward to the secretary and to the president represented a consensus view of the military leadership in this country.

The process by which we -- they were derived was candid, transparent and thoroughly collaborative. The entire chains of command for both Iraq and Afghanistan were involved, engaged, including the Joint Chiefs.

We did not all enjoy complete agreement early on. Frankly, I would have been surprised had it been otherwise. One sees war, feels it, fights it, bleeds it from one's unique perspective.

The key to success over the long term is proving able to see it also from another perspective, be it in the enemy's or the public's or the chain of command, and being informed by that knowledge as you move forward.

I can assure you that all of us, at all levels in the chain of command, considered the whole of each struggle, the totality of each effort, and the need to preserve on a global scale our greater national interests.

Some in the media have described our final recommendations as a compromise solution. And to the degree that this explains the process we employed, I would agree.

But it would be wrong to conclude that our proposal represented a compromise in any way of our commitment to success. We did not compromise one war for the other.

And that, Mr. Chairman, brings me to my second point. Iraq and Afghanistan are two different fights. Many of you have been to both countries.

You know these differences -- the enemies' various objectives, the political and economic challenges unique to each culture, the weather, even the ground. As one soldier in Bagram told me in Afghanistan, the terrain itself can be the enemy.

We treated the needs of each war separately and weighed our decisions for each solely against the risks inherent and the resources available.

Given the extraordinary success Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus have achieved in Iraq -- the dramatically improved security on the ground, the growing competence of the Iraqi military and police forces, the growing competence of Iraqi political leaders, and the economic progress which is burgeoning -- it is our view that the risks of drawing down by one brigade and one Marine battalion is minimal at best and can be mitigated by the readiness of coalition forces already in theater or back at home should a contingency arise to warrant their employment.

The rewards, on the other hand, are potentially great as we seek to build dwell time for our troops and their families and have at our disposal a rested, stronger, more capable strategic reserve for worldwide crises.

As always, conditions on the ground matter most, and we reserve the right to recommend adjustments to these plans should those conditions require it.

Conditions in Afghanistan certainly do require it, and I don't speak of Afghanistan without also speaking of Pakistan. From my view, these two nations are inextricably linked in a common insurgency that crosses the border between them.

You have all seen the challenges we face, particularly in the south and east, as Taliban and Al Qaida fighters grow bolder and more sophisticated.

You've seen the willingness of these disparate groups of fighters to better collaborate and communicate from safe havens in Pakistan; their ability to launch ever more sophisticated, even infantry-like, attacks against fixed coalition positions; their increasing reliance on foreign fighters; and their growing and flagrant willingness to use innocent people as shields.

Add to this a poor and struggling Afghan economy, a still healthy narcotics trade and a significant political uncertainty in Pakistan, and you have all the makings of a complex, difficult struggle that will take time.

I'm not convinced we're winning it in Afghanistan. I am convinced we can. That is why I intend to commission and have looked -- are looking -- am looking at a new, more comprehensive military strategy for the region that covers both sides of that border.

It's why I pushed hard for the continued growth and training of Afghan national security forces. It's why I pressed hard on my counterparts in Pakistan to do more against extremists and to let us do more to help them.

And it's why the chiefs and I recommended the deployment of a Marine battalion to Afghanistan this fall and the arrival of another Army brigade early next year.

These forces by themselves will not adequately meet General McKiernan's desire for up to three brigades, but they are a good and important start. Frankly, I judge the risk of not sending them too great a risk to ignore.

My expectation is that they will need to perform both the training mission and the combat and combat support missions simultaneously until such time that we can provide additional troops. And I cannot say at this point when that might be.

Again, we must continually assess our progress there and in Iraq, weighing it against the global risk and the health of the force, before we make any more commitments.

And that, sir, leads me to my final point. As I once said about Iraq, let me now say about Afghanistan. Absent a broader international and interagency approach to the problems there, it is my professional opinion that no amount of troops in no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek in Afghanistan.

And frankly, we're running out of time. We can train and help grow the Afghan security forces, and we are. In fact, they are on track to reach a total end strength of 162,000 by 2010. The Marines conducting their training are doing a phenomenal job.

But until those Afghan forces have the support of local leaders to improve security on their own, we will only be there as -- as a crutch, and a temporary one at that.

We can hunt down and kill extremists as they cross over the border from Pakistan, as I watched personally us do during a day-long trip recently to the Korengal Valley. But until we work more closely with the Pakistani government to eliminate safe havens from which they operate, the enemy will only keep coming.

We can build roads and schools and courts, and our provincial reconstruction teams are doing just that. But until we've represented in those teams more experts from the fields of commerce, agriculture, jurisprudence and education, those facilities will remain but empty shells.

Fewer than one in 20 PRTs throughout the country are supported by non-military personnel. Afghanistan doesn't just need more boots on the ground. It needs more trucks on the roads, teachers in schools, trained judges and lawyers in those courts.

Foreign investment, alternative crops, sound governance, the rule of law -- these are the keys to success in Afghanistan. We cannot kill our way to victory, and no armed force anywhere, no matter how good, can deliver these keys alone. It requires teamwork and cooperation.

And it will require the willingness by everyone in the interagency and international community to focus less on what we think we each do best and more on what we believe we can all do better together.

I know you understand that, and I appreciate all you do on this committee to support those of us in uniform. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SKELTON:

Thank you so much for your statement, Admiral.

As a side note, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the end game in Iraq. It's rather interesting to recall the Sun Tzu precept that said that a war should not be entered into without considering the end of that war. And I question whether that was considered to begin with.

I have a question, and I will only ask one at this time, if each of you would like to share it. Is Iraq still the higher priority than Afghanistan? I think we should know what the priority is between the two and, to lift a phrase from an earlier testimony, Admiral, when will we be able to do what we must to win in Afghanistan?

Mr. Secretary?

GATES:

I don't think it's a -- a mathematical equation. I would say that success in Iraq means that we are steadily reducing our commitment, our level of commitment and resources, particularly manpower, to that theater.

At the same time, we are able under those circumstances to increase our level of commitment and resources to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a -- is a -- in some ways, a more complex challenge, it seems to me, in terms of how it's addressed.

For one thing, in Iraq, we and the Iraqis together basically are the principal players. And so if we reach agreement with the Iraqis on the strategy, then -- then that's pretty well the strategy.

In Afghanistan, we not only have many allies, we have diverse enemies. We don't have a -- a single adversary. We have the Taliban. We have the Hekmatyar Golbadin -- Golbadin Hekmatyar group. We have the Hakkani network. We have narco thugs. We have Al Qaida. We have foreign fighters. And while these are, in many respects, a syndicate, they are not an integrated enemy.

So in my view, the short answer to your question is that as opposed to saying which has higher priority, I would say we are reducing our commitments in Iraq and we are increasing our commitments in Afghanistan.

SKELTON:

Admiral?

MULLEN:

Chairman, I spoke publicly in recent months about the hope, as did the secretary, the hope I would have to have conditions in Iraq support reducing the number of troops that we have there and then making decisions about what we would do with those troops.

That has indeed happened and I continue to have that hope as conditions over time continue to improve, the Iraqi security forces continue to improve, both military and police, that the economy keeps continuing to improve, and that that would allow us to continue to reduce troops there over time.

I think the step that the president announced yesterday is a significant one and a very strong signal of what has happened in Iraq and, also, decisions to make -- to send additional troops into Afghanistan.

There are similarities between the two, but there are also great differences. And I agree with the secretary that is more complex, that there are many aspects of Afghanistan that need to be addressed more fully than just the security.

We need to be able to provide, with the Afghan forces, the security so that country can develop. But there is a great deal more to be done in those other areas that I talked about in my opening statement.

So they are both a priority right now. I think we're in a good place with respect to Iraq and being able to leverage that and look to increasing troops in Afghanistan is a very important step, in my view.

SKELTON:

Thank you so much.

Mr. Hunter?

HUNTER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And again, gentlemen, thanks for being here.

Mr. Secretary, just a thought on ISR. We've got the modularization of the army and the brigade combat team concept is an idea that was designed to ensure that we had a commonality of equipment and an efficiency, if you will, and the ability to chop units and to meld units and maintain military efficiency.

In looking just -- we've looked at preliminarily -- some of the staff members of the committee have done some analysis on ISR assets that we have throughout the Army and the other services, but primarily the Army, and it would appear to me that we've got assets that could be moved, could be focused on Afghanistan.

And if the genius of effective military operations is being able to concentrate forces, that is, to focus resources, whether it's personnel or equipment, on a focal point, in a limited area, we shouldn't let the brigade combat team concept keep us from breaking loose some of that equipment if we've got it in other places, having the flexibility to move that perhaps from other theaters and move it into the Afghanistan theater.

And just looking preliminarily at the operations, the buildup of operations, and the nature of those operations and the fact that we're seeing a migration of the IED threat into Afghanistan and that we need more surveillance capability, it would appear to me that we may need to look at moving existing assets very quickly into that theater.

So just an idea there. I would hope we could work together with you on that and just assure that we have plenty of ISR in the Afghanistan theater.

GATES:

Mr. Hunter, I would just say that, first of all, we are going to -- because of the success of the Army's Task Force ODIN in Iraq, we are going to re-create Task Force ODIN and replicate it in Afghanistan, with additional assets.

I think that most of the other combatant commanders would tell you -- I have, with the help of the chairman, redirected too many of their ISR assets from other theaters into Iraq and Afghanistan. So we have looked very closely at all of the ISR resources worldwide in terms of what we can do to provide additional capabilities, particularly in Afghanistan.

HUNTER:

OK. Thank you. And I would hope we could continue to work on that.

The other thing is if we look at our allies, look at the conditions that have been imposed on some of our allies with respect to what they can do, down to the point where some of them can't leave the garrison in Afghanistan, give us, if you will, your thoughts on how the allies are performing and how well we're doing in bringing this team, this NATO plus, if you will, into what is really their first major military operation since their inception.

How are we doing and how do we invoke more cooperation from the allies?

GATES:

Let me speak to that and then invite the chairman to add his view.

I think, first of all, one of the positive results that has not gotten much attention out of the Bucharest NATO summit last April was the decision on the part of several of our allies to reduce or remove the caveats, the national caveats that they had on their troops.

So we have seen, in several instances, our allies be able to step up to the plate and take on the full range of responsibilities since April that they had not done before.

The reality is that some of our allies have a significant number of people in Afghanistan. I mentioned the Germans are going from 3,500 to 4,500, and the Germans basically are taking care of R.C.- North in Afghanistan.

We have a significant Italian and Spanish presence in the western part of Iraq. The heavy fighting in the south is carried out not just by the United States, but by the United Kingdom, by Australia, the Canadians, the Dutch and the Danes, and I would tell you that they are in the fight all the way.

And it is one of the sad results of that that the British, the Dutch, the Canadians especially, the Australians, all are taking significant casualties proportionate to the size of the force that they have their and proportionate to the size of their armed forces.

So I would say that particularly in R.C.-South, where the fighting is the heaviest, our allies are playing a really critical role for us and are doing so both with skill and great courage.

So I would say that the trend lines are very positive in this regard.

Admiral?

MULLEN:

Mr. Hunter, I would only add that in my interaction with my counterparts, which is very frequent, on this issue and, in particular, those countries that the secretary mentioned, they really are very committed and it has changed over the last year.

When I'm in R.C.-South and visiting, that kind of feedback is what I get from our people on the ground with respect to the Canadians, the Brits, the Aussies, and, indeed, the French just sent an extra battalion in and, tragically, not too long after they were there, they lost 10 of their soldiers.

So there is a significant improvement, in my view, of that and I think the overall 10,000 troop increase there that the secretary spoke to in his opening statement is part of this.

We've tried to focus particularly over the last year, year and a half, and I think they've responded and I think they will continue to respond, maybe not as quickly as we would like, maybe not with as much force, but clearly they are heading in the right direction in many of those countries.

HUNTER:

OK. Thank you, gentlemen.

Just one last point. Mr. Secretary, I've looked at the timeline for the replication of Task Force ODIN with respect to Afghanistan. There may be some ways we can make some improvements on that.

I would hope you'd work with the committee on that and we might be able to move some equipment a little bit quicker.

And lastly, rules of engagement, looking at some of the battles that have taken place in the south recently, we may need to engage on that a little further in that there are different rules of engagement, as you know, with respect to different countries, and that provides, at some point, provides some issues when you have joint operations and there have been one or two instances where there has been -- I think where we've had an issue or two arise.

But I think we'll talk to you about that off record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SKELTON:

Thank you.

John Spratt?

SPRATT:

Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, thank you very much for your testimony and for your service.

I think you both agree that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost us vastly more than anyone ever anticipated in dollar terms and, frankly, there's no near-term end in sight.

By our calculation on the Budget Committee, with the help of CBO, Iraq and Afghanistan, between '01 and '09, a 10-year period of time, have cost about $859 billion.

We asked CBO if they would give us a projection of the next 10 years, assuming a phase-down to about 75,000 troops in both theaters in a steady-state by 2013, and the number they gave us for that 10- year period of time was $913 billion. Together, that's $1.8 trillion, which I think you'd agree is a lot of money and a consequential number.

If we spend it here, we have to forego things elsewhere.

We are six years into the engagement in Iraq and we still don't get good numbers. We still don't get budget requests that reflect real needs, and this year is a good example.

The request for the supplemental expenditure needed for Iraq and Afghanistan in this year's budget is $70 billion. I think you'd both agree that's a plug. It's not a real number. It's not a realistic number.

In addition, if you look at the president's budget over time, over a five-year period of time, he gave us a run-out of the numbers over that period of time, in real dollars, the defense budget to 050 (ph) goes down each year from '09 through '13.

So my question to both is: when can we expect to get realistic numbers or realistic budget requests? I know that, to start with, you didn't have a cost-based to operate upon, but we've been there some time now. There ought to be some way to extrapolate from past costs based upon present and future plans and come up with numbers that are lot more realistic and reliable than the numbers we've got.

Could you provide us those numbers now or is there any way we could obtain those numbers from you in the near future or at least a commitment for the budget requests that we have more realistic numbers than we've had in previous fiscal years?

GATES:

Mr. Spratt, I think that now that the president has made his decisions in terms of the next step on the draw-downs in Iraq and, also, the reinforcement in Afghanistan, that we are now in a position to go back and as you -- I couldn't agree with you more.

We all knew that the $70 billion was basically to get us through March or thereabouts the next year, and we will come back to you with what we think is the most realistic additional number on top of the $70 billion.

SPRATT:

Is that in the near future?

GATES:

I hope so, sir.

SPRATT:

All right. Thank you very much.

SKELTON:

Mr. Saxton, please.

Mr. McHugh? I'm sorry.

MCHUGH:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you, as always, for your service. I'm not sure, this may be the last time we see you certainly for this year.

But I know I speak for all my colleagues, we deeply appreciate your being with this committee on any number of occasions, but more importantly, for the great work you do on behalf of our men and women in uniform.

Admiral Mullen, the last time you and I had a chance to chat, we talked about the kinds of things you mentioned today, and I couldn't agree with your comments more.

The fact of the matter is troop strength is important. We need to focus on it, but Afghanistan presents a much more complex picture than just force structure in not just Afghanistan.

I don't know how we solve Afghanistan or our nation's and world's problem without solving the problem with the FATA in Pakistan.

The time we did discuss it, Admiral, we talked about the Frontier Corps, which remains kind of at the focus of addressing those what I argue are ungoverned tribal areas, not administered tribal areas, but that corps had a rather rocky start and yet it remains a key part of the hope for a solution there.

I wonder if you could give me an update on how you view the Frontier Corps program.

MULLEN:

If I can, Mr. McHugh, I'd just a go a little broader initially. The Pakistani -- because an equally important, if not more important part of that is what the Pakistani military is doing literally right now, and they've had ongoing operations for -- for several months now and will continue to do that.

And I capture the shift that their leadership has generated if I look at the forces they have now in the Northwest Frontier provinces and -- and that part of Pakistan.

A year ago, I think there were eight or nine brigades, and there are at least 10 more there now. And -- and there -- so there's a -- there's been a big shift and a commitment on the part of the Pakistani military.

In addition, there is -- we do have a focus on the Frontier Corps. We are in a position to -- to commence training with them -- training the trainers, if you will -- with a little more -- with more capacity than we've had in the past.

And I also know that there's been a -- there's been a leadership change at the head of the Frontier Corps which General Kiani made which is significant.

So as I indicated, this isn't going to happen quickly, but I think it is headed in the right direction, and it is a combination in the long run, I think, of both the PakMil, the Frontier Corps, and then the development that would come to follow that on the heels to be able to sustain