ISW Releases New Report: "Creating Police and Law Enforcement Systems"

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Contact: Megan Ortagus
mortagus@understandingwar.org
(863) 398-8164 cell
October 13, 2010

LTG James Dubik (ret.) explains how to achieve long term security in fragile states through building institutions and training local security forces


Washington, D.C. - Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Senior Fellow LTG James Dubik (ret.), has released the fourth report in ISW'
s Best Practices in Counterinsurgency series: Creating Police and Law Enforcement Systems. This report assesses strategies for police training in troubled and developing states and includes case studies from Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

During LTG Dubik's tenure in the U.S. Army , he held several positions where he oversaw the training of indigenous security forces, including: commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) during the Surge and commander of the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division during the first 4 months of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti during the Clinton Administration.

LTG Dubik explained some of his lessons learned on training security forces in a war zone saying, "While training and equipping of police is necessary, you also have to build institutions to support the police. Just training and equipping is a cosmetic approach; without institutions, the police will erode over time."

Download Creating Police and Law Enforcement Systemsby LTG James Dubik (ret.)

Key facts from the report:

  • Dealing with a national-level threat like an insurgency requires a national army and some form of a national-level paramilitary police. Military or paramilitary police forces can impose security; local police enforce it locally once it exists.  The difference is subtle, but important. Local police are not trained, armed, equipped, or organized to defeat insurgent attacks. Secure conditions must exist before local police can do their job.
  • Once military and paramilitary police forces impose security and keep it in place long enough to sufficiently eliminate the conditions of police intimidation, the process of transforming the local police can begin.
  • Creating police is not a numbers game. Numbers are important, but they do not determine effectiveness.  At least two other separate but related law enforcement factors are important: the confinement system and the judicial, or adjudication, system; and the local-to-national level institutions and processes designed to support and to continually improve the police. These include planning, training, education, leader selection and development, administration, logistics and acquisition, facility construction and maintenance, resource management, and internal affairs.

ISW's Best Practices in Counterinsurgency series examines case studies of pivotal COIN operations executed in Iraq by publishing reports and interviewing the soldiers who designed, participated in, and led the successful missions in theater. These products record the lessons learned on the battlefield and serve as an educational tool for current and future military thinkers.

To request LTG Dubik for a media interview, please contact ISW Communications Director Megan Ortagus mortagus@understandingwar.org or (863) 398-6184 cell.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. www.UnderstandingWar.org