Publications

Afghanistan in Review January 3 – January 25, 2022

January 31, 2022 - ISW Press

Key Takeaway: Uzbek Taliban units revolted, forcibly disarmed local Pashtun Taliban units, and briefly seized control of Maimana, the provincial capital of Faryab Province on January 13. Local Taliban leadership, including the governor and police chief, fled the city while locals reported some shots fired. The revolt occurred shortly after Taliban Deputy Defense Minister Mullah Fazel Mazloom arrested a senior Uzbek Taliban commander, Makhdoom Alem, in Mazar-i-Sharif on January 12. The Taliban central leadership responded quickly to the revolt in Faryab Province by deploying additional reinforcements January 14-16, which appears to have ended the revolt. Makhdoom Alem remains in custody in Kabul. If the Taliban exclude local elites from ethnic minority groups from power, it risks increasing inter-ethnic tensions in Afghanistan, and it may not have enough forces to forcibly stop every revolt.

Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine: Updated Course of Action Assessment

January 27, 2022 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin is using the crisis he created by mobilizing a large military force around Ukraine to achieve two major objectives: first, advancing and possibly completing his efforts to regain effective control of Ukraine itself, and second, fragmenting and neutralizing the NATO alliance. Russian military preparations can support a massive invasion of Ukraine from the north, east, and south that could give Putin physical control of Kyiv and other major Ukrainian cities, allowing him to dictate terms that would accomplish the first objective. Such an invasion, however, might undermine his efforts to achieve the second objective because it could rally the NATO alliance around the need to respond to such a dramatic act of aggression. An invasion would also entail significant risks and definite high costs. A Russian military action centered around limited military operations in southern and southeastern Ukraine coupled with a brief but widespread and intense air and missile campaign could better position Putin to achieve both aims as well as reduce the likely costs and risks to Russia.

Russian Forces in Belarus as of January 25, 2022

January 26, 2022 - ISW Press

Russian Force Posture Around Ukraine in BTGs As of January 25, 2022

January 26, 2022 - ISW Press

Turkey in Review: December 28, 2021 – January 18, 2022

January 21, 2022 - ISW Press

Kazakhstan Crisis Exposes Limits of Turkey’s Reach in Central Asia: Rapid developments in Kazakhstan in January 2022 outpaced the Turkey-led Organization of Turkic States’ ability to respond with more than offers of support to the Kazakh government. Ankara’s initial response to the Kazakh crisis was limited to calling for stability and peace. Turkey accelerated its outreach to Kazakhstan, however, after the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) agreed to deploy troops into the Central Asian country. The CSTO deployment, the first time the organization invoked its collective security provision, likely motivated Ankara to take more vigorous steps to ensure Turkey retains a role in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan remains under a state of emergency imposed in response to widespread unrest that began with localized fuel protests.

Russia in Review: December 1, 2021 – January 11, 2022

January 14, 2022 - ISW Press

ISW’s Russia team is closely monitoring the ongoing situation around Ukraine, including Russian force deployments, rhetorical changes, and Western responses. This issue includes coverage of Russian activity in Vietnam, Egypt, Belarus, the Balkans, India, Tajikistan, and Germany.

Turkey in Review: December 7 – December 27

December 30, 2021 - ISW Press

Turkey’s volatile currency has worsened the humanitarian crisis in northern Syria and raised the cost of Ankara’s governance responsibilities there. The Turkish lira’s recent volatility and Turkey’s high inflation rates pose significant problems for not only those living in Turkey but also in Turkish-controlled northern Syria, where Turkey has built extensive financial networks and introduced the use of its currency. The Turkish lira lost up to 40 percent of its value over 2021 as a result of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s unconventional monetary policies. The lira’s value has improved slightly and stabilized since December 20, but price hikes on basic goods will likely remain, disrupting the purchasing power of Turks and Syrians alike.

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