Publications

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 15, 2024

March 15, 2024 - ISW Press

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that it redefined its criteria for a “first strike” against PRC military assets, which now include a “first move” by PLA aircraft and vessels across Taiwan’s territorial boundaries. ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan that Taiwan reserves the right to take military countermeasures if enemy military planes or ships enter Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace and Taiwan fails to expel them by interception, identification, and warning. He did not clarify if the “first strike” concept applies to Taiwan’s outlying islands. Chiu said the MND’s definition of an enemy “first strike” before the policy change specifically referred to enemy artillery or missile fire at Taiwan. The reason for changing the definition was to counter the PRC’s “gray zone” operations around Taiwan. The CCP has not publicly commented on the policy change as of March 13.

Iran Update, March 14, 2024

March 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Hamas reportedly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City on March 13 likely as part of Hamas’ effort to reassert its authority in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas targeted the head and other members of the armed Dughmush clan amid local accusations that the clan stole humanitarian aid and cooperated with Israel. The clan responded to the killing by vowing to retaliate and declaring Hamas members and positions as “legitimate target[s].”[3] Hamas denied reports that its forces killed the clan members.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 14, 2024

March 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev posted a detailed call for the total elimination of the Ukrainian state and its absorption into the Russian Federation under what he euphemistically called a “peace formula.” Medvedev’s demands are not novel but rather represent the Kremlin’s actual intentions for Ukraine — intentions that leave no room for negotiations for purposes other than setting the precise terms of Ukraine’s complete capitulation.

Foreign Fighters and Jihadi Rivalry in the Sahel; Somalia Backslides

March 14, 2024 - ISW Press

ISSP has expanded its areas of control and established itself as a hub for foreign fighters from North Africa and Europe since early 2023, which increases the group’s transnational threat risk. ISSP began resurging in the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after the withdrawal of French forces in 2021. The UN observed that the territory under ISSP control doubled between 2022 and the first half of 2023, including swaths of northeastern Mali that its al Qaeda–linked rivals and communal militias previously controlled.

Iran Update, March 13, 2024

March 13, 2024 - ISW Press

Israeli media reported on March 13 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Navy fired at two suspected Palestinian fighters in scuba gear approaching the border between the northern Gaza Strip and Israel. CTP-ISW has not recorded Palestinian fighters attempting to infiltrate into Israel from the Gaza Strip since early November 2023.[2] An IDF Navy helicopter destroyed an unspecified Palestinian vessel near Gaza City on March 11.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 13, 2024

March 13, 2024 - ISW Press

Ukrainian shortages of ammunition and other war materiel resulting from delays in the provision of US military assistance may be making the current Ukrainian front line more fragile than the relatively slow Russian advances in various sectors would indicate. Ukrainian prioritization of the sectors most threatened by intensive Russian offensive operations could create vulnerabilities elsewhere that Russian forces may be able to exploit to make sudden and surprising advances if Ukrainian supplies continue to dwindle. Russia’s retention of the theater-wide initiative increases the risks of such developments by letting the Russian military command choose to increase or decrease operations anywhere along the line almost at will.

Iran Update, March 12, 2024

March 12, 2024 - ISW Press

The Qatari Foreign Affairs Minister said on March 12 that Israel and Hamas are “nowhere near a deal” regarding a ceasefire deal and prisoner-for-hostage exchange. The minister also noted that Qatar is engaged in a “constructive” dialogue with Israel and Hamas. CIA Director William Burns said on March 12 that a potential ceasefire deal “is still a possibility” despite the difficult process of negotiations. Hamas’ maximalist demands for a permanent ceasefire, return of displaced people, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, and sufficient humanitarian aid do not align with Israeli plans to continue clearing operations in the Gaza Strip until Hamas is defeated.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 12, 2024

March 12, 2024 - ISW Press

The All-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), and Siberian Battalion conducted a limited cross-border incursion into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts on the morning of March 12. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on March 12 that elements of the RDK, LRS, and the Siberian Battalion were involved in clashes in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts. Russian sources initially denied reports of the incursion but later claimed that Russian forces repelled Russian pro-Ukrainian forces with tank, armored vehicle, and drone support attacking near Odnorobivka, Kharkiv Oblast and Nekhoteevka and Spodaryushino, Belgorod Oblast. Footage published on March 12 shows Russian pro-Ukrainian forces operating near Nekhoteevka and Spodaryushino in Belgorod Oblast and in Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.

Iran Update, March 11, 2024

March 11, 2024 - ISW Press

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh presented Hamas’ comprehensive demands in ceasefire and hostage negotiations in a speech marking the start of Ramadan on March 10. Haniyeh presented five maximalist demands for a hostage-for-prisoner exchange. Haniyeh proposed a comprehensive ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, the complete and unconditional return of displaced Gazans, and the resolution of humanitarian issues, including relief, shelter, and reconstruction, and ending restrictions on the movement of people and goods out of the Gaza Strip. Haniyeh said that the Hamas leadership would reject any agreement that does not meet these demands.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 11, 2024

March 11, 2024 - ISW Press

Russia’s increased defense industrial base (DIB) production is likely not sustainable in the medium- and long-term as it will likely suffer from labor shortages, decreased weapons and equipment stockpiles, and an inability to completely compensate for military and dual-use items it can no longer acquire due to sanctions. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on March 11 that a senior NATO official stated that Russia can likely sustain its current war effort for two to five more years. WSJ noted that some Russian production figures, such as those for military vehicles, do not differentiate between newly produced items and refurbished ones brought out of storage, such as older, lower quality T-62 and T-54/-55 tanks. ISW has observed that reports of Russia’s reported tank “production” numbers in recent years largely reflect restored and modernized tanks drawn from storage rather than new production.

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