REPORTS: THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE SADRIST MOVEMENT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Overview
Deliberate Coalition and Iraqi military operations, and Iraqi political maneuvers, have severed the political, military, and social strands of the Sadr Movement, which no longer co-exist in the same entity and likely will not recombine in 2009.
While the political and military power of the movement has declined, its traditional constituency — the urban Shi’a poor and rural Shi’a tribes — remains a large and politically-valuable electorate.
Two main factions within the movement now compete for control of the traditional Sadr constituency: the clerics and politicians (including al-Sadr) who emphasize a return to social, religious and educational programs; and an armed movement, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which seeks to continue resistance against Coalition Forces. Both groups seek to operate in the political process.
Existing frictions between Muqtada al-Sadr and the leaders of the military wing make it unlikely that the groups will combine assets in the near future.
In light of these ongoing tensions, rival political groups such as Prime Minister Maliki’s Dawa Party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, have sought to co-opt the Sadr Movement’s key constituency of urban Shi’a poor and rural Shi’a tribes.
If Maliki succeeds in building a Parliamentary coalition with leaders from either Sadrist faction, he will most likely cement his hold on power in the 2009 elections and dramatically reshape the political environment in Iraq.
Part One
Following the failed Shi’a uprising in Iraq, Saddam Hussein sought to reestablish strict control over the Shi’a population by co-opting specific Shi’a tribes and clerics.
The Sadrist Movement (or Sadrist Trend), under the leadership of Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, rose to prominence in the 1990s as part of the state-sponsored initiative. The movement was at once populist, nationalist, and religious.
As Sadeq al-Sadr’s influence grew, he adopted a more aggressive tone with respect to the regime and other political issues. In response, regime-affiliated gunmen assassinated Sadeq al-Sadr and two of his sons in 1999.
Following the assassination, many members of the Sadrist Movement fled or went underground. Muqtada al-Sadr, Sadeq’s other son, was placed under house arrest. The movement was held together underground by a group of young clerics who had been close deputies and students of Sadeq al-Sadr: Riyad al-Nouri, Mohammed Tabatabai, Mustafa al-Yacoubi, Qais Khazali, and Jaber al-Khafaji.
Following the 2003 invasion, the Sadrist movement reemerged with the support of Iranian-based Iraqi cleric Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri. Haeri appointed Muqtada al-Sadr as his representative in Iraq.
The Sadrists quickly reopened mosques, established Friday prayers, created a militia to provide security, assumed control of local political institutions, and provided social services for their communities. Sadr sought to build the movement into a Hezbollah like organization with a political arm, a social services and religious arm, and a military arm.
The Sadrist Movement sought to capitalize on the anger and resentment of the Shi’a poor by opposing the Coalition.
Two failed uprisings against the Coalition in 2004, both launched from position in close proximity to holy shrines, diminished Sadr’s stature among the Shi’a. Following the failed conflicts, Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri broke with Muqtada and thereby deprived the Sadr Movement of its principle source of funding.
Disputes arising from the two failed uprisings, exacerbated by the financial shortfall, resulted in increased fragmentation among the leaders of the Movement. One faction, led by Qais Khazali split from Sadr.
In 2005, the Movement joined the political process and secured 30 parliamentary seats in the January 2006 election. Engagement in the political system provided the clerical and political leadership of the Sadrist Trend with a new source of income and expanded their patronage network.
In 2006, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) reorganized their support of militia groups within Iraq. Qais Khazali was chosen to lead a network known as Special Groups to other members the Jaysh al Mahdi militia (JAM) and Coalition Forces. But Khazali’s network adopted its own name, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous).
The Sadrists’ political and military decline began in December 2006.
Prior to that time, the Sadr Trend served as an essential faction in the Prime Minister Maliki’s coalition government. This support won them a degree of autonomy from Coalition Forces, as evidenced by the prohibition of Coalition Forces operating in Sadr City.
However, as the Sadr Movement grew in strength and power, it became more unwieldy and began to seriously challenge the efforts of the government. In late 2006, Prime Minister Maliki decided to marginalize the Sadrists and to tackle the problems of Shi’a militias
Part Two
The Sadrist Movement’s remarkable reversal of fortunes from early 2007 to late 2008 stemmed from the deep divide between the political, religious and military factions that were exacerbated by external pressures.
Several important developments during the Surge split Muqtada al-Sadr, other leaders of his movement, and militia groups. The most important changes in the Sadrist Movement occurred as a result of Sadr’s stand-down and departure for Iran in January 2007; the arrest of Qais Khazali in March 2007; the Karbala incident of August 2007; and the Iraqi campaigns in Basra, Sadr City, and Amarah in the spring of 2008.
From January 2007 to mid-2008, Coalition and Iraqi offensive operations not only targeted JAM’s military strength in Baghdad and southern Iraq, but they also empowered political rivals to isolate the Sadrist movement.
There were at least five major divisions within the militia: the ‘Golden JAM’ that sought to purge criminal elements and Iranian influence; the ‘Noble JAM’ that exposed the criminal gangs and favored Coalition assistance; the Kadhimiyah wing which advanced the interests of cleric Hazem al-Araji and his brother Bahaa al-Araji, a Sadrist parliamentarian; Asaib Ahl al-Haq/Special Groups led by Qais Khazali and later, Akram al-Kabi; and the criminal gangs that depended upon the money generated from extortion.
After a series of additional political and military setbacks, it had become evident that Sadr had lost his ability to use the militia to strengthen his political position. Accordingly, Sadr sought to strengthen his control over the movement by enhancing his religious credentials. In late 2007, Sadr announced that he would be pursuing religious studies in Iran with the hope of becoming an ayatollah.
Prompted by security concerns and political calculations, Prime Minister Maliki launched an offensive in Basra against Shi’a militias.
The Sadrists’ rivals in the Iraqi government sought to capitalize on the weakened Sadrist Movement by pushing for legislation that would ban any political party that maintained a militia. This move resulted in a fierce debate among Sadrist leadership between the political, religious and military camps.
The developments in the spring of 2008 demonstrated that Muqtada al-Sadr was unable to control the movement, which was politically isolated, and lacked a capable fighting force.
Sadrist clerical and parliamentary leadership sought to consolidate their fractured movement in the wake of their political and military losses, and embarked on a dramatic restructuring of the movement to improve its image and political prospects in the summer of 2008. Notably, Sadr emphasized a return to the social services model and sought to transition JAM into a non-violent organization.
