The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has been active in the Pakistani tribal region since late 2001, where it reconstituted after sustaining heavy losses fighting alongside the Taliban during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. After years of targeting the Pakistani military and pro-government tribal elders, the IMU is now an increasingly active part of the insurgency in Afghanistan and has recently planned terrorist attacks in Europe. This new strategic orientation—targeting coalition forces in Afghanistan and civilians in Europe instead of the Pakistani security establishment—has made the IMU a much more dangerous organization.

This report will first provide a brief background on the IMU and its movement from Afghanistan to the Pakistani tribal region, as well as its subsequent entrenchment in South Waziristan. It will examine the IMU’s alliances and operations in both South and North Waziristan, and document the splintering and movement of the group, as well as its evolving objectives. Finally, it will discuss the consequences of these changes for security in Afghanistan and in the West.

**INITIAL IMU PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN**

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a terrorist organization founded in 1998. Its original goal was the overthrow of Uzbek President Islam Karimov and the creation of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. The IMU first appeared in Afghanistan in late 1999. Toher Yuldashev, one of the two original founders of the IMU and the group’s spiritual leader, had met with Taliban officials and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan as early as 1997. While living in Kandahar in 1998, Yuldashev secured the Taliban’s approval to set up a base of operations in Afghanistan. In November 1999, Juma Namangani, the other founding member of the IMU and the group’s military commander, led 600 IMU fighters into Afghanistan from across the border in Tajikistan. In exchange for using Afghanistan as a safe haven from which to launch attacks into Central Asia, the IMU provided militants to the Taliban to fight against Ahmed Shah Massoud and the Northern Alliance. The IMU, which numbered close to two thousand militants, fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance in several battles, including the siege of Taloqan. It was during this time that the IMU came to the attention of the United States government in August 2000, after it kidnapped four American mountain climbers on an expedition in Kyrgyzstan. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. government designated the IMU a terrorist group, noting the IMU’s association with Osama bin Laden.

In exchange for using Afghanistan as a safe haven from which to launch attacks into Central Asia, the IMU provided militants to the Taliban to fight against Ahmed Shah Massoud and the Northern Alliance. The IMU, which numbered close to two thousand militants, fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance in several battles, including the siege of Taloqan. It was during this time that the IMU came to the attention of the United States government in August 2000, after it kidnapped four American mountain climbers on an expedition in Kyrgyzstan. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. government designated the IMU a terrorist group, noting the IMU’s association with Osama bin Laden.

The IMU maintained its alliance with the Taliban after the September 11, 2001 attacks, and suffered heavy casualties fighting the U.S. military in Afghanistan in late 2001. Juma Namangani is reported to have commanded a unit consisting of foreign fighters affiliated with the Taliban at
Kunduz in November 2001. Namangani was killed that same month by a U.S. airstrike in northern Afghanistan. Yuldashev, now the sole leader of the IMU, is believed to have led IMU militants in the fight against the U.S. Army during Operation Anaconda in the Shahikot Valley. U.S. forces found few bodies after the battle, but it is believed that the IMU suffered heavy casualties. Overall, it is unknown how many IMU militants were killed during the invasion, but it is estimated that the fighting reduced their numbers to between 500 and 1,000.

POST 2001: RETREAT INTO SOUTH WAZIRISTAN

In early 2002, Yuldashev led the remaining fighters across the Pakistani border into the South Waziristan Agency, the largest agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). To its north is the North Waziristan Agency, and to the west is Afghanistan’s Paktika province. South Waziristan has a rough topography that has contributed to the isolation and independence of its two main Pashtun tribes, the Ahmadzai Wazirs and the Mehsuds. The Ahmadzai Wazirs are primarily situated in the south, whereas the Mehsud tribe is positioned in the central and northern parts of South Waziristan. Several Wazir clans agreed to host the Uzbek militants under the principles of Pashtunwali, a set of social norms that includes hospitality to guests, known as melmastia. During this time, Yuldashev is reported to have become a popular speaker at local mosques, while many of his Uzbek followers bought land and settled down in farming communities.

Under U.S. pressure, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf targeted the foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan in June 2002, when the Pakistani military launched Operation al Mizan. The objective of this operation was “to kill or capture militants—especially foreign militants—that threatened the Pakistani government. This meant clearing notable portions of South Waziristan of foreign fighters.” On June 22, 2002, eleven Pakistani soldiers and six IMU fighters were killed in a gun battle in Azam Warsak, a village six miles west of Wana. Local tribesmen were reported to have helped more than thirty IMU fighters escape from the firefight. Five days later, Pakistani Army officers made an agreement with a local tribal jirga (council) to inform tribesmen of upcoming operations against al-Qaeda fighters and their affiliates, and to allow the tribesmen to expel the foreign fighters first. Animosity between the local tribesmen and the Pakistani military continued to develop, however, after 2,500 Pakistani soldiers assaulted the village of Baghar, South Waziristan, in October 2003. It was reported that thirty-one Pakistani soldiers, as well as seven foreign fighters, were killed in the firefight, with many more militants escaping.

2002-2004: RECOVERY IN WAZIR SANCTUARIES

Between 2002 and 2004, reports of IMU activity are limited in the open source. The few instances of IMU activity outside of the Pakistani border region occurred in Kyrgyzstan, where the IMU was blamed for two terrorist attacks. In December 2002, an explosion at a market in the Kyrgyz capital city of Bishkek killed seven people. In May 2003, eight people were killed when an exchange booth was bombed in Osh. There were also threats to the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan in 2003, but it appears that the perpetrators were arrested in May 2003 before the attacks could be carried out. There is little indication that these attacks were directed from the IMU central leadership in South Waziristan.

Yet, it was during this time that the IMU became further entrenched in South Waziristan during this time, though it was not particularly active. The IMU was hosted by two clans within the Zalikhel sub-tribe of the Ahmadzai Wazirs, the Yargulkhel and the Kakakhel. The IMU’s initial contact was Nek Mohammad, a young Ahmadzai Wazir of the Yargulkhel clan and a Taliban commander in South Waziristan. Mohammad joined the Taliban in 1993 and had commanded a Taliban rearguard against U.S. forces near Bagram Airbase in 2001. It is possible that Mohammad hosted the IMU as a result of time spent at Kargha, a training camp.
near Kabul known for hosting foreign fighters. While there, he met Saif Rahman Mansour, the deputy commander of the camp; Mansour is also thought to have commanded the Taliban forces in the Shahikot Valley during Operation Anaconda, a battle in which the IMU participated. It is likely that, given Mohammad and Mansour’s previous interaction and the latter’s experience with foreign fighters, Mansour helped connect the IMU with Nek Mohammad when they arrived in Pakistan. Mohammad is reported to have been well-paid by al-Qaeda for hosting the foreign militants in Wana, and as a result rose to a position of prominence within the Yargulkhel clan.

The Kakakhel clan, led by Maulvi Nazir, was also initially involved in protecting the foreign fighters. Maulvi Nazir, better known as Mullah Nazir, was born in 1975 in Afghanistan’s Paktika province and was educated in the central madrassa in Wana. He joined the Taliban in 1996 and fought in at least eight different battles against the Northern Alliance before returning to South Waziristan in 2001. Under Nazir’s leadership, Kakakhel tribe competed with the Yargulkhel for the financial compensation awarded to those hosting the IMU fighters.

In addition to harboring the IMU, Mohammed and Nazir launched attacks against U.S. and Pakistani military forces. Mohammad, assisted by local commanders like Haji Omar, Haji Sharif, and Maulvi Abbas, conducted cross border attacks on U.S. and Afghan units. Nazir had led raids into Afghanistan since late 2001, when he attacked an American base in Machadad and an Afghan unit in Shkin, a village in Paktika province. Both of these commanders also sanctioned attacks on Pakistani military personnel. In response to the Pakistani military operation in 2002, Mullah Nazir stated that he had “no choice other than to direct [his] weapons towards the Pakistani Government,” becoming such a threat that he was high on the Pakistani military’s most wanted list. Similarly, Nek Mohammad gave orders in early 2004 to “treat the Pakistani soldiers as legitimate targets,” following the latter’s military operations in the region.

**KEY PLAYERS**

Juma Namangani – Co-founder and military leader of the IMU until his death in late 2001.

Toher Yuldashev – Co-founder and spiritual leader of the IMU before assuming overall command after Namangani’s death in 2001. Yuldashev lead the IMU into South Waziristan and focused operations on the Pakistani security forces until his death in 2009.

Nek Mohammad – Taliban commander in South Waziristan and member of the Yargulkhel sub-tribe of the Ahmadzai Wazirs. Mohammad was an ally of Yuldashev until the former’s death in 2004.

Mullah Nazir, aka Maulvi Nazir – Taliban sub-commander in South Waziristan and member of the Kakakhel sub-tribe. Nazir initially hosted the IMU before leading a successful military campaign in 2007 to expel them from South Waziristan.


Baitullah Mehsud – Commander of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and a member of the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan. Baitullah hosted the IMU after their expulsion from Wana in 2007 until his death in August 2009.

Hakimullah Mehsud – TTP commander of Bajaur, Orakzai, and Kurram agencies between 2006 and 2009, and a member of the Mehsud tribe. Hakimullah became the overall commander of the TTP after Baitullah’s death in 2009. He continued to host the IMU after Baitullah’s death, appearing in a video with Yuldashev.

Jalaluddin Haqqani – Former mujahedeen commander and patriarchal leader of the Haqqani Network, a prominent insurgent group based in Pakistan’s North Waziristan agency and active in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces of Paktika, Paktia, and Khost.

Sirajuddin Haqqani – Son of Jalaluddin Haqqani and the day-to-day commander of the Haqqani Network. Siraj is believed to be more radical than Jalaluddin and has hosted the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union in Mir Ali, North Waziristan.

Najmiddin Jalolov, aka Ebu Yahay Muhammed Fatih – Co-founder and overall commander of the IJU until his death in September 2009.

Suhayl Buranov – Co-founder and deputy chief of the IJU. Buranov is an explosives expert and likely assumed command of the IJU after Jalolov’s death.
The agreement, however, broke down almost immediately when Nek Mohammad refused to turn over the foreign fighters. Fighting resumed soon after, and Mohammad was killed by a drone strike on the evening of June 17, 2004.48

Nek Mohammad’s death prompted a competition for power in South Waziristan within the Ahmadzai Wazir tribes. Infighting amongst local Taliban commanders led to the creation of a five-person shura (council) that would jointly lead the Taliban in South Waziristan. The Shura, known as the “Wana Five” included Haji Omar, his brother Haji Sharif Khan, Javed Karmazkhel, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Mohammad Abbas.49 This group signed an agreement with the Pakistani government in November 2004 pledging not to harbor any foreign militants in Pakistan.50 despite this agreement, the Yargulkhel, under the leadership of Toher Yuldashev and the IMU.51

The Uzbeks Fall out of Favor

By 2005, the Uzbeks were becoming increasingly unpopular amongst the Ahmadzai Wazir in South Waziristan. The IMU militants represented a financial drain on the tribes of South Waziristan. Upon their arrival in late 2001, the Uzbek fighters, with their families in tow, had either bought or received large properties as gifts from the local tribesmen.52 Many of the properties were turned into successful farms. The local population was divided between those who willingly did business with the Uzbeks and those who resented their success.53 In May 2004, the Pakistani government imposed an economic blockade on Wana to punish the community for shielding the IMU.54 This prevented agricultural products from being sold, and damaged farmers’ incomes. It was also reported that in April 2004, the Uzbek militants were unable to pay their Wazir hosts as much as Arab jihadists were.55

There were several other reasons why the Wazir population turned against the IMU. Battles between the Pakistani military and the IMU were endangering local tribesmen and angering the population. IMU attacks on Pakistani military and government officials prompted retaliatory strikes by the Pakistani military, and local tribesmen...
Nazir’s newfound opposition to the IMU could be linked to his temporary imprisonment by the Pakistani army in 2004. Nazir surrendered to the Pakistani army after the latter had made him a high-priority target. He was released shortly thereafter, seemingly cleared of all charges by the Pakistani government, and was largely absent until 2006. Upon his reemergence, Mullah Nazir consolidated power amongst the Wazir factions opposed to the Uzbeks.

Mullah Nazir likely struck an agreement with the Pakistani government when he was arrested in 2004. The speed with which Nazir was released is unusual considering his stature as a militant commander with a history of successful attacks on the Pakistani military. The Pakistani military identified Nazir as a potential counterbalancing force to the Wazir tribes who provided safe haven to the IMU. Nazir’s clan, the Kakakhel, is the smallest and least influential of the zalikhel sub-tribes of the Ahmadzai Wazirs. He competed with the larger and more powerful Yargulkhel clan for control of the area. The Uzbek presence in South Waziristan divided the Wazir tribe into several factions; Haji Omar and the Yargulkhel fought alongside the IMU against the Pakistani government and pro-government tribal elders, whereas the Darikhel and Kakakhel – led by Mullah Nazir – aligned themselves against the IMU. Nazir’s newfound opposition to the IMU could be linked to his temporary imprisonment by the Pakistani army in 2004. Nazir surrendered to the Pakistani army after the latter had made him a high-priority target. He was released shortly thereafter, seemingly cleared of all charges by the Pakistani government, and was largely absent until 2006. Upon his reemergence, Mullah Nazir consolidated power amongst the Wazir factions opposed to the Uzbeks.

Mullah Nazir likely struck an agreement with the Pakistani government when he was arrested in 2004. The speed with which Nazir was released is unusual considering his stature as a militant commander with a history of successful attacks on the Pakistani military. The Pakistani military identified Nazir as a potential counterbalancing force to the Wazir tribes who provided safe haven to the IMU. Nazir’s clan, the Kakakhel, is the smallest and least influential of the zalikhel sub-tribes of the Ahmadzai Wazirs. He competed with the larger and more powerful Yargulkhel clan for control of the area. The Uzbek presence in South Waziristan divided the Wazir tribe into several factions; Haji Omar and the Yargulkhel fought alongside the IMU against the Pakistani government and pro-government tribal elders, whereas the Darikhel and Kakakhel – led by Mullah Nazir – aligned themselves against the IMU. Nazir’s newfound opposition to the IMU could be linked to his temporary imprisonment by the Pakistani army in 2004. Nazir surrendered to the Pakistani army after the latter had made him a high-priority target. He was released shortly thereafter, seemingly cleared of all charges by the Pakistani government, and was largely absent until 2006. Upon his reemergence, Mullah Nazir consolidated power amongst the Wazir factions opposed to the Uzbeks.
funding and regional influence. This inter-tribal competition for resources could easily have been exploited by the Pakistani military in order to secure a local ally.

In early 2007, Nazir began actively campaigning to expel the IMU from the area. He was aided by the intervention of several militant groups. A high-ranking Taliban jirga traveled to South Waziristan in November 2006 to appoint Mullah Nazir as its regional commander. Additionally, there was a large influx of Pakistani sectarian militant groups, known as the “Punjabi Taliban,” into the region, and these fighters were under Nazir’s command. These militants were reported to be connected to the Pakistani security apparatus, the first indication of Pakistani government support for Nazir’s faction.

Wazir tribesmen, led by Mullah Nazir, attacked the Uzbeks in Sheen Warsak, Azam Warsak, and Kalosha in the first week of April 2007. Nazir’s forces were covertly supplemented by the Pakistani military. Medics, sharpshooters, and strategists were embedded within Nazir’s forces, and the Pakistani Army deployed heavy artillery to shell the Uzbek positions. The Pakistani military initially denied assisting Nazir, but Major General Shaukut Sultan, the Army’s Public Relations chief, stated “We did provide support to Mullah Nazir, there was no way around it.” The exact number of Uzbek casualties is unknown, and reports vary between fifty and 250. Nazir’s offensive forced the IMU to flee their sanctuaries in Wana, moving further north to the enclaves of the Mehsud tribe in the central part of South Waziristan, where they were hosted by Baitullah Mehsud, the head of the Pakistani Taliban in South Waziristan.

**Alliance with the TTP and Operation Rah-e Nijat**

After its 2007 expulsion from Wana, South Waziristan, the IMU aligned itself with Baitullah Mehsud and the Pakistani Taliban, known as the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). It is difficult to state with certainty what the IMU did during their time with Baitullah, though they likely fought alongside the TTP. Between late 2007 and mid 2009, there were several terrorist attacks and conventional raids by the TTP on Pakistani security forces and civilians. Yet, Uzbek fighters were rarely featured in reports of these engagements. There are isolated reports that the IMU carried out a suicide bombing on April 4, 2009 in Miram Shah, killing one Pakistani soldier and seven civilians. Uzbek militants were also believed to have been among the twenty-five militants killed near Ladha, South Waziristan, in a drone strike in February 2009.

The TTP attacks prompted the Pakistani army to announce a military incursion into South Waziristan in June 2009, an operation known as Rah-e Nijat (Path to Salvation). Despite the summer announcement, the operation was not launched until October 2009. In the interim, drone strikes killed both Baitullah Mehsud and Toher Yuldashev. Mehsud was killed on August 5, 2009 in Zangra, a village fifteen kilometers northeast of Ladha, South Waziristan. He was staying at his father-in-law’s house when a Predator drone strike killed him and his second wife. Yuldashev was killed by a drone strike on August 27, 2009, in Tapar Ghai, a village in the mountainous Kaniguram district of South Waziristan. He is said to have been wounded in the attack, and died later.

The Pakistani Army finally began the operation on October 17, 2009. A key objective of Operation Rah-e Nijat was targeting the foreign fighters in the area, especially the IMU. 28,000 Pakistani soldiers attacked militant positions in strongholds at Spinkai Raghzai, Makin, Ladha, and Sara Rogha. Total insurgent forces were estimated at 10,000, including 1,000-1,500 Uzbeks. IMU fighters were entrenched in well-defended bunkers in the towns of Sherwangai, Kaniguram, and Karama. News reports preceding the operation described the IMU as the most lethal enemy force, with highly developed combat skills. Though the Pakistani military met “stiff resistance” in initial confrontations with Uzbek forces in Sherwangai, Kaniguram, and Karama, the army captured each town within a few days.

The operation continued throughout November and into early December. All major cities and towns were declared under the control of
government forces by November 8, 2009, though combat continued into late November. The speed with which the Pakistani army cleared this area, the alleged heartland of the TTP and a major stronghold of veteran IMU fighters, implies that the Pakistani Taliban and its affiliates chose to withdraw the majority of its forces rather than fight a pitched battle with the Pakistani Army.

Yuldashev’s Death and New Leadership

The IMU’s inability or unwillingness to stay and fight in South Waziristan in 2009 is linked to the death of Tober Yuldashev in August 2009. While part of the IMU’s strategic focus on the Pakistani military between 2004 and 2009 can be attributed to its alliances with local groups who were hostile to the military, Yuldashev also possessed a personal animosity towards the Pakistani security establishment and thus gravitated towards the TTP (which he stayed with). In December 2009, the IMU released a video in which Yuldashev eulogizes Baitullah Mehsud. The video also shows Yuldashev with Hakimullah Mehsud; they appear to leave a meeting together before walking, hand-in-hand, to a picnic. This video was probably released to refute reports of Yuldashev’s death, demonstrate the ongoing cooperation between the IMU and TTP after Baitullah’s death, and signal Hakimullah’s ascension to the head of the TTP.

After Yuldashev’s death, two men, Abdur Rahman and Usman Jan, vied for leadership of the IMU. In September 2009, someone claiming to be government forces by November 8, 2009, though combat continued into late November. The speed with which the Pakistani army cleared this area, the alleged heartland of the TTP and a major stronghold of veteran IMU fighters, implies that the Pakistani Taliban and its affiliates chose to withdraw the majority of its forces rather than fight a pitched battle with the Pakistani Army.

Yuldashev’s Death and New Leadership

The IMU’s inability or unwillingness to stay and fight in South Waziristan in 2009 is linked to the death of Tober Yuldashev in August 2009. While part of the IMU’s strategic focus on the Pakistani military between 2004 and 2009 can be attributed to its alliances with local groups who were hostile to the military, Yuldashev also possessed a personal animosity towards the Pakistani security establishment and thus gravitated towards the TTP (which he stayed with). In December 2009, the IMU released a video in which Yuldashev eulogizes Baitullah Mehsud. The video also shows Yuldashev with Hakimullah Mehsud; they appear to leave a meeting together before walking, hand-in-hand, to a picnic. This video was probably released to refute reports of Yuldashev’s death, demonstrate the ongoing cooperation between the IMU and TTP after Baitullah’s death, and signal Hakimullah’s ascension to the head of the TTP.

After Yuldashev’s death in August 2009, the IMU relocated to Haqqani Network strongholds in North Waziristan. The IMU were implicated in several attacks on Pakistani targets after Yuldashev’s death, though the group’s visibility in the area dropped considerably. It is possible that the Haqqanis, a deadly insurgent group with close ties to al-Qaeda, directed the IMU to lay low with respect to the Pakistani military. The Haqqanis have long been suspected of having links to the Pakistani security and intelligence establishments, and high profile IMU attacks on Pakistani targets would threaten this relationship.

After Yuldashev’s death, two men, Abdur Rahman and Usman Jan, vied for leadership of the IMU. In September 2009, someone claiming to be
Yuldashev’s former bodyguard called into an Uzbek radio station and stated that Abdur Rahman had replaced Yuldashev. Rahman, an ethnic Tartar, has been described as the group’s spokesman as well as the leader of an internal faction. Other reports indicate that Usman Jan, an Uzbek member of the IMU, became the group’s commander.

On August 17, 2010, an announcement on the IMU’s website stated that Usman Odil had replaced Yuldashev as the leader of the IMU. It is possible that Usman Jan and Usman Odil are the same person; it is common for the names of militants in this region to have several variations, and the name “Jan” is sometimes used locally as an honorific. Odil, in several audio statements, confirmed Yuldashev’s death and discusses the ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan, describing it as “a type of disgusting plot orchestrated by infidel governments against Muslims. And the victims are again ordinary Muslims -- women, old people, and children. May Allah give the Muslims a way to make the right conclusions and take the path of jihad.” The discussion of events in the Central Asian Republics during Odil’s inaugural public statements is consistent with the larger trend towards internationalization exhibited by the Uzbek terrorist groups.


Since 2007, Uzbek militant groups have demonstrated an increasingly international focus in their operations and movement. The IMU shifted away from targeting Pakistani security forces. They did not strongly defend territory in the border region against Pakistani military offensives as they had before, and they became much more active in northern Afghanistan. They were also directly implicated in an al-Qaeda plot to launch terrorist attacks in Germany in 2010. Even before then, a splinter group, known as the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), was implicated in a 2007 attempt to bomb the U.S Air Force base in Ramstein, Germany, and attacked International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan. Both the IMU and IJU have forces based in North Waziristan Agency and appear to be hosted by the Haqqani Network.

The IMU in Afghanistan

It is likely that the IMU had moved much of its force into both Afghanistan and North Waziristan prior to Operation Raj-e Nijat in 2009. As early as 2007 and following their expulsion from Wana, IMU fighters appeared in regions of Afghanistan far from the tribal regions. The IMU moved into southern Afghanistan, operating on the border between northern Zabul province and southern Ghazni province. U.S. Army intelligence reports indicate that the IMU moved to Zabul’s northern district of Deh Chopan in the latter half of 2007. Deh Chopan is made up of several mountains that span southern Ghazni, northern Zabul, and north-eastern Kandahar. The IMU continued to be active in the region through 2009. The IMU is also operating in northern Afghanistan, most notably in Kunduz and Takhar provinces. While it is unclear when they first moved to these areas, they are reported to have been active as early as 2008. ISAF press releases documenting operations in Kunduz and Takhar have frequently described insurgent commanders as having links to both the Taliban and the IMU. Northern Afghanistan, given its increasing instability, the relatively small deployment of ISAF forces, and close proximity to the traditional targets of the Central Asian Republics, would be an attractive place to relocate the majority of their forces. The IMU has been targeted in ISAF operations in these provinces throughout the last two and half years, and is one of the more prominent insurgent groups operating in this increasingly dangerous region. These activities will be discussed in greater depth in an upcoming ISW report examining IMU operations in Afghanistan.

The Move to North Waziristan

By late 2009, the majority of Uzbek terrorists had moved out of South Waziristan and into North Waziristan. The IJU had been present in North Waziristan as early as 2006, while the IMU is not reported to have been in the region until 2009. Additionally, both the IMU and the IJU were
increasingly associated with transnational militant and terrorist groups that attacked ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces in Afghanistan, as well as targets in Europe. In particular, the IMU and the IJU closely cooperated with the Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda.

Entrenchment in North Waziristan has had serious implications for security both in the region and abroad. Since arriving in North Waziristan, the IMU and IJU have both attempted to execute terrorist attacks in Europe, launched either on their own initiative or at the behest of al-Qaeda. Partnership with the Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda has increased the capabilities of all these groups, individually and collectively, to attack ISAF and ANSF forces in Afghanistan, as well as targets in Europe. Before discussing these operations, it is necessary to briefly discuss the IJU’s background.

The Splintering of the IMU: the Islamic Jihad Union

The circumstances surrounding the IJU’s creation are unclear, and there is a lack of reliable literature on their early activities. The IJU was created between 2002 and 2005, probably due to a strategic divergence within the IMU over whether to focus operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or instead to expand operations beyond the immediate region, including targeting President Karimov’s government in Uzbekistan. There is evidence of such a split in South Waziristan between 2004 and 2007: Wazir tribesmen perceived the Uzbeks as either “good Uzbeks,” who were focused on fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan and the Uzbek government in Uzbekistan, and “bad Uzbeks,” who targeted the Pakistani military. It is possible that the “good Uzbeks” represented militants belonging to the Islamic Jihad Union, while the “bad Uzbeks” referred to the IMU under the leadership of Toher Yuldashev.

The IJU is believed to have been founded by Najmiddin Kamolitudinovich Jalolov and Suhayl Fatilloevich Buranov. Jalolov, a former member of the IMU, is said to be the spiritual and strategic leader while Buranov is the IJU’s deputy chief and an explosives expert. The IJU’s first major operations occurred in Uzbekistan between March and July 2004. The attacks in late March targeted a bazaar and several police checkpoints, killing forty-seven people, thirty-three of which were the terrorists themselves. The July attacks featured attempted suicide bombings at the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Tashkent, as well as the Uzbekistani Prosecutor General’s office. Both Jalolov and Buranov were named as the organizers of these attacks by IJU members standing trial in Uzbekistan in July 2004.

The United States cited these attacks in the press release designating the IJU (referred to then as the Islamic Jihad Group, or IJG) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in May 2005. This declaration attributed the 2004 attacks in Uzbekistan to the IJU. The United Kingdom made a similar designation shortly thereafter, adding the IJU to their list of Proscribed Terrorist Groups. Since then, Jalolov was killed near Mir Ali, North Waziristan by a drone strike on September 14, 2009. It is not known who has assumed leadership, though it is probably Buranov.

IJU Operations in North Waziristan

The IJU has operated out of Mir Ali in North Waziristan since 2006, using the town as a base from which to launch terrorist attacks abroad as well as cross-border raids into Afghanistan. Mir Ali is one of the four major towns in North Waziristan, populated by members of the Pashtun Daur tribe. Mir Ali has long been within the Haqqani Network’s sphere of influence. The Haqqani Network is an insurgent group with established ties to al-Qaeda, the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Pakistan’s Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI). It was created by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a well-known mujahedeen commander who fought the Soviet Army during the 1980s. The organization’s day-to-day operations are run by Jalaluddin’s son, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The Haqqani Network conducts cross border raids on the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) from its bases in Mir Ali and Miram Shah – the capital of North Waziristan – into Afghanistan in the border provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and...
The Haqqani Network has been linked to a number of terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

The Haqqani Network is often described as one of the most dangerous insurgent groups in Afghanistan, one that is strongly opposed to peaceful integration into the Afghan government. Additionally, unlike the Pakistani Taliban, they have studiously avoided drawing the ire of the Pakistani government. Consequently, the Pakistani government is less inclined to target the Haqqani Network and the organizations affiliated with it. This has made insurgent and terrorist groups who partner with the Haqqanis much more dangerous, as they are able to operate out of Pakistan with relative impunity.

The IJU’s most prominent operation is closely tied to North Waziristan. The IJU was largely unknown until 2007, when it gained international notoriety after a high profile terrorist plot in Germany was thwarted. In September of that year, German police arrested four men for their roles in an attempted bombing of the U.S. Air Force base in Ramstein. Fritz Gelowicz and Daniel Schneider were German citizens and converts to Islam, and Adem Yilmaz and Attila Selek were of Turkish descent. These men, known as the Sauerland Cell, had planned to detonate several car bombs simultaneously using a total of 730 kilograms of hydrogen peroxide, a chemical that is explosive at highly concentrated levels. German authorities determined that these men had attended an IJU training camp in Mir Ali as early as March 2006.

The IJU was also active in Afghanistan in 2008 and 2009, partnering with the Haqqani Network to launch small cross-border raids on ISAF forces in the provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost. In their most notable attack, Cuneyt Ciftci, a Turkish national who had grown up in Germany, detonated a truck loaded with fertilizer in the Sabari district center in Khost Province on March 3, 2008, killing two U.S. soldiers as well as two Afghans. Ciftci is believed to be Germany’s first suicide bomber. Ciftci was born in Freising, Germany, the son of two Turkish immigrants who are among the two million Turkish expatriates living in Germany. He is thought to have become radicalized while attending a mosque that was under surveillance by German authorities.

Another Sauerland cell member, Adem Yilmaz, facilitated his travel to the IJU training camp in Mir Ali, North Waziristan. Ciftci’s picture was also seen in an al-Qaeda video released in August 2010. In the video, al-Qaeda second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, encourages Turks to undertake jihad and Ciftci’s picture appears alongside other Turkish terrorists.

Eric Breininger, a German convert to Islam who was also associated with the Sauerland Cell, was also implicated in attacks on ISAF and ANSF forces. In May 2008, the IJU released a video of Breininger stating that Germany was a target for jihadist groups because of its support for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Breininger was born in Neuenkirchen and was recruited by Sauerland Cell member Daniel Schneider. Schneider encouraged Breininger to leave Germany in the summer of 2007 because he feared that the Sauerland cell’s activities would implicate Breininger. Breininger left Germany in November for Egypt to visit a radical Islamic cleric with ties to Germany, and he eventually arrived in Mir Ali in early December 2007.

Breininger was trained in heavy weaponry and allegedly participated in raids on ISAF forces, though his greatest contribution seemed to be as a propaganda tool. Breininger released several videos during his time in Afghanistan that discussed his own activities in Afghanistan. Breininger’s final video was released in April 2010, where he claimed that he had led a new group known as the German Taliban Mujahedeen. He is reported to have written in his memoirs that German members of the IJU created their own group within the Taliban hierarchy; Breininger states that he left the IJU in 2009 and joined this group. His leadership was short lived, as he was killed on April 30, 2010 during a firefight with the Pakistani Army, in Miram Shah or Mir Ali, North Waziristan.
THE IMU IN NORTH WAZIRISTAN: THE EUROPE PLOT

The IMU has also used North Waziristan as a safe haven to plan attacks overseas. As early as March 2009, several German jihadists attended an IMU training camp in the town of Mir Ali. These German IMU recruits were key operatives in an al-Qaeda plot to attack civilian targets in Germany, the first time the IMU has attempted to operate in Europe. It is also significant that the IMU and the IJU are co-located in Mir Ali, though the nature of their relationship is unknown.

The IMU has been implicated in a recent al-Qaeda plot to target government buildings, tourist sites, and transportation infrastructure in a series of terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Germany has received the most international attention, as the German government has maintained a heightened security posture nationwide after recent news reports indicated that members of the suspected terrorist cell remain at large. The plot is closely tied to North Waziristan. The operation’s intended operatives trained at an IMU camp in Mir Ali and were later killed by drone strikes in North Waziristan. Details continue to emerge, but the attack plans called for several small groups of terrorists to target civilians in crowded areas using automatic weapons. The Reichstag, the historic building housing the German Parliament and a major tourist attraction, was a likely target.

The plan was inspired by the November 2008 LeT attacks in Mumbai, India. Nine members of LeT, a terrorist group fighting for Pakistani control of Kashmir, killed 175 people using automatic weapons and grenades. The terrorists launched multiple attacks over two days, operating in small groups that independently assaulted two five-star hotels as well as several other targets.

The plot in Europe was disrupted in October 2010 after several of the suspected perpetrators were captured or killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Despite these reports, the heightened security posture in Germany remained in place. An announcement by German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière on November 17, 2010 indicated that terrorists planned to attack German tourist sites and transportation infrastructure sometime in late November. Since then, major newspapers have reported that terrorists associated with the plot are still at large in Germany and the Pakistani border region. Five German members of the IMU, known as the Hamburg Group, were implicated in the plot after having traveled from Hamburg, Germany to North Waziristan.

In early 2009, five men met at the Taiba Mosque in Hamburg, a well-known meeting point for Muslim extremists. The men traveled to the Afghanistan–Pakistan border region in February and March 2009, and four of them eventually arrived at an IMU training camp in Mir Ali, North Waziristan.

Al-Qaeda, which has sought to conduct Mumbai-style attacks in Europe, was directly involved in the planning and funding of this plot. In early summer of 2010, Osama bin Laden personally issued orders for al-Qaeda-affiliated groups to launch such an attack in Europe. Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist Ilyas Kashmiri is also reported to have met with members of the Hamburg group to discuss the operations. Kashmiri is the leader of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI), an international terrorist group operating primarily in India and Pakistan. He is alleged to have had a major role in planning the 2008 LeT attacks in Mumbai. Kashmiri has also increasingly provided operational support to al-Qaeda, and is described as a top operational commander for al-Qaeda. The plot unraveled in the summer of 2010 when two members of the Hamburg group were arrested, one in the Pakistani city of Bannu and the other in Kabul, Afghanistan. The man arrested in Kabul, Ahmed Sidiqi, is reported to have cooperated with interrogators; the information he revealed was key to the terror plot’s disruption. After his arrest, the Taiba mosque was closed in August 2010 and the two remaining members of the Hamburg group, as well as al-Qaeda-affiliated planners, were killed in drone strikes in North Waziristan in September and October.

It is possible that high ranking al-Qaeda leader Sheikh Fateh al-Misri’s death is also linked to the
disruption of this plot.\textsuperscript{153} Al-Misri, also known as Sheikh Abdul Razziq, was reported to have been al-Qaeda’s chief of operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, having taken over for al-Qaeda third in command Mustafa Abu-Yazid after the latter’s death in May 2010.\textsuperscript{154} Al-Misri was killed in Datta Khel, near Miramshah, North Waziristan on September 25\textsuperscript{th} in a drone strike.\textsuperscript{155} A captured member of the Hamburg group, Rami Maknesi, is reported to have told Pakistani interrogators that al-Misri was the al-Qaeda operational chief of the plot, and that al-Misri had been working with two German brothers, Mouneer and Yaseen Chouka, who have been linked to the IMU.\textsuperscript{156} The Chouka brothers are in their mid-twenties and were born in Bonn, Germany. They are of Moroccan descent and have appeared in propaganda videos in Pakistan as early as August 2009.\textsuperscript{157} Mouneer, AKA Abu Adam, and Yaseen, AKA Abu Ibrahim, have been reported to be leaders of a group of German Islamic fighters in Pakistan. They have appeared in an IMU video lecturing about Islam, and are alleged to have been training between fifteen and forty Germans to conduct attacks in Europe.\textsuperscript{158} They were targeted by a drone on October 4, 2010 in Mir Ali, but survived the strike.\textsuperscript{159}

By early October 2010, all four members of the Hamburg group had been killed or were in the custody of Western security services. Yet, there are credible reports that a second cell remains at large and German officials have retained the heightened security measures. An informant in Pakistan, claiming to be a member of the terrorist group involved in the plot, alerted authorities that several terrorists are still active in Germany and the Pakistani tribal regions.\textsuperscript{160}

**CONCLUSION**

The IMU has evolved from being an organization focused on targeting President Karimov’s administration in Uzbekistan to a multi-faceted terrorist group with broader objectives and increased capability to fight coalition forces in Afghanistan and launch terrorist attacks in Europe. The IMU’s strategic shift over the last several years has made it a bigger threat to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, as well as to the European allies of the United States. The IMU and the IJU’s increased association with the Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda are the greatest causes for concern. The Haqqani Network’s ability to project force beyond North Waziristan into eastern Afghanistan has made them one of the most dangerous insurgent groups in Afghanistan, and partnership with international terrorist groups can only increase its capabilities. Additionally, the unwillingness of the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments to treat the Haqqanis as an enemy group has created a safe haven for terrorist groups aligned with the Haqqani Network. Likewise, the IMU’s growing relationship with al-Qaeda, as evidenced by the latter’s role in planning the Europe attacks, is also troubling. If left unchecked, this has grave implications for the security of U.S. allies at home. Policymakers and military leaders must make it a priority to eliminate these groups while they are co-located in North Waziristan.
NOTES

7 “Kidnapped mountain climbers recount dramatic escape” AP, August 26, 2000.
9 It is possible that Namangani was the commander of the 3,000 Arab, Pakistani, Chechen, and Chinese militants who fought alongside another 9,000 Taliban in Kunduz. He has also been described as the commander of “Brigade 21,” the Taliban’s foreign fighter unit.
11 There are contradictory reports of Namangani’s death. In December into Chaos, Ahmed Rashid reports that Namangani was killed November 26 at Cheshmai Shefa, Mazar-e-Sharif. However, multiple accounts place the location of Namangani’s death at Kunduz. The Kunduz location would make more sense, seeing as foreign fighters (including Uzbeks) were present in great numbers during the Coalition’s siege of Kunduz in November. By this time fighting had been over at Mazar-e-Sharif for about a month.
13 Naylor, Sean. *Not a Good Day to Die*, 2005
14 “Tribe: Ahmadzai Warsirs.” Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Naval Post-Graduate School
15 “Mansud Tribal Dynamics.” Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Naval Post-Graduate School
16 Yuldashev is described as having been in Sheen Warsak, a village near South Waziristan’s summer administrative headquarters of Wana.
18 Seth Jones and Christina Fair. “Counterinsurgency in Pakistan” Rand Corporation.
19 There are conflicting accounts as to whether a particular engagement in late July of 2002 was an al-Qaeda ambush that precipitated Operation al Mizar, or the opening assault in the Pakistani operation. A 2004 article in the Asia Times by Saleem Shahzad “Unlearned Lessons from North Waziristan” states that the Pakistani military attacked al-Qaeda on June 22, 2002. Shahzad writes that the ensuing gunfire resulted in the deaths of 6 Uzbeks and Chechen fighters, as well as 11 Pakistani military personnel, and that more than 50 Uzbeks escaped with the help of local tribesmen. Claudio Franco’s account of this operation in his essay “The Tehrick-e Taliban Pakistan” seems to support this account. Franco writes that the Pakistani army “went in to hunt down the foreigners” during the first Azam Warsak operation launched June 22, 2002, noting that tribesmen aided in the escape of three dozen Uzbeks. This telling also implies that this engagement was the result of a Pakistani military offensive. However, in the Rand Corporation essay “Counterinsurgency in Pakistan” by Seth Jones and Christina Fair, this engagement is described as “In June 2002, for example, al Qaeda militants conducted a lethal attack on the Pakistani Army in Azam Warsak, near Wana in South Waziristan, killing nearly a dozen Pakistani soldiers.” As the Pakistani military casualties and the timeframe are very similar, it is safe to assume that Jones and Fair are describing the same engagement as Shahzad and Franco. However, this description states that the operation began as a result of an al-Qaeda attack on Pakistani military, not as an independently conceived operation on the part of the Pakistani army.


Imtiaz Gul writes that the IMU fighters were in the home of Noorul Islam, a Yargulkhel Wazir and a close allies of Nek Mohammad, and that Kalasha was under the control of Nek Mohammad, Mohammed Sharif, Maulvi Abbas, Maulvi Abdul Aziz, and Noorul Islam. Seth Jones and Christine Fair confirm this account, stating the Frontier Corps had surrounded three buildings that belonged to Nek Mohammad, Haji Mohammed Sharif and Noor-ul-Islam.


The exact number of casualties is not clear; Rand's report "Counterinsurgency in Pakistan" states that 14 members of the Frontier Corps were killed and 14 had been taken hostage with at least a dozen vehicle destroyed. Imtiaz Gul writes that the Pakistani military claimed it suffered 46 deaths in the battle, but notes that other sources put the casualties closer to 80. Gul also states that "scores of vehicles belonging to the [Waziristan] Scouts" were destroyed in the firefight.


The financial component of the deal struck by General Hussein is documented by both a PBS Frontline presentation as well as a Press Trust of India article. The debt to al-Qaeda appears to originate from money loaned by al Qaeda to the Wazir tribesmen, though it is unknown what the money was used for.


"FATA Timeline: Year 2004" South Asia Terrorism Portal.


Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, 2009


There are different reports as to the name and circumstances of the murdered al-Qaeda financier. He is referred to as Saiful Asad by Roggio and Raman, however Raman's article also mentions Asadullah. Liebl also refers to the militant as Asadullah. Most reports also indicate that the al-Qaeda financier in question was killed on the 26th, however Raman states he was killed on the 19th.


"Tribal Elders Killed in Pakistan." South Asia Terrorism Portal.


Walsh, Declan. "Toll hits 250 as Pakistani Tribesmen fight to Expel Foreign militants." Guardian (UK) April 5, 2007


Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, 2009

Baithullah creates the TTP in December 2007, but the IMU appears to have sought shelter with him shortly after their expulsion from Wana in mid-2007.


71 In 2007, Baitullah’s forces captured 240 Pakistani soldiers and he is accused of planning to assassinate former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December. In 2008, the TTP fought the Pakistani military during the latter’s Operation Zaralal, a January offensive geared towards killing or capturing major Mehsud targets. In 2009, Baitullah’s forces raided the Manawan police academy in Lahore, killing 8 policemen.

72 There were also suicide bombings by the TTP in Torkham, Swat, and Islamabad, and a car bombing in Peshawar. The most high profile attack was on the Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi in October.


73 Binnie and Wright note that the IMU released a video July 11, 2009 stating claiming responsibility for the bombing, though the link to the website featuring the video is broken.


75 He was in the home of his father-in-law, Ikramuddin Mehsud.


77 There are conflicting accounts of how long Yuldashev survived after the attack, with reports varying between several days and up to a month.


84 Seth Jones and Christina Fair. “Counterinsurgency in Pakistan” Rand Corporation

85 Interestingly, this video was released in December 2009 and has a production date of October, 2009. Baitullah Mehsud was killed on August 7, 2009, and Yuldashev was killed on August 27, 2009. The IMU denied that Yuldashev was killed for some time, not officially acknowledging it until August of 2010. It is likely that this video was made to counter claims that Yuldashev had been killed. The production date of October is probably falsified, an attempt to make it appear that Yuldashev had not been killed.


88 The IMU is reported to have been located in Mir Ali and Miramshah, two major towns in North Waziristan that are firmly in the control of the Haqqani Network.


90 Several attacks on Pakistani targets are said to feature Uzbek fighters: On March 26, 2010, militants storm a Frontier Corps checkpoint at Kalaya, and Major General Tariq Khan states that “Those killed in the fighting were mostly Uzbeks and Arabs.” April 28, 2010 two soldiers are killed, along with three Uzbek fighters and one German, when militants attack a check point in North Waziristan. However, neither the IMU nor the IJU appear to have publicly claimed responsibility. Additionally, several drone strikes are said to have targeted or killed Uzbek: January 17, 2010 a drone strike in Shaktori (South Waziristan) kills five Uzbeks and may have been targeting Usman Jan or Hakimullah Mehsud; June 21, eleven of sixteen militants killed at a government water supply point in Sukhel are said to have been either Arab or Uzbek. Finally, police in Bannu speculated that the IMU was responsible for a suicide bombing that killed nine policemen and wounded eleven, though there did not appear to be strong evidence of their involvement.


14 Toher Yuldashev is sometimes referred to as Toher Jan. In his book The Most Dangerous Place, Imtiaz Gul writes that “Tahir Yuldashov, or Tahir Jan, as he was known locally…” Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, 2009.

15 Captain Feitt is a Military Intelligence officer who deployed to Afghanistan in 2009 with the 3rd Special Forces Group. Captain Andrew Feitt. “Countering the IMU in Afghanistan.” Small Wars Journal, March 11, 2010.

16 Captain Feitt is a Military Intelligence officer who deployed to Afghanistan in 2009 with the 3rd Special Forces Group. Captain Andrew Feitt. “Countering the IMU in Afghanistan.” Small Wars Journal, March 11, 2010.


20 Jalolov states in an interview in 2007 that the IJU was created in 2002, a date that is widely used to mark the IJU’s establishment. However, there are no accounts of any IJU activity until the 2004 attacks in Uzbekistan. The IJU is not known to have a base until 2006, when German members of the IJU attend a training camp in Mir Ali, North Waziristan. “Islamic Jihad Union: ‘A Chat with Commander Ebu Yahya Muhammed Fatih.’” NEFA Foundation, May 31, 2007: Jeremy Binnie and Joanna Wright. “The Evolving Role of Uzbek-Led Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” CTC Sentinel, August 2009.


24 There is speculation that these early attacks were not perpetrated by a single group associated directly with the IJU. A recent report by CSIS criticizes the only definitive account, that of Ronald Sandee, of IJU involvement in these attacks. Multiple, and previously unknown, groups claimed responsibility for the attacks, and some Western officials in Uzbekistan expressed doubt that a foreign terrorist group were responsible. Former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, has stated that evidence of the IJU’s participation in the operation is “extremely tenuous and if it does is almost certainly the fruit of an Uzbek agent provocateur operation.” He also states that, based on his examination of the attack’s aftermath, it was unlikely that a suicide bombing had occurred, as was claimed by the Uzbek government.


26 “Islamic Jihad Union, National Counter Terrorism Center.”


30 “Proscribed Terrorist Groups” UK Home Office


33 For more information, read ISW’s report entitled, “The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan.”


35 For more information, read ISW’s report entitled, “The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan.”


37 There were several additional arrests in Germany that were related to the Sauerland Cell. On September 18, Omid Shirkhani, a German citizen of Afghan descent, and Huseyin Ozgun, a Turkish citizen, were arrested in connection with the Sauerland Cell and for supporting the IJU. Ozgun is suspected of having acquired equipment for the IJU’s use, including night vision goggles. Additionally Burhan Yilmaz, the brother of Adem Yilmaz, was arrested on October 22, 2008 on suspicion of sending equipment and money to the IJU.


39 A fifth German, Dana Boluri, was also implicated as an accomplice in the plot.


41 Detonators shipped from Turkey would have produced three separate bombs, each containing roughly 250 kilograms of hydrogen peroxide, an explosive force equivalent to 500 kilograms of TNT.

42 Yassin Musharbash and Matthias Gebauer. “Islamic Jihad Union Threatens Attacks Outside Germany.” Der Spiegel, September 12,


"Coalition, Afghan Troops Kill 17 Terrorists, Capture to Heat."


"Five civilians killed in Khost; US forces rebut." Pajhwok Afghan News, April 9, 2009.


Boyes, Roger. "Bavarian Cueneyt Ciftci is Germany's first suicide bomber." The Times (UK), March 18, 2008

Boyes, Roger. "Bavarian Cueneyt Ciftci is Germany's first suicide bomber." The Times (UK), March 18, 2008


The Press release by the IJU announcing Breininger's death states that he was killed in a vehicle in the Miramshah-Mirali area.


"The Spiegel reported that an terrorist informant in Pakistan alerted German authorities that the Reichstag would be targeted. Security around the building was substantially increased in mid November 2010.


Both Der Spiegel and the New York Times reported that the informant stated that terrorists staged in the Pakistan border region, and others remained at large in Germany.


The men were Naam Meziche, Assadullah Mushlih, Ahmad Sidiqi, Shahab Dashi, and Rami Makenesi (possibly spelled Mackenzie). Naam Meziche was a French citizen of Algerian descent in his late thirties who appeared to be the ringleader, persuading the rest of the group to travel to Pakistan for jihadist training. Meziche was known to German authorities, having been linked to the 9/11 plotters. Assadullah Mushlih seems to have been the group’s coordinator for travel to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. He was born in Kabul and left for Germany in the late 1970s, having been granted political asylum. He is alleged to have traveled extensively between Hamburg and Pakistan, and probably developed contacts that led to the group’s entry into terrorist training camps. Ahmad Sidiqi was originally born in Afghanistan, having moved with his family to Kabul to Germany in the mid 1990’s. Shahab Dashi was in his late twenties and originally from Iran. Rami Makenesi was born in Frankfurt and was the youngest member of the group, having recently moved from Frankfurt to Hamburg to be with his wife.


Assadullah Mushlih disappeared shortly after his arrival in Pakistan and was not heard from again.


Sidiqi also claims to have met with Sheikh Younis al-Mauritaniani, who is alleged to be a spiritual leader in al-Qaeda. This meeting occurred in Mir Ali, where Younis told him that attacks had been planned for France, as well as Germany and Britain. While Sidiqi described him as the highest ranking member of al-Qaeda, this is unlikely to be true. Little is known about al-Mauritaniani, and multiple news reports refer to Mustafa Abu-Yazid as al-Qaeda’s third in command during this time until his death in May of 2010. Said Bahaji, former roommate of Mohammad Atta and currently wanted by Interpol on terrorism charges, is reported to have met with...
Sididi, Dashti, and Meziche in May or June 2010 in Mir Ali. Bahaji's passport was found by the Pakistani army while clearing Sherwanga in October 2009. Bahaji, a German citizen of Moroccan descent, had shared an apartment in Hamburg with Ramzi Binalshibh before disappearing on September 11, 2001. He was reported to have fled to Karachi before traveling to Pakistan's border region. Bahaji was also an associate of Ramzi Binalshibh, who is alleged to have been an al-Qaeda operative who acted both as a link between 9/11 master plotter Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Mohammad Atta as well as an al-Qaeda spokesman in Afghanistan. Binalshibh was later captured and is currently being held at Guantanamo Bay.


145 An unnamed U.S. government official told National Public Radio, "We know that Osama bin Laden issued the directive." Bin Laden is said to have issued the orders through a courier system, and to have funded the operation.


146 Sidiqi met with Kashmiri at some point in Pakistan, where Kashmiri told him there were already small teams in Germany, and Britain preparing to conduct an attack similar to those in Kashmiri's September 28, 2010. Khan, SH. "Afghan-Pakistan al-Qaeda chief killed by US drone." Agence France Presse, September 28, 2010: Crilly, Rob. "Al-Qaeda Pakistan operations director killed in drone attack." The Telegraph, September 28, 2010: Pakistan Al-Qaeda chief killed by US drone." Dawn, September 28, 2010. 

147 He was named by the US government as specially designated global terrorist in August 2010 due to both his leadership of HUJI and his association with al-Qaeda. Kashmiri came to the attention of US authorities for his role as the handler of David Headley, a Pakistani-American thought to have had a major role in planning the Mumbai attacks.


149 Former White House Director of Homeland Security described Kashmiri as "clearly in the tradition of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, he is the heir to the position of global operational commander for al-Qaeda." Former CIA officer and Brookings Institute scholar Bruce Riedel said: "He certainly has to be regarded today as one of the top operational commanders of al-Qaeda. Because of his connections in Pakistan, he brings capabilities that probably no one else has. Paramilitary experience, connections to the Pakistani army and the Pakistani intelligence service, he knows where the bodies are." He is alleged to have helped plan several high profile attacks, including an assassination attempt on Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in 2003, a plot to attack the Copenhagen newspaper Jyllands-Posten for their depiction of the Prophet Mohammad in a comic, and the Mumbai attacks in 2008.


150 June 21, 2010, Rami Makanesi was arrested by the Pakistani police when the car he was traveling in was stopped at a checkpoint near the city of Bannu. He was wearing a white burka in an attempt to conceal his identity, but his above average height prompted police to search him. Two Kalashnikov assault rifles were discovered in the car, and he was promptly arrested. Pakistani police speculated that he had traveled from Mir Ali to get medical treatment at a larger hospital for a broken leg. The British newspaper The Guardian reported that German officials stated that Makanesi was trying to reach the German embassy in Islamabad in an attempt to end his involvement in the plot. Makanesi was extradited to Germany in August, where he was held in southern Germany for further investigation, July 2010. Ahmed Sididi was arrested by plain-clothed U.S soldiers in Kabul. It is unknown exactly when or why he had traveled to Kabul, though it is reported that he was approaching the German embassy at the time of his arrest. The Guardian speculates that Sididi, like Makanesi, was trying to leave Afghanistan for Germany in the hopes of ending his involvement in the planned attacks. Sididi was transferred to the U.S. military airbase at Bagram, and is reported to have cooperated extensively with his interrogators.


151 "2010: The year of the drone." Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, New America Foundation

152 "2010: The year of the drone." Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, New America Foundation

153 "2010: The year of the drone." Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, New America Foundation


155 "2010: The year of the drone." Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, New America Foundation

156 Although Amir Mir’s article discussing Ramzi’s confession appears to be the only such account, Ramzi’s role in giving authorities information as to the whereabouts of German fighters in Waziristan is corroborated in Issan Ahmed’s piece in the Christian Science Monitor.


157 “Anti-German jihadist videos flood internet.” The Local (Germany), August 21, 2009
http://www.thelocal.de/national/20090821-21441.html

158 Rising, David. “German Militants Training in Pakistani Border Area.” AP, October 7, 2010
