BEST PRACTICES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
Lieutenant General James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.)

BUILDING SECURITY FORCES AND MINISTERIAL CAPACITY:
IRAQ AS A PRIMER

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REPORT 1
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant General James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.), a Senior Fellow at ISW, currently conducts research, writes, and briefs on behalf of the Institute. His areas of focus include the ways to improve U.S. and allied training of indigenous security forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere; counterinsurgency doctrine; and changes in the nature, conduct, and understanding of war.

LTG Dubik commanded Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) from June 10, 2007 until July/August 2008. During this final command, he oversaw the accelerated generation and training of the Iraqi Security Forces. Previously, he was the Commanding General of I Corps at Ft. Lewis, the Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division, and the Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. As the DCG for Transformation, LTG Dubik led the effort to create the Army’s first Stryker Brigade Combat Team and design the training and leader development program for these unique formations. Dubik has held numerous leadership and command positions with airborne, ranger, light and mechanized infantry units around the world. He was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry from Gannon University as a Distinguished Military Graduate in 1971, and he retired from service on September 1, 2008.

He holds a Bachelor’s of Arts degree in Philosophy from Gannon University, a Master’s of Arts degree in Philosophy from Johns Hopkins University and a Master of Military Arts and Sciences Degree from the United States Army Command and General Staff College.

His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, four awards of the Legion of Merit, five awards of the Meritorious Service Medal, and numerous Army Commendation and Achievement Medals. He is ranger, airborne and air assault qualified and holds the expert infantryman’s badge, master parachutist badge as well as the Army Staff Identification Badge.

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The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a private, nonpartisan, not-for-profit institution whose goal is to educate current and future decision makers and thereby enhance the quality of policy debates. The Institute’s work is addressed to government officials and legislators, teachers and students, business executives, professionals, journalists, and all citizens interested in a serious understanding of war and government policy.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
BUILDING SECURITY FORCES AND MINISTERIAL CAPACITY: IRAQ AS A PRIMER | LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES M. DUBIK (U.S. ARMY, RET.) | AUGUST 2009

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... 02

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 04
Re-Defining the Work .......................................................................................................... 05
Organizing Around the Work ............................................................................................. 16
Executing the Program ......................................................................................................... 17
Reflections ............................................................................................................................ 22

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 23

VIGNETTES
The Up-Armored HMMWV Transfer .................................................................................. 06
Spending Iraqi Security Force Funds .................................................................................. 09
Building the Iraqi NCO Corps ............................................................................................ 10
Unit Set Fielding .................................................................................................................. 11
Reforming the Iraqi National Police .................................................................................... 13

CHARTS AND GRAPHS
Figure 1: “It’s About Security” .......................................................................................... 05
Figure 2: “It’s About an Enterprise” .................................................................................. 06
Figure 3: Security Force Assistance .................................................................................. 07
Figure 4: Security Sector Reform ....................................................................................... 07
Figure 5: “The Enterprise” .................................................................................................. 08
Figure 6: “It’s About Sufficiency” ...................................................................................... 09
Figure 7: Balanced Security Forces .................................................................................... 14
Figure 8: The Flat MNSTC-I Structure .............................................................................. 16
Figure 9: The Functional MNSTC-I Structure ................................................................. 16
Figure 10: Foreign Military Sales May 07 - June 08 ......................................................... 20
Figure 11: Enterprise Approach: Results ........................................................................... 21
OVERVIEW

This report discusses how U.S. commanders in Iraq vastly accelerated the growth of the Iraq Security Forces as part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy to supplement the Surge of U.S. forces into the region.

The author, Lieutenant General James Dubik (ret.), who served as the commander of Multi-National Security and Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) from mid-2007 to mid-2008, oversaw a rapid growth in the quantity of Iraqi Security Forces, an improvement of their operational capability due to the partnership and training with the U.S., and a reformation of the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense to help institutionalize the growth of these indigenous security forces. Despite the success in developing security forces during the Iraqi Surge, our current military doctrine does not reflect the lessons learned or best practices used in 2007 – 2008.

Future conflicts will likely arise in failing states and will therefore involve the Army in counterinsurgency (COIN) or stability operations. The conventional forces of the United States Army will have an enduring requirement to build the security forces and security ministries of other countries. This requirement is consequently not an aberration, unique to Iraq and Afghanistan. Planning, training, doctrine, and acquisition must take account of this mission and support it.

KEY FINDINGS

- The responsibility for defeating an insurgency lies with U.S. as well as indigenous forces. Passing on an active insurgency to weak indigenous forces is a failing strategy.
  - Training Commands must actively support the efforts of the overall operational commander. MNSTC-I in 2007 generated Iraqi units to fulfill specific needs identified by Lieutenant General Ray Odierno – then the operational commander in Iraq – as he planned his surge campaign and assigned U.S. and Iraqi forces to tasks.
  - MNSTC-I had a direct effect on helping the Iraqis contribute to the counter-offensive, and thus improve the security situation.
  - The end result would ultimately be the indirect effect we all sought: transition of security responsibility to Iraqi control.
- Increasing indigenous security forces reduces but does not eliminate the need for U.S. forces in counterinsurgency conflicts and in the state-building efforts that follow. Policymakers mistakenly equate developing indigenous security forces with an exit strategy from conflict, arguing that as indigenous troops stand up, American forces can “stand-down.”
- U.S. efforts to build indigenous security forces can and should stimulate state-building as a whole, providing the impetus and resources for the development of ministries, financial systems, budgeting, contracting, legal development, and other necessary functions of state and industry – as they did in Iraq in 2007-2008.
- Building armies and the institutions that support them takes years. Our transition commands consequently tend to focus on executing long-term development plans. Although such plans are necessary, the transition command must provide a series of achievable, short-term tasks upon which the trainers and advisors can focus attention.
- The perceived trade-off between quality and quantity is a false dichotomy. The U.S. needs to develop
indigenous forces that are good enough to fight and defeat specific insurgents in conjunction with U.S. forces. Over time, these forces will have to metamorphose in size and composition ultimately to defend their country against external enemies. These countries will require residual U.S. assets even after the COIN fight, as they acquire these more sophisticated capabilities for national defense. Quantity has a quality of its own.

- Train forces iteratively to increase quality without compromising the availability of forces. Quality standards should be flexible. At first, a minimum standard is good enough, given the enemy and other key factors of the situation. Once a force, or part of it, meets that standard, it can be raised and continually improved—especially as part of a coherent partnership program.
  - U.S. forces fighting on the ground played a vital role in continuing the training of the Iraqi Army and Police forces. That role included the embedded training teams, the Coalition maneuver units—called “partner units”—who fought side-by-side with their Iraqi counterparts, and the contracted civilian police trainer/advisors. The advisors, trainers, and war fighters continuously upgraded Iraqi combat skills, developed their leadership techniques, and improved maintenance and maintenance management procedures.

- Balancing a force between the Army and the Police requires developing each institution at the right time for use at the right stage of the conflict. The relative requirements for Army and Police forces will change over time, as the state develops.
  - Decelerate the growth and fielding of forces that are ill-suited for current or likely future situations on the ground. Police forces – especially beat-cops rather than paramilitary forces – are poorly suited for a COIN mission, as they cannot link to an effective legal system and cannot stand up to enemy forces. Once counter-offensive operations were completed in an area, and sufficient coalition and Iraqi forces were available to hold and build, the construction of police facilities could take place.

- Strong indigenous senior leaders can and must reform broken institutions – when advised, supported, and even criticized by their U.S. partners, who have leverage with them. Security ministries must be strong enough to manage malign or corrupt actors within their ranks through their own internal affairs processes.

CONCLUSIONS

In fragile, failing, or failed states, it may take a generation for an indigenous force to reach a level of self-sustainment, in which case the U.S. must prepare to engage in a long-term cooperative security arrangement with the host nation.

Nations that require security force assistance and security sector reform are likely also to require external funding for these tasks. Foreign contributions are necessary for success and can have a double benefit – by contributing to the growth of state finances as well as security forces.

Organizations with responsibilities like MNSTC-I have to be staffed with leaders experienced in operating large, institutional organizations and staffed with members able to link their tactical, day-to-day actions to strategic effects. The Army must train its officers and its general officers better to meet these management requirements.
The United States has long given technical assistance to the security forces of other nations, particularly as they fought insurgencies or common enemies. This mission, once the domain of U.S. Special Forces or specially-trained advisors has become a core requirement for our conventional forces during the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This mission is not just an evanescent requirement associated with Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather, it is a relatively enduring requirement associated with assisting foreign security forces as well as reforming a nation’s security sector. Further, it will be a requirement should U.S. forces be directed to assist a failing or failed state deemed connected to our national interests.

U.S. military and policy makers must understand the scope and scale of both the assistance and reform aspects of this mission. Moreover, they must understand how to use this mission to strengthen failing states in conflict and to prevent others from falling prey to similar internal conflicts. So far, leaders in and out of uniform usually equate security force assistance with an exit strategy for U.S. forces, perpetuating the theory that as indigenous troops “stand-up,” American forces will “stand-down” and leave the theater of war. This vision of security force assistance is simplistic and misleading.

Assisting foreign security forces cannot be an end-in-itself, for all national security forces depend upon a nation’s security sector—its security related ministries and senior military headquarters—for budgetary, materiel acquisition, training, and other forms of sustaining support. Security force assistance, at least in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, is better understood as a means to improve security and reform a nation’s security sector. My experience as the Commanding General of Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I, pronounced “min-sticky”) from June 2007 to July 2008 provides a case study in how to use security sector assistance to stimulate the reform of a security sector as well as the development of governmental ministries and national defense spending in a failing or fledging state.

The dissolution of Saddam Hussein’s government and military necessitated a fundamental rebuilding of Iraq’s ministries and security forces. Furthermore, the scale and pace of Iraq’s insurgency—in an area of the world critical to US and allied interests—required a larger number of sufficiently-trained indigenous troops much faster than previously envisioned or required.

In June 2007, I assumed command of MNSTC-I. At the time, violence was significant, as was the belief in the United States that we had all but lost in Iraq. I arrived only several months after Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus and their joint counterinsurgency campaign plan was still in draft form. Yet, the arrival of the Crocker/Petraeus leadership team signaled a sharp turn in the approach that the Coalition would take in Iraq. Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I), commanded by then Lieutenant General (LTG) Raymond Odierno, had already begun initial offensive operations conducted mostly by Coalition Force conventional and special operations, but the full counter-offensive “surge” had yet to commence. The Iraqis played an important part in these operations, but at the start it was less than it would become.

My part would be to accelerate the growth of the Iraqi Security Forces in size and in capability to match objectives in the Crocker/Petraeus joint campaign plan and complement Odierno’s counter-offensive. Unity of effort and coherency of action was our common goal. While my predecessors had laid a solid foundation upon which to build, by any measure there was still much to do. One essay cannot hope to capture the complete story of what some have called “the Iraqi Surge,” but this paper presents a description, explanation, and the results of the approach MNSTC-I took during this critical period.
Conceptually, the MNSTC-I challenge had three parts: re-defining the approach to our work in light of the emerging joint campaign plan, organizing around that work, and executing the plan. Of course, all this had to be done simultaneously—and done as the fighting took place. The MNSTC-I team often used the apt analogy of “building an aircraft while in flight.”

**RE-DEFINING THE WORK**

The first conceptual task was to un-learn the ideas guiding our collective action. Three reigning concepts had become part of the conventional wisdom associated with building and developing the Iraqi security forces from the start. That each did not fit the actual facts of our situation in 2007 was not just an academic or theoretical problem. These concepts played out in action because they governed how MNSTC-I perceived and executed its work.

**Security or Transition**. Many believed that fighting the war (providing security) was the job of MNC-I. In contrast MNSTC-I’s role, as the title of our command suggested, was only to transition the training and equipping of the Iraqi Security Forces to Iraqi control. This belief was false. In delivering a sufficient number of sufficiently capable security forces—military and police—at the times and places required by the joint campaign plan, we would contribute directly to security and, thereby, set the conditions for transition. “We’re in the security business,” became part of mantra.

Using this mantra as our guide, MNSTC-I linked itself to battlefield priorities as set by Odierno’s plan and that of the Iraqi Security Ministries and ended its separate campaign plan. We had no separate “MNSTC-I priorities.” We would generate new units and replenish units already formed and fighting when, where, and at the pace the operational commander needed them; we had to expand the output of Iraq’s training bases to do both simultaneously. Additionally, to increase the actual numbers of Iraqi soldiers available to conduct combat operations, we adjusted the Iraqi training output to fill all army units to 120 percent. These adjustments helped the Iraqis significantly. With the expansion of their training capacity and the alignment of unit and replacement output, they would be able to play the larger role in the counter-offensive that they wanted to play.

We took the same approach to equipment fielding and construction. The fielding of M16s, refurbished armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs or Humvees), new communications equipment, and other equipment, as well as the construction of command and control, maintenance, and training facilities—all followed the operational priorities needed to maintain the momentum of the counter-offensive, and thus contribute directly to improving security.

MNSTC-I abandoned its separate campaign plan and wrote instead only “execute orders” derived from the Crocker/Petraeus campaign plan. Further, our execute orders focused on a six-month time horizon to make sure that we were driven by and measured our success by short-term tasks. Our decision to be “in the security business” resulted in all actions within MNSTC-I having a direct effect: helping the Iraqis contribute to the counter-offensive, and thus improve the security situation. The end result would ultimately be the indirect effect we all sought: transition of security responsibility to Iraqi control.
VIGNETTE 1: THE UP-ARMORED HMMWV TRANSFER

In the fall of 2007, LTG Odierno and I started the process of identifying whether transferring some older U.S. Army HM-MWVs to the Iraqi Security Forces made fiscal sense. We both knew it made tactical and strategic sense. The addition of these vehicles would be a huge boost to the Iraq Army and Police capability. After several months of analysis in the Pentagon, the approval finally came. We began the transfer in the spring of 2008. Brigadier General (BG) Jim Yarborough of MNC-I’s Iraqi Assistance Group and BG Robin Swan of MNSTC-I coordinated the military portion of this effort; Major General (MG) Mike Jones and BG Dave Phillips led the effort to assist the police forces of the Ministry of Interior.

This program highlighted the importance of partnership between MNSTC-I and MNC-I; it also highlighted the approach MNSTC-I took in using tactical actions as means to stimulate institutional growth in the Iraqi Joint Staff and Security Ministries.

MNC-I was the source of the vehicles; Corps’ units would turn their old vehicles to MNSTC-I based upon standards agreed upon by BG Yarborough and Colonel (COL) Mark Morrison (the MNSTC-I logistics chief) and the Army Materiel Command (AMC). MNSTC-I and AMC set up a refurbishment center at the Taji National Depot, just outside of Baghdad. Creating and using this center was a means to help the Iraqis develop a vehicle repair capability and a managerial program robust enough to track vehicles through the refurbishment process from arrival to fielding with an Iraqi military or police unit.

The Iraqi Defense and Interior headquarters identified mechanics that would be trained during the refurbishment process and then assigned to a unit with the refurbished vehicles. Further, they had to coordinate for soldiers or police to attend driver training at Taji following refurbishment. Finally, military and interior staffs assembled a group of vehicles, with trained drivers and mechanics, and assigned the set as a replacement package to an Iraqi Division, an Iraqi Special Operations Force, a provincial Iraqi Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, or an Iraqi National Police unit, based upon the battlefield priorities set with MNC-I in coordination with the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

Train and Equip. Conventional wisdom interprets the mission of a command like MNSTC-I as “training and equipping” indigenous security forces. This simplistic understanding could not be farther from reality. “Train and equip” is only a partial description of the tactical aspect of MNSTC-I’s mission.

The actual role of a command like MNSTC-I lies with creating a security enterprise. The mission might be stated as follows: “In conjunction with MNG-I, MNF-I, the US Embassy, the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior, and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, develop and use force generation and force replenishment processes to assist the Iraqis in fielding and replenishing a sufficient number of balanced and sufficiently trained, led, and capable military and police forces and to improve the functioning of the Iraqi Security Sector.” This mission is sometimes called Security Force Assistance, a phrase that captures only part of the task involved. (See Figure 3 on the following page)

The other portion of the task is Security Sector Reform, which is focused on the capacity of security ministries and other related headquarters to function properly in support of a government. (See Figure 4 on the following page) Each of these institutions must perform the ten core functions depicted below, ranging from the recruitment and separation of personnel to the acquisition of weapons systems. These functions are relatively common in almost every nation’s security sector, although history, culture, governmental structure, state of the nation’s economy, level of education and technology, among other factors, shape how these functions are actually executed.
Iraq, like other failing, fragile, or nascent states, lacked the institutions to perform these functions well. Multi-National Force-Iraq and the U.S. Embassy aimed to increase the Iraqi government’s capacity to perform sophisticated tasks. MNSTC-I focused on using the accelerated growth and capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces as means to build institutional proficiency in six functional areas: force management, acquisition, training, resources, sustainment, and development. Thus, we linked tactically important actions with strategically important outcomes.

To ensure that we would facilitate proper organizational learning, we embedded advisor teams in each of these six areas within the ministries and the Joint Headquarters to work with our Iraqi counterparts. We used the force generation and force replenishment processes to stimulate both tactical and strategic responses. At the tactical level, we wanted to create larger, better, and more balanced security forces. At the strategic level, we wanted the ministries and joint headquarters to develop the managerial processes and actions that ensured that forces being generated or replenished (a) fit within a long term force management scheme, (b) had associated equipment plans, including acquisition and budget plans, (c) were able to receive the necessary initial training at the rate required by operational commanders and the demands of the battlefield, (d) would be sustainable over the long term, and (e) had iterative, long-term developmental plans for both equipment and personnel.
We called this approach “Two Bangs for One Buck.” The one buck was the force generation and force replenishment process. The first bang was tactical improvement—Security Force Assistance; the second bang was strategic improvement—Security Sector Reform. This shifted MNSTC-I’s framework from a train and equip approach to an enterprise approach that better described the task required by the Crocker/Petraeus Joint Campaign Plan and in support of MNC-I’s counter-offensive operations.

This was a tall order but one that was necessary for us to help the Iraqis produce not just tactical forces but also the institutional capacity to make these forces self-sufficient. One of the most difficult aspects of this enterprise concerned time, which in this case was not constant; it is relative, not just in the scientific sense, but also in human affairs.

MNSTC-I could not complete its work by a single point in time, nor could we accelerate the rate of developing the security forces evenly. Artificial timelines set by Washington did not recognize the complexity of building foreign security forces or reforming a security sector. We could train and field small units faster than larger ones. We could produce fighting units faster than we could produce logistics units. Junior officers and sergeants could be developed faster than senior officers. And we could grow units faster than we could create a ministry’s administrative or procedural habits. Success in these and other areas required different time horizons and different skill sets.

The security ministries also needed the capacity to plan for out-years. Using the enterprise approach, MNSTC-I was able to extend the planning horizon of both the Interior and Defense Ministries and increase their ability to execute a larger percentage of their budgets each year. Both Ministries also improved their acquisition processes, their managerial ability to track actions to completion, and their Inspector General and Internal Affairs functions. Both ministries better attended to their obligation to develop leaders within their sector,
and both began to focus more on sustainment of their forces. Admittedly, these areas still require much more development before they can be called set habits of organizational behavior. The important point, however, is: each Ministry and the Joint Headquarters improved in each of the six focus areas MNSTC-I and the Iraqi Ministers had identified. Just as tactical actions can and should be linked to strategic effects on the battlefield, the tactical actions of security force assistance—generating and replenishing forces—can and should be linked to strategic effects in the security sector’s institutional capability.

Quality or Quantity: The final false belief of conventional wisdom concerned the supposed choice between “quality or quantity.” The belief was that MNSTC-I had to choose either to produce the numbers of security forces needed or create a quality Iraqi Security Force. Such a discussion had academic appeal, but in practice it was as unhelpful as it was unnecessary. MNSTC-I had wasted a good bit of organizational energy debating this point. We got out of that debate and into reality by adopting the idea of sufficiency.

Our thinking was that the framework of “quality or quantity” set up a futile debate. If we focused too much on quality, we could end up with a high-quality security force but take so long that we would lose the war. Equally possible, if we focused only on quantity, we could produce large numbers of poorly trained security forces that would not be able to win the war.

**VIGNETTE 2: SPENDING IRAQI SECURITY FORCE FUNDS**

In the fall of 2007, the Iraqi Minister of Defense and his Secretary General came to MNSTC-I headquarters to enjoy a great dinner cooked by Sergeant First Class Patrick Casey, and to coordinate with BG Robin Swan and me about the spending of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense’s money and the Iraqi Security Force Fund.

COL C.A. Cruise, the MNSTC-I comptroller whose expertise had won a Department of Defense Award for most improved process, helped the Iraqi Joint Staff prepare a consolidated requirement list of what the Iraq services would need to purchase in 2008. We had completed an extensive discussion with GEN Babakir, the Chief of the Iraqi Joint Staff, several nights before. GEN Babakir revised several items and together with his staff, we amended the charts in preparation for the dinner discussion with Minister of Defense Abdul Qadr.

The charts listed each funding line-item in priority. We drew a line under what the Ministry of Defense could afford with Iraqi money only; we then drew another line further down his list. This line depicted what could be purchased if we coherently combined our spending. We could use the Iraqi Security Force Fund to accelerate the fielding of several units in 2007 and 2008, if the Minister of Defense would commit his funds to the sustainment of those forces. We could also use some of the Iraqi Security Force Funds to field capabilities the Iraqis needed, such as helicopters, if the Ministry of Defense would commit to funding part. This approach was part of the overall MNSTC-I program of using the acceleration of the Iraqi Security Forces as a means to stimulate ministerial capacity.

By mixing our funds together this way, not only did we grow the size and capability of the Iraqi military forces significantly in the 2007–2008 period, but we also helped the Iraqi Joint Staff and Ministry of Defense develop their own capacity to identify requirements, establish priorities, and align funding. We also assisted them in linking the acquisition of equipment with the training necessary to use that equipment and the sustainment required to maintain that equipment. Further, this process helped foster development in other institutional areas like the planning for necessary space at training centers, orders for soldiers to conduct this training, and coordination for life–support at the training centers.
Furthermore, we recognized two other important realities. First, that numbers count in a counterinsurgency, for it is a war of presence. A security force cannot protect the population if it is not there. The Iraqi Security Force—military and police—had to be large enough, therefore, to be have its presence felt by the population. Second, the American way of using high technology capabilities networked throughout the force to offset numbers would not work for the Iraqis. Numbers would have to offset technology in this case—at least for the near future. Our task, therefore, was a practical one: define a sufficient number of sufficiently trained, led, and capable security forces, and then produce those forces.

Using sufficiency as our guide, we first tackled the question of how large the Iraqi Security Forces should be. To answer this, we looked to several independent sources: the Center for Army Analysis, the commanders of Multi-National Corps—Iraq, the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior, and my predecessor, then-LTG Martin Dempsey. We asked each to describe the size of force that required by 2010. Independently, all projections ranged from 600,000 to 650,000 combined military and police operational forces. After coordinating with GEN Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, that range became our goal.

Defining a sufficiently led, trained, and capable force was more difficult. In fact, while each could be considered separately, the MNSTC-I leadership team knew that these were a related set. Working with the

### VIGNETTE 3: BUILDING THE IRAQI NCO CORPS

Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Tommy Williams, the MNSTC-I CSM, led a team of Command Sergeants Major to figure out a way to expand the number of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) in the Iraqi Army, and to use this expansion to stimulate institutional growth in several ways: to help the Iraqi Army Command Sergeant Major standardize the training for Iraqi sergeants, to help the Iraqi Joint Staff develop a way to manage an NCO corps, and to enhance the role of NCOs in the Iraqi Army. It would take a team of CSMs—CSM Marvin Hill of Multi-National Force—Iraq; CSM Neil Ciotola of Multi-National Corps—Iraq; and CSM Adel Hassan Hamad of the Iraqi Army—to make any headway.

One the first things they did was establish a program designed to give the top twenty percent of every graduating class of Iraqi basic training recruits follow-on elementary NCO leadership training. Those who passed became sergeants. While we never achieved a full twenty percent in each class, we did increase the number of NCOs in the Iraqi Army by over 16,000 during the surge period. This sharp increase in NCOs strained the Iraqi personnel managers, who had to produce orders promoting these soldiers to sergeant and increasing their pay. Relatively intense management was necessary at the start, but over time the Iraqi system improved and showed promise that it could take hold.

In addition, the team of CSMs and the senior NCOs from the NATO Training Mission—Iraq helped the Iraqi CSM draft a set of training standards for squad leaders and platoon sergeants. These standards, when added to those used to train sergeants, meant that the Iraqis would have standards for all sergeants who led at the point of battle. Furthermore, it meant that the variety of schools begun by the divisions and brigades of Multi-National Corps—Iraq could slowly be transferred to the Iraqis as part of an NCO education and training system.

MNSTC-I, with the Iraqi Joint Headquarters and Ministry of Defense, built the infrastructure; and the team of CSMs took up task of developing instructors. By the end of 2008, each Iraqi Division had a training center and a cadre of instructors—a mix of MNSTC-I advisors, Iraqi NCOs and Officers, and American contractors. To accentuate the importance of training NCOs, the Iraqi Army CSM put in place a competition for “best NCO trainer and the CSM team hosted NCO conferences and awards ceremonies.

Growing an NCO corps is a multi-generational activity, and it’s unknown how the Iraqi Security Forces will develop their corps. But the groundwork had been set—not just for increasing the numbers of sergeants, but also for growing the sinews of a NCO system.
Iraqi leadership and the operational commanders, we developed five major programs that would advance the set simultaneously.

We first sought to increase the leader content in fielded units. Together with the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, we conducted a recruiting program to attract former officers and sergeants who, after appropriate vetting and retraining, could return to military service or join the police forces.

To address the significant shortfall in police officers, the Ministry of Interior put in place several innovations: shortened courses for former officers or those already with college educations and transition courses for police sergeants with the appropriate length of service and education to become officers. Perhaps most important, the Interior Ministry significantly increased the student body of the Baghdad Police College. Furthermore, he directed the formation of two extension colleges—one each in the northern and southern Iraq—that would be completed by 2010. The Ministry also completed a training program, started under my predecessor, to improve leadership within the Iraqi National Police. Finally, the Ministry asked the Italian Carabinieri to conduct focused leader development training for the National Police, one battalion at a time beginning in October 2007.

The second major program we developed was a unit-set fielding and replacement package approach. In the early fall of 2007, MNSTC-I and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters started to field army brigades as a unit-set. We assisted the Iraqi Joint Staff in identifying a central location for this fielding; publishing standards for unit training; coordinating issuance of all minimum essential combat equipment before training began; and assigning and delivering the unit’s leaders to the training site, also before training began—then sending the unit’s soldiers directly from basic training graduation to the unit training site. MNSTC-I ensured that the unit’s embedded advisors also arrived in time to go through training with their brigade. Training consisted of squad, platoon, and company tactical skills and rudimentary staff training for battalion and brigade

VIGNETTE 4: UNIT SET FIELDING

In the late summer of 2007, BG Robin Swan and COL Al Dochnal of MNSTC-I and BG Jim Yarborough of MNC-I’s Iraqi Assistance Group worked together with the Iraqi Joint Staff and Ministry of Defense to develop a concept to improve the training level, cohesion, and operational capability of the Iraqi Army. This was a jointly-developed concept because of the complexity of execution.

Soldiers would be assigned to a unit following their basic training. That unit would form and train together at Besmaya Military Training Center outside Baghdad. Newly graduated soldiers would meet their chain of command and embedded coalition training team at the training center, receive their minimum essential combat equipment, and undergo a progressive training program as a unit. The Iraqi training staff at Besmaya would coordinate with the Joint Staff to synchronize this effort.

The first couple of rotations in the early fall of 2007 were a bit rough. But over the next several months, the Unit Set Fielding methodology became more and more routine within the Iraqi Joint Staff and Ministry of Defense. Soldiers arrived on time for training, as did the officers and NCOs. The Iraqi Joint Staff logistics section coordinated to have the right equipment delivered and issued on hand receipts. And the training was done according to the standards outlined in the Iraqi Joint Staff training program.

The Iraqi Army units that went through this program were then sent to their battle-space locations and assigned a partner unit from MNC-I. The cohesion and training proficiency achieved in this program allowed Iraqi units to bypass the lowest level of readiness rating, and usually accelerate to Operational Readiness Level 2 (the highest being Level 1). Few achieved Level 1 because units were not fielded with all of the equipment their organization required, but only the minimum essential combat equipment. This decision—made by MNSTC-I and the Iraqi Joint Staff—undertaken in order to create the highest number of sufficiently trained and equipped units with the Iraqi and U.S. resources available.
staffs. The result was a cohesive unit delivered to its battlespace ready to fight.

MNSTC-I took a similar approach with personnel and equipment replacements. Divisional and regional training centers sent personnel replacements in large groups so that soldiers arrived with friends—the result was built-in cohesion. When equipment arrived, it was also fielded as a package. For example, a unit would receive not just a piece of equipment but also a trained operator and maintainer. Equipment, therefore, could translate faster into a capability for units on the ground.

As the security situation improved, we were able to create regional police training centers. These centers allowed a province to train its police as a group to a standard set by the Ministry of Interior’s training directorate.

Such a unit-set fielding and replacement package approach resulted in better trained units with greater cohesion among its soldiers, between soldiers and leaders, and with its embedded training team. It also resulted in more confident Iraqi Security Forces. From the fall of 2007 through the summer of 2008, multiple brigades graduated as unit-sets, all Iraqi Army units received multiple replacement packages in the same period, and local police began training as groups.

The third major program that MNSTC-I implemented was an iterative approach to training. Rather than requiring all individuals and units to be fully trained before they were fielded, MNSTC-I trained them at intervals. We recognized that we needed to place into battle as quickly as possible, individuals, leaders, and units who are sufficiently prepared to fight; then, we could improve them over time. Iterative training took several forms.

With the local police, the Ministry of Interior developed a two-step approach. The first step was a two week pre-basic training course that all new police had to complete before they could assume duties. This pre-basic training was necessary so that the large numbers of new police, thousands of whom came from the Sons of Iraq program and some of whom were former insurgents, could safely assume the security duties assigned to them. Following this pre-basic training, and as training centers and academies came online, all police would be required to complete the full basic police training program mandated by the Ministry of Interior—a process remains ongoing. The Coalition Forces and the Iraqis recognized the risk of this two step approach. Both wanted the full training program completed right from the start, but time and war-fighting requirements led us to conclude otherwise. We deemed the two-step sufficient in this case because the greatest risk in the near-term was failing to generate forces that were “good enough.”

MNSTC-I and the Ministry of Interior also adopted a four-part iterative approach to training the Iraqi National Police: changing leaders at the battalion, brigade, and division levels; taking each brigade offline to a training center for centralized, Ministry of Interior-directed retraining and refitting; rotating one battalion at a time for leader training conducted by the Italian Carabinieri; and developing continuing professionalization programs.

Iterative training for the Iraqi Army also had four components. The first component concerned institutional training: basic training for all soldiers and a basic program for “rejoining” leaders; advanced technical training for specialists prior to joining a unit; and leader training in specific branches like infantry, communications, or intelligence. The second element was squad and platoon combat skills training as well as initial staff training conducted during unit set fielding. The third component involved continued training, which was conducted during and after combat operations. This training was done by the embedded advisors in conjunction with Iraqi commanders. It often used local Iraqi training facilities built by MNSTC-I and staffed by both MNSTC-I and Iraqi trainers. Frequently, this training involved a Coalition unit that was partnered with an Iraqi unit and centered on preparation for a specific combat operation. The fourth and final step was rotational training conducted at centralized training facilities. This training would involve taking battalions out of combat and moving them to central locations where they would undergo advanced individual, unit, staff, and leader training.

The first three components of Iraqi Army iterative training were put in place and executed in 2007 and 2008. The last—rotational training—had been long-
envisioned but only began in June 2008. Called the Warfighter Training Program, or Warrior Training Program, this Iraqi-run, twenty-eight day training improves the fighting and leadership skills from individual soldier through battalion level. So far, seven battalions have completed this program, but all Iraqi Army battalions will ultimately complete it.

This set of programs did increase the level of training of the Iraqi Security Forces enough that they contributed significantly in reducing the level of violence in Iraq. Over time, this kind of iterative approach will continue to improve the fighting capability of the Iraqi Security Forces. No one training program will produce the level of proficiency required. Rather, a set of programs executed consistently over time will continue, incrementally, to improve the proficiency and professionalism of the security forces.

The fourth major MNSTC-I program focused on balancing the military and police forces. Until 2007, the priority for the Iraqi Security Forces had been to field maneuver units, the right priority at the time given that the army and police had to be rebuilt. This meant that creating maneuver units—battalions, brigades, and divisions; local and national police—was job one.
Security forces, whether military or police, are more complex than just their maneuver elements. Headquarters must command and control these maneuver units and determine where and when to place them in combat or training, for example. Combat service support must house troops, supply units, and provide soldiers with medical treatment. The figure below captures that complexity, depicting on top, the seven elements of a balanced military force; on the bottom, the ten elements of a balanced police force.

![Balanced Security Forces Diagram](image)

Figure 7

Work had begun in early 2007 to bring more balance to the Iraqi Security Forces by enhancing their non-maneuver elements, but the security situation did not allow that work to be fully planned, adequately coordinated and resourced, or completely executed. As violence came down in late summer and early fall of 2007, it came time for necessary planning, coordination, resourcing, and execution.

For the military forces, MNSTC-I aimed at improving Iraqi capabilities in intelligence, command and control, sustainment (logistics and maintenance), and aviation. MNSTC-I aggressively developed these areas, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense and Iraqi Joint Headquarters and in keeping with battlefield priorities. Regional operations and intelligence fusion centers were created, equipped, and staffed; command and control digital networks expanded and the initial secure radio networks fielded; work on the national-level maintenance facilities, begun in 2006, was accelerated; army maintenance and logistics units and facilities were fielded; and the Iraq Air Force accelerated its lift capacity, reconnaissance ability, which included live downlinks to Iraqi Army units, and initial air-to-ground fire capability.

To bring more balanced capability to police forces, the Ministry of Interior and MNSTC-I accelerated work in five crucial areas: forensics, internal affairs, facilities, logistics, internal affairs, and leadership. The Iraqi judicial system is a confession-based system in which judges determine guilt through witness statements or admission by the accused. The Government of Iraq wants to develop an evidence-based system in which prosecutions occur by relying upon physical evidence to corroborate personal statements. Such a shift is nothing short of transformational. It requires a forensic capability to be developed within the Ministry of Interior as well as huge changes in the Iraqi judicial system. To do so, regional facilities needed to be built, those who worked in the facilities needed to be trained, and this training needed to cascade throughout the force at the national, provincial, and local levels. This transformation will, of course, take time, but the first steps have been taken.

Key to any professional police force serving a democracy is its internal affairs capability. This gives leadership the ability to hold the police accountable to the law and to standards of professionalism. Internal investigations were an urgent requirement, as the infiltration of militias into the police undermined the official command structure and resulted in the involvement of some police forces in sectarian violence. The Ministry of Interior recognized this. Following the passing of a special legal code for police service and with the help of MNSTC-I, the Ministry of Interior set in motion an internal affairs program so aggressive that the its internal affairs director has been the subject of multiple assassination attempts and the division’s investigators subject to multiple attacks—over a dozen of which were unfortunately successful. The Minister continued to investigate and clean the Ministry’s ranks while recognizing the magnitude of the task before him and the length of time it would take to achieve satisfactory results.

Police facilities—stations, headquarters, and academies—were constantly the object of insurgent attacks. Built and rebuilt over the years, they remained...
deficient. Once counter-offensive operations were completed in an area, and sufficient coalition and Iraqi forces were available to hold and build, the construction of police facilities could take place. This construction was coordinated with the Ministry of Interior as well as the Coalition’s Multi-National Corps – Iraq so that the timing of construction would match the “build phase” of the counter-offensive. Such facilities were a visible symbol that the government’s security forces were there to stay.

Finally, the Ministry of Interior developed, resourced, and executed a plan to expand its ability to produce police officers. This program (explained above) included both new programs to train officer and expansion of the Baghdad Police College.

None of this work to bring balance to the Iraqi Security Forces, military and police, was completed in the 2007-2008 period, but it was accelerated. Some of the work will be completed in 2009, but a good bit will continue into the next two years. Even so, this acceleration helped bring the Iraqi Security Forces not only to a position where they were able to contribute to reducing the levels of violence in 2007 and 2008, but also to a point where Government of Iraq and Iraqi citizens, as well as coalition leadership, were increasingly confident in their ability to perform.

The fifth program that MNSTC-I developed was a taking partnership approach to every activity. All MNSTC-I work was done with three main partners: friendly combat forces, the Iraqi military and civilian security sector, and MNF-I and the US Embassy, Iraq.

The U.S. Army provides a good example of why then-LTG Odiero (and his successor LTG Lloyd Austin) and I considered the partnership between MNSTC-I and MNC-I essential. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) provides institutional training and education for the Army—for example, basic combat training, advanced individual training, specialty training, and officer and Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) training and education. The training provided at TRADOC centers and schools, however, has to be continued by the unit commanders of Forces Command (FORSCOM), whether at home station or even while in combat. The utility and necessity of the partnership between MNSTC-I and MNC-I reflects the shared responsibility between an institutional and operating force inherent in any security force.

The Corps played a vital role in continuing the training of the Iraqi Army and Police forces. That role included the embedded training teams, the Coalition maneuver units—called “partner units”—who fought side-by-side with their Iraqi counterparts, and the contracted civilian police trainer/advisors. The Corps’ training and development included the continuous upgrade of combat skills, development of leadership techniques, and improvement of maintenance and maintenance management procedures. This same kind of institutional-to-field partnership extends to the Iraqi special operations, air, and naval forces. Training and development continues on the job in Iraq just as it does in the United States.

The second partnership, between MNSTC-I and the Iraqi security sector—military and civilian—was to prove as essential as the first. Everyone in MNSTC-I understood that ultimately it was the Government of Iraq’s responsibility for the development of the Iraqi security forces and institutions. We also realized that we would improve the chances of success not by developing a plan internally, and then trying to “sell” that plan to the Iraqis. Rather, our chances of success increased when plans were formulated together. Persuasion and collaboration, not force, accelerated growth and development. To be sure, arguments on both sides were forcefully delivered at times and each side had red lines; equally sure, however, is that recommendations derived from experience in one cultural setting do not always work in another. The dialogue between the advisor and those advised and the relationship of trust that develops from it often resulted in the most practical solution.

The final, often unrecognized, partnership was that between MNSTC-I, and MNF-I, and the US embassy. This partnership derived from the fact that the security sector of a nation is only one part in that nation’s security architecture and governance structure, which, in a democratic state, includes that nation’s civilian leadership.

The work of MNSTC-I, in partnership with MNC-I, to provide coherent advice regarding the training, equipping, and developing of a nation’s security forces and institutions, took place within the context of similar
efforts to improve the processes and institutions of civil governance and economic development that were undertaken by GEN Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, and the ambassadors of our Coalition partners.

The intellectual work described above would normally precede the physical work. The reality of war, however, required simultaneity of thinking and acting. In the summer of 2007, the general and flag officers, senior executive civilians, and senior colonels of MNSTC-I—in collaboration with Coalition and Iraqi partners—shifted our approach dramatically. We focused directly on security; developed a coherent, enterprise approach; and used sufficiency as our guide. In doing so, we contributed to reducing violence and improving the security of the Iraqi population. Simultaneity would also be required to adjust our organization.

For good reasons, MNSTC-I initially evolved into a flat organization. Each subordinate general officer or senior executive reported directly to the Commanding General. Figure 8 depicts this organizational structure below.

Not all flat organizations can execute as fast as is necessary, however. As we sought to accelerate the growth and development of the Iraqi Security Forces, the leadership team of 2007 concluded that the flat organization had too many direct reports to the Commanding General and, as such, slowed our decision and action time. In this organizational structure, we thought the Commanding General would become more “cork” than “conduit” as we accelerated our efforts.

We decided to form six major subordinate functional areas which we believed would allow decisions to be made faster and actions coordinated more completely.
One general officer would lead all activity associated with the Iraqi military—the Ministry of Defense, the Iraqi Joint Force Headquarters, and all services. A second general officer would lead all activity associated with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and police forces. Because unique professional qualifications were necessary to help the Iraqis grow and develop their counter-terrorist/special operations sector and their military and police operational intelligence sectors, each would stay a separate entity. A special operations flag officer led the counter-terrorist/special operations directorate, and a civilian senior executive led the intelligence effort. A general officer also led the security assistance office, new in 2007, that had responsibility for helping the Iraqi Ministries and Joint Headquarters use the US Foreign Military Sales program to acquire equipment. A senior colonel led the functional capability team directorate which contained the functional teams to stimulate the force management, acquisition, training, resources, sustainment, and development functions. These teams, embedded in the Ministries of Defense and Interior and the Iraqi Joint Force Headquarters, supported all the other directorates. We believed that this organization would give MNSTC-I Commanding Generals more flexibility in making whatever adjustments would become necessary to support MNSTC-I’s future role in Iraq.

The organizational discussion within MNSTC-I was a spirited one, for not only did it involve a move from the flatter version but also a reduction in overall size of the organization. All headquarters tend to grow beyond that which is necessary. MNSTC-I was no exception. Although we had no directive to reduce, we reduced our personnel by about ten percent. Additionally, we made our organizational changes based on the assumption that in time MNSTC-I would likely evolve into a security and cooperation office similar to those in other nations with whom the United States has normal diplomatic and security arrangements. So we wanted to make changes that made sense in the near and long-term.

Our final organizational adjustments included transportation and communication. If we wanted to accelerate the growth and development of the Iraqi Security Forces, we would have to ensure that the more than thirty-one locations in which teams of MNSTC-I trainers operated would all work as much in tandem as was humanly possible. So we secured two Blackhawk helicopters for permanent assignment to MNSTC-I. For our leadership to be felt throughout Iraq, we simply had to travel, and the aircraft support provided by MNC-I was essential.

We also upgraded our communications with our outlying training locations. We established an online, distributive, and collaborative network that leaders throughout the organization could use. Groups of leaders, therefore, could share information, identify problems and obstacles, and resolve situations at the speed required by our execution orders. Without this network, we simply would not have been able to grow and develop the Iraqi Security Forces as quickly as we needed.

Our six directorates, two helicopters, and a collaborative network allowed us to organize around the work we had to do. Now all we had to do was execute.

EXECUTING THE PROGRAM

It is simply not possible to adequately describe the difficulty in executing the program. As Clausewitz said, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult….Friction is the only concept that...distinguished real war from war on paper.” We had plenty of friction. To overcome as much friction as possible, we developed two programs: one to focus leadership effort—making sure that MNSTC-I was doing the right things; and a second to focus on management—making sure that we were doing things right.

The Leadership Program. The leadership program was fairly straightforward. The team of leaders in MNSTC-I—myself, other general and flag officers, civilian senior executives, selected colonels, and a few very selected lieutenant colonels and majors—worked together, first to create the vision described in the foregoing sections and then to align our organization around that vision.

To achieve this alignment, we knew that everyone in the organization should understand the “big picture” relative to MNSTC-I’s mission and how he or she fit into
that picture—for this we used the “Two Bangs for One Buck” concept depicted in figure 5. Thus, we could empower not only our subordinate leaders but also every person in the organization to decide and act within our intent. This kind of alignment and empowerment, we thought, would be an accelerant to accomplishing the necessary tasks.

Next, we wanted to lead an organization that would adapt as quickly as conditions changed on the battlefield or in the strategic environment. We had the right vision and direction, but we knew that conditions in war changed rapidly—the enemy’s actions and reactions could not always be predicted, and unforeseen opportunities would arise. We knew that an empowered and encouraged work force would be the kind that could adapt to changes while staying consistent with our overall direction and vision.

Presence and purpose were the final aspects of our leader-team approach. We wanted and needed to be present throughout the organization to make sure we were doing the right things and not dissipating organizational energy. We knew, however, that we could not be present everywhere, but that at least one of the senior leaders could get to every MNSTC-I location with enough frequency to make our leadership felt. So we tracked our movement.

The leadership had enough experience to understand that as we accelerated the growth and development of the Iraqi Security Forces and simultaneously improving ministerial capacity, we would be creating challenges so big that a team of general and flag officers would be needed to address them. We also knew that progress would give rise to new problems. We concluded, therefore, that the team of general and flag officers would work on behalf of our subordinates and seniors to help address the problems that progress would create.

Our leadership program was simple: act as a leader-term; create a vision together; align our organization around that vision; sustain that alignment through constant communications; empower and encourage our work force; know what was going on throughout our organization; and help sweep away the obstacles that our work force encountered. Good management complements good leadership. Developing a management program, therefore, was our next task.

The Management Program. The goal of our management program was to make sure we were executing the tasks we set for ourselves correctly, on time, and within our budget and the law. Our management program had four basic elements: the format for our daily presentations in Multinational Force, Iraq’s daily briefings; a quarterly-reviewed Balanced Scorecard for our four main directorates—defense, interior, counter-terrorism/special operations, and intelligence; a rigorous, externally-audited spending plan for the Congressionally-provided Iraqi Security Force Fund; and a weekly senior leader meeting at which we reviewed our performance.

The Daily Briefs. Almost every senior leader in Iraq began the day by attending or viewing GEN Petraeus’s morning briefings. These were hugely helpful sessions for him and for those of us who worked for him. MNSTC-I had regular input into these sessions to keep GEN Petraeus, his staff, key members of the embassy staff, our coalition partners, and the senior leaders of MNC-I informed as to what we were working on and the problems we were facing.

Using the force generation and force replenishment processes, we reformatted the presentations at the morning update so that every activity was described in terms of its contribution to generating or replenishing the forces needed to execute the counterinsurgency campaign. This was our way to transmit to the entire command that MNSTC-I was in the security business, contributing directly to the fight. This reformatting of power point slides, while seemingly innocuous, was key in recalibrating not only MNSTC-I’s view of itself, but also everyone else’s view of MNSTC-I.

The Balanced Scorecard Review. We published our first six month execute order in late summer and early fall 2007. This order contained specific tasks each of the MNSTC-I directorates were to achieve in the next six months—a period of time long enough to allow forward planning, but short enough to maintain focus and to measure progress. The specificity in this order allowed us to develop a balanced scorecard for defense, interior, counterterrorism/special operations, and intelligence. We then used that scorecard to track progress and identify obstacles to progress when and where they emerged.
We reviewed a portion of each directorate’s scorecard weekly and conducted a full review quarterly. These reviews were attended by all of MNSTC-I’s senior leadership and went a long way to retain organizational alignment. They also made sure that we were all aware of obstacles to progress and requirements to adapt. We could use these reviews to determine if we had to change a task or deadline or if we could eliminate the obstacle identified and stay on track. Furthermore, these reviews were conducted with our Iraqi counterparts to help grow their managerial processes. The Balanced Scorecard approach was not fully embraced by the Iraqi Ministries or Joint Headquarters, but exposure to it did spawn their own version of management reviews.

The Rigorous, Externally-Audited Spending Plan. Management of the Congressionally-provided Iraqi Security Force Fund was the one function over which I retained centralized control. We reviewed execution status at our weekly task reviews. Each month, we had an executive budget meeting where all projects were reviewed by the general and flag officers and civilian senior executives. At this meeting, I expected my subordinate generals, flag officers, or civilian executives to explain each project they suggested, to demonstrate the linkage to our priorities, to present the cost saving measures they had put into place, and to identify the ways in which spending US funds stimulated similar or greater spending by the Iraqi ministries. These were not pro forma meetings. These were decision meetings.

Prior to these monthly executive meetings, the MNSTC-I chief of staff and the resource manager—two outstanding colonels—held a colonel-level review, during which each approved expenditure was subjected to a thorough analysis to ensure it was on track. Any new expenditure was rigorously reviewed to ensure it was linked to accelerating the growth and development of the Iraqi Security Forces and met all of our fiscal management criteria. We also ensured that any expenditure of U.S. money was complemented by an Iraqi expenditure. For example, if we started a project, the Iraqis finished it; or if we accelerated a portion of a unit’s equipment, Iraqi money funded the balance. In this way, we maximized the impact of U.S. funds on our goal of accelerating the growth and capability of the Iraqi Security Forces, while building the resource management and acquisition functions of the Iraqi Ministries and Joint Headquarters to support our security sector reform mission.

Finally, our resource management team conducted monthly reconciliation reviews of all expenditures to ensure that if a project was executed at less than the planned costs, we could document the amount not spent and reprogram that amount back into our fund. The team did so well at this task that in 2006 the Department of Defense awarded MNSTC-I a “Most Improved Process” award for resource management. Our financial management team also invited the Department of Defense Inspector General, the Special Inspector General for Iraq, as well as other auditing agencies to review our program. On average, we had one external audit or inspection every quarter.

The weekly task reviews were vital. During these three-hour weekly sessions each directorate and selected staff elements reviewed what they were supposed to have accomplished that week. For those tasks not accomplished, we discussed why and what the command should do to help or to adjust. Each briefer also presented the tasks to be accomplished in the coming week as well as decisions needed from the senior leader-team in order to stay on track in achieving their assigned tasks.

More often than not, these sessions were painfully detailed, but they served a purpose: they maintained, in conjunction with the other management forums, organizational momentum and alignment.

Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the weekly review concerned the status of Iraq’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, by which Iraq purchased military equipment from the United States. Far too complex to fully explain here, FMS is worth mentioning. The Iraqi Ministries had invested over a billion dollars of their money in this program starting in late 2006 and early 2007. Unfortunately the FMS program is a peacetime process that was very slow to adjust to war-time demands. In May 2007, equipment deliveries from FMS sales were about $115 million—unsatisfactory from everyone’s standpoint.

Once this deficiency was highlighted, the Secretary of Defense established a special FMS task force. Work-
ing together with that task force, the U.S. Joint Staff, Central Command, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, we achieved a common conception of the problem and a common way to track requests, approvals, contracts, and deliveries. By the fall of 2007 equipment began to flow and delivery accelerated rapidly, reaching about $1.4 billion of delivered equipment by June 2008. Figure 10 depicts equipment deliveries using the FMS process.

The sluggish start to the FMS program in Iraq was an obstacle to accelerating growth and capability. Equipment delivery was tied to the Iraqi force generation and replenishment processes. We could only field units at the rate that equipment was available, and we could only replenish a unit’s battle damaged equipment if replacement equipment arrived quickly. Thus, we used the FMS process as a means to stimulate improvements in the acquisition and sustainment functions of the Iraqi Ministries and Joint Headquarters. We also used FMS to stimulate their resource management function. Once the equipment flow began, the deliveries stimulated each of the other functions.

Of course MNSTC-I used other management procedures, but these four formed the core of ensuring we had organizational integrity—that is, we did what we said we were going to do and we did things right. This management program, including other forums not described in this essay, allowed us to monitor the entire enterprise for which MNSTC-I was responsible: from tactical-level security force assistance projects and actions, to the strategic effects we sought in security sector reform at the ministerial and institutional level. In sum, our management scheme complemented our leadership approach and our mission.

![Foreign Military Sales: May 2007- June 2008](image-url)
Results. Our enterprise approach yielded the results that we wanted. The chart below depicts the growth in the size of the Iraqi Security Forces as well as the improvements in capability.

Statistics and empirics, however, cannot tell the entire story. Perhaps the best indicator of the change in the Iraqi Security Forces and the development of the Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as the Iraqi Joint Headquarters came in the spring of 2008. The Government of Iraq had enough confidence in its security forces and ministries that the Prime Minister directed and conducted a series of semi-independent operations starting in Basra, then in Mosul, Sadr City, and Amarah.

To be sure, the initial operation in Basra started off badly. On very short notice, the Iraqis moved units—military and National Police—from several distant locations throughout the country to Basra. Although
inadequate planning and preparation resulted difficulties and the Coalition had to assist in several key areas, the Iraqis had the institutional capacity to adapt quickly. Two examples demonstrate this point. First, Iraqi plans to resupply forces sent to Basra had been insufficient. They asked for Coalition help to immediately rectify this deficiency, but they were also able to use two of their three C130 cargo aircraft as part of the logistics effort—and for days, they kept these aircraft flying in tons of supplies and replacements. Further, they redirected Iraqi Army truck companies from units not in contact to those in Basra.

Second, one of the first units to be employed in Basra was a newly-trained brigade that had just moved to Basra and was re-forming after leave. The brigade had no embedded Coalition trainers, and the Iraqi commander had received insufficiently clear orders before being employed in combat. The result was predictable: loss of unit cohesion and the refusal of over 800 soldiers to fight. What few would have predicted was the Iraqi Army's response.

Some commanders were relieved immediately and a few were imprisoned. Most of the soldiers were fired, and the unit was pulled out of combat and moved to its Divisional training center just a few miles outside of Basra. The Iraqi Joint Headquarters ordered about 1,000 replacements diverted from the units to which they were to go. The Iraqi Army then ordered these replacements and new leaders to move to the Basra training center. There, they underwent re-training with their new leaders and an embedded training team. Within weeks, they were back in the fight, and performing well enough to remain in the battle through the clear, hold, and build phases of the operation. Clearly, the Iraqi forces that deployed to Basra were not the same as those of just one year prior.

The Iraqi senior leadership, civilian and military, demonstrated the ability to learn and improve. In the subsequent operations in Mosul, Sadr City, and Amarah, they improved in areas where previous actions were deficient—planning, preparation, and command and control. Finally, all these operations were sustained simultaneously—even as both the military and police continued generating new forces and to replenish those already in the field—at testing to the improving capability of the Iraqi Security Forces.

This set of actions marked a bold departure from the limited tactical and ministerial capacity demonstrated at the start of the Baghdad Security Plan in early 2007. Of course, it did not mark the end of development nor did it mark the end of the Iraqi need for assistance. But it does show significant improvement. While it is impossible to empirically show a cause-and-effect relationship between the changes in MNSTC-I's approach and the tactical and ministerial improvements in the spring and early summer of 2008, no one doubts the MNSTC-I approach was a main contributor to this improvement.

**REFLECTIONS**

Each case of developing a nation's security sector—from improving their tactical forces to enhancing the performance of security ministries and senior headquarters—is different. Each case evolves over time and is affected by factors such as history, government structure, culture, education, state of economy, and level of technology. That said, the mission of a headquarters like MNSTC-I is governed by common, general principles.

**Improve Security.** The worse the security situation is—multiple, complex attacks, high levels of violence—the harder it is to create or improve fledging security forces. Job one, then, is to apply enough force to reduce violence to an acceptable level as quickly as possible, and then keep it down. This is especially true with respect to local police forces. When insurgents or criminals can intimidate local police or their families, one cannot expect police to function. For this reason, creating or improving a nation's security forces will likely be a sequential project—military before police, national police before local police, for example. Further, high levels of violence can indicate, and often do, that the government may not be perceived as legitimate or permanent. Under these conditions, loyalty of the security forces to its government will be in question. The focus for an organization like MNSTC-I, is to directly contribute to tactical success: improving security; then using that contribution as a means to strategic success by improving the legitimacy of the government and its ministerial and institutional capacity.

**Define Sufficiency.** Trainers and advisors are the products of their own experience and the products
of the training and education standards enforced by their nations. Their default position will be to use the same, or similar, standards in the development of the security forces and ministries in question. Perhaps in the long-term, applying these standards is correct. In the short-term, however, these standards will almost always be too high. The issue for an organization like MNSTC-I, therefore, becomes defining sufficiency in as much detail as possible for the near term to suit the real conditions of the nascent force. Then it must use that definition as a guide to training and developing a nation’s security force and improving its security ministries. Over time, the definition of sufficiency may change, but that is precisely the point.

**Approach Quality Iteratively.** For an organization like MNSTC-I, “better” can easily become the enemy of “good enough.” Quality standards should be flexible. At first, a minimum standard is good enough, given the enemy and other key factors of the situation. Defining that standard is the point of the previous principle. Once a force, or part of it, meets that standard, it can be raised and continually improved—especially as part of a coherent partnership program. In many cases, meeting the “good enough” standard will be “hard enough.”

**Develop Partners.** Developing a security sector, from tactical to strategic levels, takes partners. These partners will include a combat force, so that training and development can continue in the field; the host nation, so that their self-training and self-development capacity can grow; and the other organizations responsible for overall development of the host nation’s governmental capacity. Partners, however, must achieve unity of effort; the actions of all partners must be coherent to achieve the desired effects. The relationship among partners, therefore, is as important as the partnership itself. This relationship has an organizational component (clear lines of responsibility) and a personal component (leaders who can get along and who can sublimate ego to mission.) Organizations like MNSTC-I must take a systems approach to their mission.

**Plan for the Long-term; Execute for the Near-term.** Assisting a nation’s security forces and developing a nation’s security sector is, by definition, a long-term affair. The set of tasks associated with these activities simply cannot be done quickly. A long-term development plan is necessary, but what is also needed is a very specific, achievable set of short-term tasks upon which the trainers and advisor organization can focus its attention. An organization that combines short-term tasks with long-term objectives improves the changes of success.

**Secure Funding.** A nation that needs extensive security assistance, in most cases, will not have the resources to do it by itself. Without an outside source of funding, the growth and development of security forces and sectors will, by default, happen at a very slow rate—often too slowly to meet U.S. strategic objectives, given the urgency of the situation that required intervention in the first place. External funding, especially when combined with what is available from the nation, is a
huge accelerator in the development of security forces and security sectors—but only if it is spent as part of a coherent plan. Spending must stimulate the entire security sector. Organizations like MNSTC-I must be able to conceive of such a plan, explain it, and hold to it long enough to create the desired outcomes.

These and other principles, when applied to the specifics of a particular nation’s security situation, will result in differing judgments and actions. This set of principles, however, provides a framework for analysis that would be useful in determining the extent of the assistance a nation may require as well as the length of commitment necessary to provide that assistance.

CONCLUSION

This essay is not a claim that MNSTC-I got it perfect during the period of the surge in Iraq, but rather that we got it right enough to get us to a better place as compared to late 2006 and early 2007. The MNSTC-I that I commanded was built upon the solid foundations of my predecessors, who led under very difficult circumstance, and I respect not just what they did but how we benefited from their hard work. Like them, we left an organization to build on and plenty of work for my successor and his leadership team to do.

Describing the approach that the leaders in Iraq took during the surge period, I believe, will help others who find themselves in a similar situation. My hope is that this description will also help current leaders who are reworking the strategy in Afghanistan and determining how to help Pakistan. Perhaps this description may also help to improve doctrine concerning Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform in the United States and elsewhere. Finally, it may help those who are thinking through an approach to improving and developing a nation’s non-security sectors. This is vital not only for ensuring strategic success in any counter-insurgency campaign, but for preventing insurgencies from developing.