THE HAQQANI NETWORK
A STRATEGIC THREAT
JEFFREY DRESSLER

AFGHANISTAN REPORT 9

THE HAQQANI NETWORK

A STRATEGIC THREAT
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The Haqqani Network represents a strategic threat to the enduring stability of the Afghan state and U.S. national security interests in the region. The Haqqanis are currently Afghanistan’s most capable and potent insurgent group, and they continue to maintain close operational and strategic ties with al-Qaeda and their affiliates. These ties will likely deepen in the future.

Unlike the Quetta Shura Taliban in southern Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency campaign has not weakened the Haqqanis’ military capabilities significantly. Few of the “surge” resources deployed to their strongholds in Eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network has increased its operational reach and jihadist credentials over the past several years. The Haqqani Network has expanded its reach toward the Quetta Shura Taliban’s historical strongholds in southern Afghanistan, the areas surrounding Kabul, as well as the Afghan north.

The Haqqanis maintain considerable sanctuary and support nodes inside Pakistan’s tribal areas. From their safehavens in North Waziristan and Kurram Agencies in Pakistan, the Haqqanis project men and materiel to resource their terrorist campaign in Afghanistan’s southeastern provinces of Khost, Paktika and Paktia onwards to the provinces surrounding Kabul.

The Haqqani Network is the primary proxy force backed by elements of Pakistan’s security establishment. Pakistan’s support for the Haqqani Network has increased, through both facilitating additional sanctuary and providing strategic and operational guidance.

The Haqqanis serve Pakistan’s interests by dominating key terrain along the border and beyond in Afghanistan’s south and east, serving as a Pakistani-influenced “firewall” against national, northern, U.S. and Indian influence. The Haqqanis would also serve Pakistan’s interests by being the primary influence in Afghanistan’s Ghilzai Pashtun lands, as well as the tribal areas in North Waziristan, organizing these tribal areas in ways consistent with Pakistan’s interests.

The Haqqanis execute spectacular attacks in Kabul in order to generate a disproportionate psychological and propaganda effect. The Haqqanis have strengthened their presence in Logar and Wardak, surrounding the southern and western approaches to Kabul. They have also expanded into Kabul’s eastern approaches in the provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman, and Kapisa. The network will use these positions to increase their destabilizing attacks in Kabul.

The Haqqani Network has increased their presence in Afghanistan’s north, through their partnership with the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The Haqqani Network and IMU execute targeted assassinations of northern powerbrokers who are affiliated with the Jamiat-e Islami Party. These assassinations are meant to undermine the Jamiat party and the influence of minority powerbrokers, who are historical rivals to the Pashtuns and the Pakistani state.

The Haqqanis are ideologically committed insurgents, and they are increasing their territorial reach. The group also has ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The Haqqanis have never given any indication that breaking ties with al-Qaeda was either possible or in their interests. Consequently, the Haqqani Network is not reconcilable. They also do not fully follow the guidance of the Quetta Shura Taliban, because they maintain a separate power base and leadership structure.

Coalition and Afghan forces must conduct a sustained, well-resourced offensive against the Haqqani Network inside of Afghanistan. This campaign would likely require at least two adequately-resourced fighting seasons. Consequently, it is imperative that the U.S. retains force levels at 68,000 troops after September 2012, rather than conducting a further drawdown. Without such a campaign, the Haqqani Network will be a dominant force inside of Afghanistan indefinitely, and the United States would fail to
achieve its stated objective of preventing the return of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups to Afghanistan. Addressing the threat from the Haqqani Network inside of Afghanistan is necessary, even if further action should ultimately be taken to disrupt the organization in Miramshah.

- The ANSF are not equipped to deal with the threat from the Haqqani Network in their current state. The Afghan Security Forces lack the intelligence, enablers, and sophisticated command and control required to reclaim the enemy support zones south of Kabul. The Afghan units are also under-filled and wrongly positioned for this fight. American troops in a properly-resourced campaign can help reduce the threat from the Haqqani Network to a level that the Afghan Security Forces can handle.

- The United States must not abruptly shift the mission of its forces in Afghanistan from counter-insurgency to security force assistance. U.S. forces cannot curtail or cease offensive operations in the areas South of Kabul in Regional Command East in 2012. The United States and its Afghan partners must dismantle the Haqqani Network’s strongholds in Khost, Paktika, and Paktia and contain the organization’s expansion toward Kabul prior to a shift in mission. Failure to do so will present a strategic threat to U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan.
The Haqqani Network is the most capable and dangerous insurgent organization in Afghanistan. The network’s current leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, effectively organizes the tribal and insurgent groups of the southern part of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas in ways consistent with the interests of the Pakistani government. The Haqqanis use these Pakistani bases as training areas for multiple terrorist groups, including Lashkar-e Taiba, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan. The Haqqani Network uses safehavens inside Afghanistan to support insurgent and terrorist operations throughout Afghanistan.

The Haqqanis have historically operated within Afghanistan primarily in Khost, Paktia and Paktika Provinces (collectively known as Loya Paktia or Greater Paktia). Many policymakers have mischaracterized the Haqqanis, therefore, considering the group a regional insurgency limited in ambition to controlling a handful of provinces in Afghanistan. But the Haqqani Network is a strategic threat to the Afghan government and a threat to regional stability, as it hosts international terrorists with objectives in India, Central Asia, and the Arab lands.

The Haqqani Network now has important logistical support bases less than fifty miles from Kabul. Since 2008, the Haqqani Network has expanded its safehavens and operating areas into Logar and Wardak Provinces, the provinces immediately south of Kabul. The Haqqanis and other insurgent groups have used that presence to conduct attacks in the capital as well as in those provinces. The Haqqani Network has also established itself in smaller numbers east of Kabul in Nangarhar, Kapisa, and Laghman Provinces, from which it can threaten key lines of communication between the capital and outlying provinces. Its historical home, Loya Paktia, still serves as a vital base in which the Haqqani Network maintains a sophisticated network of supply lines, facilitation nodes, and safehavens inside of Afghanistan. That logistical network enables them to conduct operations against coalition and Afghan forces; execute assassination campaigns against key Afghan security, political, and tribal actors; and facilitate the movement of foreign fighters into and around Afghanistan. This logistical trail from Miramshah to Kabul is a key asset for the Haqqani Network, which otherwise would be confined largely to the tribal areas of Pakistan. It is also a key vulnerability, as the safehavens close to Kabul are necessary for the Haqqanis to facilitate spectacular attacks.

The Haqqanis have long disregarded Mullah Omar’s public orders to avoid civilian casualties, mounting spectacular suicide attacks and assassinations of key security and political figures in Kabul and elsewhere. They coordinate with many other insurgent groups to conduct these attacks beyond Loya Paktia. The high-profile attacks in Kabul are an important strategic communications tool that supports the Haqqanis’ regional and international recruiting and fundraising. They also show the Afghan government and the Western public that the insurgency can launch attacks in the most protected and fortified locations in all of Afghanistan.

The Haqqani Network has expanded its operational reach into the northern provinces of Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar through a partnership with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The Haqqanis are able to capitalize on Uzbek disenfranchisement in the north while simultaneously infiltrating the isolated Pashtun communities in that area. The Haqqanis and the IMU also use their northern bases to assassinate political and security officials linked with powerful northern figures, particularly ethnic Tajiks affiliated with the Jamiat-e Islami Party. These assassinations are meant to undermine Jamiat and the northern leadership generally, which has been a historical rival to the Pashtuns as well as to Pakistan.

The Haqqani Network is the preferred insurgent group to represent the interests of the Pakistani security services going forward in Afghanistan, as the group...
Network’s recent operations to expand its Pakistani sanctuary into Kurram Agency, which projects directly into the heart of eastern Afghanistan and has afforded the Haqannis critical infiltration routes that make it more difficult to constrain their operations. The third section describes the network’s command and control nodes and key safehavens throughout the southeast. The Haqqani Network uses these areas to direct its operations and to facilitate the movement of resources and foreign fighters to the network’s other fronts, such as Kabul and northern Afghanistan. The fourth section outlines the Haqqani Network’s efforts to isolate Khost province from the rest of southeastern Afghanistan. The fifth section analyzes the Haqqani Network’s efforts to expand its presence and influence into areas beyond Loya Paktia, including the provinces of Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, Nangarhar, Laghman and Kapisa in order to expand its operations in Kabul. The sixth section analyzes the Haqqani Network’s campaign to destabilize Kabul, including directing, resourcing, and executing spectacular complex attacks against the Afghan government as well as U.S. and coalition forces. The final section details the Haqqani Network’s efforts to increase its presence in Afghanistan’s northern provinces through partnerships with the IMU and other al-Qaeda affiliates.

is more effective than the much-diminished southern Taliban. The Haqqani Network’s territorial control of the southeast could provide the Pakistanis with much needed “strategic depth” in case of a full-scale breakout of hostilities across Pakistan’s eastern border with India. Additionally, given Pakistan’s concerns of increased Indian involvement in Afghanistan, the Haqqani Network is a tool to target strategically Indian political, diplomatic and economic interests in Kabul and elsewhere around the country. Furthermore, by helping to dissuade anti-Pakistan insurgents, such as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), from launching attacks on Pakistani security services and instead reorienting some of their focus on Afghanistan, the Haqqanis are assisting in the campaign to quiet military tensions in Pakistan’s tribal frontier, though they have not been successful in doing so.

The first section of this report provides a detailed understanding of the Haqqani Network’s operation in and around Loya Paktia, including its efforts to consolidate its historical powerbase in support of continued operations within and beyond the southeast. The second section outlines the Haqqani Network’s infiltration routes from Pakistan’s tribal areas in addition to the comprehensive logistical infrastructure that supports its vast operational agenda. This section also details the Haqqani Network’s recent operations to expand its Pakistani sanctuary into Kurram Agency, which projects directly into the heart of eastern Afghanistan and has afforded the Haqannis critical infiltration routes that make it more difficult to constrain their operations. The third section describes the network’s command and control nodes and key safehavens throughout the southeast. The Haqqani Network uses these areas to direct its operations and to facilitate the movement of resources and foreign fighters to the network’s other fronts, such as Kabul and northern Afghanistan. The fourth section outlines the Haqqani Network’s efforts to isolate Khost province from the rest of southeastern Afghanistan. The fifth section analyzes the Haqqani Network’s efforts to expand its presence and influence into areas beyond Loya Paktia, including the provinces of Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, Nangarhar, Laghman and Kapisa in order to expand its operations in Kabul. The sixth section analyzes the Haqqani Network’s campaign to destabilize Kabul, including directing, resourcing, and executing spectacular complex attacks against the Afghan government as well as U.S. and coalition forces. The final section details the Haqqani Network’s efforts to increase its presence in Afghanistan’s northern provinces through partnerships with the IMU and other al-Qaeda affiliates.
This report builds on the author’s previous work on the Haqqani Network by offering a detailed analysis of how the Haqqani Network functions on an operational and tactical level throughout the areas in which it operates. It also describes the network’s expansion into new areas and how that expansion supports and reveals the network’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan. This report does not outline the current state of relations between the Pakistani security services and the Haqqani Network, but very little has changed in that relationship since the October 2010 report, The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan. All indicators suggest, in fact, that the relationship between the Haqqani Network and these elements inside the Pakistani state will continue to deepen and expand as the network becomes the most capable and effective insurgent force with objectives in line with those of the Pakistani security services.

THE HAQQANI NETWORK: INSURGENCY IN DEPTH

Conventional wisdom holds that the Haqqani Network draws its strength and resilience primarily from its bases in North Waziristan. Pakistan’s consistent refusal either to act against the Haqqanis or to allow the U.S. to do so has increased the focus of military leaders and policymakers on those bases. It has led some to conclude that the Haqqani problem is predominantly a problem of dealing with Pakistan rather than a counter-insurgency challenge within Afghanistan. That conclusion is incorrect. The Haqqanis do rely on the sanctuary they enjoy in Pakistan’s tribal areas, but that sanctuary would be meaningless if they were unable to project resources, command and control, and manpower from those bases into parts of Afghanistan that matter. The projection of Haqqani power into Afghanistan to hit targets in Kabul and the north relies on a series of infiltration routes into Afghanistan, as well as safehouses and rat lines within Afghanistan itself.

Haqqani leaders recruit, train, plan, and direct operations in Afghanistan from bases around Miramshah, North Waziristan. Fighters, commanders, and resources infiltrate into Afghanistan through several rat-lines, primarily into Khost Province but also into neighboring Paktia and Paktika Provinces. Safehouses in all three provinces allow the Haqqanis to plan, conduct, and supply operations into and through Ghazni, Logar, and Wardak Provinces and, ultimately, into Kabul. The Haqqanis have also established infiltration routes and support areas in Nangarhar, Laghman, and Kapisa Provinces and into northern Afghanistan. The core of the group’s activities, however, remains the area south of Kabul.

Pakistani Bases

The majority of fighters, weapons, and materials that sustain the Haqqani Network’s operations in and around Loya Paktia emanate from its sanctuary in Pakistan’s North Waziristan Agency. Miramshah, the capital of the agency, has been a Haqqani base since the beginning of the Mujahideen struggle against the Soviets. The tribes of Loya Paktia met in Miramshah in 1979 to discuss the conduct of the jihad in their territory. Jalaluddin Haqqani built the Manba ul Ulum mosque and madrassa there in the 1980s. Afghan sources allege that he lived under the protection of the Pakistani military and even in a compound reserved for Pakistani army officers during that period. The Haqqanis today operate mainly out of Sarai Darpa Khel and Danday Darpa Khel, two towns in Miramshah that are both close to the Pakistani Army’s
nearly four years of constant warfare to an end. The Haqqani Network played a key role in brokering the deal. In September and October 2010, the influential brothers of Jalaluddin Haqqani, Khalil, and Ibrahim attended meetings with Shia and Sunni tribal elders in Peshawar and Islamabad. According to individuals with knowledge of the talks, Khalil Haqqani was instrumental in reaching a settlement after the Pakistani government pressured both sides to heed his authority.

The Shias agreed to allow the Haqqanis and affiliated groups to transit through upper Kurram into Afghanistan’s eastern provinces in exchange for the opening of the only major road leading out of upper Kurram into Pakistan's eastern territories. The road had been closed due to security concerns and the constant threat of attack from both Sunni militants and minority tribesmen in central and lower Kurram. The closure isolated the Shia population in upper Kurram and caused great hardship because residents were unable to trade, secure food and medicine, or visit family in major Pakistani population centers.

The agreement held for approximately one month before hostilities resumed. The kidnapping and killing of Shia in central Kurram in mid-March 2011 jeopardized the fragile peace that the Haqqani Network had worked to achieve throughout 2010 and 2011. Between late June and early August 2011, the Pakistani military launched a large-scale operation in central and southeastern Kurram Agency to drive out the TTP fighters that were threatening the Sunni-Shia peace deal. Most of the TTP militants reportedly fled ahead of the early July operations after a failed attempt to negotiate with the military through interlocutors from the Haqqani Network. By the end of the operation in early August, the Pakistani military had secured central and lower Kurram, driving out the majority of TTP fighters who had undermined the peace with the Turi tribe of upper Kurram.

In November 2011, just months after the conclusion of the Pakistani military operation, tribal elders in Kurram reported a significant increase in Haqqani Network activity. According to the elders, large numbers of Haqqani fighters stationed themselves in the highlands near Khaiwas, just three kilometers from the Paktia border, demanding freedom of movement to carry out attacks in neighboring Afghanistan. In addition to Khaiwas, the villages of Bashura and Mata
Sangar are also host to both Haqqani and foreign fighters, including al-Qaeda. Finally, to protect their presence along the Paktia-Kurram border, the Haqqanis have allied themselves with elements of the Sunni Moqbil tribe who dominate the area. The Haqqanis emplace sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to restrict U.S. forces’ ability to interfere with Haqqani operations in southeastern Afghanistan.

**INfiltrating and Operating in Khost**

**Spera**

Numerous rat-lines lead from the Haqqani Network’s safehaven in North Waziristan Agency across the border into Khost. Haqqani insurgents have taken advantage of the mountainous Spera district in Khost’s southwestern corner bordering Paktika. For years, Spera and the Kowchun Valley have served as a facilitation route for militants crossing into Afghanistan. Militants operate training camps and bed-down facilities there. From the valley, militants can cross the sparsely populated province of Paktika, including the districts of Ziruk, Nikeh, and Orgun before continuing west. Insurgents then move through the districts of Yahya Khel and Zarghun Shahr in western Paktika, where the Charbaran Valley serves as a Haqqani Network safehaven that runs parallel to Highway One (Ring Road). From the Charbaran Valley and surrounding areas, insurgents can reach Highway One and transit north to Kabul or south to Zabul and Ghazni. Militants also move through Spera to the mountainous Khost-Gardez pass, home to the Zadran tribe and Haqqani Network loyalists. The difficult terrain gives insurgents relative freedom of maneuver to travel from Khost to Paktia and points north, including Logar and Kabul provinces.

U.S. forces have intermittently disrupted insurgent movement through Spera, maintaining a combat outpost (COP) there until December 2010. Colonel Viet Luong, commander of 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, responsible for Khost and...
Paktia, decided to close COP Spera to free up forces for a more population-centric counterinsurgency strategy.²¹ Luong’s successor, Colonel Chris Toner (commanding the 3rd BCT of the 1st Infantry Division, Task Force Duke), found that Spera had once again become a significant thoroughfare for insurgents traveling across the Pakistani border.²² As a result, troops from Task Force Duke, Task Force Currahee (4th BCT, 101st Airborne Division responsible for Paktika province), and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) conducted Operation Maiwan III in mid-May 2011 as part of Regional Command East’s Operation Oqab Bahar VI (Eagle Spring VI).²³ Maiwan III was meant to attack and disrupt the enemy in and around COP Spera.²⁴ Towards the end of the four-day operation, commanders noted that the expected level of enemy activity had failed to materialize.²⁵ Insurgents likely decided to retreat and return once the clearing force departed the area and the operation did not last long enough to prevent them from doing so. A combined Afghan and coalition security force subsequently captured a Haqqani leader responsible for directing more than 250 fighters, including Uzbeks.²⁶ The leader was described by coalition forces as “the second-in-charge for Haqqani operations in Paktia,” indicating that he and his fighters likely traveled from North Waziristan to Paktia through the district.²⁷

Task Force Duke reported that the insurgents apparently decided to reduce their dependency on the route through Spera and find an alternate means of infiltration because of coalition disruption operations. Insurgents continue to move through Spera, but are also moving through Giyan District in neighboring Paktika Province. Giyan, in fact, may have become an alternate route for insurgents, even though it offers a less direct route to safe havens in Loya Paktia.²⁸

**Terayzai**

In addition to logistical lines through Spera, Haqqani infiltration routes also run through Khost’s southern town of Terayzai. One of the most active facilitation routes for Haqqanis moving through Khost province appeared to lead from Terayzai district through Bak District to the north, and then west into Sabari District. This route, known as Mazera, is advantageous because a narrow north–south valley leads directly into the districts of Bak and Sabari abutting the mountains along the Paktia Province border.²⁹ Numerous Haqqani Network facilitators were captured in these districts over the course of 2010 and 2011. This route has served as a major pipeline for the insurgency since 2004 but probably dates back to the 1980s.³⁰ According to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reporting, Terayzai appeared to be a way-point for the shipment of weapons to Haqqani strongholds in Khost’s northern districts, including IED materials for use against U.S. and Afghan forces throughout southeastern Afghanistan.³¹ Weapons and fighters have often been housed in mosques, bazaars, and madrassas and moved in civilian vehicles along the facilitation route to avoid detection.³² Task Force Duke conducted frequent operations to disrupt the Haqqani Network’s Mazera logistical facilitation route in the late spring and early summer of 2011, challenging the Haqqanis’ ability to resource and conduct attacks during the 2011 fighting season.³³

**Sabari**

Sabari District and its environs in northern Khost form a key safe haven and command-and-control hub for the Haqqani Network in Loya Paktia.³⁴ Sabari borders Jani Khel district in Paktia Province, and a wide valley surrounded by mountains on its western, northern, and eastern sides, offers concealed transit routes directly into Khost City, Bak, and Terayzai.

The Haqqanis benefit from the fractured tribal structure of the district. The Soviets drove most members of the Yaqubi tribe into Pakistan, creating space for Kuchi nomads. Yaqubi tribesmen returning to the district during and after the Soviet withdrawal confronted the Kuchis, creating fissures the Haqqanis have been able to exploit. Sabari is also home to a large portion of Mangal tribesmen, whom the Haqqanis have co-opted through a careful campaign of intimidation and bribery.³⁵ Jalaluddin Haqqani
As the spring fighting season arrived insurgents escalated their defense of Sabari in response to increased ISAF attacks. Insurgents tried to assassinate the Sabari chief of police using an IED in April. Although the attempt failed, insurgents once again tried to kill the police chief in the Kholbasat Bazaar area in Sabari. Attackers fired on the police chief’s vehicle, injuring him and a number of his bodyguards. Throughout the summer, ISAF and insurgent forces traded attacks. Sporadic IED and insurgent suicide attacks continued to be directed against ISAF patrols and ANSF troops, while coalition forces launched raids targeting insurgent fighters and facilitators throughout Sabari.

For ISAF and Afghan forces, it seemed that the increased focus on Sabari was beginning to pay dividends. Combined operations had largely prevented the insurgency from operating openly by the summer. Insurgent indirect fire attacks on CoP Sabari dropped precipitously, due to increased dedicated patrolling and surveillance assets. In June, the district governor held a jirga with elders of Zambar village, considered to be the center of the Haqqanis' influence. Perhaps the most influential individual there has been Khan Zorman, an elder with the Zambar subtribe of the Sabari tribal confederation. When Zorman is in the district, “he handles all issues” despite the inaction of Afghan government officials and infighting within the tribe itself. He is the most respected tribal leader in Sabari—he is also believed to work with the insurgency.

The appearance of success in Sabari was deceiving, however. The Haqqanis are noteworthy among Afghan insurgents for their intimidation and brutalization of locals who oppose them. According to Maulvi Shah Mohammad, the head of Khosť city’s Ulema Council (council of Islamic scholars), the security situation in Sabari is so perilous that imams (Islamic prayer leaders) often refuse to perform prayers at the funerals of dead Afghan soldiers and police for fear of insurgent retaliation. Mohammad said this practice is common in Tani, Bak, and Terayzai Districts as well.

Coalition and Afghan forces have fought hard in Sabari and disrupted the safehaven there without, however, eliminating it. In November 2010, ISAF and Afghan forces launched a joint operation in Sabari to clear selected compounds identified as participating in the assembly of IEDs and for supporting indirect fire attacks. Haqqani fighters destroyed mobile phone towers in Terayzai, Bak, and Sabari in early December, likely because they were afraid that ISAF forces were increasingly effective at targeting their logistics lines. ISAF and Afghan forces continued to target insurgents in January and February 2011, detaining or killing numerous facilitators of fighters and weapons, especially IEDs, in and around Sabari district.

Sabari is also home to insurgents who identify themselves as members of Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), a fractious political-insurgent movement whose military wing is nominally headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. HiG was one of the major Mujahideen groups fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, and it served as the main proxy for CIA and Pakistani support. HiG fighters have been in and around Sabari for at least as long as the Haqqanis. Task Force Duke’s efforts to target the insurgency in Sabari in 2011 focused on capturing and killing HiG fighters, in fact. Although HiG and Haqqani fighters occasionally cooperate in joint attacks and share resources, tensions between the groups remain. The focus on HiG fighters inadvertently strengthened the hand of the Haqqanis in the aftermath of the operation.

Jalaluddin himself claimed to be present in Sabari during an attack on the district center at the start of the 2008 fighting season. Although it is impossible to verify Jalaluddin’s claims, it is at least an indication that the Haqqanis devoted considerable attention to Sabari.
One elder from Sabari remarked that “Pashtunwali is dead,” implying that the insurgents have destroyed the Pashtuns’ traditional system of values and norms. During the fall of 2011, reports of Haqqani death-squads in Sabari and neighboring Musa Khel district surfaced. The squads function much like the joint Haqqani-al-Qaeda group in North Waziristan, known as the Lashkar-e Khurasan, which is charged with killing those suspected of passing information to the U.S. and intimidating the population to prevent further cooperation.

Haqqani death-squads were responsible for twenty killings over the summer months of June, July and August. They executed three men in broad daylight in Sabari; residents said the men had little or no contact with coalition forces. According to an American military official, “people in Sabari are living in abject terror, twenty-four hours a day.” The official said that each time American forces conduct a raid on a Haqqani leader, a group of about fifteen death-squad members go into the surrounding area and “massacre people.” Beyond the civilian population, Afghan government officials may even be secretly supporting the insurgency. According to an interrogation of a senior Haqqani militant, “Fighters [including himself] have been approaching Afghan government and military officials…persuading them to sign a five-page document secretly pledging their loyalty to the Taliban leadership.” The senior Haqqani militant claimed to have signed up twenty individuals himself. Although there is no way to verify the militant’s claims, it is clear that the Haqqani Network controls Sabari and has co-opted elements of the district’s governance structure.

Musa Khel

Much like Sabari, neighboring Musa Khel to the west is also a key district in the Haqqanis’ command and control network for the southeast. The district lies just over an 8,000-foot mountain range. A narrow valley that feeds into central Khost bisects the center of the province, and the district is surrounded by mountains on the west, east, and north. To the northwest, a series of mountain passes lead directly into Pakhtia province and the capital of Gardez, only fifty kilometers from the center of Musa Khel.

In Musa Khel and the surrounding areas, including Khost’s border with Pakhtia province, a tribal feud between the Moqbil and Mangal tribes has raged for decades. The Haqqanis have exploited these tribal tensions as well. When a dispute over who controlled a section of forest used for the harvesting of pine nuts broke out between the majority Mangal tribe and the Moqbil tribe during the late summer of 2009, the Haqqanis provided the Moqbil with heavy weaponry, which stymied the Mangal offensive. The Haqqanis then inserted themselves as mediators to settle the dispute between the two warring parties. The Moqbil praised the Haqqanis for settling the dispute, and the Haqqanis received safe haven for training camps and infrastructure in northwest Khost in return.

Since 2008, increased Haqqani Network influence coupled with the inability of ISAF forces to provide protection to the Mangal has eroded the tribe’s ability to resist insurgent influence. U.S. Special Forces officers who served in the area and interacted with Mangal tribal elders observed their disappointment with ISAF forces. Mangal elders remarked that in their tribal areas, the Haqqanis imposed their will by force and the tribe had little ability to resist them. The Mangal succumbed to the Haqqanis and cut a deal with them allowing for the use of their land for training camps and other insurgent activities. Nearly all of Musa Khel’s residents are Mangal. The man who may have led the Haqqani Network’s efforts in the Mangal tribal areas and Musa Khel in particular is Haji Mali Khan.

ISAF forces captured Haji Mali Khan in Musa Khel district in a raid on September 27, 2011. He was one of the most senior and trusted commanders in the Haqqani Network and is related to Jalaluddin and his son, the current leader of the Haqqani Network, Sirajuddin (or simply Siraj). Mali Khan’s sister is Siraj Haqqani’s mother, and his uncle is married to Jalaluddin’s sister. In addition to his military
duties, such as helping to funnel foreign fighters and recruits from the Waziristans into Afghanistan, he was also one of the Haqqanis’ business managers. Furthermore, unlike the majority of senior leaders of the Haqqani Network, Mali Khan is believed to have spent the majority of his time as a senior commander in southeastern Afghanistan. He was captured three months after one of his deputies, Ismail Jan, was killed in an airstrike in Gardez, Paktia. As a result of the high-value Haqqani Network captures and kills, joint forces increased their operational focus on Musa Khel district. Just one week after Mali Khan was apprehended in Musa Khel, his deputy, Dilawar, was killed in an airstrike in the same province. Dilawar was an attack coordinator and a facilitator of fighters, including members of al-Qaeda and the IMU, a terror outfit operating under the protection of the Haqqanis in North Waziristan which is active in northern Afghanistan.

Coalition forces have not undertaken to clear Musa Khel District, however, despite this progress against high-value targets.

HAQQANI OPERATIONS IN THE KHOST BOWL

Khost City lies at the center of the Khost Bowl. The contrasting terrain of Khost province is striking. To the north is the mountainous border with Paktia province, while Paktika province lies approximately fifty kilometers to the west. From the center of the province, the border with Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas is only twenty kilometers to the south and east. There are numerous crossings into Pakistan from Khost’s southern and eastern districts, but the mountainous terrain limits travel there, especially during the harsh Afghan winter.

While there are no accurate census figures for the province, estimates of Khost’s population range anywhere from 500,000 to more than one million. Khost’s population is more educated and cosmopolitan than some of its neighboring provinces, largely due to its proximity to Pakistan, where many residents were educated while they were refugees. Moreover, a large number of people from Khost (estimated around 70,000-80,000) live and work in the Gulf (primarily the United Arab Emirates). Trade with Pakistan and remittances from the Gulf contribute to Khost’s relative wealth.

Khost City is an active trader’s town due to its proximity to the Pakistani border, including the Ghulam Khan border crossing point. The town is crowded with shops, people, and motor traffic. Although the Haqqani Network remained active in Khost City and 2011 was still a violent year, it was less kinetic than previous years. Haqqani Network activity in Khost City was typically limited to assassinations of Afghan security and government personnel, kidnappings, and harassment of security personnel.

In Khost, insurgents tried to remain active during the winter months of 2010 and 2011, when Haqqani militants conducted several high-profile attacks. Haqqani fighters ambushed and murdered the police chief of Musa Khel district in northern Khost along the Paktia border. They also attempted to assassinate a retired colonel of the ANSF, and they successfully assassinated a National Directorate of Security (NDS) employee in Terayzi district. Insurgents occasionally employed IED attacks in and around Khost City, often targeting ANSF forces. During patrols, ANSF troops are more exposed than their coalition partners, are usually less well-armed, and do not possess the same level of tactical execution during small-arms engagements as their international counterparts, making them more attractive targets for insurgents. Approximately 6,000 additional ANSF troops were sent to Khost and Paktia province over the course of 2010, offering more opportunities for insurgents to engage them.

Kidnappings were also frequent during the winter months of 2010 and early 2011. In December 2010, twelve workers with the Afghan Mine Detection Center were kidnapped in the Khost’s northern Musa Khel district but were later freed during a joint Afghan and coalition operation. In Khost’s northern Sabari district, unidentified gunmen kidnapped the father of Khost’s Refugee Affairs director and separately, a
By the spring of 2011, the Haqqani Network’s yearly offensive had begun in earnest. In April and May, the Haqqanis increased their assassination and intimidation campaign throughout Khost. Two attacks were foiled in early May when a fourteen-year-old suicide bomber was arrested as he attempted to infiltrate the district headquarters of Jaji Maidan (Zazi Maidan) in eastern Khost near the border with Pakistan’s Kurram Agency. An Afghan police investigation revealed that the bomber, Sher Hassan, was a resident of North Waziristan and had likely been sent by the Haqqani Network to assassinate the district’s chief of police, General Azizullah. Days later, a suicide bomber riding a motorcycle was captured before he could execute his attack in the district center of Terazai in eastern Khost.

The Haqqanis also employed magnetic mines in targeted assassinations of key individuals in Khost. Although magnetic mines have been used in previous attacks in the southeast, they have been relatively rare. In consecutive days in mid-April, insurgents in Khost City attached magnetic mines to vehicles of the director of the Services Section of the office of the Khost governor and an employee of the NDS. Both targets were killed in the explosion. Insurgents also attempted to kill Mullah Muhammad Amir, a progovernment cleric, in Jaji Maidan district in April. According to a statement released by the insurgency claiming credit for the attack, the cleric was targeted due to his work at a U.S.-run radio station in Khost from 2002 to 2009. Haqqani Network fighters continued their offensive in Khost City throughout May, detonating a bomb in front of the provincial municipality in Khost City and launching a complex suicide attack with multiple attackers on the Khost City traffic department headquarters. Towards the end of May, a motorcycle packed with explosives detonated in a busy market in Khost City, wounding four civilians.

Throughout the summer and fall, sporadic suicide attacks and assassinations of government and security personnel continued in Khost City, often on the order of two to three attacks per month. The majority of suicide attacks against Afghan government installations in Khost City appear to have been directed at poorly defended targets, such as the traffic and provincial municipality departments, rather than high-profile targets, such as the governor’s mansion or National Directorate of Security (NDS) headquarters. This suggests that insurgents were either incapable of penetrating high-profile targets or that they were deliberately choosing targets that were more vulnerable. Explosions in crowded markets, which often caused civilian casualties, supplemented these attacks. The Haqqani Network likely sought to create an atmosphere of chaos and insecurity while simultaneously demonstrating the inability of Afghan and coalition forces to protect the civilian population. It is plausible that the insurgency believed one or two attacks per month in the city itself was enough to continually reaffirm the notion that neither Afghan nor coalition forces could provide for their security and thus dissuade would-be government collaborators. Despite these attacks, coalition and Afghan forces in Khost City reported that based on their interactions and engagements with the population in and around Khost City, they were not overly concerned with the security situation. It is impossible to corroborate these claims through alternate sources, however.

The Haqqani Network has not had to besiege Khost City or the surrounding areas in order to control them or operate through them. The Haqqanis likely believe that they can wait out the coalition presence in Khost and compete effectively with Afghan security forces should they chose to actively resist the Haqqanis’ increasing presence surrounding the city. Historically, as long as the Haqqanis could control the Khost-Gardez pass and prevent ground re-supply of government and security personnel in Khost, they eventually would be able to control the bowl. There is no reason to believe that the Haqqanis feel a post-ISAF Afghanistan will be any different.

HAQQANI INFILTRATION INTO AFGHANISTAN FROM KURRAM

The Haqqani Network has not confined itself to the Khost bowl, and its presence in Kurram Agency since 2011 indicates its interests in diversifying its access routes to Kabul. The Haqqani presence in and around upper Kurram lies opposite Paktia’s eastern districts of Dand Patan, Chamkani, and Jaji, as well as Logar Province’s Azrah district. Historically, the Haqqanis have maintained a presence in Jaji and Chamkani,
attacking and expelling Afghan and Soviet forces from the area between 1985 and 1988 in a major offensive push.\textsuperscript{81} Coalition Forces have conducted Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Chamkani and Dand Patan, launching Afghan Local Police sites there. Village Stability Operations constitute a bottom-up program that works with tribes at the village level to stabilize local areas. VSO includes such key components as economic, development and security assistance, including the establishment of local police which are designed to function as a tribal security force to resist insurgent coercion and intimidation. The primary focus of VSO is to rebuild village-level tribal institutions that have been dismantled by decades of war.

The Haqqani Network’s annual offensive in the spring of 2011 targeted these districts, showing the importance they placed on expelling the highly effective Afghan local police from this vital infiltration route from Kurram. For example U.S., and Afghan forces killed Haqqani fighters in May 2011 after launching attacks on a joint patrol (U.S. and Afghan) and the administrative center of Chamkani district.\textsuperscript{82} The contest continued in June 2011, when, insurgents kidnapped a High Peace Council member in Chamkani.\textsuperscript{83} Jaji District in northeastern Paktia and Azrah District in Logar Province have also been active since the Haqqani Network expanded its presence in upper Kurram. The Haqqanis and Osama bin Laden have historical roots in Jaji—in the mid 1980s, bin Laden built a training camp there.\textsuperscript{84} In 1987, bin Laden and a contingent of Arab fighters withstood a brutal attack on their training camp and cave complex by Soviet fighter jets. Bin Laden remarked that after surviving the attack, he “felt closer to God than ever.”\textsuperscript{85} Haqqani-directed attacks in Jaji have become more sophisticated and complex than attacks in the other
mid-June, the security situation in Azrah had become so precarious that ISAF launched a joint operation to “purge [the district] of armed opponents.”93

At the conclusion of the week-long operation, ISAF forces reported that only five insurgents had been killed.94 Less than two weeks later, a Haqqani Network Suicide Vehicle-born Improvised explosive Device (SVBIED) detonated at an Afghan hospital in Azrah. Witnesses said the blast completely leveled the building, killing more than thirty and injuring more than 100.95 Interestingly, Quetta Shura Taliban media outlets denied responsibility for the attack, as is often the case when the Haqqani Network executes particularly egregious acts the Taliban’s leaders have discouraged.96 By the end of the summer, the Haqqani Network and its affiliates had increased their presence in Azrah.

PROJECTING BEYOND PAKTIA FROM THE STRONGHOLD IN ZORMAT DISTRICT

Zormat is the most important enemy stronghold within Paktia, and it supports the Haqqani Network’s ability to project beyond Loya Paktia. The Mujahideen have used Zormat district and its surrounding environs in Paktia province to resist invaders since the early 1980s. A Soviet officer who had fought the Mujahideen in and around Paktia discussed the importance of the areas surrounding Zormat, including the infamous Shahikot Valley, which was a stronghold of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s fighters during the 1980s.97 The Mujahideen used the treacherous terrain to their advantage, the officer said, especially in the Zhawar Ghar mountain range to the east of the Shahikot.98

Zormat district is the largest and most populated of Paktia province’s districts, and a central crossroads that borders four provinces – Logar, Khost, Ghazni, and Paktika. Population estimates from 2004 to 2007 ranged from 80,000 to 150,000, or between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the province’s entire population. Zormat is on the periphery of five large tribal areas: the Andar to the west in Ghazni province, the north in Logar Province, and south in Paktika province; the Suliman Khel and Ali Khel to the south; the Kharoti to the southeast in Paktika province; the Ahmadzai to the north in Paktia; and the Zadran to the east in Paktia province.99 A wide valley border districts. Jaji is key terrain for insurgents looking to infiltrate Paktia from upper Kurram Agency. There is a large valley that runs west from the Kurram border through central Jaji before breaking south and continuing on through Laja Ahmadkhel district. U.S. Special Operations forces previously serving in Paktia reported seeing Toyota Hilux vehicles driving freely across Kurram’s border into Jaji carrying men and materials for insurgents operating in eastern Afghanistan.86

At the start of the Haqqanis’ 2011 offensive in April, three policemen were killed and two were wounded when a Haqqani Network suicide bomber detonated his explosives in a police training center in Jaji. Four suicide bombers attempted to enter the base. One was shot before he could detonate while the other two bombers fled the scene after the initial chaos.87 In June a suicide attacker entered the building of the district’s Rapid Reaction Unit (Provincial Response Company) and detonated his explosives, killing Abdul Zaher, the commander of the unit.88 Then in late August insurgents attempted to assassinate the district governor of Jaji in his vehicle while he was traveling with his bodyguards.89 Although the attack failed, the Haqqani Network’s attempts to undermine the security situation in Jaji demonstrate that it views the district and the logistical and communication lines running through the district as key terrain.

Similarly, in Logar’s Azrah district bordering the northernmost point of upper Kurram Agency, enemy activity spiked beginning in June 2011. In early June, Afghan police officers and the arbakai (community defense force) commander of the Akbarkhel tribe in Azrah surrendered to insurgents.90 It is unclear whether the Akbarkhel maintain insurgent sympathies or have simply submitted to insurgent threats and intimidation. In either case, there has been no permanent coalition presence in Azrah, which is remote, mountainous, and sparsely-populated, making it difficult to provide a clear picture of insurgent activity. By June, residents reported that all three of the main roads in the district had become so insecure that they were unable or unwilling to use them.91 The provincial police commander of Logar stated that foreign terrorists, including al-Qaeda, entered Logar through Azrah district.92 The increased activity of Haqqani Network operatives and affiliated foreign fighters was directly tied to the Haqqanis’ recently established positions in upper Kurram. By
running southwest from Paktia’s capital of Gardez cuts diagonally across the center of the district. The valley continues south, running parallel to Highway One before reaching Zabul province. The district is a key node for the southeastern insurgency because it is a logistical crossroads to points west, east, and north.

Zormat has been an impoverished town, even by Afghan standards. In 2002, the town had no schools, health clinics, electricity, or jobs other than standard farming duties. Camels roamed the dry and dusty streets. Mud-walled homes dotted the landscape, while brightly decorated jingle trucks (named for the sound that is made from bells on the truck) move goods and people to and from the Pakistani border. Elders, Mujahideen commanders, and religious leaders have been the key powerbrokers at different times throughout Zormat’s history. However, centers of power have become increasingly localized due to growing disunity and the weakening of local leaders. The Haqqani Network and others have exploited the power vacuum and disunity.

During the early winter months of 2002, as U.S. forces continued the hunt for al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan’s east, Zormat again proved invaluable to local Taliban and foreign fighters, just as it had during the 1980s. Zormat was identified as a potential hotbed of al-Qaeda activity during the lead-up to Operation Anaconda in March 2002. Operation Anaconda was the second large-scale military offensive in Afghanistan after the Battle of Tora Bora in 2001. Intelligence reports suggested that al-Qaeda fighters sheltering in the mountains southeast of Zormat relied on Taliban influence in the towns of Zormat and Gardez (the capital of Paktia) to keep them supplied. A local madrassa in Zormat appeared to be the key source of this support. This was likely Saifullah Rahman Mansour’s madrassa, named after the son of the former leader of the Mansour insurgent network. Mansour was instrumental in assisting al-Qaeda fighters during Operation Anaconda, and the network maintained close ties with the Haqqani Network since at least the early 1990s. Although Operation Anaconda ultimately killed, captured, or drove al-Qaeda and Taliban forces out of the Shahikot, there are indications that Zormat and the surrounding terrain continued to serve as a safe haven and support zone for Mansour, Haqqani, al-Qaeda, and affiliated fighters after the offensive.

The village of Marzak, nearly forty kilometers south of the center of Zormat district, is one such example. Marzak lies near the border with Paktika in the Nikeh district. The district is extremely mountainous with narrow footpaths snaking south and east to the border with Pakistan’s North Waziristan Agency. It takes approximately two days for fighters traveling on foot from Pakistan to make their way through the mountains to Marzak. During Operation Anaconda, Marzak served as one of the support nodes for enemy fighters held up in the Shahikot. Residents (who largely self-identify as Taliban) admittedly house, feed, and supply fighters moving through the area. A July 2011 ISAF joint operation in the village dubbed Operation Marauder Rapids killed an estimated eighty to 120 insurgents, nearly all of whom were foreigners, such as Waziris, Chechens, and Arabs. In Marzak and the surrounding villages, it is likely the Haqqanis’ relationship with the Mansour network allowed such significant insurgent operations to exist.

The Mansours have historical roots in Zormat. The head of the network, Abdul Latif Mansour, was believed to have been born in Zormat, and as a Zadran Pashtun, he comes from the same tribe as the Haqqani family. Although the Haqqani and Mansour networks maintain a working relationship, it appears to be largely transactional between lower-level operatives in Paktia. Mansour network influence is largely confined to a triangular stretch of terrain between the main roads leading west from Gardez to Ghazni and south from Gardez to northern Paktika province. In Gardez, the capital of Paktia province, the Haqqani Network and Mansour network both enjoy significant influence. Although violence in the town is minimal, it is primarily because Afghan security forces are not patrolling or engaging the insurgency. Gardez is a key waypoint for insurgents moving north to Logar and Wardak provinces, and the town provided critical provisions and other non-
The Mansour network, which maintains ties with the Haqqani Network, is also active in Ghazni and maintains historical linkages to the province. Much like the Haqqani Network, the Mansour network is officially part of the larger Quetta Shura Taliban umbrella movement but enjoys considerable autonomy. The founder of the Mansour network, Mawlawi Nasrullah Mansour, received his religious education at Nur ul-Madaris, a conservative madrassa a few kilometers outside of Ghazni city in Andar district. Although Mawlawi Mansour died in a car bombing in 1993, it is likely that the network relies on the same historical support base today, including the Andar tribe, which operates in eastern Ghazni.

Mansour network militants assist the Haqqani Network by allowing them to operate through their terrain, likely in exchange for money, materials, and technical expertise in IED construction and placement. The southern portions of Zormat are typically described as Haqqani strongholds, while the northern areas are often described as Mansour strongholds. Zormat tribal elders revered Mansour, crediting him with expelling the Soviets from Paktia and preventing Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin commander Naem Kuchi from destabilizing Zormat. Occasionally, incidents have strained the cooperation between the two insurgent groups. In 2011, Haqqani fighters burned a school in Mansour network territory, angering the local population. The Haqqanis are known for employing heavy-handed tactics to coerce and intimidate populations outside of their typical area of influence.

In addition to intimidation and coercion, the insurgency in Zormat provides services to local villages. Usually, this involves providing loans and reducing criminal activity. This shadow governance fills a vacuum created by limited government reach and declining influence and power of local powerbrokers. With local solidarity networks already weakened at the beginning of Karzai’s government, insurgent targeting has made key traditional power structures and figures less and less effective. The insurgency has weakened traditional power structures, limiting their reach and influence. Between 2002 and 2004 the Zormat district government was able to mobilize an arbakai of several hundred to secure district polling centers during the first post-Bonn elections. Since then, the district’s religious shuras have ceased to function, and even the arbakai can no longer be mobilized. By 2012 communities were either unwilling or unable to mobilize arbakai forces due to increased insurgent intimidation.

**THE HAQQANI NETWORK EXPANSION BEYOND LOYA PAKTIA**

**Ghazni**

Ghazni is an important province in Afghanistan to the south of Kabul along Highway One. The Haqqani Network had not exerted much influence in Ghazni in the past, even though the insurgency is strong in that province. The Taliban has been the dominant group in the area since 1995. Famed Mujahideen commander and Harakat-e Inqilab member, Qari Baba, enjoyed a significant amount of influence in Ghazni, but the Taliban defeated his forces when they seized Ghazni in January of 1995. Harakat was one of the seven Mujahideen groups fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, but it fell into disarray after members began defecting to the Taliban. Ghazni was also one of the first provinces to witness a resurgent Taliban when Mullah Farooq led his fighters in an attack against workers of the Afghan Red Crescent Society in Andar district in 2003.

Farooq’s assassination of Qari Baba in 2006 paved the way for increased Taliban control and consolidation of Andar district and its environs.

The Haqqani Network nevertheless uses Ghazni as a transit and support zone, and has moved foreign fighters into and through Ghazni since 2008. Foreign fighters, including Punjabis, Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks, have been reported to be moving through the area facilitated by the Haqqani Network. The activity in Ghazni probably resulted from the Pakistani government’s peace deal with Pakistani Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan in April 2008. Militants who were no longer engaged in attacks against Pakistani security forces became attractive recruits to the Haqqani Network fighting in Afghanistan. The influx of foreigners caused some tension with local Taliban fighters. For example, one local commander was forced to leave the province following a disagreement with some foreigners after one incident in the fall of 2008.
Lieutenant Colonel David Fivecoat, whose battalion served in Andar and Deh Yak districts of Ghazni in 2010 and 2011, said he believes the Haqqanis provide foreign trainers to fighters in Andar district. Some of the expertise they provide is in the building of IEDs. Fivecoat noted that his battalion did not see “foreign fighters” actively engaged against Afghan and coalition forces in Ghazni. Yet in Andar and Deh Yak district, commanders stated that as many as fifty-five percent of insurgents who were captured or killed had come from outside the region to fight. It is

Haqqani and Mansour network fighters also have support zones in Ghazni’s eastern districts of Zanakhan, Deh Yak, Andar, and Giro. Haqqani support for the insurgency in Ghazni includes fighters, money, weapons, communications equipment, and supplies. For example, Ahmed Jan Wazir is as a key commander of the Haqqani Network who operates in Ghazni, serves as a spokesman and advisor to Siraj Haqqani, and acts a liaison to the Quetta Shura Taliban Supreme Leadership Council.
likely that the majority of these fighters were Pakistani recruits from North or South Waziristan, but might not actually be considered foreign fighters by Lt. Col. Fivecoat, since the U.S. military usually reserves that description for Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, and al-Qaeda affiliates.

The Haqqanis’ foreign fighters may not engage in combat in Ghazni, though they are certainly using the province to transit to Kabul and the northern provinces. Haqqani Network facilitators are likely the key enablers to foreign fighter infiltration, including providing infiltration and exfiltration assistance to al-Qaeda members in Pakistan. The IMU, in particular, is known to transit fighters through Ghazni. Ghazni City serves as a waypoint for IMU fighters who are then moved north via Highway One through Kabul and on to Afghanistan’s northern provinces. Often Haqqani Network facilitators serve a second role as IMU facilitators. For example, two Haqqani Network facilitators were captured in Ghazni City in April 2011. One individual provided safehaven for foreign fighters travelling between Paktika and northern Kunduz province, while the other was a dual-hatted Haqqani-IMU facilitator operating out of Orgun district in Paktika. IMU fighters, with assistance from the Haqqani Network, are primarily routed from the Waziristan through central Paktika into the Gelen and Ab Band districts of Ghazni before moving north to Ghazni City, and eventually to Kabul and northern Afghanistan. This is one of two major trade routes throughout the southeast from the Pakistani border region that insurgents have been able to exploit. The other main route is through Pakistan’s Kurram Agency into Nangarhar and then north through Laghman and Kapisa directly into Kabul and northern Afghanistan.

Ghazni also serves as a facilitation node in the Kabul Attack Network (KAN), a confederation of insurgent
groups, including the Haqqani Network, Quetta Shura Taliban, and Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin, that work together to execute attacks in Kabul. According to Task Force Duke, Ghazni City, just north of Andar district, served as a waypoint and major transit route for suicide attack materials and homemade explosives headed north to Wardak and Kabul. Known ISAF operations support this characterization. For example, joint forces searched for a Taliban leader in the Muqer district in January 2011. He was known for weapons trafficking and bomb attacks in Ghazni, but was also linked to a complex suicide attack in Kabul in December that killed four Afghan soldiers. Similarly, joint forces searched Andar in September 2011 for a Haqqani Network facilitator and attack planner who was involved with other insurgent organizations in a plot to carry out a car bomb attack in Kabul.

Logar

The southern approach to Kabul runs through Logar province. Districts in the center of the province comprise a valley that runs north from Paktia province. Paktia and Logar provinces are separated by a ridgeline that extends to mountainous eastern Logar bordering the northernmost portion of Pakistan’s Kurram Agency. The majority of the population in Logar resides in the agricultural areas surrounding the central valley where they engage in seasonal cultivation of wheat, maize, fruits, nuts, grapes, and vegetables.

The Haqqani Network, with the support and cooperation of other insurgent groups, has expanded its presence in Logar province over the past several years. Two of the most important factors that aided the insurgency’s attempts to expand their presence into Logar were the corruption of state institutions and the sidelining of influential religious leaders in a province with historically high levels of religious sentiment. The Haqqanis’ primary motivation for establishing a presence in Logar has been to project men and materiel into Kabul to launch attacks on Afghan, coalition, and other foreign governments operating in Afghanistan’s capital city. According to Captain Kirstin Massey, an intelligence officer with 4th BCT, 10th Mountain Division, who had responsibility for Logar and Wardak provinces for much of 2011, the Haqqanis have extended their reach in both provinces. Massey noted that the Haqqanis’ trademark is their brutality. Beheadings, summary killings, and intimidation became more frequent, particularly in Logar, during the spring of 2011. A Pentagon report released in late 2011 indicated that violence in Logar was roughly seventy-five percent higher than the previous year.

The Haqqani Network has a support and transit zone in Logar’s southern districts of Kharwar, Charkh and Pul-e Alam, which border Paktia’s northern districts of Zormat, Gardez and Ahmadabad. From northern Paktia, Haqqani Network insurgents can easily move men and supplies across the border into Logar province. The mountain range that separates Paktia’s Zormat from Logar’s Kharwar district is crisscrossed with narrow passes and valleys. Insurgents who move through Paktia’s Gardez district into Logar’s Pul-e Alam district can then follow a main road northward directly to Kabul. Haqqani Network fighters, facilitators, and affiliated members of the Kabul Attack Network use key nodes in southern Logar, such as Kharwar and Charkh, to move men and materiel north through Baraki Barak and Pul-e Alam. Several joint clearing operations were launched in Kharwar and Charkh over the course of 2011 to disrupt the enemy network operating in the province. These operations likely disrupted the enemy temporarily, but it is unclear whether they will have an enduring effect without a sizable and enduring reinforcement. According to a member of Logar’s provincial council, as of August 2011, twenty to thirty percent of Charkh’s population had fled the district due to the deteriorating security situation.

The enemy system extends northeast from Charkh and Kharwar into Pul-e Alam district, which is home to the province’s main roadway that runs north to Kabul. North of Pul-e Alam is the expansive district of Muhammad Agah.

The northernmost point of Muhammad Agah district is only twenty-five kilometers from Kabul’s city center. Consequently, the district is a critical logistical and command and control node of the Kabul Attack Network. Numerous facilitators and attack planners have been captured or killed in the district over the course of 2011. These individuals also recruit fighters and suicide bombers who are sent back to North Waziristan to receive training. For example, police in Paktia apprehended a teenager from Baraki Barak district while he was on his way to a Haqqani training facility in Miramshah, North Waziristan.
Nerkh appears to be a command and control node for multiple insurgent groups in Wardak. Quetta Shura Taliban, Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin, and Haqqani fighters have operated out of Nerkh. Historically, Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin has been influential in Wardak province for some time and appears to maintain a sizeable presence in the district. Muzafarudin Wardak, the former commander of the Afghan 42nd Division and until recently the provincial police chief, was a member of Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin before allegedly severing his affiliation in the post-Taliban era. Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin had a strong presence in Wardak during the Soviet occupation, and some of the important commanders of that period were Governor Muhammad Halim Fidai (the current Wardak governor), Faizanullah Faizan, and Mawlawi Abdul Baqi (whose son Shafiq became a Taliban commander). According to an elder interviewed in Sayyadabad, “During jihad, you were not a good Muslim unless you were with Hizb-i Islami.” Some of these individuals, such as former Sayyadabad district governor Fazal Karim, maintained power and influence long after the defeat of the Soviets. A 2007 survey found that nine of twenty mullahs in Wardak had aligned themselves with either Harakat-e-Islami or Hizb-i Islami. The historical ties to the core Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin leadership have continued to the present. An ISAF airstrike killed Habibullah Shahab, a son of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s brother in Karimdad, Nerkh, in April 2011. Shahab was later buried in the same area, which indicates that he has familial ties to the village. Consequently, villagers in and around Karimdad may provide significant local support for Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin.

Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin fighters in Nerkh have often clashed with Quetta Shura Taliban fighters and commanders. Reports of local Taliban engaging in racketeering, kidnapping for ransom, and murder have been widespread, despite specific orders from senior Quetta Shura leadership to not engage in such activities. Similarly, Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin fighters have been accused of attacking construction workers, implementing roadblocks throughout Nerkh, and illegally collecting taxes from locals. In April 2011, Taliban fighters clashed with those of Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin. Although it is unclear what started the disagreement, most often these are turf wars over revenue streams, such as taxation and extortion, in a particular area.
In August 2011, an intelligence officer with a unit operating in the area said, “There’s a lot happening in Tangi. … It’s a stronghold for the Taliban.”

Tangi was the site of perhaps the most devastating security incident suffered by U.S. forces in Afghanistan. On August 6, 2011, a helicopter full of American forces, including Navy SEALs and eight Afghans, was shot down by an insurgent rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) during a nighttime raid on an insurgent position in the village of Jaw-e-Mekh Zareen in the Tangi Valley. The following month, ISAF announced it had killed Qari Tahir, an insurgent operating in the valley who was involved in the attack on the ISAF helicopter. Although the Haqqani Network was not specifically implicated in the attack, it is known to operate in the Tangi Valley. For example, on the eve of the anniversary of the tenth anniversary of the September 11th attacks, the Haqqani Network executed a massive suicide bombing on a coalition base in adjacent Sayyadabad. The blast injured seventy-seven U.S. troops and demolished a portion of the base’s infrastructure.

**NORTH AND EAST OF KABUL: NANGARHAR, LAGHMAN, AND KAPISA**

The Haqqani Network maintains limited but effective operational reach into Afghanistan’s eastern provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman, and Kapisa. Nangarhar is an important and densely populated province in Afghanistan’s east. The provincial capital of Jalalabad is a large city that serves as the southeastern gateway to Pakistan via the Khyber Pass. A major highway through the province connects Kabul to the Pakistan
interrogation, the only surviving attacker remarked that the Haqqanis instructed him to kill everyone in the bank. The attacker stated that he trained at a religious school belonging to the Haqqanis in South Waziristan and that after entering the province of Nangarhar, he was sheltered in a residence located in the Mawlawi Khalis residential area of Jalalabad. After the suspect made these remarks, Sirajuddin Haqqani released a statement threatening to launch operations targeting judges and courts if the captured suspect was executed.

The Haqqani family’s historical ties to Nangarhar province have created relationships that permit the network to operate there. Jalaluddin Haqqani, as a top commander for Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin Khalis (HiK) during the 1980s, worked with other senior HiK leaders to establish and run training camps for Arab Mujahideen fighters operating throughout eastern Afghanistan. It is likely that the Haqqanis maintain relationships with current or former HiK and Tora Bora Front members in order to function in and around Nangarhar. This is not unlike the Haqqanis’ relationship with the Mansour network in Paktia. Within Nangarhar, the Haqqanis’ relationship with local insurgent groups has allowed them to launch occasional attacks in and around Jalalabad, move men and materiel north to Kabul, and facilitate the movement of Uzbek fighters to Afghanistan’s northern provinces, possibly in exchange for material and financial support.

The Haqqanis have also used Nangarhar to traffic IMU insurgents through eastern Afghanistan to border. Nangarhar is bordered by Laghman to the North and beyond that, Kapisa. Haqqani Network influence in Nangarhar is largely limited to the western half of the province in the districts of Hisarak, Sherzad, Chaparhar, and Jalalabad. A presence in these districts, the majority of them opposite Pakistan’s Kurram Agency, allows the network to project force into the provincial capital of Jalalabad, transit east to Kabul, or smuggle men and materials into northern Laghman and Kapisa provinces. In early 2011, more than a dozen Haqqani Network fighters and commanders were detained throughout districts in western Nangarhar. The men were involved in planning, organizing, and facilitating attacks on Afghan government officials and security forces in and around Jalalabad. One Haqqani fighter attempted to purchase stinger missiles for a future attack on Jalalabad Airfield. The Haqqani Network executed a very complex attack in Nangarhar in February 2011. A team of five suicide bombers and gunmen stormed the offices of Kabul Bank in Jalalabad on February 19, targeting Afghan soldiers and policemen who had lined up to collect their monthly salaries. At least thirty-eight people were killed and more than seventy others were wounded in the attack, which lasted several hours. The bank’s security cameras recorded the attack and broadcast the video footage on Tolo TV, a national television channel. The attack sparked outrage, especially in Nangarhar province, which resulted in the Taliban denying responsibility for the attack and instead attributing it to the Haqqanis.
the country’s northern provinces. From Haqqani Network positions in northern Kurram Agency, IMU and other foreign fighters cross into Nangarhar before transiting north through areas of Laghman and the Sarobi district of Kabul province. In Laghman, Haqqani facilitators resource attacks both within the province and in Kabul, while providing assistance for IMU and al-Qaeda fighters moving north. IMU and foreign fighters travel through the Tagab Valley in Kapisa. Although the majority of Kapisa is inhabited by Tajiks, Tagab is predominately Pashtun. From the valley, there is a direct line into northern Afghanistan’s Kunduz, Baghlan, and Takhar provinces, where IMU and foreign fighters are known to operate and conduct attacks.

The Haqqani Network maintains a presence in Kapisa province, which lies roughly fifty kilometers northeast of Kabul, in order to facilitate spectacular attacks in the capital from the districts of Tagab, Nijrab, and Alasai. The Haqqani Network’s operations in Kapisa are led by Mullah Daoud and his brother Amin. Several Haqqani Network operatives have been killed or captured in the province over the past several years. Kapisa is home to a large presence of Taliban and Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin fighters, particularly in the districts of Tagab, Nijab, Kohistan, and Kohband. Enemy activity has steadily increased since as early as 2006, after Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin and Taliban insurgents re-energized historical networks in the province. The Haqqani Network’s presence in Kapisa has sometimes resulted in conflict with other insurgent organizations, such as local Taliban fighters. In 2009, Mullah Daud ordered the assassination of the Taliban’s shadow governor of Kapisa’s Nijrab district. The killing was a reprisal for Taliban commander Mawlawi Mahmud’s decision to kill the Haqqani Network’s shadow governor for the same district.

THE HAQQANI NETWORK AND SPECTACULAR ATTACKS IN KABUL

The Haqqani Network is perhaps best known for its brazen attacks on high-profile targets inside Kabul, where it has been responsible for several dozen attacks since 2007. It has struck at the symbolic infrastructure of the Karzai administration and the NATO presence, including Afghan ministries, NATO compounds, foreign embassies, and hotels and other landmarks associated with foreigners. The Haqqani Network has not been responsible for every attack inside Kabul, but its signature attacks there include sophisticated suicide bombings and coordinated attacks. In a typical Haqqani attack, small groups of gunmen wearing suicide vests assault and then barricade themselves inside a fortified structure. By forcing security forces to lay siege and carefully clear a building, the Haqqani attackers prolong the attack and generate maximum media exposure. Notable examples of Haqqani attacks in Kabul include complex suicide attacks against the Serena Hotel in 2008, an army recruitment center in 2010, the Intercontinental Hotel in 2011, and the U.S. Embassy in 2011.

Haqqani spectacular attacks inside Kabul are an asymmetric strategy designed generate a disproportionate psychological and propaganda effect. The hallmarks of Haqqani attacks—large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, suicide vests, and swarming attackers—capture headlines and create doubts about the ability of Afghan forces to protect the city independently of NATO support. The propaganda value of attacks in Kabul, regardless of their scale, is amplified by the concentrated presence of international and domestic media in the capital. Even a relatively small attack in Kabul can create the appearance of instability and the impression that the city is besieged. According to a 2011 interview with Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, spectacular attacks inside the capital are “not aimed at controlling it physically but to capture it psychologically” with the goal of increasing “the political and financial costs of doing business for foreign forces and diplomatic missions located in Kabul.”

A top Haqqani commander, Taj Mir Jawad, is responsible for the network’s operations in Kabul and is reportedly one of multiple individuals behind the Zabihullah persona, adding extra credence to the psychological aspect of the Haqqani strategy. (Zabiullah is not one individual but rather a persona that Haqqani and Quetta Shura Taliban fighters use to publicize attacks.)

The Haqqani Network primarily uses its extensive lines of communication throughout Khost, Paktia, and Logar in order to facilitate and ultimately stage attacks in Kabul. Low- and mid-level commanders assist in the movement of fighters, weapons, and IED-making components from the border area into the areas surrounding Kabul, primarily in Logar’s Pul-e Alam district. The facilitation of Kabul attacks
preparations places attackers and facilitators at high risk, given the high concentration of security forces and police checkpoints surrounding. NATO and Afghan forces frequently interdict Haqqani operatives and supplies. Afghan National Directorate of Security forces foiled two imminent attacks in January 2011: they arrested a five-person cell planning a complex suicide attack on the home of First Vice President Qasim Fahim and a two-person cell planning a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device on the presidential palace. Security forces disrupted other major plots, including one in May 2011 targeting politician Abdul Rasoul Sayaf and one in October targeting President Karzai. Security forces dismantled as many as ten different cells targeting the November 2011 Loya Jirga. In the case of the October plot, the cell consisted of teachers and students at Kabul University, as well as a palace bodyguard from Karzai’s hometown, some of whom had received training at Haqqani camps in North Waziristan. To infiltrate high security targets and maintain freedom of movement throughout Kabul, the network frequently relies upon sympathizers and bribery.

is intertwined with localized Haqqani operations throughout southeastern Afghanistan. Coalition and Afghan forces have killed and captured numerous individuals who conduct local attacks, in addition to facilitating suicide attacks in Kabul and the movement of foreign fighters. For example, coalition forces captured a commander associated with Taj Mir Jawad’s network in Khost district, Khost, in April 2011. The individual was responsible for facilitation in Pul-e Alam, Logar, illustrating the extent of movement and facilitation networks. A second line of communication, used primarily for staging attacks north of Kabul but occasionally for attacks in Kabul itself, moves fighters and materiel through Haqqani-controlled Kurram Agency, across into Nangarhar and then to staging areas in Kabul’s Sarobi district or Kapisa’s Tagab Valley. The Haqqani Network also utilizes other groups, including the local Quetta Shura Taliban and Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin networks, to provide safe houses and facilitate movement.

Facilitators move fighters and materiel into safe houses in Kabul city from the approaches to the city in Logar, Kapisa, and Kabul districts. This final state of preparations places attackers and facilitators at high risk, given the high concentration of security forces and police checkpoints surrounding. NATO and Afghan forces frequently interdict Haqqani operatives and supplies. Afghan National Directorate of Security forces foiled two imminent attacks in January 2011: they arrested a five-person cell planning a complex suicide attack on the home of First Vice President Qasim Fahim and a two-person cell planning a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device on the presidential palace.

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The Haqqani Network has leveraged its extensive ties with other militant organizations to conduct spectacular attacks in Kabul. Analysts sometimes refer to this Haqqani syndicate as the “Kabul Attack Network,” a name coined by an ISAF public affairs officer in the summer of 2010 after Special Operations Forces conducted a number of major operations in and around Kabul to disrupt planned attacks. Operations continued throughout the summer and fall that disrupted several cells, culminating in the death of senior Haqqani commander Qari Mansour in a valley east of Kabul city. ISAF forces captured or killed several other mid-level Taliban and Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin leaders associated with the group. At the time, ISAF described the syndicate as a composite network of Haqqani, Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin, and Taliban elements. Taliban shadow governor Mullah Dawood (Daoud) and Haqqani commander Taj Mir Jawad led the network.

Little is known about Mullah Dawood (he is believed to be a dual-hatted Haqqani and Taliban commander, who is probably not the same individual as Mullah Daoud in Kapisa). Taj Mir Jawad, however, has a long history of high-profile attacks, dating back to the kidnapping of a French journalist in Nangarhar when he was a Taliban intelligence official in 2001.

According to an ISAF public affairs officer, “The Haqqani Network is deeply entrenched in the Kabul Attack Network, specifically in the facilitation of weapons and fighters into the area south of Kabul in Logar and Wardak.” This analysis, however, downplays the leading role of the Haqqani organization within the overall syndicate. The Haqqani Network functions as the key planner, organizer, and facilitator that pieces together the complex elements necessary for an attack. The Kabul Attack Network has also included, at various points since 2007, elements of al-Qaeda, the Kashmiri group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the anti-Indian group Laskhar-e Taiba, the Pakistani anti-Shia sectarian group Laskhar-e-Jhangi, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin, Peshawar Shura Taliban, and Quetta Shura Taliban.

A major attack in Kabul requires the different capabilities of the “network of networks” in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan, and an informal division of labor exists between the Haqqani Network and other organizations. Haqqani commanders provide command and control, target surveillance, and selection. Additionally, the network finances and facilitates the movement and arming of fighters. Other organizations provide the men. In a typical attack, fighters are recruited from sympathetic Afghan or Pakistani madrassas in Pakistan. Afterwards, they receive further indoctrination and basic small arms training at camps run by a variety of Pakistani militant groups including the TTP, Punjabi Taliban, or Waziristan commanders such as Mullah Nazir or Hafiz Gul Bahadar. Selected recruits receive further training in small arms tactics or in suicide attacks.

Senior Haqqani leaders, including Siraj Haqqani’s brother Badruddin, exert key command and control functions throughout the planning and execution of attacks from their headquarters in Miramshah, North Waziristan. Top leaders directly communicate with cell members in Kabul and even offer tactical advice during attacks. The involvement of senior Haqqani family members and their top deputies suggests that spectacular attacks inside Kabul play a key role in their overall strategy.

The June 2011 Intercontinental Hotel attack provides an example of how the Haqqani Network’s leaders plan and coordinate an attack. According to the State Department, Siraj Haqqani’s maternal uncle, Haji Mali Khan, who was captured by U.S. forces in Musa Khel district of Khost province in October 2011, was a key logistician and financier of Kabul attacks, including the June 2011 attack. A video of this attack released by the Haqqani Network’s media wing, Manba al-Jihad, provides other details of how the Haqqani Network plans and coordinates a spectacular attack. The video shows a Haqqani operative conducting surveillance of the Intercontinental Hotel and unidentified Haqqani commanders utilizing Google Earth and scale models of the hotel while conducting a pre-operation briefing. According to phone intercepts released by Afghan intelligence officials, Badruddin Haqqani and another Haqqani commander, Qari Younis, gave tactical directions to the attackers via cellular phone. Later, special operations forces killed Ismail Jan, a senior Taliban commander involved in the attack, in a raid in Paktia province, further indicating the involvement of the senior leadership cadre in the attack. Habullah Rahman, the deputy head of the Haqqani Network’s Kabul cell, stated that Haqqani leaders were disappointed with the attack; for an unknown reason, the cell executed the raid a day early and missed targeting a major international
These events show the limitations of Haqqani cross-border command and control, but the tactical failure nevertheless generated the desired media attention.

ISAF operations from late 2010 to early 2012 successfully disrupted Haqqani safe houses in the city, but the organization has evolved in response. Increasingly, Kabul attack cells have utilized the support of radical imams to house cell members and to store weapons in local mosques. In February 2011, for example, NDS operatives arrested an imam of a Kabul mosque, who confessed to having ties with the Haqqani Network, for storing a dozen magnetic mines and ten IEDs in his mosque. The imam was connected to a cell responsible for a January 2011 suicide bombing in the capital’s Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood. Coalition forces and Afghan security forces must exert great efforts to disrupt and prevent spectacular attacks in Kabul, because of the Haqqani Network’s increasing territorial presence surrounding the city and active role as the leader of network.

THE HAQQANI NETWORK AND THE NORTHERN INSURGENCY

An influx of Haqqani operatives and associated fighters from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan since 2009 has increasingly destabilized the Afghan North, particularly Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar provinces. These provinces, once considered secure and stable in comparison with southern and southeastern Afghanistan, have seen a sharp increase in spectacular attacks, suicide bombings, and assassinations of key officials and power brokers. The northern insurgency is multifaceted. Hizb-e-Islami and the Quetta Shura Taliban are both present. Criminality and infighting between former Northern Alliance factions—the predominately Tajik Jamiat-e-Islami and the predominately Uzbek Jumbesh—complicate the security picture. The Haqqani Network, through its own activities and its IMU proxies, is positioning itself to take advantage of the chaos produced by this complicated struggle. For the Haqqani Network, expansion into the north serves three strategic purposes: to undermine potential post-2014 rivals through assassinations and other suicide attacks; to contest control of key transit routes and smuggling networks; and to force competitors to divert resources away from other areas the Haqqani Network prioritizes.

By providing sanctuary in Pakistan and facilitation to IMU activities in the North, the Haqqani Network has opened an additional insurgent front, one designed to undermine the leadership of the collection of Tajik Northern Alliance commanders organized under the Jamiat-e-Islami tanzim (organization).

The IMU has evolved from its roots as an Islamist opposition group in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, and its current iteration hardly resembles the original organization. Although it was formally founded in 1998, the IMU’s precursor organization, the Adolat Party, was founded in 1990 by Tohir Yoldash (Tahir Yuldashev) in Uzbekistan’s Ferghana valley, as an Islamist political party challenging the rule of strongman Islam Karimov. After support for the group grew, the government belatedly suppressed it in 1992, forcing its leaders into exile in Tajikistan. Yoldash allied himself with radical forces in the Tajik opposition and organized a guerrilla force to fight in the Tajik civil war. A former Soviet paratrooper named Juma Namangan emerged as the group’s military leader. During this time, Yoldash also traveled extensively in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. With the end of the civil war in 1997 and a simultaneous crackdown in Ferghana, Namangan and Yoldash fled to Afghanistan with scores of Islamist exiles from both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The IMU contingent began an ongoing guerrilla campaign against the Uzbek government from sanctuaries in northern Afghanistan, particularly in Balkh and Kunduz. During this period, Yoldash and Namangan set up training camps in Afghanistan and developed close ties with al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. Though they were ostensibly aimed at overthrowing the Uzbek government and establishing a Sharia-based state, the majority of the IMU’s activities concentrated on controlling the northern drug trade. Due to its extensive connections along the opium pipeline from northern Afghanistan into Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the IMU became a leading narcotics trafficker in Central Asia.

The U.S. invasion in 2001, however, dislodged the group from northern Afghanistan. Namangan was killed while he defended Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001, and the organization was forced into a second exile in Pakistan. Through alliances with local militant and tribal leaders, the IMU contingent found sanctuary in South Waziristan, particularly around Wana. A local commander, Haji Noor Islam—who,
according to an IMU video, married his daughters to his “noble guests” from the IMU and hosted hundreds of “exiles”—provided critical sanctuary and support. The exiles were largely inactive until 2004, when they began participating in attacks against Pakistani security forces alongside Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan commander Baitullah Mehsud and later Hakemullah Mehsud.

The initial support of local militant leaders waned over time, as the IMU increased its participation in attacks against Pakistani forces and engaged in kidnapping and extortion. By 2007, relations with the leading South Waziristan commander Maulvi Nazir, a pro-Pakistan Wazir commander aligned with the Haqqani Network, had become particularly strained. In March 2007, IMU fighters and militants loyal to Maulvi Nazir fought in Wana, leaving seventy-eight Uzbeks and twenty-eight locals dead. Siraj Haqqani and his aide Bakhti Jan personally traveled to Wana to persuade the combatants to stop fighting each other. At the end of the month, Haqqani convened a tribal jirga to broker a ceasefire between Nazir and the Baitullah-affiliated Uzbeks, and both factions pledged wak (authority) to him to settle their dispute. The ceasefire lasted less than two weeks, and over the course of the spring, Pakistani military units and Mullah Nazir’s forces evicted the Uzbeks from Wana and other Wazir-controlled areas. The majority of the IMU contingent found sanctuary in the Mehsud tribal areas in South Waziristan and the Dawar tribal areas around Mir Ali, North Waziristan in 2008 and 2009 under the protection Maulvi Manzoor Dawar. This base of operation, however, is precarious and relies upon the goodwill of the Haqqani leadership to mediate the Uzbeks’ disputes with the two powerful Wazir commanders and the Pakistani state.

From 2008 on, the IMU shifted its strategic focus and its recruitment patterns from Uzbekistan and...
other Central Asian states to the Afghan North, largely focusing on weapons trafficking and narcotics smuggling. A U.S. drone strike killed the IMU’s emir, Yoldash, in August 2009, and a brief power struggle within the IMU leadership ensued. Abu Uthman Adil replaced Yoldash, but the organization’s new mufti (Sunni Islamic scholar), Abu Zar al-Burmi, emerged as an important strategist and ideologue for the group. Adil’s appointment of al-Burmi, a native Urdu speaker of Burmese descent, reflected the shifting composition of the IMU. In his writings for the IMU’s Urdu-language magazine, *Battle of Hind*, al-Burmi, states that the Hind—that is, Pakistan and Afghanistan—rather than Central Asia is the priority for the organization.

In addition to its shifting strategic focus, the actual composition of the organization has changed. “The composition of IMU fighters has become so ‘indigenized’ in Afghanistan and Pakistan that the IMU is ‘Uzbek’ in name only,” according to journalist J.Z. Adams. While it was once composed of Tajik and Uzbek nationals who immigrated with Yoldash to Waziristan, the group recruits heavily from northern Afghanistan, as evidenced by a November 2011 martyrs list released on the IMU website. Only four of the eighty-seven IMU members killed in operations in 2011 came from Uzbekistan, but sixty-four came from Afghanistan, the majority from Baghlan, Takhar, and Kunduz provinces. The message also confirmed the organization’s shifting priorities. In a summary of its operations in 2011, the IMU did not mention Uzbekistan and instead stated that the group had carried out “jihad operations” in a list of Afghan provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan, Samangan, Badakhshan, Faryab, Sar-e-Pol, Kabul, Zabul, Ghazni, Panjshir, and Kapisa. According to the statement, the IMU carried out fidai (suicide) operations in Panjshir and Kunduz.

This shift towards attacks in the North paralleled the organization’s growing reliance on the Haqqani Network for sanctuary and support in Pakistan’s tribal areas. IMU propaganda videos since 2008 have featured footage of joint attacks against U.S. bases in Paktika, Paktia, and Khost. Whether the relationship is purely transactional or guided by a shared ideological approach, the Haqqani Network and the IMU have entered into a cooperative arrangement. The Haqqani Network provides sanctuary and training for the IMU cadre in North Waziristan and facilitates independent IMU attacks in northern Afghanistan. In exchange, the IMU provides foot soldiers for Haqqani organized attacks, such as the May 2010 attack on Bagram.

### NORTHERN POWERBROKERS KILLED BY IMU/HAQQANI NETWORK 2010-2011

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
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<tr>
<td>October 8, 2010</td>
<td>Engineer Mohammad Omar</td>
<td>Governor of Kunduz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moalim Mohammad Nazir</td>
<td>District Governor of Qala-i-Zal district, Kunduz</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Masood Joshan Pur</td>
<td>District Governor of Nahrin district, Kunduz</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 10, 2011</td>
<td>Gen Abdul Rahman Sayed Khili</td>
<td>Provincial police chief of Kunduz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Rahman Aqtash</td>
<td>Deputy provincial police chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 28, 2011</td>
<td>Gen Daud Daud</td>
<td>Police commander “Northern Zone”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shah Jahan Noori</td>
<td>Provincial police chief of Takhar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1, 2011</td>
<td>Commander Yasin (Sangi Mohammad)</td>
<td>Powerbroker in Kunduz and Takhar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 26, 2011</td>
<td>Abdul Mutaleb Baik</td>
<td>Member of Parliament for Takhar</td>
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### FAILED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS 2010-2011

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<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
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<tr>
<td>June 10, 2011</td>
<td>Samiullah Qatara</td>
<td>Provincial police chief of Kunduz</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 14, 2011</td>
<td>Abdul Basir Salangi</td>
<td>Governor of Parwan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sher Ahmad Maladani</td>
<td>Provincial Police Chief for Parwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 23, 2011</td>
<td>Bismullah Khan</td>
<td>Minister of Interior</td>
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<td>December 13, 2011</td>
<td>Bismullah Khan</td>
<td>Minister of Interior</td>
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Airbase or the October 2011 attack on the Panjshir provincial reconstruction team, and acts as a proxy force in the North. Although the IMU increasingly has become dependent on the Haqqanis, the Haqqani Network, for its part, has gained a seasoned fighting force capable of providing attackers for operations throughout the majority of Afghanistan.

Estimates of the size of the Haqqani and IMU presence and the extent of their activities in the North differ greatly. A 2008 Defense Department map shows three pockets of IMU activity in central Kunduz, Shulgara district in Balkh, and Qaysar-Pashtun Kot in Faryab. ISAF and Afghan government reporting from 2009 to 2012 indicates that Haqqani commanders and facilitators have been killed or detained throughout the North, but the Haqqani and IMU presence is concentrated in Baghlan, Takhar, Kunduz, and Faryab. The overall size of Haqqani and IMU forces is disputed. U.S. and Afghan officials stated in 2010 that between 200 and 500 foreign fighters, mostly IMU members, were active in the North. Antonio Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter argue, based upon 2010 fieldwork throughout the north, that the overall number of Haqqani and IMU fighters is much lower, but they note that a number of small IMU groups—teams of ten to twelve—have operated throughout the North.

The overall size of the Haqqani and IMU presence is limited somewhat by the difficulty of infiltrating fighters from Pakistan. The Haqqani and IMU lines of communication stretch from Pakistan’s tribal areas to the border with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The length of these infiltration routes is complicated by geographic chokepoints. The Hindu Kush mountain range poses a severe obstacle and confines transit along one of two routes, either through the Salang Tunnel in Parwan or through mountain passes in Badakhshan. Haqqani and IMU fighters primarily appear to utilize the Salang Tunnel and the Ring Road north of Kabul. The first stages of this route overlap with the two routes used to facilitate attacks in Kabul: moving from North Waziristan Agency to Logar or Wardak via Loya Paktia, or from Kurram Agency through Kapisa’s Tagab Valley via Nangarhar. Militants can also use a more difficult secondary route from Chitral, Pakistan into Takhar via Nuristan and Badakhshan.

The IMU is a combat multiplier among the northern insurgent groups and provides the Haqqani Network the ability to access areas without significant Pashtun pockets. The ability to recruit and foment antigovernment sentiment among disaffected ethnic Uzbeks is key. General Attiqullah Baryalai, the former Afghan Deputy Defense Minister, said the expansion of the IMU in the north has three principal causes: the marginalization of the Uzbek population and its perceived lack of representation, former Mujahideen and anti-Taliban commanders’ loss of influence, and finally “the emergence of radical youth who were educated in Pakistani madrassas.” In areas such as Kunduz and Takhar, where the Taliban includes
ethnic Uzbeks, the distinction between the groups is nonexistent, and analysts suggest there is a “growing integration of IMU cadres and Taliban.” The IMU has been better trained and equipped than local Hizb-e-Islami and Taliban factions, and local militia groups allying themselves with the IMU receive significant benefits, including access to better weaponry and foreign funding. The IMU, for example, embedded with a militia controlled by the Kunduz shadow governor Mawlavi Asadullah and provided his group with new AK-47s with plastic magazines and modern foreign weaponry such as thermobaric RPG warheads. According to an Afghan intelligence official, roughly a third of the northern insurgency’s funding comes from “financial support from Pakistan … which could mean from the ISI or from other sources in the Gulf who channel their money through Pakistan.”

A rising number of assassinations and suicide attacks have occurred in the North since 2009, largely through Haqqani and IMU cells. Approximately forty-five national and provincial officials and power brokers were assassinated or wounded in attacks in the North in 2010 and 2011. Although some of these attacks may be related to factional politics, the Haqqani Network and the IMU have systematically targeted Jamiat commanders and politicians, security officials, and local anti-insurgent commanders. Haqqani suicide bombers have killed numerous national Jamiat leaders have been killed by Haqqani suicide bombers, including Engineer Mohammad Omar, the governor of Kunduz, in October 2010; General Abdul Rahman Sayedkhili, the Kunduz provincial police chief, in March 2011; General Daud Daud, the Afghan National Police commander for the North, and his deputy and Shah Jahan Noori, the Takhar provincial police chief, in May 2011; and the provincial strongman-turned-politician Abdul Mutaleb Baik in December 2011. Other significant Jamiat figures have been the targets of unsuccessful attacks, including Vice President Fahim Khan in January 2011; Samiullah Qatara, the provincial police chief in Kunduz in June 2011; Abdul Basir Salangi, the governor of Parwan, in August 2011; and Bismullah Khan, the minister of Interior, in October 2011.

The hand of the Haqqani Network and the IMU in these attacks is clear. For example, NDS officials captured two Haqqani commanders—Mullah Abdul Qadir and Abdul Haim (AKA Abid)—connected to the October 2010 assassination of Engineer Mohammad Omar. Qadir, a madrassa-educated Uzbek commander from Khwaja Ghar, Takhar, reportedly collected ushr (Islamic tax) throughout the province, indicating linkages between the Haqqani Network and the Taliban shadow government in the province. NDS forces then captured three more Haqqani operatives linked to the assassinations of Omar in October 2010, Daud in May 2011, and Baik in December 2011. The three individuals were students at the Khwaja Mukhtar religious school in Taloqan, Takhar province and were reportedly in contact with a Pakistan-based commander, Qari Abdul Rashid, who was previously the shadow district governor of Darqad, Takhar. In January 2012, ISAF forces captured an individual named Ilhom, a senior IMU commander from Taloqan who was linked to the December 2011 assassination of Abdul Mutalib Baik, as well as other assassinations and suicide bombings. Several other IMU leaders linked to the assassination campaign have also been killed or captured, including an unnamed IMU senior commander in Baghlan district, Baghlan in September 2011.

The Jamiatis are the Pashtuns’ main rival for influence and control of the country and vigorously anti-Pakistani. Consequently, the removal of senior Jamiat leadership has the potential systematically to weaken Pakistan’s primary historical adversary in Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

The Haqqani Network is well-poised to present a grave challenge to the stability of the Afghan state. Unlike the Quetta Shura Taliban in southern Afghanistan, the Haqqani Network has not been the target of a major coalition offensive. Although coalition efforts have degraded the Haqqani Network’s capabilities at intervals over the past several years, the network has tremendous regenerative capacity due to its sanctuary in North Waziristan, recruiting capability in Pakistan, and support from elements of Pakistan’s security establishment.

The campaign of 2012 and 2013 must dismantle the Haqqani Network and its support zones inside of the Afghanistan. The areas that the Haqqanis and their allies control are identifiable and discrete. They do have some active popular support, but they also maintain footholds through the intimidation of the local population. U.S. and Afghan forces have not conducted protracted counterinsurgency operations
in these locations, but rather temporary raids and strikes, which do not deprive the leadership of the support structure on which they rely to project force from Miramshah to Kabul.

Unless Coalition and Afghan forces deliver a severe blow to the Haqqani Network, that capable enemy group will likely continue to expand its geographical reach throughout the country as the majority of U.S. and coalition forces transition lead security responsibility to the Afghans and retrograde from the country. Partnerships with like-minded insurgent entities will help the network expand its range. In the east, the Haqqanis will seek to consolidate their influence in Loya Paktia while continuing to infiltrate and expand their presence in Logar and Wardak provinces to keep pressure on Kabul, maximize safe havens for foreign fighters, and transit IMU fighters to Afghanistan’s northern provinces. In Nangarhar, Kapisa, and Laghman, the Haqqanis will continue to enhance their standing over other insurgent groups, such as Hizb-i Islami and local Taliban, in order to maximize their geographic presence, diversify access routes to Kabul, and maintain alternate transit routes to northern Afghanistan.

The Haqqanis will seek to maintain their influence in Ghazni due to the province’s geostrategic location along Highway One. The Haqqani foothold in Ghazni helps them stake a territorial claim on the edge of the Quetta Shura Taliban’s historical heartland. Over the past year, the Haqqanis have sent men and materiel into the south, either at the request of the Quetta Shura or of their own accord. Their reallocation of resources has demonstrated the power of their network at the same time that the Quetta Shura has lost ground to coalition and Afghan forces. This may be a calculated effort to lure away from local Taliban groups disaffected fighters who are disheartened by the Taliban’s military losses and increasingly alienated by reports of senior Taliban leaders’ supposed willingness to engage in reconciliation talks. The Haqqanis have shown no sincere desire to participate in these talks and are far more likely to present themselves as the bulwark against any sort of compromise with the coalition or the Karzai government.

Transitioning key terrain in eastern Afghanistan to the Afghan National Security Forces will not be possible without substantially degrading the Haqqani Network. The current security situation in Loya Paktia and beyond presents too great of a challenge for the ANSF to address. The Afghan Security Forces lack the intelligence, enablers, and sophisticated command and control required to reclaim the enemy support zones south of Kabul. The Afghan units are also under-filled and wrongly positioned for this fight.

Recent high-level policy discussions about shifting the mission from counterinsurgency to security force assistance are premature, at least in eastern Afghanistan. An early mission change may prevent the conduct of combat operations in an area that requires them. If the Coalition-Afghan force can diminish the security threat from the Haqqani Network in 2012 and 2013, the Afghan forces can assume responsibility for the area south of Kabul while U.S. and coalition provide over-watch and assistance as forces are currently doing in areas of southern Afghanistan.

The Haqqani Network represents the most severe threat to U.S. national security interests and objectives in Afghanistan. The network’s practical and ideological partnerships with international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and their affiliates will undoubtedly continue and likely even increase as U.S. and coalition forces begin to withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network’s growing geographical footprint in concerning because it will allow for the facilitation and sheltering of al-Qaeda and its affiliates on a much larger scale. The Haqqani Network’s cross-border linkages with the Pakistani tribal areas will allow for the maintenance and expansion of a robust facilitation pipeline between the two countries in order to allow for regional and international terrorists to reconstitute and re-energize after years of punishing attacks from U.S. and coalition forces on both sides of the border. Moreover, the Haqqani Network’s objectives in Afghanistan overlap significantly with those of the Pakistani security services; therefore, support for the Haqqani Network will continue and likely even increase as they expand their geographic and operational reach. Allowing the Haqqani Network to continue along its current trajectory will have serious consequences for regional and international stability in the years to come.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Execute aggressive offensive operations in Loya Paktia. In order to decrease the national reach and efficacy of the Haqqani Network, coalition forces must mount
comprehensive and sufficiently-resourced operations against the network in Loya Paktia. This necessitates preserving as much U.S. combat power as possible until these operations can achieve their objectives. These operations must target Haqqani Network safehavens, key support zones and logistical lines. This will weaken the network’s control in their stronghold of Loya Paktia and disrupt the network’s national-level operations. After the successful completion of at least two additional, well-resourced fighting seasons, Afghan National Security Forces could be capable of maintaining an acceptable level of security in and around the southeastern provinces with the caveat that they will need continued support and assistance for some time, including air and supply support in addition to partnering and mentoring.

Constrain and reverse Haqqani Network expansion beyond Loya Paktia. Although the Haqqanis have expanded their operational presence beyond Loya Paktia to Logar, Wardak, Nangarhar, Kapisa, Laghman and a selection of Afghanistan’s northern provinces, they are vulnerable to kinetic action in these areas. Given that the network has not historically operated in these areas, coalition and Afghan forces must identify their support bases in these areas, including tactical or operational alliances with other insurgent groups. If coalition and Afghan forces can understand precisely how the Haqqanis have been able to expand into these new areas, joint forces can devise and execute operations designed to exploit fissures between the Haqqanis and other insurgent groups and the population.

Support Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Loya Paktia and the surrounding provinces. Although there are certainly challenges with implementing VSO, it is a necessary and vital element of the way forward in Afghanistan. If VSO sites are able to deny key tribal populations to the insurgency, they may ultimately constrain their operational freedom while rebuilding tribal solidarity and institutions capable of resisting their influence.

Target key Haqqani Network leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Haqqani Network and indeed the Haqqani family are extremely influential. The ideological and strategic cohesion of the network is held together by key Haqqani Network family members and trusted senior commanders in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, the capture and kill missions to remove such key individuals as Haji Mali Khan and his deputy, Dilawar, have had a negative effect on the network’s command and control. The death of Jan Baz Zadran in Miramshah, North Waziristan in October 2011 was also significant. Jan Baz was the third-in-command of the Haqqani Network and a trusted member of the Haqqani Network inner circle. Despite these notable achievements, the majority of the senior Haqqani commanders and family members, such as Siraj, Badruddin, Nasruddin, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Jalaluddin’s brothers, Ibrahim Omari and Haji Khalil, are still alive and actively involved in the network’s operations. The family leadership maintains the ties with foreign terrorists such as al-Qaeda, the IMU and others. Removing these senior leaders and family members from the battlefield in Afghanistan and Pakistan could help fracture the network. Of course, if in fact direct action inside of Pakistan is possible and taken, it will likely further strain the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. If President Obama wishes to achieve his core objectives in Afghanistan, the effect may be worth the cost.

Continue to train, mentor and equip the Afghan National Security Forces, including the Afghan Commandos. No matter how successful U.S. and coalition forces will be if they are given the time and resources needed to degrade and dismantle the Haqqani Network, the ANSF will need to remain active to secure Kabul and its approaches in the future. Their success depends on multiple factors, including the quantity and quality of the force combined with the necessary funding commitment from the U.S. and international community. Recent efforts to reduce the overall of the ANSF in order to control costs are potentially catastrophic mistakes that will imperil efforts to transition security responsibilities to the Afghans. If the U.S. and international community wish to withdraw troops in Afghanistan in the near future, reducing the quantity and quality of the ANSF is the wrong approach.
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