The Kremlin’s Campaign in Africa: Assessment Update

By Nataliya Bugayova and Darina Regio

[This paper expands on the initial assessment of Russia’s campaign in Africa published in October 2018. ISW is monitoring developments ahead of the inaugural Russia–Africa Summit in Sochi on October 24.1]

Key Takeaways: The Kremlin’s campaign in Africa is a case study of the methods it uses to pursue its global objectives. Russian President Vladimir Putin is no mere opportunistic predator. His investments in Africa are strategic despite their limited scope and results, and will likely have important long-term consequences. Russia’s expansion of influence in Africa could reduce the impact of coercive sanctions, provide an additional revenue stream for the regime, and expand its military footprint and global disinformation network. It additionally has implications for the counter-terrorism efforts by the U.S. in Africa. The campaign also provides insight into the Kremlin’s potential points of vulnerability, including its overreliance on human networks and the risk of blowback from failed influence operations.

The Kremlin is deepening its outreach to Africa as a key component of its wider global campaigns.2 Russian President Vladimir Putin holds a set of core strategic objectives: preserving his regime, suppressing political dissent, expanding his economy, reestablishing his state as a global power, and diminishing the global influence of the U.S. and NATO. He seeks to break the unity of the West and reestablish suzerainty over the former Soviet Union. He is reestablishing a global military footprint that aims to shape the activity of his adversaries at low cost using small numbers of troops and advanced area denial systems. He is attempting to create a constellation of pliable states and political alliances and legitimize his violations of international law. He is waging several campaigns in support of these goals, some more coordinated than others. These campaigns transcend geographic boundaries and feature multiple intertwined lines of effort.

In Africa, Russia sees an opportunity to expand its military footprint and mitigate the negative economic consequences of its deteriorating relationship with the West. It also likely aims to balance against the global influence of China. The Kremlin aspires to pull African states into the network of geopolitical alliances and shared global information space that it has built to cast itself as a revitalized great power, international mediator, humanitarian actor, and effective counter-terrorism partner.3 It has dedicated some of its most senior officials to this coordinated effort to expand its influence in Africa. Russia has focused on boosting its bilateral military and economic ties throughout Africa. It will host its first major Russia–Africa Summit in Sochi in October 2019 in partnership with Egypt.

The Kremlin views Africa as an avenue to boost its economy without reform by developing new revenue streams and undermining the sanctions regime imposed by the West. Putin’s ability to sustain an assertive foreign policy, maintain domestic control, and subsidize his inner circle of power requires a stable economy. The Kremlin likely views Africa as a growing market for its goods, a potential venue to evade sanctions, and a source of lucrative deals for close associates of Putin.
Russia is expanding its access to natural resources in Africa. Russia’s Alrosa expanded its diamond mining investments in Zimbabwe and Angola in 2019. Russia’s Nordgold similarly expanded its gold mining investments in Burkina Faso in March 2019 while Rosalco — the state-owned defense conglomerate — signed a $4 billion deal to develop a new platinum mine in Zimbabwe in April 2019. Meanwhile, Gazprom expressed interest in new natural gas projects in Algeria in February 2019 while Zarubeshneft discussed joint oil projects with Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in April — May 2019. Rosgeologia signed similar cooperation agreements with Algeria, Madagascar, and Sudan in 2018.

Russia also seeks to expand its exports and investments in Africa. Russia seeks to export a wide array of goods ranging from medicine and food to energy products to create new revenue streams, diversify its economy away from hydrocarbons, and mitigate the effects of international sanctions. Russia is attempting to capture a larger share of the continent’s wheat market, particularly in Algeria, Morocco, and Libya. It is already a major source of wheat for Egypt. The Kremlin also emphasizes infrastructure development in Africa. Russia and Hungary discussed joint railway projects with Angola in November 2018. Russian Railways has also eyed partnerships in Botswana and Libya. Russia may intend to use this infrastructure in support of its other activities in Africa.

Russia might also use Africa as a platform to evade sanctions through money laundering. Many African states suffer from weak governance that creates a permissive environment for money laundering by foreign actors. Angola, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Libya — all of which are states where Russian entities are currently seeking to do business — rank among the most corrupt governments in the world. Russia tends to invest in industries well suited to money laundering, such as commodities and natural resources.

Africa is likely a potential additional revenue source for close associates of Putin. Sergey Ivanov — the son of former Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov — is Alrosa’s CEO. Yevgeny Prigozhin — a close associate of Putin indicted for his role in the interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election — has also reportedly received concessions for diamonds and gold in the Central African Republic. Putin’s associates are also linked to Russia’s grain exporters as well as Russian Railways.

Africa is a major target of the Kremlin’s strategic effort to cultivate the global nuclear energy market. Russia is capitalizing on its competitive advantage in the nuclear energy market relative to the West. It also likely seeks to preempt expansion into the sector by China. Russia has signed agreements to build nuclear power plants in Hungary, Turkey, Finland, Iran, Belarus, Bangladesh, and India since 2017. In Africa, Rosatom — the state atomic corporation — is building the first nuclear power plant in Egypt. It also holds an agreement to develop the Geregu Nuclear Plant in Nigeria. It signed a new roadmap with Ethiopia and expanded existing agreements with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in 2019.

Russia likely seeks to create a market for the full range of nuclear-related services including engineer training, fuel provision, and physical security. It likely aims to make local governments dependent on its largesse to maintain their nuclear plants. Rosatom will supply nuclear fuel for the first ten years of operation of Egypt’s El Dabaa Nuclear Plant. Russia has also attempted — unsuccessfully thus far — to obtain licenses for uranium exploration in Namibia. The Kremlin may ultimately intend to develop an integrated nuclear energy production and extraction system in Africa.

Rosatom is leveraging similar information and outreach tactics similar to those of the Kremlin. Rosatom is pursuing nuclear science centers to promote nuclear energy in Rwanda and Ethiopia, replicating a model previously developed in Zambia. It has promoted nuclear energy through formal partnerships and youth programs, including an annual video contest called ‘Atoms for Africa.’ The winners included videos entitled “How Would You Explain the Benefits of the Peaceful Atom to Your Fellow Africans?” and “Going Nuclear: Africa’s Energy Future” in 2018. Rosatom signed a memorandum...
of understanding to build positive public opinion about nuclear energy in Rwanda in May 2019. It is also conducting a soft power campaign using a variety of tools ranging from fishing tournaments near nuclear power plants to the annual ATOMEXPO Forum.

Russia is creating a cadre of Russian-educated nuclear energy scientists in Africa. Rosatom launched a scholarship program for Africans to study nuclear-related fields in Russia in January 2019. It claimed that the program received thousands of applicants from Nigeria. Rosatom invited international nuclear energy students to tour the Leningrad Oblast (Region) Nuclear Plant in June 2016. Representatives from Tanta University in Egypt similarly visited the Beloyarsk Nuclear Plant in Sverdlovsk Oblast in December 2018.

Russia views Africa as a key part of its effort to regain a global military footprint. Putin intends to expand his military’s freedom of movement and impose additional operational costs on the U.S. and NATO. He has secured long-term air and naval basing in Syria since 2015. The Russian Armed Forces and its proxies are now openly operating in Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela. The Kremlin intends to expand its maritime presence in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Arctic.

Russia holds basing aspirations in Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Eritrea, and (possibly) Burundi and Somaliland. The Kremlin has had limited success in its effort to secure new military basing in Africa. It has not yet finalized a two-year-old draft agreement for access to airspace and airbases in Egypt. Russia is nonetheless deepening its relationship with Egypt through other means including the Russia-Africa Summit and the expansion of the Russian Industrial Zone in Egypt.

Russia likely almost brokered a deal for naval basing in Sudan before the ouster of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. The Kremlin discussed establishing a naval supply center on the Red Sea in Sudan in 2018. Sudan signaled that it would be open to the proposal in January 2019. Russian media claimed that Russia and the new Government of Sudan later signed a seven-year military agreement after the removal of Bashir in May 2019. Neither government confirmed the deal. The deal reportedly included rules of entry for military vessels and aircraft. The Kremlin likely has a chance at resuming the basing talks given its investment in a diverse set of stakeholders across Sudan.

Russia’s efforts to secure naval basing in Libya likely experienced a similar slowdown due to the start of an offensive by Libyan National Army (LNA) Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar on Tripoli in April 2019. The Kremlin has historically supported Haftar but Libya’s descent into renewed active civil war will likely hinder any short-term prospect of basing from Russia in Libya. Like Sudan, Russia has maintained ties with various political actors across both sides of the Libyan Civil War. The Kremlin may attempt to leverage this outreach or its involvement in a future peace process to gain its desired military access in Libya.

Russia has also held talks to build a naval logistics center on the Red Sea in Eritrea since 2018. Russia had advocated for sanctions relief for Eritrea before the UN removed sanctions from Eritrea in November 2018. Putin signed a decree lifting Russian sanctions on Eritrea in July 2019. Russia will likely attempt to use this economic and diplomatic support to revitalize basing discussions with Eritrea.

Russia may also expand further inland into the Central African Republic (CAR). CAR Defense Minister Mari-Noelle Koyara stated in January 2019 that he did not rule out a military base for Russia in the CAR. Russia operates a training center in the CAR under a military cooperation agreement signed in 2018.

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Russia has signed agreements ranging from general memorandums of understanding to substantive deals that include arms sales, training services for local forces, and joint military exercises.

- **Assessed Basing Aspirations**: Russia is pursuing strategic basing or expanded access to naval facilities in several countries.
- **Assessed Training of Local Security Forces**: Russia has signed agreements to provide training services to security forces (ranging from law enforcement to military) and has started training some of them.

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**Map Legend**

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**Graphics by**: Alexandra McClintock and the ISW Russia Team

**Base map source**: Wikimedia Commons
The Kremlin has undertaken a piecemeal expansion of its security service provision in Africa. Russia has signed agreements to train local security forces or is actively training local security forces — from law enforcement to military personnel — in Chad, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Botswana, Burundi, and Madagascar. It secured most of these deals since 2017. In 2019, Russia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed an agreement to dispatch military specialists to the Congo to “service hardware” from Russia. The Russian Interior Ministry has also held annual training for small numbers of peacekeeping troops operating in Africa.

The Kremlin has layered these services onto general military cooperation agreements, which it has signed with at least twenty-eight states in Africa. The Kremlin has capitalized on historical security ties between Africa and the Soviet Union, but it made a coordinated push to expand beyond these partnerships starting in 2014. The Kremlin frequently uses counter-terrorism and anti-piracy efforts as the basis for these deals. Russia signed its latest military cooperation agreement in Africa with Mali in June 2019. It has also reportedly sought to establish offices of the Russian Defense Ministry in Sudan and the Central African Republic.

The Kremlin is also expanding its arms sales to Africa. Russia is the largest supplier of arms to Africa, accounting for over a third of all arms exports to the continent. It currently holds more than $50 billion in military contracts with Africa. Russia signed a $2 billion deal to sell over twenty Su-35 ‘Flanker-E’ fighter jets to Egypt in March 2019. The Kremlin will likely attempt to close these deals and scale this model to other states across Africa.

The Kremlin is attempting to pull Africa into its global information space. Russia wages a wide array of information campaigns in support of various strategic objectives, ranging from normalizing its violations of international norms to undermining the sanctions regime. Its war on the idea of truth has been perhaps its most damaging recent undertaking across the globe. RT, Sputnik, and other state-controlled media outlets have increasingly prioritized the formation of local partnerships to expand their reach and (likely) ensure a more sustainable presence. Russian media outlets have signed cooperation agreements in the past two years with partners in China, India, Pakistan, the West Bank, and Mongolia. These deals may enable Russia to launder its narratives and obscure the true source of its information campaigns.

In Africa, Russia is investing in the information space through partnerships and soft power outreach. RT and Sputnik already broadcast their content in Africa. Both organizations have nonetheless started to expand into new local partnerships. ANO TV-Novosti RTTV — the parent organization of RT — signed a cooperation agreement to share content with Eritrean Eri-TV on May 13. RT also explored cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s National RadioTV Corporation (RTNC) in November 2018. Sputnik signed a cooperation agreement with RTNC in May 2019. It also holds deals with several other outlets in Africa including the South African Government News Agency. Prigozhin also reportedly sponsors a radio station in the Central African Republic. The Kremlin is also using soft power to legitimize its illegal activities. The Russian Foreign Ministry hosted celebrations of the fifth anniversary of its occupation of Crimea in several states including the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Botswana.

The Kremlin uses its information campaign to legitimize itself and aid its other strategic objectives in Africa. The Kremlin uses an evolving set of narratives to portray itself as a great power, peacemaker, humanitarian actor, counter-terrorism partner, and counter-narcotics fighter. Russia is attempting to boost these narratives in Africa. The Kremlin has attempted to insert itself into the

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peace process in Libya. The Russian National Anti-Drug Union signed a memorandum of understanding with Rwanda in May 2019. Russia is positioning itself as a partner against Ebola. Rusal completed trial vaccinations against Ebola in Guinea in 2018. Russia later announced plans to ship the vaccine to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Kremlin amplifies these limited investments through its propaganda machine.

The Kremlin is also attempting to pull Africa into a network of states that gravitate towards Russia. Putin has been working hard to create multiple international blocs and groupings centered on Russia as a counter to the international order led by the U.S. Few of these efforts have thus far been effective, but the tenacity with which they are pursued demonstrates their importance to the Kremlin.

In Africa, Russia has experienced some minor successes, such as a military-technical cooperation agreement between Russia and the Southern African Development Community. Yet other efforts have slowed, including a free trade agreement between Egypt and the European Economic Union led by Russia.

The Kremlin is expanding its low-cost human networks across Africa over the past year. It uses targeted and limited measures and investments in human capital, amplified through its information networks, to achieve strategic gains at relatively low cost – a necessary optimization given its struggling economy.

The Kremlin is creating numerous forums to foster high-level personal relations with African leaders. Several hundred officials from Africa visited Russia in 2019 to attend two major conferences centered on economic and parliamentary cooperation with Africa as well as the Ufa Security Forum. Russia has also worked to cultivate ties with African powerbrokers at other venues including the Yalta International Economic Forum, ATOMEXPO, and the annual International Army Games.

The Kremlin is diversifying its outreach to include subnational and legislative ties with Africa. Russia has worked to develop region-to-region ties across Africa. Russia’s Sverdlovsk Oblast sent a delegation to discuss economic investment with Eritrea in February 2019. Russia has also floated cooperation on the provincial level between Russia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Russia has adopted a similar approach in Syria. The Kremlin is also working to build parliamentary ties with Africa. Russian State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin held a forum to engage African parliamentarians in July 2019. Russia has built ties with the Russia-DRC Friendship Group in the Parliament of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Russia is cultivating these links to ensure future support for its interests in Africa.

The Kremlin is also making a long-term investment in the educated cadre of future leaders in Africa. Russia is funding new scholarships for Africans to study in Russia. The Russian Foreign Ministry has held numerous ambassador-level engagements with local universities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola in 2019. Russia established university partnerships with Botswana in March 2019. It also opened a cultural center in Namibia in 2018. The Kremlin is leveraging the historic ties of many of these states to the Soviet Union. Russia holds regular meetings with African graduates of universities from the Soviet Union and leverages these networks to promote its image. For example, Soyuznik — the Russian alumni organization in Angola — organized several humanitarian events highlighting Russia in 2019.

The Kremlin is likely growing its own cadre of experts on Africa. Russian students are reportedly increasingly interested in African Studies. Sevastopol State University in the illegally occupied Crimean Peninsula opened a program of African Studies in March 2019. Saint Petersburg State University launched a competition for emerging social scientists to conduct fieldwork in Africa in 2017. Russia’s Sberbank funds a Young Global Pioneers Program that allows Russians with technical skills to spend three weeks in Tanzania.
Implications

The Kremlin's engagements in Africa suffer from a number of potential vulnerabilities. The Kremlin will ultimately likely run into its inherent limits in Africa — its investments are too sparse, its narratives often do not stick, and its value proposition is likely to be outcompeted by other actors such as China. Its emphasis on human networks and information campaigns enable it to accomplish a lot with a little in the absence of competition. These means will likely become a limiting factor in the future. Russia has also stretched itself thin with only a few officials and business executives to cover the whole of Africa. The quantity and quality of human capital among its agents remain one of the key constraints of the Kremlin.

The Kremlin is likely to experience blowback in Africa.\(^95\) Russia suffers harm when its covert campaigns are exposed, as seen in its attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Its secrecy makes revelations about its efforts major news, attracts sanctions and other forms of punishment, and generally stokes suspicion about its motivations. Such exposure raises costs, as it generally requires the replacement of human agents, which in turn implies additional time, resources, and further risk of exposure.

The Kremlin has already suffered several blown operations with the potential to cause blowback in Africa. Libya detained two men accused of working for an online ‘troll farm’ linked to Prigozhin in July 2019. Libya stated that they were attempting to influence the 2019 Libyan Presidential Election.\(^96\) One of the men had previously participated in a separate alleged plot to influence the 2018 Madagascar Presidential Election.\(^97\) The decision to reuse an exposed asset could indicate human capital constraints or a low perception of risk in Africa. The individual in question also held ties to the newly created Russian Foundation for the Protection of National Values, which features a dedicated ‘African Discussion Club’.\(^98\) The likely goals of this organization include framing domestic and international perceptions about the role of Russia in Africa. The Foundation has confirmed that it has experts on the ground in Sudan.\(^99\) Former Central African Republic President Karim Meckassoua has also accused Russia of influencing a vote of no confidence that removed him from power in order to gain easier access to natural resources.\(^100\) Finally, The Guardian claimed to obtain documents detailing a wide-ranging influence campaign (including staged protests and disinformation) funded by Prigozhin in Africa.\(^101\) While it is difficult to judge the direct effect of these disclosures, they will likely raise the costs to the Kremlin and could increase local suspicions regarding the motives of Russia in Africa.

The Kremlin's framing of its efforts in Africa might also backfire in the long term. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has stressed the need for “African solutions to African problems” and asserted that “Africa is underrepresented” in international organizations like the UN.\(^102\) Rosatom has framed its own push for nuclear energy as helping the continent to become self-sufficient.\(^103\) Russia often stresses that it has never been a colonial power in Africa and that the Soviet Union helped many of the fights for independence across Africa.\(^104\) It directs this anti-colonial rhetoric against the West, particularly France.\(^105\) These narratives may resonate in the short term with select powerbrokers in Africa. However, they will likely come into conflict with the reality that the Kremlin can only afford limited investments in Africa.

"Africa is likely a potential additional revenue source for close associates of Putin."
The Kremlin’s outreach to Africa will nevertheless likely yield limited but important gains. The Kremlin has accelerated its engagement with Africa ahead of its Russia–Africa Summit in October 2019. Russia is attempting to saturate the diplomatic landscape, build or reestablish ties, and sign new framework agreements with states across Africa. It plans to use the summit to present its ‘Russia-Africa: Shared Vision 2030’ and strike numerous bilateral deals in the energy, agriculture, transport, healthcare, military–industrial, and mining sectors. The Kremlin also intends to sign a memorandum of cooperation between the African Union and the Eurasian Economic Union.¹⁰⁶

The Kremlin will likely attempt to secure the maximum possible number of deals in Africa, although only a few are likely to produce tangible gains for Russia. The Kremlin will further attempt to layer on new services such as military training, weapon sales, and access to naval facilities onto its existing military cooperation agreements in Africa. It will also prioritize securing access to new natural resource, boosting its exports, and cornering the emerging nuclear energy market — areas where it will likely experience moderate and gradual success. It will also expand its influence in the continent’s information space, build out its human network, and create new opportunities to evade sanctions, secure additional cash for core associates, and boost its global disinformation campaigns.

The Kremlin’s campaign in Africa affects the strategic interests of the U.S. and Europe. Putin could exploit Africa’s wealth of natural resources and weak governance to strengthen his regime and weaken the effects of sanctions imposed for its illegal global activities. The U.S. also holds a legal obligation to counter the illicit exploitation of natural resources in Central Africa under the Dodd–Frank Act Section 1502. Putin might also succeed in his attempts to secure naval basing or an anti-access / area denial zone in Africa. This foothold could enable Russia to contest the strategic maritime chokepoints of the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The Kremlin’s support for hostile or incompetent regimes also stands to worsen popular grievances and set favorable conditions for further growth by Salafi-Jihadist Groups in Africa.¹⁰⁷

The authors would like to thank Emily Estelle and James Barnett of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute for their feedback on a draft of this assessment.

Key Assessed Characteristics of the Kremlin’s Campaign in Africa:

- The Kremlin is employing existing and evolved tactics to achieve its strategic goal — namely, preserving the current regime and expanding its military footprint, geopolitical clout, and global information space.
- The Kremlin likely views Africa as a source of potential revenue and a venue to evade sanctions.
- The Kremlin’s campaign is comprehensive and coordinated with its other global campaigns. It has engaged some of the most senior officials in the Kremlin.
- The Kremlin uses limited and targeted financial and human investments amplified by its propaganda machine to achieve strategic benefits at minimum cost.
- The Kremlin’s campaign currently prioritizes scale over depth. It pursues general framework agreements followed by new layers of additional services and conditions.
- The Kremlin has diversified its political investments within select countries across Africa.
- The Kremlin’s campaign has inherent limits and demonstrates a number of vulnerabilities, including an overreliance on human networks and the risk of blowback from failed influence operations.
Appendix A: 
The Kremlin’s Action Officers in Africa

Author: Michaela Walker with the ISW Russia Team

The Kremlin uses a wide network of individuals and organizations (operating in both an official and unofficial capacity) to pursue its strategic objectives in Africa. This chart provides a non-exhaustive overview of some of the key entities operating on behalf of Russia in Africa. It excludes high-level individuals routinely involved in major foreign policy campaigns such as Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev.

**Mikhail Bogdanov** is Russian Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa and Deputy Foreign Minister. In this capacity, he serves as Putin’s primary diplomat for Africa. He has personally met with senior representatives from most states in Africa and his visits are indicators of intended expansion for the Kremlin.

**Nikolai Patrushev** is Russian Security Council Secretary and the former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director. He has participated in military deals and diplomatic meetings in numerous countries in Africa including Angola, South Africa, and Egypt. He has hosted leaders from Egypt, Burundi, Namibia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tunisia, and Uganda during the annual Ufa Security Forum in Russia.

**Dmitri Patrushev** is Russian Agriculture Minister and the son of Nikolai Patrushev. He has worked to secure bilateral agricultural and economic cooperation deals with South Africa and Morocco.

**Vyacheslav Volodin** is Russian State Duma Chairman. Volodin is developing ties with legislatures in Africa. He chaired the International Development of Parliamentarism Forum in July 2019 including a dedicated section on Russia and Africa, where he met with officials from Libya and Ethiopia. He has advocated for bilateral educational deals and expanded programs to teach Russian in Africa, emphasizing that thousands of Africans study in Russia.

**Yuri Ushakov** is an International Affairs Aide to Putin. He is the lead coordinator of the upcoming Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi in October 2019.
Yevgeny Prigozhin is a major businessperson and a close associate of Putin. He reportedly funds the Russian Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group.\(^{125}\) The U.S. indicted Prigozhin and two of his companies — the Internet Research Agency and Concord Management — for interfering in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.\(^{126}\)

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<tr>
<th>Private Military Companies</th>
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<tr>
<td>At least two Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs) currently operate in Africa — the Wagner Group and the RSB Group. RSB Group Chair Oleg Krynitsyn confirmed that the group has contractors in Libya and a regional office in Nigeria.(^{127}) Wagner reportedly operates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mozambique, Central African Republic, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Sudan.(^{128}) Russian PMCs train local forces and likely support the push for mineral resources in Africa.</td>
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<th>Valeriy Zakharov</th>
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<tr>
<td>is Russian Special Security Advisor to the President of the Central African Republic (CAR).(^ {129}) In this capacity, he has overseen a number of new arms deals and deployments of Russian PMCs to the CAR.(^ {130})</td>
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<th>Foundation for the Defense of National Values</th>
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<tr>
<td>is a new Russian NGO implicated in a reported effort to influence elections in Libya in 2010.(^ {131}) The Foundation runs the African Discussion Club, with the expressed purpose of deepening ties between Russia and Africa. Its experts operate from locations in Africa including Sudan and Libya.(^ {132}) Russia likely uses the Foundation to collect information and shaping the public narrative about Russia in Africa.</td>
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<th>Alexander Malkevich</th>
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<td>is the Foundation for the Defense of National Values Chair.(^ {133}) He is likely an associate of Prigozhin, having previously worked at the Internet Research Agency as well as USA Really — a news organization sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department.(^ {134})</td>
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<th>Maxim Shugaley</th>
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<td>is a political consultant employed by the Foundation for the Defense of National Values.(^ {135}) The BBC implicated Shugaley in a plot to shape the 2018 Madagascar Presidential Election.(^ {136}) Security forces later detained him for attempting to influence the 2019 Libyan Presidential Elections.(^ {137})</td>
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<th>Rosatom Africa</th>
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<tr>
<td>is the regional branch of Russia’s Rosatom — the state-owned atomic energy corporation.(^ {138}) Rosatom Africa builds nuclear power plants and cultivates the emerging nuclear energy market in Africa.(^ {139}) It has signed numerous cooperation agreements with African states including Ethiopia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, and Tanzania.(^ {140})</td>
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<th>Dmitry Shornikov</th>
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<tr>
<td>is the Chief Executive Officer of Rosatom Central and Southern Africa.(^ {141}) He has focused on deals to promote nuclear energy from Russia in Africa.(^ {142})</td>
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**Alrosa** is a Russian diamond-mining corporation. It is currently expanding projects in Zimbabwe and Angola. Alrosa CEO Sergey Ivanov – the son of an associate of Putin – announced that Alrosa would invest $12 million in diamond exploration in Zimbabwe in July 2019.

**Rosgeologia** is a Russian state-owned geological exploration company that works with multiple states in Africa. It signed an agreement to develop natural gas in the Red Sea with Sudan in July 2018. It also entered into an agreement with South African Petro SA to explore and develop any oil and gas on the Southern South African Shelf in 2018. It has signed geological cooperation and educational programs with Algeria and Angola.

**Rostec** is a Russian state-owned conglomerate focused on defense and technology. It holds weapon sales contracts with African countries including Uganda and Zimbabwe as well as a platinum contract with Zimbabwe.

**Rosneft** is a Russian state-owned oil and natural gas corporation that has contracts throughout Africa. It signed an oil exploration agreement with Mozambique in October 2018. It also signed a memorandum of understanding with Nigerian Oranto Petroleum and a deal to deliver liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Ghana in May 2018.

**Rusal** is a Russian aluminum corporation. It operates a refinery in Guinea and a joint enterprise with the Aluminum Smelting Company of Nigeria. Rusal built a Scientific Clinical and Diagnostic Center for Epidemiology and Microbiology at the height of the 2015 Ebola Epidemic in Guinea. It worked with the Russian Health Ministry to administer two thousand trial vaccinations in Guinea in December 2018.

**Russia Today, Radio Sputnik**, and other Russian state-owned media companies are creating partnerships with local news organizations across Africa. Ano-TV — the owner of Russia Today — agreed to gift equipment and information to the Eritrean Eri-TV in May 2019. Radio Sputnik similarly signed a cooperation agreement to exchange news content and journalists with Cote d’Ivoire’s AIP in August 2019.


3. Ibid., pg. 31


32. Ibid.


82. [“On the Meeting of the Russian Ambassador with the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Middle East and African Countries Russian Deputy Foreign Minister M.L. Bogdanov with the Special Presidential Envoy from DRC P. Myanda Congo,”] Russian Foreign Ministry, April 4, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/ld/-/asset_publisher/0UDulyKohRL/content/1248541.
86. [“On the Meeting of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Middle East and African Countries Russian Deputy Foreign Minister M.L. Bogdanov with the Special Presidential Envoy from DRC P. Myanda Congo,”] Russian Foreign Ministry, April 4, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/ru/maps/ld/-/asset_publisher/0UDulyKohRL/content/1248541.


