ACCELERATING COMBAT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN
Cover photo: Afghan National Army (ANA) Military Police Trainees practice vehicle mount and dismount drills at Kabul Military Training Center under ANA and Task Force Phoenix Headquarters Security Support Command supervision on June 4, 2007. U.S. Army Soldiers of Task Force Phoenix have the mission to train and mentor the ANA. The ANA is an all volunteer army much like the military forces in the United States. The ANA is ethnically balanced at all levels and provides a truly representative force for the people of Afghanistan. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Jim Downen 218th BCT PAO) (Released).
REPORT 2
BEST PRACTICES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
Lieutenant General James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.)

ACCELERATING COMBAT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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LTG Dubik commanded Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) from June 10, 2007 until July/August 2008. During this final command, he oversaw the accelerated generation and training of the Iraqi Security Forces. Previously, he was the Commanding General of I Corps at Ft. Lewis, the Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division, and the Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. As the DCG for Transformation, LTG Dubik led the effort to create the Army’s first Stryker Brigade Combat Team and design the training and leader development program for these unique formations. Dubik has held numerous leadership and command positions with airborne, ranger, light and mechanized infantry units around the world. He was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry from Gannon University as a Distinguished Military Graduate in 1971, and he retired from service on September 1, 2008.

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His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, four awards of the Legion of Merit, five awards of the Meritorious Service Medal, and numerous Army Commendation and Achievement Medals. He is ranger, airborne and air assault qualified and holds the expert infantryman’s badge, master parachutist badge as well as the Army Staff Identification Badge.

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.
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OVERVIEW

- Building foreign security forces is a challenge at any time due to political and cultural barriers, but it is even more so during active combat.

- Under my command, Multi-National Security and Transition Team – Iraq (MNSTC-I, pronounced “minstickey”) accelerated the growth of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—military and police—by over 125,000 personnel. This rate of growth far exceeded any growth rate from previous years and, as the number of men in uniform grew dramatically, so did their capability and confidence.

- Although Afghanistan is not Iraq, some practical lessons for growing security forces during a conflict can be adapted to the unique circumstances in Afghanistan.

- Building indigenous military and paramilitary police forces while fighting is not just about numbers of individuals and units trained, equipped, and released onto the battlefield. Rather, building indigenous security forces while fighting requires one to focus on creating combat power that can be used effectively in battle and in providing security to the population.

- Combat power has two major components:
  - First, having a sufficient number of sufficiently trained, equipped, and led military and paramilitary police forces.
  - Second, those forces being confident and capable enough to do what is expected of them relative to the enemy they face and the conditions in which they must succeed.

SIZE AND COMBAT POWER

- Any plan to accelerate the size of the Afghan National Security Forces will require increasing the Afghan training system’s “throughput capacity.” Throughput capacity can be expanded by:
  - Building more training facilities.
  - Expanding the size of existing training facilities.
  - Increasing the number of training cycles per year.
  - Compressing the training cycle by expanding the training day by several hours, training six or seven days a week, or eliminating unnecessary redundancies in training.

- In Afghanistan, there is currently the throughput capacity to generate and replace an army of about 90,000 and a police force of about 98,000. Any plans to grow these forces to 240,000 and 160,000, respectively, will require greater throughput capacity.

- As a temporary mitigating strategy, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) may be able to leverage vacant or under-utilized training facilities in nations near Afghanistan. Yet, the construction of more facilities within Afghanistan will be necessary to accelerate the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

- NTM-A/CSTC-A will also be able to field more Afghan army and police by using a minimum essential combat equipping standard.
  - Equipping the ANSF can be done iteratively, with an initial focus on the basic equipment associated with infantry and paramilitary police. Afghans can rely, in the short term, on NATO’s artillery, air support, medical evacuation, transport, and other combat multipliers.
  - Over time, NTM-A/CSTC-A must go beyond the minimum in order to build a self-sufficient security force.
CONFIDENCE AND COMBAT POWER

- Confidence translates potential combat power latent in raw numbers of forces into actual, usable combat power.

- Accelerating confidence within an indigenous security force requires taking coherent and coordinated action at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
  - At the tactical level, one must increase cohesion among soldiers and leaders, partner with Western forces, and ensure reliable access to combat multiplier systems.
  - At the operational level, embedded trainers at the operational headquarters of the indigenous forces are necessary to accelerate proficiency, and thereby, confidence. Partnership at the operational level is likely even more effective than just embedded trainers.
  - At the strategic level, developing competent and capable security ministries—ministry of defense, general headquarters, and ministry of interior—can accelerate confidence. Failing to do so can create a dependence upon the intervening force.

- The difference between local police and paramilitary or military forces has important practical consequences for those fighting a counterinsurgency or growing indigenous security forces during one.
  - Military and paramilitary police forces impose order and are the proper organizations to clear insurgents from an area. Local police, who live and work in the same area, enforce order and cannot work effectively when insurgents dominate.
  - The security imposed by military and paramilitary police forces sets the conditions for quasi-normal civic and economic life to emerge. These conditions are necessary before rebuilding the local police forces can begin in earnest.

- The difference between imposing and enforcing security suggests a priority of effort when building a security force during a fight.
  - In general, the priority of development should go to military and paramilitary police units.
  - This prioritization is consistent with the need to sustain momentum of a counteroffensive to secure the population against insurgents and to ensure that, when the population has been secured, there is a large enough and capable indigenous security force can begin to assume responsibility for internal security.
  - Raising local police forces is not just a matter of training and equipping a set number of police. Rather, local police are a part of a set of enforcement systems: patrolling, investigations, forensics, apprehension, incarceration, logistics, facilities, training, leadership/management, and internal affairs.
  - Growing local police forces requires: first, setting out the proper conditions with military and paramilitary police forces; second, establishing rudimentary police enforcement systems from local to ministerial levels; third, continuing the professionalization within those enforcement systems.

- In places like Iraq and Afghanistan, growing indigenous security forces—military, paramilitary police, and local police—is not an activity that can be understood separate from the overall counterinsurgency strategy. Rather, the effort to grow indigenous security forces is nested within the conduct of offensive and defensive operations to secure the population.
From the spring of 2007 to the late summer of 2008, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—military and police—grew by over 125,000. This growth, which took place during the surge of US forces and at a time of intense fighting, was not just in numbers but also in capability and confidence and was essential to establishing the security gains that set conditions for eventual US troop reductions. Building foreign security forces is a challenge at any time due to political and cultural barriers, but it is even more so during active combat. US and NATO political leaders are now considering whether such growth is possible in Afghanistan, a subject that I studied for General Stanley McChrystal last July. Although, Afghanistan is not Iraq, there are some practical lessons for growing security forces during a conflict that can be adapted to the unique circumstances in Afghanistan.

Under my command, Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq (MNSTC-I, pronounced “minsticky”) accelerated the growth of the ISF. This effort began soon after the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and Iraqi Security Forces began their counteroffensive to wrest the initiative from the Iraq’s insurgents and provide security to population.

This accelerated growth of security forces was necessary both to sustain the momentum of the surge’s counteroffensive and, once security was established, ensure there would be an Iraqi force large enough and capable enough to assume responsibility for Iraq’s security.

Understanding the practical considerations associated with accelerating the development of foreign security forces during a fight begins with the recognition of the fundamental difference between military and paramilitary police forces on one hand, and local police forces on the other. Military and paramilitary police forces are trained, equipped, and organized to impose security in chaotic situations; local police forces, on the other hand, enforce security. The subtle but important difference between imposing order and enforcing security cannot be overstated. To impose security is to force order amidst a chaotic, insecure situation; to enforce security is to compel compliance to order that already exists.

**MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY POLICE FORCES**

Building indigenous military and paramilitary police forces while fighting is not just about numbers of individuals and units trained, equipped, and
released onto the battlefield.

Numbers count, especially in the kind of fight that exists in Afghanistan, but numbers alone are an insufficient measure of capacity. Rather, building indigenous security forces while fighting requires one to focus on creating combat power that can be used effectively in battle and in providing security to the population. Combat power has two major components.

First, creating combat power requires having a sufficient number of sufficiently trained, equipped, and led military and paramilitary police forces. This outcome is empirically measurable. Second, creating combat power requires those forces to be confident and capable enough to do what is expected of them relative to the enemy they face and the conditions in which they must succeed. This quality does not lend itself to easy measurement.

Unfortunately, many believe that the empirical elements of combat power describe the entire task of raising an indigenous security force. This is a dangerous belief because it may lead one to conclude that when a certain number of soldiers or police are at a specified level of training, the task is complete. This false belief is at the heart of the oft-heard saying, “when they stand up, we stand down.”

Confidence translates potential combat power latent in raw numbers of forces into actual, usable combat power—security forces that are confident in themselves, in their equipment, their buddies, their leaders, and the systems that support them in a fight. For example, confidence increases when intelligence is available, timely, and accurate; when fire support, air or ground, can be counted upon; when medical treatment and evacuation are available; when forces in contact can rely on resupply of ammunition; when food, water, replacement personnel and equipment arrive on a timely enough basis.

Confidence described in this way is easy to understand. It is composed of the kinds of things anyone would want in a fight. Interestingly, the standards for confidence are relative. My experience training with security forces around the world confirms that what generate confidence in one nation’s security force may not generate it in another’s. One size does not fit all. For example, leadership practices and training standards acceptable in the Thai Army may not be acceptable in the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force. Leader-to-led ratios or resupply rates in the armies of NATO countries may be unnecessary for other nations. Standards for South Korean army facilities will not apply to every other nation’s army. Iraq and Afghanistan are likewise different in the standards necessary to develop confidence.

An organization tasked to build indigenous security forces must work with the host nation to produce a sufficient number of sufficiently trained, equipped, and led military and paramilitary police forces that are confident in the ways described above.

Further, it must produce them as quickly as possible. In a fight, going slowly is to no one’s advantage except the enemy’s.

ACCELERANTS TO COMBAT POWER

The Empirical Component of Combat Power

Accelerating the growth in the empirically measurable elements of combat power must focus on resources, financial and human. Money is the first accelerator; used properly, it can create throughput capacity. Funding must allow the construction of enough training facilities to generate and replenish the indigenous security
forces. Throughput capacity is relative to the size of the force. For example, a force of 50,000 that is experiencing fifteen percent attrition rate will require “x” number of training bases to accommodate training “y” number of soldiers per year, while a force of 100,000 with a twenty-five percent attrition rate will require either more training bases, larger ones, or more training cycles per year.

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) can also “compress” training to help increase throughput. Expanding the training day by several hours, training six or seven days a week, or eliminating unnecessary redundancies in training can all increase throughput. The tables below demonstrate how throughput capacity increases as training time is compressed.

In Afghanistan, there is currently a throughput capacity to generate and replace an army of about 90,000 and a police force of about 98,000. Any plans to grow those forces to 240,000 and 160,000 respectively—or beyond—will require greater throughput. This can be accomplished by building more training facilities, expanding the size of those that exist, or increasing the number of training cycles per year to accommodate more throughput capacity.
ecessary for barracks and operating facilities. Building indigenous security forces during a fight means that those forces need places to live, fight, and train between operations—and these facilities must be situated in such a way so as to protect the population. As we grew the Iraqi Security Forces during the Surge, for example, MNSTC-I built permanent barracks and police stations, unit training facilities and police academies to be used to continue training, as well as command and control centers to help coordinate civil-military operations, and MNC-I built combat outposts used by both the army and police. Both sets of facilities were placed to help protect the Iraqi people. Some similar set of facilities will be necessary in Afghanistan. Still in question are numbers, size, types, locations, purposes, and construction standards. These questions will have to be answered within the context of the civil-military campaign plan that emerges from President Obama’s decision.

As a temporary mitigating strategy, NTM-A/CSTC-A may be able to leverage vacant or underutilized training facilities in nations near Afghanistan. MNSTC-I did this at various times to help increase the throughput of the Iraqi Security Forces. In the final analysis, however, construction of more facilities within Afghanistan will be absolutely necessary if NTM-A/CSTC-A is to accelerate the growth of Afghan National Security Forces.

Finally, money will also be necessary to buy equipment. NTM-A/CSTC-A will be able to field more Afghan army and police for its money by using a “minimum essential combat” equipping standard that is coordinated with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior. Even at this minimum level of equipment, however, growing over 150,000 more army and 60,000 more police personnel will be expensive, especially for a country with so little of its own capital and such weak economic resources.

Equipping the Afghan National Security Forces is a task that can be done iteratively. An initial focus on basic equipment associated with infantry and paramilitary police needed in a counterinsurgency will suffice as the Afghans can rely on NATO’s artillery, air support, medical evacuation, transport, and other combat multipliers. Over time, NTM-A/CSTC-A must go beyond the minimum in order to build a self-sufficient security force. That is, the United States, NATO, and the Afghans will ultimately have to develop a longer-range plan to build and supply combat multipliers to their army and police. This planning will never take place, however, if the initiative is not wrested from the Taliban and security improved. Tomorrow’s problems should not prevent ISAF from taking the action demanded by today’s challenges.

Human capital is the second accelerant to growing the empirical component of an indigenous security force’s combat power during a fight. A nation must be able to fill its army and police, as well as retain enough recruits and leaders to maintain specified strength goals. Filling the security forces—through recruiting, conscription, or some combination—will determine whether the indigenous force can actually grow to the size necessary. If it cannot, then all other difficulties in building the indigenous force are rendered moot.
The number of recruits that must be retained varies—as does the number and adequacy of leaders. In Iraq, MNSTC-I saw both recruiting and retention improve as the successes of the Surge’s counteroffensive became evident to all. A similar relationship will likely emerge in Afghanistan.

The levels of literacy, education, and technical knowledge in a security force have varied throughout the history of warfare. The Western professional militaries are now accustomed to a recruiting standard that even one generation ago, let alone two or three, would have been unattainable. This fact does not mean that Western militaries ought to lower their standards. Rather, it means that standards are relative to the time and situation even in Western armies. In the United States Army, for example, recruiting standards changed significantly from the 1960s, when soldiers were conscripted, to the 1970s, when the U.S. Army became a volunteer force. The standards were continually raised since that time to create the army the United States now fields. U.S. recruiting standards also change as a function of the end strength of the desired end strength and the state of the economy.

Armies reflect their societies, and they only have to be better than their enemies. When accelerating the growth of an indigenous security force, one must be cognizant of that society’s human capacity and work within the realities of the case and cognizant of the enemy the indigenous force must defeat. Illiteracy in the Afghan army, therefore, is not an a priori insurmountable obstacle to growing the Afghan security forces. Rather, it is a constraint to be considered in developing the kinds of training programs that work for Afghan recruits given the way that force is organized and likely to fight. Then, over time, literacy rates—and other quality characteristics—can be improved.

**The Non-Empirical Component of Combat Power**

Confidence translates the potential combat power resident in numbers into actual combat power that can be used on the battlefield. Accelerating confidence within an indigenous force that will be employed in an on-going fight is much more complicated than simply increasing its size.

Combat power is concerned with the confidence of soldiers and leaders in battle. As previously noted, soldiers and leaders fight better when they are confident in themselves, their equipment, their leaders, and the systems that support them.

System performance and reliability matters: a soldier’s confidence increases when he is confident that the intelligence provided for an action is timely and accurate; when he is properly supplied prior to the action; when the necessary transportation is available, adequate, and timely; when needed fire support, whether delivered by air or from the ground, is available, timely, and accurate; when resupplies of ammunition, food, and water arrive during an extended action; when medical care and evacuation of wounded is timely; when damaged equipment is repaired or replaced and

**CONFIDENCE FACTORS**

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<th>Buddies</th>
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<td>Leaders</td>
<td>Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Systems that support a unit in combat</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Tactical</td>
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<td>- Operational</td>
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<td>- Strategic</td>
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**TABLE 4 - CONFIDENCE FACTORS**
new replacement soldiers arrive after an action. These systems are so important that they are often they are called “combat multipliers” or “enablers.” When they are absent, especially if this absence is habitual, soldiers and leaders in battle fight differently, if at all.

Accelerating confidence within an indigenous security force requires taking coherent and coordinated action at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels simultaneously.2

At the tactical level three actions are necessary. First, one must increase the cohesion among soldiers and leaders. For new units, this cohesion comes through training as a whole unit prior to employment in combat. Following basic combat training, new soldiers must move to a training center, where they are issued their unit’s equipment, meet their unit leaders and embedded trainers, and train for several weeks as a team, practicing the skills they will need on the battlefield. This shared experience will form a bond that increases the unit’s confidence.

Cohesion is created differently for replacements that are sent to units already formed and in battle. In this case, replacements should be sent as a package of soldiers who have trained together in basic training. If possible, the unit to which they will be assigned should provide brief orientation and training to the unit’s specific area of operations, and then assign them to duties in groups to maintain friendships.

S.L.A. Marshall’s famous book, Men Against Fire, summarizes the importance of cohesion and combat power when he says, “…all things being equal, the tactical unity of men working together in combat will be in the ratio of their knowledge and sympathetic understanding of each other.”3

Partnership with Western forces is the second component to accelerating confidence at the tactical level. Newly created indigenous units must partner with the more proficient, “battle hardened” combat units of the intervening force.

Such a partnership not only increases the confidence of the new unit, but also continues the new unit’s training and development. Learning does not stop once soldiers graduate from basic training or a unit completes its initial unit training. By planning, preparing, executing, and assessing combat missions together, the new unit’s soldiers and leaders continue to learn on the job. As soldiers and leaders learn more, their proficiency grows, as does their confidence. On the job learning with experienced partners and continued coaching through embedded trainers, when added to the cohesion created through unit-focused training, are powerful accelerants to confidence, and therefore, to creating usable combat power.

The last tactical accelerant concerns access to the combat multiplier systems described above.

In situations like Iraq and Afghanistan, where

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1 Military organizations must set and meet a hierarchical series of objectives at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war that will accomplish the overall goal. For example, tactical objectives may include destroying a safe haven or holding a piece of terrain, operational objectives may include securing a city, and strategic objectives may include establishing a secure and stable government.


security forces are being created from scratch, the complex set of organizations, procedures, equipment, and capabilities that are inherent in fully operational combat multiplier systems simply do not exist. Furthermore, creating them takes a lot longer than creating combat units themselves. Initially, therefore, new indigenous units must get access to these systems through their partner units.

Creating confidence at the tactical level is perhaps the most immediate task, but it is not the only task. Tactical units are employed within a context of higher headquarters. Senior headquarters are responsible for directing and resourcing multiple tactical actions, sometimes simultaneously and sometimes in sequence. The proficiency of these senior headquarters, or lack thereof, has a direct impact upon confidence at the tactical level. For example, confusing, incomplete, incoherent, or foolish directives from senior headquarters erode confidence at the tactical level, as does a senior headquarters that orders its tactical subordinates to execute actions but provides them inadequate resources. Embedded trainers at the operational headquarters of the indigenous force are necessary to accelerate proficiency, and thereby, confidence and combat power in battle. Partnership at the operational level, when possible, would probably be even more effective than just embedded trainers.

Operational proficiency, and the tactical combat power to which it is connected, must ultimately flow from a nation’s strategic level: a competent ministry of defense, general headquarters, and ministry of interior.

In cases like Iraq and Afghanistan, building tactically and operationally capable security forces without growing competency at the strategic level creates a dependence upon the intervening force. This temporary dependency, in Iraq and Afghanistan at least, emerges not from an unwillingness to “step up” or “take responsibility,” but from an immature state’s inability to perform the complex tasks of strategic and operational coordination.

The intervening force must accept the indigenous force’s dependency in the early stages of its development, while creating those higher-level capabilities over the longer term. If left unattended, however, such dependence becomes apparent even at the lower tactical levels and, therefore, affects confidence in the indigenous force’s ability to fight absent the intervening force. All security ministries must perform the ten key functions listed in Table 5.

Tactical and operational combat requirements must be treated as stimuli to these functions, helping develop ministerial capacity as well as operational and strategic independence. Too often, organizations created to grow and develop indigenous security forces view combat requirements as ends-in-themselves. With this perspective, such organizations then get into a mode where they first identify the requirements associated with generat-
must first identify the priority of effort in developing ministerial functional capacity. Then they must embed teams to advise and assist in those functional areas. For example, in the summer of 2007, the MNSTC-I identified six functional areas as the priority: force management, acquisition, training, sustainment, development, and resource management.

MNSTC-I then embedded fairly substantial teams on the staff of the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior and within the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. These embedded teams used the tactical and operational requirements, whether resulting from creating new units or replenishing already existing units, as means to stimulate analysis, decision, coordination, and action at Iraq’s strategic level—always done by, with, and through the Iraqi’s leadership. The point was to use the requirements associated with accelerated growth in size and capability of the Iraqi Security Forces as means to stimulate similar growth in Iraq’s strategic security sector. MNSTC-I wanted to match the confidence it was creating with MNC-I at the tactical and operational levels with sufficient competence-based confidence at the strategic level.

MNSTC-I executed the set of actions described above simultaneously with the counteroffensive enabled by the surge in U.S. forces. Success in the counteroffensive compounded the confidence that resulted from the tactical, operational, and strategic actions MNSTC-I had put in place. By improving security and focusing on both the empirical and non-empirical aspects of combat power, MNSTC-I and MNC-I created conditions

<table>
<thead>
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<th>FUNCTIONS OF A SECURITY MINISTRY</th>
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| **1. FORCE MANAGEMENT:**  
Develop capable security forces within allocated resources.  
Describe the security force needed—size and composition—relative to the security needs as well as the requirements for each of the functions below. |
| **2. ACQUISITION:**  
Access the people and purchase or produce the material specified in the requirements documents that result from the force management function. |
| **3. TRAINING:**  
Convert civilians into soldiers through initial training or provide additional training associated with new equipment. |
| **4. DISTRIBUTION:**  
Distribute individual, units, and equipment according to requirements, authorizations, and priorities resulting from the force management function. |
| **5. DEPLOYMENT:**  
Send individuals, units, and equipment to locations based upon security requirements. |
| **6. SUSTAINMENT:**  
Meet required levels as stated by the force management function in the following areas: personnel, equipment, and supplies fill; individual skills; unit capabilities; and equipment operational readiness. |
| **7. DEVELOPMENT:**  
Improve individual and unit proficiency through (A) officer and sergeant education and professional development programs, formal and informal, and (B) repetitive collective training programs. |
| **8. SEPARATION:**  
Replace old, damaged beyond repair, or destroyed equipment and materiel as well as separate individuals in a variety of categories—voluntary and involuntary. |
| **9. FUNDING:**  
Replace old, damaged beyond repair, or destroyed equipment and materiel as well as separate individuals in a variety of categories—voluntary and involuntary. |
| **10. MANAGEMENT:**  
Establish organizations and operate processes that plan, program, direct, control, and monitor inputs, decisions, and actions associated with the 9 functions above.  
Leadership: transparent, accountable, and responsible. |

**TABLE 5 – FUNCTIONS OF A SECURITY MINISTRY**

**PHOTO 9 - IRAQI FEDERAL POLICE TRAINING**
whereby the Iraqis wanted to take on more security responsibility themselves—and they had the confidence and competence to do so. Transition, it seems, may be best achieved indirectly.

**LOCAL POLICE FORCES**

The perspective of growing usable combat power applies not only to generating and replenishing military forces during active fighting, but also to paramilitary police forces. Local police, however, are a different animal.

Local police work best when they enforce already existing laws or social norms, a tacit agreement of a community to live together. One has to think only of the American riots in the 1960s to understand that no local police force, whether in the United States or elsewhere, can impose security in a situation where violence crosses a certain threshold—let alone in a situation in which an active insurgency is rampant. When the security situation deteriorates to such a level, a military or paramilitary police force is necessary to impose order.

This philosophical difference has important practical consequences for those fighting a counter-insurgency or growing indigenous security forces during one.

First, the difference shows that military and paramilitary police are the proper organizations to clear insurgents from an area. Force—wielded or threatened by conventional and special operations units—is needed to kill or expel insurgents, and thus impose security and eliminate the intimidation and terror that insurgents use to strangle a community into submission. Such force remains necessary to prevent the insurgent’s inevitable attempt to return. The security imposed by military and paramilitary police forces set the conditions for quasi-normal civic and economic life to emerge.

These are the very conditions that are also necessary before rebuilding local police forces can begin in earnest. Otherwise, the effort to build a local police force will likely be wasted. Local police, who live and work in the same area, cannot work effectively when insurgents dominate.

When an area is cleared of insurgents and is held long enough to be confident, insurgents will not return, one can begin the work of recruiting, vetting, re-training, re-equipping, and hardening police facilities.

During this build phase, the iterative professionalization of police can also begin, and some kind of initial, even if rudimentary, judicial procedure and penal facility can be established. In places like Iraq and Afghanistan, rule of law emerges slowly. How laws are enforced is always unique to the cultural and historical experiences of a particular place. Local police will also not be “professionalized” in one or two training events. These are long-term, transformative efforts that are best thought of as iterative improvements.

The build phase also permits growing provincial-
level or regional police systems—improving administrative proficiency and equipment accountability, continuing training and education, and the like—that tie individual stations and districts together into a coherent police entity and that fit into national police institutions (again, consistent with a nation’s history and culture).

Finally, the build phase permits more rapid expansion of a national police officer training and education program. 2007 and 2008 saw the exponential growth in the Baghdad Police College. First, the facility in Baghdad was expanded to more than double its annual output. Then, the Ministry of Interior expanded the numbers of programs that generated police officers. Added to the multi-year education program, were shorter programs for citizens who already had college educations, for police sergeants with over a decade of service, and for military officer who wanted to become police officers. Last, the Ministry decided to create two extension colleges, one in the North and a second in the South, both with a full complement of police officer training programs. Similar expansions are possible with the Kabul Police Academy.

Certainly there will be places where the local police want to and can participate in the clearing and holding phases of an operation. When this is possible, local police should be used. But this kind of situation will be the exception, not the rule. Normally, using local police that have not been trained, organized, or equipped to fight insurgents will result only in higher police casualties—as such attempts in both Iraq and Afghanistan have shown. As a rule, the development of local police is less-than-practical while the insurgents control an area. Also impractical is trying to create a community-based police force during an active insurgency, or threat of insurgency. Such attempts, again as both Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, are likely to fail, waste lives, and be counterproductive to the counterinsurgency effort.

Second, the difference between imposing and enforcing security suggests a priority of effort when building a security force during a fight. In general, the priority of development should go to military and paramilitary police units.

If there are areas of a country where the insurgency has not taken hold, the primary tasks there with respect to local police are to embed trainers or advisors; ensure the police are organized, trained, equipped, and staffed at a level sufficient to keep the insurgents out; and harden both police facilities and vehicles so that they are able to withstand insurgent attacks.

This priority of development is consistent with the need to sustain momentum of a counteroffensive designed to wrest the initiative from the insurgents and secure the population—a priority that was necessary in Iraq and is now necessary in Afghanistan. Furthermore, this priority will also ensure that, when the population has been secured, a large enough and capable enough indigenous security force can begin the process of assuming responsibility for internal security on its own.

As with military forces, raising local police forces is not just a matter of training and equipping some agreed upon number of police. Rather, local police are part of a set of enforcement and support systems like those depicted in Table 6.

At the tactical level, an organization tasked to build indigenous local police forces can only begin to develop these systems—usually in conjunction with other, non-security agencies—after the population is secured. The same is generally true at the operational level—i.e. for provincial directors of police or regional police headquarters. The necessity of having security imposed before local
MNC-I had satisfactory coverage at the station level, albeit spotty in some areas. But as violence rose in 2006 and early 2007, this coverage became inadequate because many of the civilian police professionals could not travel to their assigned stations. As the counteroffensive succeeded and MNSTC-I and MNC-I entered the “build” phase in more locations, the commands were faced with the problem of linking Iraqi ministerial policies with actual tactical police requirements. Thus, MNSTC-I identified the inadequacy of our attention at the provincial level. Administratively, addressing this linkage was problematic; MNSTC-I and MNC-I had to redraft the contract for civilian police professionals from one primarily focused at the station and district level, to one that would focus at the provincial level. Redrafting the contract took over half a year. This linkage also proved to be bureaucratically difficult for the Ministry of Interior. Initially, the Ministry’s procedures were not sufficiently mature to respond to local needs fast enough. MNSTC-I’s functional capability teams embedded in the Ministry of Interior helped ministry officials develop managerial practices that worked well enough, especially when the police advisors and trainers that MNC-I embedded at the provincial level via the redrafted contract could help apply these improved practices.

The second important partnership concerned the Rule of Law Task Force that Multi-National Force—Iraq and the U.S. Embassy, Iraq set up in 2007. This task force set in motion a series of actions to jump start Iraq’s judicial system. The task force worked primarily with Iraq’s Ministry of Justice, but obviously had close ties to both the MNC-I’s Military Police Brigade and MNSTC-I’s work with the Ministry of Interior. The task force’s effort in building secure rule of law facilities—court rooms, quarters for judges and court officials, and detention facilities—was also timed to the build phase and was closely coordinated with related police reform and development efforts.

The difficulty and complexity of growing local police forces during an active insurgency cannot be overstated. The organization responsible for this
effort must think at least in three, fairly sequential phases: first, setting the proper conditions with military and paramilitary police forces; second, establishing rudimentary police enforcement systems from local to ministerial levels; third, continuing the professionalization within those enforcement systems.

The actions in phase two are necessary but insufficient. Police professionalization—creating an active internal affairs function, changing the judicial system from confession-based to evidence-based, building a forensic capability—is a long-term activity. Thinking in this way highlights the fact that in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, creating local police forces and the enforcement systems within which they operate is actually a transformational effort, not merely an effort to train and equip to some numerical standard. Furthermore, it is a transformational effort that requires unity of effort and coherent action by multiple agencies which is hard to achieve in peacetime let alone in war.

CONCLUSION

In places like Iraq and Afghanistan, growing indigenous security forces—military, paramilitary police, and local police—is not an activity that can be understood separate from the overall counterinsurgency strategy. Rather, the effort to grow indigenous security forces is nested within the conduct of offensive and defensive operations to secure the population, attacking insurgents and their networks, improving local-through-national governance capabilities, bringing selected insurgents into the political process, and expanding economic opportunities. Governmental legitimacy emerges over time and, like reconciliation, is facilitated by improved security and better indigenous security forces. The whole is often greater than the sum of its parts. A comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy is such a whole, and one should not expect that any of its parts alone can do the job of the whole.