BEST PRACTICES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
Lieutenant General James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.)

OPERATIONAL ART IN COUNTERINSURGENCY: A VIEW FROM THE INSIDE

May 2012
Photo Credit: As the sun rises in the Salah ad Din province, Soldiers from 1st Special Troops Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, alongside their Iraqi police counterparts, await helicopters to take them to another al Qaeda hideout located near Lake Tharthar in the Western Desert. DoD photo by Master Sgt. Kevin Doheny.
REPORT 5

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant General James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.), a Senior Fellow at ISW, currently conducts research, writes, and briefs on behalf of the Institute. His areas of focus include MNSTC-I and the Iraqi Security Forces, the ways to improve U.S. and allied training of indigenous security forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and counterinsurgency doctrine. LTG Dubik assumed command of Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) on June 10, 2007. During this final command, he oversaw the generation and training of the Iraqi Security Forces. Previously, he was the Commanding General of I Corps at Ft. Lewis and the Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. He also served as the Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division.

Dubik has authored numerous publications including Choices and Consequences, The U.S. Role in Iraq Beyond 2011, Iraq’s Lessons for Transition In Afghanistan, Afghanistan: It’s Not Over, Accelerating Combat Power in Afghanistan, and Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer. He has also appeared on major news networks such as BBC and NPR. He has been published in The New York Times. Dubik testified before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia during a hearing entitled “Halting the Descent: U.S. Policy toward the Deteriorating Situation in Iraq.”

Dubik has held numerous leadership and command positions with airborne, ranger, light and mechanized infantry units around the world. He was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry from Gannon University as a Distinguished Military Graduate in 1971, and he retired from service on September 1, 2008. He holds a Bachelor’s of Arts degree in Philosophy from Gannon University, a Master’s of Arts degree in Philosophy from Johns Hopkins University and a Master of Military Arts and Sciences Degree from the United States Army Command and General Staff College. His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, four awards of the Legion of Merit, five awards of the Meritorious Service Medal, and numerous Army Commendation and Achievement Medals. Dubik is ranger, airborne and air assault qualified, and he holds the expert infantryman’s badge and the master parachutist badge, as well as the Army Staff Identification Badge.

In February 2012, Dubik was named the next General Omar N. Bradley Chair in Strategic Leadership, shared by the Army War College, Dickinson College, and Penn State University’s Dickinson School of Law and School of International Affairs. General Dubik was honored as a 2012 inductee into the U.S. Army Association Ranger Hall of Fame.

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. ISW is committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.
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The framework for understanding conventional operations is straightforward: destroy the enemy’s military forces, seize his territory and capital, and victory is yours. Executing such a war may be difficult, but understanding it is not. Understanding counterinsurgency campaigns is the opposite.

This monograph provides a framework for understanding operational art in counterinsurgency campaigns, at least ones like those the U.S. and its allies conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to the framework, the monograph describes how one set of strategic civil-military leaders, who were the operational artists charged with executing the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq during 2007 and 2008, achieved sufficient alignment in order to produce unity of effort and coherency of action throughout the civil-military organization.

This paper’s contents draw upon my experience accelerating the growth—in size, capability, and confidence—of the Iraqi Security Forces during the surge period in Iraq from 2007 to 2008, and helping redraft the plans for similar accelerated growth in the Afghan National Security Forces in 2009. In addition, I made multiple trips to Afghanistan between 2008 and 2010 to conduct independent assessments for the commanding generals of the International Security and Assistance Force, Afghanistan and the commanding generals of NATO Training Mission, Afghanistan. The monograph also draws upon the experiences of a number of other senior civil and military leaders who served in Iraq during the surge period. Those are:

- Ambassador Ryan Crocker, recently retired U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan; during the surge, the US Ambassador in Iraq.
- Ambassador Patricia Butenis, currently the U.S. Ambassador in Sri Lanka; during the surge, the Deputy Chief of Mission U.S. Embassy, Baghdad.
- Ambassador Charles Ries, currently the director at the Center for Middle East Public Policy, RAND; during the surge, Minister for Economic Affairs and Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq.
- Ambassador Marcie Ries, currently the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance; during the surge, Minister-Counselor for Political-Military Affairs.
- Ambassador Phyllis Powers, currently the U.S. Ambassador in Nicaragua; during the surge, director of the Office of Provincial Affairs.
- General David Petraeus, currently the director of the Central Intelligence Agency; during the surge, Commanding General, Multi-National Force, Iraq.
- General Stanley McChrystal, currently co-founder of the McChrystal Group; during the surge, Commanding General, Special Operations Forces.
- General Raymond Odierno, currently Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; during the surge, Commanding General, Multi-National Corps, Iraq.
- General Lloyd Austin, currently Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Iraq; during the surge, Commanding General, Multi-National Corps, Iraq.
- Lieutenant General Michael Barbero, currently Commanding General, Joint IED Defeat Organization; during the surge, Operations Officer, Multi-National Force, Iraq.
- Lieutenant General Frank Helmick; currently Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps; during the surge, Commanding General, Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq.
While I drew upon the reflections of these leaders and appreciate the time they made for interviews, any mistakes in fact or inference are mine alone. I must also acknowledge the work of Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, and Spencer Butts, who contributed significantly to researching and writing the vignettes contained in this monograph as well as Maggie Rackl whose help in editing and formatting was indispensable.

The following description of operational art in a counterinsurgency campaign and the team of civil-military leaders who executed it is lengthy. Even so, the description is not complete.

An exhaustive description of all these important components would require volumes. This monograph seeks only to lay out the broad elements of what operational art looks like in a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how one set of civil-military operational artists approached their task. Some contents of the monograph can be, and should be, generalized. Even so, the generalized elements would have to be modified to the specifics of any other insurgency/counterinsurgency situation. While counterinsurgencies are specific affairs that reflect the details of a particular culture, history, and set of traditions, they are not just that. Insurgents often follow patterns. In each insurgency the pattern is adapted to the particular circumstances in which insurgents hope to succeed, but they contain patterns nonetheless. What works against in one situation will not necessarily work in a different situation. In sum, Afghanistan is not Iraq, and neither is Vietnam. Still, successful counterinsurgency campaigns have patterns that must be adapted to the particular circumstances.
This monograph provides a framework for understanding operational art in counterinsurgency campaigns, particularly those the U.S. and its allies conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. It uses the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq during 2007 and 2008 as a case study. It draws upon the author’s experience in Iraq during this time, as well as interviews with a number of other civil and military leaders who served in Iraq during the surge period.

The term “operational art” describes the practice of using tactical military forces in sequence or simultaneously; in battles, engagements, and maneuvers; and in a campaign or series of campaigns to achieve strategic aims. In conventional war, the product of successful operational art is linear: a front line that progresses as enemy units are destroyed or captured, territory held by the enemy is liberated, and enemy capitals are seized.

What one sees as the result of operational art in a counterinsurgency campaign, at least for insurgencies like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, is significantly different than from a conventional campaign. Operational art in counterinsurgency appears more impressionistic and mosaic: a complex series of tactical, operational, and strategic transitions. These transitions require the employment of military, political, economic, and diplomatic “forces” in sequence and simultaneously.

The set of tactical transitions are straightforward: friendly military and paramilitary police forces first clear out the insurgents and hand off security responsibilities to a combination of intervening and indigenous military or police forces that then hold what was gained from the insurgents. Then, the legitimate government, aided by the intervening powers, can build by conducting reconstruction, governmental, and economic development activities in order to establish a growing sense of normalcy.

Each of these tactical transitions can take weeks and months. There is no well-defined time for the transition from clearing to holding or holding to building. Success in one transition sets the conditions for potential success in the next, but each has its own requirements and difficulties. Success in one phase does not guarantee success in the next. Timetables are helpful, but it is important not to declare prematurely that the transitions are complete.

Operational level transitions involve shifting large parts of the host nation from the control of the intervening forces to the host nation government and its security forces. Normally, four elements are essential for successful operational level transitions: security, governance, adjudication, and reconstruction. Planning for these elements should begin as early as possible in the intervention, if not before. Work during the hold and build phases sets the conditions for operational level transitions. Conditions on the ground are the best gauge when it comes to executing operational level transitions. Regardless, metrics used to guide movement toward transfer are more subjective than empirical.

At some point during the set of operational transitions, leaders may be tempted to claim that the conflict is over. But successful tactical and operational transitions must be followed by a period of strategic transition, which has its own set of actions to be accomplished.

Strategic transitions, as far as a counterinsurgency campaign is concerned, generally fall into five categories: institutional, governmental, security sector, economic, and organizational. The strategic transition period is not equivalent to normal peacetime diplomatic activities. The period of strategic level transition is aimed at the space between war and peace. The period of strategic transition helps continue moving the political discourse from the language of violence to the language of politics.
In conceiving and executing a counterinsurgency campaign, the cultural, historical, and societal details of the host nation are vitally important, as is understanding the unique circumstances of a nation's insurgency. Yet patterns emerge from a study of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and patterns suggest principles. One of the principles that remain constant: success requires civil-military unity of purpose and coherency of action throughout a counterinsurgency campaign.

Enough civil and military leaders in the intervening nation and the host nation must work together to achieve sufficient overall coherency in the actions each is responsible to execute. Furthermore, this coherency must last over time, take into account actions the host government and its security forces will initiate, and be flexible enough to adapt to changes in the enemy's behavior and other aspects of the environment.

The probability of success in waging a counterinsurgency campaign increases, however, when proper civil-military leadership teams—using adequate planning documents, processes, and organizations—are in place. The surge period in Iraq during 2007 and 2008 provides an example of the power of sufficient alignment that resulted in coherence among the civil-military organizations executing a counterinsurgency campaign.

Four factors were essential for success in Iraq: strong and capable civilian and military leaders who can achieve alignment throughout the breadth and depth of their organizations; the use of a centrally guiding document; a campaign plan; a properly constructed organization; and a set of managerial practices that help the overall organization stay centered on leaders' goals.

It is necessary to take seriously the adjustments that both the State Department and Defense Department must make to jointly and systematically train and educate leaders, to expand the understanding of operational art as a civil-military activity, and to institute a proper set of civil-military exercises.
The art of war revolves around the non-physical aspects of waging war. These aspects include the realm of leadership, morale, determination, confidence, and training of those fighting the war, as well as the will of the community waging the war. The art of war also involves fear, chance, friction, courage, motivation, leadership, and genius. Finally, the art of war includes the intellectual aspects of war: devising strategies and tactics that use *impedimenta* of the conflict in a way that successfully achieves the goals set for the war. The 101st Airborne Division’s stand against the German offensive known as the Battle of the Bulge in 1944 and Britain’s steadfastness against the German air offensive during the Battle of Britain in 1940 provide two good examples of the importance of the non-physical aspects of waging war. Britain’s Gallipoli campaign in 1915 and 1916 during World War I, the French reaction to World War II, and preparations for World War II are good examples of failures at the intellectual level. These examples of intellectual failure illustrate strategies and tactics that failed to use the means of war to achieve the goals set.

Science and art go hand-in-hand. In 1940, France had excellent defensive fortifications and better tanks than the Germans but lost to the German’s Blitzkrieg. This loss is as much the result of an intellectual failure as it was any material deficiency. Having the right equipment and using it well are two different things. The German’s equipment—or its science—was good enough; how it was led, trained, organized, and used—its art—won the day.

The second prism concerns war’s levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. The tactical level, fighting in skirmishes and battles, is the most familiar. Attacks, ambushes, raids, and defenses are the grist of many war accounts, novels, journalists’ reports, and media productions.

Doolittle’s Raid on Japan in 1942, the fights for Normandy’s beaches and the Ranger assault of the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc in 1944, the defense of the Pusan Perimeter in 1950, the Battle of Pork Chop Hill in Korea in 1953, the Battle of Khe Sahn in 1968, Hamburger Hill of Vietnam in 1969, and the Navy Seals assault on Bin Laden’s compound in 2011 are all examples of tactical actions. Tactical successes are important in war, but by themselves they do not guarantee victory. Perhaps the most poignant example comes from Colonel Harry Summer’s book *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context*:

‘You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,’ said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. ‘That may be,’ he replied, ‘but it is also irrelevant…On the battlefield itself, the Army was unbeatable. …Yet in the end, it was North Viet Nam, not the United States, that emerged victorious. How could we have succeeded so well, yet failed so miserably?’

Vietnam demonstrates that good strategy can compensate for bad tactics, and it also demonstrates that good tactics cannot compensate for bad strategy. The operational level of war concerns how to use battles, or tactical fighting, to achieve strategic aims. Specifically, the term
maneuvers, operations, and battles that form a distinct part of a larger war. In the U.S. Civil War, General Ulysses Grant’s campaign to capture Vicksburg provides a good example. This campaign, in conjunction with others that preceded it, wrested control of the Mississippi River from the Confederate States and contributed to achieving President Abraham Lincoln’s war aims. During World War II the Allied campaigns for Northern Africa, Italy, and Europe present near classic examples of the operational level of war. More recently the initial campaigns to oust the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq are other examples of large-scale, long-duration sets of maneuvers, operations, and battles that formed distinct parts of a larger war intended to achieve war aims. Campaigns most often use forces from more than one military service, even from multiple nations. The campaign for Vicksburg used both naval and ground forces, while those against Nazi Germany used air, naval, and ground forces from multiple allied nations. Campaigns of only one type of force are possible: the naval campaign to secure the North Atlantic and the air campaign against German industry are two World War II examples of single-service campaigns. These are exceptions, however, that prove the rule: most campaigns use joint forces.

In a conventional war, what one sees as the product of operational art is usually a front line that advances as the campaign progresses, enemy armies are destroyed or captured, and capitals change hands from one side to the other. Whether one conjures up images of Napoleon and his campaigns across Europe, Grant progressing down the Mississippi or South toward Richmond during the American Civil War, the World War II Soviet armies moving East toward Berlin or the Japanese expanding South across the Pacific in the early years of World War II, MacArthur pushing North from the Pusan Perimeter in Korea, the British in the Falklands, or the campaigns to oust both the Taliban in 2001 and Saddam in 2003, progress is measureable and discernible. That’s not the case in counterinsurgency campaigns.

“operational art” describes the practice of using tactical military forces in sequence or simultaneously; in battles, engagements, and maneuvers; and in a campaign or series of campaigns to achieve strategic aims.8

A campaign is a large-scale, lengthy set of military

### SIDEBAR CONVERSATION: COUNTEROFFENSIVE AS CATALYST

The surge’s counteroffensive acted as a catalyst for synchronizing other counterinsurgency actions, thus improving unity of effort and coherency of action among multiple civil and military lines of operation. Special Operations Forces, for example, shifted their work from conducting near, semi-autonomous attacks on high value targets and insurgent networks to conducting attacks that supported the overall counteroffensive’s scheme and contributed to the objectives in the joint, civil-military campaign plan. Many of the same targets were struck, but how and when they were hit became much more an object of coordination and synchronization.

Generating, fielding, and replenishing Iraqi Security Forces also shifted from actions governed by a semi-independent timeline to one determined by the counteroffensive’s force requirements. Priorities for generating new forces and replenishing forces already in the fight were set more by Multi-National Corps, Iraq and the Iraqi Ministries and less by Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq. Freshly generated Iraqi Security forces could partner with some Coalition forces to execute clear-and-hold operations so other Coalition and Iraqi forces could continue counteroffensive.

The PRTs provide yet one more example of how the counteroffensive was also a catalyst. Adequate security was required for the PRTs to do their work. Thus, the Office of Provincial Affairs attempted to time the delivery PRTs based upon the counteroffensive’s timeline. To be sure, OPA was under constant pressure to produce PRTs whose members had specific skills associated with a particular region or province, and the personnel procedures OPA had to work with were often inadequate. Regardless, OPA did produce as close as possible to the timeline that the counteroffensive required.

OPERATIONAL ART IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

What one sees as the product of operational art in a counterinsurgency campaign, at least for insurgencies like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, is significantly different. In this form of war, operational art appears as a series of tactical, operational, and
strategic transitions. Some of these transitions have a geographic element. Others are functional. Some are associated with improved security and diminished insurgent capability, while others concern economic or political development. In Iraq, the United States began a strategic transition, ending its military involvement and transitioning to something new. In Afghanistan, the United States and NATO face a set of tactical and operational transitions between beginning the withdrawal of surge forces in 2011, as announced by President Barack Obama, and ending with full transition to Afghan control in 2014.\(^9\)

On the surface, transition seems to be a straightforward concept. Beneath the surface, however, the actual transitions associated with the operational art of a counterinsurgency campaign are anything but simple. Progress in a counterinsurgency is much less linear, much more impressionistic and mosaic, difficult to measure, and often seems indiscernible when compared to its conventional counterpart.

Few who use the term “transition” in the context of counterinsurgency really understand its full meaning or grasp the complexity of what successful transitions actually entail. Most often, at least in the United States, transition is understood as a handoff similar to American football, the seemingly routine action of a quarterback handing the football to a running back. Yet the action is far from simple in football, let alone in war.

Any American can picture a professional quarterback getting pummeled by the defensive end because the timing of the handoff was off by a fraction of a second—a running back not quite in position, or a linebacker penetrating the offensive line. The result is a fumble or lost yardage.

Football and war analogies are never perfect, but this one is illustrative. Handoffs are not easy, even on the football field; they cannot be forced when the conditions are not right. They do not consist in merely one person giving the ball to another. The quarterback has to be in the right place at the right time, so must the receiver. And a handoff needs a protected zone, set in place long enough so that the handoff can be executed without interruption. Finally, the handoff is executed as a means, not an end. It is a means to advance the ball through the opponent’s defense, so the handoff is executed within a context of a larger set of actions and operations. Timing, preparation, protection, advancement, and context—these are the unseen aspects of a handoff and demonstrate why something that looks easy really is not.

In a counterinsurgency campaign the situation is even more complex, for there are three categories of handoffs—tactical, operational, and strategic—all going on at the same time. The counterinsurgency campaign isn’t linear; multiple issues must be addressed simultaneously. Further, the issues are normally so complex that they cannot be solved but can only be managed or mitigated. Finally, the campaign can suffer a setback at any time, at any level. In fact, the enemy is trying to cause just that.\(^{10}\)

**TACTICAL TRANSITIONS: CLEAR, HOLD, AND BUILD**

In concept, this set of tactical transitions can be described in a relatively straightforward way: friendly military and paramilitary police forces first clear out the insurgents and hand off security responsibilities to a combination of intervening and indigenous military or police forces that then hold what was gained. Finally, the legitimate government, aided by the intervening powers, can build by conducting reconstruction, governmental, and economic development activities, establishing a growing sense of normalcy. The reality of executing tactical transitions, however, is much more complex.

**Clear**

The friendly force—often including intervening forces augmented with indigenous military and paramilitary police—does not just sweep through an area, fight the inevitable battles, detain those who resist, and move on. Clearing means staying in place long enough to
CLEARING: A CASE STUDY

The pre-surge strategy in Iraq relied on troops operating from Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), conducting raids and strikes, and devolving control for the battlespace to Iraqi units. Then-Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno, who had taken command of Multi-National Corps-Iraq in late 2006, assessed that U.S. forces had been focused on “transitioning more responsibility to the Iraqis, reducing our footprint, reducing the number of headquarters that we had and then turning over responsibility for the mission to the Iraqi forces.”

U.S. forces in Iraq did not have a counterinsurgency mission, and their method of engagement did not reduce or prevent insurgent activity. The density and frequency of troops patrolling from FOBs did not reduce insurgent activity, and there were too few American troops to saturate insurgent-infested areas.

Lieutenant James Danly, who was deployed to the Doura neighborhood of south Baghdad from late 2006 to early 2008, asserted, “We had too few people to really cover it…You have to get a sufficient troop density present in an area to effectively disrupt the enemy’s activities.” In addition, because the FOBs were located outside of urban centers, they concentrated combat forces away from the population. Even though troops conducted patrols, their presence in the territory was by no means permanent. Instead, according to General David Petraeus, who commanded Multi-National Force-Iraq during the surge in 2007, “they might have engagements, they might stop, they might walk, might even do a patrol, but generally then [they] went back to the big base when the patrol was over.” This system could not comprehensively defeat insurgents because, as Danly observed, “If you’re there only infrequently all they [insurgents] have to do to continue operations is wait five minutes.” Because locals could not rely on a stable U.S. presence, militant groups gained an advantage.

The location and tactics of U.S. forces allowed enemy combatants to maintain operations in an area and encouraged the population to provide tacit, if not direct, support. Danly commented that the environment fostered insurgent groups because “When the community was not secure…the fear was even worse, and that was when Al-Qaeda truly came to power.” The lack of a permanent U.S. presence compelled the population to turn to other groups for protection, especially in neighborhoods where sectarian purges were common. Colonel J.B. Burton, who commanded a brigade in northwest Baghdad during the surge, summed up the pre-surge environment, stating, “We were in the pursuit of failed practices…We were commuting back and forth to work and subsequently, we had no true understanding of the operational environment…We were operating in an environment that we really couldn’t control.” The announcement of the surge marked a paradigm shift in counterinsurgency tactics for clearing areas and disrupting combatant operations.

With the change to a counterinsurgency strategy in January 2007, the initial step was to change the presence of U.S. forces fundamentally. This would pave the way for successful clearing operations, the first major phase in a counterinsurgency. Odierno said he realized that placement was critical because “it wasn’t just about forces, it was about our procedures, and it was really focused on protecting the population…We had to push our forces back out into the communities so we were there 24 hours, 7 days a week.” To do this, troops began to move off FOBs onto small bases throughout the neighborhoods of Baghdad known as Combat Outposts (COPs) and Joint Security Stations (JSSs). This shift marked a dramatic change. Lieutenant Colonel James Crider, who commanded a battalion in Doura during this time, said the new strategy surprised many. He stated, “And it really for a while threw the role players off and even the observer controllers were like, ‘You guys are actually going to stay in town?’ We said, ‘Yes, we’re going to stay in town,’ and we did.” During the surge, U.S. forces established and manned seventy-seven additional JSSs, COPs, and patrol bases. The new JSSs and COPs allowed U.S. forces to not only respond to situations immediately, but also to engage the community consistently.

Several districts of Baghdad provide excellent examples of the new tactics to clear areas and secure the population. Before a unit could move into a neighborhood and establish a permanent presence, it needed to develop an understanding of the terrain, which in many cases had been long held by insurgents. In the Rasheed district of south Baghdad, Danly’s unit first gathered intelligence to facilitate clearing operations. Using hand-held Garmin GPS devices, they mapped all the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in mahalla (neighborhood) 826. “Two
nights later after I’d done all this work to prepare the intel for this operation the company went in, en masse, all of us together, and walked from south to north, and cleared every IED out of the ground,” Danly recalled. Removing IEDs allowed them to, in Danly’s words, “prove our bona fides.” Then troops moved to establish a permanent presence in the neighborhood.

Soldiers typically sought out already-hardened positions that provided vantage points over a neighborhood as the preferred location to establish a COP. They added defenses such as concrete T-walls, sandbags, and concertina wire in order to hold off numerous insurgent attempts to overrun the position. Colonel Ricky Gibbs, whose brigade was responsible for the entire Rasheed district, stated, “You’d put the COP up in 24 hours. It was fully functioning in about 30 days. The first 30 days were contentious.” Conducting frequent patrols of the neighborhoods from the COPs gave U.S. forces a continuous presence in communities and helped in slowly building the trust of the population.

Troops in Rasheed provided additional security through walled markets and communities “to limit the freedom of movement of the insurgents,” as Odierno observed. Crider walled some communities in the Dora neighborhood of Rasheed because “at the southern end of Dora there was a lot of gunfire that came from the south to the north… We put these tall concrete T-walls up and the gunfire stops coming in.” Then, “the biggest tactical effect that those things had was that it forced the population to move through chokepoints,” he said. Walls manipulated the environment by granting U.S. forces more control over it and limiting insurgent freedom of movement.

Walled communities were particularly effective in northwest Baghdad in the neighborhoods of Ghazaliya and Amiriyah. Burton explained the barriers served the important function of “deny[ing] the fundamentalist, the extremists on both sides, access to that moderate population.” He recalled, “When we went out one weekend [we] put in a series of barriers, regular Jersey barriers three feet high, between north and south Ghazaliya dividing where the sects were. We saw the murders in Ghazaliya drop by 50 percent because the death squads couldn’t come in.” Burton coordinated with local leaders to place walls strategically not only to provide protection but also to allow troops to build a history of cooperation with Iraqis. U.S. forces collaborated with Iraqis to gate off Amiriyah. Burton described discussions over the walls as “this great dialogue and this great waltz…It wasn’t just American ideas, it was partnership with the Iraqis, constant dialogue on what was working, what wasn’t working.” Cooperation with the Iraqis became an essential part not only of protecting the population, but also in moving against insurgents.

The new tactics helped U.S. troops collect intelligence as they moved to secure areas, which proved critical in carrying out operations against irreconcilables. Petraeus assessed, when forces “establish a presence and the locals know you’re going to stay with them they’ll start to provide information and provide increasing amounts of intelligence that allows you to conduct more successful operations.” After clearing the IEDs in Dora, Danly endeavored to create a uniform map of the area to streamline identification and information gathering. Using a satellite photo of the neighborhood, “all we did was go out with our soldiers carrying spray paint cans with the map that I made and spray painting the addresses on the houses,” He said. Danly then developed Operation Close Encounters, instructing troops to go street by street, block off the area, provide security, and go house to house to meet with locals “to find out all of the information about every single person in the entire area that we were responsible for.” The information included things such as family members’ names, photographs, AK-47 serial numbers, and their vehicle’s make, model, and license plate number. Once they had photos of everyone in the area, they created a comprehensive “facebook” binder and had intelligence sources point out militants. Confidential they had a complete list of targets, they launched a series of raids. “What we found was that because we had done such a good job of preparing the battle for ourselves, since we had the entire target deck established, we managed to knock out every single one of the five major cells that were operating in our mahalla in the course of 72 hours,” Danly observed.

Crider adopted Close Encounters in his area of Rasheed and was similarly successful. “We were always welcomed in. We’d come in, sit down, lieutenants, captains, sergeants, you know a few people,” and ask the families questions.
about the neighborhood’s history, what they used to do, and what concerns they have. The wide, comprehensive approach proved effective because “if you’re an insurgent you don’t know who is talking, because these American are going into everybody’s house. They can’t target anybody and so people felt safe.” The operation provided crucial support to clearing operations because “after awhile, bad guys could not hide from us anymore, so twenty-four hours a day presence, and Operation Close Encounters were the two pivotal things that we did.”

However, Crider stressed that gaining the population’s support “doesn’t happen overnight but it happens over awhile.” Despite the new tactics’ success, Petraeus asserted, “this will get harder before it gets easier,” as insurgents fought to regain their control of the area and push U.S. forces from the neighborhoods. Danly noted that violence dramatically increased after they had knocked out the five al-Qaeda cells. However, because of the U.S. force’s new hold over the region, insurgent tactics shifted and, over time, grew less sophisticated. Eventually, “we had reached a point where we had so thinned the number of Al-Qaeda in the area that they could no longer conduct operations from a purely logistical standpoint. … And so attacks were sporadic and uncoordinated, just single people with machine guns or grenades.”

U.S. forces supported clearing operations through efforts to win the support of the moderate population that al-Qaeda had coerced or threatened into carrying out attacks. In Dora in early July, Danly decided, “We were no longer going to detain or conduct raids on people who were the low-level direct action fighters” if they believed Al-Qaeda had forced them to carry out operations. Commanders sought to undermine insurgent support by improving neighborhoods, because “you have to change the conditions on the ground that allowed the insurgency to flourish in the first place,” Crider said. Odierno summarized the method to remove support for insurgent groups: “You had the Iraqi society and individuals who needed certain things for them to stop providing support to these insurgent groups, and that was basically security, it was services, it was jobs, it was you know just growth.”

To do this, troops relied on job-creating projects and money infusions to repair combat damage or kick-start local economies.

Jobs proved especially important because locals “needed an alternative to the insurgency.” To help foster job growth, Crider utilized a micro grant program to small businesses seeking to start or expand. Often, Operation Close Encounters helped them find people eligible for the program. Public works projects benefited neighborhoods and provided employment opportunities. Crider launched projects to improve the electricity infrastructure and clear up sewage, and he hired a local contractor to put in new sidewalks, a project specifically intended to employ youths from the neighborhood. The Sons of Iraq—a local defense force—and other neighborhood watch groups secured neighborhoods and created jobs. Gibbs recalled a conversation with a neighborhood sheikh where he arranged for locals to guard a path through the concrete T-walls. While the pay was less than what Iraqis could earn carrying out attacks for al-Qaeda, “they had a guaranteed job, they had honor … and they took pride in it.” Gainful employment provided infused local economies with cash and removed key support for al-Qaeda.

U.S. commanders began to see improvement. In Dora, Gibbs observed “now we had 1,000 stores. We had 900 stores open in the Dora market when I left and when we got there … there was three or four or five.” In addition to neighborhoods falling back into a normal routine, Crider saw a serious decrease in attacks. “I knew in late September it was really turning. And in October it was very hopeful. About December, I thought, this place is safer than the Green Zone right now,” he said. “52 enemy events in the first 30 days to the last six months on the ground and we had not one single attack on our forces in Dora.” Crider remarked on the success, asserting, “My personal opinion is that it probably would not have worked without an increased density in soldiers. … I think it was a combination of the increase in density of troops but primarily a change in the way that we use them.”

find and dismantle scores of improvised explosive devices and the components to make them. It also often requires repetitive house-to-house or field-to-field fighting. Clearing is hard, dirty work, even when it goes smoothly. These are offensive operations; wars are rarely won on the defense. Clearing means taking something away from those who are out to kill you in order to keep what is theirs. It also means preventing or defeating the inevitable counter-attacks which, in insurgencies, come in many forms— ambushes,
beheadings, murders, rapes, kidnappings, and other intimidating actions intended to keep the insurgents' hold on the population.

Clearing entails imposing security—and “imposing” is key—where either none existed or where the insurgents provided their brand of security. Clearing, therefore, includes dismantling much of the insurgent shadow government, as well as the support and bomb-making networks; finding and eliminating caches of equipment, arms, ammunition, and other supplies; disrupting insurgent intimidation operations; and preventing their return long enough to convince the population they will not come back. A clearing operation often takes many weeks, even many months. Declaring a location cleared too soon invites failure and will entail re-clearing at some later time. In infantry parlance, “doing it too fast” just means “doing it over.” Unfortunately, too much from our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq corroborates this dictum.

**Hold**

The beginning of holding operations looks a lot like the end of clearing. The clearing forces—friendly intervening forces as well as indigenous—continue to impose security long enough to slowly change the complexion of the security forces. At first, more indigenous military and paramilitary police forces may augment the clearing elements. This larger force is necessary to dismantle the insurgent’s shadow government, disrupt intimidation, and prevent their return. It’s also necessary to begin the initial reconstruction and development task associated with establishing the legitimate government and a sense of normalcy.

Eventually some of the friendly intervening and indigenous forces can withdraw, or thin out, and be made available for clearing operations elsewhere. Some must remain, however, to partner with the indigenous forces and their military and police command-and-control organizations. Partnering helps assure a high level of performance and prevent local security forces from backsliding into previous corrupt, abusive, or predatory practices. During the hold phase, intervening military and police forces that partner with local security forces use ongoing, combined operations as a means to continually improve the training and leader development of the indigenous force.

Gradually changing the complexion of the holding forces requires close coordination among the headquarters responsible for combat operations, the headquarters responsible for training and fielding indigenous forces, the agencies responsible for reconstruction and development, and host government officials. Coordinated planning is necessary so that an adequate number of sufficiently trained indigenous military and paramilitary forces are available when and where the operational commander needs them. This means that the indigenous force must either be shifted from elsewhere in the country or have completed its recruiting, individual and unit training, and equipping activities prior to the time they are needed in the battlespace. It also means that the indigenous formations must have their embedded advisors prior to employment into the battle area, so they can bond as a unit. Ideally, operations are timed so that the flow of indigenous forces supports the momentum that all offensive operations seek to build and sustain.

The size of the indigenous security forces is important because numbers count in counterinsurgency campaigns. The indigenous security forces must be large enough so that, with their embedded advisors and when partnered with intervening forces, they can contribute to the overall operational objectives and extend the legitimacy of the government. The issue with indigenous forces is not a matter of quantity or quality, it is a matter of sufficiency.

In most cases, local police are not helpful in clearing and initial holding operations. Local police are generally no match for insurgents. More often than not, insurgents target police for assassination, ensure police cannot do their job, and intimidate not only the police but also their families. Quite often local police
are also not adequately armed, protected, organized, or equipped to deal with insurgents, nor are their facilities sufficiently hardened to protect them from an insurgent attack. Further, police in many countries are inadequately paid, led, or supported—all of which tends toward a norm of corruption and predatory behaviors. Couple these conditions with inadequate police oversight, and what emerges are the conditions for abuse of power and other behaviors that erode local police effectiveness and governmental legitimacy.

Police legitimacy can only emerge when the conditions are right, so building a local uniformed police force cannot really begin until well into holding operations. Of course, where adequate conditions exist, local uniformed police development can begin and other police-building activities should occur even as clearing operations begin. For example, the detailed operational planning for local, “protect and serve” police should begin as part of the pre-intervention planning. Even as clearing operations are ongoing, the headquarters responsible for police development and the indigenous ministry of interior should write policies addressing pay, equipment, and facility shortfalls; construct or expand training and education facilities; conduct recruiting and training; and identify leaders so the probability of success in fielding local police increases when the right time for developing and fielding police comes.

Again, the process of transforming the local police in a locality requires the right conditions. These conditions emerge once intervening and indigenous military and paramilitary police forces impose security and keep it in place long enough to eliminate the conditions of police intimidation. Then, the indigenous government, assisted by the headquarters responsible for training and fielding indigenous forces, can begin transforming and creating local, “protect-and-serve” police.

Transformational activities will include changes in leadership, scrubbing police rolls to eliminate ghost police, arresting those police who are guilty of crimes, vetting the remaining police to ensure they meet minimum quality standards, recruiting new police, and entering biometric data into a national database. Among the most important police transformational activities involves establishing a police training regimen. Initial training may place more emphasis on survival and security tasks but must include a sufficient amount of training in “protect and serve” policing to ensure police understand their role is different from that of the military and different from merely enforcing the regime's policies. A training regimen also means putting in place a program for iterative improvement and continual professionalization that, over time, changes the main efforts of police from security to more of a community-based focus.

The embedding advisors and partner units assigned to local police play an important role. Circumstances often dictate that initial police training is too short, so advisors and partners continue police training on the job. They also help prevent backsliding into police practices that delegitimize the government and diminish the overall counterinsurgency campaign’s goal of protecting the population.

These police development activities, which must be planned and prepared in advance, need the protected space of security imposed by military and paramilitary police forces in order to be executed properly. Additionally, these activities take up most of the hold period and need months to complete. Vetting, training, and leader identification often must be done and re-done. During these months, the complexion of the hold force continues to morph. As the insurgent threat and capability diminish, the local police gain competence, and the population gains confidence in their police forces, the counterinsurgency force’s operational headquarters can begin to thin the military and paramilitary police forces needed to impose security. Eventually a local police force properly backed up by special, SWAT-like police units, paramilitary police, the army, or some combination of each can enforce security. The population must see such a force as growing in its ability to protect and serve the community. This is the signal that holding operations are winding down and building operations have begun.

Coordination prior to the clearing operations is necessary so the indigenous and intervening reconstruction and development activities can be identified and prepared. As soon as security is sufficient, local living conditions must improve, however slightly. In holding operations, better becomes the key metric. Better does not have to mean a huge qualitative improvement, just conditions that are better than they were and believed, by the local population, to be improving, even if glacially. As soon as possible, the indigenous government, not the intervening force, must make available whatever
public goods and services the indigenous population expects on a relatively equitable and improving basis.

One of the most important public goods is security itself. A sense of security requires more than reduction in violence. It requires the hope of a return to normalcy, however the indigenous society, not the intervening forces, defines it. One of the important public services is the ability to adjudicate differences among members or groups in the indigenous society without the resort to violence. Some call this rule of law, but that title may carry with it connotations and expectations foreign to the indigenous culture. “Methods of adjudication” may be more appropriate than “rule of law.” The point is that during holding operations, public expectations and governmental performance rise to the fore. If there is a time lag between imposing security and providing public goods and services through reconstruction and development, that time lag plays to the insurgent’s hand and works to delegitimize the host government.

Also, the way reconstruction and developmental actions take place during the hold phase has important consequences. The tension between the fast and the good is natural and unavoidable. Going too fast risks creating counterproductive dynamics, especially if the agents of reconstruction and development contracts with the wrong individuals or firms; going too slowly risks fostering the perception that the government is incapable. Reconstruction or development actions the intervening force takes because they are necessary for the near-term should be linked to a mid- and long-term development plan. Such linkages may not always be possible initially. As soon as the intervening force’s reconstruction and development agencies become operational, however, a common civil-military development plan should be created.

Improvement, whether within the indigenous security forces or in providing public goods and services, is cyclical and iterative. Often it’s three steps forward, then two back. Corruption is hard to eliminate, so the aim must be to keep reducing it. Identifying competent and trustworthy leaders usually involves trial and error. Establishing solid administrative procedures takes time. Embedding self-correcting bureaucratic behavior, even at local levels, takes longer still. Improvement also develops at different rates. Fielding a local police forces takes longer than fielding a military force. Security forces can be built
HOLDING: A CASE STUDY

As violence decreased in Iraq beginning in the late summer of 2007, operations changed from focusing on clearing an area of insurgents to focusing on holding secured areas and building upon security improvements through political and economic efforts. Key factors of holding included improving the environment through the provision of services, building the capacity of local government, reforming Iraqi security forces, and securing the buy-in of Iraqi tribes. Colonel David Sutherland, the brigade commander responsible for Diyala province during the surge, remarked, “We had to get the government of Diyala back to work. We had to get the Iraqi army participating and trained. … We had to get the tribes to start participating.”

There is no well-defined time for the transition from clearing to holding, however, and the tenets of clearing continue to apply in order to consolidate gains successfully. In Diyala province and Haifa Street in central Baghdad, the holding phase lasted for months. Holding continues to be an active, kinetic operation. Colonel Steve Townsend, a Stryker brigade commander who deployed to Baghdad and Diyala in 2007, observed, “The effects of any kind of operation like that where you’re clearing or disrupting the enemy are temporary in nature, unless you do something to hold what you…the hard work that you’ve done. That doesn’t mean you don’t do it. It’s still necessary. The floor needs to be swept once a week.” Holding’s success “depended on how many of them [U.S. forces] there were and how active they were going about that work.” Even as U.S. forces began to concentrate on rebuilding capabilities, they still endeavored to secure areas from militants. Around Haifa Street in Baghdad, Colonel Brian Roberts observed, “They weren’t able to come back because we filled that vacuum… We acted as a quote-unquote reconstruction force.”

Replacing critical services proved vital to facilitate cooperation with Iraqis, to consolidate control over areas, and to win and maintain the population’s trust. As General David Petraeus stated, once an area was secure “you can start to reestablish basic services, you can open a market or two, or shops, you can start to … repair the electrical lines, you can start to get the water systems working again, open the schools, some people will come…start coming home.” On Haifa Street, Roberts expressed his intent “to improve everything that that particular zone needed in order to … take care of the people that lived there.” To encourage development, he would “work very closely with the government, work very closely with religious and tribal leaders, we work very closely with entrepreneurs.” Roberts divided Haifa Street into eight different sections, each one under the control of a local Iraqi contractor. The contractors would coordinate and collaborate not only with U.S. forces but also with one another. Using the contractors had two important benefits: they employed locals for their works projects and “they did the work that we could never have done in the time that we were faced with.”

At the beginning, Roberts engaged with members of the district government to canvas Haifa Street and collaborate on what needed improving. These tasks included replacing flower boxes, old windows, and generators, painting buildings and barriers, re-cementing curbs, renovating a playground and a market, and other building or refurbishing projects. They even cooperated to reopen the zoo, which Roberts hailed as “probably the second [most important] of our major accomplishments in central Baghdad.” Over time, Iraqis controlled more and more of the projects. “I would say that what we were able to do was to mobilize the populace to take control over their own destinies,” Robert said. “And that’s what Haifa Street served as, that vehicle to do that.” Building capacity in one area not only helped the situation there but also had a ripple effect. Roberts recalled, “As we went up Haifa Street, the areas in the surrounding communities got better as well. And that was by design, that didn’t happen by itself.”

U.S. forces helped establish local governance to foster long-term stability, while assisting with services. Because institutions were not functioning properly in Diyala as in many other places, “the people were turning to al-Qaeda and other extremist organizations for protection from the Iraqi security forces. They were turning to them for services because the government had shut down,” Sutherland said. Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Commander Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno instructed commanders, “You [have] got to create local governance. You have to connect that to the provincial government.” Sutherland’s goal was to help the provincial council function. “In early February [2008], based on the level of security work that we had done, the shift in violence from the people to the security forces, the provincial council came back to work and we were able to establish a quorum, we were able to pass a budget,” he said. As the council reestablished itself, Sutherland could
“provide services to the tribal areas that had been denied for many months, while the government got back on its feet.” Eventually, the provincial council successfully established weekly quorums and began passing and spending budgets.

During the holding phase, U.S. forces worked to build the capability of the Iraqi military. Townsend observed, during the surge “the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Police, and specifically the National Police, grew tremendously.” The military became a functioning, capable force because “the National Police went through a very tough period of retraining and professionalization. They came out better for it. And the rise of the ISF, I think, was a key factor.” By this time, the Multi-National Security Command, Iraq (MNSTC-I) had changed its focus from transition to Iraqi control to contribute to creating security. This change of focus resulted in MNSTC-I generating new Iraqi Army brigade-level forces at an accelerated rate by the fall of 2007, replenishing existing Iraqi Army units at a rate that increased their boots on the ground strength by 20 to 25 percent and improving the training and leader development programs for the Iraqi Federal Police. The cumulative effect of these changes allowed the Iraqi Security Forces to contribute more meaningfully to the clear, hold, and build phases of MNC-I’s counteroffensive as well as to the momentum of the overall counteroffensive.

Around Haifa Street, American troops “focused on making life better for the people,” said Roberts. “We’ve worked very, very closely with the Iraqi security forces, both military and police, to help maintain security.” Iraqi National Police commander Brigadier General Baha had a critical role in providing security and sharing the burden. The Iraqi-Coalition force partnership program was another innovation MNC-I and MNSTC-I created jointly. As Lieutenant General Jim Dubik remembered, “Odierno and I realized the training that MNSTC-I provided in the Iraqi training base was necessary but not sufficient. Training had to continue through an on-the-job partnership program.” According to Roberts, “It truly took a partnership and his presence on the street to maintain the security … that was established in January. And we planned it. … We worked hand in hand together.” He stressed the importance of a multi-faceted approach to keeping an area secure, stating, “Just like you talked about that vacuum, you have to fill it with the right thing. Sometimes it’s security forces, sometimes it’s electricity, sometimes it’s good governance, sometimes it’s essential services, sometimes it’s the right religious or tribal leader. But truly, all the time it’s a partnership.”

U.S. commanders also concentrated on collaborating with tribes to achieve their participation in the new political order. As the new surge tactics proved successful, tribes realized that “[U.S. forces were] going to be here for some sustained period of time and we [the tribes] can gain control over our own area by aligning ourselves with them.” Tribes were seeing “that by not participating in the security process, not participating in the political process, they were going to be left behind as things got better, as security got better,” Sutherland said. Then “they became very aggressive at working reconciliation and getting their young men to participate with the security forces and process as either Sons of Iraq or CLCs [Concerned Local Citizens].” Tribes served an important function by harnessing youths because “in their society, the best way to control the actions of young men is to bring the sheikhs together.” In Diyala, Sutherland recalled meeting individuals he believed were former insurgents but who “wanted to participate in the security process and fight with us, and they wanted to participate in the political process and get services back to the province.” These men helped establish the Sons of Iraq program in Diyala. As the Sons of Iraq or Concerned Local Citizens programs produced results, “other tribal leaders that came up and asked us, said they wanted to establish a home guard or a neighborhood watch program.” “There’s really no question that the surge has had a significant military effect, both directly and indirectly as a catalyst which allowed the awakening movement to spread … [and] create an environment in which the Iraqis could begin to make some political progress,” said journalist Michael Gordon, who was embedded in Baghdad and Diyala in 2007.

Because of the initial shift in tactics, the situation on the ground improved. Sutherland observed, “I can tell you without a doubt that the security momentum that took place as a result of the surge would not have happened if the indigenous forces would not have participated to the level that they did. The government would not have come back to work, and the people would not have had the hope that was established and reestablished because of our actions.”
faster than functioning provincial councils and ministries of defense or interior. Local-regional-national adjudication procedures, as well as national infrastructure and economic development, take much longer than initial reconstruction projects. The first steps in all of these activities must take place during holding operations. Their immediate impact is important, but these initial steps do not come to full bloom until well after the building phase.

Build

At first, building operations are indistinguishable from holding. Building does not mean an absence of violence; insurgencies do not abruptly end, they peter out. Rather, building means that more of the dialogue necessary to build a community is political, not violent. It also means there is a growing sense that the government is prevailing over the insurgency. This sense is very important. Without it, citizens are unsure of their future, unsure as to who they can trust, and unsure which processes to use—those of the insurgents’ shadow government or those of the legitimate government. The loyalty of the indigenous security forces is also ambiguous unless there is a sense that the government will prevail over the insurgency. Indigenous military, paramilitary police, and local police forces act differently when the sense of prevailing is present than when it is absent.

If the legitimate government is not seen as winning, then indigenous forces will hold back because if the government for whom they are fighting loses, it is not a matter of national shame and redeployment. Rather, it is a life and death matter for the indigenous forces and their families, as well as for those who helped the intervening forces. It is also an existential matter for political leaders and citizens. As long as the legitimate government’s existence and proficiency remains in doubt, political leaders will look out for themselves and their families more than for the common good. Many call this corruption, and it may be that, but it is also a choice to hedge against an ambiguous future. For citizens, the hedging strategy is not manifested in corruption but in fence sitting. Not knowing who will win in the end means the normal citizen will neither reject the insurgents nor support the government. Citizens will not step forward with the vital information they have concerning insurgents and their networks if they think the insurgents will come back. Building operations must establish a growing sense first that the government and its representatives at the local levels are interested in advancing the welfare of citizens, and second that the government will survive in the end. Otherwise, the counterinsurgency program is doomed.

Successful building operations are as important as successful clearing operations. Building operations may mark the diminishing priority of the military aspects of a counterinsurgency campaign, but they do not mark the end of the war. The insurgency will not die until the indigenous citizenry—especially those elements in the indigenous society that had been supporting the insurgents—believes a better future lies with the legitimate government and their security forces. Building operations can take months or even years. Indigenous military, paramilitary police, and local police work together to provide internal security, often with intervening assistance, however diminishing. After all, if a country is fighting a counterinsurgency campaign, it means there is an internal threat to the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the nation. All forms of security forces—military and police—should be involved in eliminating this threat. Separating military forces from normal police and internal security affairs will take a long time, if it happens at all.

Handing off security responsibility in a counterinsurgency campaign is a complex and dangerous affair. Timelines are helpful, but only if they are realistic. If time is the primary driver of the handoff, the probability of a fumble and a potential loss of momentum benefit the insurgents. The conditions for a good handoff have to be set long enough so the handoff can be executed without interruption.
OPERATIONAL TRANSITION: TRANSFERRING PROVINCIAL CONTROL

Once tactical transitions are complete, both the host nation and the intervening forces have moved toward a radically different relationship. Fewer intervening forces may be necessary, but setbacks can still happen at the operational level. The fight is not over. Successful tactical transitions do not guarantee success at the operational level. Four elements essential for operational level success

SIDEBAR CONVERSATION: RECONCILIATION AND THE SONS OF IRAQ

Fighting insurgents and talking with those insurgents go hand-in-hand in a counter-insurgency campaign. In fact, unless the insurgents sense they are losing, they have little incentive to talk. The excesses of al-Qaeda and other insurgents, combined with the psychological effect of the surge and the progress of the counteroffensive, provided plenty of incentive.

The opportunity to negotiate came in the way of the Sunni Awakening, when Sunni tribes turned against al-Qaeda and the former insurgents joined the Coalition as Sons of Iraq. Capitalizing on the opportunity was difficult. Negotiations with the insurgents were sensitive and required steady civil and military hands, Coalition and Iraqi. The purpose of this sidebar is not to attempt a summary of those negotiations but to highlight one of their effects: insurgents-turned-Sons of Iraq.  

The Multi-National Force-Iraq and the American embassy, led by General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and using British Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb as their point person, guided the entire effort with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and other senior Iraqi leaders. Then-Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno and his subordinate commanders had immediate contact with the insurgents-turned-local security forces. The Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq, assisted the Ministries of Defense and Interior in establishing procedures for including Sons of Iraq who wanted to join the Iraqi Security Forces. The government of Iraq formed a special committee to vet insurgents; working with this committee initially fell to Multi-National Corps, Iraq but later shifted to Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq. To say that the Iraqi special committee was overly bureaucratic would be an understatement. Over time and with continued Coalition pressure, however, the process crept forward. Initially, Iraqi leaders had good reason to go slowly on account of their concern over reconciling with former insurgents, even as Coalition leaders wanted to move quickly.

Ultimately, common ground emerged, and the numbers of Sons of Iraq grew to more than 100,000. The Coalition and the Government of Iraq hammered out procedures for those who wanted to join the Iraqi police or military (in fact, fewer than 25 percent ever wanted to do so). Command and control and payment procedures were also worked out well enough that the contributions that these local forces made to improving security could be recognized by all.

The issue was still not resolved completely in 2012, and absent Coalition pressure there is good reason to believe that the process has stalled all together. Accommodating former insurgents is a lengthy process, as America’s own Civil War exemplifies. Accommodation is more difficult under weak economic conditions and uncertain political conditions—both of which still plague Iraq even after U.S. troops withdrew.

Finally, the handoff is executed as a means, not as an end in itself. As complex and dangerous as tactical handoffs from the clear, hold, and build stages of a counterinsurgency are, they are merely means to enable the host nation to assume overall governmental control, first at the provincial level, then more widely across the entire country. Thus tactical handoffs set the conditions for handoffs at the operational level.
stand out: security, governance, adjudication, and reconstruction. Planning for these elements should begin as early as possible in the intervention, if not before. But the immediate antecedent roots of each lie in tactical transitions, specifically actions taken in the hold and build phases.

Work during the hold and build phases sets the conditions for provincial transfer. Some of this work is done in the provinces, and some will have been done at the national governmental and ministerial levels. In fact, changes made or demanded at the local or provincial level can often be used to stimulate actions at the national or ministerial level. In some cases, all four functions are transferred to the host nation control simultaneously; in other cases, transfers occur function-by-function. Furthermore, provinces will transition at different rates. Even as some provinces begin the process of transitioning to indigenous control, others—because of insurgent activity, continuing sectarian tension, lack of leadership, or some combination thereof—will remain in one of the tactical phases of activity. Conditions on the ground are the best gauge when it comes to executing operational level transitions. Regardless, metrics used to guide movement toward transfer are more subjective than empirical.

1. Function One: Security

In general, the security situation that permits provincial transfer is reached when levels of violent insurgent capacity are reduced; the capabilities of the indigenous security forces in the local, provincial area—military, paramilitary police, and local uniformed police—are greater than those of the insurgents and other destabilizing forces; and the population of the province has sufficient confidence in the capability and leadership of the security forces assuming control. The government must win this confidence during the build and hold phases. During these phases, the host nation’s government works together with the civil and military leaders of the overall campaign, the operational commander of the intervening force, and the commander responsible for fielding and developing indigenous security forces to select the best security force leaders. The selection of leaders is consequential for transition in the other functions, because citizens of the province will conclude from security force behavior whether security forces have made the transformation from enforcers of the regime to protectors of the people and representatives of a legitimate government.

Even at the time of transfer, the host nation military and police are often both required to maintain internal security. During the build or hold phase, the indigenous military and police forces should create a common operational headquarters. This headquarters helps create synergy necessary between these two forces that both facilitates and offsets the ultimate withdrawal of the intervening forces.

At the time of transfer, the local police are probably just beginning to become a “protect and serve” force, a process that is more likely to take decades rather than months. Their iterative professionalization and the development of laws, supporting law enforcement systems, and the institutions and process necessary for a full self-sustaining police force will continue well after the security transfer. Even when the intervening security forces withdraw to elsewhere in the country or to their national bases and the indigenous government assumes responsibility, some kind of external police assistance team should remain at the provincial level and some form of trainers or advisors must remain with military forces.

Such assistance helps grow the necessary leadership and organizational behaviors associated with managing a professional police force within the provincial director of police and his headquarters. For example, continuing training and education; merit-based promotion and leader selection; improved property, fiscal, and personnel accountability; internal affairs; and policy development all will have begun in the hold phase, but none will have become organizational habits unless they are practiced and enforced over time. Continued embedded trainers and advisors must have similar effects on military forces.

2. Function Two: Governance

Once again, asserting host nation governmental presence and control begins well before the time of provincial transfer. As with security, it begins in the hold and build phases of the counterinsurgency operation. In one of these phases, the host government will have identified a representative (or one will have been elected) to coordinate reconstruction and development activities being made available from the intervening force or other agencies. This official, and any associated elected or appointed governing
BASRA: A CASE STUDY

While Baghdad has long been the seat of Iraqi politics, Basra is the economic hub of Iraq, home to the country’s largest oil reserves and only maritime access. Basra was relatively calm in the period immediately following the 2003 invasion, but the collapse of the Iraqi state and ensuing civil war enabled Islamist parties to expand their influence and roles in Basra. Violence in Basra was steadily rising by late 2004, as Shi’a Islamist parties vied for control of the city’s lucrative resources through assassinations, kidnapping, sectarian violence, and criminality. By 2006, Shi’a militants controlled large swaths of terrain. Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) dominated many of Basra’s most populous neighborhoods. JAM effectively replaced the state as the provider of security or services and imposed strict Islamic rule that was often enforced violently. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force aided these militants by providing weapons, money, and training.

British forces, which were stationed in Basra and had responsibility for security in the province, quickly became targets of Shi’a militant attacks. Moreover, they were too undermanned and under-resourced to stem the growing violence. After launching a last-ditch effort to reclaim the city from militia control in late 2006, the British ultimately withdrew to their main base at the Basra airport, located outside the provincial capital, by mid-2007.

In the months that followed, the security situation in Basra continued to worsen, as the competition between Shi’a militant factions escalated. By the spring of 2008, Maliki realized his government had lost control of one of Iraq’s most important cities to Shi’a militants. With provincial elections slated for later in the year, this presented a significant challenge for Iraq’s central government.

The success of military operations elsewhere in Iraq during the surge offensive was increasingly evident by early 2008, even if the situation in Basra remained grim. Violence had dropped by more than 50 percent to levels not seen since early 2005 before the start of widespread sectarian violence. Other security indicators, including civilian deaths, coalition casualties, and ethno-sectarian attacks, were also down significantly. More than 90,000 Sons of Iraq had joined with Coalition and Iraqi forces to establish and maintain security in Baghdad and the surrounding regions. During this same period, the Iraqi Security Forces had grown in size, capability, and confidence. This confidence was twofold. First, soldiers and police were more confident in themselves. Second, Iraqi political and military leaders were more confident in their own forces. This second example of confidence played significantly in the 2008 operations in Basra.

Given the security improvements in Baghdad and central Iraq, U.S. forces began to plan the next phase in the offensive. U.S. officials planned operations to secure Basra after an operation to clear Mosul in northern Iraq. According to Lieutenant General George Flynn, who was the deputy commander for Multi-National Corp-Iraq, “We always knew we were going to go south. We thought we would go south in the fall or in the winter of 2008.”

In late March, General David Petraeus briefed Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on how the Basra planning was developing. Following the meeting, Petraeus learned that Maliki had accelerated the timeframe for the operation and had already given units orders to move to Basra within days. The decision surprised U.S. officials, and they scrambled to provide support for the operation, despite not having the time to properly shape conditions for the offensive. Lt. Gen. Flynn later reflected, “I believe now that the reason he went to Basra was he believed that the situation in Basra had gotten out of hand. We had zero situational awareness of what was going on in Basra. The British forces had withdrawn to the air base. They were not out in the town. The reports that the prime minister was getting was that it was a city that was not under control and that, you know, crime and a whole bunch of bad activities were going on in the streets, so he felt that he needed, I believe, to make a stand, and he decided to take his forces and to go to Basra and to make a stand. And in many ways, I think, he bet his prime ministership on this operation. He bet his future on this operation.”

The decision to act in Basra would not have been possible without the dramatic political and security changes brought by the counterinsurgency offensive of 2007. Tactical and operational military successes generated strategic effects by changing the political calculus of Iraq’s powerbrokers. Iraq’s parliamentary politics become more dynamic as security improved. The Iraqi Parliament was holding more frequent sessions and passed three key pieces of legislation. “In February of 2008, you saw the trifecta in which in one single session, Iraq passed
Iraq’s political leaders, many of whom still perceived Maliki as a weak and incapable leader, also ratcheted up the pressure on the prime minister to build an effective governing coalition by threatening a vote of no confidence in early 2008.95 Seeking to avert a vote of no confidence and bolster his image as a strong and capable leader, Maliki decided to act against the Sadrist militias in Basra. The counterinsurgency offensive in 2007 had weakened the Sadrists politically and militarily, and the group was no longer the main guarantor of Maliki’s position, so he was more willing to move against them. Further, the Iraqi Security Forces had become large and capable enough that the prime minister was confident they could secure Basra with little or no support from the Coalition. By moving into Basra, Maliki could demonstrate to the Kurdish and Sunni factions that he was a nationalist leader who was serious about taking action against the Shi'a militias. Maliki himself also realized the threat that Iranian-backed Shi’a militants posed not only to his own political fortunes but also to the government’s control of southern Iraq, especially with provincial elections only months away. As Crocker summarized, “As you move forward through the rest of 2007 and into early 2008, you have this shifting political climate among the Shi’a that allowed Maliki to do what he did in March 2008, which was go down to Basra and take on Jaysh al-Mahdi directly. The politics in the Shi’a community would not have supported that six or nine months earlier.”96

Following his meeting with Petraeus, Maliki arrived in Basra on Monday, March 24, in preparation for the operation.97 The next day, Iraqi Security Forces launched a security offensive known as Charge of the Knights seeking to restore stability and law to the province by clearing militias from the city. Almost immediately, the Iraqi Security Forces met fierce resistance from JAM. The Iraqi Security Forces faced a better armed and more capable enemy than they expected because of the large number of Iranian weapons provided to the militias.98 Heavy fighting continued throughout the week in Sadrist strongholds across Basra. Local police and soldiers from the 14th Iraqi Army Division, which had been recently formed and trained, struggled to contain the violence during the first few days of fighting.99 Coalition forces scrambled to provide combat and logistical support for the operations, and Iraqi reinforcements also rushed down to Basra to help reverse the operations poor start.100 Iraqi Security Forces continued to clash with Shi’a militants through the last week of March, and the fighting only subsided after Sadr ordered a ceasefire agreement brokered in Iran following several days of negotiations between Sadr and other Iraqi Shi’a politicians.101

In early April, following the arrival of Iraqi reinforcements and the call for a ceasefire, the Iraqi Security Forces began more deliberate counterinsurgency operations. For two weeks, Iraqi units expanded their presence in the city, establishing outposts in Basra’s neighborhoods and cordoning off militia strongholds in preparation for the large-scale clearing operations that began in mid-April.102 Iraqi Security Forces conducted month-long clearing operations throughout the city, moving from south to north. By late May, the government controlled most of Basra, including its oil infrastructure and economically vital ports.

JAM militants across southern Iraq and in Baghdad reacted strongly to the offensive in Basra. Iraqi and Coalition forces moved quickly to contain the violence and oust the militias from most of Iraq’s southern cities. However, its 2008 budget, it passed a provincial powers law ... and then thirdly, an amnesty law, which was extremely important to the Sunnis. So this was kind of a legislative grand bargain,” Ambassador Ryan Crocker explained, “and that could only happen in a climate in which outside the halls of parliament you don’t have widespread street violence. And even within the halls of Parliament because you’ll recall again, in that bloody month of April 2007 a suicide bomber walked in to the restaurant in the Council of Representatives and blew himself up, killing one deputy and wounding a number of others. [This is] not a climate in which you can get grand legislative bargains. But in the vast improvement that ten months represented, you could.”94
the uprising in the JAM stronghold of Sadr City in Baghdad was most violent. Militants used the safe haven to launch frequent indirect fire attacks on the Green Zone and to target U.S. forces with powerful IEDs supplied by Iran. In May 2008, Coalition and Iraqi forces launched a major clearing operation in Sadr City, moving in force into the district for the first time in years. Heavy fighting ensued and lasted for weeks, but the Iraqi and U.S. forces ultimately prevailed. The Shi'a militias were defeated across Iraq, and many of those who were not captured or killed fled to Iran.

It was not evident at the time, but Maliki’s decision to take action in Basra fundamentally altered Iraq’s political and security course. Despite its rocky start, the offensive was viewed as a major success, not just for the government of Iraq but also for Maliki himself. According to Petraeus, “This decision by Prime Minister Maliki to take on the Sadrist militia was really of strategic importance. [And] there were a lot of tactical reactions.”103 The security offensive in Basra enhanced Maliki’s image as a nationalist leader. “The Sunnis took a look at the prime minister and said, ‘Wow, you know, he just took on Shi’a extremists. Maybe he’s a national leader. Maybe he’s not just a sectarian leader. And that began the process that led to the return of...the Sunni coalition to the government which we saw in July of 2008.”104 Maliki’s popularity also soared among Iraq’s Shi’a community, which resented the violence of the militias. To capitalize on the military success of Charge of the knights, the Iraqi government increased its efforts to deliver essential services to Basra’s residents. Maliki also established Tribal Support Councils across southern Iraq in order to involve tribal leaders in reconstruction and security efforts and to generate a base of support for the upcoming election.

The security offensive against the Shi’a militias set conditions for successful provincial elections, which were ultimately held in January 2009. High numbers of members of all ethno-sectarian groups turned out for the elections, and there were few security incidents. The results reflected the voters’ demands for more accountable, non-sectarian, and competent government officials, as incumbents lost in the vast majority of provinces.105 Maliki’s State of Law coalition performed well throughout Iraq, even though Maliki himself was not on the ballot. The smooth conduct and outcome of the vote would not have been possible without the security transformation in 2007 and 2008, of which the Basra offensive was an important inflection.

The Basra offensive also “triggered a change in regional attitudes,” Crocker said.106 Iraq’s Sunni Arab neighbors, who had long been skeptical of Iraq’s Shi’a leader, “saw both an improving security picture but also again a prime minister operating like a national leader, they started to change their attitudes and then we began to see moving into summer 2008 the Arabs stepping forward.” 107 Arab states sent more senior leaders on visits to Iraq, and some offered to host Maliki. In a telling sign, four Arab ambassadors were posted to embassies in Baghdad by the fall of 2008.108

councils, must begin to act on behalf of all of the citizens of the province. Following security, relatively equitable distribution of public goods and services becomes an important milestone in establishing the legitimacy of the government and drying up support for the insurgency.

Often there is a competition for leadership within a province. Many believe that an election aimed at choosing the provincial governor and governing council as well as local political leadership is the sine qua non with respect to legitimate government and the right way to resolve the competition for leadership. As important as elections are, however, appointed officials, or a representative selected by a non-electoral but community-endorsed process, may fill a necessary interim step prior to elections. Legitimacy can take multiple forms.

The important point with respect to transferring the governmental function from the intervening forces is that the citizens of the province, whether minority or majority, generally believe that their welfare will be assured by the governing officials in charge and that the government will prevail against the insurgents.

As with security, transfer of the governmental function often requires a residual civilian advisor, or team of advisors, from the intervening nations. These civilian advisors, called Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, should continue to work side by side with elected or appointed officials at the provincial to help make the transfer smooth.
These advisors will also help in the continuing development of provincial leaders and in creating the processes required to manage a province and to connect to the national government. In places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the pool of leaders who are proficient in running a decentralized government is not deep.

If the intervening security forces moves too quickly from clear through build and then transfers authority to whoever is immediately available, they often set the conditions for more corrupt governmental processes and less legitimacy. The consequences of going too fast in the build and hold phases plays out during operational level transitions. On the surface, those interested only in timelines might "claim" success, but fast is the enemy of good with respect to this kind of activity. In reality, haste merely creates the necessity to redo.

3. Function Three: Adjudication

Beyond security, dispute resolution is one of the other important basic services a legitimate government must provide. In developed countries, disputes are resolved in an elaborate and codified legal system that stretches from the cop on the beat through local or regional courts to some kind of national or supreme judiciary. Lawyers, administrators, clerks, judges, and other officials whose permissions and obligations are defined by specified legal boundaries support this system. The formality and completeness of this legal system is the result of decades, if not centuries, of repetitive legislative and court action. Such elaborate and codified legal systems emerge over time. They are not born fully developed, and it is unrealistic to think that such systems can be imposed.

Thirty years of war in Afghanistan has eliminated any semblance of a rule of law, and Saddam Hussein’s thirty of years of rule eroded the rule of law system in Iraq. Furthermore, each nation’s history, culture, and traditions lead to its own understanding of rule of law. In some cases, societies use multiple, culturally acceptable dispute resolution methods. These facts reinforce the suggestion that methods of adjudication, rather than a single, nation-wide rule of law in the developed democratic sense, may sometimes be a better way to proceed. In some cases, variety must be as acceptable as uniformity.

During the conduct of a counterinsurgency campaign, the initial focus is on wresting initiative from the insurgents and establishing security. Hand-in-hand with this focus is the fielding and development of a sufficiently large, capable, and confident indigenous security force so that they can contribute to success in the main security tasks which are the near-term priority. As the intervening and indigenous forces impose security, they must also begin resurrecting or creating the adjudication and confinement arms of the government in a way that is consistent with the nation’s experience and with international standards. This effort, however vigorously planned and executed, will normally lag behind security force growth and improvement.

In the hold and build phases, the intervening and indigenous forces will have to provide for some kind of interim rule of law processes for arbitrating disputes, adjudicating crime, and confining those detained. Initially these will be some sort of emergency authorities. As security improves and a sense of normalcy begins to emerge in the hold and build phases of operations, emergency actions necessitated by the exigencies of the situation should begin to shift toward processes consistent with both the nation’s history and international norms. Citizens must see that there are relatively transparent and equitable ways their disputes can be resolved and enforced. Short of a full rule of law system, the host government should announce interim adjudication, enforcement, and confinement measures. They may even re-establish tribal adjudication models in some areas. Though these are interim measures, they are important ways the government legitimizes itself and de-legitimizes the insurgency.

Transfer of provincial control requires a clear approach to the rule of law, even if that approach is still developing. The nation’s judicial system (or systems), must begin re-emerge, even if only province by province as each is ready for transfer. Independent, properly secured judges—not only with the necessary administrative, investigative, and confinement support but also with laws, methodologies, and polices that emanate from the nation’s experience—are as important as legitimate governors, governing councils, and police forces. This full system of formal adjudication may not be complete when provincial control is passed to the indigenous government, but it must have begun.
4. Function Four: Reconstruction

Reconstruction begins as early in the clear phase as security permits. Once the intervening and indigenous security forces clear insurgents from an area, they must demonstrate to the citizens not only that they will prevent the insurgents from returning and complete the destruction of the insurgent’s support networks, but also that they will immediately begin improving the living conditions for all citizens. Initially some form of commander’s emergency response funding supports this work. As quickly as possible, however, these military funded projects must be replaced by a coordinated set of community-based reconstruction activities—some paid for via funds provided by the intervening powers, some paid for from indigenous funding, but all involving the community.

During the hold and build phases, these reconstruction activities must produce two simultaneous outcomes. The first is the immediate benefit that completion of the project provides to the local community. Wells, schools, improvements to an irrigation system, access to electricity, home improvement materials, food distribution, road or bridge repair, and sewage removal are all examples of the first, immediate outcome that reconstruction funds must produce. The second outcome involves linking the immediate benefit to a longer-term solution. This longer-term solution can come in the form of connecting a project to a provincial, regional, or national program that will sustain a particular benefit over time, perhaps by training local citizens and governing bodies how to sustain the benefit themselves. Reconstruction projects that can only be sustained by the intervening force create dependencies and do not, therefore, contribute to real progress.

The central idea in the hold and build phase is to provide citizens with tangible reasons to hope and empirical evidence that it is in their best interest to align themselves with the government and not the insurgents. Initially, citizens will be skeptical. They will not align with the government if they think the insurgents will return, the government will be corrupt, or the benefits seem to be superficial or temporary. This is why the hold and build phases of a counterinsurgency campaign take longer than many would like and why rushing to transition to indigenous control is counterproductive.

If done well, however, the benefits of the initial reconstruction and development will contribute to ultimate transfer of provincial responsibility from the intervening forces to a local government. That means the provincial governor and governing bodies can plan and manage reconstruction activities in their province. Furthermore, it means that during the build phase, the governor and governing bodies learned to manage the budget they were given, start the process of economic development, and coordinate matters with national ministries so citizens see that they are capable and responsive leaders.

This learning often results from embedding civil-military provincial reconstruction teams with the provincial government structure sometime during the hold phase of an operation. Initially, these teams may do the bulk of the coordination work. As they build proficiency and confidence in the provincial leadership, however, their work becomes advising and coaching locals. By the end of the build phase, the work of these teams seems complete, but it is not. Teams, even if reduced in size and scope, must remain after transfer of provincial authority. Post-transfer, the team’s duties are similar to those of embedded police advisors—that is, to foster continued improvements in the provincial governing body’s processes, to prevent backsliding to corrupt practices, and to monitor spending provided by intervening governments.

These four functions—security, governance, adjudication, and reconstruction—are the minimum essential functions necessary for a provincial government. Certainly there are more, but these four demonstrate the continuum of activities that begin with clearing out insurgents and their support networks and end in provincial transfer. The continued...
THINNING: A CASE STUDY

As areas grew more secure and local governments increased their capacity and control, U.S. forces moved to less secure areas and over time left the theater entirely. This was a process of thinning the concentration of U.S. forces from areas over time, rather than a complete withdrawal of units from an area. Despite the reduction in troop levels, General David Petraeus, the commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq from 2007 to early 2008, remarked that commanders must “retain the situational awareness that comes from staying in locations, albeit in smaller numbers and perhaps fewer locations.” The decision over which areas needed troops the most, and in what numbers, was a delicate equation. “You’re always balancing between competing demands,” Petraeus said. “It’s never an either-or. I mean those that tend to say, well you know, which is more important, this or that? Well, both. But what’s the relative importance and how much more important is this than that? And that’s how you allocated resources and assets.” The relative importance of an area and a series of other local variables influenced the distribution of forces.

Petraeus referred to the different factors affecting troop allocations as “tactical geometry” or “battlefield calculus.” “It’s basically a process of looking at different areas on a map—different districts, provinces—and asking a number of questions.” These questions included assessments of the enemy and friendly situation, the political dynamics, the status of basic services, the status of local government, and employment prospects. General Raymond T. Odierno, the operational-level commander, echoed Petraeus’ sentiments, explaining, “You have to understand what the nature of the state is politically, you have to understand the nature of the state economically, you have got to understand the nature of the state. And that’s local decisions.” Odierno discussed the importance of evaluating the effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces, the strength of the economy, and the nature of the local governance. Thinning is only a possibility if the Iraqis have the capability to maintain the gains U.S. forces generated. One reason Coalition forces could “thin out” was improved security. Another reason was larger, more effective, and more confident Iraqi Security Forces.

Commanders could use that knowledge to assess the situation to “determine what kind of force and what size force we needed to maintain in that area,” Petraeus said. The kind and size of remaining force took the removal of support and service personnel, in addition to combat troops, into consideration. Petraeus stated, “And then over time you can say, ‘Well, we could take a little more risk here prudently, and that might free up over time another brigade,’ and you can redraw these boundaries and re-scope this. Allow the Iraqis to do more of that and so on. And that was the process by which we determined where we could remove brigades.” Each of these decisions was applicable only at a local level, because factors are “all very different in different parts of the country so you have to come up with a different solution. ... There is a basic concept that you can use, but how you use that concept has to be adapted to the environment that you’re operating in.”

U.S. forces had played a large role in political and military development. Petraeus remembered there being “enormous learning about the Iraqi Security Forces, about how we could help them with transition teams. Now we have gone to units, partnering very effectively with them.” As Iraqi forces gained control over an area, the U.S. “use[d] units to provide the transition teams, to provide partner elements,” Petraeus said. In Kirkuk, Odierno removed a brigade once he observed that “we have police primacy, security is very ... good there.” However, since a U.S. presence helped keep the political process functioning properly, Odierno kept “a headquarters there that [would] be able to deal with those political issues.” Retaining a headquarters while thinning the number of troops could keep that kind of meaningful presence because drawdown numbers did not proportionately correlate to a reduction in combat power or the ability to influence the political dynamics in the area. Odierno observed that U.S. forces could reduce as an “across-the-board spectrum of all of those forces, just not our combat brigades,” because of the multiple combat enablers, combat support, and combat service support positions. Instead of concentrating on combat forces, drawdowns took place in a variety of ways, and the military was able to contract out other positions to free up the remaining troops for the priority tasks, while being careful not to compromise effectiveness. Petraeus pushed U.S. soldiers off the bases and into the population. “Let’s put contractors on the towers,” he said. “Let’s put them on the gate if we have sufficient trust in those, perhaps with some assistance.
Let’s contract out every logistical task … everything, every task that we possibly can to enable our soldiers to do something that no other elements can do.”

In Ramadi, Colonel John Charlton developed a method to reduce forces in an offensive matter. The process reflected the considerations of battlefield calculus. “How do you reduce in size in a way that maintains security and maybe even gives you some additional capabilities?” Charlton mused. Since he knew he would lose an army battalion in October, he instead removed them in August. “I’m going to lose them anyway, so if I pull them out in August that allows me to rest my forces and watch that and see if I’ve done it right,” he said. The added benefit, apart from the opportunity to check whether the redistributed forces remained effective, was Charlton’s ability to take these freed up combat forces and use them offensively. During “last six weeks of their deployment, when most forces are thinking of winding down, I put them into the offense,” Charlton said. “And it allowed us to actually generate combat power as we were drawing down.” The increased activity was also misleading because, “From the enemy’s standpoint, not only does he not recognize that you’re getting smaller, he thinks that you’re actually increasing in size ‘cause the effect he sees is a lot more, you know, combat forces coming at him.” Charlton referred to the strategy as “drawdown in the offensive mode.” The operation in Ramadi, which began with 4,000 to 5,000 troops, ended at around 900. An entire brigade combat team headquarters was eliminated. “When we left we were not replaced by another brigade combat team. The remaining marine forces in Anbar, you know, spread out and kind of filled in the areas,” Charlton said. Battlefield calculus allowed U.S. forces to redistribute a smaller force of troops over a larger area while not compromising their effectiveness.

Charlton also leveraged Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to build and support Iraqi governance even as U.S. forces were thinning out. While U.S. forces partnered with Iraqi forces and “actually live[d] down in the police station, or lived at the Iraqi army compound,” PRT collaboration was more complicated. “So there’s really no requirement to live with them, but we certainly want to use the same technique of partnering with them and working day to day, you know, with the municipal government,” Charlton said. “If you go downtown and you partner up with the municipal government, I think you’re going to be very successful.” That partnership “allowed us to build that municipal government with the Iraqis in six, eight, ten months.” Once U.S. forces had assessed that Iraqi governance stepped up and the security forces were functioning properly, they began the process of drawing down.

Improvements in security and development that begin in the hold and build phases of a counterinsurgency operation provide the foundation of the host nation’s ability to assume responsibility for one of its provinces.

No one should infer that all these actions move in some kind of inevitable linear progression. There is nothing inevitable about any of this, and certainly nothing linear. If there is any guarantee, it is that progress, when and if it comes at all, comes as a result of hard work over time and in the face of many obstacles and setbacks. Nor should one infer that these four functions must be performed perfectly, or even well. Rather, the standard is lower: these functions would be performed well enough; “better” and “improving” is the standard, not “best.” The metrics associated with measuring transitions at the operational level are more subjective than objective. Some components can be quantified, but most of the important elements do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis. Finally, as is the case at the tactical level, artificial timetables that force transitions before the right conditions are set do more harm than good. Timetables are important for a host of reasons, political and military. More often than not, however, they are misused, doing damage in the process.

STRATEGIC TRANSITIONS: SELF-SUSTAINING CAPACITY

At some point during the set of operational transitions, there will be the temptation to claim that the conflict is over. Unfortunately, insurgencies do not end when the fighting lulls. Seeing an end or a significant reduction in violence may indicate that battles have mostly been won, but it is not an indication that the war is over. Iraq of 2011 and early 2012 provide all the evidence needed to corroborate the fact that insurgencies are slow-dying phenomena. Successful tactical and operational transitions must be followed, therefore, by a period of strategic transition, which has its own set of actions to be accomplished.
Insurgencies end when the conditions that cause people to support them dry up. Even if the set of tactical and operational transitions are mostly successful, negative dynamics will still be at play in the indigenous government, its security forces, and the society at large. Examples of these dynamics are obvious in Iraq today. Although it’s in much a much better place overall than it was in the dark days of 2006 and the turning point years of 2007 and 2008, Iraq still manifests internal dynamics that work against progress and stability. For example, Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, his movement, and its militia work more against stability and progress than it does in support of them. Sadr is as much a surrogate of Iran as he is a representative of a portion of the Iraqi citizenry. Other examples of destabilizing internal dynamics include the tensions that still exist along the disputed boundary between Arab and Kurdish communities in northern Iraq, the insufficient inclusion of the Sunni in positions of power, the prime minister’s aggregation of control over the security forces, and the Iraqi military’s inability to protect its air, land, or sea borders.

Certainly Iraq’s security forces are more capable, some of its ministries more proficient, and its government more legitimate than any were a few years ago, and these issues are largely for the Iraqis themselves to resolve. Equally certain, however, is that governmentally and economically, Iraq is a fledgling state, and fledging states still need help. This is why strategic transitions are as important as tactical and operational transitions are. Furthermore, a period of strategic transition does not mean that a normal state-to-state relationship has been established. Ambiguity still exists as to which direction the host nation will take; backsliding is still possible; the insurgents may be down, but they are not out. Setbacks can still happen at the strategic level. All of these ambiguities are at play in Iraq today. Further, the U.S. seemed to equate the withdrawal of American military forces in December of 2011 with the establishment of “normal state-to-state” relations. In effect, by doing so, the administration moved from a state of operational transition to “normal relations,” ignoring strategic transition all together.

Strategic transitions shift the host nation from the position of externally initiated or supported action to self-initiated and supported actions. If the tactical and operational transitions have been done well enough, this shift is not a sudden one. Rather, the government and its institutions slowly improve their proficiency, creating a growing sense of legitimacy for the population and a continual movement toward normalcy.

For example, the requirements associated with growing an army and sustaining it in the field so it can fight should stimulate the Ministry of Defense and the nation’s highest military headquarters to develop policies for recruiting, leader selection, and promotion. These requirements should also stimulate the nation’s strategic planning, force structure, and acquisition functions. As the army grows in size and capability, its supporting bureaucratic institutions and processes grow with it. Tactical, operational, and strategic transitions are as simultaneous as they are sequential.

Similarly, the set of requirements associated with growing a police force—e.g. published criteria for officer promotion, established procedures for selection to key positions, regulations governing continuing education and training requirements, and transparent, repeatable acquisition and budgetary processes—help transform it from a tool to impose dictatorial power to a profession that protects and serves citizens and should stimulate behaviors within the Ministry of Interior. The ministry must be encouraged to produce appropriate training policies, leader selection programs, and internal affairs procedures. The ministry must begin and slowly develop a capability to work within the nation’s laws or adjudication methodologies, not outside them. This is complex business, because they require a legislative foundation, laws and adjudication methodologies, which may emerge slowly and at different rates. And the nation’s Ministry of Justice must use police development requirements to stimulate
the appropriate confinement and investigatory institutions. Detention operations, a normal result of tactical operations during counterinsurgency campaigns, also provide an opportunity to extend the legitimacy of the host government. Other opportunities for reconciliation come from sifting through detainees to sort out those who are hardcore insurgents and should be confined from those who are “accidental guerrillas,” those that supported insurgents for economic reasons for example.

Reconstruction activities that occur in the hold and build phases of tactical operations or that are executed as part of the operational-level transitions are not ends in themselves. Rather, they should be used to stimulate the national government to set in motion policies and procedures that increase the political legitimacy of the government in the eyes of its citizens. To do this, however, requires a team of experienced civil-military advisors to be embedded within the host nation’s ministries as soon as the security situation permits.

Finally, operational-level transition offers the chance for provincial and national cooperation. In Iraq, for example, provincial budgets are provided from national ministries. Budget clarity at the beginning of the year, budget execution and reconciliation throughout the year, and final accounting at the end of the year all provide opportunities to stimulate development of policies, procedures, and systems among the levels of government; within national ministries; and between national ministries and the Ministry of Finance. They are also opportunities to expand the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of its people.

The ultimate goal of the set of tactical, operational, and strategic transitions is to move the host nation from a position of externally initiated and supported action to self-initiated and supported action. Conducting tactical and operational transitions as ends-in-themselves, where the intervening force continues to initiate and support more than it should just to get the job done or meet the timeline actually impedes progress and ultimate success.

Strategic transitions, as far as a counterinsurgency campaign is concerned, generally fall into five categories: institutional, governmental, security sector, economic, and organizational. The strategic transition period is not a period of normal peacetime diplomatic activities. Rather, the period of strategic level transition, the final phase of a civil-military counterinsurgency campaign, is aimed more narrowly at the space between war and peace. The period of strategic transition helps move the political discourse from violence to political confrontation.

Strategic transitions occur during the period when violence is diminished but not extinguished. The insurgency has receded significantly, but normal life is not yet established. The period of strategic transition is one marked by optimistic ambiguity and hopeful anxiety. It is a period where the host government and its citizenry, as well as the intervening governments and their citizens, see things moving in the right direction but recognizes reality for what it is: the war is not yet over.

Finally, strategic transitions require that intervening nations change their outlook. During tactical transitions the relationship between intervening powers and host nation may be akin to senior partner and junior partner. During operational transitions the relationship begins to level out, and during strategic transition the relationship must be peer-to-peer. This shift complicates action because the intervening forces “lose some leverage,” but the shift is absolutely necessary. The shift also means that the internal domestic politics of the host nation will constrain the range of alternative solutions the intervening powers may see as possible. Such constraint, however, is itself a sign of progress.

Category One: Institutional

In Iraq, de-Baathification and its consequential policies largely destroyed the bureaucracies that did exist prior to the intervention, so they had to be recreated. In Afghanistan, what little bureaucracy existed was destroyed after thirty years of war, so it also had to be created. Where tactical and operational transitions were executed well enough in Iraq and Afghanistan, bureaucratic capacity began to develop. Such development, however, is uneven. Normally, as is the case in both Iraq and Afghanistan, security ministry growth outpaces that of other ministries. Slowly the muscles, nerves, and sinews of institutions begin to grow. But where earlier transitions do not occur, were stifled, or were executed poorly, no such institutional capacity emerges. Institutional dependency substitutes for institutional growth.
Developing institutional capacity focuses on national-level ministerial capacity, but it does not stop there. Institutions are larger than national ministries. Institutional capacity is better understood as a web or network of local-through-national organizations and activities that collectively allow a country to function. Institutions include bureaucratic policies, procedures, and systems, as well as the set of organizations they govern. Institutions may also include tribal or regional arrangements that have emerged in a society’s culture and history. Intervening powers must be flexible enough to allow that institutional models other than their own may be the best way to help a nation develop.

Whatever set of institutions and processes that ultimately makes up this network must be brought to a sufficient level of efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and transparency. Bureaucracies and institutions exist as stabilizing functions. Those that are efficient, effective, responsive, and transparent allow a nation to avoid political extremes. They also provide a degree of confidence that the government is reliable. Of course, well-oiled bureaucracies and institutions can serve dictators and autocrats as well as more representative governments. Strategic transition, therefore, is broader than institutional capacity.

Category Two: Governmental

An insurgency is a fight over governmental legitimacy. Insurgents highlight those areas in which a government lacks legitimacy, at least in the eyes of the insurgent’s constituency. Disenfranchised Sunnis, for example, formed the core of Iraq’s insurgency, even when it was led by foreigners associated with al-Qaeda and included many non-Iraqi fighters. Al-Qaeda in Iraq saw the secular government as illegitimate and, at least for a while, used Sunni disenfranchisement to fuel its grab for power in Iraq. Some Shia became insurgents as well, fighting to establish a government that reflected their vision of a political community, and some of Iraq’s neighbors added to the confusion and violence by supporting one side or the other.

Iraq’s elected government has prevailed thus far, but maneuvers for power, manipulation of the judiciary, consolidation of security ministry decision make at the prime ministerial level, a weak parliament, and still unresolved issues among Iraq’s major segments all keep the legitimacy of the elected government fragile.

Coalition support is a partial explanation for Iraq’s fledging success. Iraq’s government took advantage of each of the tactical and operational level transition to grow its legitimacy. By 2008, Iraqis recognized that the government was prevailing in the fight for legitimacy. Not all of the insurgents had given up, but many had. The Strategic Framework Agreement, which was negotiated between the United States and Iraq in late 2008, and the subsequent movement of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities in the summer of 2009 were important strategic transition steps. The contested 2010 national election, subsequent extended government formation period, and continuing political wrangling, however, have stalled progress. The legitimacy of Iraq’s fragile coalition is still problematic for many Sunnis and other Iraqi minorities. The current political activities in Iraq clearly show that it is a country between war and peace, with violence reduced but not quite having returned to normalcy—all indicators of a strategic transition period. Iraq still needs help using non-violent means to resolve its remaining internal conflicts because not all have made non-violent political language a habit. On one hand, such help must be provided delicately, respecting Iraq’s sovereignty. On the other hand, the help must be provided or continued progress will be at risk.

Not all conflicts will be resolved in the period of strategic transition, but all parties must be increasingly confident that the political procedures for resolution are fair enough to result in a satisfactory outcome. Such confidence will allow the conflict to move from the realm of potential violence to the realm of public discourse and political wrangling. To affect such a move is one of the aims of the strategic transition period and requires delicate diplomacy on the part of all concerned.

Category Three: Security Sector

Strategic transition in the security sector is marked by four major movements.

The first is a move to police primacy. Once again, this move begins within the set of tactical transitions, expands during the operational transition at provincial levels, and only comes to maturity during the period of strategic transition. Because the
provinces are not fully peaceful during the period of strategic transition, complete police primacy will not be possible. But in areas where the insurgency is either weak or non-existent, local police that are supported by appropriate special police or paramilitary police and adequate adjudication and confinement systems can begin to assume full control of normal security and rule of law duties. Under these conditions, police can serve as they are designed to, enforcers of preexisting social and legal agreements rather than imposers of security.

The second part of the security sector strategic transition is a move to change the military’s focus from internal security to external defense. During the strategic transition period, the host nation can begin to look at the size and structure of military forces. What was required to defeat the insurgency is no longer needed. When conditions are right, a smaller military force may be all that is needed. With this change in focus comes not only a change in size and composition but also a change in the type of equipment and training the force will need. As before, the roots of this movement are found in earlier transitions. As the host nation’s military force grows to meet the needs of the counterinsurgency campaign, it builds some dual capabilities. For example, protected mobility—tanks, infantry carriers, and up-armored support vehicles—are needed both in a counterinsurgency and as the foundation of a self-defense force. Fixed wing and rotary aircraft also serve as a dual capability. They are needed to fight the insurgency, and they serve as the basis for further growth in the air-to-ground and air-to-air self-defense arenas.

The third security sector movement is to a complete justice system. During the period of strategic transition, the police, adjudication, and confinement aspects of a justice system must be brought into alignment. Again, this alignment begins during tactical and operational level transitions. It is not just part of the security sector transition but also part of building institutional capacity and extending governmental legitimacy. The justice system must be consistent with the historical experience and culture of the host nation, as well as with international norms, but need not be finished in any absolute sense. During the period of strategic transition, however, it must be far enough along to prevent backsliding into a system that works more to serve political purposes than to assure fair treatment of all citizens.

A move to security force professionalization is the fourth component of strategic security sector transition. The simultaneous requirements to create and develop a security force and defeat the insurgency necessarily stifle aggressive professionalization of the force. Indigenous military officers do not have the time to attend developmental training and education, and police cannot receive full training, as continuing training and education takes a back seat to current operations. During tactical and operational transitions, these conditions change. Training is expanded in time, frequency, and scope. Educational opportunities grow. During the period of strategic transition, a more complete set of training and professional education programs, both in the host country and abroad, must be established. More officers, for example, can attend entry level and advanced specialty schools, routine attendance as mid-grade staff college can begin, and out-of-country exchange programs for senior officers can be negotiated. In addition, non-commissioned officer programs can expand, creating the opportunity to match a sergeant’s training and education with his level of responsibility.

**Category Four: Economic**

Just as insurgents highlight those areas in which a government lacks legitimacy as reasons to join the insurgency, they use poverty, hopelessness, unemployment, under-employment, and economic disenfranchisement as recruiting tools. Economic development, therefore, is an essential element of any counterinsurgency campaign.

As before, the seeds of strategic transition are sowed in tactical and operational ones. Local shops and markets that open during the hold and build phases of tactical transitions become counterfactuals with respect to the insurgent narrative. Insurgents know they lose if local security and economic conditions flourish, especially if it happens as the government begins to deliver public goods and services. Insurgents often attack markets and shops, assassinate those who run them, and intimidate local merchants and farmers because they’re attempting to prevent this development. It also explains why local mayors, teachers, and police are among the primary insurgent targets.

Strategic economic transition does not require a fully functional economy. If that were the standard,
the counterinsurgency campaign would be eternal, or close to it. Rather, transition seeks minimum conditions. For example, by the end of the period of strategic economic transition, the nation’s economic infrastructure—electricity, ports of entry, and communication architecture—should be mostly repaired and functioning. Parliament and the executive branch should be working to complete the legal framework under which the nation’s economy can grow. Corruption should be declining, and enough of the nation’s agricultural, manufacturing, construction, and public works sectors should be improving so that citizens are increasingly hopeful. Whether the economy is completely free market or remains partially nationalized is not the issue.

The issue is improvement and a sense of optimism for the future, as viewed from the eyes of citizens. Security is not just a matter of being free from attack. The nation’s justice system, governmental proficiency, and economy also influence a citizen’s sense of security. The indigenous government’s actions during the period of strategic transition, with help from the intervening powers, should contribute to this broader sense of security.

Category Five: Organizational

During strategic transitions, the military effort is significantly reduced. The headquarters responsible for waging the military aspects of a counterinsurgency campaign is no longer needed, but some military capacity—determined by the security tasks yet to be accomplished and in agreement with the host nation—must remain. This transition is not a simple withdrawal of military forces. Rather, it involves a complex set of actions that first identifies the functions the military headquarters and its subordinates fulfilled that must continue to be fulfilled by the enduring civilian entity, then creates the ability of those functions in the civilian entity.

Two examples are useful. The military headquarters will have had the responsibility for training, equipping, and developing the host nation’s military forces as well as its Ministry of Defense and Senior Military Headquarters. While these activities will diminish and change, they will not go away. The enduring civilian entity must have the capacity to execute the remaining training, equipping, and developing tasks.

Secondly, the military headquarters will have had the responsibility for providing situational awareness, including intelligence and other information on the host nation’s security status and security-related societal, political, and economic activities. Again, as the campaign moves into the period of strategic transition, the need for this intelligence and other information changes but does not evaporate. Hence, the enduring civilian entity must have sufficient situational awareness capacity to assist the host nation’s government and security forces to end the insurgency and create a better peace.

Insurgencies do not end when violence is reduced; they end when the conditions from which they draw recruits and support dry up. Evaporation of such conditions takes time. Temptation will arise at the end of the tactical phases of the campaign to declare success, and this temptation will again surface at the end of the operational transition phase. The U.S. has fallen prey to this temptation in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In doing so, we have prolonged the war; increased costs—in time, money, will, and blood; and reduced the probability of success. The actions necessary during the period of strategic transition are as much a part of a full civil–military campaign plan as the actions at the tactical and operational level are. How the intervening powers help the indigenous government in the last set of transition is as important—if not more so—than the help needed to get through the tactical and operational transitions.

INTERIM CONCLUSIONS

In conceiving and executing a counterinsurgency campaign, the cultural, historical, and societal details of the host nation are vitally important, and
understanding the unique circumstances of a nation’s insurgency. Who are the insurgents and how are they related to one another, what conditions gave rise to their cause, which insurgents are irreconcilable and which can be reconciled, and how the various groups are supported and sustained—all hold the key to structuring any specific counterinsurgency campaign and increase the probability of success.

Yet patterns emerge from a study of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. And patterns suggest principles. How, or whether, a particular principle applies to a specific case is always a legitimate question, and how a principle must be modified to unique circumstances is also a legitimate issue. These caveats aside, one of the principles that remains constant is this: success requires civil-military unity of purpose and coherency of action throughout a counterinsurgency campaign.

Executing the multitude of complex civil and military actions associated with the tactical, operational, and strategic transitions of a counterinsurgency campaign so they achieve the strategic aims is no easy task. The fact that the campaign is likely to last several years and involve changes in senior civil and military leadership within the intervening powers as well as the host nation complicates it further.

Enough civil and military leaders in the intervening nation and the host nation must work together to achieve sufficient overall coherency in the actions each is responsible to execute. Furthermore, this coherency must last over time, take into account actions the host government and its security forces execute, and be flexible enough to adapt to changes in the enemy’s behavior and other aspects of the environment.

ACHIEVING SUFFICIENT ALIGNMENT, UNITY OF PURPOSE, AND COHERENCY OF ACTION

Perfection is not the standard. No civil-military effort will ever be perfectly aligned or unified. The actions of any campaign will contain some element of incoherence. The probability of success in waging a counterinsurgency campaign increases, however, when proper civil-military leadership teams—using adequate planning documents, processes, and organizations—are in place. The absence of such arrangements, or the presence of arrangements that inhibit unity and coherency, reduces alignment and the probability of success. The result is a war that goes on longer than necessary or one that is lost.

“Alignment is both a noun and a verb—a state of being and a set of actions,” George Labovitz and Victor Rosansky explain. An organization that is sufficiently aligned is one where most members, from top to bottom, share an understanding of the overall goal and each member’s part in achieving that goal. In such an organization, each component knows how it fits into the organization and what it is charged to accomplish to achieve the common goals. No organization can stay perfectly aligned for long, since “almost every business lives in an environment of constant change,” Labovitz and Rosansky write. Vertical alignment is achieved not just by information that flows down from the top, but also when the top is informed and shaped by those who are executing the strategy. Continual feedback is the mark of an organization that is well aligned vertically. Vertical alignment is necessary but insufficient. Horizontal alignment—across the various functions and subordinate elements of the larger organization—is also necessary. Achieving sufficient alignment in any large organization is difficult, but it is much more so in a civil-military organization charged with the responsibility for guiding a counterinsurgency campaign through the stages of transition.

The surge period in Iraq during 2007 and 2008 provides an example of the power of sufficient alignment that resulted in coherence among the civil-military organizations executing a counterinsurgency campaign. During the eighteen months between the spring of 2007 and fall of 2008, the situation in Iraq turned from hopelessness and near strategic failure to one that not only wrested the initiative from the insurgents but also significantly reduced their capacity, setting the conditions diminishing the necessity of U.S. forces in a combat role. In this eighteen-month period, Coalition and Iraqi forces were able to move through all three phases of tactical transition and complete operational transition well enough to begin period of strategic transition marked by the Strategic Framework Agreement, the movement of U.S. forces out of the cities, and the shift of U.S. military force structures from a Brigade Combat Team structure to an Advise and Assist Brigade structure.

If operational art in a counterinsurgency consists of progressing through tactical, operational, and strategic transitions, then the artists are the senior civil and military leaders responsible for the campaign. The
SIDEBAR CONVERSATION: THE SIX SURGES

The surge is commonly understood as an increase in the number of U.S. forces sent to Iraq in 2007. This understanding is incomplete and leads to a superficial understanding of how the Coalition avoided defeat and set the conditions for potential success.

The surge was actually six, interrelated surges.

First, it was an intellectual surge. The number of troops on the ground would be important only if they were used differently from the 2003 to 2006 employment scheme. Intellectual change leads physical change. Publishing the Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, and the process of extensive dialogue and learning that led to its publication, was perhaps the most visible aspect of the thinking that went on well before the surge. That manual and the rethinking of U.S. and Coalition strategy resulted in a properly conceived counterinsurgency strategy that fit the circumstances in Iraq.

Second, the surge led to improved security. The conventional and special operations counteroffensive, both its kinetic and non-kinetic components, included Coalition and Iraqi security forces. This counteroffensive forced al-Qaeda and other insurgents and militia from their safe havens, exposed their networks and leaders, and allowed them to be attacked under conditions favorable to the Coalition and Iraqi forces. Numbers, again, were important. Larger numbers of U.S. forces allowed friendly forces to create more pressure across the country and to sustain that pressure over time. Improved security had positive effects on the lives of Iraqis. It also created conditions in which political progress could be made. Finally, the reduced numbers and capacity of al-Qaeda and other insurgents helped the Iraqi Security Forces gain confidence that they could “handle” the residual security requirements.

Third, the growth of indigenous security forces contributed to the surge’s success. Accelerated growth in size, capability, and confidence of the Iraqi Security Forces, including both military and police, played a significant role in the counteroffensive. Their size and capability helped ensure that Iraqi forces were part of the fight and that the counteroffensive did not culminate prematurely. Generating new forces and replenishing those that already existed meant that Iraqi forces could backfill some coalition forces in the hold and build phases of the campaign who, in turn, could be moved to other parts of Iraq to continue the counteroffensive. Further, later in the fight — and at least partially as a result of the success of the counteroffensive — local Sons of Iraq forces also made a vital contribution to improving security and reducing violence.

Fourth, economic progress helped. Increased oil production, as well as an increase in cost per barrel, allowed the Iraqi budget to grow. In the security arena, for example, by 2009 the Iraqi Defense and Interior budget was $11 billion, and with the help of Coalition advisors, the ministries executed much of their budget. In addition, the surge period generated improvements in other portions of Iraq’s economic infrastructure—electricity, rail, sea and air ports, road system, and banks. Iraq’s economy was not fully functioning, but the improvement was noticeable. Finally, some of Iraq’s additional money found its way to provincial capitals where the Coalition’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) could help governors and governing councils use the money for Iraqi-sponsored reconstruction activities.

Fifth, there was an increase in diplomacy. While most U.S. officials working on the surge focused on Iraq proper, the embassy had a wider focus. The diplomats in Baghdad worked with a variety of diplomatic, political, and military agencies to expand engagement with Iraq’s neighbors. They aimed to reduce the flow of foreign fighters, the malevolent influence of Iran, and the tension between Turkey and the Kurdish region. Other parts of the engagement sought to help Iraqi political leaders and diplomats encourage neighbors to renew diplomatic relations with Iraq.

Last, but certainly not least, the surge was political. The number of PRTs grew during the surge. Some were embedded within coalition military units; others served geographic areas. As security improved, these teams expanded their activity and influence at the local and provincial level. The political proficiency at these levels helped stimulate positive developments at the national level. In addition, embedded advisory teams and top Coalition leaders, civil and military, did their part to help increase the proficiency of selected Iraqi ministries as well as within the Office of the Prime Minister.
In addition, leaders need flexibility in reassigning poor-performing subordinate leaders. Normal civilian human resource and military personnel regulations will sometimes be insufficient to handle the fast-paced changes in personnel requirements or inadequate performance in war. Top leaders should not be given dispensation from following their nation’s laws or their department’s regulations; they need only flexibility. The stakes associated with waging war are too high not to accord special attention to leader selection and flexibility with respect to leader replacement.

Finally, the top civil-military leaders have to lead. They lead by providing vision, direction, and motivation not only to their respective organizations but also throughout the civil-military force and among the capitals of nations contributing to the intervening effort. They cannot be captives of the embassy or the headquarters. They must be present, sharing the danger of those they lead, seeing the effects of their decisions firsthand, understanding the conditions under which subordinates execute what leaders have directed, explaining why tasks in the campaign plan are important, ensuring the necessary support gets to those who need it, and sensing the effects of operations and policies on the host nation’s political leadership and civilian population. Physical presence on the battlefield and open, personal discussions with multiple subordinates are two of the most important activities leaders can do to contribute to the vertical and horizontal alignment necessary to keep a large, complex organization focused on the right things.

The top civil and military leaders cannot be micro-managers. They must insist upon decentralized execution of their orders and directives.
Counterinsurgencies are fought by the smallest of units—whether civilian or military. The strategic corporal is vital to success, as is the strategic Provincial Reconstruction Team member. Reconstruction, governmental, and economic development activities have a sharp end to their spears, just as military activities.

These same leadership demands apply to the senior civil and military leaders subordinate immediately below the top. The top civil–military leaders cannot lead a counterinsurgency campaign themselves. On the military side, the top leader needs his subordinate leaders—for example, a deputy, a commanding general of the combat forces, a commanding general of the special operations forces, a commanding general charged to grow and develop indigenous military and police forces, and a chief of staff—to use initiative within the top leader’s intent. Similarly, on the civilian side, the top subordinate diplomats and foreign service officers must work independently within their areas of responsibility—running the administration and logistics of the civil organization; directing fiscal, economic, political–military, and provincial reconstruction activities within the theater of war; and coordinating with the intervening powers’ governments.

Finally, this set of top and senior-level civil and military executive form the corporate brain necessary to understand and interpret the many complexities associated with executing a counterinsurgency campaign. These are mature and experienced leaders. They are led by a pair of top leaders, but they play off one another, advise one another, learn from one another, and support one another much as leaders do throughout the civil–military organization.

General George Patton said the attributes of a leader are “best illustrated by a comparison to the ignition system of gasoline motor. No matter how carefully designed and accurately machined and assembled it may be, the motor is but iron sloshed with oil until fired to powerful and harmonious activity by the electric spark—the soul of the leader.” The spark necessary in a counterinsurgency campaign comes not just from the top leaders but also from a larger group of senior civil–military executive leaders. No two leaders are ever the same, but the set of senior civil–military leaders responsible to execute a counterinsurgency campaign must have some common traits. Their professional and personal skills must be commensurate with the complexity of the counterinsurgency task. They must be able to lead as part of a leadership team. And they must all understand and support the requirement for the decentralized execution that is the hallmark of a counterinsurgency.

Leadership at this level, whether civil or military, is indirect leadership. These leaders, the top as well as the next level down, act through other leaders and through organizations. Thus, achieving alignment between and among them is necessary but not sufficient to improve the odds of success significantly. They must achieve sufficient alignment throughout the breadth and depth of the entire civil–military organization. Part of this alignment is achieved through their personal interactions with their subordinates, mid- and junior-level leaders, as well as the soldiers and civilians doing the job. Part, however, is achieved through the use of a centrally guiding document, a campaign plan; a properly constructed organization; and a set of managerial practices that help the overall organization stay centered on what the top leaders want done.

The Joint Campaign Plan

The surge, contrary to common belief, was not about only adding more U.S. troops. Rather it was about changing the way those troops and the ones already in country would be used. The new counterinsurgency manual, the joint civil–military assessment of the situation in Iraq conducted prior to the surge of 2007, as well as other independent assessments concerning the situation in Iraq and the proper response to that situation, spelled out this new strategy. They formed the intellectual surge that preceded the physical surge in Iraq. The 2007 Joint Campaign Plan benefitted from and reflected the thinking of this intellectual surge.

The 2007 Joint Campaign Plan, signed by Crocker and Petraeus, was the foundational document that guided all civil–military activity during the surge. Important as the plan was, its real utility as a tool to achieve alignment was in the development of the plan and in the campaign assessment methodologies Crocker and Petraeus used in Baghdad.

The plan emerged from the work of a campaign plan review team. Many of those responsible for executing the plan were part of the team or major contributors to the review. The review process and the planning
process that resulted in publishing the 2007 Joint Campaign Plan forged sufficient consensus as to what the civil–military team was to achieve and how it needed to be done. This consensus became the basis for senior civil–military leader alignment and initial alignment throughout the civil–military organization because of the bottom-up input throughout the process. This initial alignment, however, had to be expanded. Senior civil and military leaders used briefings, battlefield visits, commander and leader conferences, and many other forums to explain the central ideas in the campaign plan to those who would execute them.

Alignment is always a temporary affair, however. Unforeseen obstacles and opportunities demand that planned activities shift—some were accelerated, others were delayed or canceled, still others were adapted. The requirement, then, is constant re-assessment followed by renewed vertical and horizontal communications to re-explain the central ideas.

To accommodate the demands of constant change, the plan must be accompanied by a campaign plan assessment methodology. That methodology, like the plan itself, is a joint, civil–military activity. In 2007–2008, this methodology consisted of monthly and quarterly assessment meetings, the latter jointly hosted by the ambassador and the commanding general. At these meetings, those responsible for the major lines of operation—governmental, economic, reconstruction, and security—presented their assessments. They identified where progress had been made and why, as well as where progress was stalled and why. The assessments used quantitative data and qualitative analysis relative to the metrics presented in the joint campaign plan. The assessments stimulated discussion between the top leaders and among the other senior civil and military executive leaders.

The meetings were focused, sometimes with intense discussions of alternative opinions and analyses. The preparation for these meetings was often as important as the meetings themselves. The discussion at multiple preparation sessions not only produced a worthwhile agenda and more focused topics but also cross-checked facts and understanding within the civil–military organizations responsible for executing the campaign. The preparations sessions, as well as the campaign assessments themselves, became one more way the ambassador and commanding general maintained alignment within and among their respective organizations.

Organizational Construct

The indirect leadership of the top civil–military leaders and the set of subordinate senior civil–military executive leaders is exercised through the organization created to execute the counterinsurgency campaign.

All civil–military organizations created to wage counterinsurgencies are unique. Rare will be the case when a standing civil–military organization is either in place or that can be lifted in toto and deployed to the insurgency’s location. Rather, an organization will have to be created. This created organization will reflect the environment in which it must operate as well as nature of the intervening power, whether that’s a single intervening power, an alliance, or a coalition. Further, the organization will change over the duration of the counterinsurgency campaign. The intervening powers will learn and adapt, and as the overall insurgent situation changes and progress is made in the counterinsurgency campaign, various functions of the civil–military organization will rise and fall in importance. What was important, for example, to achieve tactical transitions will change as the campaign progress from operational to strategic transitions. All these reasons, and others, demonstrate that each civil–military organization created to wage counterinsurgencies will be unique.

All should share, however, two important characteristics. First, they must have the capacity to do the job. Neither of the civil–military organizations established following the 2003 invasion of Iraq—the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), followed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and U.S. Army V Corps, called
the Afghan army; Germany was responsible for police development; the U.K. had lead on the counternarcotics mission; Italy was responsible for justice; and Japan (with U.N. assistance) led the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. Each nation had near-independent areas of responsibility as well as separate rules of engagement and an inadequate civil-military integration element.146

History shows that there are many ways to solve this organizational challenge, ranging from combining the civil and military functions in one person and then forming a common civil-military staff. That was done in the individual of British Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templar in Malaya during World War II and in the team of American Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and General Creighton W. Abrams in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s, then adapting an organizational construct around that team.147 A long-held military dictum holds that the initial dispositions of forces often determine the conduct and outcome of wars. While no organizational design will ever be perfect, the design chosen will contribute to or detract from the civil-military unity and cohesion essential to the success of any counterinsurgency campaign, as explained in R.W. Komers classic 1972 study, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam.”148

In terms of sheer mass, the organizational design of 2007 Iraq was one that favored the military side of the equation. Multi-National Force–Iraq, Multi-National Corps–Iraq, Multi-National Security and Transition Command–Iraq, and Headquarters–Special Operations Forces all had staffs that were far larger and more capable than the staff of Ambassador Crocker’s embassy. Add the military staff together and factor in that the staff officers were all trained and educated in common staff procedures, and the magnitude of the imbalance becomes clearer. Embassy staff said they often felt crushed by the overwhelming numbers of the military staff. In 2007, the Under Secretary of State for Management conducted a thorough review of the U.S. Embassy that resulted in a significant increase in the size of the embassy staff. Still, the imbalance persisted.

Recognizing this imbalance and understanding that the civil-military organization must facilitate unity of purpose and coherency of action, Crocker and Petraeus and their senior executive leaders tried to

### SIDEBAR CONVERSATION: NATO TRAINING MISSION, IRAQ

NATO Training Mission, Iraq (NTM-I) contributed significantly during the surge period. The NTM-I staff monitored and improved Iraq’s military academy at Rustamiyah. They mentored and taught at Iraq’s fledging mid-grade and senior officer development programs. They provided mobile training teams to help improve the leadership and staff proficiency of Iraqi units during unit training prior to being employed in battle. NTM-I also provided mobile training teams throughout the country to help improve unit-level Iraqi leader development programs. They ran the training programs for the Iraqi Navy and Marines. Finally, they helped develop instruction and standardization for the Iraqi Army’s Non Commissioned Officer programs.

Additionally, the presence of the fifteen NATO nations represented in NTM-I provided senior Iraqi military and civilian leaders a visible reminder that the U.S. approach to any given institutional issue was not the only approach. This aspect of NATO’s contribution often goes underappreciated, but it was a key component leading to the Prime Minister’s 2008 request to NATO that its mission in Iraq be extended.

Combined Joint Task Force 7—had the organizational capacity to do the job assigned.145 Second, the organization should contribute to the civil-military unity of purpose and coherency of action necessary to wage a successful counterinsurgency campaign. The arrangement in Afghanistan prior to 2009 is an example of an organizational construct the inhibited both unity of purpose and coherency of action. It reflected a stove-piped, lead nation approach where the U.S. was responsible for reconstructing
mitigate it. Selecting embassy leaders with significant weight of experience and title was an important way to mitigate the inevitable imbalance. Simply put, one ambassador offsets many colonels. The embassy’s managerial practices also offset this imbalance. A little more was offset by the open door style that the senior civil and military leaders used with one another. During the periods of tactical transition, the military staff also provided a robust number of liaison officers to work in the various sections of the embassy’s staff in another effort to address the imbalance. As the campaign moved to the operational level, the military headquarters augmented the embassy staff with several hundred semi-permanent military staff officers who replaced or augmented many of the liaison officers.

As the period of strategic transition neared and the military mission changed, augmentation slowly shifted to near-merging of the top leaders’ staffs and embedding within the embassy staff a small cell of about 150 personnel called the Office of Security Cooperation, Iraq. This cell remains as a permanent part of the embassy staff even after the full withdrawal of U.S. Forces–Iraq in December 2011. At the same time, the embassy staff grew. This growth resulted from the recognition that, while the embassy will not replace the functions of the military headquarters and staff, many of the informational, planning, operational, coordination, and support activities that the military staff provided have fallen upon the embassy in 2012.

Some may suggest that the two staff should have become one much earlier. Given the direness of the situation in 2007 and the multitude of high-priority tasks that had to be accomplished in a short time, expending leadership and organizational energy on staff reorganization would have been wasteful choice. The issue is not that the perfect organization be created, since there is no such organization. Rather, the questions that senior leaders must ask themselves is this: “Can we make what we have sufficient, will it be capable enough, will it reflect unity of purpose, and will it produce sufficiently coherent action in the set of civil–military actions associated with the tactical, operational, and strategic transitions the organization had to achieve?” In retrospect, the answers to these questions during the surge period was an unambiguous, “Yes, good enough.”

Managerial Practices

As much as they are decried, bureaucracies are a necessary evil. A counterinsurgency has many simultaneously-moving parts, and those parts are geographically dispersed. In Iraq, for example, the military organization responsible for growing, developing, and fielding Iraq’s military and police forces was distributed over 70 locations throughout the country. Special and conventional operations occurred simultaneously throughout the entire country. The embassy’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams spanned fifteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. Iraq is about twice the size of Idaho, and Baghdad has about six million residents. Afghanistan is slightly smaller than Texas and geographically more compartmentalized than Iraq. Kabul has about three million residents. Achieving unity of purpose and coherency of action across distances like these, especially given the complexity of the tasks to be accomplished and the danger involved, require not just leadership but also a well-thought out and disciplined management and communication scheme. In fact, it requires several overlapping schemes.

The discipline of the “Surge-period” management scheme consisted of pre-scheduled meetings with set agendas and prescribed frequencies. Crocker and Petraeus put such a scheme in place. Each major civil–military subordinate executive also had in place a scheme that was both necessary to manage his or her portion of the enterprise as well as complement that of the top leaders. Appropriate representatives of both the civil and military staffs attended key meetings at each level. Though this practice led to many back-to-back meetings, such a discipline was necessary and beneficial.

The regimen was fairly predictable. This predictability allowed top-tier and second-tier senior executive leaders to schedule extensive battlefield circulations around the meeting schedule. Further, if a civil or military senior leader’s presence was needed on the battlefield, that person’s deputy or another designated and empowered representative could attend in the principal’s stead.

Predictability also created a rhythm. The first beat of this rhythm was frequency. Each day had its set of meetings, as did each week, month, and quarter. Frequency facilitated empowerment. Subordinate leaders, executive and others, were expected to use their initiative within the intent of their seniors between meetings. The second beat of the rhythm was content. The meeting agenda allowed subordinates
SIDEBAR CONVERSATION: MEETING RHYTHM, ONE EXAMPLE

Below is a sample of my meeting rhythm during my tenure as the Commanding General, Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq during the surge timeframe. This meeting rhythm is representative of all other civil-military senior leaders at the time.

Daily:

- Multi-National Force, Iraq’s morning Battle Update followed by two smaller group sessions with senior civil and military leaders.

Weekly:

- Battlefield circulations. Some visits were scheduled, while others were coordinated at the last minute. Most involved visiting one or more of the 70-plus locations where the Iraqi Security Forces trained. Other visits included locations where the Iraqis and Coalition forces were fighting to see the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces first-hand. Many also involved visits to Coalition Forces to get their assessments of the Iraqi Security Forces operating in their sectors. Still others were to U.S. forces with whom I had served before or who were commanded by officers who had been in one of my commands. Some visits were conducted over multiple days, but others lasted only hours.
- Meetings with the Iraq’s Chief of Defense, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Interior (these meetings were commonly in each official’s office, but they were sometimes in their homes or in conjunction with visits to Iraqi military or police in the field).
- Iraqi Security Force budget and program review for all force generation and force replenishment programs. These included review of Foreign Military Sales cases, equipment purchases not made through the Foreign Military Sales program, and all major construction projects.
- The Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq’s update to the Commanding General, Multi-National Force, Iraq. The subject of this weekly meeting rotated. The first week concerned the development of the Iraqi military forces; the second, the Iraqi police forces; the third, Iraqi Intelligence and Special Operations Forces; and the fourth week, a special topic of the commanding general’s interest.
- Private meeting with the Commanding General, Multi-National Corps, Iraq.
- The Commanding General, Multi-National Force, Iraq’s Board of Directors meeting. This meeting included all major subordinate commanders and principal staff officers.
- Iraqi Ministerial Council for National Security. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki chaired this meeting, and his National Security Advisor and principal ministers associated with national security attended, as well as the U.S. ambassador.
- The U.S. Ambassador’s security core group. This meeting was held in the ambassador’s office, and a very small group attended.
- Engagement or discussion with groups visiting Iraq — Congressional, media, academic, think tank, or some combination thereof.

Monthly:

- Meeting with the NATO Training Mission, Iraq’s Deputy Commander and staff. Sometimes we met at the NTM-I headquarters in Baghdad and other times at one of the training sites for which NTM-I was responsible.
Secure Video Conference on Engagement and Reconciliation. This video conference was internal to Iraq but included nodes from throughout the country. Often it did include nodes within the U.S.

Meeting with Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq’s general and flag officers and senior executives. This was a private, executive level discussion of what the command was doing, what was working, what was not, and how we should adapt.

Secure video conference with the NATO command responsible for Iraq. This command was headquartered in Naples, Italy.

Budget execution briefings. There were three of these briefings: one with the Comptroller, Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq; a second with the command’s budget review board; and a third with the command’s subordinate leaders and staff.

Senior leaders of Multi-National Corps, Iraq and Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq.

Update to the Minister-Counselor for Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad. This was scheduled monthly, but given the constant interchange among senior leaders, we often met more frequently.

Bi-monthly:

Multi-National Force, Iraq’s commander’s conference. The senior military commanders and senior embassy leaders attended these meetings, which centered on the discussion of best practices.

Joint Campaign Plan assessment board.

Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq’s “all hands” brief. This was a personal update brief from the Commanding General to the members of the command. It was broadcast live and hung on the command’s internal web portal for asynchronous viewing. Its agenda included a status update, a description of where the command had progressed, and a discussion of obstacles we faced and what we were trying to do to deal with these obstacles. It also included a question-and-answer period.

Quarterly:

Social event with senior Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq leaders, selected leaders from the Embassy, other Coalition commands, senior leaders from the Iraqi Joint Force Headquarters, and the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior.

Review of ministerial development in the Ministries of Defense and Interior. This was first conducted with each Minister, then with the Commanding General, Multi-National Force, Iraq.

Dinner with the Multi-National Security and Transition Command, Iraq’s Command Sergeant Major and selected soldiers and NCOs. This was a formal program of recognition, but the Command Sergeant Major and I often ate with soldiers and junior leaders informally.

Update or visit with the prime minister and appropriate representative from the U.S. Embassy and Iraqi ministry. Like other meetings, these were scheduled quarterly, but they often occurred more frequently.

Luncheon with NATO ambassadors to provide a status report and to engage in discussions.

Campaign assessment discussion.
to update the seniors as to progress or lack thereof, identify obstacles and opportunities, lay out intended actions, and ask for guidance and direction where necessary. The seniors did not have to ask for updates at irregular intervals, because they knew there was a time coming up when they would receive information and could provide direction. Unless something unusual happened, subordinates did not need to wait for guidance. They got what they needed on a predictable basis. Some meetings, such as the commanding general’s daily update, had elements of the agenda that were the same each day and other elements that varied. The variable component, however, had its own rhythm. For example, each Monday might include a short summary of the status of Iraq’s electric grid; Tuesdays, an update on the growth of the Iraqi Security Forces; Wednesdays, a report from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams; and so on. These kinds of meetings combined the frequency and content beats of the meeting rhythm.

The third beat was scope of attendance. Both civil and military personnel widely attended some meetings, such as the commanding general’s morning update, and they were broadcast live throughout the organization. The Multi-National Security and Transition Command–Iraq’s weekly coordination session was also broadcast, though all executive and other senior leaders usually physically attended. Given that this command had more than 70 locations outside of Baghdad, this meeting was broadcast and hung on the command’s Web site for asynchronous viewing. Only senior military commanders and embassy leaders attended other meetings, such as the senior commander’s conference. Two other examples of more narrowly-attended meetings were the quarterly session the Commanding General of NATO Training Mission–Iraq hosted with all of the NATO and coalition ambassadors or senior political representatives and the ambassador’s country team meeting. The principle of including all who were necessary but no more guided every forum.

The last beat of the rhythm was decisiveness. While many meetings were designed as informational only, inevitably the discussion resulted in guidance and decisions. Such an arrangement allowed a continual flow of decisions and significantly reduced the likelihood of actions becoming mired in bureaucracy.

In all these ways, the discipline and rhythm of the management regime—especially within the context of the battlefield presences of senior civil and military executive leaders—facilitated alignment, constant situational awareness, feedback, and continual adaptation within the senior civil-military organizations and throughout the depths of those organizations.

The meeting rhythm also included specialized joint, civil-military task forces that focused on particular issues. Some of the joint task forces centered on the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq, countering Iranian influence, threat-financing networks, rule of law, and countering Iraqi militias. The number of joint task forces grew and diminished as necessary. Like the other meetings, these were scheduled on a predictable basis; their civil and military attendance was fixed, as was the agenda. The task forces were informational, coordinating, and decision-making bodies. Top leaders attended some but not others.

The meeting rhythm included secure video conferences with senior political and military leaders in Washington, D.C. Few attended these sessions, but they were valuable to those who did. They cut through layers of bureaucracy and assured political-military commonality of understanding and consistency of effort.

Finally, there was a constant flow of visitors to Iraq. Political leaders from the executive and legislative branches of government and from the diplomatic corps from the United States, NATO and other coalition partners visited Iraq. Coalition maintenance is as important as any battlefield activity. Representatives from think tanks, the media, audit and accounting organizations, and non-governmental agencies from multiple nations also visited. Scheduling and coordination for visiting individuals and groups required a lot of thought and work, and depending upon the security situation, availability of senior leaders, and transport resources, visits were sometimes...
reduced or stopped all together. Yet these visits were an essential component of waging a counterinsurgency campaign. A campaign may be fought in one country, but the campaign is also fought within a political and social context that extends beyond the theater of operations.

Translating the strategic political aims into realizable civil-military objectives and capturing those objectives into a coherent joint, civil-military campaign plan takes the strategic leadership of a strong civil-military team. Operational art in counterinsurgencies, the use of tactical civil and military forces—in sequence or simultaneously in battles, engagements, activities, and maneuvers—in a campaign or series of campaigns to achieve strategic aims, requires strategic leaders to provide the vision, direction, and motivation. This vision, direction, and motivation emanate from the top civil-military strategic leaders and then through their immediate subordinates. Operational art in a counterinsurgency also requires that strategic leaders publish a joint civil-military campaign plan to help guide the multiple lines of operation of the campaign. The leaders must establish an adequate organizational construct and managerial scheme. This construct and scheme helps create sufficient alignment throughout the civil-military organization by augmenting leadership of presence, communicating the vision throughout the civil-military organization, overseeing implementation, maintaining focus on the main things, and adapting to the ever-changing events of the campaign.149

A LOOK FORWARD

“As they do after all wars, Americans had become almost pacifist following the Civil War. It was one of those ‘never again’ interludes,” Stanley Karnow wrote.150 Of course, war did come again. Karnow was writing about the U.S. involvement in the Philippines in the late 1890s, an involvement that required fighting “the most obdurate resistance…from the Muslims of Mindanao and the other southern islands.”151 The “never again” returned after World War I, the war to end all wars—which it did not. The attitude “never again” once more applied to the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. How interesting that “never again” attitude is creeping back into discussion about American involvement in wars similar to Iraq and Afghanistan.

What the Philippines, Vietnam, the host of peacekeeping operations following the end of the Cold War—Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Iraq, and Afghanistan—teach us is the continual need for civil-military leadership, as well as joint planning documents, organizations, and management practices. Yet neither the Department of State nor the Department of Defense seem to believe that such a requirement should be a permanent part of their organization’s repertoire of behavior. Rather, as each case arises, the U.S. reaction seems to be one of surprise, requiring a re-learning of lessons that should have already been a part of each department’s systematic professional training and education system.

If there is one lesson that jumps out of the pages of history as well as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan it is this: civil-military cooperation, leadership, organizations, and management practices are a recurring requirement. The requirement may be episodic, but the episodes recur frequently enough that they demand more serious attention from the diplomatic and military professions. This requirement demands a serious, joint, systematic study.

In a chapter entitled, “U.S. Foreign Policy in the Age of Ambiguity,” David Rothkopf wrote,

In an era for which there are few precedents or guidelines, the result is...adopting old models to new circumstances from which they may be ill suited or...reactively backing into a pattern of behavior that has not been thought out in advance. Leaders must make a commitment to breaking this cycle.152

This aspect of U.S. national security capability is weak within the diplomatic corps, the military, and at the national, inter-agency level.

Yet most analysts agree that we live in a time that requires more extensive civil-military cooperation at all levels, tactical through strategic. Some writers, like Rupert Smith in The Utility of Force, have even claimed that over the past thirty to fifty years the understanding of war has changed. Gone, according to Smith, is the peace-crisis-war-peace model; in its stead is a confrontation-conflict mode. “Confrontations and conflicts,” he wrote, “must be understood as intertwined political and military events, and only in this way can they be resolved.” As such, he explained,

It is no longer practical for the politicians and diplomats to expect the military to solve the problem by force, nor is it practical for
the military to plan and execute a purely military campaign, or in many cases take tactical action, without placing it within the political context, with both politicians and the military adjusting context and plan accordingly...as the situation evolves.\textsuperscript{153}

Whether Smith is right in claiming that a new model has replaced the old remains to be seen. The new model may be an addition to the old. Regardless, the conflicts the U.S. has been involved with since 1989 seem to fit the confrontation-conflict model, a model that highlights the necessity of civil-military approaches. This trend will continue for the foreseeable future.

Now is the time to take seriously the adjustments that both the State Department and Defense Department must make to jointly and systematically train and educate leaders, to expand the understanding of operational art as a civil-military activity, and to institute a proper set of civil-military exercises. Now is the time, while events in Iraq and Afghanistan are fresh in everyone’s memories, to make serious changes to U.S. interagency processes. Now is not the time to say “never again,” only to doom another generation of leaders to re-learn hard lessons.
NOTES


8 For a good history of the development of operational art, see Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips, Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2005), 3-21. Interestingly, the glossary of the 2006 joint Army/Marine Corps manual on counterinsurgency contains no definition of operational art with respect to counter insurgency campaigns.

9 President Barack Obama, Speech at the United States Military Academy, December 1, 2009.

10 A new publication that provides a good overview of transitions is Dr. Harry R. Yarger, ed. Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions in International Assistance (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2010). The essays in this report come from a 2010 conference held at the Army War College, Carlisle, PA.

11 Interview with General Raymond T. Odierno, November 8, 2008.

12 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel J.B. Burton, September 24, 2008.

13 Interview with Odierno.

Interview with Colonel Steven Townsend, October 8, 2008.

Interview with Townsend.

Interview with Townsend.

Interview with Colonel Brian Roberts, October 9, 2008.

Interview with General David Petraeus, October 10, 2008.

Interview with Roberts.

Interview with General Raymond T. Odierno, November 8, 2008.

Interview with Sutherland.


This sidebar conversation drew heavily upon the doctrine division of the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization draft paper entitled, “Observations from Iraq, Provincial Reconstruction Team Planning and Assessment.” Several sites provide more complete information concerning Provincial Reconstruction Teams: The January 2009


53 Interview with Colonel Steven Townsend, October 8, 2008.

Interview with Townsend.

Interview with Townsend.

Interview with Colonel Brian Roberts, October 9, 2008.

Interview with General David Petraeus, October 10, 2008.

Interview with Roberts.

Interview with General Raymond T. Odierno, November 8, 2008.

Interview with Sutherland.

Interview with Sutherland.

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Interview with Townsend.

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Interview with Colonel Brian Roberts, October 9, 2008.

Interview with General David Petraeus, October 10, 2008.

Interview with Roberts.

Interview with Roberts.

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Interview with Colonel David Sutherland, September 26, 2009.

Interview with General Raymond T. Odierno, November 8, 2008.

Interview with Sutherland.

Interview with Sutherland.


Interview with Roberts.


Interview with Roberts.

Interview with Roberts.


Interview with Sutherland.

Interview with Sutherland.

Interview with Sutherland.

Interview with Gordon.

Interview with Sutherland.

Interview with Sutherland.

Interview with Sutherland.

Interview with Sutherland.
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87The U.S. Institute of Peace’s October 2008 report by David Steele, “Reconciliation Strategies in Iraq,” is more useful in affirming the requirement to fight and talk and outlining general approaches to and principles that guide reconciliation, than it is as an account of what was happening in Iraq at that time. The report is available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr213.pdf.


91Testimony of General David Petraeus to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, April 8, 2008.

92Testimony of General David Petraeus to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, April 8, 2008.

93Interview with Lieutenant General George Flynn, July 7, 2009.

94Interview with General David Petraeus, October 10, 2008.

95Interview with Flynn.

96Interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, November 10, 2008.


98Cochrane Sullivan, “The Battle for Basra.”

99Interview with Petraeus.

100Interview with Petraeus; interview with Flynn.


103Interview with Petraeus.

104Interview with Crocker.


106Interview with Crocker.

107Interview with Crocker.

108Interview with Crocker.

109Interview with General David Petraeus, October 10, 2008.

110Interview with Petraeus.

111Interview with Petraeus.

112Interview with General Raymond T. Odierno, November 8, 2008.

113Interview with Odierno.

114Interview with Petraeus.

115Interview with Petraeus.

116Interview with Odierno.

117Interview with Petraeus.

118Interview with Petraeus.

119Interview with Odierno.

120Interview with Odierno.

121Interview with Odierno.

122Interview with Petraeus.

123Interview with Colonel John Charlton, September 23, 2008.

124Interview with Charlton.

125Interview with Charlton.

126Interview with Charlton.

127Interview with Charlton.

128Interview with Charlton.

129Interview with Charlton.

130Interview with Charlton.

131Interview with Charlton.

132Interview with Charlton.


140Labovitz and Rosansky, The Power of Alignment, 7–47.


143One of the most influential independent assessments was done by Dr. Fredrick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute. That study, entitled “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq,” was published in January 2007 and can be found at http://www.aei.org/paper/25396.

144Two short accounts of the campaign plan, its origins and effects can be found at: www.nytimes.com/2007/07/24/world/middleeast/24military.html? and kidoaklandblog.blogspot.com/2007/.../joint-campaign-plan-redesign. For background, one should also read Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Ollivant and First Lieutenant Eric D. Chewing, “Producing Victory: Rethinking


146Seth Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan” (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2008), 104.


149General David Petraeus, Speech at the American Enterprise Institute, May 6, 2010.