On June 25, an anonymous security source stated that ISIS executed a former candidate for the Salah al-Din Provincial Council, Jassim Muhammad al-Juburi, in Sudaïra village, south of Shirqat district. Between June 25 and 26, CENTCOM reported six airstrikes “near Mosul.”

On June 25, Anbar Police chief Maj. Gen. Hadi Razij stated that the Iraqi Police (IP) forces attacked ISIS on the outskirts of Haditha district, northwest of Ramadi, killing 12 ISIS fighters and destroying four vehicles and a tanker VBIED.

On June 26, Federal Police (FP) forces attacked ISIS in eastern Husayba, east of Ramadi, killing six ISIS members and capturing 12 anti-tank rockets. Anbar Police chief Maj. Gen. Hadi Razij supervised the integration of Ramadi police into six Emergency Battalions by the Interior Ministry (MOI), which provided the battalions with weapons and training.

On June 25, CENTCOM reported three airstrikes “near Ramadi.” On June 26, Anbar Police chief Maj. Gen. Hadi Razij stated that the Iraqi Police (IP) forces attacked ISIS on the outskirts of Haditha district, northwest of Ramadi, killing 12 ISIS fighters and destroying four vehicles and a tanker VBIED. On June 26, CENTCOM reported three airstrikes “near Ramadi.”

On June 25, Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) spokesman Brig. Gen. Saad Maan stated that the ISF supported by U.S.-led Coalition airstrikes repelled an ISIS attack against Baghdadi sub-district west of Hit district, killing 18 ISIS members. ISIS attacked the sub-district from the east and from Jubbâ sub-district, north of Baghdad. A Popular Mobilization source stated that “1st Martyr Sadr’ militiamen killed 31 ISIS members during the attack. Between June 25 and 26, CENTCOM reported three airstrikes “near Baghdad.”

On June 25, a VBIED exploded “near Mosul.”

On June 25, an anonymous governmental source in Diyala stated that IEDs destroyed four transmission towers near Khanaqin, in eastern Diyala, along a power line that carries electrical power from Kerman-shah in Iran to Diyala Province. On June 26, an anonymous Diyala source stated that the IP defused an additional three IEDs placed near electrical towers in Khanaqin. Reports indicate Diyala was already suffering from extended power outages because of funding or technical issues prior to these attacks.

On June 26, an ISIS SVBIED targeted a gathering of IA soldiers on the road between Baiji and Tikrit, killing three soldiers and wounding five others. A Diyala Popular Mobilization source stated that three ISIS fighters, including an “explosives expert,” were killed on the outskirts of Baiji. Between June 25 and 26, CENTCOM reported three airstrikes “near Baiji.”

On June 25, a Turkmen Popular Mobilization source stated that an Iraqi airstrike killed and wounded an unspecified number of ISIS members in Bashir village, south of Kirkuk. A separate report stated that a Turkmen Popular Mobilization force advanced on Bashir and sustained one casualty after ISIS fired mortars. On June 26, an IA Aviation airstrike targeted ISIS at the police station in Bashir, killing 35 ISIS militants. The fighters were reportedly planning an attack on Taza, south of Kirkuk. On June 26, CENTCOM reported one airstrike “near Kirkuk.”

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On June 25, a VBIED exploded in northern Baghdad, killing one person and wounding eight others.

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s Shi’a religious establishment (Hawza) has issued new guidance that is likely to increase the size of the armed groups fighting under its supervision and ultimately its base of popular support. A new program supervised by an armed group affiliated with the establishment aims to provide military training to students during summer break in provinces throughout southern and central Iraq. The establishment initially supervised the formation of armed groups to protect holy sites following Sistani’s religious ruling calling for the mobilization of Iraqis in June 2014. Since then, such groups have expanded in both size and area of operation. Currently, Firqat al-Abas al-Qitaliyah, affiliated with the Imam al-Abas Shrine, maintains deployed forces around Karbala in addition to forces that are forward-deployed in southern Salah ad-Din Province. Liwa Ali al-Akbar, affiliated with the Imam al-Hussein Shrine, also has forces deployed around Karbala and Baiji, in northern Salah ad-Din. On June 5, 2015 a representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Karbala issued guidance for Iraqi students to enroll in “intellectual, cultural, … and weapons training.” Shortly after, Firqat al-Abas al-Qitaliyah began to open training centers to conduct 15-day military training cycles in Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Muthana, Babil, Diwaniya, and Karbala. The leader of the group continues to emphasize the need to work under the command of the ISF according to Sistani’s ruling. This requirement stands in a stark contrast to the behavior of the Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias such as the Badr Organization that operate outside the ISF command, weakening the Iraqi state. It will be important to watch for an increase in the size of groups such as Firqat al-Abas al-Qitaliyah or the formation of additional groups, which would likely indicate that students have chosen to remain out of school to fight. Additional recruits from these areas would further expand the influence of both the armed group and the religious establishment in these areas. It would also allow the armed group to expand its areas of operations. In addition, it will be important to watch for friction between volunteers and other militias especially in areas of Baghdad with historic militia presence such as Zafaranîya, Bâyâ’, Sadr City, and Shula, which would generate instability.