

1 Tentative agreement on terms of Popular Mobilization involvement in Ninewa operations. The Ninewa Popular Mobilization Commission announced on June 29 that it would open five camps to train local recruits who would participate in operations to retake Mosul. The agreement would place Ninewa tribal fighters, including ethnic minority militias, operationally under the control of the Joint Operations Command (JOC), but the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) would control their administrative and financial elements. Ninewa governor Nufal Sultan Hammadi al-Akub stated that the force would number 15,000 fighters. Akub stressed that the Turkish-backed National Mobilization, controlled by former Ninewa governor Atheel al-Nujaifi, was not included in the initial formation, but could be involved if it joined the Popular Mobilization apparatus. The announcement follows a meeting between PMC chairman Faleh al-Fayadh, the Interior and Defense Ministers, the Kurdistan Interior Minister, and local officials on June 27 to discuss militia involvement in future Ninewa, and Mosul, operations.

10 U.S.-led Coalition extends and increases military training program in Iraq. Great Britain announced on June 30 that it sent an additional 250 military trainers to Ain al-Assad airbase, south of Haditha, as a part of the effort to train Iraqi troops to fight ISIS. New Zealand announced that on June 29 its military trainers will extend its program to work with forces from the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi Army following its announcement on June 20 that its forces will remain in Iraq until 2018. Meanwhile, the U.S. signed a \$2.7 billion loan with Iraq on June 29 to provide service and maintenance for military equipment, including F16 aircraft, armored vehicles, the Umm Qasr Port, and oil platforms.

9 ISF launches small-scale operation to clear Ramadi desert. The Joint Operations Command announced on July 2 that forces from the 8th, 9th, and 10th IA Divisions under Anbar Operations Command launched operations to clear the Khalidiya Desert between Ramadi and Fallujah, with air support from the Iraqi Army Aviation (IAA), Iraqi Air Force (IAF), and Coalition.

8 Iraqi and Coalition airstrikes on ISIS convoy result in massive losses for ISIS. At least two series of airstrikes targeted ISIS convoys of vehicles fleeing southwards from Fallujah on June 29. Operations Inherent Resolve reported that Coalition airstrikes destroyed 40 vehicles around Fallujah, killing at least 250 ISIS militants. Iraqi sources reported that Iraqi airstrikes destroyed "140" ISIS vehicles moving towards the Razazah Desert south of Fallujah.

7 Iranian-backed proxy militias demonstrate for al-Quds Day. Major Iranian-backed Shi'a militias including Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and the Badr Organization organized large-scale parades as part of al-Quds Day, an Iranian-backed holiday in support of Palestinian resistance against Israel. Protests occurred on July 1 in Baghdad, Diwaniyah, Babil, Dhi Qar, and Najaf Provinces, in conjunction with Friday protests in Baghdad and in the southern provinces.

2 ISF continues to advance in operations south of Mosul. The War Media Cell announced that forces from the Coalition-trained 91st Iraqi Army (IA) Brigade of the 16th Division and the 37th IA Brigade of the 9th Armored Division with Coalition air support fully recaptured Hajj Ali, south of Mosul, on July 3, during operations to retake Qayyarah from the east. The Ministry of Defense announced on June 29 that forces from the 9th IA Division and Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) retook the Shirqat Junction and Tulul al-Baj, southeast of Shirqat, and were approaching the Qayyarah airbase from the south. The recapture of Shirqat and Qayyarah from ISIS are critical for condition setting prior to the start of operations to retake Mosul city.

3 SVEST targets Badr headquarters in Tuz Khurmato. A Suicide Vest (SVEST) attacker detonated near the Badr Organization headquarters in Tuz Khurmato District in northeastern Salah al-Din on July 1. A second source stated the forces from the Badr Organization thwarted the attack, though the attacker detonated, killing himself and another ISIS member. ISIS has not yet claimed the attack.

4 ISIS continues SVEST attacks around Baghdad outskirts. ISIS continued to attack soft and military targets with Suicide Vests (SVEST) around the outskirts of Baghdad. An ISIS attacker detonated an SVEST in al-Shurta al-Rabia neighborhoods in southwestern Baghdad on June 30. Two SVESTs detonated on July 4 targeting security checkpoints, one in Saba al-Bour, northwest of Baghdad, and one in Arab Jabour in southern Baghdad. ISIS has not yet claimed these attacks.

5 ISIS detonates SVBIED in central Baghdad, marking the worst attack in Iraq since 2003. ISIS detonated a Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED (SVBIED) in the early hours of July 3, targeting a shopping center in the majority Shi'a Karrada district in central Baghdad. The area was crowded with people out after *iftar*, the evening Ramadan meal, and for start of Eid al-Fitr, the holiday marking the end of Ramadan. Fire consumed the area. The attack left upwards of 250 people dead, making it the deadliest suicide attack in Iraq since 2003.

6 Minister of Interior submits resignation in wake of Karrada bombing. Minister of Interior Muhammad al-Ghabban offered his resignation to Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi on July 5, calling on PM Abadi to either reform the security apparatus or accept his resignation. Ghabban called for the Baghdad security file to be handed over entirely to the Ministry of Interior, criticizing the failure to address the lack of coordination between security institutions that allowed security breaches to occur. The security file is currently shared between the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Ghabban handed authority over to his deputy until PM Abadi makes a decision.



- Major Cities
- ✈ Airstrikes
- 🚩 Coalition
- Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
- Anti-ISIS Iraqi Sunni Tribes
- Iraqi Shi'a Militias
- 🚗 SVBIED
- 👤 Demonstration
- 🚩 SVEST
- ISIS
- Peshmerga

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ISIS detonated a suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED) in the majority Shi'a neighborhood of Karrada in central Baghdad on July 3, resulting in the deadliest attack in Iraq since 2003 with upwards of 250 people killed. The attack comes at the end of the holy month of Ramadan, during which ISW assessed that ISIS would attack Baghdad at a time of political unease in order to break Iraq as a state. The Karrada attack has advanced that objective as it prompted Minister of Interior (MOI) Muhammad al-Ghabban to submit his resignation to Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi on July 5. Ghabban, a Badr Organization member, charged PM Abadi to either reform the security apparatus in Baghdad, by placing the security file fully under the control of the MOI, or to accept his resignation. Baghdad's security file is currently split between the Ministries of Defense and Interior. The Ministry of Interior is ostensibly controlled by Iranian proxy, the Badr Organization, which has allowed pro-Iranian elements to compromise units in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Full MOI control of the Baghdad security file would allow pro-Iranian forces, particularly the Federal Police, more control in the capital, which may constrain U.S. and Coalition movement in and around Baghdad. It will also increase the likelihood of sectarian violence by pro-Iranian elements in the ISF against Sunni and minority residents. Even if PM Abadi accepts Ghabban's resignation, the position will likely transfer to either Ghabban's deputy, who is also a Badr Organization member, or Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, who has shown interest in the position in the past. Ghabban has successfully moved the conditions of the Karrada bombing in Iran's favor. He has forced PM Abadi to either submit security in Baghdad under control of pro-Iranian forces or accept Ghabban's resignation with the chance that his replacement will further empower the Badr Organization and its control of the security in Baghdad. Neither of these options aligns with U.S. interests in Iraq, and both will serve to weaken PM Abadi's tenuous control over the Iraqi Government.