

1 PM Abadi and Erdogan trade barbs over Turkish presence near Mosul. Turkish President Recep Erdogan and PM Haidar al-Abadi traded barbs over the presence of Turkish troops northeast of Mosul. Erdogan stated on October 11 that Turkey has a right to “intervene against the threats right next to it,” adding that Turkey does not need permission to do so and it does not “plan on getting it.” PM Abadi reaffirmed that Turkey’s violation of Iraqi sovereignty is a “red line.”

10 Coalition airstrike hits Sunni tribal fighters in friendly fire incident.

Joint Operations Command (JOC) announced that Coalition airstrikes mistakenly struck Sunni tribal fighters in Khara’ib Jabr, in Hajj Ali east of Qayyarah on October 5, killing at least 20 tribal fighters. JOC and the Coalition announced a full investigation into the incident.

9 ISF secures desert on northern Euphrates bank between Hit and Haditha.

Joint Operations Command (JOC) announced on October 10 that the 7th Iraqi Army (IA) Division and tribal fighters secured the desert on the northern Euphrates River bank between Hit and Haditha District and the recapture of Hayy al-Bakr, in Hit District, on October 10 by the 10th IA Division. The operation occurred with the coordination of Anbar Operations Command (AOC) and Jazeera and Badia Operations Command (JBOC).

8 Reform Front leads questioning of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Reform Front, the shadow party of former PM Nouri al-Maliki, led the questioning of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ibrahim al-Jaafari in the Council of Representatives (CoR) on October 6. The questioning is the prerequisite for a vote of no confidence. So far, there have been no reports of moving to a no confidence vote.

7 Federal Court reinstates Vice Presidency positions, including Maliki.

The Federal Court overturned on October 10 PM Haidar al-Abadi’s decision in August 2015 to dissolve the position of vice president, citing that the elimination of the positions is unconstitutional. PM Abadi canceled the positions as part of cost-cutting reforms, removing former PM Nouri al-Maliki, senior Sunni leader Osama al-Nujaifi, and Ayad Allawi, leader of the secular Wataniya bloc, as the three vice presidents. Maliki stated that the court’s decision “corrects a mistake.” Radical Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr criticized the decision and the continued delay in installing technocratic ministers. In protest, Sadr suspended negotiations between the Sadrist Trend and the National Alliance, called for continued “angry” protests on Tuesday, October 18 in the Green Zone, and for preparations for a second mass sit-in.

2 Kurds and Sunnis differ over permitting Turkish forces in northern Iraq. Five Kurdish parties called on October 8 for Turkey to withdraw its troops from the Kurdistan Region, however the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) -- the party of Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani that is closely aligned with Turkey -- was not among those five. Turkish officials claimed on October 5 that Barzani requested the troops to train local forces, however a KDP member denied it. Meanwhile, General Muhammad Yahya, the deputy commander of the National Mobilization, Sunni tribal fighters trained by the Turkish forces near Mosul, denied on October 10 that Turkey will take part in the Mosul operation and that the National Mobilization will join the command of the ISF. However, leader of the National Mobilization Atheel al-Nujaifi stated on October 6 that Turkish troops are important for training forces and would participate in Mosul if the Popular Mobilization and Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) participate.

3 Ministry of Defense delegation meets with Ministry of Peshmerga in Arbil to discuss Mosul operations.

A delegation from the Ministry of Defense, alongside representatives from the Ministry of Interior and War Media Cell, arrived in Arbil to meet with the Ministry of Peshmerga on October 11. The two delegations discussed preparations for Mosul and the formation of a joint media cell for the operation.

4 15,000 tribal fighters inducted into Popular Mobilization for Mosul operation.

The Popular Mobilization, during a conference with Ninewa Operations Commander Brigadier General Najm al-Juburi and Ninewa Governor Nufal al-Akub on October 10, stated that 15,000 Sunni tribal fighters from Ninewa Province were inducted into the ranks of the Popular Mobilization in order to participate in Mosul operations.

5 ISIS targets checkpoint with SVBIED in western Diyala Province.

ISIS detonated a Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED (SVBIED) at a security checkpoint in Khalis, northwest of Baquba in Diyala Province, on October 9, killing six people, including police officers, and injuring eight others. ISIS claimed the attack.

6 ISIS targets Shi’a pilgrims in southeastern Baghdad with SVEST.

ISIS detonated a Suicide Vest (SVEST) targeting a Shi’a pilgrimage convoy in Baghdad al-Jadida in southeastern Baghdad on October 10, killing five people and injuring 22 others. ISIS claimed the attack, which occurred during the Shi’a holiday of Ashura.



- Major Cities
- Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
- Peshmerga
- ▲ SVEST
- ✈ Airstrikes
- Iraqi Shi’a Militias
- ISIS
- 🚗 SVBIED
- 🚩 Coalition
- Anti-ISIS Iraqi Sunni Tribes
- Turkey
- 👤 Demonstration

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Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki continues to shape the political landscape in Iraq. Maliki’s shadow party, the Reform Front, led an interrogation of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ibrahim al-Jaafari on October 6. The effort to remove Jaafari from his post follows an ongoing process steered by Maliki to eliminate his key rivals and undermine Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s administration. The successful removal of Jaafari, a competitor to Maliki’s premiership, would indicate that the Shi’a National Alliance is too fractured to support Jaafari, a pro-Iranian and consensus figure, and to foil Maliki’s targeting of ministers, which the National Alliance has stated it opposes. Jaafari’s removal would also indicate to Maliki that he has the numbers to drive a vote of no confidence in the prime minister, a position he ultimately aims to retake. The Federal Court also gave Maliki a boost on October 10 when it overturned PM Abadi’s unconstitutional August 2015 decision to eliminate the three vice presidencies, including Maliki’s. Although Maliki has largely continued to function as Vice President, the court’s decision will add to his legitimacy and deals a serious blow to PM Abadi’s reform efforts to streamline the government. Maliki may have also prompted the Federal Court, largely still seen as a pro-Maliki institution, to issue the decision at this time for political purposes. The ruling notably also reinstates Osama al-Nujaifi, a senior leader in the Sunni political alliance. In return, Maliki may call for Sunni political support either for pro-Maliki ministerial candidate or for a future bid for the premiership.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan and PM Abadi traded bombastic rhetoric over Turkish force presence northeast of Mosul. Turkey renewed its one-year force mandate on October 1, reviving ongoing complaints by Iraqi officials against Turkey’s violation of Iraqi sovereignty. Erdogan’s hostile comments against Iraq and PM Abadi on October 11, however, are part of a greater trend by Erdogan to posture Turkey as having a right to influence any decision made about northern Iraq. Erdogan went as far as to give the date for operations to begin in Mosul during an interview on September 25, pre-dating the argument over Turkey’s force renewal on October 1. Erdogan’s over-the-top statements do not yet indicate that Turkey will increase its presence in northern Iraq, where they are currently training Sunni forces to retake and hold Mosul. His firm rhetoric does, however, suggest that he is reserving Turkey’s right to operate in northern Iraq, primarily to counter the expansion of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) on the Turkish-Iraqi border and prevent them from participating in Mosul operations.