Adversary Entente Task Force Update, June 18, 2025

 

 

 

 

Authors: Grace Mappes, Daniel Shats, and Karolina Hird, with Nicholas Carl

Data cutoff: 0930 ET, June 16

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is launching a task force that will examine the strategic interactions between the United States’ main adversaries: Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea. The new Adversary Entente Task Force will produce weekly products providing assessments on major developments between these adversaries in order to more holistically examine the evolution of the Entente, assess prospects of cooperation, and determine exploitable vulnerabilities within these adversary relationships. Adversary Entente Task Force publications will supplement the regional expertise in ISW’s existing Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Iran Update, and China-Taiwan Weekly Update.

Key takeaways:

• Russia offers to mediate Israel-Iran talks: Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to mediate Iran-Israeli talks following the onset of the Iran-Israeli war on June 13. Neither Iran, Israel, nor the United States is likely to engage in productive talks for peace or Iran's nuclear program in the near term. Putin is likely using the Iran-Israeli war to present himself to US President Donald Trump as a peacemaker in a bid to improve bilateral US-Russian relations and secure concessions over the war in Ukraine.
• Entente responses to the Israel-Iran war: Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) condemned Israel's strikes against Iran and expressed support for a diplomatic settlement of the war. The PRC is attempting to balance between appearing to promote international law while maintaining good relations with Iran and other regional allies. Russia and other US adversaries are watching and learning from international reactions to the Israel-Iran war.
• Russo-Iranian coalition prospects: The Israel-Iran war may have limited impacts on Iran’s ability to sustain defense cooperation with Russia. Russia is currently less reliant on Iran than it has been in previous years since the start of the war in Ukraine, underlining the current asymmetry of the Russo-Iranian relationship. Russia’s lack of substantive response towards Iran emphasizes the limitations of Russia as a partner to states such as Iran, the PRC, and North Korea.
• Russo-North Korean civilian cooperation: Russia and North Korea are expanding road, rail, and air links as they promote civil cooperation. North Korea can use these transportation links to send more workers to Russia and reap economic benefits.
• Sino-Russian competition in Central Asia: CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping signed a multilateral treaty of friendship and bilateral agreements with all five Central Asian states at the second China-Central Asia Summit in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan announced that it would purchase its first nuclear power plants from both Russia and the PRC, highlighting how Central Asia is balancing between the two dominant powers in the region.

Russia offers to mediate Israel-Iran talks

Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to mediate talks between Israel and Iran following the start of the Israeli strike campaign into Iran. US President Donald Trump and Putin had a phone call on June 14.[1] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that the call focused on the Israeli strikes on Iran and that Putin expressed a readiness to help mediate between Israel and Iran.[2] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev, who has been involved in Russian diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis Ukraine and the United States, claimed on June 15 that Russia could play a "key role" in mediating between Israel and Iran.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated on June 16 Russia's willingness to mediate and noted that Putin also had phone calls with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in which Putin called for both Israel and Iran to negotiate.[4]

Calls for renewed United States-Iran talks or the start of Israel-Iran talks are unlikely to result in a peaceful resolution to the Israel-Iran war, however, as nuclear talks collapsed and both Iran and Israel are unlikely to agree to engage one another diplomatically. Iran announced on June 13 that it withdrew from the nuclear talks following the initial Israeli strikes, and Pezeshkian said on June 14 that Iran will not participate in talks as long as Israel continues its strikes.[5] Two sources told Axios on June 14 that Iran stated that it would only be willing to return to talks with the United States after Iran has finished its retaliatory strikes against Israel, and Pezeshkian said that Iran will not participate in negotiations during the Israeli strike campaign.[6] Western media have since reported that Iran is open to returning to negotiations if the United States does not join the Israeli strikes, but Iran appears to maintain its negotiating position on its nuclear program, indicating that Iran is unwilling currently to compromise and negotiate an end to the conflict.[7] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said on June 16 that the Iranian parliament is preparing a bill to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which Iran previously indicated that it would do in the event of US "coercion" or E3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) snapback sanctions.[8] Israeli Ambassador to Russia Simona Halperin said on June 16 that it is "too early" for Israel to discuss a non-military settlement to the Israel-Iran conflict.[9]

Putin is likely using the Israel-Iran conflict to present himself to Trump as a capable and willing negotiator as part of a broader effort to reset United States-Russia relations on Russian terms. Putin attempted to use the United States-Iran nuclear talks to portray Russia as the only possible mediator capable of achieving a satisfactory nuclear deal, but these talks collapsed before Russia had a chance to actually mediate.[10] Ushakov claimed on June 14 that Putin reiterated to Trump that Russia proposed "specific steps" to find "mutually acceptable agreements" between the United States and Iran during Putin's June 4 last call with Trump and that both the United States and Russia are prepared to return to the negotiating table regarding Iran's nuclear program.[11] Putin likely aims to use Russia’s stance on the Israel-Iran war to create the impression that Russia is amenable to restoring bilateral relations with the United States without having to make concessions regarding its war in Ukraine.[12]

Entente responses to the Israel-Iran war

Russian reactions to the Israeli strikes against Iran express support for Iran, condemn Israel and the West for allegedly escalating the situation in the Middle East, and call for diplomatic solutions. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the Israeli strikes on June 13, claiming that Israel conducted "unprovoked military strikes against... sleeping peaceful cities" in violation of international law and accused Western states of provoking "anti-Iran hysteria" regarding Iran's nuclear program.[13] Russia conducts frequent unprovoked strikes against civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, which undermines the weight of the Russian statement.[14] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that military force cannot yield a settlement on the Iranian nuclear program and expressed support for a political and diplomatic solution. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya similarly accused Israel of conducting an "unprovoked" attack and accused Western states of directly provoking the attacks with "anti-Iran hysteria."[15] Russian State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that Israel will "regret" its strikes against Iran.[16] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky accused France and Germany of provoking a full-scale war in the Middle East.[17] The Russian rhetoric condemning the West mirrors Russia's criticisms of Western support for Ukraine and likely aims to push the West into accepting a deal about Iran's nuclear program that Russia favors.[18]

PRC officials condemned Israel’s strikes on Iran and suggested that Beijing could play a “constructive role” in helping restore peace and resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. PRC Ambassador to the United Nations Fu Cong condemned Israel’s “risky military actions” in an emergency UN meeting on June 14 and called for Israel to stop its attacks on Iran.[19] PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi told Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar that Beijing “opposes Israel's violation of international law by attacking Iran with force, especially when the international community is still seeking a political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue,” according to a PRC readout. Wang said that diplomatic means for the Iranian nuclear issue have not been exhausted and that force cannot bring lasting peace and offered Beijing’s aid in helping Israel and Iran resolve their differences.[20] Wang expressed a similar stance to Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, noting the PRC support for Iran’s sovereignty against Israel’s “brutal attack on Iranian officials.” Wang particularly stressed that Israel’s strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities “set a dangerous precedent that could have disastrous consequences.”[21] The PRC’s opposition to attacks on nuclear infrastructure is a consistent stance and one of its few indirect criticisms of Russia’s actions in Ukraine.[22] Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping made similar comments to the press during a meeting in Kazakhstan, saying that the PRC is “deeply concerned” about the sudden escalation in the Middle East and is willing to play a constructive role in restoring peace.[23] The PRC’s official rhetoric did not condemn the United States or the West, but an editorial in the semi-authoritative state newspaper Global Times said that the United States bore some responsibility “as a country with special influence over Israel” and that its “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran may have been a “significant factor” in the escalation of tensions.[24] 

PRC criticism of Israel reflects Beijing’s effort to portray itself as a principled mediator that upholds international law, while maintaining good relations with Iran and other regional states. Beijing notably helped negotiate the original 2015 Iran nuclear deal and a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023, but it has not been effective in facilitating peace in Ukraine or Gaza, where it has also offered to play a “constructive role.” Beijing has an interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East, including by preventing war and regime change in Iran, but at the same time likely does not support Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. The PRC offers a critical economic lifeline for Iran by buying 90 percent of its oil, but it buys even more oil from Iran’s Gulf State rivals and wishes to ensure a stable and diversified supply of energy.[25] The PRC also wants to preserve its longstanding economic ties with Israel, which include Israeli participation in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), despite Beijing’s frequent criticism of Israeli strikes in Gaza and other places since 2023.[26] PRC officials are likely to continue to call for de-escalation without taking decisive actions to either aid or hinder either side of the Iran-Israel conflict.

Russia and other US adversaries are watching and learning from international reactions to the Israel-Iran war. Peskov claimed on June 13 that the international reaction to Israel's strikes against Iran is a "good lesson for everyone" and that there are two main groups of states: those who condemn the strikes and those who "supported" and "justified" the strikes.[27] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Novikov claimed that the Western reaction to Israel's strike was "toothless."[28] These comments underline the fact that Russia is observing Western reactions to the Israel-Iran war and will likely integrate lessons on Western rhetorical and tangible responses into its own calculus regarding the war in Ukraine. Other adversaries, such as the PRC and North Korea, may similarly be observing how the West responds to the Israel-Iran war in order to shape their planning for aggression in their own regional peripheries.

Prospects for the Russo-Iranian coalition

The Israel-Iran war may hamper the Iranian ability to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, but these impacts are likely to be minimal, given Russia’s indigenization of many Iranian-provided weapons and a general increase in Russia’s defense-industrial base output. Israeli strikes have damaged or destroyed aspects of the supply chain that links Moscow to Tehran. An Israeli airstrike killed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh on the night of June 12-13.[29] The European Council previously sanctioned Hajji Zadeh and the IRGC Aerospace Force in November 2022 for their roles in supervising the transfer of Iranian drones to Russia for use against Ukraine.[30] Ukrainian officials also reported that Hajji Zadeh had a “direct relationship” with the transfer of drones to the Russian military.[31] The extent of Hajji Zadeh’s relationship with Russian officials as of June 2025 is unclear, but his death may complicate the Iran-Russia drone supply chain to some degree. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Majid Mousavi to replace Hajji Zadeh as IRGC Aerospace Force commander on June 14, however, and Mousavi has also been sanctioned for his role in the production of Shahed-136 drones and ballistic missiles.[32] Mousavi likely has the technical know-how to maintain drone supplies to Moscow if needed, but the IRGC Aerospace Force’s bandwidth to continue interfacing with Russia will nevertheless be constrained as they focus on directing Iran’s strike campaign against Israel.

Israel has also targeted several Iranian missile sites, which may impact Iran’s ballistic missile shipments to Russia. Tehran and Moscow signed a contract in December 2023 on Iran’s provision of Ababil close-range ballistic missiles (CRBM) and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to Russia, and as of September 2024, Ukrainian sources reported that Iran had sent Russia over 200 Fateh-360 SRBMs.[33] Since the outbreak of the Israel-Iran war on June 13, Israeli strikes have damaged or destroyed several prominent Iranian missile storage bases, including the Parchin military complex (east of Tehran), the Kermanshah missile facility (Kermanshah Province), Bid Khaneh missile facility (Tehran Province), and the Khoramabad missile base (Lorestan Province), all of which were involved either in the development or storage of ballistic missiles.[34] The strikes on these locations will primarily attrit Iran’s ability to launch ballistic missiles at Israel, but they may also further constrain Iran’s ability to provide these missiles to Russia.

Russia has taken significant steps over the past year to indigenize some of the production capabilities it previously got from Iran, thus decreasing Moscow’s overall reliance on Tehran for defense materiel. Russia has largely taken over production of Iranian Shahed-model drones (called Gerans in Russian) using Iranian production licenses and imported Iranian components since 2023, and is now producing more Shaheds than it is receiving from Iran.[35] Ukrainian intelligence reported in May 2025 that Russia was producing 170 Shahed-type drones per month and would likely be able to produce 190 Shahed-type drones per month by the end of 2025.[36] Russia is now routinely able to launch upwards of 400 Shahed-type drones at Ukraine in nightly strike packages. Russia is also much less reliant on missile shipments from its international partners than it was in 2023-2024 and has reportedly stockpiled upwards of 13,000 missiles of various types as of May 2025.[37] Direct arms shipments from Iran are less valuable to Russia now than they have been in previous years, and Russia is likely to find ways to compensate for the lack of Iranian arms deliveries with its bolstered domestic capabilities. 

Russia’s response to the Israeli strikes on Iran highlights the current asymmetry of the Russo-Iranian coalition and emphasizes the limited benefits that Russia can provide its partners as it continues to focus on fighting in Ukraine. Russia will not intervene militarily on Iran’s behalf in the ongoing Israel-Iran war; it cannot afford to redirect personnel or arms to Iran due to the requirements it faces on the battlefield in Ukraine. Russia has previously provided Iran with some defense materiel (including some aircraft, electronic warfare systems, and air defense systems), but these weapons do not appear to be providing Iran any sort of offensive or defensive edge against Israel.[38] The January 2025 strategic partnership agreement that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian also notably does not contain a mutual defense clause, so Russia is not obligated to come to Iran’s aid.[39]

Beyond Russia’s declarations of support for Iran on the international stage, more tangible support for Tehran is unlikely to materialize. Russia is likely concerned about the potential for regime change in Iran and about the proliferation of hostilities into Russia’s more direct sphere of influence (namely in the Caucasus) and will likely continue to try to mitigate these consequences using diplomatic means as opposed to military intervention. But Russia actually stands to reap some benefits from the Iran-Israel war. ISW recently assessed that the increase in oil prices resulting from Israeli strikes on Iran may increase Russian oil revenues, which could help finance Russia’s war in Ukraine.[40] Russian commentators, including prominent milbloggers, have also noted that the Israel-Iran war is to Russia’s benefit because it will divert Western attention and military aid away from Ukraine and towards Israel.[41]

Russia’s responses to the Israel-Iran war, therefore, highlight the asymmetry of the current Russo-Iranian relationship and emphasize the weakening of Russia’s reputation as a credible partner, particularly following the December 2024 fall of the Assad regime in Syria.[42] Russia has benefited greatly from its relationship with Iran, but Russia’s increased indigenization of the capabilities it previously relied on Iran for has decreased Russia’s immediate need for continued Iranian military aid. Russia’s defense industrial output is likely to remain stable despite Israeli strikes on Iranian missile and drone storage sites. Iran now needs Russia more than Russia needs Iran, but Russia is very unlikely to intervene on Iran’s behalf in any meaningful way. The asymmetry in the Russo-Iranian relationship should be seen as an indicator of how Russia will fail to support its partners in future conflicts in their respective spheres of influence, regardless of what these partners have provided to sustain Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Russo-North Korean civilian cooperation

Russia and North Korea continue to expand civil and economic cooperation, including by pursuing infrastructure connectivity projects. Russian Railways reported on June 9 that a trans-Siberian rail route between Pyongyang and Moscow would resume train service on June 17, while another train route between Pyongyang and the Russian Far East city of Khabarovsk would begin operation on June 19. Train services crossing the Russia-North Korea border were suspended in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[43] North Korea and Russia also began construction on their first road bridge in May, which will cross the Tumen River. A Soviet-era rail bridge is currently the only land route between the two countries.[44] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Maria Zakharova also said on June 12 that Russia and North Korea are in talks to increase the number of commercial flights between the two countries.[45] The only direct commercial flight from Russia to North Korea is the Vladivostok-Pyongyang flight.[46]

North Korea will very likely use expanded cross-border transportation with Russia to reap further economic benefits from its relationship with Russia. The new transportation links will allow North Korea to more easily send workers to Russia. North Korea sends laborers abroad as a means of sanctions evasion, as the workers must transfer a large portion of their wages to the North Korean government.[47] South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS) estimated that North Korea earned about $1.75 billion from its overseas workers from 2017 to 2023.[48] The final report of the UN Panel of Experts responsible for monitoring North Korea sanctions compliance said that over 100,000 North Koreans were working abroad in March 2024, and that North Korean workers in industries other than information technology generate about $500 million in revenue annually.[49] South Korea-based outlet DailyNK reported on June 10, citing an unnamed North Korea-based source, that North Korea is preparing to send 28,000 more workers overseas, 24,200 of which will go to Russia. These workers can help Russia fill serious labor shortages resulting from the economic requirements of sustaining Russia’s war in Ukraine.[50] Increased air, road, and rail links between Russia and North Korea may also allow North Korea to profit from Russian tourism, which it has periodically allowed.[51] North Korea can use this revenue to fund government priorities, including military and nuclear weapons development. The increase in Russia-North Korean civil cooperation is emblematic of the growing closeness of the two states since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. ISW previously assessed that their strategic realignment is likely an enduring geopolitical shift that will outlast the war in Ukraine.[52]

Sino-Russian competition in Central Asia

Kazakhstan announced that it would purchase its first nuclear power plants from both Russia and the PRC, emphasizing the current power balance between the PRC and Russia in Central Asia. The Kazakh Atomic Energy Agency announced on June 14 that Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom and the PRC’s state-owned China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) will lead separate consortia to build the first two nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Kazakhstan.[53] The agency stated that Rosatom's proposal is the most optimal and that Kazakhstan is working to get funding. It said that Kazakhstan will sign a separate agreement with CNNC for the second NPP. Kazakhstan is one of the largest uranium producers in the world and supplies both Russia and the PRC, but does not have domestic nuclear energy generation capacity.

Kazakhstan’s decision to engage with both Rosatom and the CNNC highlights how Central Asian states are balancing between Moscow and Beijing. Nuclear powerplant contracts can grant suppliers an avenue for political influence in the client country by creating dependencies on the contractor for energy supplies. The contracts are very long-term, not only because NPPs take years to build but also because the contracts include multiple decades of maintenance and refueling, and ultimately decommissioning, undertaken by the same company. Russia’s Rosatom is the world’s largest exporter of nuclear power plants and uniquely serves as a “one stop shop” for related services, including uranium enrichment, plant operation, and nuclear waste disposal.[54] Although the PRC lags far behind Russia in NPP exports, it has built dozens of NPPs domestically, and its state-backed nuclear corporations make it one of the few countries able to seriously compete with Russia.[55] Kazakhstan may wish to diversify its suppliers of nuclear power so that its nuclear fuel cycle is not dominated by Russia.

The PRC is expanding its own cooperation with Central Asian states even as Central Asia attempts to balance between Moscow and Beijing, capitalizing on Russia’s degraded international reputation and influence due to the war in Ukraine. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping met with the presidents of all five Central Asian states in Kazakhstan during the China-Central Asia Summit on July 17.[56] This is the second meeting of the summit since the PRC inaugurated it in 2023.[57] Xi noted in his keynote speech that the PRC and Central Asian countries have deepened cooperation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), increased trade volume by 35 percent, and made progress on several regional connectivity infrastructure projects in the two years since the summit was founded. He also called for deepening security cooperation to counter terrorism and extremism.[58] Xi signed a Treaty of Permanent Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation with the five Central Asian states, similar to the PRC agreements with Russia and Pakistan.[59] He also signed bilateral cooperation agreements with each country.[60]

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Xi’s trip to Kazakhstan on June 16 and claimed that Russia is not concerned about the strengthening of PRC-Central Asian relations because the PRC is Russia’s "privileged strategic partner” and because Russia has its own mechanisms for cooperation with Central Asia.[61] Indeed, Beijing and Moscow have some common interests in the region, such as combating terrorism, and both states cooperate in regional groupings such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Russia’s influence in the region has waned since its invasion of Ukraine, however, both because the war has occupied its resources and attention, and because the invasion has made Russia’s other neighbors less trusting of its intentions.[62] The relative retreat is very likely to Beijing’s benefit.

[1] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/06/14/trump-putin-phone-call-middle-east-00406285; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114683261634430212

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77187

[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/24224907

[4] https://tass dot ru/politika/24230573

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-edition-israeli-strikes-iran-june-13-2025-200-pm-et; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-14-2025-evening-edition

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-14-2025-evening-edition; https://www.axios.com/2025/06/14/trump-putin-nuclear-talks-iran-kremlin; https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1933946909502115982

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2025-evening-edition

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-foreign-ministry-says-parliament-is-preparing-bill-leave-npt-2025-06-16/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-11-2025

[9] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24231753

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-11-2025

[11] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77187; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-11-2025

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-11-2025

[13] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2025920/; https://t.me/MID_Russia/60977

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425

[15] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24215127

[16] https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2025/06/13/26027552.shtml

[17] https://t.me/slutsky_l/3508

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121124

[19] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3314430/chinese-envoy-urges-israel-halt-risky-iran-attacks-warns-serious-consequences ; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250614/79d3afba3cee4501815c3062b04f0746/c.html

[20] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202506/t20250614_11648697.shtml

[21] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202506/t20250614_11648693.shtml

[22] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3198505/no-nuclear-weapons-over-ukraine-chinese-president-xi-jinping-says-clear-message-russia ;

https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202302/t20230224_11030707.shtml

[23] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3314808/chinas-xi-calls-israel-iran-de-escalate-says-beijing-ready-play-peacemaker?module=further_reading_RM&pgtype=article

[24] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202506/1336302.shtml

[25] https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/crude-petroleum/reporter/chn

https://www.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/if-irans-oil-is-cut-off-china-will-pay-the-price-95b9c7e1

[26] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3298885/china-signals-willingness-boost-israel-ties-after-gaza-conflict-strained-relations

[27] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24230583

[28] https://t.me/tass_agency/319829

[29] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-confirms-irgc-air-force-chief-top-echelon-killed-in-israeli-strike/

[30] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:293I:FULL&from=EN

[31] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9402

[32] https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-sanctions-on-two-iran-based-entities-pursuant-to-e-o-13949-and-one-iranian-individual-pursuant-to-e-o-13382/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-18-2024

[33] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iran-deliver-hundreds-ballistic-missiles-russia-soon-intel-sources-say-2024-08-09/; https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/ballistic-clmpm3d7m; https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3901774/iran-gives-russia-short-range-missiles-while-us-partners-expect-to-keep-bolster/#:~:text=%22The%20United%20States%20has%20confirmed,Gen.

[34] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2025-evening-edition; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-16-2025-morning-edition; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2e299j20xo

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf

[36] https://mezha dot media/oboronka/rosiya-viroblyaye-170-shahediv-shchodnya-302445/

[37] https://nv dot ua/ukr/ukraine/events/gur-pro-raketni-zapasi-rf-iskander-kinzhal-kalibr-h-101-cirkon-chi-vistachit-dlya-novih-udariv-50519076.html

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf

[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf

[40] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2025

[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/73427; https://rg.ru/2025/06/13/udary-izrailia-po-iranu-srikoshetiat-po-ukraine.html

[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-11-2025

[43] https://www.nknews.org/2025/06/north-korea-russia-to-launch-6k-mile-trans-siberian-rail-link-between-capitals/

[44] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy8qeel6959o

[45] https://tass dot com/politics/1972253

[46] https://www.koreatimes.co dot kr/foreignaffairs/northkorea/20230825/n-korean-plane-arrives-in-vladivostok-for-1st-time-in-over-3-years-report

[47] https://www.38north.org/2024/12/workings-of-north-koreas-illegal-foreign-currency-transactions/

[48] https://www.inss.rehttps://www.inss.re dot kr/publication/bbs/js_view.do?nttId=41037260&bbsId=js&page=2&searchCnd=100&searchWrd=

[49] https://www.38north.org/2024/12/workings-of-north-koreas-illegal-foreign-currency-transactions/ ; https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202024%20215.pdf

[50] https://www.dailynk dot com/english/n-korea-plans-to-send-28000-more-workers-overseas-mostly-to-russia/

[51] https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/north-russia-tourists-09042024002705.html

[52] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-11-2025

[53] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-rosatom-lead-consortium-build-first-nuclear-power-plant-kazakhstan-2025-06-14/

[54] https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Rosatom-Report-Final.pdf

[55] https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61927

https://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/resources/fact-sheets/Russia-and-China-Are-Dominating-Nuclear-Energy-Exports-Can-the-U-S-Catch-Up.pdf

https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/UnderConstructionReactorsByCountry.aspx

[56] http://www.news dot cn/politics/leaders/20250617/1a63af0dea3d482fa7458282c480f4bd/c.html

[57] https://english.news dot cn/20250617/3a34c3fb43fb443e8ad6df64d15c1908/c.html

[58] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202506/t20250617_11651891.shtml

[59] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3314828/china-and-central-asian-leaders-cap-summit-friendship-pact-and-aid-pledge?module=top_story&pgtype=homepage

[60] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202506/t20250616_11649613.shtml

 https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202506/t20250617_11651853.shtml

https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202506/t20250617_11651619.shtml

https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202506/t20250617_11651519.shtml

https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202506/t20250617_11651479.shtml

[61] https://tass dot ru/politika/24230663

[62] https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47591