Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update June 6, 2025

 

Kateryna Stepanenko, Tetiana Trach, Jennie Olmsted, Angelica Evans, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and Jessica Sobieski

June 6, 2025 9:30am ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was on June 3. ISW will cover subsequent developments in next week's update.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be overestimating Russian recruitment rates, likely in an effort to appease the Kremlin, portray Russia's military as a formidable force, and incentivize recruitment. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) estimated on May 30, using data on Russia's 2024 federal budget expenditures, that the Russian MoD recruited between 374,200 and 407,200 people in 2024.[1] IStories noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to raise federal payments upon conclusion of military contracts from 195,000 rubles ($2,469) to 400,000 rubles ($5,065) in August 2024 obscured iStories’ estimations of the exact number of Russian recruits who had signed military service contracts in the third quarter of 2024.

IStories argued that the budget expenditures data suggests that the Russian MoD continues to exaggerate Russian recruitment rates at a level comparable with previous Russian exaggerations prior to 2024. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov stated in December 2024 that 427,000 people signed military contracts with the Russian MoD in 2024, which is nearly 20,000 recruits more than the maximum estimated number based on the 2024 budget expenditures.[2] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev reported an even higher number in January 2025, stating that 450,000 people signed military contracts with the Russian MoD in 2024.[3] IStories reported in August 2024 that the Russian MoD likely inflated the reported number of Russian recruits who had signed military service contracts by a factor of 1.5.[4] IStories calculated, using Russian federal data on one-time enlistment payments, that 354,400 people signed military contracts in 2023, as opposed to 540,000 claimed by the Russian MoD in late 2023. The Russian MoD thus may have exaggerated Russian recruitment numbers in 2023 by over 185,000 recruits. The discrepancy in the numbers of recruits who signed military service contracts announced by Russian officials and estimates by independent sources suggests that the Russian MoD is likely trying to create an impression of a strong Russian military committed to a long-term war effort in order to convince Putin and the Russian people that Russia’s recruitment efforts have been successful and to attract additional recruits. The discrepancies between Russian MoD claims and Russian federal data on one-time enlistment payments appear to have decreased from 2023 to 2024, however, possibly because the Kremlin has been increasingly streamlining and centralizing control over regional and municipal recruitment efforts.

Russian recruitment rates reportedly fell in 2024 and may continue to decline in 2025, although Russia's exact recruitment rates are unknown. Russian opposition outlet Meduza estimated in December 2024, using data on Russian federal budget expenditures, that the number of Russian recruits fell from 93,000 in the second quarter of 2024 to roughly 50,000 in the third quarter of 2024, despite Putin’s increase in one-time federal enlistment bonuses.[5] IStories reported, using the same data, that the number of military contracts signed daily decreased from 2,236 per day (around 201,240 in total over the quarter) in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 1,706 per day (153,540 in total over the quarter) in the same period in 2024.[6] IStories reported that Russian recruitment rates may continue declining in 2025 based on the federal subject recruitment rates. IStories reported that the enlistment rate of Russian soldiers has declined across several Russian federal subjects since late 2024 and early 2025. IStories reported that Russian recruitment rates in the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic fell by a factor of 1.5 in May 2025 compared to December 2024, despite the fact that the region offers one the highest one-time enlistment bonuses in Russia: 1.5 million rubles ($19,418). IStories reported that regional recruitment rates in Kemerovo and Orlov oblasts are also lower in 2025 than they were at the end of 2024.

The Russian MoD and federal subjects have been employing dynamic and more varied tactics to recruit personnel in late 2024 and early 2025, which may further indicate that Russian recruitment may be declining. Russian federal subjects have been increasingly relying on dynamic pricing to attract recruits in late 2024 and early 2025, with some regions even increasing one-time payments by a factor of three since the start of 2025.[7] The Russian MoD has also been increasingly luring men to sign military service contracts via online job search platforms under false pretenses, recruiting foreigners, offering compensations to people who bring their friends to military enlistment centers, and forming all-female detachments.[8] Russian municipalities are also contracting out Russian patriotic centers to recruit on their behalf, likely in an attempt to meet recruitment quotas.[9] Russian regional education ministries also have offered military service contracts to university students facing deferment, debt, or poor academic performance in exchange for debt or academic sanction forgiveness and a chance to continue their studies upon their return from the frontlines.[10] The Russian MoD has also been increasingly leveraging the popular Africa Corps branding since April 2025, at least in part to recruit personnel to fight in Ukraine.[11]

The Russian MoD and other Russian officials may be continuing to misrepresent Russian recruitment rates to the Kremlin. Putin stated on May 13 that Russian monthly recruitment rates almost doubled to 50,000–60,000 soldiers per month in 2025.[12] Putin’s claim, if true, would suggest that between 1,666 and 2,000 people sign military contracts daily. An analyst at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) estimated the Russian recruitment rate in May 2025 using enlistment data from 37 Russian regions and reported that around 1,000 people sign military contracts daily.[13] The analyst assessed in April 2025 that Russia was recruiting around 1,300 volunteers per day, or about 39,000 per month.[14] Putin's claim is also at odds with Medvedev's May 28 claim that almost 175,000 people have arrived at military units and that more than 14,000 people have joined volunteer units since the start of 2025, which equates to roughly 1,285 people per day.[15] Putin's claimed recruitment rate is notably higher than Medvedev's, although Medvedev also reiterated Putin's claimed monthly recruitment rate. Putin may have deliberately embellished Russia's recruitment numbers in his ongoing effort to portray Russia as undefeatable and discourage further Western support for Ukraine amid discussions of peace negotiations to end the war.

Key Takeaways:

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be overestimating Russian recruitment rates, likely in an effort to appease the Kremlin, portray Russia's military as a formidable force, and incentivize recruitment.

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring

• Russia is forming and training anti-unmanned aerial systems (UAVs) groups across different military branches in an effort to defend military infrastructure.

Integration of Veterans into Russian Society

• Russian law enforcement arrested leaders of two combat veteran public and non-profit organizations, possibly as part of the Kremlin's ongoing effort to establish state-controlled and pro-war veteran organizations.

Russian Defense Industrial Base

• The Russian Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media Ministry is considering introducing restrictions on the use of foreign-made cloud servers in hopes of incentivizing and speeding up the creation of a state-controlled cloud server.
• Russia is reportedly recruiting Ukrainian teenagers in occupied Ukraine to produce strike drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ), Republic of Tatarstan.

Russian Technological Adaptations

• Russian developers continued to test and deploy new anti-drone measures such as combat lasers, tools to cut fiber-optic cables, and electronic warfare (EW) adaptations.
• Russian forces have deployed into combat jet-powered Dan-M drones, which can be launched from Mi-8 helicopters.

Russian Economy

• The Russian government is reportedly pressuring Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina to lower Russia’s key interest rate on June 6 to reduce the impact of high interest rates on the Russian budget and civilian industries.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Assessed Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization and undermining regime stability)

Primorskiy Krai formed a female detachment within the Tigr volunteer battalion, likely in an effort to increase recruitment among women. Primorskiy Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako announced on June 1 that Primorskiy Krai recruited five Russian women to assist Russian servicemen in Ukraine as medical orderlies.[16] Kozhemyako claimed that Russian women had been spamming the krai's administration with appeals to be allowed to join the detachment, and this statement is likely an attempt to attract additional female recruits. Primorskiy Krai’s press service added that all five women signed six-month military service contracts with the Russian MoD and will receive the same financial and social benefits given to volunteers fighting as part of the Tigr volunteer battalion.[17] Russian occupation officials have been similarly recruiting women to participate in combat operations in Ukraine.[18] Primorskiy Krai notably had one of the first and most prolific volunteer recruitment campaigns in Russia in Spring-Summer 2022, and Kozhemyako's announcement marks the continuation of the regional efforts to generate more forces and meet Kremlin's recruitment quotas.[19]

Russian municipalities are increasingly offloading recruitment responsibilities to Russian patriotic centers. Russian regional media outlets reported on May 30 that the Aleksandrov Municipal Market in Vladimir Oblast concluded a contract worth 300,000 Russian rubles (roughly $3,799) with Moscow-based military-patriotic Voyevoda Training Center on May 28.[20] Voyevoda will work through June 30 to identify recruits for signing military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Voyevoda will fulfill the contract only after recruits finalize contracts with the MoD and deploy for military service in the Russian Armed Forces, likely referring to recruits' deployment to Ukraine. Russian regional media also reported that the Khanty-Mansiysk City Electricity Network company in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug signed a similar contract worth 9.5 million rubles (roughly $120,294) with an unknown bidder.[21]

Russian federal subjects are decreasing the compensation amount offered to recruits in one-time enlistment bonuses, likely as part of the Kremlin's dynamic pricing schemes. Russian regional outlets Kommersant-Bashkortostan and RBC Ufa reported on June 3 that Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan Radiy Khabirov signed an order lowering the one-time enlistment bonus for Russian recruits from 1.6 million rubles ($20,711) to one million rubles ($12,944) effective June 5 and that this order will be effective until June 30.[22] Kommersant-Bashkortostan and RBC Ufa reported that the Republic of Bashkortostan also reduced the one-time municipal enlistment bonus for Russian recruits who reside in Ufa from 1.2 million rubles ($15,533) to 600,000 rubles ($7,766) effective June 5.[23]

Russian Force Centralization (Assessed Russian objective: Centralize the state's control over informal volunteer-based units that emerged in early 2022 after the Kremlin failed to declare general mobilization)

The Russian MoD is expanding the Africa Corps' operations in Central Africa. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger amplified footage and reports on May 28 from the official website of the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea that 125 Equatorial Guinean Presidential Guard servicemen completed a training course taught by Russian instructors through a cooperation program with the Russian MoD on May 20.[24] The milblogger claimed that the MoD's Africa Corps trained Equatorial Guinean servicemen in personal security techniques, including shooting, escorting VIPs, identifying saboteurs, and conducting evacuations in combat conditions. The milblogger also claimed that the Russian instructors in Equatorial Guinea aim to build and strengthen long-term ties with loyal elements of the Equatorial Guinean security apparatus, as well as strengthen Russia's image as a reliable partner.

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring (Assessed Russian objective: Restructure the Russian military to maintain the war in Ukraine while preparing for a potential large-scale conventional war with NATO)

Russia is forming and training anti-unmanned aerial systems (UAVs) groups across different military branches in an effort to defend military infrastructure. Russian military sources told Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestiya on May 30 that the Russian Navy's Coastal Troops are forming new anti-drone units to defend coastal missile systems. Izvestiya reported that anti-drone groups are training to intercept drones using shotguns; standard assault rifles; machine guns, including large-caliber; and anti-aircraft mounts, including two ZU-23-2 systems. Izvestiya reported that the Russian Navy began intensifying anti-drone protection efforts in 2024 and has reportedly already conducted several exercises in repelling land and sea drone strikes. The Russian Navy reportedly deployed anti-drone equipment to the Russian 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade’s (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) deployment point in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Kamchatka Krai. Izvestiya reported on April 9, 2025, that elements of the Russian Railway Forces also began undergoing anti-drone training.[25]

Integration of Veterans into Russian Society (Assessed Russian objective: Mitigate the risk of veterans emerging as a political group in a way that could erode the stability of the Russian state)

Russian law enforcement arrested leaders of two combat veteran public and non-profit organizations, possibly as part of the Kremlin's ongoing effort to establish state-controlled and pro-war veteran organizations. Russian Interior Ministry (MVD) Spokesperson Irina Volk announced on June 2 that Russian law enforcement arrested the former head of the "Invalidy Voiny" ("Disabled Fighters") all-Russian public organization for disabled Afghan veterans, Andrei Chepurnoy, and general director of the "Veteran-Rus" non-profit organization and center for medical and social rehabilitation of war veterans, Valery Belyalov.[26] Russian law enforcement detained both Chepurnoy and Belyalov on the suspicion of one-billion-ruble ($12.7 million) fraud against "Invalidy Voiny." Russian investigators alleged that Chepurnoy and Belyalov illegally acquired ownership of 48 real estate properties that make up the "Veteran-Rus" rehabilitation center free of charge from "Invalidy Voiny" in 2017. Moscow Oblast's Ruzsky Raion court ruled in May 2023 that the acquisition agreement was illegal, and the MVD reportedly plans to ask Moscow Oblast's Meshchansky Court to seize the property. Chepurnoy headed the "Invalidy Voiny" organization for over 20 years and was charged with embezzlement in 2019.[27] The Kremlin may use these arrests to consolidate state control over independent veteran organizations and their infrastructure.

A Russian veteran called on the United Russia Party to expedite efforts to integrate veterans into positions of power, citing concerns over the radicalization of veterans and another possible mutiny. Russian veteran Viktor Birtolan stated at a regional United Russia Party branch conference that the party needs to speed up its efforts to integrate veterans into the party because returning veterans could become targets for "nationalist and radical parties."[28] Birtolan added that the "Blackshirts" (a paramilitary organization composed initially of former soldiers and veterans who were organized to fight against Socialists and Communists in Italy after World War I) brought Benito Mussolini, the leader of the National Fascist Party, to power. Birtolan made an implicit comparison between the rise of Mussolini and deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's June 2023 mutiny, noting that the mutiny showed that “even brave, courageous, and honest veterans" may follow "insane orders." Britolan's statements acknowledge that the Kremlin's efforts to reintegrate Russian veterans into society and appoint them into positions of power are part of the campaign to preserve the regime and prevent mutinies, as ISW has previously assessed.[29]

The Russian Government formally approved a plan that will require municipal institutions and Russian enterprises to form a job reserve for Russian servicemen and veterans as part of the Kremlin's ongoing effort to increase employment rates among veterans.[30] Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian Government and federal subjects on May 30 to create pathways for Russian war veterans to enter municipal service.[31] Putin instructed Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to model the new program after Tula Oblast’s Hero 71 project, which aims to educate veterans to prepare them for employment using the Unified Portal of State and Municipal Services system.[32] The Russian Government published a plan on June 2 to help Russian veterans to receive legal and administrative assistance with employment and offer them advanced job training in an effort to integrate veterans into the Russian labor market. The plan also aims to offer employers incentives to employ Russian veterans and establish employment quotas that will require employers to hire disabled veterans. The Russian Government specified that federal and regional authorities, the Russian Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund, and other unspecified organizations will be responsible for implementing the plan based on Putin's directive.

The Kremlin continues to appoint veterans to positions of power in Russia in an effort to establish a new pro-war elite. The Republic of Sakha’s (Yakutia) governmental press service announced on May 27 that a veteran of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Georgy Andreev, became Sakha Republic's Minister of Business, Trade, and Tourism.[33] The office of the Sakha Republic head stated that Andreev joined the Russian war effort in August 2024, fought in Kursk Oblast, and served as Sakha Republic's deputy minister of innovation, digital development, and information-communication technologies between 2020 and August 2024.

Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) is setting conditions to employ Russian veterans via the Russian Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund. The Tula Oblast branch of the “Defenders of Fatherland” Fund reported on May 22 that it signed an agreement with the Tula Oblast FSIN to help employ Russian veterans and their families.[34] The Tule Oblast FSIN reported that the agreement also establishes a quota for the number of Russian veterans and their children eligible to study in FSIN departmental universities. Tula Oblast FSIN Head Pavel Lomakin stated that the agreement will help address staffing issues in the Tula Oblast FSIN.

Putin continued efforts to appease Russian servicemen, veterans, and their families by introducing additional state benefits. Putin ordered the Russian government on May 30 to develop recommendations for memorializing "Defenders of the Fatherland," including those killed in action (KIA) in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[35] Putin signed a decree on May 30 extending monthly welfare payments to the children of soldiers reported missing in action (MIA).[36]

Militarization of Society and Youth: (Assessed Russian objective: Condition Russian society and youth for military service and raise societal support for Russian war efforts)

Russia continues to expand military-patriotic education initiatives for Ukrainian children on the basis of the "Time of Heroes" veteran program. Russian media reported on May 29 and 30 that 3,400 teenagers from Volgograd and Belgorod oblasts and occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts attended the "Time of Young Heros" program at the "Avangard" camp in Volgograd Oblast.[37] The program reportedly lasted for three days and was free of cost, and Russian officials and athletes taught the teenagers tactical training, drone piloting, first aid, and parachute training. Russian officials are reportedly planning to host four sessions of the program. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo announced on May 30 that over 40 Ukrainian teenagers from occupied Kherson Oblast participated in the "Time of Young Heros" program.[38] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated that an unspecified number of children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast also attended the program in Volgograd Oblast.[39] ISW has previously argued that Russia's militarization and forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia amounts to genocide.[40]

The Kremlin continues efforts to elevate the status of Russian veterans in the eyes of children and to encourage young Russians to undertake future military service. Belgorod Oblast Children's Rights Commissioner Galina Pyatikh reported on May 27 that the Belgorod Oblast Children's Public Council is partnering with the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program to have veterans engage with Russian students.[41]

Russian Defense Industrial Base (Assessed Russian objective: Increase Russia's defense industrial base production to support Russian war efforts)

Russia's tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod Concern (UZV), reportedly supplied Russian forces with modernized T-80BVM tanks with advanced protection systems, as Ukrainian forces have reportedly destroyed more than 4,000 Russian tanks since February 2022. UVZ’s press service announced on June 2 that UVZ sent Russian forces an updated version of the T-80BVM tanks with advanced protection systems to protect crews. Russian state business outlet Kommersant reported that the T-80BVM tank is a modern adaptation of the T-80 tank with improved firepower, protection, mobility, and command control. Kommersant claimed UVZ previously sent batches of the T-90M and T-72B2M tanks to Russian forces on the front on May 9 and made over 200 technological improvements since 2022.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 2 that the T-80BVM tanks were modified based on feedback from Russian tankers on the frontlines.[43] Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski stated on June 1 that Ukrainian forces have destroyed over 4,000 Russian tanks since February 2022, roughly 20 years‘ worth of Russian tank production.[44]

A Russian official argued for the Kremlin to centralize control over drone and artificial intelligence development companies. The Head of the Russian Center for Unmanned Systems and Technologies, Andrei Bezrukov, stated on May 31 that drone and artificial intelligence (AI) systems have ceased to be solely civilian products and have become crucial tools in modern warfare.[45] Bezrukov noted that current Russian legislation classifies drone and AI industries as civilian products and does not properly regulate the private production of drones and AI systems. Bezrukov called on the Kremlin to consolidate state control over drone and AI companies and tighten legal regulations of drone and AI production in Russia. Bezrukov called on the Kremlin to become a leader of the new international security system and develop new international legal mechanisms for tracking interstate exchanges of drone and AI systems. ISW has long observed that the Kremlin is actively trying to centralize control over the Russian drone industry and previously assessed that Russian state efforts to regulate drone innovations will likely result in less effective Russian drone and AI capabilities.[46]

The Russian Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media Ministry is considering introducing restrictions on the use of foreign-made cloud servers in hopes of incentivizing and speeding up the creation of a state-controlled cloud server. Russian Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadayev announced at the TAdviser Summit on May 29 that the ministry does not rule out the possibility of introducing gradual restrictions of the use of foreign cloud servers that have Russian analogs.[47] Shadayev specified that Russia uses foreign cloud services "under the counter" and out of habit after foreign cloud companies stopped their operations in Russia. Shadayev stated that Russia continues to pay for cloud services from foreign cloud providers who left Russia and that Russian companies are experiencing difficulties when working with and paying for these services. Shadayev also acknowledged that Russia's "difficult" macroeconomic situation and Russia's Central Bank's high interest rate introduced difficulties in Russia’s IT sector and that Russian companies can profit from proprietary cloud servers. Putin called on Russian business representatives on May 26 to "strangle" reliance on Western servers, and the Russian Digital Development Ministry announced on March 21 preliminary plans to oblige state-owned companies to transfer some of their services to clouds and private data centers.[48] The Kremlin is likely trying to catch up to Ukraine's innovation in creating military and government cloud applications, which in part enabled Ukrainian forces to create a joint situational awareness and battlefield management system.[49]

Russia is reportedly recruiting Ukrainian teenagers in occupied Ukraine to produce strike drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ), Republic of Tatarstan. Ukraine's Luhansk Oblast Head Oleksiy Kharchenko reported on May 30 that Russian occupation officials placed ads on billboards and public transportation in occupied Luhansk Oblast recruiting teenagers to study at an unspecified institution in the Tatarstan Republic, which is located at the Alabuga SEZ. Kharchenko implied that Russian occupation officials are recruiting Ukrainian teenagers to produce strike drones for the Russian military, given that Russia produces Shahed and other drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone.[50] ISW recently reported that Russia was recruiting young women from Latin America, South Asia, and countries of the former Soviet Union to build Shahed strike drones in the Alabuga SEZ.[51]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Assessed Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian developers continued to test and deploy new anti-drone measures such as combat lasers, tools to cut fiber-optic cables, and electronic warfare (EW) adaptations. Russian milbloggers published footage on May 30 reportedly showing a Russian mobile air defense group from the "Kochevnik" ("Nomad") Spetsnaz detachment using a laser air defense system against a steel plate to shoot down Ukrainian drones.[52] One Russian milblogger claimed that the "Kochevik" Spetsnaz detachment appeared to have solved problems with the laser air defense system's power supply but noted that it is not clear how this system will perform in smoky or foggy conditions.[53] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi commented on the footage on June 1, stating that Russian forces deployed likely Chinese-made Silent Hunter laser air defense system (also known as Low Altitude Laser Defense System [LASS]).[54] Militarnyi added that the footage suggests that Russian forces have been using the Silent Hunters system since at least October 2024 and have successfully intercepted drones at distances exceeding 1.3 kilometers. Militarnyi reported that Silent Hunter is a 30 KW fiber-optic laser mounted on an SUV chassis and features radar and an optical station for detection, tracking, and targeting. Silent Hunter can reportedly detect targets at a range of up to five kilometers, and its optical systems can track targets within three kilometers.

Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov reported that Russian developers patented a system to protect Russian vehicles from drones consisting of a frame structure that is attached to the body of the vehicle and has at least one electric motor with blades.[55] Beskrestnov added that Russian forces can connect electric blades to the vehicle's power supply system.[56] Russian milbloggers published footage reportedly showing a Russian Mavic quadcopter using its propellers to cut the Ukrainian drone's fiber-optic cable.[57] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces accidentally discovered this countermeasure to Ukrainian fiber-optic drones and have since begun using this approach at scale.[58] Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin claimed on May 30 that the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (which Rogozin oversees) developed a new Mgla-Sarmat dome complex for electronic counteraction of drones and that the complex has successfully passed all tests at the Voronezh City Scientific Research Testing Institute.[59] Rogozin claimed that Mgla-Sarmat developers have recommended the complex for use among Russia’s Airborne (VDV) Forces and for serial production. A Russian milblogger also published footage showing Russian forces testing a first-person-view (FPV) drone with a shotgun designed to shoot down Ukrainian drones and observed that Ukrainian forces have been actively using such drones on the battlefield.[60]

Russian forces have deployed into combat jet-powered Dan-M drones, which can be launched from Mi-8 helicopters. Beskrestnov reported on May 29 that Russian forces attacked Ukraine with a new "Dan-M" jet-powered strike UAV from occupied Crimea.[61] Beskrestnov reported that the “Dan-M” system is a jet-powered training target used to test air defense systems, which Russian developers modified into a strike UAV. Beskrestnov observed that Ukrainian forces had also created the "STRIZH" UAV from a training target at the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine to address shortages of long-range missiles and drones. Beskrestnov reported that Russian developers changed the "Dan-M" target's red color and that this new strike UAV can fly for 25 to 40 minutes at a speed of 400 to 750 kilometers and at an altitude of up to nine kilometers. Russian milbloggers amplified footage on May 29 claiming to show a Russian Mi-8 helicopter launching the "Dan-M" UAV.[62]

A Russian milblogger called on the Russian MoD to modify old Su-25 and Su-27 aircraft to facilitate Banderol cruise missile strikes.[63] The milblogger responded to a fellow milblogger's observation that the Russian military command needs to think about its reliance on Su- and MiG-type aircraft for Russia's cruise missile strikes. The milblogger claimed that Russia can only use these aircraft to launch Kh-69 cruise missiles and noted that the Kh-69 missiles are scarce and require long-term storage. The milblogger claimed that Russian developers integrated new Banderol cruise missiles onto Russia's attack helicopters and redesigned aerial targets. The milblogger argued that older tactical aircraft like the Su-25 could facilitate Banderol strikes as these missiles can be hung "under the wing of any tactical aircraft." The milblogger hypothesized that Russian forces could withdraw Su-27 aircraft and equip them with Banderol missiles, which would enable Russia to have "another hundred attack aircraft" each with a payload carrying capacity of four to eight cruise missiles. The milblogger estimated that such an adaptation could add 300 aircraft that could carry 1,200 to 1,800 cruise missiles. The milblogger claimed that such adaptations would require Russian officials’ full commitment.

Russian forces are reportedly using unmanned ground systems (UGVs) for logistics in the Toretsk direction. Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly using UGVs in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that two UGVs can transport 800 to 1,000 kilograms of supplies in a day and release 30 to 40 servicemen from logistics responsibilities.[65]

Russia's majority state-owned Sberbank introduced some machine learning (ML) and AI capabilities, which may support Kremlin's efforts to develop new autonomous drones and other applications. Sberbank presented the GigaChat 2.0 neutral network model on June 3, which can reportedly solve complex problems and can be used to make informed engineering decisions.[66] The Russian Government claimed that Sberbank had integrated its generative AI capabilities into 100 different projects and that 15,000 external clients use these capabilities. Mishustin offered Sberbank to consider cooperating with small start-up companies, and ISW recently observed reports that the Kremlin has been increasingly and disproportionally investing in small companies specializing in aircraft and drone production.[67]

Russian Economy (Assessed Russian objective: Mobilize Russian economy to support the war effort against the backdrop of sanctions)

The Russian government is reportedly pressuring Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina to lower Russia’s key interest rate on June 6 to reduce the impact of high interest rates on the Russian budget and civilian industries. Head of the Russian VTB Bank, Andrei Kostin, stated on May 30 that he is confident the Russian Central Bank would reduce the interest rate at the upcoming Central Bank meeting on June 6, citing "gradual cooling of the economy" and a slowdown in inflation.[68] Three Kremlin officials told Bloomberg that the Kremlin expects Nabiullina to reduce the 21 percent interest rate because the rate's effects are becoming more apparent on the budget and civilian industries.[69] One source familiar with Central Bank discussions told Bloomberg that a stronger ruble may have allowed for a decline in the Russian inflation rate from 10.7 percent in January 2025 to 6.2 percent in April 2025 but that it is unclear how stable the inflation decline is at this time. Bloomberg reported that high rates are negatively impacting the Russian industrial sector, with Russia's Severstal steel producer reporting a negative cash flow of 33 billion rubles ($421 million) in the first quarter of 2025. Severstal's spokesperson stated that the Central Bank would need to cut the interest rate to at least 15 percent for Severstal to turn a profit. Russian state media outlet Izvestiya also published an article on May 28 indirectly accusing the Central Bank of harming small businesses with the high interest rate, likely in an effort to pressure the Central Bank to lower the interest rate.[70] Izvestiya claimed that every tenth small Russian company struggles to repay their loans and that 665,500 Russian companies have debt as of April 1, 2025. Izvestiya prominently featured a rhetorical question of whether the Central Bank will account for small companies in debt when deciding on the interest rate during its upcoming meeting.[71] Bloomberg reported in June 2024 that Nabiullina is one of the only people in Putin's circle who has the "exclusive right" to tell Putin "what he doesn't like" because Putin views her as straightforward and uninfluenced by corruption.[72] Putin routinely pressured Nabiullina in late 2024 and early 2025 to lower the interest rate.[73]

Russian Demographic Problems (Assessed Russian objective: Fix persistent demographics problems by incentivizing immigration, disincentivizing emigration, and promoting pronatalist policies to support long-term force generation and economic initiatives)

The Kremlin continued efforts to portray Putin as a protector of traditional values and families in an effort to appeal to Russian mothers who have historically been critical of the Kremlin's war effort and to advance pro-natalist objectives. Putin met with families and mothers on May 29 on the eve of International Children's Day, during which he reiterated long-standing Russian narratives about Russia's commitment to "family values" and claimed that Russia’s number of large families is expanding.[74] Putin also responded to a request from one of the meeting participants about the need to support single fathers, stating that the Kremlin is discussing introducing state benefits for fathers. Putin also met on June 2 with Russia's Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova to discuss Belova's "All-Russian" inspection of orphanages in Russia and occupied Ukraine and efforts to transform the inspection into the All-Russian Assistance Service.[75] The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against Belova in March 2023 for her role in abducting children alongside Putin.[76] Putin's meetings are part of the Kremlin's systematic efforts to improve Russia's declining birthrates, which are only exacerbated by Russia's war in Ukraine.[77]

Russian State Recognition of Officers and Military Units: (Assessed Russian objective: Honor specific Russian units for service, achievements, and hardships in Ukraine and incentivize service in distinguished units)

Putin awarded the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with an honorific "Guards" title on June 3.[78] Elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade are currently operating near Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[79]

Crimean occupation governor Sergei Aksyonov awarded volunteers of the BARS-Crimea detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) on June 3.[80] Aksyonov stated that the BARS-Crimea detachment contributed to the defense of occupied Crimea. Aksyonov notably formed Crimean occupation paramilitary groups on the basis of the BARS structure starting in February 2022 to defend occupied Crimea and provide security to occupation officials.[81]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://istories dot media/stories/2025/05/30/v-2024-godu-kontrakt-s-minoboroni-podpisali-do-407-tis-rossiyan/?tztc=2 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/05/30/vazhnye-istorii-v-2024-godu-kontrakt-s-minoborony-rf-podpisali-do-407-tysyach-chelovek-no-tempy-verbovki-prodolzhayut-snizhatsya

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/46886

[3] https://vk.com/wall53083705_55007 ; https://www.rbc.dot ru/politics/24/01/2025/67937f679a7947ddcbeb9a3f

[4] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/news/2024/12/16/ministr-oboroni-andrei-belousov-zayavil-chto-v-2024-godu-na-kontrakt-nabrali-bolee-427-tisyach-chelovek-tak-li-eto/index.html?_gl=1o2znkd_gaMTgxNjYyNTAyMy4xNzQ3MzQzMTI5_ga_86829926PE*czE3NDg5ODA5MTYkbzYkZzAkdDE3NDg5ODA5MTYkajYwJGwwJGgw

[5] https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2024/12/04/even-after-doubling-its-sign-on-bonus-payment-the-russian-army-s-recruitment-rate-is-falling-losses-may-now-outpace-new-enlistments

[6] https://istories dot media/stories/2025/05/30/v-2024-godu-kontrakt-s-minoboroni-podpisali-do-407-tis-rossiyan/?tztc=1

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-23-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025

[8] https://t.me/kozhemiakoofficial/2453; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-23-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025

[9] https://chesnok dot media/2025/05/30/dlja-poiska-kontraktnikov-na-svo-vlasti-aleksandrova-nanjali-voennyj-centr/; https://zakupki.gov dot ru/epz/order/notice/notice223/common-info.html?noticeInfoId=18365519; https://zakupki.gov dot ru/epz/contractfz223/card/event-log.html?id=22378334

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-23-2025

[11] https://t.me/wargonzo/26968 ; https://isw.pub/ForceGen052125; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2025

[13] https://janiskluge dot substack.com/p/treacherous-hope-peace-talks-and; https://istories dot media/stories/2025/05/30/v-2024-godu-kontrakt-s-minoboroni-podpisali-do-407-tis-rossiyan/?tztc=1

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025

[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025

[16] https://t.me/kozhemiakoofficial/2453

[17] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24109879

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2025

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-volunteer-units-and-battalions

[20] https://chesnok dot media/2025/05/30/dlja-poiska-kontraktnikov-na-svo-vlasti-aleksandrova-nanjali-voennyj-centr/; https://zakupki.gov dot ru/epz/order/notice/notice223/common-info.html?noticeInfoId=18365519; https://zakupki.gov dot ru/epz/contractfz223/card/event-log.html?id=22378334

[21] https://zakupki.gov dot ru/epz/order/notice/notice223/common-info.html?noticeInfoId=18369203

[22] https://t.me/idelrealii/41369 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30610 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/98664 ; https://ufa.rbc dot ru/ufa/02/06/2025/683dabf09a79472a2bc0e16f

[23] https://t.me/idelrealii/41369 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30610 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/98664 ; https://ufa.rbc dot ru/ufa/02/06/2025/683dabf09a79472a2bc0e16f

[24] https://t.me/rybar/70780 ; https://www.pdge-guineaecuatorial dot com/clausura-del-curso-de-proteccion-a-altas-personalidades/

[25] https://iz dot ru/1867228/bogdan-stepovoi/vse-nad-putem-voinov-zeleznodoroznikov-nacali-obucat-borbe-s-dronami

[26] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1029048

[27] https://t.me/astrapress/82675

[28] https://66 dot ru/news/politic/281330/

[29] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans

[30] http://government dot ru/news/55211/; https://t.me/tass_agency/317913

[31] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24099011; http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/77072

[32] http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/77072

[33] https://t.me/voenkory_yakutii/9997; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24060283

[34] https://vk.com/wall-220953248_2207 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/22995; https://t.me/arestanty/3377

[35] https://tass dot ru/politika/24098725; http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/77072

[36] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/683998e19a794794f3640a9f; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202505300002

[37] https://gorvesti dot ru/education/v-volgogradskom-lagere-avangard-startovala-programma-vremya-yunykh-geroev-196378.html ; https://dzen dot ru/a/aDiPW0GxbUfLB-1n

[38] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/7618

[39] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/5459

[40] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-still-stealing-ukrainian-children ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf

[41] https://t.me/upravdel31/3816 ; https://t.me/malvovabelova/5340

[42] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7774116 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/317864

[43] https://t.me/sashakots/54052

[44]https://x.com/radeksikorski/status/1928793521466585465 ; https://x.com/radeksikorski/status/1928793521466585465 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/01/vysmiyav-trydennu-operacziyu-rf-glava-mzs-polshhi-podyakuvav-ukrayini-za-znyshhennya-4-tysyach-rosijskyh-tankiv/

[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/26883 ; https://dzen dot ru/a/aDsFarbt7AlbBxDt

[46] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/battlefield-ai-revolution-not-here-yet-status-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone

[47] https://www.rbc dot ru/technology_and_media/29/05/2025/68380af69a79471142829ea9?from=from_main_1; https://vkvideo dot ru/video-210353863_456239171?t=17m36s

[48] https://www.rbc dot ru/technology_and_media/21/03/2024/65fc53379a79477e0ce3bbcd?from=article_body; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/26/05/2025/68348ae99a79474b60f69782

[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/battlefield-ai-revolution-not-here-yet-status-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone

[50] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/27122

[51] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025

[52] https://t.me/bmpd_cast/23056; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92565; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166610;https://t.me/milinfolive/149405; https://t.me/iamsniper/12042; https://t.me/dva_majors/72366

[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/72366

[54] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-military-deploys-chinese-laser-air-defense-system/

[55] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5694

[56] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5694

[57] https://t.me/milinfolive/149262; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29295

[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29295

[59] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7137

[60] https://t.me/milinfolive/149377; https://t.me/milinfolive/138666; https://t.me/milinfolive/145320; https://t.me/milinfolive/140242; https://t.me/milinfolive/143770; https://t.me/milinfolive/145819; https://t.me/milinfolive/146193; https://x.com/RALee85/status/1929351739892777401

[61] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5683

[62] https://t.me/milinfolive/149327

[63] https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/21234

[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/72261

[65] https://t.me/dva_majors/72261

[66] https://t.me/government_rus/21364

[67] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025; https://t.me/government_rus/21364

[68] https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/30/05/2025/683a0bfc9a79471804e1186e

[69] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-02/putin-s-central-banker-under-pressure-to-cut-record-high-rates

[70] https://iz dot ru/1893705/olga-anaseva/procentnoe-otnoshenie-u-kazhdoj-desyatoj-maloj-kompanii-s-dolgami-problemy-s-ih-vyplatoj

[71] https://iz dot ru/1893705/olga-anaseva/procentnoe-otnoshenie-u-kazhdoj-desyatoj-maloj-kompanii-s-dolgami-problemy-s-ih-vyplatoj

[72] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2024

[73] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024

[74] https://t.me/tass_agency/317389 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/317391 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/317392 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77059

[75] kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77086 ; https://t.me/malvovabelova/5351 ; https://t.me/malvovabelova/5353 ; https://t.me/malvovabelova/5354 ; https://t.me/malvovabelova/5356

[76] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-still-stealing-ukrainian-children

[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-orthodox-church-declares-%E2%80%9Choly-war%E2%80%9D-against-ukraine-and-articulates-tenets; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025

[78] https://t.me/mod_russia/53415

[79] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20June%202%2C%202025%20PDF-compressed.pdf

[80] https://t.me/Aksenov82/7450

[81] https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-67454788