Russian Occupation Updates Page

Russian Occupation Update, June 30, 2025

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Author: Karolina Hird

Data cut-off: 11am ET, June 30

Key Takeaways:

• Russian occupation administrators continue efforts to incentivize Russians and loyalists to relocate to occupied Ukraine.
• The Russian federal Unified Institute for Spatial Planning (EIPP) announced plans on June 30 to develop the “tourist potential” of occupied Ukraine. Russia’s insistence on treating occupied Ukraine as a viable tourist destination is a potential violation of international law.
• Russia is likely to leverage the new occupation head of Mariupol to deepen links between the occupied city and Russian federal subjects and to pursue the proliferation of profitable development projects.
• The Russian youth military-patriotic activism group “Movement of the First” is expanding its influence in occupied Ukraine.
• Russia continues sending Ukrainian children to summer camps and military-patriotic programs across the Russian Federation.

Russian Occupation Update, June 19, 2025

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Authors: Karolina Hird and Anna Harvey

Data cut-off: 11:30 am ET, June 18 

Key Takeaways:

• Russian occupation officials continue to advertise the deportation of Ukrainian children to summer camps in Russia.
• Russian officials continue efforts to paint occupied Ukraine as an attractive tourist destination in order to encourage Russians to travel to occupied areas and support local occupation administration economies.
• Russian occupation officials articulated plans for the continued economic integration of occupied Ukraine into Russia during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum (SPIEF), focusing on attracting business and investment to occupied areas.

Russian occupation officials continue to advertise the deportation of Ukrainian children to summer camps in Russia. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported on June 16 that it plans to send over 4,000 children from 77 educational institutions in occupied Kherson Oblast to summer camps in Kaluga and Smolensk oblasts throughout Summer 2025.[1] An outlet affiliated with the Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported on June 15 and 16 that the camps will be open to children between the ages of 10 and 17 and that the Kherson Ministry of Natural Resources, Ecology, and Fisheries is providing vouchers to children through their schools to attend the camps for free.[2] The outlet reported that this is the third year that Russian officials have sent children from Kherson Oblast to summer camps in Russia.[3] Another outlet affiliated with the Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported on June 16 that Kaliningrad and Ryazan oblasts and the Republic of Adygea sponsor the program, suggesting that the camps in these regions may have agreements with Kherson Oblast occupation authorities.[4] ISW reported in May 2025 that the Kherson Oblast occupation administration planned to send 600 children from occupied Henichesk Raion to summer camps in the Adygea Republic throughout Summer 2025.[5] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration also reported on June 16 that 47 children from occupied Oleshky Raion are traveling to Moscow from June 15 to 21, where they will study Russian cultural, scientific, and historical heritage through the "Cultural Map 4+85" program.[6] ISW has previously assessed that “Cultural Map 4+85” and similar programs facilitate the forced assimilation of Ukrainian children into Russian sociocultural norms.[7] The deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of participation in summer camps, regardless of the duration of their stay, is likely a violation of international law.[8] ISW continues to assess that these various summer camp programs are intended to indoctrinate and militarize Ukrainian children, eradicating their Ukrainian identities and instilling pro-Russian hyper-militarized sentiments in them to create the next generation of loyal Russians.[9]

Russian officials continue efforts to paint occupied Ukraine as an attractive tourist destination in order to encourage Russians to travel to occupied areas and support the local occupation administration economies. A delegation representing the Kherson Oblast occupation administration travelled to Moscow on June 16 to attend the “Travel!” international tourism forum.[10] The delegation held meetings about encouraging “rural tourism” in occupied Kherson Oblast. Rural tourism is a specific type of tourism wherein visitors travel to rural areas and small villages in order to experience daily life in these areas, including participating in local labor tasks.[11] Russian Minister of Transport Roman Starovoit similarly encouraged Russian tourists to visit occupied Ukraine in an interview with Russian outlet Izvestia on the sidelines of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 18, and suggested that tourists travel to occupied Crimea via the Novorossiya highway, which runs from Rostov-on-Don through occupied Mariupol, Melitopol, and Sevastopol.[12] Starovoit claimed that Russia is focusing on creating “safe conditions” along the Novorossiya highway for “auto tourists.” ISW has previously reported on Russia’s insistence on treating occupied Ukraine as a viable tourist destination despite the fact that Russia has turned Ukraine into an active warzone.[13] Efforts to increase rural tourism initiatives and other similar vacation projects in Ukraine are likely intended to stimulate the economies of occupied areas, which have significantly suffered under Russian occupation. Tourism to occupied Ukraine along Russian-subsidized transportation infrastructure programs, such as the Novorossiya highway, additionally integrates and connects occupied Ukraine with Russia, as ISW has previously assessed.[14]

Russian occupation officials articulated plans for the continued economic integration of occupied Ukraine into Russia during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum (SPIEF), focusing on attracting business and investment to occupied areas. CEO of the Russian Small and Medium Business Corporation Aleksandr Isaevich claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS on the sidelines of SPIEF on June 18 that there are now 120 thousand registered small and medium businesses in “Donbas and Novorossiya” (referring to occupied Ukrainian territory).[15] Russian economic policy in occupied Ukraine seeks to simultaneously attract Russian businesses to occupied Ukraine and to encourage local businesses to register with the Russian government in order to maximize profit. Deputy Chairman for the Russian Federation Council Committee on Economic Policy Dmitry Vorona noted during the “Travel!” tourism forum on June 15 that the Russian Federation Council is considering amendments to the law on the free economic zone (FEZ) in occupied Ukraine in order to “attract business opportunities” and investors to the area.[16] Russia previously introduced a FEZ in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts in June 2023, and incentivized participation in the FEZ via special insurance and tax benefits for participating enterprises starting on January 1, 2024.[17] Russia appears to be now considering amendments to the FEZ to further attract investment and generate increased profit from its occupation of Ukraine. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin also attended SPIEF on June 18 and highlighted various Russian investment and development projects, including a planned 600-million-ruble ($8 million) investment by the Telmanovsky Quarry LLC into granite mining for infrastructure restoration in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[18] Such Russian investments in infrastructure in occupied Ukraine serve two purposes—first, to generate dependencies on Russian companies to maintain economic output, and second, they allow Russia to profit from industries and businesses in occupied Ukraine.[19]

Russian Occupation Update, June 17, 2025

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Author: Karolina Hird

Data cut-off: 10:30 am ET, June 16

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is attempting to leverage the Ukrainian children it has illegally deported in ongoing negotiations with Ukraine, thereby contradicting recent Russian efforts to deny and downplay the scale of its deportation campaign and confirming that Russia has indeed stolen Ukrainian children in clear violation of international law.
• Russian occupation officials used the circumstances of Russia Day festivities to forcibly passportize Ukrainian children.
• The Republic of Kalmykia is facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children via its patronage ties with a local Luhansk Oblast occupation administration.
• Russia continues to deport Ukrainian children to Russia for military-patriotic training and ideological indoctrination through the “Time of Young Heroes” program.
• Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky credited Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova and the “Country for Children” charitable foundation for the recent deportation of 100 children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian occupation authorities are suppressing religious freedom in occupied Crimea by prosecuting religious minority groups as “extremists” and by appropriating worship sites for the benefit of the occupation administration.
• Ukrainian partisan groups conducted attacks on Russian military personnel and assets in occupied Ukraine on June 11 and 12.

Russia is attempting to leverage the Ukrainian children it has illegally deported in ongoing negotiations with Ukraine, thereby contradicting recent Russian efforts to deny and downplay the scale of its deportation campaign and confirming that Russia has indeed stolen Ukrainian children in clear violation of international law. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 16 during a press conference with Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen that Russian officials proposed exchanging deported Ukrainian children for Russian prisoners of war (POWs).[1] Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine will not exchange children for Russian combatants, condemned the proposal as “beyond international law,” and called for Russia to return the children unilaterally, without exchanging them. The Russian suggestion that children be treated as combatants runs contrary to international law, which grants children special protected status in times of war.[2] The Russian proposal additionally acknowledges that Russia has deported Ukrainian children, despite recent Russian attempts to either deny or greatly downplay the scale of the deportations.[3] ISW continues to assess that there can be no just peace in Ukraine until Russia has returned all of the children it has deported.[4] Russia cannot use children as bargaining chips and must ensure their return unilaterally and unconditionally, not in exchange for anything.

Russian occupation officials used the circumstances of Russia Day festivities to forcibly passportize Ukrainian children. Russia celebrates its national holiday, Russia Day, on June 12, and enforced patriotic celebrations of Russia Day throughout occupied Ukraine. Russian occupation officials marked Russia Day by holding passportization ceremonies for schoolchildren. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported that representatives of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) migration department presented Russian passports to schoolchildren from Skadovsk Raion who had recently turned 14.[5] Young residents of occupied Chaplynka Raion, Kherson Oblast, also received Russian passports during a Russia Day ceremony.[6] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev gave Russian passports to 13 teenagers as part of the “We are Russian citizens” program, which is an initiative of the Russian youth activism organization “Movement of the First.” [7] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin similarly posted footage of himself handing out Russian passports to teenagers in occupied Donetsk Oblast as part of the “We are Russian citizens” program, and claimed that over 1,000 youth in occupied Donetsk Oblast received Russian passports as part of Russia Day ceremonies.[8] ISW has previously reported that the “We are Russian citizens” program handed out Russian passports to youth at the “Movement of the First” festival in occupied Luhansk Oblast in early June.[9]

The focus on Ukrainian children who have just turned 14 reflects Russian domestic law, which requires all residents of Russia to obtain a Russian internal passport at the age of 14. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russia completed the passportization of occupied Ukraine as of March 2025, and Russian occupation authorities appear to have since shifted passportization efforts to focus on children turning 14.[10] Putin also issued a presidential decree on March 20 requiring all residents of occupied Ukraine to receive passports by September 2025 or risk deportation in order to further coerce passportization of residents who have not yet received Russian documents.[11] Families of youth, therefore, likely feel extraordinary pressure for their children to receive Russian passports upon turning 14 in order to avoid separation or deportation. ISW continues to assess that Russia is using passportization efforts to consolidate bureaucratic and administrative control over occupied Ukraine, and to make real the Kremlin’s false claims that the majority of residents of occupied Ukraine are inherently Russian.[12] Many residents of occupied Ukraine see Russian passportization as a coercive tool of control—a Ukrainian partisan group highlighted various instances on June 12 of residents of occupied Ukraine emphasizing that they had no choice but to take Russian passports.[13]

The Republic of Kalmykia is facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children via its patronage ties with a local Luhansk Oblast occupation administration. Local Russian media outlets reported that 50 children from occupied Antratsyt Raion, Luhansk Oblast, arrived at the “Lesnaya Skazka” summer camp in Yashalta, Republic of Kalmykia.[14] “Lesnaya Skazka” brands itself as a summer rest and recreation camp for children from all over the Russian Federation, and has notably been facilitating programs for children from occupied Ukraine since 2016, following Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine.[15] The Republic of Kalmykia has established patronage ties with occupied Antratsyt Raion, which means that Kalmykia provides the raion with economic and infrastructure assistance and facilitates the deportation of children to various summer camps and programs in Kalmykia.[16] The Kalmykia Republic Ministry of Education and Science reported in November 2023, for example, that 494 children from occupied Antratsyt City “rested” at camps in Kalmykia in Summer 2023, including at “Lesnaya Skazka” and at the “Gorodovikov” Cossack Cadet Camp.[17] ISW previously assessed that Russian federal subjects are pursuing patronage over occupied Ukrainian cities in order to integrate these occupied areas into the Russian Federation.[18] Patronage links also frequently enable the deportation of Ukrainian children to camps and programs located in and maintained by Russian federal subjects, highlighting the deeply ingrained political linkages between Russian federal subject administrations, occupation administrations, and Russia’s policies towards Ukrainian children.[19]

Russia continues to deport Ukrainian children to Russia for military-patriotic training and ideological indoctrination through the “Time of Young Heroes” program. A Telegram channel based in Russia’s Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug reported on June 10 that 30 teenagers from occupied Volnovakha Raion, Donetsk Oblast, arrived at the “Avangard” military sports center in Noyabrsk to take part in the “Time of Young Heroes” summer patriotic training camp.[20] Images of the teenagers show them dressed in tactical cadet-style uniforms with Russian flag patches on their arms.[21] The teenagers will reportedly receive training in physical fitness, tactical medicine, small arms fires, and drone operation. The Russian “Voin” youth military-patriotic education project runs the “Time of Young Heroes” initiative, which brands itself as “an intensive training course in various military-applied disciplines” for youth aged 14 to 18.[22] The Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug appears to have patronage ties with occupied Volnovakha Raion and has engaged in modernization projects with the raion in the past.[23] “Voin” and the “Time of Young Heroes” programs are a cornerstone of Russia’s policies towards Ukrainian children, both in occupied Ukraine and in Russia. ISW has previously reported on how these programs facilitate the deportation of children to Russia and how Russia uses these programs as a tool to indoctrinate and militarize Ukrainian children, ultimately preparing them for future service in the Russian military.[24]

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky credited Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova and the “Country for Children” charitable foundation for the recent deportation of 100 children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[25] Balitsky emphasized that the children are from frontline areas in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, including the Vasylivka, Kamyansko-Dniprovskyi, and Kuibyshevsky municipal districts, and claimed that over 9,000 children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast will attend “health and excursion” events in Russia in Summer 2025. The “Country for Children” foundation began operations in August 2022 and aims for the “social and psychological adaptation of children and adolescents from new subjects [illegally occupied regions] of the Russian Federation” via its “Day After Tomorrow” project.[26] ISW has previously noted that Lvova-Belova is very involved in implementing “Country for Children” projects in occupied Ukraine, which emphasizes the fund’s close ties to the Kremlin.[27]

Russian occupation authorities are suppressing religious freedom in occupied Crimea by prosecuting religious minority groups as “extremists” and by appropriating worship sites for the benefit of the occupation administration. The Sevastopol occupation city court rejected on June 11 the appeal of two Jehovah’s Witnesses who a lower occupation court convicted for their affiliation with the Jehovah’s Witnesses in January 2025.[28] Russia banned the Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2017 due to allegations of “extremism,” and has since exported its persecution of this religious community to occupied Ukraine.[29] The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs Main Directorate for Combatting Extremism (“Center E”) similarly opened administrative protocols against the head of the Crimea-based independent Muslim community Eski Qırım on June 12 due to “extremism” allegations.[30] Russia frequently uses politically motivated charges against religious minority groups in occupied Ukraine in order to strengthen its control over occupied areas, and privileges the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as part of its religious persecution policy.[31] Russia’s attempts to exert control over religious minorities notably extend beyond court rulings. The Crimean Tatar Resource Center reported on June 13 that Sevastopol occupation authorities intend to convert a historical building, which the local Roman Catholic community uses for mass, into a concert venue or entertainment facility.[32] An April 2025 investigation by Novaya Gazeta Evropa highlighted how Russia has significantly decreased the number of religious communities in occupied Ukraine by either physically destroying worship sites or by depriving believers of the ability to access worship sites or attend services, including by appropriating such sites for non-religious or ROC uses.[33]

Ukrainian partisan groups conducted attacks on Russian military personnel and assets in occupied Ukraine on June 11 and 12. The Crimea-based “Atesh” partisan group reported on June 11 that Atesh agents set fire to a Russian Ural truck near occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, killing an unspecified number of Russian servicemembers.[34] The “AntiSmersh” Ukrainian partisan group additionally reported that it set fire to a Russian military police vehicle near occupied Kalanchak, Kherson Oblast, in protest of Russia Day on June 12.[35]

Russian Occupation Update, June 12, 2025

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Author: Karolina Hird

Data cut-off: 1:30 pm EST, June 11

Key Takeaways:

• Occupied Crimea is poised to face a severe water crisis in the coming months, a crisis that the Russian occupation of Crimea has precipitated and which ongoing Russian mismanagement and resource misallocation will exacerbate.
• Russia is intensifying filtration processes against Ukrainians, greatly restricting their freedom of movement and their ability to leave occupied Ukraine.
• Kherson Oblast occupation officials continue efforts to consolidate control over the oblast’s agricultural output for Russia’s economic gain.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky approved sanctions on June 10 targeting numerous Russian officials and organizations for their role in the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children. The sanctions list supports ISW’s assessment of the links between high-ranking Kremlin officials, Russian youth organizations, and the widescale deportation of Ukrainian children.
• The Russian “University Shifts” program has begun summer sessions, facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children and teenagers to participate in university classes at schools throughout the Russian Federation.

Occupied Crimea is poised to face a severe water crisis in the coming months, a crisis that the Russian occupation of Crimea has precipitated and which ongoing Russian mismanagement and resource misallocation will exacerbate. Head of the Department of Chemical Technologies of Water Use at the Russian-founded Crimean Federal University Ilya Nikolenko stated in an interview with Russian media on June 5 that reservoirs in occupied Crimea lost 11 million cubic meters of water in May 2025 alone.[1] Nikolenko noted that water reservoirs in Crimea are operating at about 50 percent of maximum volume, compared to 75 percent at the same time in 2024.[2] Nikolenko warned that the current rates of the depletion of Crimea’s water reserves presage an acute water crisis reminiscent of the 2020-2021 water shortages.[3] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Crimea Service Krym Realli reported on June 6 that the Bilohirsk Reservoir (in southeastern Crimea about 35km east of Sevastopol) began to rapidly lose water in recent weeks due to the onset of hot weather and resulting increased water consumption throughout Crimea.[4] Russian occupation officials are clearly aware of the looming water crisis, but are nevertheless continuing efforts to attract Russian tourists to Crimea for the summer season. Head of the Committee on Ecology and Natural Resources in the Crimean occupation parliament Svetlana Shabelnikova claimed that Russia will provide Crimea with 60 percent of its needed drinking water this summer despite supply challenges, and that resort towns in southern Crimea will be “supplied drinking water without interruption.”[5] It remains unclear how the Russian occupation administration intends to supply the 40 percent shortfall of potable water, but Shabelnikova’s statements make it evident that Russian authorities are prioritizing water supply for tourist hotspots, potentially leaving hundreds of thousands of people who do not live in or near resort towns without reliable water supply.

Russia as a belligerent occupying power is obliged by international law to provide for the health of the population it occupies, which extends to the provision of basic goods and services such as drinking water.[6] Ukraine initially shut off water supply to Crimea via the North Crimean Canal as a form of sanction when Russia invaded and annexed Crimea in 2014.[7] Russia then struggled with maintaining water supply, particularly as it inundated the peninsula with Russian servicemembers and re-located Russian civilians to Crimea, all of which added strain on already limited water resources.[8] Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has  mismanaged water infrastructure in Crimea, failed to invest in alternative water sources, continued diverting water resources to military needs, and mired water projects corruption scandals.[9] Russia’s June 2023 destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam further severely limited water supplies to Crimea.[10] Despite mounting water concerns, Russian officials continue to insist on bringing Russian tourism to the occupied peninsula, which will likely further stretch scarce water resources and disproportionately impact Ukrainian residents.[11]

Russia is intensifying filtration processes against Ukrainians, greatly restricting their freedom of movement and their ability to leave occupied Ukraine. Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti reported on June 8 that it reviewed a dozen Russian court documents that say that signs of deleting information from mobile phones can be considered a valid reason to deny entry of Ukrainian citizens into Russia.[12] RIA Novosti claimed that there have been instances of Ukrainian citizens arriving at border checkpoints having clearly deleted information from chats, photo galleries, and contacts. Russian law enforcement officials are now allowed to take the absence of evidence as actual evidence to detain and prosecute Ukrainian citizens. These new measures will impact Ukrainians travelling from Ukrainian-controlled areas to Russia for a variety of reasons, but will most adversely impact residents of occupied Ukraine. The only way for residents of occupied Ukraine to leave occupied territories is through Russia, which requires passing through Russian border checkpoints and undergoing filtration measures.[13] Russian filtration processes include checking personal devices for any evidence of pro-Ukrainian sentiment—for which the punishment is arrest and detention on a variety of “terrorism” charges.[14] The new rules on searches for deleted content will make it even more dangerous for Ukrainians to attempt to leave occupation via Russia. Russian officials also physically require Ukrainian residents to come to Russia for a variety of bureaucratic procedures, and these new content deletion rules will make it even more dangerous for them to do so.

Kherson Oblast occupation officials continue efforts to consolidate control over the oblast’s agricultural output for Russia’s economic gain. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo met with Head of the Russian-founded Kherson Grain Company Sergei Kiva on June 7 to discuss the occupation administration’s support for agricultural producers in occupied Kherson Oblast.[15] Russia registered the Kherson Grain Company as a state unitary enterprise in June 2022 and has since used it to exploit revenue generated by grain producers in occupied Kherson Oblast.[16] Kiva told Saldo that specialists from the Kherson Grain Company are “helping” farmers “re-register” their land—likely meaning that farmers are having to register their land, and their crop yield, with Russian administrative organs, which will enable the occupation administration to profit off of their agricultural yield. The Ukrainian Resistance Center warned that the Kherson Grain Company is centralizing the agricultural market and forcing Ukrainian farmers to be beholden to the company and the occupation administration for revenue without the option of seeking fair market prices.[17] ISW has previously reported on Russian efforts to steal grain from occupied Ukraine and sell it to international markets via occupied Black Sea ports.[18] Russian state-owned enterprises such as the Kherson Grain Company are facilitating these efforts.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky approved sanctions on June 10 targeting numerous Russian officials and organizations for their role in the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children.[19] The sanctions list names nearly 50 individuals and nine Russian organizations whom Ukraine has designated as involved in the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children, including the head of the Crimean branch of Yunarmia (Young Russian Cadets National Movement) Sergei Havrilchuk and Kaluga Oblast Commissioner on Children’s Rights Irina Ageeva.[20] Zelensky also sanctioned the “Artek” International Children’s Center in occupied Crimea and the “Movement of the First” youth organization, including its occupied Kherson Oblast branch, for their involvement in deporting and indoctrinating Ukrainian children. ISW has written at length on the role of “Artek” and “Movement of the First” in the broader Russian deportation and indoctrination ecosystem, and the new Ukrainian sanctions lists supports ISW’s assessment of the links between high-ranking Kremlin officials, Russian youth organizations, and the widescale deportation of Ukrainian children.[21]

The Russian “University Shifts” program has begun summer sessions, facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children and teenagers to participate in university classes at schools throughout the Russian Federation. The Russian Ministry of Education announced on June 6 that the fourth season of the “University Shifts” program has begun and that over 16,000 children aged 14 to 17, including children from occupied Ukraine, will take part of the program in coming months.[22] “University Shifts” will hold nine sessions this summer. 570 children from occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts are taking part in the first session, and Russian officials announced in April that they plan for a total of 2,000 children from occupied Ukraine to take part in “University Shifts” in Summer 2025.[23] Russian outlet Interfax reported on June 10 that a group of 48 school children from occupied Donetsk Oblast arrived in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, to attend classes at the Bashkir State Pedagogical University.[24] ISW previously noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin personally praised “University Shifts” for exposing Ukrainian children to Russian values, traditions, and culture—highlighting the fact that “University Shifts” is part of the Kremlin’s wider Russification toolkit.[25] Russia is using “University Shifts” to deport Ukrainian children to Russia with the purpose of indoctrinating them and integrating them into Russian society via the educational system.

Russian Occupation Update, June 9, 2025

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Author: Karolina Hird

Data cut-off: 9:30 am EST, June 9

Reporting period: June 2-June 9 

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova tacitly acknowledged that Russia has illegally deported Ukrainian children. Lvova-Belova’s statements further confirm the illegality of Russia’s behavior vis-à-vis Ukrainian children.
• Russia is consolidating control over occupied Ukraine in the digital sphere.
• Schools in occupied Kherson Oblast are introducing new curricula for the upcoming school year to encourage high birth rates amongst Ukrainian youth and to propagate traditional Russian family values.
• Russian occupation courts continue to weaponize spurious or overblown “high treason” charges to prosecute residents of occupied Crimea for perceived anti-Russian or pro-Ukrainian sentiment.
• The ongoing “Great Russian Word” festival in occupied Crimea highlights Russian efforts to use the Russian language as a tool of sociocultural occupation.

Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova tacitly acknowledged that Russia has illegally deported Ukrainian children. Lvova-Belova claimed on June 4 that Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky gave her “the list” and that her office has “started working on it,” in reference to the list of hundreds of kidnapped Ukrainian children which Ukrainian officials handed over to Russian officials during negotiations in Istanbul on June 2.[1] Lvova-Belova claimed that efforts to reunify Ukrainian children with family members can only be carried out if a parent or close relative with “appropriate legal grounds” applies for custody of the child, as instructed by Russian President Vladimir Putin.[2] Lvova-Belova also noted that her office has “reunited” 101 children with their families in Ukraine and other countries—around 0.5 percent of the 19,546 children whom the Ukrainian government has confirmed Russia has deported.[3] The actual number of deportations is likely to be much higher, as ISW and others have frequently assessed.[4]

Russian officials have attempted to downplay the scale of Russia’s deportations of Ukrainian children, claiming that the list that the Ukrainian government provided in Istanbul showed “hundreds” as opposed to “thousands” of children.[5] An anonymous Ukrainian source noted to Euronews that Ukraine made the decision to only submit a list of 339 names in order to protect the children out of concerns that Russia may try to further hide them by changing their names or moving them within Russia.[6]  Lvova-Belova, however, tacitly admitted that Russia has indeed deported Ukrainian children by stating that she is “working” on returning the children named in the Ukrainian list—acknowledging that there is a population of Ukrainian children living within Russia who must be returned to Ukraine and have guardians in Ukraine, meaning there is no reason for them to be in Russia in the first place. Lvova-Belova’s statements also further confirm the illegality of Russia’s behavior vis-à-vis Ukrainian children. The suggestion that children can only be repatriated upon the appeal of a guardian “with an appropriate legal basis” forgoes the potentially thousands of orphans whom Russia deported from children’s institutions in occupied Ukraine who do not have relatives who know what has happened to them or who can advocate for them in the Russian legal system.[7] Lvova-Belova has herself adopted such a child—an orphan teenager from Mariupol.[8] Russia has also gone to great lengths to change the names and birthplaces of some of the children it has deported, which makes it nearly impossible for potential relatives to identify these children in the first place.[9] Lvova-Belova’s discussion of the list furthermore highlights the fact that Russia is failing to respect its international legal responsibilities as a belligerent occupying power—Russia should have made lists of the identities of each and every one of the Ukrainian children it deported for tracking and accountability purposes, and it clearly has not done so.[10]

Russia is consolidating control over occupied Ukraine in the digital sphere. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo reported on June 2 that the occupied Kherson Oblast-based Tavria TV and Radio Company launched the new “Tavria” mobile application.[11] “Tavria” is the first such application associated with a media organization in occupied Ukraine and allows users to access live news, radio broadcasts, and curated content from Tavria TV.[12] ISW previously reported that Russian media expert Alexander Malkevich created Tavria TV and Radio in order to disseminate pro-Russian narratives in occupied Ukraine.[13] The launch of the “Tavria” app will allow Tavria TV and Radio an even greater information monopoly in occupied Kherson Oblast, ensuring that residents receive a constant stream of pro-Russian narratives disseminated in the form of news broadcasts and personalized media offerings.

Russian occupation officials are also restricting mobile phone connection and monitoring text messages and calls in order to deepen control over the digital sphere. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Oleksiy Kharchenko warned on June 4 that mobile phone operators in occupied Luhansk Oblast are threatening to disconnect the phone numbers of individuals who fail “verification,” which entails presenting a Russian passport to occupation authorities to “verify” one’s personal data.[14] This suggests that Russian occupation authorities are using the threat of mobile disconnection to coerce passportization in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko similarly noted on June 4 that mobile communications are not operating properly throughout occupied Ukraine due to poor Russian software, and also reported that Russian officials are monitoring correspondence and calls—suggesting that the monitoring may be impacting the overall quality of mobile communications.[15] Russia’s digital censorship in occupied Ukraine is multifaceted—it relies on the dissemination of Russian-controlled media and apps with the simultaneous physical blocking of means and methods of mobile communication.

Schools in occupied Kherson Oblast are introducing new curricula for the upcoming school year to encourage high birth rates amongst Ukrainian youth and to propagate traditional Russian family values. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration announced on June 5 that schools in occupied Kherson Oblast will begin introducing the “Family Patterns” project in school curricula starting on September 1, 2025.[16] “Family Patterns” will encourage discussions in the format of the “Conversations about important things” project in order to develop “respectful attitude towards family memory and values in schoolchildren.” The Kherson Oblast occupation administration also announced the start of the “Save Life” educational program in schools, which defines itself as “aimed at increasing the birth rate…. among young people.” School classes that extol traditional Russian family values and encourage youth to start large families are a form of Russification and additionally seek to increase birth rates in occupied Ukraine, as ISW has previously reported.[17] Russia requires population growth to support its occupation of Ukraine, as children who are born in occupied territories immediately receive Russian citizenship. This allows Russia to make real the fallacy that these territories are Russian because they are inhabited by Russian citizens.[18]

Russian occupation courts continue to weaponize spurious or overblown “high treason” charges to prosecute residents of occupied Crimea for perceived anti-Russian or pro-Ukrainian sentiment. The Crimean occupation Supreme Court and Sevastopol occupation City Court issued three “high treason” sentences between June 5 and 6—one against a man and two against women. In all three cases, the Russian courts alleged that the respondents had provided financial or informational support to the Ukrainian armed forces. One case involves a woman who was living in Ireland following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and whom Russian security services detained when she returned to occupied Crimea in 2024 to attend her mother’s funeral on the allegation that she had bought a pro-Ukrainian digital postage stamp.[19] The woman will spend 17 years in prison on the charge of “high treason” for her purchase of the postage stamp.

The Russian State Duma approved a bill which expanded the definition of “high treason” in December 2024 to include affiliation with any organization deemed to be participating in “activities against the security of the Russian Federation.”[20] Russia began convicting record numbers of people both in Russia and in occupied Ukraine on treason charges following the full-scale invasion, and has leveraged treason charges in order to target and stifle perceived dissent in occupied Ukraine.[21] The fact that Russia also appears to be increasingly targeting women in occupied Ukraine with treason, extremism, and terrorism charges is also noteworthy and indicative of a growing trend, as ISW has previously reported.[22]

The ongoing “Great Russian Word” festival in occupied Crimea highlights Russian efforts to use the Russian language as a tool of sociocultural occupation. The eighteenth annual “Great Russian Word” festival opened in occupied Crimea on June 3 and will run until June 12.[23] The festival brands itself as “aimed at supporting Russian culture” and “strengthening the position on the Russian language” for the purpose of defending “[Russian] state interests.”[24] One of the self-described goals of the 2025 iteration of the festival is on “preserving the purity of the Russian language”—the festival is disseminating a brochure that describes how “Anglicisms” (English words or phrases) risk destroying Russian culture and language.[25] An anonymous Crimean human rights activist noted that the festival is advocating for notably anti-Western ideologies, intended to propagate the narrative of the supremacy of the Russian language while further separating occupied Crimea from Ukraine and the West.[26] Russia has used the Russian language as a cudgel against Ukrainian identity and pro-Western sentiment in occupied Ukraine since its first invasion in 2014, and has severely limited access to Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar language education in its over decade-long occupation of the peninsula as a means of consolidating its sociocultural influence.[27] Russian officials have also cracked down on English-language education in Crimea, claiming that English-speakers have been at “war” with Russia for “thousands of years.”[28] Occupation officials from Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts notably attended the festival in order to learn lessons on Russian language education and institute these lessons in their respective educational systems.[29]

Russian Occupation Update, June 3, 2025

Click here to read the full report

Author: Karolina Hird

Data cut-off: 12 pm EST, June 2

Key Takeaways:

• Russian occupation officials continue to articulate plans for the forced removal and deportation of Ukrainian children over the course of Summer 2025.
• Russian federal-level youth programs are indoctrinating and militarizing Ukrainian children.
• Russia continues to pursue infrastructure projects in occupied Ukraine as a means of forcibly integrating Ukraine into the Russian Federation.
• Russian infrastructure projects also facilitate Russian efforts to reap economic benefit from Ukraine’s indigenous resources.
• Russia is taking steps to further consolidate its control over the energy grid in occupied Ukraine, supporting Russian efforts to integrate the energy system in occupied Ukraine with the Russian energy system.

Russian occupation officials continue to articulate plans for the forced removal and deportation of Ukrainian children over the course of Summer 2025. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik reported on June 2 that Luhansk Oblast occupation officials are planning to provide “full-fledged rest” for at least 30,000 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast at summer camps and programs in occupied Ukraine and Russia in the coming summer months.[1] Pasechnik noted that around 1,000 children will attend Russian federal summer camp institutions, including the “Artek” and “Alyye Parusa” camps in occupied Crimea; the “Krasnaya Gvozdika” camp in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast; the “Smena” and “Orlyonok” camps (Krasnodar Krai); the “Snegiri” health center and “Young Patriot” military-patriotic center (Moscow Oblast); and the “Okean” camp (Primorsky Krai), and that 12,500 other children will “rest and improve their health” at other camps in Altai Krai, Stavropol Krai, and the Tatarstan Republic. High school-aged children will participate in the “University Shifts” and “Cultural Map 4+85” programs in Russia.[2] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo reported on May 30 that 40 teenagers from occupied Kherson Oblast arrived in Vologograd Oblast to participate in the “Time of Young Heroes” military-patriotic training program at the “Voin” center, where they will learn tactical drone operation and combat medicine.[3] ISW previously reported that Russian officials have set conditions to remove or deport 53,000 Ukrainian children to summer camps in occupied Ukraine and in the Russian Federation in Summer 2025 via summer camps, military-patriotic training courses, and other schemes.[4] ISW continues to assess that these various summer camp programs are intended to indoctrinate and militarize Ukrainian children, eradicating their Ukrainian identities and instilling pro-Russian hyper-militarized sentiments in them to create the next generation of loyal Russians.[5]

Russian federal-level youth programs are indoctrinating and militarizing Ukrainian children. The Russian youth civic activism initiative “Movement of the First” held its first festival in occupied Ukraine and in Russian on June 1, highlighting Russian efforts to massively indoctrinate Ukrainian children and instill in them pro-Russian views.[6] The occupied Luhansk Oblast branch of “Movement of the First” reported that the festival featured the “We Are Citizens of Russia” program, which issued Russian passports to attendees.[7] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Minister for Youth Policy Kirill Makarov posted images showing Russian servicemembers teaching young children how to hold and operate small arms as part of festival programming.[8] The “Movement of the First” festival is exemplary of Russia’s policies towards Ukrainian children—it supports Russia’s efforts to bureaucratically Russify Ukrainians by granting them Russian passports, while simultaneously supporting Russian efforts to militarize Ukrainian children and normalize the concept of war in order to prepare Ukrainian children for future service in the Russian military.

Russia continues to pursue infrastructure projects in occupied Ukraine as a means of forcibly integrating Ukraine into the Russian Federation. DNR Head Denis Pushilin met with Russian Minister of Construction, Housing, and Public Utilities Irek Fayzullin on May 30 to discuss Russia’s restoration and development of occupied Donetsk Oblast.[9] Pushilin claimed that Russia is actively restoring 15,825 residential and social facilities in occupied parts of the oblast, and additionally noted that the Russian federal “Youth and Children” program has allocated over 660 million rubles ($8.3 million) for the provision of educational equipment to 513 schools in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[10] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin additionally signed an order on May 30 that allocated 7.6 billion rubles ($96 million) to the budgets of occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts for the repair of their regional, inter-municipal, and local roadway infrastructure.[11] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration is particularly focusing on expanding housing projects—the Russian Unified Institute of Spatial Planning (a subordinate entity to the Russian Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Utilities) developed a plan to construct over 1.3 million square meters of housing in occupied Kherson Oblast by 2030.[12] Russia is likely to use these new housing developments in part to attract Russians to relocate to occupied Ukraine, as is already the case in parts of occupied Mariupol.[13] ISW previously assessed that Russian infrastructure projects in occupied Ukraine are intended to create dependencies on Russia for the provision of basic services, thus further integrating occupied Ukraine into Russia.[14]

Russian infrastructure projects also facilitate Russian efforts to reap economic benefit off of Ukraine’s indigenous resources. Russian opposition outlet Verstka, citing data from the Russian state procurement portal, reported on May 28 that the Russian Ministry of Agriculture has allocated 450 million rubles ($5.6 million) to the surveying and mapping of agricultural lands in occupied Ukraine.[15] The corresponding documents notably require survey material only from before 2002, when Ukraine implemented vast land reform efforts to privatize agricultural land and disband collective farms, so the survey data will lack contemporary layouts of agricultural land and will not show how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has disrupted agricultural production in frontline and occupied areas.[16] Russia is likely to use these maps of agricultural land to support efforts to steal grain and other agricultural commodities from occupied Ukraine and to generate economic benefit off of their export, as ISW has previously reported.[17] Russia is actively pursuing infrastructure projects to maximize the export of stolen resources from ports in occupied Ukraine. The Russian Unified Institute of Spatial Planning announced plans on May 27 to increase the cargo turnover at the port of Berdyansk (occupied Zaporizhia Oblast) by 40 percent by 2030, and noted that this will be accomplished by the construction of a new railway line, the modernization of port infrastructure, and other projects to increase the depth of the port to accommodate heavier ships that can export larger cargo loads.[18] Russia is already actively using Black Sea ports in occupied Crimea and occupied Mariupol to export stolen Ukrainian goods such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), grain, and coal to international markets, and expanding the export capacity of the Berdyansk Port will facilitate trade across the Sea of Azov and provide Russian with diversified trade routes in occupied Ukraine.[19]

Russia is taking steps to further consolidate its control over the energy grid in occupied Ukraine, supporting Russian efforts to integrate the energy system in occupied Ukraine with the Russian energy system. International environmental activism organization Greenpeace’s Ukraine service reported on May 27 that satellite imagery taken between February and May 2025 shows that Russia has laid 90 kilometers of powerlines near the coast of the Sea of Azov in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts—an indicator that Russia intends to act on its long-held plans to connect the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to the Russian energy grid.[20] Russia’s occupation of the ZNPP in March 2022 forced the plant into a state of cold shutdown, and Russian actions in and around the plant frequently place the ZNPP at risk.[21] Russian officials appeared to agree in May 2024 with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) assessment that restarting operations at the plant would be “impossible” under the current conditions of Russia’s invasion, but available open-source evidence and Greenpeace’s reporting suggest the opposite.[22] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko similarly reported on May 28, for example, that Russian officials temporarily stopped traffic along the Donetsk City-Makiivka-Torez route on May 28 to dismantle and rebuild the LEP-220 powerline in order to connect it with the ZNPP.[23] Andryuschenko also posted screenshots of several documents taken from the DNR Ministry of Construction site that show Russian plans to build a new electrical substation and high-voltage power line in occupied Mariupol in order to connect Mariupol to the ZNPP and to facilitate the connection of the ZNPP to the Russian energy grid.[24] These powerline construction projects will allow Russia to essentially seize energy from occupied Ukraine for its own power grid, and further integrate occupied Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence by generating a reliance on Russian energy providers and operators. Occupied Ukraine’s connection to the Russian energy grid will also complicate Ukrainian reintegration efforts—adding legitimacy to Russia’s false claims that Ukraine is intrinsically part of Russia.

Authors: Nate Trotter, Jessica Sobieski, Jennie Olmsted, and Karolina Hird

Data cut-off: 1pm EST, May 7

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is inventorying real estate in occupied Ukraine in order to seize property from Ukrainian residents, likely in part to facilitate the transfer of Russian citizens to occupied territories.
• Russia may be using children’s summer camps in occupied Crimea to discourage Ukrainian strikes against Russian military assets located throughout occupied Crimea, effectively using children as shields in a violation of international humanitarian law.
• Russian occupation officials continue to promote and expand the “Zarnitsa 2.0” military patriotic game as part of Russia’s wider campaign to militarize Ukrainian children and erase Ukrainian identities.
• Russia is struggling to adequately staff occupied territories with doctors and other medical personnel.

Russia is inventorying real estate in occupied Ukraine in order to seize property from Ukrainian residents, likely in part to facilitate the transfer of Russian citizens to occupied territories. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin claimed on April 29 that Russia entered 251,750 real estate objects from occupied Ukraine into the Russian Unified State Register of Real Estate as part of an inventory of real estate objects in occupied territories.[1] Khusnullin claimed that the inventory process will allow residents of occupied areas to quickly formalize and “protect” their property rights and allow Russia to valuate real estate objects. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko responded to Khusnullin’s statements and emphasized on May 6 that Russia is planning to nationalize all the inventoried real estate objects in occupied Ukraine, essentially “looting” the property from its Ukrainian owners.[2] ISW previously observed how the nationalization of property in occupied Ukraine allows the Russian government to auction that property off to Russian citizens, which facilitates the illegal relocation of Russian citizens to occupied areas of Ukraine from Russia.[3] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Crimea service Krym Realii published a story on May 7 detailing how two women who left occupied Crimea for Kyiv in 2019 after refusing to receive Russian passports discovered that the Russian occupation administration seized and sold their apartment in Crimea to a Russian servicemember.[4] Russia’s property nationalization policy is increasingly displacing residents of occupied Ukraine and robbing them of their homes, as ISW has assessed.[5]

Russia may be using children’s summer camps in occupied Crimea to discourage Ukrainian strikes against Russian military assets located throughout occupied Crimea, effectively using children as shields in a violation of international humanitarian law. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Crimea service Krym Realii warned on May 5 that Russian officials may use the presence of children in summer camps in Crimea to deter Ukrainian forces from striking military assets on the occupied peninsula.[6] Russia simultaneously continues to militarize Crimea while advertising it as a location for summer tourism, including for children. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on May 5 that Russian officials plan to operate seventeen summer camps for Russian and Ukrainian children in occupied Sevastopol, including orphans and the children of Russian soldiers.[7] Russian officials have claimed that over 400 facilities in occupied Crimea will host children this summer.[8] ISW previously assessed that Russia used summer tourism in Crimea to deter Ukrainian strikes on legitimate military targets, particularly in 2024.[9] Ukrainian forces recently targeted occupied Crimea with over 30 naval drones and 100 aerial drones on the night of May 1 to 2, and occupied Crimea remains strategically important to Ukrainian forces.[10] ISW previously noted that Russia is likely using human shields in violation of international humanitarian law, which states that “the military command shall avoid deploying military objectives in densely populated areas or in their vicinity.”[11] Russia’s insistence on treating occupied Crimea as a tourist destination, despite the fact that Russia uses Crimea to support its continued military aggression against Ukraine, places civilian lives (particularly children’s lives) at risk.

Russian occupation officials continue to promote and expand the “Zarnitsa 2.0” military patriotic game as part of Russia’s wider campaign to militarize Ukrainian children and erase Ukrainian identities.“Zarnista 2.0” is a Russian military-patriotic game designed to indoctrinate and militarize children aged seven to 17 by training them in military tactics, modern warfighting technologies, and Russian military history.[12] Children register for “Zarnitsa 2.0” and create squad-sized “detachments” that compete against other “detachments” on the municipal, regional, and national level.[13] Russian youth civic activism initiative “Movement of the First,” Yunarmia (Russian Young Army Cadets National Movement), and the “Voin” network of military-patriotic training centers organize and hold “Zarnitsa 2.0” competitions throughout occupied Ukraine and the Russian Federation.[14] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported on May 5 that high school students from occupied Chaplynka took part in the municipal stage of the “Zarnitsa 2.0,” which included events such as drill training, shooting, drone control, tactical medicine, practice protecting against radiation and chemical attacks, and other military skills.[15] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik reported on May 5 that 13,000 Ukrainian children from occupied Luhansk Oblast have so far participated in the qualifying and municipal stages of “Zarnitsa 2.0.”[16] The official “Zarnitsa 2.0” Telegram channel previously reported in February that over one million students registered to participate in the game, including children from occupied Ukraine.[17] Russian opposition outlet Verstka, however, reported that Russian teachers and instructors forced a number of these students to register for the competition.[18] “Zarnitsa 2.0” is part of Russia’s long-term strategy to Russify, militarize, and indoctrinate Ukrainian children in occupied areas, erasing their Ukrainian identity and preparing them to fight for the Russian military against their fellow Ukrainians, as ISW has previously assessed. [19]

Russia is struggling to adequately staff occupied territories with doctors and other medical personnel. The Russian Ministry of Health published a draft bill on May 6 that would require graduates of Russian medical schools to work for three years in hospitals and clinics after their graduation, or else face a fine three times higher than their medical school tuition.[20] The Russian Ministry of Health framed this bill as a response to Russia’s growing shortage of medical staff, and Ukrainian sources noted that, if passed, the bill will impact Russian health policy in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on May 6 that Russia will compel some of these recent graduates to work in Ukraine under the threat of mobilization into the Russian army.[21] Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Oleksiy Kharchenko noted that Russian occupation officials hope to use these doctors to offset a “catastrophic” shortage of medical professionals in occupied Ukraine.[22]

The medical system in occupied Ukraine appears to be in a state of disarray due to Russian mismanagement. Kherson Oblast occupation Health Minister Elena Borchaninova recently claimed on April 21 that medical institutions in occupied Kherson Oblast are gravely short of qualified personnel, having only filled 40 percent of the needed quota for doctors, 58 percent of the quota for middle medical staff, and 64 percent of the quota for junior medical staff.[23] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo met with the Russian Deputy Health Minister Andrei Plutnitsky on May 6 to discuss a plan to overhaul the Henichesk Medical College and convert a five-story building in occupied Novooleksiivka into housing for doctors in order to encourage medical personnel to move to occupied Kherson Oblast to remedy medical personnel shortages.[24] Russia previously implemented the “Zemskyi Doktor” (“Rural Doctor”) program to relocate Russian doctors to occupied Ukraine, and ISW previously assessed that “Zemskyi Doktor” and similar Russian programs are in part also efforts to facilitate the repopulation of areas of occupied Ukraine with Russian citizens.[25] The lack of qualified doctors in occupied Ukraine may worsen a humanitarian crisis in these areas, particularly if Russia continues to inadequately implement health policy and maintain the medical system.

Russian Occupation Update, May 5, 2025  

Click here to read the full report

Authors: Nate Trotter, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and Karolina Hird

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is forcibly deporting Ukrainian civilians from occupied Ukraine to Russia while engaging in a deeply systematic and institutionalized policy of torture against Ukrainians held in Russian detention.
• Russian reconstruction efforts in occupied Mariupol are leaving tens of thousands of residents displaced and homeless.
• Russian plans to deport at least 300 children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to the Chuvashia Republic during Summer 2025.
• Russia continues to use logistics and infrastructure projects to forcibly integrate Ukraine into its sphere of influence.

Russia is forcibly deporting Ukrainian civilians from occupied Ukraine to Russia while engaging in a deeply systematic and institutionalized policy of torture against Ukrainians held in Russian detention. The Viktoriia Project, a journalism collective comprised of 13 media outlets including the Guardian, Le Monde, and the Washington Post, published an investigation on April 30 detailing Russia’s systematic use of torture against Ukrainian prisoners at 29 identified Russian-run prisons—18 in Russia and 11 in occupied Ukraine.[1] The investigation found that Russia is holding a majority of the 16,000 detained Ukrainian civilians for months or years without any formal charges except the allegation of “opposing the special military operation” at as many as 180 separate sites in occupied Ukraine and Russia, including the prison in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, where Russia tortured and killed Ukrainian investigative journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna (after whom the Viktoriia Project is named).[2] The Viktoriia Project also found that Russia has used 695 separate forms of torture, resulting in multiple fatalities at these facilities. ISW previously reported that Russian agents are likely conducting systematic Soviet-era torture practices, including beatings, humiliation, electric shocks, and dog attacks against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians detained in occupied territories and Russia.[3] Legal experts told the Viktoriia Project that there is no official crime in the Russian legal code for “opposing the special military operation,” highlighting the apparent illegality of these actions even under Russian domestic law. Russia’s mass imprisonment of Ukrainians on legally dubious grounds likely also violates international legal prohibitions on arbitrary detention and deprivation of liberty and may additionally constitute illegal deportation, as Russia is removing Ukrainians from their homes to Russian-controlled institutions en masse.[4] Russia is a signatory to the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits both the forcible transfer/removal and the deportation of occupied populations by the occupying power.[5]

Russian reconstruction efforts in occupied Mariupol are leaving tens of thousands of residents displaced and homeless. Russian independent investigative outlet Bumaga reported on April 30 that it will take Russia at least 18 more years to fully “restore” Mariupol, despite frequent promises that Russia would rebuild the city by 2025.[6] Bumaga found that Russia is building the “Leningradsky Kvartal” residential complex in occupied Mariupol on the basis of demolished older housing and intends to sell apartments in the complex exclusively to Russian citizens, thereby displacing thousands of people who previously lived there. Residents of occupied Mariupol estimate that over 18,000 people lack housing—an issue that is apparently exacerbated by Russia’s preferential treatment of Russian expatriates who are now moving en masse to Mariupol in exchange for preferential mortgages and newly renovated properties.[7] Bugama also noted that Russian authorities are depriving residents of housing by declaring property “ownerless” and transferring it to state control, which is consistent with previous reports of how Russia is seizing private property to facilitate the relocation of Russians to occupied Ukraine, generate profit from the occupation of Ukraine, and consolidate bureaucratic control over occupied areas.[8] Bumaga’s investigation found that Russia’s Leningrad Oblast has been funding reconstruction projects in Mariupol and sending construction “specialists” to the city to assist with building projects, consistent with ISW’s prior assessment that Russian federal subjects (regions) provide patronage assistance to occupied areas in order to strengthen administrative ties between Russia and occupied Ukraine.[9] Russian reconstruction projects in Mariupol are likely in violation of various international legal principles. Russia, as the occupying power, is legally required to ensure the provision of adequate housing and shelter to the occupied population.[10] International law also explicitly prohibits Russia, as the occupying power, from transferring its own population to areas of Ukraine that it occupies.[11] Russian reconstruction projects in Mariupol appear to be directly facilitating the latter violation.[12]

Russian plans to deport at least 300 children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to the Chuvashia Republic during Summer 2025. Russian media outlet MKRU Zaporizhia reported on April 28 that Russian occupation officials plan to send 300 Ukrainian children from occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, to the “Brigantina” and “Berezinka” summer camps in Chuvashia in Summer 2025.[13]  The government-funded “Brigantina” camp charter states that the camp propagates Russian “spiritual, moral, civil patriotic, military patriotic, and labor education” in line with the rules and regulation of the Russian Federation.[14] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation officials have patronage ties with Chuvashia that facilitate the deportation of Ukrainian children to the Republic under the guise of participation in summer camps.[15] Russian media reported on June 14, 2023 that Zaporizhia occupation officials planned to send 300 children from occupied Berdyansk to Chuvashia in Summer 2023.  ISW previously assessed that Russia will escalate the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of summer camps in the coming months.[16]

Russia continues to use logistics and infrastructure projects to forcibly integrate Ukraine into its sphere of influence. First Deputy General Director of the Russian Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Novorossiya Railways” Oleg Kalevatykh announced on April 30 that Novorossiya Railways will start running trains through the Donetsk Railway Station in occupied Donetsk City for the first time since 2014 starting on May 9, coinciding with Victory Day.[17]  The affiliation of the railway station opening with Russia’s Victory Day holiday is likely an intentional effort on the part of the occupation administration to claim that it has improved the living conditions and lives of Ukrainians under Russian occupation despite the fact that Russia harmed Ukrainians’ living conditions when it invaded Ukraine. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin previously stated in March that the Donetsk Oblast occupation administration is preparing to launch the Donetsk – Volnovakha railway line, service of which stopped in 2014 with Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine.[18]  Novorossiya Railways already runs three lines through occupied Ukraine– the Donetsk branch, Luhansk branch, and Kherson-Melitopol branch (linking occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts). Russia previously announced plans in March to develop 441 kilometers of rail lines through occupied Kherson Oblast.[19] The Russian Federal Road Agency (Rosavotrans) additionally announced on April 30 that occupation officials are launching interregional bus routes connecting occupied Kherson oblast with occupied Crimea and Moscow via occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to simplify and encourage increased movement between Russia and occupied Ukraine.[20] The Crimean occupation Ministry of Transport previously reported that over 80,000 Ukrainians travelled by bus from occupied Crimea to occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts in 2024.[21] Russian-controlled or -built bus routes and railway lines in occupied Ukraine allow Russia to consolidate influence over occupied areas and will help facilitate population transfers within occupied Ukraine and enable Russia’s economic exploitation of occupied areas, as ISW previously assessed.[22]

Russian Occupation Update, May 1, 2025  

Click here to read the full report

Authors: Karolina Hird and Nate Trotter

Data cut-off: 10 am ET, April 30

Key Takeaways:

• Russia continues preparations to deport tens of thousands of Ukrainian children to summer camps across occupied Ukraine and Russia, including to areas of Crimea that are unsafe.
• Russia is systematically torturing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians held in Russian detention.
• Kremlin-linked and federally-funded youth organizations and educational initiatives continue to facilitate the indoctrination of Ukrainian children.
• Russia is installing Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine in occupation administrations as part of a wider initiative to militarize occupied Ukraine and strengthen Russian governance over occupied areas.
• The wife of a deceased Kherson Oblast occupation deputy launched a youth program aimed at encouraging high birth rates and Russian family values in occupied Kherson Oblast.

Russia continues preparations to deport tens of thousands of Ukrainian children to summer camps across occupied Ukraine and Russia, including to areas of Crimea that are unsafe. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported on April 28 that it plans to send 600 children from occupied Henichesk Raion to summer camps in the Adygea Republic throughout Summer 2025 for “recreation and rest.”[1] ISW previously observed reports of children from occupied Kherson Oblast, specifically from occupied Henichesk Raion, arriving at the Lan and Gornyi children’s camps in Kamennomostskii, Adygea Republic between 2022-2024, suggesting that these camps may have agreements with Kherson Oblast occupation authorities.[2] Kamennomostkskii is nearly 500km from occupied Henichesk. The Adygean Ministry of Labor previously claimed that Ukrainian children will experience “culture and the way of life of our Motherland” while at summer camps in Adygea—strongly emphasizing the fact that Russia uses such summer camps to indoctrinate Ukrainian children and propagate pro-Russian values.[3] Russian First Deputy Education Minister Alexander Bugayev stated on April 27 that about 53,000 Ukrainian children will “spend their summer holidays” at Russian summer camps throughout occupied Ukraine and the Russian Federation, likely including camps in Adygea Republic.[4] Summer camps on the coastline in occupied Crimea are likely to be physically unsafe for children, however, due to the lasting results of a December 2024 crash of Russian oil tankers in the Kerch Strait.[5] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov recently claimed that over 23,000 children from occupied Ukraine and Russia will attend over 380 summer camps in occupied Crimea in Summer 2025, despite concerns from Russian activists about persistent fuel contamination of beaches, including those near children’s camps.[6] The deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of participation in summer camps, regardless of the duration of their stay, is likely a violation of international law.[7] Russia, as the occupying power, is furthermore required to safeguard the health of occupied populations (particularly vulnerable populations such as children) and will be in violation of this responsibility if it sends children to unsafe areas that could pose health risks to children.[8]

Russia is systematically torturing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians held in Russian detention. The Ukrainian Media Initiative for Human Rights (MIHR) published a report on April 29 detailing how Russia has used Soviet-era torture practices, including beatings, humiliation, electric shocks, and dog attacks, against Ukrainian POWs and civilian prisoners.[9] MIHR based the report on the testimonies of 138 freed Ukrainian POWs who the Russians detained in 2022-2025. The report notably coheres with a UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (UN OHCHR) assessment from October 2024 that assessed that Russian authorities have subjected Ukrainian POWs to torture, ill-treatment, and inhumane conditions “in a widespread and systematic manner.”[10] The UN OHCHR report also noted that it is highly likely that the Russian military command is aware of the treatment of Ukrainian POWs and that Russian state entities may be coordinating the use of torture. UN High Commissioner on Human Rights Volker Türk noted that there is significant coordination on the poor treatment of the POWs and prisoners among various Russian entities, specifically the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN).[11] Russia’s abuse of Ukrainians in detention is notably not exclusive to POWs. The Ukrainian Ombudsman’s Office confirmed on April 28 that Russia is illegally detaining almost 16,000 civilians in occupied territories and at least 1,800 civilians in Russia, and it is likely that Russian agents are torturing many of these detainees.[12] Russia recently returned the body of Ukrainian journalist Viktoriya Roshchyna, whom Russia detained while she was investigating Russian detention centers in occupied Ukraine, with “extensive damage to the coronary arteries” and missing organs, a sign that Russian authorities were trying to obfuscate evidence of torture.[13]

Kremlin-linked and federally funded youth organizations and educational initiatives continue to facilitate the indoctrination of Ukrainian children. Teenage participants of the “Movement of the First” youth activism organization from Podove, occupied Kherson Oblast, visited Grozny, Chechyna on April 28 as part of the “More than a Journey” program.[14] The visit included memorial activities to commemorate the Chechen War and Akhmat Kadyrov, the father of the current Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov. The Russian “Youth and Children” project, which Russian President Vladimir Putin created in 2024, oversees and implements the “More than a Journey” program.[15] “Russian opposition outlet Mozhem Obyasnit published an investigation on April 22 that found that the “Youth and Children” project will provide Yunarmia (the Russian Young Cadets National Movement) with 800 million rubles in subsidies (nearly $10 million) in 2025, dispersed via the “Movement of the First” organization.[16] Mozhem Obyasnit also found that Yunarmia will receive 1 billion rubles ($12 million) in funding in 2025, the most it has received since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[17] The scale of Russian federal investment in militarization programs is noteworthy—all of these Russian organizations have active presences in Russia as well as in occupied Ukraine and militarize adolescents to prepare them for long-term service to the Russian state.[18] Russia uses these programs in occupied Ukraine to generate multi-generational buy-in for Russian rule via curated military-patriotic indoctrination projects.[19]

Russia is installing Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine in occupation administrations as part of a wider initiative to militarize occupied Ukraine and strengthen Russian governance over occupied areas. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on April 30 that 680 Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine passed the first stage of testing for state and municipal service in the Kherson Oblast occupation administration via the “Heroes of Kherson” program.[20] The 680 candidates will undergo another round of testing, after which the top 10 scorers will receive jobs in the Kherson Oblast occupation administration, and the remaining portion will be placed in the personnel reserve. Saldo initially launched the “Heroes of Kherson” project in February 2025 as an oblast-level analogue to Putin’s “Time of Heroes” project, which aims to install veterans of the war in Ukraine in various Russian government positions.[21] Similar selection processes are ongoing in occupied Luhansk Oblast through the “Heroes of Luhansk” program, as ISW recently reported.[22] The installation of Russian veterans who are loyal to the Kremlin into occupation administrations in Ukraine will further militarize occupied Ukraine and additionally strengthen the Kremlin’s control over local governance.

The wife of a deceased Kherson Oblast occupation deputy launched a youth program aimed at encouraging high birth rates and Russian family values in occupied Kherson Oblast. Oksana Stremousova, the wife of Kirill Stremousov, a Kherson Oblast occupation deputy who died in a reported car crash in November 2022, launched the “Family Traditions Workshop” program in occupied Kherson Oblast on April 29.[23] Stremousova’s project is “aimed at promoting family values and large families” by engaging with high school students in occupied Kherson Oblast.[24] Stremousova’s focus on encouraging Ukrainian teenagers to plan on having large families aligns with other efforts on the part of the Russian occupation administration to stimulate population growth in occupied Ukraine.[25] Stremousova’s program also seeks to teach Ukrainian teenagers about Russian traditions and norms for family life, thereby acting as another tool of Russification in occupied Ukraine. Stremousova appears to be advocating for the creation of a pro-Russian society in occupied Kherson Oblast in which Ukrainian girls grow up to be mothers who focus on raising several children to be loyal to Russia, and where boys grow up to serve the Russian state either militarily or politically.[26]

Russian Occupation Update, April 28, 2025  

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Authors: Jennie Olmsted and Karolina Hird

Data cut-off: 11am EST, April 27

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is once again preparing to escalate the forced removal and deportation of Ukrainian children during the upcoming summer months. A Russian official stated that about 53,000 children from occupied Ukraine will “spend their summer holidays” in children’s camps throughout occupied Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
• Russian preparations for Victory Day throughout occupied Ukraine emphasize Russia's continued weaponization of historical narratives to consolidate social control over occupied areas.
• Russia is further integrating occupied Ukraine into Russia’s wider governance system by re-distributing single-mandate constituencies.
  

Russia is once again preparing to escalate the forced removal and deportation of Ukrainian children during the upcoming summer months. Russian First Deputy Education Minister Alexander Bugayev stated on April 27 that about 53,000 children from occupied Ukraine will “spend their summer holidays” in children’s camps throughout occupied Ukraine and the Russian Federation.[1] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin noted on April 22 that his administration will send 2,500 children to the “Artek” camp (occupied Crimea),  the “Orlyonok” camp (Krasnodar Krai), the “Krasnaya Gvozdika” camp (occupied Zaporizhia Oblast), the “Smena” camp (Krasnodar Krai) and the “Alyye Parusa” camp (occupied Crimea), and will also continue to send teenagers aged 14 to 17 to Russia via the “University Shifts” program.[2] Pushilin also claimed that 13,000 children will “rest” (likely meaning attend various summer camps) in various Russian federal subjects (regions). ISW previously reported that Russia intends to deport 2,000 Ukrainian teenagers to Russia through the “University Shifts” program in 2025 alone.[3] International law notably differentiates between “forcible transfer/removal” and “deportation,” with “forcible transfer/removal” referring to occasions when the occupying power (in this case Russia) forcibly moves people within internationally-recognized national boundaries (in this case internationally-recognized Ukrainian territory), whereas “deportation” refers to the forced removal of individuals from outside of national boundaries.[4] Russian occupation authorities are both removing and deporting Ukrainian children to these summer camps, as ISW has previously assessed.[5] Both of these actions can rise to the level of a violation of international law.[6]
Such summer camps, whether in occupied Ukraine or in Russia, are re-education camps that aim to indoctrinate Ukrainian children through academic instruction, military training, and military-patriotic education. ISW has historically noticed an increase in the number of reported removals and deportations to such camps in the summer months, as Russian occupation officials are able to increasingly use the guise of summer vacation programs to facilitate the removals and deportations.[7]  The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) previously identified 43 such facilities, including 41 pre-existing summer camps in occupied Ukraine and Russia, which are involved in the removal/ deportation and re-education of Ukrainian children.[8] Occupation authorities are not only increasing the scale of these deportations but also institutionalizing them as part of a long-term strategy to separate Ukrainian children from their identity and more broadly Russify occupied Ukraine. These efforts are aligned with the Kremlin’s broader campaign to erase Ukrainian identity by assimilating the next generation of Ukrainians into a manufactured Russian national narrative that distorts Ukrainian historical memory, erases Ukrainian language, and conditions children to be loyal to the Russian state.

Russian preparations for Victory Day throughout occupied Ukraine emphasize Russia's continued weaponization of historical narratives to consolidate social control over occupied areas. Victory Day, celebrated on May 9, is Russia’s primary patriotic holiday and commemorates the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War, known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War. In preparation for Victory Day, Russian occupation governments are compelling Ukrainian residents of occupied areas to participate in events including the “Dictation of Victory,” a historical test on the Great Patriotic War comprised of 25 questions.[9] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on April 25 that occupation authorities administered the test to 9,400 participants at 208 locations in occupied Donetsk Oblast and additionally had Ukrainian children write letters to Russian frontline servicemembers.[10] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated on April 25 that 150 sites in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast took part in the test including  schools, universities, libraries, and various enterprises.[11] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on April 25 that upwards of 4,000 residents of occupied Kherson participated in “Dictation of Victory” at 126 locations across occupied Kherson Oblast (twice as many as in 2024) including in schools, museums, near monuments, at the former military airfield in Shotivka, and at the Askania-Nova nature reserve.[12] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration additionally announced on April 24 that occupied Kherson Oblast has joined the Russian “St. George Ribbon” campaign, held in the lead-up to Victory Day from April 24 to May 9, claiming that it unites “millions” of Russians.[13] The Kremlin has historically used Victory Day to present Russia as a protector against Nazism, a narrative the Kremlin has frequently invoked to justify its invasion of Ukraine and further militarize Russian society in the long term.[14] Russian occupation authorities use Victory Day and the narrative of the Great Patriotic War as a means of disseminating a Kremlin-approved and propagandized version of history to Ukrainians, part of a wider initiative to Russify and militarize occupied Ukraine.[15] Russian occupation authorities will use Victory Day programming in occupied Ukraine to disseminate pro-Russian histories and hyper militaristic ideals, while vilifying Ukrainian historical identity.

Russia is further integrating occupied Ukraine into Russia’s wider governance system by redistributing single-mandate constituencies. The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) approved a new scheme on April 25 that will re-distribute single-mandate constituencies throughout Russia and include them in occupied Ukraine.[16] The new scheme allocates seven of the existing 225 single-mandate constituencies to occupied Ukraine—three in Donetsk Oblast, two in Luhansk Oblast, and one each in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.[17] The re-distributed single-mandate constituency scheme will first be employed in the September 2026 State Duma elections, where 7 total representatives will be “elected” to the Duma from occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Russia created four single-mandate constituencies in Crimea during the 2016 and 2021 Duma “elections” following the 2014 occupation and annexation.[18] A prominent Russian insider source previously remarked on the redistricting plans for occupied Ukraine, claiming that they are “a logical continuation of [Ukraine’s] integration into the Russian system of governance.”[19] Russia will use this new constituency scheme in an attempt to legitimize its illegal occupation of Ukraine, much as it did with the introduction of single-mandate districts in Crimea in 2016 and 2021.[20] Residents of occupied areas will likely be forced or coerced into voting in 2026, and the Kremlin will then have the grounds to claim high voter turnout and popular local buy-in for Russian governance. Duma representatives are likely to be pro-Russian or Kremlin-sanctioned candidates, which will allow Russia even greater legislative control of occupied areas. ISW has reported at length on Russia’s pseudo-legal manipulations in occupied Ukraine, and assesses they are part of the Kremlin’s wider campaign to forcibly integrate Ukraine into Russia using Russian legislative levers.[21]

Russian Occupation Update, April 24, 2025

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Author: Karolina Hird 

Data cut-off: 1 pm EST, April 23

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is extracting economic benefits from occupied Ukraine by exploiting Ukrainian infrastructure and logistics networks.
• Despite Russia’s drive to exploit economic resources in occupied Ukraine, some Russian companies are struggling to properly manage coal mines in occupied Ukraine, likely putting residents of occupied areas near these mines at risk.
• Russia is actively recruiting teachers from throughout the Russian Federation to teach in occupied Luhansk Oblast as part of the “Zemskyi Uchitel” (“Rural Teacher”) program.

Russia is extracting economic benefits from occupied Ukraine by exploiting Ukrainian infrastructure and logistics networks. The Russian Federal Agency for Railway Transport (Roszheldor) announced on April 21 that the first container train carrying unspecified cargo travelled along the Russian “Novorossiya Railways” network through occupied Ukraine and arrived in occupied Sevastopol.[1] The train’s cargo will be unloaded at Sevastopol and exported via ship through Russian-occupied Black Sea ports to unspecified final destinations. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin signed an order in May 2023 creating “Novorossiya Railways” to unite rail lines in occupied Ukraine and Russia by merging them under the auspices of Roszheldor.[2] “Novorossiya Railways” currently operates three lines in occupied Ukraine: the Donetsk branch, the Luhansk branch, and the Kherson-Melitopol branch (linking occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts), all operated on the basis of railways that Ukraine controlled before the full-scale invasion in 2022.[3] Russia’s use of railways in occupied Ukraine supports two Russian objectives—first, to provide logistical support for Russian troops fighting in Ukraine via rail, which can be quicker and safer than logistical support by vehicles, and second, to transport various goods to Black Sea ports for maritime export.[4] Russia can use these railways to transport goods from Russia to ports in occupied Crimea without having to rely on the Kerch Strait Railway Bridge, which in recent years has been routinely non-operational due to Ukrainian long-range strikes, or to directly take resources from occupied Ukraine and export them to international markets. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Crimea service Krym Realii reported on April 21, for example, that Russia is using ports in occupied Kerch to export stolen Ukrainian liquified natural gas (LNG) and grain.[5] The Wall Street Journal found that Russia had sold nearly $1 billion in stolen Ukrainian grain as of September 2024, using railway lines and roads in occupied Ukraine to bring massive amounts of grain to occupied Black Sea ports for export.[6] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko similarly reported that Russia exported over 12,000 tons of coal via occupied Mariupol during the week of April 14-20 alone.[7]

Despite Russia’s drive to exploit economic resources in occupied Ukraine, some Russian companies are struggling to properly manage coal mines in occupied Ukraine, likely putting residents of occupied areas near these mines at risk. Russian business-focused state outlet RBK reported on April 21 that Russian companies Impex-Don LLC and Donskie Ugli Trading House LLC are ending their leases on nine coal mines in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and returning them to the occupation administrations due to high operating costs and low profits.[8] Both these companies began their leases for the nine mines in 2024. The Russian Federal State Budgetary Institution for the Reorganization and Liquidation of Unprofitable Mines (GURSH) will now oversee liquidating (in effect, shutting down) the nine mines. Russia has gone to great lengths to exploit Ukraine’s coal industry and the coal-rich Donetsk Basin, and reportedly exported over $288 million worth of coal from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts between 2014 and 2022.[9] This number has likely significantly increased since 2022, as Russia now has access to additional mines in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Russia was in the process of liquidating 114 coal mines in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as of September 2023.[10] Russia is likely liquidating these mines in part due to the mismanagement of coal mine infrastructure, and also due to volatile international markets. If GURSH fails to close down these coal mines properly, they may degrade in a way that will pose health and environmental risks to nearby communities, namely the Ukrainian residents of these occupied areas.[11]

Russia is actively recruiting teachers from throughout the Russian Federation to teach in occupied Luhansk Oblast as part of the “Zemskyi Uchitel” (“Rural Teacher”) program. “Zemskyi Uchitel” is a Russian program that selects teachers through a competitive application process and sends them to teach in small towns and villages with populations of less than 50,000 residents for a five-year period in order to compensate for teacher shortages in rural areas.[12] The Luhansk People’s Republic announced in early March that teachers who move to occupied Luhansk Oblast as part of “Zemskyi Uchitel” will receive two million rubles (about $24,000) in compensation.[13] “Zemskyi Uchitel” serves two parallel purposes, both of which strengthen Russia’s control over occupied Ukraine. First, the program further Russifies schools by using Russian teachers to teach Russian curricula in Ukrainian schools.[14] These teachers are likely only using government-approved lesson plans, which include the Kremlin’s revisionist view of Ukrainian history and are centered around pro-Russian military-patriotic ideals.[15] “Zemskyi Uchitel” teachers are also likely to further cut off schoolchildren’s access to Ukrainian-language education, which Russia has essentially destroyed throughout all of occupied Ukraine.[16] Second, “Zemskyi Uchitel” and other professional relocation programs facilitate the repopulation of areas of occupied Ukraine with Russian citizens. Russia has similarly used the “Zemskyi Postalyon” (“Rural Postal Service”) and “Zemskyi Doktor” (“Rural Doctor”) programs to relocate Russian postal workers and doctors to occupied Ukraine.[17] ISW previously assessed that Russia is offering employment opportunities to Russian citizens to encourage them to move to occupied Ukraine as part of the Kremlin’s larger project of repopulating Ukraine with Russian citizens from Russia.[18]

Russian Occupation Update, April 21, 2025  

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Key Takeaways:

• A recent BBC Verify investigation highlights the scale of Russia’s property seizures in occupied Mariupol, supporting ISW’s assessment of how Russian occupation officials are using bureaucratic tools to exert control over occupied Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continue efforts to surveil and securitize occupied Ukraine. The increased surveillance and securitization of occupied Ukraine are likely intended to encourage self-censorship and facilitate Russian occupation authorities' efforts to prosecute perceived anti-Russian sentiment.
• Russia continues to systemically violate the human rights of the residents in occupied Crimea.

A recent BBC Verify investigation highlights the scale of Russia’s property seizures in occupied Mariupol, supporting ISW’s assessment of how Russian occupation officials are using bureaucratic tools to exert control over occupied Ukraine.[1] The investigation, published on April 17, found that Russian occupation authorities have identified at least 5,700 Mariupol homes for seizure, most of which belong to individuals who either fled or died during Russia’s 2022 siege of the city. BBC Verify noted that Russian occupation authorities use a complicated bureaucratic process to seize properties they deem “ownerless,” which requires the owner to appear in occupied Mariupol within 10 days with a Russian passport and relevant ownership documents. If no owner appears before the occupation authorities within 30 days, the occupation administration begins the process of formally registering the property as “ownerless” and transferring it to city (occupation administration) ownership after three months. BBC Verify notably found that only residents of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) with Russian passports are eligible to take ownership of such seized homes under the current process in Mariupol, suggesting that this scheme is likely an effort to exert pressure specifically on residents of occupied Donetsk Oblast to obtain Russian citizenship. This policy may vary between occupation regimes, however. Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated on April 7 that Russian occupation authorities in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast are transferring seized property to Russian officials and military personnel as part of a campaign to repopulate occupied Ukraine with Russian citizens from Russia.[2] BBC Verify noted that ongoing property seizures in Mariupol appear to be part of a wider Russian effort to Russify the city, and cited satellite images showing the recent construction of a new naval academy and war memorial.[3]

The scale on which Russian authorities are seizing Ukrainian property is staggering. Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Oleksiy Kharchenko stated on April 19 that Russia has seized and nationalized over 114,000 properties in occupied Luhansk Oblast (likely since 2022).[4] Russian authorities transferred over 17,000 of these properties to the regional occupation administration, 46,000 properties to municipal-level occupation administrations, and 51,000 properties to the Russian federal government. ISW recently assessed that Russian property seizures throughout occupied Ukraine are part of the wider campaign to collect personal information on residents of occupied areas, forcibly passportize Ukrainian citizens, generate profit from the occupation of Ukraine, and facilitate the relocation of Russian citizens to occupied Ukraine from Russia.[5]

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to surveil and securitize occupied Ukraine. Crimea occupation governor Sergei Aksyonov reported on April 17 that his administration will begin implementing an “intelligent video surveillance system” to “increase the level of public safety, law and order, and anti-terrorist activity” in occupied Crimea.[6] Aksyonov noted that the surveillance system will collect videos and use artificial intelligence (AI) to process them before sending data to Russian law enforcement agents. Russia has employed similar systems to track domestic dissent and has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on installing surveillance cameras in occupied Crimea to track pro-Ukrainian partisan activity.[7] Physical video surveillance is just one layer of a more complex Russian system meant to surveil the activities of residents of the occupied areas—Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor issued a decree on March 31 that will require telecommunications operators to continuously collect and send information about users’ internet activities to Russian federal control bodies, including IP addresses and geolocation data.[8] The March 31 Roskomnadzor decree may be linked to the recent arrest of a resident of occupied Simferopol, whom the Russian State Security Service (FSB) accused on April 18 of posting anti-Russian content on an online chat room.[9]

Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on April 18 that the Russian “AN-SECURITY” private security company has “monopolized” the provision of security services in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[10] Andryushchenko noted that “AN-SECURITY” has personal links to Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov and former DNR Science and Education Minister Olga Koludarova, suggesting that Koludarova used her connections to Zolotov to import this private security firm to occupied Donetsk Oblast. “AN-SECURITY” has several active job listings on its website advertising work at schools and other educational institutions in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[11] Russia has already militarized most schools in occupied Ukraine, and the presence of private security personnel will only add to that dynamic and increase pressure on residents to act supportively towards the occupation regime. The increased surveillance and securitization of occupied Ukraine is likely intended to encourage self-censorship and facilitate Russian occupation authorities' efforts to prosecute perceived anti-Russian sentiment.

Russia continues to systemically violate the human rights of the residents in occupied Crimea. The Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), a Crimean-based human rights monitoring group, released a report on April 18 documenting Russian human rights violations in occupied Crimea between January and March 2025.[12] The report detailed Russia’s enforced disappearances of Ukrainian citizens, politically motivated persecution of minority groups such as Crimean Tatars and Jehovah’s Witnesses, and violations of freedom of speech and expression. CHRG noted that Russian occupation officials persistently prosecute residents of occupied Crimea for perceived pro-Ukrainian or anti-Russian stances and reported that it has documented at least 1,152 administrative proceedings against Ukrainians for “discrediting the Russian army” since 2022, including 159 such cases in 2025.[13] CHRG also found that Russian occupation authorities continue to coerce Ukrainians to serve in the Russian military and documented at least 23 cases of Crimean residents facing criminal cases for “evading military service.”[14] Crimean Tatars continue to bear the brunt of Russian oppressions in occupied Crimea—the Crimean Tatar Resource Center (CTR) reported on April 17 that in the first three months of 2025, Russian law enforcement authorities conducted 13 forcible searches of personal homes in occupied Crimea, seven of which were against Crimean Tatar homes.[15] CTR also found that Russian authorities illegally detained 38 individuals in Crimea between January and March 2025, 12 of whom were Crimean Tatars.[16]

Russian Occupation Update, April 17, 2025  

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Author: Karolina Hird 

Data cut-off: 12:30 pm EST, April 16

Key takeaways:  

• Russian officials continue to advertise programs that deport and Russify Ukrainian children and teenagers.
• The Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU) formally lodged a complaint against the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) over the issue of Russia’s forced passportization and adoption of Ukrainian children.
• Zaporizhia Oblast occupation authorities appear to be cracking down against Ukrainian employees of the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), using fabricated criminal cases to punish them for pro-Ukrainian sentiment.
• Russia is using an administrative “road safety” law to force residents of occupied Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship.

Russian officials continue to advertise programs that deport and Russify Ukrainian children and teenagers. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin held a meeting with Russian deputy prime ministers on April 14 and discussed the “University Shifts” program—a program that takes children aged 14–17 from occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson to Russian university campuses and summer camps for “educational” experiences.[1] Mishustin noted that over 2,000 Ukrainian children will participate in “University Shifts” in Summer 2025 and reported that the Russian government has allocated 150 million rubles ($1.8 million) to funding this program. Mishustin also emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin gave the “University Shifts” program his blessing with the acknowledgement that it exposes Ukrainian children to Russian values, traditions, and culture—suggesting that this is one of many programs that the Russian government is using to Russify Ukrainian youth. The Russian Ministry of Education and Science and the “Movement of the First” military-patriotic youth organization jointly founded the “University Shifts” program in 2022 and has since facilitated the deportation and Russification of tens of thousands of Ukrainian children—10.6 thousand in 2022, 10.7 thousand in 2023, and over 12 thousand in 2023.[2] “University Shifts” also likely prepares Ukrainian teenagers for eventual admission into Russian universities, which further separates them from their Ukrainian identities, families, and homes and further integrates them into the Russian Federation.

Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Deputy Chairperson Larisa Tolstykina also advertised the “Cultural Map 4+85” program on April 11, noting that this program will take over 3,000 Ukrainian children from occupied Donetsk Oblast to Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-on-Don, and Kazan between April and October 2025 to participate in “cultural exchanges.”[3] “Cultural Map 4+85” brands itself as a “cultural and educational” program for Ukrainian children, but emphasizes that its goal is to “become an effective mechanism for the socio-cultural rehabilitation and integration of children into a single Russian society.”[4] ISW previously assessed that Russia is deporting Ukrainian children and exposing them to pro-Russian indoctrination using multiple schemes, including educational programs such as “Cultural Map 4+85” and “University Shifts.”[5]

The Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU) formally lodged a complaint against the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) over the issue of Russia’s forced passportization and adoption of Ukrainian children.[6] The UHHRU complaint, initially lodged in 2023 and then published on April 14, 2025, is written on behalf 10 Ukrainian children aged 12 to 16 years old, all of whom are orphans from Crimea.  The complaint notes that the children were wards of the Ukrainian state at the time of Russia’s illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014, and that the Russian government refused Ukraine’s requests to return the children to territory controlled by Ukraine and instead began the process of issuing them Russian citizenship. Crimean occupation authorities notably put the children up for adoption, and their whereabouts are currently unknown since the children disappeared from publicly-available adoption sites—which the UHHRU noted could mean that they have been adopted by Russian families. The ECHR previously agreed with allegations that Russia was violating international law by imposing Russian citizenship on residents of occupied Crimea, and UHHRU is seeking to apply this principle to the case of these 10 Ukrainian children.[7] The UHHRU complaint highlights a trend that ISW has observed for several years—Russia is placing vulnerable Ukrainian children up for adoption into Russian families and forcibly granting them Russian citizenship, which makes it much harder for Ukrainian authorities to identify these children and advocate for their return.[8]

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation authorities appear to be cracking down against Ukrainian employees of the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), using fabricated criminal cases to punish them for pro-Ukrainian sentiment. Ukrainian Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov reported on April 15 that the Russian-controlled Zaporizhia Oblast Court sentenced Liliya Kachkareva, a civilian ZNPP employee, to 14 years in prison for “high treason” for allegedly sending money to the Ukrainian armed forces in 2024.[9] Orlov noted that Russian occupation officials have increasingly been prosecuting female employees of the ZNPP and other Russian-occupied energy facilities under similar charges. Russian law enforcement authorities were holding at least 13 ZNPP employees in arbitrary detention on dubious charges as of April 1, 2025.[10] The locations and conditions of many of these employees remains unknown. Russian occupation courts frequently fabricate “terrorism,” “espionage,” or “treason” charges against Ukrainian residents of occupied areas in order to punish them for the expression of perceived pro-Ukrainian or anti-Russian views.[11] Russian occupation officials may be pushing for increased sentences against ZNPP employees in order to replace Ukrainian employees with Russian employees—thereby consolidating Russia’s control over the occupied ZNPP.

Russia is using an administrative road safety law to force residents of occupied Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship. The Russian federal law “On Road Safety,” which the Russian government initially amended in July 2023, began requiring Russian drivers’ licenses to drive in occupied Ukraine and the Russian Federation as of April 1, 2025.[12] Residents of occupied Crimea and Zaporizhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts who do not have Russian drivers’ licenses and maintain either Ukrainian licenses or licenses issued by the Donetsk and Luhansk peoples’ republics (DNR and LNR) must now apply for a Russian license by January 1, 2026 using a simplified procedure that the Russian government codified in December 2022. This simplified procedure requires residents of occupied Ukraine to obtain Russian drivers’ licenses by submitting a Russian passport or residence documents, but without taking a driving exam.[13] The Ukrainian Resistance Center responded to this development by calling it “passportization on wheels” and noted that it is another Russian occupation scheme intended to pressure residents of occupied areas into receiving Russian documentation.[14] Russian occupation officials are likely to use this road safety law to further coerce passportization, as residents will need to obtain Russian citizenship in order to maintain their ability to drive by getting Russian passports. The road safety law will also allow Russian occupation officials to collect personal data on residents of occupied areas, which they can later use against residents in the case of dissent or non-compliance with the occupation regime.

Russian Occupation Update, April 14, 2025  

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Author: Karolina Hird 

Data cut-off: 11:15am EST, April 13

Key takeaways:  

• Russia is using occupied Ukraine to support its domestic drone development and production industry.
• Russia is also integrating Ukrainian children into its wider drone operator training and drone production ecosystem.
• Russian occupation administrators are implementing projects to increase the birth rate in occupied Ukraine and further Russia’s illegitimate claims to the territories it illegally occupies.
• Russia is deporting Ukrainian prisoners from prisons in occupied Ukraine to penal colonies throughout the Russian Federation.

Russia is using occupied Ukraine to support its domestic drone development and production industry. The Ukrainian Eastern Human Rights Group (EHRG) and Institute for Strategic Research and Security (ISRS) released a report on April 3 detailing how Russia is using land, infrastructure, and people in occupied Ukraine to expand drone development, production, and operator training.[1] EHRG and ISRS reported that Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec has seized the Luhansk Aircraft Repair Plant (occupied Luhansk City, Luhansk Oblast) and the Snizhne Machine-Building Plant (occupied Snizhne, Donetsk Oblast) and is producing drones at both enterprises.[2] The report noted that Russia is also using the Donbas Development Corporation, Vladimir Zhoga Republican Center for Unmanned Systems, LLC 3D-Techno, LLC NPO Front, LLC NPO Utesov, GC Almaz, and IP Grigoriadiadis (all in occupied Donetsk City) and the JSC Pervomaiske Mechanical Plant (occupied Pervomaiske, Luhansk Oblast) to produce components and assemble drone models for the Russian army. Russia is also using occupied Ukrainian land to build new drone training grounds, start technological preparatory courses in schools and colleges to train drone operators, and create new research and development centers. The Kremlin has routinely signaled its commitment to increasing Russian drone production capabilities and improving drone operations on the battlefield in Ukraine and appears to have plans to integrate Ukrainian infrastructure and production capabilities into its wider drone production campaign.[3]

Russia is also integrating Ukrainian children into its wider drone operator training and drone production ecosystem. The EHRG and ISRS report emphasized that Russia has instituted drone training curricula for over 10,000 teenagers in secondary schools throughout occupied Ukraine.[4] Primary school-aged children are also subjected to drone training in schools and extracurricular programs.[5] Russia incentivizes children’s participation in drone training in part by “gamifying” the process and holding drone racing competitions throughout occupied Ukraine. The Kherson Oblast occupation Sports Ministry, for example, hosted its first drone racing tournament for children aged eight to 14 in occupied Skadovsk in May 2024.[6] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also previously reported that Russian officials began a “special engineering class” in occupied Mariupol’s School 47 to teach students how to design and manufacture drones for the Russian army.[7] Russian efforts to integrate Ukrainian children into drone production and operator training programs serve three main purposes: first to militarize Ukrainian children by exposing them to hyper-militarized ideals from a young age; second, to prepare Ukrainian children for potential future service in the Russian armed forces; and third, to support Russia’s domestic defense industrial base (DIB) output.

Russian occupation administrators are implementing projects to increase the birth rate in occupied Ukraine in order to stimulate population growth and further Russia’s illegitimate claims to the territories it illegally occupies. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky reported on April 11 that he issued draft orders for a regional program to increase the birth rate in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] The specifics of the proposed regional program are unclear, but Balitsky’s proposal is consistent with other projects that Russian occupation officials have undertaken to encourage population growth in occupied areas.[9] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on April 11 that Russia plans to reopen all kindergartens in occupied Kherson Oblast by 2030 and build 55 new preschools for 6,700 children by 2044.[10] Saldo noted that the planned new preschools “are designed for [to accommodate] population growth.”

Russia has been reckoning with a demographic crisis at home for several decades, caused by declining birthrates, relatively lower life expectancies, high emigration levels, and an aging population.[11] The war in Ukraine has exacerbated many of these factors, but Russia continues efforts to stimulate population growth to overcome pre-existing and new demographic challenges.[12] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s occupation of Ukraine is intended in part to offset Russia’s demographic decline, as Russia sees Ukrainian citizens as a demographic asset that can be forcibly integrated into the Russian Federation.[13] Russian occupation authorities have historically used methods such as the provision of social services like maternity capital (one-time payments made to women for the birth or adoption of a child beyond their first) to encourage higher birth rates in occupied Ukraine.[14] Higher birthrates in occupied areas mean that Russian occupation authorities will grant more Russian citizenships and raise a generation of children under Russian rule—ultimately creating the false impression that Russia has a right to these illegally occupied areas due to the prevalence of Russian citizens living there.

Russia is deporting Ukrainian prisoners from prisons in occupied Ukraine to penal colonies throughout the Russian Federation. Russian independent investigative outlet Mozhem Obyasnit (We Can Explain) published a story on April 11 examining how Russia has deported over 1,800 prisoners from Ukraine to penal colonies in Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion.[15] Mozhem Obyasnit found that Russian forces deported the prisoners from Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts in the early days of the invasion and interned them in at least 11 penal colonies in Krasnodar Krai, Rostov Oblast, the Mordovia Republic, and occupied Crimea. Deported prisoners reported that Russian guards beat and tortured them for being Ukrainian. Russian guards also reportedly attempt to bribe Ukrainian prisoners with shorter and more lenient sentences if they take Russian passports — suggesting that Russian efforts to deport Ukrainian prisoners are part of Russia’s larger passportization campaign. Ukrainian human rights groups have previously raised concerns about Russia’s treatment of deported prisoners and noted that Russia has purposefully made it very difficult for Ukraine to repatriate these individuals.[16] All of the prisoners that Russia has deported are Ukrainian citizens whom Ukrainian courts convicted of crimes under Ukrainian criminal law, so Russia has no legal basis on which to deport or re-convict these individuals, much less to forcibly change their citizenship.[17]

Russian Occupation Update, April 10, 2025

Click here to read the full report

Author: Karolina Hird

Data cut-off: 1pm EST April 9

Key takeaways:  

• Russian occupation administrations are seizing property throughout occupied Ukraine.
• Russia continues to crack down against the Crimean Tatar community in occupied Crimea, often using dubious legal charges to prosecute and detain Crimean Tatars.
• Children throughout occupied Ukraine are taking part in the “Zarnitsa 2.0” military-patriotic game—a revived Soviet-era war game aimed at training youth in basic military skills in eventual preparation for service in the Russian military. 

Russian occupation administrations are seizing property throughout occupied Ukraine in order to collect personal information on residents of occupied areas, conduct coerced passportization, and facilitate the relocation of Russian citizens to occupied areas of Ukraine. The Mariupol City occupation administration published updated lists on April 4 and 7 of residential and non-residential properties in Mariupol classified as “ownerless.”[1] The administration instructs residents of Mariupol to submit an application to the occupation Housing and Utilities Department within 30 days of the lists’ publication in order to have ownership restored. The Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration similarly reported in late March that it is checking properties throughout occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to determine ownership status.[2] The Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration directed residents of occupied areas to present a Russian passport and other documentation to claim ownership of any property classified as “ownerless.”

Ukrainian officials immediately voiced concerns about the Russian property inventory process. Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Administration Head Ivan Fedorov noted that Russian officials “nationalize” property that they have determined to be “ownerless,” and then auction off property to make a profit.[3] Fedorov also noted that, in some cases, Russian occupation administrators will sell the "stolen" property to Russian soldiers, occupation officials, and other Russian citizens, regardless of whether a Ukrainian resident legally owns the property or not. The Ukrainian Resistance Center suggested that this issue is particularly acute in Mariupol, reporting that the number of properties registered as “ownerless” and nationalized by the occupation administration in 2024 was 5.5 times higher than in 2023.[4] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko also suggested that Russian officials often falsify ownership documents and property titles in order to deprive  Ukrainians of their homes.[5]

Russian occupation officials are likely seizing and nationalizing property in occupied Ukraine to accomplish three objectives. First, the mass nationalization of Ukrainian property lets the Russian government directly profit from the occupation of Ukraine’s towns and cities. The Russian occupation administration in Crimea made an estimated 4.8 billion rubles ($56 million) from nationalizing Ukrainian property in Crimea between 2022 and 2024 alone, for example.[6] Russia can benefit greatly from extracting economic value from occupied Ukraine to support its struggling domestic economy, as ISW has previously observed.[7] Second, the process of registering properties as “ownerless” facilitates personal data collection and supports passportization efforts. Residents of properties that the occupation administration has classified as “ownerless” must present personal information and documentation to occupation authorities to restore their ownership. The registration process also requires people to present Russian passports, meaning that residents may feel pressured to obtain Russian citizenship out of fear of losing their homes.[8] Finally, the seizure of property from Ukrainian residents allows Russian occupation administrations to give that property to Russian citizens, facilitating the illegal relocation of Russian citizens to occupied areas of Ukraine from Russia.[9]

Russia continues to crack down against the Crimean Tatar community in occupied Crimea, often using dubious legal charges to prosecute and detain Crimean Tatars. The Russian Southern District Court in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, requested 17 years imprisonment in a maximum-security penal colony for a group of six Crimean Tatar men from occupied Dzhankoi on April 8.[10] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and other law enforcement agents detained the men during a raid in January 2023 on “terrorist” charges due to their alleged involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir—an international pan-Islamic fundamentalist organization that has historically been active in Central Asia and Crimea and that is banned in Russia. Crimean human rights organizations that reviewed the case materials of the “Dzhankoi Six” noted that there was no evidence that the men were planning for or preparing to commit any sort of terror attack and that the Russian occupation administration is prosecuting them because of their Crimean Tatar identities and their involvement in Muslim community organizations.[11]

The Crimean occupation administration has frequently targeted Crimean Tatar communities on tenuous “terrorism” charges, promoting the claim that Crimean Tatar identity is inherently dangerous by affiliating it with Hizb ut-Tahrir.[12] The Russian occupation Supreme Court of Crimea additionally sentenced another Crimean Tatar man to five years in prison on April 4 on the charge of communicating with the Ukrainian military.[13] Chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis Refat Chubarov warned on April 1 that the FSB launched a new wave of mass searches and repressive actions against Crimean Tatars, breaking into homes and seizing personal documents from various Crimean Tatar households.[14]

Children throughout occupied Ukraine are taking part in the “Zarnitsa 2.0” military-patriotic game—a revived Soviet-era war game aimed at training youth in basic military skills in eventual preparation for service in the Russian military. “Zarnitsa 2.0” brands itself as an “all-Russian military-patriotic game in a qualitatively new, modern format using digital technologies,” intended to teach children aged seven to 17 “traditional values” and “modern challenges” such as cyber warfare and drone operations.[15] Children and youth registered in “Zarnitsa 2.0” create squad-sized “detachments” that compete against other “detachments” for points and ranking on a national leaderboard, which notably includes teams from occupied Ukraine. “Zarnitsa 2.0” is a creation of the Russian Movement of the First and Yunarmia (Young Army Cadets National Movement) youth military-patriotic movements, both of which have active presences in occupied Ukraine and strive to militarize Ukrainian youth via various military-patriotic education and training courses.[16] The municipal (city-level) stage of “Zarnitsa 2.0” competitions is currently underway in Russia and occupied Ukraine until April 16.[17] “Zarnitsa 2.0” competitions concluded in some towns in occupied Luhansk Oblast on April 9, including in occupied Bilovodsk and Sverdlovsk.[18] Over 12,000 youth from occupied Luhansk Oblast alone reportedly registered for “Zarnitsa 2.0” in February and March 2025.[19] “Zarnitsa 2.0” is part of a wider Russian ecosystem operating throughout occupied Ukraine with the explicit purpose of militarizing Ukrainian children, indoctrinating them against their Ukrainian identities, and training them to fight for the Russian military against their fellow Ukrainians.[20]