Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 10, 2023, 7:00pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Wagner Group continues to maintain a presence at facilities in Belarus and the status of its rumored withdrawal to Russia remains unclear. Satellite imagery collected on August 9 shows a significant number of vehicles at the Wagner camp in Tsel, Asipovichy, Belarus, and may even indicate that more vehicles have arrived at the base between August 1 and August 9.[1] Ukrainian sources continue to report about expanding Wagner activity in Brest Oblast, and a Wagner-affiliated source posted footage on August 10 showing that Wagner instructors continue to train Belarusian military personnel.[2] The Wagner-affiliated source amplified a denial from an alleged Wagner fighter wherein the fighter stated that the speculations are “fantasies,” although he acknowledged that many Wagner fighters themselves often do not learn about their deployments until the last moment.[3] ISW has not observed counter-indicators that would refute recent speculation from August 8 that Wagner bussed 500 to 600 personnel from Belarus to Krasnodar Krai and Voronezh and Rostov oblasts, however.[4] Russian sources speculated that Wagner forces plan to conduct the second stage of their alleged withdrawal from Belarus on August 13 but that a small group of Wagner instructors would remain in Belarus to train Belarusian forces.[5]

Source: Planet Labs

Source: Planet Labs

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has yet to comment on these speculations either directly or through intermediary sources as he has done previously, suggesting that Prigozhin may not be entirely at liberty to comment on the future of Wagner. Prigozhin was last publicly seen on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa Economic Humanitarian Forum in St. Petersburg on July 27 and most recently commented on Wagner‘s future in an audio recording published on July 30, during which he asserted that Wagner fighters who did not sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would arrive in Belarus by August 5.[6] ISW previously assessed that the speculation about Wagner’s withdrawal from Belarus suggested that the Kremlin may be reneging on elements of the agreement brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko that brought Wagner’s June 24 rebellion to an end.[7] Kremlin-affiliated sources renewed attacks against Prigozhin in early August, and the speculation itself may be a part of an information operation aimed at degrading Prigozhin’s position with Wagner fighters or at some other objective.[8]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut, Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area), and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[9] Geolocated footage published on August 10 suggests that Ukrainian forces crossed the Mokri Yaly River and advanced eastward into the southwestern outskirts of Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved partial successes in the direction of Urozhaine and south and southeast of Staromayroske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[11]

A Russian milblogger accused Russian military personnel of fabricating or embellishing claims of Russian forces destroying Ukrainian vehicles in Ukraine. The milblogger claimed on August 7 that the ”Soviet system of military service” encourages Russian servicemen to report false successes on their missions to please their commanders and claimed that commanders and peers actively discourage Russian military personnel from writing honest, but “dull” and negative reports.[12] The milblogger suggested that Russian soldiers have filmed Russian helicopters and artillery firing on the same, previously damaged Western-provided armored fighting vehicle from different angles and on different days and reported them as separate kills at least three times.[13] The milblogger claimed that everyone in the Russian military knows that servicemen do this and that the Russian military leadership has no intention of stopping servicemen from making false or embellished reports.[14] Russian milbloggers have previously accused Russian attack helicopters of striking already destroyed Ukrainian military equipment and suggested that the Russian MoD may be using these repeated hits to inflate Ukrainian losses.[15] The Kremlin has previously used wildly inflated Ukrainian armored vehicle losses to portray Russian defensive operations as extremely effective.[16]

Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes in Ukraine overnight on August 9-10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Zaporizhia Oblast officials reported that Russian forces conducted an Iskander missile strike against a residential area in Zaporizhzhia City, injuring 16 civilians.[17] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces targeted Ukraine with 10 Shahed 131 and 136 drones, seven of which Ukrainian forces shot down.[18] Rivne Oblast Regional Administration Head Vitaly Koval reported that a Russian drone struck an oil depot in Dubno Raion, Rivne Oblast.[19]

The Kremlin is likely attempting to crypto-nationalize Russian internet giant Yandex to strengthen control over the Russian information space in preparation for the 2024 Russian presidential election. Yandex has likely been trying to balance between the Kremlin and its foreign governing bodies but now appears to be losing the battle to the Kremlin. The Kremlin appears to be forcing Yandex to sell or distance itself from international subsidiaries, including rideshare service Yango Israel, in order to comply with strict Russian data disclosure laws requiring Yandex to supply all user data – not just data of users in Russia – to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).[20] The Russian government has previously fined Yandex for failing to comply with this law despite Yandex’s statements that it is unable to provide the requested data.[21] The Russian government also previously fined Yandex CEO Artem Savinovsky for Yandex’s failure to comply with Russian censorship laws, possibly trying to compel Yandex into complying with Russian censorship laws not just in Russia but globally to undermine its global operations and userbase.[22] Yandex officials have previously stated that Yandex aims to follow the laws within each country it operates and have rebuked Russian datamining efforts by claiming it only provides user data to governments of users in that specific country.[23] Some Russian insider sources speculated that Yandex corporate development advisor Alexey Kudrin attempted and failed to turn Yandex into a national private company that Putin’s reported personal banker Yuri Kovalchuk would control.[24] Yandex founder and former CEO Arkady Volozh publicly decried the invasion of Ukraine on August 10, and some Russian insider sources speculated that Volozh’s statement was a “white flag” showing that he had accepted that the Kremlin would likely go forward with its speculated formal nationalization effort.[25] Reuters reported that its sources within Yandex fear a “brain drain” if the Kremlin nationalizes Yandex, as many Yandex employees left Russia following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[26] The Kremlin is likely aware of this concern as investors affiliated with Kremlin officials rather than Russian government entities have recently made bids to purchase Yandex.[27]

The possible transfer of Yandex to affiliates of Russian First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko suggests that Putin seeks to reward Kiriyenko for his personal loyalty, particularly following the June 24 Wagner Group rebellion. Russian opposition outlet Meduza previously suggested that Kovalchuk, Kudrin, and Kiriyenko collaborated to propose a deal for investors to purchase Yandex on behalf of Kovalchuk.[28] Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk previously backed Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin; while their current connection to Prigozhin is unclear, Kiriyenko has continued to publicly posture himself as a firm Putin loyalist following the June 24 rebellion.[29] Putin may be rewarding Kiriyenko to further secure Kiriyenko’s loyalty headed into the 2024 presidential elections, particularly as Kiriyenko has served as the Kremlin’s point person for affairs and elections in occupied Ukraine.[30]

Affiliates of arrested former Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin continue to explicitly attack the Kremlin on August 10. “Civic Solidarity” movement leader and Angry Patriots Club member Georgiy Fedorov, amplified by Girkin’s Angry Patriots’ Club, proposed a platform of radical social and economic policy reforms aimed at decreasing economic inequality and the power of the elite in Russia.[31] The proposed policy changes include reduced funding for the entire state apparatus “starting with the President,” the implementation of fair, competitive elections at all levels, and the formation of a “truly independent judiciary.”[32] Fedorov notably called for the resignation of the current Russian government and the formation of a new coalition government in its place.[33] Fedorov claimed that these reforms will lead to “democratic socialism” in Russia and will remove oligarchs and the “influence of money on politics.”[34]

Key Takeaways:

• The Wagner Group continues to maintain a presence at facilities in Belarus and the status of its rumored withdrawal to Russia remains unclear.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has yet to comment on these speculations either directly or through intermediary sources as he has done previously, suggesting that Prigozhin may not be entirely at liberty to comment on the future of Wagner.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 10.
• A Russian milblogger accused Russian military personnel of fabricating or embellishing claims of Russian forces destroying Ukrainian vehicles in Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes in Ukraine overnight on August 9-10.
• The Kremlin is likely attempting to crypto-nationalize Russian internet giant Yandex to strengthen control over the Russian information space in preparation for the 2024 Russian presidential election.
• The possible transfer of Yandex to affiliates of Russian First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko suggests that Putin seeks to reward Kiriyenko for his personal loyalty, particularly following the June 24 Wagner Group rebellion.
• Affiliates of arrested former Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin continue to explicitly attack the Kremlin on August 10.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 10 and made some advances.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 10.
• Russian officials continue to highlight the claimed success of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• A Ukrainian military official reported that Russian forces are co-opting civilian infrastructure for the repression of local populations in the occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and reportedly advanced on August 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks north of Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and near Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[35] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces are trying to seize the initiative in the Kupyansk direction and that Ukrainian forces have significantly strengthened defenses in the area in recent days.[36] The Russian MoD claimed that assault detachments of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces improved their tactical situation along the front line during offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction.[37] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that Russian elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) captured five Ukrainian strongholds near Vilshana (14km northeast of Kupyansk).[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the initiative in the Kupyansk direction and are conducting offensive operations near Synkivka, Vilshana, and Lyman Pershi (11km northeast of Kupyansk).[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to positions 7km away from Kupyansk in the Synkivka area and are also advancing in the direction of Kamianka (33km northeast of Kupyansk) and Dvorichna (16km northeast of Kupyansk).[40] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces withdrew from unspecified positions in the Synkivka area and that Russian forces are advancing after Ukrainian forces retreated towards Kupyansk.[41] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) between August 8 and 9 and that they hold positions within 4km of the R-79 (Kupyansk to Dvorichna) highway.[42] The milblogger speculated that Russian forces are attempting to capture positions along the Synkivka-Petropavlivka-Kucherivka line (up to 7km east of Kupyansk) and plan to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) along the R-79 highway to threaten Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk.[43] ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Russian forces making these recent advances in the Kupyansk direction and currently assesses that the closest Russian positions to Kupyansk are roughly 10km northeast of the settlement.

Ukrainian officials announced mandatory evacuations for civilians in 53 settlements in Kupyansk Raion, Kharkiv Oblast on August 9 due to intensified Russian shelling and aviation strikes against settlements near the frontline.[44] Russian forces hold positions northeast of Kupyansk well within artillery range, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations in the area significantly increases the risk to civilians in Kupyansk and surrounding settlements. The evacuations in Kupyansk Raion do not necessarily indicate that Ukrainian forces expect Russian forces to make significant advances in the area, however.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks northeast of Kupyansk on August 10. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Synkivka and the Mankivka tract (around 15km east of Kupyansk).[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on August 10 and advanced south of Kreminna. Geolocated footage published on August 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Kreminna.[46] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces broke through Ukrainian first lines of defense near Kreminna, but did not specify the nature or location of the breakthrough.[47] A Russian milblogger amplified footage on August 8 purporting to show Russian forces breaking through Ukrainian defensive lines in the Serebryanske forest area south of Kreminna.[48] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 2km into Ukrainian defenses and captured an unspecified number of Ukrainian strongholds and tactically significant heights, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Nadiya (15km west of Svatove) and south of Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove).[50]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Novoselivkse, Luhansk Oblast, and Terny (16km northwest of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (33km south of Kreminna) in Donetsk Oblast.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and made no confirmed or claimed advances on August 10. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks south of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) and that the intensity of combat remains high in these areas.[52] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) on August 9.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly made marginal advances on August 10. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted counterattacks against Ukrainian forces near Klishchiivka and Andriivka and pushed Ukrainian forces from unspecified positions near Klishchiivka.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions northeast of Druzhba (18km southwest of Bakhmut), on the outskirts of Klishchiivka, and near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut.[55]

Russian forces continued attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on August 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka), Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City), Marinka (just southwest of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km south of Marinka).[56] Russian sources also reported Russian ground attacks in these areas.[57]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not advance on August 10. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Novomykhailivka.[58]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and advanced on August 10. Geolocated footage published on August 10 suggests that Ukrainian forces crossed the Mokri Yaly River and advanced eastward into the southwestern outskirts of Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[59] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk direction and achieved partial success south and southeast of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and in the direction of Urozhaine.[60] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Urozhaine and tried to gain a foothold near the settlement on August 9.[61] The Russian “Vostok” Battalion, which is defending the area, claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced closer to Urozhaine on the evening of August 9.[62] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking Russian forces on the outskirts of Urozhaine on the morning of August 10, and other Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Russian forces repelled the Ukrainian attacks.[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on August 10.[64]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and did not advance on August 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain lost positions near Staromayorske.[65]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 10 and reportedly advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the direction of Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[66] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced into Russian defenses near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Novopokrovka (16km southeast of Orikhiv).[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne on the night of August 9, and another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Robotyne on August 10.[68] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the direction of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) on August 10.[69] A Russian media aggregator claimed on August 9 that positional battle continued near Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv) and Robotyne, and a Russian milblogger claimed on August 10 that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct limited ground attacks near Pyatykhatky and Zherebyanky (26km southwest of Orikhiv).[70]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not advance on August 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations south of Novodanylivka (6km south of Orikhiv).[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked east of Robotyne on August 9.[72] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of the Chechen “Vostok-Akhmat” battalion are fighting near Robotyne.[73]

Russian sources continued to discuss the recent Ukrainian incursion near Kozachi Laheri in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian thermobaric artillery units struck near Kozachi Laheri on August 9 and speculated that this suggested that some Ukrainian forces are still on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[74] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces did not attempt to cross the Dnipro River on August 10.[75]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted unsuccessful drone strikes on occupied Crimea. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Russian forces downed 11 to 12 Ukrainian drones near Sevastopol, Cape Tarkhankut (115km northwest of Sevastopol), Yevpatoria (67km north of Sevastopol), and Saky (59km north of Sevastopol).[76] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian drones targeted the Novofedorivka airfield near Saky.[77]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials continue to highlight the claimed success of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). First Deputy General Director of the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec Vladimir Artyakov claimed on August 10 that Rostec’s production of armored vehicles has quadrupled since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and that Rostec’s shipments are often ahead of schedule.[78] Artyakov claimed that Rostec is producing 20 times the amount of artillery and MLRS ammunition in 2023 compared to 2021. Artyakov claimed that Rostec is constantly refining its armored vehicle designs based on how the vehicles perform in combat in Ukraine.[79]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

A Ukrainian military official reported that Russian forces are co-opting civilian infrastructure for the repression of local populations in occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on August 10 that Russian forces recently converted a Ukrainian food production facility into a prison in Pervomaivka, occupied Kherson Oblast.[80] Malyar reported that armed Russian military personnel confiscated non-residential buildings from local Ukrainian business owners to use as detention centers in Tokmak, occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Malyar also reported that Russian forces are using a student dormitory room to interrogate and torture local Ukrainian citizens in Vasylivka, occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[81]

Russian occupation officials highlighted the expansion of patronage networks tied to Henichesk Raion in occupied Kherson Oblast, likely to project stability following the Ukrainian missile strikes on the Chonhar and Henichesk bridges on August 6. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on August 10 that he met with Russian Energy Minister Nikolai Shulginov to discuss problems with Kherson Oblast’s energy facilities following the Ukrainian strikes on the Henichesk bridge and future energy-related infrastructure projects in occupied Kherson Oblast.[82] Saldo stated that the Russian federal government has assumed ownership of 260 energy facilities in Kherson Oblast and that large Russian energy companies have already begun work at these facilities.[83] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported that Kherson Oblast occupation minister of industry and trade Ivan Safronov met with representatives of the Russian trading network, who agreed to open two new stores in Henichesk.[84] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported on August 9 that officials from Krasnodar Krai are renovating a public facility in Henichesk.[85]

Russian and Ukrainian officials continue to report the forced movement of Ukrainian children to Russia and Russian-held territory. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration head Yevgeny Balitsky stated on August 10 that the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration sent 15 Ukrainian children from a Melitopol school to Moscow for a children’s cultural forum.[86] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported that Ryazan Oblast sponsored and organized the movement of 39 Ukrainian children from Kherson Oblast to a 21-day long camp in Yevpatoria in occupied Crimea.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

See topline text.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.