Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 27, 2023

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 27, 2023, 5:45pm ET 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced further south under the Antonivsky road bridge north of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[2]

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and six Shahed-131/136 drones from the near Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed five Shaheds over Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts.[3] Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on October 27 that Russian forces launched over 500 Shaheds targeting critical infrastructure and military facilities in Ukraine in September 2023.[4] Ihnat also stated that the composite materials for the fuselage of modernized Shaheds make them harder to detect and that weather conditions do not affect Russian Shahed operations.[5]

Germany and Denmark announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on October 27. The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced a package of military materiel support for Ukraine valued at 3.7 billion kroner (about $520 million) that includes T-72 tanks, BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, artillery ammunition, and drones.[6] The German government announced a military aid package valued at around 5.4 billion euros (about $5.7 billion) that includes MARS II anti-aircraft missiles and an additional IRIS-T SLM air defense system.[7]

Unspecified actors attempted to assassinate Russian-backed former separatist Ukrainian politician Oleg Tsaryov on October 27. Tsaryov’s Telegram channel reported that unspecified actors shot Tsaryov twice at his home in occupied Yalta, Crimea.[8] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) opened an investigation into the assassination attempt against Tsaryov.[9] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Tsaryov is in intensive care.[10] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Kremlin did not have information on the assassination attempt against Tsaryov.[11]

Russian authorities reportedly arrested Russian citizens who allegedly used Telegram channels, including some that identify themselves as insider sources, to extort money from Russian officials. Russian state media outlet TASS reported on October 27 that the Tverskoy Court of Moscow arrested Anton Safonov and detained Stanislav Daineko, both of whom work in public relations, for extorting more than 2 million rubles (about $21,200) from Rostec Director for Special Assignments Vasily Brovko in exchange for not publishing potentially compromising information on the “Nebrekhnya” Telegram channel.[12] The ”Provisional Government” Telegram channel, which stated that it has previously published allegations about Brovko’s involvement in corruption schemes, claimed that Brovko has close ties to the well-connected Rostec Director, Sergei Chemezov.[13] Another Russian insider source claimed on October 26 and 27 that Brovko initiated searches of the administrators of the ”Nebrekhnya“ and ”Provisional Government” channels, but the ”Provisional Government” Telegram channel denied claims on October 27 that authorities searched and detained its own administrators.[14] A Russian insider source claimed that the case concerns events from April to August 2022 that involved more than 20 Telegram channels, including some insider sources and the ”Nebrekhnya” and ”Provisional Government” channels.[15] Russian authorities have previously detained reported administrators of popular Telegram insider source channels that possibly used secret information to extort Russian officials.[16]

Russian authorities have likely coerced Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) into joining a “volunteer” formation that will fight in Ukraine, which would constitute an apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. Russian state media reported on October 27 that the “Bogdan Khmelnitsky” volunteer battalion “recruited” roughly 70 Ukrainian POWs from various Russian penal colonies, has begun training, and will deploy to an unspecified area of the front line upon completion of training.[17] Coercing POWs into combat would be a violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, which stipulates that “no prisoner of war may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone” and shall not “be employed on labor which is of an unhealthy or dangerous nature,” as ISW has previously reported.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 27.
• Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 26 to 27
• Unspecified actors attempted to assassinate Russian-backed former separatist Ukrainian politician Oleg Tsaryov on October 27.
• Russian authorities reportedly arrested Russian citizens who allegedly used Telegram channels, including some that identify themselves as insider sources, to extort money from Russian officials.
• Russian authorities have likely coerced Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) into joining a “volunteer” formation that will fight in Ukraine, which would constitute an apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on October 26 that Russian forces have suffered thousands of casualties and have lost at least 125 armored vehicles in recent offensive operations near Avdiivka.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia and advanced near Bakhmut.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov announced the formation of a second Chechen volunteer formation named for a second Chechen figure who fought against imperial Russian rule.
• Russian occupation authorities cracked down against pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels operating in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 27 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed on October 26 and 27 that Russian forces advanced near Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk) and captured unspecified positions south of Torske (15km west of Kreminna), although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces captured unspecified positions in the Kupyansk direction over the past week.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Petropavlivka (6km east of Kupyansk), Ivanivka, Nadiya (15km southwest of Svatove), Makiivka (21km southwest of Svatove), and Kreminna.[21] Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on October 27 that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction have been operating fewer loitering munitions and have decreased the rate of shelling by half due to rain.[22] Geolocated footage published on October 27 shows elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) operating near Kreminna.[23]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 27. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka, Tymkivka (18km east of Kupyansk), and Serhiivka (12km southwest of Svatove).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Petropavlivka.[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations near Bakhmut on October 27 but did not make any confirmed or claimed gains. Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting an “active defense” in the Bakhmut direction and conduct offensive actions to improve their tactical positions when they have the opportunity to do so.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction.[27] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[28]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Bakhmut on October 27 and made confirmed gains. Geolocated footage published on October 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of the Berkhivka reservoir (6km north of Bakhmut).[29] Additional geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Russian forces made marginal gains west of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled five Russian assaults near Bohdanivka and Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) and over 10 Russian assaults near Klishchiivka and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[31] Fityo stated on October 27 that 20 combat engagements occurred over the past day.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and described Russian forces as trying to seize the initiative in the Bakhmut direction.[33] A Russian media aggregator claimed that Russian forces advanced at heights northeast of Khromove and recaptured positions near the railway line east of Klishchiivka on October 26.[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled more than 20 Russian assaults near Stepove (3km north of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[35] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 26 and 27 that Russian forces advanced north from Opytne (4km south of Avdiivka) and established control over positions 1.5km southwest of Avdiivka near the T0505 (Spartak-Avdiivka) highway, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 26 and 27 that Russian forces bypassed Ukrainian fortified positions near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant on Avdiivka’s southern outskirts.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 26 and 27 that Russian forces advanced closer to the Avdiivka Coke Plant and consolidated further control over positions at the Avdiivka waste heap north of Avdiivka.[38] Russian sources claimed on October 26 and 27 that Russian forces continued to advance near the railway line north of Avdiivka and towards Stepove, although ISW has not seen visual confirmation of these claims.[39] A Ukrainian military observer stated on October 27 that Russian forces have captured the Avdiivka waste heap and have made unspecified advances near the railway line north of Avdiivka.[40] The Ukrainian military observer stated that Russian forces are achieving unspecified successes in the Vodyane-Tonenke (7km southwest to 5km west of Avdiivka) direction, and a Russian milblogger claimed on October 26 that Russian forces advanced from Vodyane to the outskirts of Pervomaiske.[41] The Ukrainian military observer claimed that the command of Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) has changed tactics in the Avdiivka area and is now instructing tactical groups on Avdiivka’s northern and southern flanks to alternate assaults.[42] Russian forces are conducting regular assaults north and south of Avdiivka but have only made some gains on Avdiivka’s northern flank and only a few marginal gains on the southern flank since starting larger offensive efforts on October 10.

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets offered new information about the deployment of Russian units and formations participating in the Russian effort to encircle Avdiivka as of October 27. Mashovets stated that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 1st Army Corps (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District) are responsible for Avdiivka’s southern flank and that elements of the DNR 1st Army Corps, the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps, Western Military District) and the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army) are responsible for the section of the front immediately south of Avdiivka.[43] Mashovets stated that elements of the 115th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the DNR 1st Army Corps), the 1140th Territorial Defense Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 109th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the mobilization reserves, and the 277th Motorized Rifle Battalion (likely of the DNR 1st Army Corps) are operating on Avdiivka’s northern flank.[44] Mashovets also added that the Russian command has deployed elements of the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District) as an operational reserve for Russian operations south of Avdiivka and elements of the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade and two motorized rifle regiments and a regiment of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division to act as an operational reserve for operations north of Avdiivka.[45]

Western and Russian sources continue to report that Russian forces have suffered heavy losses and are experiencing pronounced morale issues near Avdiivka. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on October 26 that Russian forces have suffered thousands of casualties and have lost at least 125 armored vehicles in recent offensive operations near Avdiivka.[46] Kirby also stated that the US has observed Russian forces executing those who refuse to follow orders in the Avdiivka direction as well as Russian commanders threatening to shoot entire units if they retreat from Ukrainian artillery fire in the area.[47] Russian sources described Russian morale near Avdiivka as incredibly poor, with one Russian milblogger claiming that morale was a determining factor in Russian failures at the start of the renewed offensive effort near Avdiivka.[48]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed counterattacks near Avdiivka on October 27.

Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled over 19 Russian assaults near Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[49]

The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Marinka.[50]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Vodyane (6km northeast of Vuhledar).[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Mykilske (4km southeast of Vuhledar).[52]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Vuhledar between October 21 and October 27.[53]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted limited offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on October 27. The Russian “Vostok” Battalion, which operates southeast of Velyka Novosilka, claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near the battalion’s positions, possibly along the Novodonetske-Novomayorske (12km to 18m southeast of Velyka Novosilka) line.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on October 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Zolota Nyva (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in the direction of Staromayorske and from Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[56] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) are consolidating control over recently captured positions northeast of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of recent Russian advances in this area.[57] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces improved their positions in the south Donetsk direction (western Donetsk Oblast and Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) in the past week.[58]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances on October 27. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in the direction of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces withdrew from positions near Nesteryanka (12 km northwest of Robotyne) following a Ukrainian counterattack in the area.[60] Russian sources claimed on October 26 and 27 that Ukrainian forces attacked northwest of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne) and near Nesteryanka, Kopani (6km northwest of Robotyne), Rivne (8km west of Robotyne), Robotyne, and Novoprokopivka (3km south of Robotyne).[61] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted 19 unsuccessful attacks near Robotyne and Verbove in the past week.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on October 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked northwest of Verbove.[63] Another Russian milblogger claimed on October 26 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions near Verbove and conducted a series of counterattacks along the Kopani-Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line (6km northwest to 9km east of Robotyne).[64]

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 27. Geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced further south under the Antonivsky road bridge north of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[65] A prominent Russian milblogger, who previously claimed on October 25 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson Oblast and 2km from the Dnipro River), claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Krynky as of October 26 despite Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of the settlement.[66] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Pishchanivka (14km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and continue to operate along the road near Pidstepne (18km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and Kozachi Laheri (22km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River).[67] The Russian milblogger claimed that seven Ukrainian “assault groups” are operating on the east bank of Kherson Oblast but has yet to describe the size of these groups.[68]

Russian forces are likely worried about future Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian airfields in Russian rear areas. Satellite imagery dated October 26 indicates that Russian forces have likely painted four outlines of MiG-31 aircraft on the flight line at Belbek airfield near occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, likely intended to draw Ukrainian targeting from the four real MiG-31 remaining at the airfield.[69] ISW previously assessed that the Ukrainian ATACMS strikes on operationally significant Russian airfields in Ukraine on October 17 will likely prompt the Russian command to disperse aviation assets and withdraw some aircraft to airfields further from the frontline.[70]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov announced the formation of a second Chechen volunteer formation named after a Chechen figure who fought against imperial Russian rule. Kadyrov announced the creation of the “Baysangur Benoyevsky” volunteer battalion, named after a deputy of 19th-century Chechen insurgent leader Imam Shamil.[71] ISW assessed on October 24 that Kadyrov appears to be struggling to balance appealing to his Chechen Muslim constituencies while maintaining the support of the Kremlin due to the Kremlin’s support for Russian ultranationalism and Orthodoxy.[72]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities cracked down against pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels operating in occupied Ukraine. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reported on October 27 that it arrested the administrators of two pro-Ukrainian channels that encouraged users to collect data on Russian military assets and movements in August 2023.[73] The FSB also claimed that the FSB killed an allegedly armed intelligence agent who resisted arrest during the detentions.[74] The FSB likely publicized these arrests now to deter further security risks in occupied Ukraine.

Russian occupation authorities continue to struggle to compensate employees of Russian state enterprises in occupied Kherson Oblast. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in occupied Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast, the “Khersonoblenergo” State Unitary Enterprise, a kindergarten in Novotroitske, and a forestry enterprise in Hola Prystan Raion reported receiving one or no salary payments since summer 2023.[75] Vazhnye Istorii reported that the Kherson Oblast occupation authorities also struggle to pay pensions and other social benefits.[76]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated boilerplate Kremlin rhetoric about Ukrainian weapons during a Russian Security Council meeting on October 27 intended to undermine Western support for Ukraine. Putin reiterated claims that illegal weapons enter Russia through Ukraine and undermine Russian security.[77] Ukrainian and Western officials have repeatedly denied these claims, and ISW has observed no evidence supporting the Kremlin’s claims.[78]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus) 

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued to indicate his unwillingness to involve the Belarusian military in the war in Ukraine. Lukashenko stated on October 26 that Belarus is committed to peace with its neighbors and does not want to fight because “it would cost [Belarus] dearly.”[79] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is a co-belligerent in the Russian war in Ukraine, is involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children, and may be facilitating sanctions evasion schemes for Russia, but is extremely unlikely to commit its own military forces to fighting Ukraine.[80]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://twitter.com/TwistyCB/status/1717913793022263570; https://twitter.com/TwistyCB/status/1717913787603329044; https://t.me/Juncker_ZOV/22

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EdNtgxwvHe6XWvJ4Zc9k3i8U5jMkBCucFc7FX6vssxk1ApA97A6DjstsadXyde9ol

[3] https://t.me/kpszsu/6810

[4] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/27/yakby-vorog-mav-shahedy-z-nadlyshkom-vin-by-yih-usi-zastosovuvav-bo-czya-zbroya-vysnazhuye-nashu-ppo-yurij-ignat/

[5] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/27/yakby-vorog-mav-shahedy-z-nadlyshkom-vin-by-yih-usi-zastosovuvav-bo-czya-zbroya-vysnazhuye-nashu-ppo-yurij-ignat/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/27/vorog-udoskonalyuye-taktyku-zastosuvannya-shahediv-yurij-ignat/

[6] https://www.fmn dot dk/da/nyheder/2023/danmark-donerer-militart-udstyr-til-ukraine-for-37-mia.-kroner/

[7] https://www.bundesregierung dot de/breg-de/schwerpunkte/krieg-in-der-ukraine/lieferungen-ukraine-2054514 ; https://suspilne dot media/603981-nimeccina-nadala-ukraini-cergovij-paket-vijskovoi-dopomogi-so-vin-vklucae/

[8] https://t.me/olegtsarov/9178 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/55065 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/55077

[9] https://ria dot ru/20231027/tsarev-1905688780.html

[10] https://t.me/vrogov/12666

[11] https://ria dot ru/20231027/tsarev-1905613164.html

[12] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/19137491

[13] https://t.me/oreshkins/14505

[14] https://t.me/oreshkins/14505 ;  https://t.me/vchkogpu/43202 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/43210 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/43214 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/43216 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/43215 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/43221 

[15] https://t.me/vchkogpu/43214 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/43221

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071523

[17] https://ria dot ru/20231027/batalon-1905528709.html; https://iz dot ru/1475729/2023-02-27/v-dnr-poiavilsia-batalon-imeni-bogdana-khmelnitckogo-iz-ukrainskikh-plennykh

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24; https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-treatment-prisoners-war

[19] https://t.me/wargonzo/16050 ; https://t.me/btr80/11665

[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/31868

[21] https://t.me/wargonzo/16050 ; https://t.me/btr80/11665

[22] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/10/27/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-ukrayinski-zahysnyky-perebuvayut-v-aktyvnij-oboroni-i-za-nagody-perehodyat-u-nastup/

[23] https://t.me/blackhussars/822 ; https://x.com/SyriaWar2/status/1717881518150795656?s=20 ; https://amalantra dot ru/15-brigada-chernyye-gusary/

[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/31862

[25] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/8952

[26] https://suspilne dot media/603637-na-lugansini-okupanti-rozgortaut-punkti-psihologicnoi-dopomogi-ta-ponad-600-raziv-obstrilali-pozicii-zsu-na-fronti/

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EdNtgxwvHe6XWvJ4Zc9k3i8U5jMkBCucFc7FX6vssxk1ApA97A6DjstsadXyde9ol

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/31868

[29] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1717812885135540243?s=20; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1717843034333663296?s=20; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/6618; https://www.facebook.com/100085594530038/posts/pfbid05ZRY1NgaXfqBqXHSXuhA4KUtxnxoL3CSYBneVavGhGhn5Sqg77NpwmtubVQDTeexl/?app=fbl

[30] https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/92; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/4806

[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EdNtgxwvHe6XWvJ4Zc9k3i8U5jMkBCucFc7FX6vssxk1ApA97A6DjstsadXyde9ol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zofbVCBKXsCxGWBjmQaiFFNiMCKdYh9jZdKifmXvTchj78dZPK9Tp2DN63kkbdLvl ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=718815993619708

[32] https://suspilne dot media/603637-na-lugansini-okupanti-rozgortaut-punkti-psihologicnoi-dopomogi-ta-ponad-600-raziv-obstrilali-pozicii-zsu-na-fronti/

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/16050

[34] https://t.me/readovkanews/68414

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zofbVCBKXsCxGWBjmQaiFFNiMCKdYh9jZdKifmXvTchj78dZPK9Tp2DN63kkbdLvl ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=718815993619708 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EdNtgxwvHe6XWvJ4Zc9k3i8U5jMkBCucFc7FX6vssxk1ApA97A6DjstsadXyde9ol

[36] https://t.me/rybar/53655 ; https://t.me/rybar/53648 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28066

[37] https://t.me/rybar/53643

[38] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/55610 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28066

[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/55610 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16050 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/68414

[40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1351

[41] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/51578

[42] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1350

[43] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1351

[44] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1351

[45] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1351

[46] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/10/26/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-national-economic-council-director-lael-brainard-and-nsc-coordinator-for-strategic-communications-john-kirby/

[47] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/10/26/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-national-economic-council-director-lael-brainard-and-nsc-coordinator-for-strategic-communications-john-kirby/ ;

[48] https://t.me/vault8pro/50273 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1717797470267150459 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/22506 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/22162

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EdNtgxwvHe6XWvJ4Zc9k3i8U5jMkBCucFc7FX6vssxk1ApA97A6DjstsadXyde9ol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zofbVCBKXsCxGWBjmQaiFFNiMCKdYh9jZdKifmXvTchj78dZPK9Tp2DN63kkbdLvl ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=718815993619708

[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/31868

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EdNtgxwvHe6XWvJ4Zc9k3i8U5jMkBCucFc7FX6vssxk1ApA97A6DjstsadXyde9ol

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/16050

[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/31868

[54] https://t.me/batalyon_vostok/231

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EdNtgxwvHe6XWvJ4Zc9k3i8U5jMkBCucFc7FX6vssxk1ApA97A6DjstsadXyde9ol

[56] https://t.me/wargonzo/16050

[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/5699

[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/31868

[59] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/102136

[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/16050

[61] https://t.me/rybar/53647 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16050 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28066 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/55600 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/68414 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4330 

[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/31869

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EdNtgxwvHe6XWvJ4Zc9k3i8U5jMkBCucFc7FX6vssxk1ApA97A6DjstsadXyde9ol

[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/55600

[65] https://twitter.com/TwistyCB/status/1717913793022263570; https://twitter.com/TwistyCB/status/1717913787603329044; https://t.me/Juncker_ZOV/22

[66] https://t.me/rybar/53666 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2023

[67] https://t.me/rybar/53666

[68] https://t.me/rybar/53666

[69] https://twitter.com/MT_Anderson/status/1717625196549415099?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1717625196549415099%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=

[70] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101723

[71] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4046; https://t.me/astrapress/41149

[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Oct%2025%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf

[73] https://t.me/rian_ru/219566

[74] https://t.me/rian_ru/219566

[75] https://t.me/istories_media/4035 ; https://storage.googleapis.com/istories/news/2023/10/26/v-okkupirovannoi-chasti-khersonskoi-oblasti-na-neskolko-mesyatsev-zaderzhivayut-zarplati-byudzhetnikam/index.html ; https://t.me/rotondamedia/4664 ; https://t.me/VKhersone/19540?comment=122982 ; https://t.me/VKhersone/19546?comment=123880 

[76] https://t.me/istories_media/4035 ; https://storage.googleapis.com/istories/news/2023/10/26/v-okkupirovannoi-chasti-khersonskoi-oblasti-na-neskolko-mesyatsev-zaderzhivayut-zarplati-byudzhetnikam/index.html ; https://t.me/rotondamedia/4664 ; https://t.me/VKhersone/19540?comment=122982 ; https://t.me/VKhersone/19546?comment=123880 

[77] https://tass dot ru/politika/19134149 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72610

[78] https://www.businessinsider.com/no-sign-of-mass-arms-trafficking-from-ukraine-authorities-say-2022-10; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-62983444

[79] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-my-ne-hotim-voevat-no-u-nas-est-chem-otvetit-kak-nikogda-596497-2023/

[80] https://isw.pub/UkrWar091423 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2023  ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2023