Ukraine Conflict Updates
This page collects ISW and CTP's updates on the conflict in Ukraine. In late February 2022, ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. These Ukraine Conflict Updates replaced ISW’s previous “Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus,” which we maintained from November 12, 2021, through February 17, 2022.
This list also includes prominent warning alerts that ISW and CTP launched beyond our daily Ukraine Conflict Updates. These products addressed critical inflection points as they occurred.
Click here to see our collection of reports from January 2 to May 31, 2024.
Click here to see our collection of reports from 2023.
Click here to see our collection of reports from 2022.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map complements the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW daily produces with high-fidelity and, where possible, street-level assessments of the war in Ukraine.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will add new time-lapses to our archive on a monthly basis. This high-definition interactive map is resource-intensive. The performance and speed of the map correlate with the strength of your hardware.
Click here to read about the methodology behind ISW and CTP's mapping of this conflict.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 3, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 3, 2024, 1:00pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 9:30am ET on October 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine that began in fall 2023 continues to produce gradual Russian tactical gains in specific sectors of the front, but operationally significant gains will likely continue to elude Russian forces. Ukrainian forces are conducting an effective defense in depth along the frontline, inflicting significant losses upon Russian forces while slowly giving ground but preventing the Russian military from making more rapid gains on the battlefield. Ukrainian forces do face serious operational challenges and constraints, which are providing Russian forces with opportunities to pursue tactically significant gains. Russian forces do not have the available manpower and materiel to continue intensified offensive efforts indefinitely, however, and current Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine will likely culminate in the coming months, if not weeks, as Ukrainian officials and ISW have previously assessed.
Russian forces have recently made notable tactical gains but have not demonstrated a capacity to seize operationally significant objectives. ISW distinguishes between tactical gains, which are relevant at the tactical level of war in the near vicinity of the fighting, and operational gains, which are significant at the operational level of war and affect large sectors of the entire frontline. Russian forces seized Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast as of October 1, and the settlement will likely afford Russian forces an improved tactical position for pursuing their operational effort to advance towards the H-15 (Donetsk City–Zaporizhzhia City) highway and eliminate the wide Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast.[1] The Russian seizure of Vuhledar will not on its own radically change the operational situation in western Donetsk Oblast, however, and Russian forces will likely struggle to achieve their operational objectives in the area during the ongoing offensive operation in western Donetsk Oblast.[2] Russian offensive operations that are pursuing operationally significant objectives, like the Russian effort to seize Chasiv Yar or to push Ukrainian forces off the left (east) bank of the Oskil River, have either stalled or are resulting in particularly gradual gains over long stretches of time, respectively.[3] Russian forces continue to prioritize their offensive push towards Pokrovsk, and the operational significance of seizing the city will likely in part depend on the Russian military's ability to leverage the city in wider operational maneuver in Donetsk Oblast.[4] Russian forces have tried and failed to conduct wide operational maneuver across several axes throughout Donetsk Oblast on several occasions during the full-scale invasion and are currently conducting intensified offensive operations in pursuit of more limited objectives on only two mutually supporting sectors of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast (western Donetsk Oblast and the Pokrovsk direction).[5]
The Russian military command prepared the ongoing Russian summer 2024 offensive operation for months in advance and accumulated operational reserves and resources for the operation that the recent months of attritional fighting have likely heavily degraded. Russian forces reportedly aimed to establish a new operational grouping of forces with uncommitted operational reserves of up to 70,000 personnel for the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024 while also establishing operational reserves for the Central Grouping of Forces' push to Pokrovsk this summer.[6] Russian forces have likely expended a good portion of these reserves on the stalling offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast, the intensified offensive tempo in the Pokrovsk direction and western Donetsk Oblast, and the response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[7] Russian forces also continue to suffer heavy armored vehicle losses in large, unsuccessful mechanized assaults throughout the frontline, particularly in western Donetsk Oblast.[8] Russian forces likely accumulated a large amount of equipment for such mechanized assaults, but significant medium- to long-term constraints on Russian armored vehicle stocks will become more salient as losses grow and may force the Russian military command to rethink the benefit of continuing such intensified mechanized activity in Ukraine.[9] Continued heavy Russian attrition in Donetsk Oblast and further Russian redeployments to Kursk Oblast will weaken Russia's ability to sustain offensive operations in northeastern and eastern Ukraine, although Russian forces are more likely to continue decreasing offensive activity on lower-priority sectors of the front than to do so equally along the entire frontline.[10] The current Russian summer 2024 offensive operation will likely culminate in the coming weeks and months, but Russian forces may nevertheless continue to conduct offensive operations at a much lower tempo throughout Ukraine in hopes that consistent offensive pressure would prevent Ukrainian forces from accumulating the manpower and resources needed to contest the theater-wide initiative.[11]
Russian forces have reportedly committed a significant portion of their intended operational reserves to offensive operations in Donetsk and northern Kharkiv oblasts, indicating that the Russian military command may have prioritized forming operational reserves to support offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline over developing theater-wide strategic reserves for the entire offensive campaign in Ukraine. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on October 3 that the Russian military command originally intended to commit most of Russia's "strategic reserves" to the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk-Toretsk directions, but that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and slowing Russian advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast complicated this plan.[12] Mashovets noted that the creation of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and the reinforcement of the Central Military District [CMD] in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions throughout 2024 comprised most of Russia's efforts to develop "strategic reserves." Mashovets noted that within the Leningrad Military District [LMD] Russian forces have established the newly-formed 69th Motorized Rifle Division and another unspecified motorized rifle division (both part of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], the 44th Army Corps (AC) and its 72nd Motorized Rifle Division and another unspecified motorized rifle brigade, and are continuing to staff the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA) and the 71st Motorized Rifle Division (14th AC).[13] Mashovets stated that Russian forces also established the 51st and 3rd CAAs and the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA) under the CMD in 2024. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command has already introduced some of these units and formations into combat below their doctrinal end strength and may introduce other formations as understrength "combined-reduced divisional tactical groups" in the near future.[14]
ISW has recently observed confirmation that some of these formations have been deployed to the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk directions. Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces recently reported that the Russian military deployed elements of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division near Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Division are also operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[16] The Russian military command has reportedly deployed elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division to northern Kharkiv Oblast as well, and Mashovets recently stated that the Russian military command intends to deploy the remainder of the understrength division to the frontline in northern Kharkiv Oblast between the end of October and the beginning of November 2024.[17] Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly operating southeast of Pokrovsk.[18] ISW has not observed reports of elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Division participating in offensive operations in Ukraine, however. Mashovets' report likely does not encompass all of the reserve units and formations that Russia recently formed or is currently forming, although it is notable that Russia has already introduced elements of most of these formations to combat.
The Russian military command is continuing to prioritize offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline over long-term planning for Russia's theater-wide campaign in Ukraine, but the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast appears to have significantly complicated the development of Russia's operational reserves. The Russian military command's reported intention for these reserves to participate in a specific priority of the sector instead of being committable throughout the theater indicates that these are "operational" and not "strategic" level reserves. Unspecified US officials told the New York Times (NYT) in August 2024 that Russia likely needs to deploy 15 to 20 brigades — at least 50,000 troops — from Ukraine or Russia's operational reserves to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast.[19] The Russian military command will likely continue to grapple with the impacts of manpower constraints on Russia's offensive capabilities until Russian President Vladimir Putin decides that the benefits of more effective force-generation policies, such as another partial mobilization call up of Russian reservists, outweigh the risk of societal backlash.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be using the "Time of Heroes" veteran support program to militarize regional and local government administrations and further solidify a pro-war ideology into the Russian state and society. Putin met with former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Sparta” Battalion Commander and Speaker of the DNR Parliament Artem Zhoga on October 2 and offered him the position of Presidential Representative to the Ural Federal Okrug, which Zhoga accepted.[20] Zhoga previously served as a member of Putin's re-election campaign initiatives group, and the Kremlin previously highlighted Zhoga and used an interaction between Zhoga and Putin to announce Putin's presidential bid in December 2023.[21] Putin signed a decree on October 2 confirming the recent appointments of Zhoga and nine other "Time of Heroes" participants to various federal, regional, and local appointments: Artur Orlov as chairperson of the Russian patriotic youth organization "Movement of the First," Alexei Kondratyev as a Russian senator, Igor Yurin as Sakha Republic Minister of Youth Affairs and Social Communications, Alexander Surazov as Altai Republic Committee for Physical Culture and Sports head, Yevgeny Chintsov as head of the Nizhny Novgorod City Duma, Zaur Gurtsiev as Stavropol City first deputy head, Roman Kulakov as Sevastopol occupation legislative assembly deputy, Konstantin Yashin as head of the Samara Research and Production Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, and Vladimir Saibel as deputy head of Russian Railways' social development department.[22] The "Movement of the First" is a Kremlin-affiliated youth organization that promotes military-patriotic education and ideology to youth within Russia and occupied Ukraine to set long term conditions for the militarization of Russian society and Russification of occupied Ukraine.[23] Putin noted that the Russian government has extended job offers to 10 additional "Time of Heroes" participants within the Russian Presidential Administration, federal and regional entities, and state-owned companies.[24] The increasing appointments of Russian military veterans of the war in Ukraine in government and state entities throughout Russia is likely part of an effort to establish pro-war, ultranationalist individuals loyal to Putin in prominent places within local government and society as Russia seeks ways to reintegrate war veterans into Russian society and subtly message Putin's vision for a future Russian class of elites and wider society comprised of such individuals.[25] Putin's publicized and likely scripted meeting with Zhoga was likely aimed at establishing Putin's public expectations of "Time of Heroes" participants. Zhoga repeatedly emphasized in his meeting with Putin that he is a "soldier first and foremost" who will serve Russia "where [he] is most needed," indicating that Putin likely expects loyalty from these handpicked individuals above all else.[26]
Russian authorities continue to arrest Russian officials on charges related to mismanagement and corruption within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The Russian Investigative Committee announced on October 2 that it placed former MoD Forestry Department Deputy Head Alexander Sluchak under house arrest and detained the General Director of “Translesstroy” LLC Ozman Avdolyan for embezzling 20 million rubles (about $210,248) related to the mismanagement of MoD contracts.[27] Russian sources stated on October 2 that Russian law enforcement initiated a case into a theft of military property worth over 1 million rubles (about $10,500) at the Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School, detaining two suspects including the driver of Major General D. Yevmenenko.[28] The Russian Investigative Committee also placed Deputy Head of the Russian MoD's Military Construction company, Dmitry Sergel, on the interstate wanted list for embezzling funds from the Russian MoD.[29] Sergel reportedly embezzled over 35 million rubles (about $367,935) as part of a contract for overhauling a military hospital in Perm valued at more than 190 million rubles (about $ 1,997,363). ISW has observed an increase in MoD-related arrests particularly under the leadership of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in a likely effort to not only “cleanse” widespread corruption prominent under the leadership of former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, but also satisfy the Russian public’s demand for justice and demonstrate that the Kremlin is fighting corruption.[30]
Strikes reportedly targeted an ammunition depot near Russia's Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia Province, Syria overnight on October 2 to 3. Footage published on October 3 shows a fire and secondary detonations overnight reportedly near Hmeimim Airbase, and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claimed on October 3 that unknown drone strikes destroyed an ammunition depot near Jableh City near the airbase.[31] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claimed that the unknown drone strikes coincided with the presence of Israeli warplanes in the area and that both Syrian and Russian air defenses attempted to shoot down incoming Israeli missiles for roughly 40 minutes.[32] A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian air defenses activated and claimed that Iranian and Syrian forces used the ammunition depot and that the Israeli strikes did not target Russia's Hmeimim Airbase directly.[33] ISW is unable to confirm the actor responsible for the October 3 Latakia strike. CTP-ISW observed a strike, reportedly conducted by Israeli forces, targeting a weapons shipment near Jableh on July 9 after an Iranian weapons shipment arrived at the nearby port of Latakia.[34] Syrian sources claimed that Syrian air defenses intercepted 17 reportedly Israeli missiles near Jableh and Tartus (south of Latakia) and reported explosions near Tartus on September 24, but the actors involved and the result of the strike remain unconfirmed.[35]
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine that began in fall 2023 continues to produce gradual Russian tactical gains in specific sectors of the front, but operationally significant gains will likely continue to elude Russian forces.
- Ukrainian forces are conducting an effective defense in depth along the frontline, inflicting significant losses upon Russian forces while slowly giving ground but preventing the Russian military from making more rapid gains on the battlefield.
- Ukrainian forces do face serious operational challenges and constraints, which are providing Russian forces with opportunities to pursue tactically significant gains.
- Russian forces do not have the available manpower and materiel to continue intensified offensive efforts indefinitely, however, and current Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine will likely culminate in the coming months, if not weeks, as Ukrainian officials and ISW have previously assessed.
- Russian forces have recently made notable tactical gains but have not demonstrated a capacity to seize operationally significant objectives.
- The Russian military command prepared the ongoing Russian summer 2024 offensive operation for months in advance and accumulated operational reserves and resources for the operation that the recent months of attritional fighting have likely heavily degraded.
- Russian forces have reportedly committed a significant portion of their intended operational reserves to offensive operations in Donetsk and northern Kharkiv oblasts, indicating that the Russian military command may have prioritized forming operational reserves to support offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline over developing theater-wide strategic reserves for the entire offensive campaign in Ukraine.
- The Russian military command is continuing to prioritize offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline over long-term planning for Russia's theater-wide campaign in Ukraine, but the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast appears to have significantly complicated the development of Russia's operational reserves.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be using the "Time of Heroes" veteran support program to militarize regional and local government administrations and further solidify a pro-war ideology into the Russian state and society.
- Russian authorities continue to arrest Russian officials on charges related to mismanagement and corruption within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
- Strikes reportedly targeted an ammunition depot near Russia's Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia Province, Syria overnight on October 2 to 3.
- Russian forces recently advanced south of Siversk and east and southeast of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast.
- Russian authorities continue to nationalize Russian enterprises for the benefit of the federal government.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 2, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, and George Barros
October 2, 2024, 1:15pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:30am ET on October 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukraine continues efforts to expand domestic production of significant military equipment and maintain its drone advantage over Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 1 that Ukrainian companies can currently produce four million drones annually and that Ukraine has already contracted the domestic production of 1.5 million drones (presumably in 2024).[1] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently claimed that Russia plans to increase drone production by tenfold to 1.4 million drones in 2024, which will be lower than the two million drones that Ukraine aims to produce in 2024.[2] Zelensky also stated that Ukraine can produce 15 "Bohdan" self-propelled artillery systems every month and recently conducted a successful flight test for an unspecified domestically produced ballistic missile.[3] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on October 2 that Ukraine will continue prioritizing domestic production of drones and long-range missiles, including ballistic missiles.[4] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on October 2 that Ukraine has allocated $7 billion for the purchase of weapons and military equipment in the Ukrainian draft 2025 state budget — a 65 percent increase from the 2024 state budget.[5] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine increased domestic weapons production by a factor of three in 2023 and by factor of two in the first eight months of 2024.[6] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian efforts to expand domestic military production will allow Ukraine to reduce its dependence on Western military assistance in the long-term, but that Ukraine still requires considerable Western assistance for the next several years in order to defend against Russian aggression and liberate strategically vital areas that Russian forces currently occupy.[7]
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov condemned the Israel Defense Force's (IDF) ground operation in southern Lebanon during a meeting with the Lebanese ambassador to Russia on October 1.[8] Bogdanov met with Lebanese Ambassador Shawki Bou Nassar and discussed the military-political situation in the Middle East. Bogdanov expressed "strong condemnation of Israel's ground invasion of Lebanon and emphasized Russia's opposition to alleged Israeli political assassinations. Bogdanov highlighted the importance of providing humanitarian assistance to Lebanon and safely evacuating Russian citizens from Lebanon. Russian Ambassador to Israel Anatoly Viktorov called for an immediate end to the conflict in the Middle East, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with ambassadors of unspecified Arab states and called for the immediate end of military operations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict area.[9] The Kremlin likely seeks to take advantage of the conflict in the Middle East to promote Russian-dominated international structures, including some connected to the Kremlin's effort to establish an alternative "Eurasian security architecture." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on October 2 that Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas has accepted Russia's invitation to attend the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 22–24 and that participants will discuss the situation in the Middle East.[10] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) recently condemned Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Israel's decision to simultaneously detonate thousands of pagers belonging to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) members across Lebanon and Syria, and previous Israeli strikes against Iran.[11]
Latvian forces enhanced air defense near the Russian border following a recent Russian drone crash in the country. Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds announced on October 2 that the Latvian Air Force deployed mobile combat groups equipped with air defense missiles in Latgale near the Russian-Latvian border and set up specialized radars along the border to detect drones.[12] Spruds confirmed that both professional military personnel and members of the Latvian National Defense Service are actively participating in the air defense operation. This decision comes in response to the September 7 Russian Shahed-type drone crash in Latvia's Rezekne municipality, close to the Russian border.[13]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukraine continues efforts to expand domestic production of significant military equipment and maintain its drone advantage over Russia.
- Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov condemned the Israel Defense Force's (IDF) ground operation in southern Lebanon during a meeting with the Lebanese ambassador to Russia on October 1.
- Latvian forces enhanced air defense near the Russian border following a recent Russian drone crash in the country.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continued assaults in Kursk Oblast.
- Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Svatove, Siversk, and Vuhledar and east and southeast of Pokrovsk
- Russian defense enterprises are recruiting tens of thousands of new workers due to acute personnel shortages amid increased production of weapons due to the war in Ukraine.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 1, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, and George Barros
October 1, 2024, 8:15pm ET
Russian forces likely seized Vuhledar as of October 1 following a reported Ukrainian withdrawal from the settlement, though it is unclear if Russian forces will make rapid gains beyond Vuhledar in the immediate future. Geolocated footage published on September 30 and October 1 shows Russian forces planting Russian flags and freely operating in various parts of Vuhledar, and Russian milbloggers claimed on October 1 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[1] A Ukrainian servicemember reported on October 1 that a part of the Ukrainian force grouping conducted a planned withdrawal from Vuhledar to avoid encirclement, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces began to withdraw from Vuhledar as of the end of September 30.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces did not completely interdict Ukrainian egress routes before Ukrainian forces withdrew but that Russian artillery and drones inflicted unspecified losses on withdrawing Ukrainian personnel.[3] The scale of Ukrainian casualties is unknown at this time, however, but the widespread reports of Ukrainian withdrawal suggest that the larger Ukrainian contingent likely avoided a Russian encirclement that would have generated greater casualties. Russian sources credited elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD), 5th Tank Brigade and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both part of 36th CAA, EMD), 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit of the 29th CAA), and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) for directly seizing or assisting in the seizure of Vuhledar.[4] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces continued to advance west of Vodyane (northeast of Vuhledar).[5]
The Russian seizure of Vuhledar follows a series of costly, failed Russian assaults near the settlement over the past two and a half years. A prominent Russian milblogger celebrated reports of Vuhledar’s seizure by recalling an alleged conversation he had with a Russian high-ranking officer, who told him that the Russian decision to attack in the Vuhledar direction in March 2022 was ill-advised because Russian forces would get “stuck” on the settlement.[6] The milblogger implied that the officer was wrong given that Russian forces eventually seized Vuhledar, although the milblogger failed to acknowledge that Russian forces struggled to advance in the Vuhledar area for over two years. Russia attempted at least two major offensive efforts to seize Vuhledar in October-November 2022 and January-February 2023, both of which resulted in heavy personnel and military equipment losses.[7] Russia's previous defeats around Vuhledar notably resulted in the attrition of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD).[8]
Some Russian sources expressed doubts that Russian forces will be able to rapidly advance and achieve operationally-significant breakthroughs immediately after seizing Vuhledar. Some Russian milbloggers noted that they do not expect the frontline to collapse following the seizure of Vuhledar, citing Ukrainian defensive positions northeast of Vuhledar and the need for Russian forces to completely clear Vuhledar to make it a useable position from which they can launch future assaults.[9] One Kremlin-affiliated milblogger attempted to misrepresent Vuhledar as “the last Ukrainian city in the southern Donetsk direction” which underpins the “entire Ukrainian defense” in western Donetsk Oblast — implying that Russia can steadily advance in western Donetsk Oblast following the capture of Vuhledar.[10] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger criticized a similar argument that the Russian seizure of Vuhledar would lead to the destruction of Ukrainian defenses in Donetsk Oblast and allow Russian forces to advance towards Kramatorsk and Slovyansk (both approximately 170km northeast of Vuhledar) after seizing Kurakhove and Pokrovsk. The milblogger implied that the argument dismisses the fact that Russian forces will need to fight through heavily fortified settlements far north and northeast of Vuhledar, such as Kostyantynivka, Dobropillya, Pokrovsk, Selydove, Kurakhove, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk.[11] ISW previously assessed that Russia's seizure of Vuhledar is unlikely to fundamentally alter the course of offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast, largely because Vuhledar is not a particularly crucial logistics node and because Russian forces have controlled most of the main roads running into Vuhledar prior to October 1, meaning that Russian forces have already had the ability to interdict Ukrainian logistics in this part of the front to some extent.[12] Vuhledar is also about 30 kilometers south of Russia’s current main effort in the Pokrovsk direction, so Russian forces would need to maneuver across 30 kilometers of open terrain to meaningfully support offensive operations southeast of Pokrovsk. Vuhledar is also located 23 kilometers south of the H-15 highway that stretches between Donetsk City and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, but Russian forces would need to advance across an open field area during the upcoming muddy season to reach the highway. Advisor to the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Igor Kimakovsky notably assessed before the Russian seizure of Vuhledar that the dirt road that Ukrainian forces could have used to withdraw from Vuhledar would soon become unusable due to mud, and it is likely that Russian forces will face similar problems if they soon resume mechanized assaults in the area.[13]
Ukrainian officials continue to highlight how Ukraine is reducing Russia's battlefield artillery ammunition advantage, likely in part due to recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots. Ukrainian First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havryliuk stated on October 1 that the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian artillery ammunition usage decreased from 8-to-1 in favor of Russian forces in Winter 2024 to 3-to-1 as of early October 2024.[14] A Russian milblogger, who is often critical of Russian authorities, claimed on September 30 that Russian forces in various sectors of the front are suffering from artillery ammunition shortages, possibly due to recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots, including the September 18 strike against a Russian missile and storage ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast and the September 21 strike against the Tikhoretsk Arsenal in Krasnodar Krai.[15] The milblogger complained that Russian defense industrial factories, which are operating every day, should still be able to produce and deliver ammunition to the Russian military but appear to be failing to do so. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on September 5 that Russian forces were firing two to 2.5 more artillery shells than Ukrainian forces but that Ukrainian forces were narrowing the gap.[16] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also stated on September 13 that the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian artillery ammunition usage in the Pokrovsk direction decreased from 12-to-1 in favor of Russian forces to 2.5-to-1 after the start of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[17] Ukrainian officials' statements in early September 2024 about Russia's decreased artillery ammunition advantage suggest that although the recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots have likely decreased Russian artillery supplies, the strikes are likely not the only contributor to reportedly reduced Russian shell supplies. Western-provided military aid and increasing Ukrainian domestic ammunition production may have also allowed Ukraine to increase its ammunition usage.[18]
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its June-August 2024 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs. The UN OHCHR reported that 589 Ukrainian civilians died and 2,685 sustained injuries from conflict-related violence from June 1 to August 31 – a 45 percent increase from the previous three-month period from March 1 to May 31.[19] The UN OHCHR assessed that Russian large-scale missile strikes against Ukraine on July 8 and Russian forces' intensified efforts to advance in Donetsk Oblast were the main reasons for the high civilian casualty numbers. The UN OHCHR interviewed 169 recently-released Ukrainian POWs, five Ukrainian retained medical personnel, and 205 Russian POWs held in Ukrainian captivity. The UN OHCHR reported that 104 of the 205 interviewed Russian POWs stated that they had faced torture or ill-treatment, mostly at the initial stage of their detainment before being transferred to official facilities, but that conditions in official Ukrainian-run POW locations generally complied with international humanitarian law. The UN OHCHR found that Russian authorities, in contrast, have subjected Ukrainian POWs to torture, ill-treatment, and inhumane conditions "in a widespread and systematic manner" and that almost all Ukrainians interviewed since March 2023 discussed a wide range of methods of torture and ill-treatment during all stages of captivity and interrogation. The UN OHCHR assessed that it is highly unlikely that Russian military superiors and administrators are not aware of the treatment of Ukrainian POWs and that Russian state entities may be coordinating the use of torture. Geolocated drone footage published on October 1 shows Russian forces executing 16 surrendering Ukrainian soldiers near Mykolaivka in the Pokrovsk direction, highlighting the most recent instance of clear Russian abuse of Ukrainian POWs.[20] ISW has extensively reported on footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs and observed a wider trend of prolific Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appeared to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and upheld by Russian field commanders.[21]
The UN OHCHR report highlighted the difference between official Russian and Ukrainian reactions to the mistreatment of POWs, and Russian state media largely misrepresented the report by ignoring assessments about Russia's systemic mistreatment of Ukrainian POWs. The report noted that Russian government officials and state-owned media regularly use "dehumanizing" language about Ukrainian POWs, that some Russian public figures have explicitly called for the unlawful treatment of Ukrainian POWs, and that there are no known prosecutions or convictions against the Russian perpetrators of torture or ill-treatment of Ukrainian POWs. The report noted how the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported that it had conducted five pre-trial investigations into possible ill-treatment and murder of Russian POWs since mid-August 2024. The UN OHCHR reported that Ukrainian authorities continue to give the organization "regular and unimpeded" access to Russian POWs, whereas Russia has denied access to Ukrainian POWs since the start of the full-scale invasion. Russian state media only reported on the UN OHCHR's assessments about Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs, withholding the details of the report about Russia's systemic abuse of Ukrainian POWs.[22]
The Russian federal budget for 2025-2027 has carved out funding to support online platforms belonging to a prominent Kremlin propagandist and a former opposition outlet, further highlighting the Kremlin's efforts to adapt its propaganda machine to Russians’ growing reliance on social media for information. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on September 30 that the 2025-2027 draft budget allocates 4.5 billion rubles ($47 million) and 49 million rubles ($511,000) in state funding towards the Solovyov Live Telegram channel and Readovka online news aggregator, respectively.[23] Astra noted that this is the first time these online platforms are receiving federal funding. A 2023 joint investigation by Russian opposition outlets Meduza and The Bell found that Readovka posed itself as a semi-opposition outlet prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but then actively started voicing pro-Kremlin views and working with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after March 2022.[24] The joint investigation noted that Readovka founder Alexei Kostylev "always wanted to be in the center," suggesting that the Kremlin viewed Kostylev's personal ambitions and affiliations as exploitable factors and coopted Readovka to further the Kremlin rhetorical line following the full-scale invasion. Solovyov Live is a Telegram channel run by Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov and has been a major platform through which the Kremlin has sustained its information narratives and dispelled the information space's criticism since the start of the war. Solovyov has been using the Solovyov Live Telegram channel to amplify his other online initiatives, such as podcasts, and most recently used the platform to defend the commander of a Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) unit who disbanded a specialized drone unit and sent specialized drone operators to their deaths while conducting an infantry assault.[25] Both Readovka and Solovyov Live have a decidedly pro-Kremlin bent, and the Kremlin's sponsorship of these online platforms and initiatives suggests that the Kremlin is increasingly adapting its state-run propaganda machine, which previously focused on traditional TV and print media, to emerging social media platforms.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces likely seized Vuhledar as of October 1 following a reported Ukrainian withdrawal from the settlement, though it is unclear if Russian forces will make rapid gains beyond Vuhledar in the immediate future.
- Some Russian sources expressed doubts that Russian forces would be able to rapidly advance and achieve operationally-significant breakthroughs immediately after seizing Vuhledar.
- Ukrainian officials continue to highlight how Ukraine is reducing Russia's battlefield artillery ammunition advantage, likely in part due to recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots.
- The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its June-August 2024 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs. The UN OHCHR report highlighted the difference between official Russian and Ukrainian reactions to the mistreatment of POWs, and Russian state media largely misrepresented the report by ignoring assessments about Russia's systemic mistreatment of Ukrainian POWs.
- The Russian federal budget for 2025-2027 has carved out funding to support online platforms belonging to a prominent Kremlin propagandist and a former opposition outlet, further highlighting the Kremlin's efforts to adapt its propaganda machine to Russians’ growing reliance on social media for information.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
- Russian authorities are reportedly planning to increase recruitment within Russian pre-trial detention centers.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 30, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 30, 2024, 4:30pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30pm ET on September 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The Russian government plans to spend 17 trillion rubles ($183 billion) on national security and defense in 2025 — about 41 percent of its annual expenditures. The Russian government submitted a bill on the federal budget for 2025 to 2027 to the State Duma on September 30.[1] The bill projects federal revenues to be 40.3 trillion rubles ($433 billion) in 2025 and federal expenditures to amount to 41.5 trillion rubles ($446 billion). The budget calls for 13.5 trillion rubles ($145 billion) to go towards "National Defense" expenditures in 2025 and projects that defense spending will decrease to 12.8 trillion rubles ($137 billion) in 2026 but increase to 13 trillion rubles ($139 billion) in 2027.[2] The 2025 budget also calls for 3.5 trillion rubles ($37 billion) towards "National Security" — meaning that Russia plans to commit about 41 percent of its expenditures in 2025 to combined "defense" and "security" expenses. The budget notably allocates 14.03 billion rubles ($151 million) annually from 2025 to 2027 to the creation of a mobilization reserve in the Russian Armed Forces.[3] The bill calls for about 40 billion rubles ($430 million) in 2025 to fund the "Defenders of the Fatherland Fund," which supports Russian veterans and their families.[4] The Russian government is also earmarking significant funding towards developing new technologies. The 2025–2027 budget allocates 6.1 trillion rubles ($65 billion) for measures to "achieve technological leadership," 234.4 billion rubles ($2.5 billion) for machine-tool production, 112.1 billion rubles ($1.2 billion) for the "Unmanned Aircraft Systems" production project, 46.9 billion rubles ($504 million) for the development of new nuclear and energy technologies, and 175.3 billion rubles ($1.8 billion) for the development of radio and microelectronics.[5] Increases in defense spending do not necessarily equate to increased military capabilities, however, especially when significant funding is going towards paying benefits to Russian soldiers, veterans, and their families.
The Russian budget will continue to support various social programs, including the Kremlin's pro-natalist programs, but a continued focus on defense spending is likely affecting the effectiveness and sustainability of these programs. The "Social Policy" section of the 2025 budget accounts for 6.4 trillion rubles ($69 billion).[6] The bill allocates about 4 trillion rubles ($43 billion) between 2025 and 2027 for payments to people with children and about 1.7 trillion rubles ($18 billion) for Russia's maternity capital program through 2030. The budget accounts for 1.57 trillion rubles ($16 billion) for education in 2025, and healthcare spending accounts for 1.86 trillion rubles ($20 billion) in 2025 and 2026. The Russian government has allocated 824 billion rubles ($8.8 million) for the payment of state pensions in 2025 and 1.36 trillion rubles ($14 billion) for recently announced pension increases.[7] Russian opposition outlet Meduza noted that the Russian government press release highlighted funding for pregnant women, families with children, national projects, and regional support but did not mention defense spending.[8] Kremlin officials similarly highlighted social spending while avoiding discussions of increased defense spending on September 29 when the Cabinet of Ministers initially approved the draft federal budget, likely due to the Kremlin's wariness about war fatigue among the Russian population.[9] Sustained high levels of defense spending in the coming years during a protracted war in Ukraine and continued military preparations for a possible conflict with NATO will make it more difficult for the Kremlin to sustain funding for the social programs that the Russian population cares about, such as pension increases and healthcare. Increased defense spending will also affect the long-term effectiveness of the Kremlin's efforts to use financial incentives to increase Russia's birth rate and reverse Russia's demographic crisis.[10] Popular demands for increased social and decreased defense funding in the future may also hamper the Kremlin's ability to sustain its war in Ukraine as Russian President Vladimir Putin must take his regime's stability and domestic support into account.
Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted presidential aide and close personal ally Alexei Dyumin to the Russian Security Council alongside three other officials.[11] Putin signed a decree on September 30 updating the membership of the Russian Security Council — a key Russian consultative body that informs Putin’s decisions on national security issues. Putin added Dyumin, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov, Head of the Russian Federal Medical-Biological Agency (FMBA) Veronika Skvortsova, and Head of the Kremlin’s Main Directorate for Special Programs (GUSP) Alexander Linets to the Russian Security Council.[12] Putin removed First Deputy Speaker of the Russian Federal Council Vladimir Yakushev from the Russian Security Council after removing Yakushev from his role as the Kremlin Representative to the Urals Federal District on September 24.[13] Dyumin is the youngest ever member of the Russian Security Council at 52 years old and has been a loyal supporter of Putin's regime since he served as Putin’s bodyguard beginning in 1999.[14] The Russian Security Council is mostly composed of officials of Putin’s generation (with most born in the 1950s), and Dyumin's appointment suggests that Putin is preparing a new generation of officials.[15] Putin has been steadily promoting Dyumin since the Wagner Group armed rebellion in June 2023, with Dyumin becoming the presidential aide for the defense industrial base (DIB) and secretary of the advisory State Council in May 2024.[16] Putin later tasked Dyumin with supervising the Russian response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[17] Putin also recently promoted Manturov (who is 55 years old) to the position of first deputy prime minister in May 2024, despite previously using Manturov as a scapegoat for Russian DIB problems and the inadequate response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast.[18] Skvortsova (63 years old) previously served as the Russian Minister of Health between 2012 and 2020 before becoming the head of FMBA, and Putin recently reappointed Skvortsova to the position of FMBA head in late June 2024.[19] Linets (61 years old) previously served as the deputy chief of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) of the 20th Combined Arms Army and as head of FSB Directorate for the Southern Military District (SMD) before assuming his current role in 2015.[20] Linets has also served as a member of the Russian Military-Industrial Commission since 2015.
The Kremlin continues to use state and regional awards to co-opt previously critical milbloggers as part of wider efforts to gain control over the information space. Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded Russian milblogger and Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny with the Hero of Russia award on September 30 for "demonstrating heroism" while performing official duties.[21] Putin personally called Poddubny in August 2024 after Poddubny sustained injuries while reporting from Kursk Oblast.[22] Poddubny served as a "trusted person" in Putin's presidential campaigns in 2018 and 2024.[23] The Kremlin had been increasingly trying to use Poddubny to disseminate official narratives in the Russian ultranationalist information space by appointing him to Kremlin-run initiatives and highlighting his reports on Russian state media since late 2022.[24]
Russian milblogger Roman Alekhin claimed on September 30 that Russian authorities awarded him the "Defender of Kursk Oblast" medal, thanked Kursk Oblast Governor Alexey Smirnov for trusting him, and proclaimed that he serves Russia and the Russian people.[25] Alekhin has long been critical of Russian authorities and rhetorically attacked Smirnov on his Telegram channel in July 2024.[26] Smirnov appointed Alekhin as a volunteer advisor following these July 2024 attacks, at which point Alekhin claimed that he is taking responsibility for and acting upon his previous criticisms of the Kursk Oblast government.[27] Alekhin's September 30 statements suggest that Russian authorities have successfully used appointments and awards to coopt a critical voice. The Kremlin has used similar methods in the past, such as by including Alexander "Sasha" Kots in the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights in 2022 and awarding Mikhail Zvinchuk of the Rybar Telegram channel with presidential and Ministry of Defense (MoD) honors in late 2023.[28]
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin arrived in Tehran on September 30 to meet with various Iranian officials and highlight Russo–Iranian economic cooperation.[29] Mishustin met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and stated that he expects that Russia and Iran will sign the anticipated comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement at the upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, from October 22 to 24.[30] Mishustin also met with Iran's First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref to talk about opportunities for Russian investment in "various fields" in Iran and notably met with Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad.[31] Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali reported that Mishustin's visit to Iran will particularly focus on developing trade and economic ties between the two countries.[32] Russian and Iranian officials likely view expanded economic and financial cooperation as a necessary component of generally intensified Russo–Iranian relations.
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian government plans to spend 17 trillion rubles ($183 billion) on national security and defense in 2025 — about 41 percent of its annual expenditures. The Russian budget will continue to support various social programs, including the Kremlin's pronatalist programs, but a continued focus on defense spending is likely affecting the effectiveness and sustainability of these programs.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Presidential Aide and close personal ally Alexei Dyumin to the Russian Security Council alongside three other officials.
- The Kremlin continues to use state and regional awards to coopt previously critical milbloggers as part of wider efforts to gain control over the information space.
- Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin arrived in Tehran on September 30 to meet with various Iranian officials and highlight Russo-Iranian economic cooperation.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Glushkvosky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed on September 30 the decree on Russia’s usual semi-annual fall conscription for 133,000 draftees.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 29, 2024
click here to read the full report
Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 29, 2024, 4:45pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on September 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Western countries continue to invest in the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD), in collaboration with the Danish DIB, announced on September 29 the establishment of a defense industrial hub at the Danish embassy in Kyiv with the aim of enhancing Danish-Ukrainian defense industrial cooperation.[1] The Danish initiative aims to support Danish defense and dual-use companies that want to establish production or partnerships with Ukraine. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Danish Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Troels Lund Poulsen also signed a Letter of Intent on September 29 that pledges Danish financial support for defense production in Ukraine.[2] Denmark will allocate a total of 575 million euros ($641 million) for investment in the Ukrainian DIB, with 175 million euros ($195 million) coming directly from the Danish budget and an additional 400 million euros ($446 million) from profits from frozen Russian assets.[3] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 14 that Ukraine will be able to domestically produce $20 billion worth of defense equipment in 2025 if Ukraine receives additional funding from its partners.[4] ISW has assessed the importance of sustained and timely Western military support for Ukraine, particularly Western assistance to develop Ukraine’s DIB, so that Ukraine can become more self-sufficient and reduce its reliance on Western military aid in the long-term.[5]
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian ammunition depot and missile storage facility near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast on September 29. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian media reported on September 29 that drone operators of the Unmanned Systems Forces, Special Operations Forces (SSO), Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck the facility and suggested that a shipment of an unspecified number of Iranian missiles recently arrived at the facility.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the strike caused a fire and secondary ammunition denotations at the facility. Satellite imagery captured on September 29 shows that the strikes likely caused a fire just northwest of the facility, and data available from NASA FIRMS shows heat anomalies in this area.[7] Kotluban Head Igor Davydenko stated that Ukrainian drones attempted to strike the area but did not cause any damage to the facility, although a local Volgograd Oblast outlet reported that firefighters extinguished a fire caused by falling drone debris near an unspecified military facility.[8] Russian opposition outlet Astra noted that internet sources are falsely attributing footage from a 2021 explosion in Dubai, United Arab Emirates to the Kutluban strike.[9] Astra also reported that its sources in Rostov Oblast's emergency services stated that Russian forces shot down over 20 Ukrainian drones targeting the Millerovo Air Base on the night of September 28 to 29 and noted that data available from NASA FIRMS shows heat anomalies near the air base.[10] Footage published on September 29 purportedly shows a fire near the Millerovo Air Base.[11] A Russian insider source published footage purportedly showing a fire near the Yeysk Air Base in Krasnodar Krai, but ISW cannot confirm the authenticity of this footage.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down 125 Ukrainian drones on the night of September 28 to 29, including 67 drones over Volgograd Oblast, 17 drones over Voronezh Oblast, and 18 drones over Rostov Oblast.[13]
The Russian government is reportedly planning to further increase defense spending in 2025, although Kremlin officials appear to be highlighting planned social spending while avoiding discussions of increased defense spending. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved on September 29 a draft federal budget for 2025 to 2027 and will submit the budget to the State Duma by October 1.[14] The draft budget states that Russia's federal revenues are expected to grow by almost 12 percent in 2025 compared to 2024 and that the share of non-oil and gas revenues in the federal budget is expected to increase to 73 percent. Bloomberg reported on September 23 that it viewed draft proposals of the three-year draft budget, which showed that the Russian government plans to spend 13.2 trillion rubles (about $140 billion) on defense in 2025 — an increase from 10.4 trillion rubles (about $110 billion) projected for 2024.[15] Bloomberg stated that Russia plans to spend roughly 40 percent on national defense and domestic security in 2025 — more than spending for education, health care, social policies, and the federal economy combined. The Kremlin will reportedly increase spending on classified items from 11.1 trillion rubles (about $117 billion) in 2024 to 12.9 trillion rubles (about $136 billion) in 2025.
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed on September 24 that the government plans to fulfill "all social obligations to citizens" and highlighted planned funding for medical care, pensions, and national projects.[16] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged that "significant resources" are going towards Russia's "special military operation," but emphasized that 40 trillion rubles (about $424 billion) will go towards 19 national projects over six years — twice as much as the funding allocated for the period of 2019 to 2024.[17] Siluanov also highlighted that Russia plans to spend 180 billion rubles (about $1.9 billion) on modernized public utilities infrastructure and preferential mortgage programs. Kremlin officials are likely wary of war fatigue among the Russian population and are attempting to maintain public support for the war by highlighting the Kremlin's attention to social projects.
Key Takeaways:
- Western countries continue to invest in the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).
- Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian ammunition depot and missile storage facility near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast on September 29.
- The Russian government is reportedly planning to further increase defense spending in 2025, although Kremlin officials appear to be highlighting planned social spending while avoiding discussions of increased defense spending.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, west of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 28, 2024
click here to read the full report
Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 28, 2024, 3:30pm ET
Western officials continue to highlight efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to support the Russian war effort in Ukraine. The Times reported on September 27 that Western officials revealed that an unspecified PRC company is sending a range of military drones to Russia for testing and eventual use by Russian forces in Ukraine.[1] A Western official reportedly stated that the PRC company signed the agreement with Russia in 2023 and that there is "clear evidence that PRC companies are supplying Russia with deadly weapons for use in Ukraine." The Times reported that the Western official confirmed a September 25 report from Reuters about Russia's secret weapons program in the PRC to develop long-range attack drones for use in Ukraine.[2] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on September 27 that roughly 70 percent of Russian imports of machine tools and 90 percent of microelectronic imports come from the PRC and Hong Kong and that Russia is using these imports to produce missiles, rockets, armored vehicles, and munitions.[3] Blinken stated that the PRC's actions do not "add up" since the PRC speaks about wanting peace in Ukraine but is allowing PRC companies to take actions that are helping the Russian war effort. The PRC has repeatedly attempted to depict itself as a neutral mediator in the war in Ukraine, and continued reports of PRC aid to Russia's war effort undermine this claim.[4]
Ukrainian media reported on September 28 that unspecified Russian resistance movements, in coordination with the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), killed the Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) 924th State Center for Unmanned Aviation Colonel Aleksei Kolomeystev in Koloma, Moscow Oblast.[5] GUR stated that Kolomeystev was involved in training Russian drone operators, including operators and support staff for Shahed-type kamikaze drones.[6] GUR posted a photo of Kolomeystev's body but did not acknowledge any involvement in the killing.[7] Russian officials have not officially acknowledged the assassination.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) strongly condemned on September 28 Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.[8] The Russian MFA responded to the Israeli airstrike on Beirut, Lebanon that killed Nasrallah and advocated for an immediate cessation to hostilities, stating that Israel will bear full responsibility for any subsequent escalation in the Middle East. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also issued a joint condemnation of Israel’s airstrikes in Syria on September 28 during a meeting with the Turkish and Iranian foreign ministers.[9]
Key Takeaways:
- Western officials continue to highlight efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to support the Russian war effort in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian media reported on September 28 that unspecified Russian resistance movements, in coordination with the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), killed the Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) 924th State Center for Unmanned Aviation Colonel Aleksei Kolomeystev in Koloma, Moscow Oblast.
- The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) strongly condemned on September 28 Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
- Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Selydove, and Vuhledar.
- Russia is reportedly implementing legislation that allows Russian authorities to release those accused of crimes from criminal liabilities if the accused signs a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 27, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Haley Zehrung, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 27, 2024, 8:15pm ET
Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction on September 26 — the first large Russian mechanized assault along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line since Winter 2024. A Ukrainian battalion operating near Pishchane (northwest of Svatove and southeast of Kupyansk) posted geolocated footage on September 26 showing Ukrainian forces repelling the reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault in fields around Pishchane and reported that Russian forces attacked in the direction of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka (west of Pishchane and directly on the Oskil River).[1] The Ukrainian battalion reported that Russian forces used 50 armored vehicles in the assault, and the Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces Command reported that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in two columns, one with 37 armored vehicles and the other with 13.[2] The Ukrainian battalion reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed three tanks and 11 armored vehicles and damaged 10 tanks and 16 armored vehicles.[3] The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces Command posted footage showing damaged and destroyed Russian armored vehicles crowded close to one another, suggesting that Russian armored vehicles attacked in tight columns and became jammed once Ukrainian fire elements started to strike the column— a common occurrence in failed Russian mechanized assaults.[4] Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian forces back to their starting positions near Pishchane, and none of the geolocated footage that ISW has observed of the assault indicates that Russian forces advanced during the assault.[5]
The Russian Western Grouping of Forces conducted several large mechanized assaults between January and February 2024 at the start of the Russian offensive operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, with the last observed battalion-size Russian mechanized assault occurring west of Kreminna in late January.[6] Russian forces have since conducted infantry assaults and occasional roughly platoon-size mechanized assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and the tempo of the Russian offensive operation along this sector of the front has generally been much lower than Russian offensive operations elsewhere in Ukraine.[7]
Russian forces may be intensifying their efforts to reach the Oskil River, although Russian advances on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River will likely continue to be relatively gradual. Russian forces have created a small tactical salient around Pishchane in recent weeks and have focused on advancing toward Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka.[8] Russian forces advanced along a ravine running east of Pishchane and in fields south and north of the settlement but have struggled to advance in the fields immediately east of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka. The command of the Western Grouping of Forces may have intended for the large mechanized assault to allow Russian forces to advance rapidly through these fields and consolidate positions within Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka and enable Russian infantry to establish a more enduring foothold within the two settlements on the Oskil River.
Russian forces are likely focusing on establishing a foothold directly on the Oskil River because it would allow Russian forces to envelop Ukrainian positions on the east bank of the river both to the north and south - creating a narrower Ukrainian salient between Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and Hlushkivka and a wider Ukrainian salient south of Kruhlyakivka since the Oskil River acts as a barrier. The Western Grouping of Forces has conducted the offensive operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in four mutually supporting axes of advance (northeast of Kupyansk, northwest of Svatove, southwest of Svatove, and west of Kreminna) specifically so that Russian territorial gains on any route of advance would generate opportunities to create Ukrainian salients on the east bank of the Oskil River and envelop Ukrainian positions both to the north and south of any advance.[9] The desired Russian seizure of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka does not ensure that Russian forces would be able to more quickly reduce the potential Ukrainian salient between Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and Hlushkivka nor increase the pace of advance south of Kruhlyakivka, however. Russian forces have not demonstrated the ability to quicken the pace of their advance along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in recent months, and Russian forces have also failed to make even marginal gains on other axes of advance, notably spending weeks to enter small settlements like Nevske and Makiivka (both northwest of Kreminna). Russian sources claimed as of September 27 that Ukrainian forces are actively counterattacking near Nevske, and Ukrainian forces have previously conducted tactically successful counterattacks in the Kreminna area — suggesting that Ukrainian forces have more flexibility to contest the tactical initiative in the area than elsewhere in eastern Ukraine.[10]
The Russian military command has demonstrated that it will likely accept continued gradual gains along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, however. The Western Grouping of Forces established the Russian offensive operation towards the Oskil River as a much more sustainable effort than previous offensive operations and has repeatedly slowed offensive tempo along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line to allow participating Russian units to rest, reconstitute, and rotate.[11] Russian forces began the effort to reach the Oskil River in Winter 2024 and have not abandoned the effort despite several brief operational culminations in the previous months.[12]
Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command are currently pursuing a theory of victory in Ukraine that posits that Russian forces can continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, and gradual Russian advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line cohere with this strategic calculus.[13] ISW continues to assess that Russia's objective to push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River is an operationally significant objective since it would allow Russian forces to establish an easily defensible front along the river and free up combat power.[14] The Russian military command continues to deprioritize other offensive operations with operationally significant objectives, however, as seen with the current Russian offensive operation around the operationally significant town of Chasiv Yar.
The Western Grouping of Forces likely has limited capacity to maintain an intensified offensive effort along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line or conduct effective combat operations that result in more rapid gains. The Western Grouping of Forces initially was comprised of both Moscow and Leningrad Military District (MMD/LMD) elements when it launched the offensive operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in Winter 2024, and the Russian military redeployed the majority of the LMD elements to the Northern Grouping of Forces to conduct the Russian offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024.[15] Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has since drawn additional elements from the Western Grouping of Forces to defend in Kursk Oblast from the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[16] The Western Grouping of Forces has now tasked the MMD's 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) with a wider area of responsibility from northeast of Kupyansk to west of Svatove while continuing to task primarily the MMD's 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA] with the front southwest of Svatove to west of Kreminna.[17] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 25 that the 1st GTA has created an operational reserve of elements of the 1st GTA's 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division), 371st Motorized Rifle Regiment (mobilized unit), and several combined rifle battalions from the 1st GTA's 4th and 47th tank divisions to support the Russian offensive operation in the Kupyansk direction, and this reserve will likely be unable to support prolonged intensified offensive operations.[18] The command of the Western Grouping of Forces has previously overseen costly and ineffective mechanized assaults. Continued pronounced failures with mechanized assaults suggest that the Western Grouping of Forces is not learning tactical lessons that other Russian groupings of forces have learned.[19]
Russian authorities appear to be expending a significant amount of effort to influence the Western debate about allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to conduct long-range strikes against military objects in Russia. This Russian effort suggests a deep concern with the operational pressures that such strikes into Russia would generate on Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, although US officials remain hesitant to permit Ukraine to conduct such strikes. The New York Times (NYT), citing unnamed US officials, reported on September 26 that US intelligence assessments "play down" the effect that Ukrainian strikes into Russia with US-, UK-, and French-provided long-range missile systems could have on the course of the war in Ukraine due to Ukraine's limited number of such weapons and uncertainty around the future provision of more long-range systems.[20] NYT noted that officials within the US military and Biden administration who support the policy change stated that Western-provided weapons would allow Ukraine to strike more distant Russian bases and ammunition warehouses and force the Russian military to relocate ammunition depots, command posts, attack helicopters, and other materiel out of the range of Western missiles, which the officials noted would significantly complicate Russian supply lines in Ukraine.[21]
Even a small number of successful Ukrainian long-range strikes could have asymmetric impacts and prompt Russian forces to move significant military and storage facilities outside the range of Western-provided weapons and further away from the frontline - complicating Russian logistics in the vicinity of Ukraine. Ukrainian forces previously conducted a series of HIMARS strikes against Russian ammunition depots throughout occupied Ukraine in Summer 2022, which prompted Russian forces to disperse ammunition storage facilities and degraded the efficiency of Russian logistics.[22] Russian authorities are likely concerned about how moving ammunition depots and other critical storage facilities further away from the frontline and outside the range of Western-provided systems will impact Russian offensive capabilities in Ukraine and appear to be engaged in a significant rhetorical effort to prevent the West from allowing Ukraine to conduct another similarly significant strike campaign.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reintroduced several of the Kremlin's previously most effective narratives back into the Western and Russian information spaces in recent weeks and tailored his typical boilerplate language to specifically target the ongoing Western debate about allowing Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes into Russia with Western-provided equipment. Putin invoked the Kremlin's ongoing narrative about its supposed "red lines" and stated on September 11 that Ukrainian strikes against Russia using Western-provided weapons would represent an escalation in the war in Ukraine and directly involve Western countries in the war.[23] Putin invoked the threat of nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West on September 25 and claimed that "aggression against Russia by a non-nuclear state with support or participation from a nuclear state" or the "receipt of reliable information about the massive launch of air and space weapons" at Russia are two possible conditions that Russia could use to justify using a nuclear weapon.[24] The Kremlin's information operations threatening nuclear war if the West crosses Russia's "red lines" were successful at prompting the West into self-deterrence and delaying Western security assistance during critical moments in 2022 and 2024.[25] Officials close to senior Russian diplomats recently claimed that Putin may be doubting the impact of his nuclear saber-rattling against Western policymakers, although Putin may continue to employ such rhetoric if he assesses that these information operations will continue to have even minimal impacts on Western decision-makers.[26]
The benefits of allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided long-range strike systems against Russia may outweigh the risk of Russian retaliation more than Western policymakers are currently considering. Western media outlets have repeatedly reported that the US and other Western governments are hesitant to greenlight Ukraine to use Western-provided systems to strike targets in Russia due to previous assessments that the risk of Russian retaliation for such strikes outweighs the possible benefits that Ukraine could generate with such strikes.[27] NYT reported that the assessment notes that Russia is likely to retaliate with greater force against the US and its allies, possibly with covert attacks on US and European strategic facilities and military bases in Europe, in the event that the West allows Ukraine to use Western-provided systems to strike objects in Russia.[28]
The Kremlin has been conducting covert operations against Western powers since long before the ongoing debate about Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike Russia and the Kremlin may intend to intensify these operations regardless of the West's decision as these operations support other Kremlin objectives to destabilize European countries and undermine NATO's military readiness.[29] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are still benefiting from and exploiting territory within the range of Western-provided systems for further Russian offensive operations against Ukraine and Western policymakers maintain the decision-making power to remove this sanctuary and further complicate Russia's war effort.[30]
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers on September 27, likely as part of the ongoing Kremlin effort to coopt Russian milbloggers and downplay recent backlash in the ultranationalist information space over the death of two prominent drone operators. Russian state-run news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti reported on September 27 that Belousov met with several milbloggers to discuss issues relating to unspecified frontline areas in Ukraine.[31] Several Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers (some of whom were present at previous meetings between MoD officials and milbloggers) praised Belousov for being receptive to their feedback about the situation on the frontlines and being in tune with the situation on the frontline.[32] One Kremlin-affiliated milblogger in attendance had recently published the claimed results of Belousov’s investigation into the deaths of drone operators of the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) Junior Sergeant Dmitry Lysakovsky (alias Goodwin) and Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Gritsai (alias Ernest).[33] Some milbloggers accused this Kremlin-affiliated milblogger of working with the Russian MoD to gauge the public reaction to the claimed results of the investigation, which allegedly found the commander of the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment not guilty of exceeding his powers by committing the drone platoon to combat operations, which ultimately resulted in Lysakovsky and Gritsai’s deaths.[34] Belousov may have met with coopted Russian milbloggers to downplay the controversy generated by the deaths of Lysakovsky and Gritsai likely in an attempt to further the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) influence in the Russian information space.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) announced a new initiative to draw international support for its alternative peace plan for Ukraine amid increasing cooperation with Russia. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced on September 26 that the PRC, Brazil, Pakistan, and "other like-minded countries in the global south" will soon establish the "Friends of Peace" platform that allegedly aims to foster "inclusive dialogue" to find a solution to end the war in Ukraine.[35] The PRC routinely promoted its alternative peace plan, allowing Russian officials to posture as willing to negotiate with Ukraine in good faith despite consistent Kremlin statements either insisting on its terms amounting to total Ukrainian capitulation or rejecting negotiations outright.[36] The Kremlin will likely promote this new Friends of Peace platform and use its support of multiple alternative peace efforts to falsely portray Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continued to meet with US officials about the war in Ukraine during his visit to the US on September 26 and 27. Zelensky met with a bipartisan delegation from the US Senate and with US President Joe Biden on September 26 and with US Vice President Kamala Harris and former US President Donald Trump on September 27.[37]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction on September 26 — the first large Russian mechanized assault along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line since Winter 2024.
- Russian forces may be intensifying their efforts to reach the Oskil River, although Russian advances on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River will likely continue to be relatively gradual.
- The Russian military command has demonstrated that it will likely accept continued gradual gains along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, however.
- The Western Grouping of Forces likely has limited capacity to maintain an intensified offensive effort along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line or conduct effective combat operations that result in more rapid gains.
- Russian authorities appear to be expending a significant amount of effort to influence the Western debate about allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to conduct long-range strikes against military objects in Russia. This Russian effort suggests a deep concern with the operational pressures that such strikes into Russia would generate on Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, although US officials remain hesitant to permit Ukraine to conduct such strikes.
- The benefits of allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided long-range strike systems against Russia may outweigh the risk of Russian retaliation more than Western policymakers are currently considering.
- Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers on September 27, likely as part of the ongoing Kremlin effort to coopt Russian milbloggers and downplay recent backlash in the ultranationalist information space over the death of two prominent drone operators.
- The People's Republic of China (PRC) announced a new initiative to draw international support for its alternative peace plan for Ukraine amid increasing cooperation with Russia.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continued to meet with US officials about the war in Ukraine during his visit to the US on September 26 and 27.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continued assaults in Kursk Oblast, but neither side made further advances.
- Russian forces recently advanced within and around Toretsk and southeast of Pokrovsk.
- Russian authorities continue to threaten Russian frontline soldiers' ad-hoc communications networks.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 26, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Haley Zehrung, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 26, 2024, 5:45pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Germany, France, and the US announced several immediate and more long-term aid packages for Ukraine on September 25 and 26. The German Ministry of Development announced on September 25 that it will provide support to Ukraine this winter for heat and energy in a package totaling around 70 million euros ($78.2 million).[1] Germany will provide Ukrainian cities and municipalities with combined heat and power plants, boiler systems, generators, and solar-power systems to support communities that have been most affected by heat and electricity shortages resulting from heavy Russian strikes. The German Bundestag also announced on September 25 a 400 million euro ($447 million) increase in military funding for Ukraine to enable the purchase of additional air defense systems, tanks, drones, ammunition, and spare parts.[2] French President Emmanuel Macron said during a meeting with Zelensky on September 25 that France will train and fully equip a Ukrainian brigade in the "near future."[3]
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on September 25 that the Pentagon will send an additional military assistance package to Ukraine worth roughly $375 million and that the package will include: air-to-ground munitions; HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; M1117 armored security vehicles; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles; light tactical vehicles; armored bridging systems; small arms, patrol boats; demolitions equipment and munitions; and other miscellaneous equipment and support materiel.[4] US President Joe Biden announced on September 26 that he directed the DoD to allocate all of the remaining security assistance funding to Ukraine (roughly $8 billion) by the end of Biden's presidential term, including funding from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and that he authorized $5.5 billion in Presidential Drawdown Authority to fund the drawdown of US equipment for Ukraine and replenish US stockpiles.[5] Biden stated that the DoD will also announce an additional assistance package worth $2.4 billion to provide Ukraine with additional air defense systems, unmanned aerial systems, and air-to-ground munitions; strengthen Ukraine's defense industry; and support Ukraine's maintenance and sustainment requirements. Biden also announced that the US will provide Ukraine with Joint Standoff Weapon (JOW) long-range munitions, a refurbished Patriot air defense battery, and additional Patriot missiles and will expand F-16 training capabilities to accommodate training 18 additional Ukrainian pilots in 2025. Biden noted that he will also convene a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in October 2024 to coordinate further Western support for Ukraine.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly struggling to coordinate combat tasks with the Russian military despite having control over the counterterrorism operation against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast. Russian exiled opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta Europe reported on September 25 that it identified an FSB Spetsnaz servicemember who died fighting in Kursk Oblast in August 2024 — confirming that elements of FSB Spetsnaz are fighting in Kursk Oblast.[6] Novaya Gazeta Europe reported that an FSB officer stated that the FSB has tasked FSB Spetsnaz, including elements of the Alpha and Vympel groups, with identifying and destroying Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in Kursk Oblast.[7] The FSB officer reportedly stated that the Alpha and Vympel groups are ill-suited for combined arms battles involving heavy equipment against regular military forces, however.[8] FSB Spetsnaz has typically conducted counterterrorism operations against small terrorist groups and likely lacks the training and equipment needed to respond to Ukrainian units conducting combined arms assaults. Another source close to Russian special services reportedly told Novaya Gazeta Europe that the FSB's Special Operations Center does not have a "common connection" with Russian military units and that there is still no common headquarters for coordinating combat tasks between the FSB and the Russian military.[9] Putin tasked the FSB with conducting a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 9 following the start of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on August 6, but then proceeded to assign overlapping tasks to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), FSB, and Rosgvardia.[10] The Kremlin and the Russian military command have struggled to establish a cohesive and effective command and control (C2) structure during the response to the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast, and it remains unclear what responsibilities fall under the purview of the FSB's counterterrorism operation or the MoD's Coordination Council.[11] ISW has previously assessed that overlapping tasks and poor C2 structures will likely continue to generate friction between the FSB and the Russian MoD.[12]
Key Takeaways:
- Germany, France, and the US announced several immediate and more long-term aid packages for Ukraine on September 25 and 26.
- The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly struggling to coordinate combat tasks with the Russian military despite having control over the counterterrorism operation against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continued assaults in Kursk Oblast but neither side made further advances in the area.
- Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City and Chasiv Yar and east and southeast of Pokrovsk.
- Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for holding joint military exercises with Laos, arguing that such exercises demonstrate that Russia is not learning from its battlefield experience in Ukraine.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 25, 2024
click here to read the full report
Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Haley Zehrung, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 25, 2024, 8:30pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on September 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to threaten the possibility of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West in order to exert further control over Western decision-making and discourage the West from allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military objects in Russia. Putin claimed during the first public meeting of the Russian Security Council's standing conference on nuclear deterrence on September 25 that Russia is adjusting its nuclear doctrine to introduce "clarifications" regarding necessary preconditions for Russia to use a nuclear weapon.[1] Putin shared two "clarifications" to the nuclear doctrine: that the Kremlin will consider using nuclear weapons in the case of "aggression against Russia by a non-nuclear state with support or participation from a nuclear state" or in the case of "the receipt of reliable information about the massive launch of air and space weapons" against Russia and these weapons crossing Russia's borders. Putin specified that these "air and space weapons" that could justify Russian nuclear weapons use include strategic and tactical aviation, cruise missiles, drones, and/or hypersonic missiles. Putin likely intends for the hyper-specificity of his nuclear threats to breathe new life into the Kremlin's tired nuclear saber-rattling information operation and generate a new wave of panic among Western policymakers during a particularly critical moment in Western policy discussions about Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided weapons. Kremlin officials routinely invoke thinly veiled threats of nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West during key moments in Western political debates regarding further military assistance to Ukraine — such as the ongoing debate about Ukraine's right to use Western-provided systems to conduct long-range strikes against Russian military objects — to induce fear among decision makers.[2] US Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William Burns cautioned Western policymakers on September 7 against fearing boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling, and ISW has long identified Russia's nuclear saber-rattling as part of the Kremlin's effort to promote Western self-deterrence and not as indicative of Russia's willingness to use nuclear weapons.[3] ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[4]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for potential strikes against Ukraine’s three remaining operational nuclear power plants ahead of the coming winter, highlighting the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued commitment to the destruction of the Ukrainian state and its people. Zelensky gave speeches to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) on September 25 stating that Ukrainian intelligence found that Russia aims to target Ukraine's three operational nuclear power plants in order to degrade Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and power generation capacity before winter 2024–2025 and cause “nuclear disaster.”[5] Zelensky recently noted that Russia is using unspecified Chinese satellites to photograph Ukraine’s nuclear power plants in preparation for strikes and emphasized in his UNGA speech that Russia's previous winter strike campaigns against Ukrainian energy infrastructure have already destroyed Ukraine's thermal power generation capacity and severely degraded its hydroelectric power generation capacity.[6] Russian authorities and sources have repeatedly falsely accused Ukrainian forces of targeting Russian and Russian-occupied nuclear power plants likely as part of Russia’s overarching informational effort to falsely paint Ukraine and the Zelensky government as illegitimate actors and war criminals with whom Russia cannot engage in peace negotiations.[7] Zelensky’s UN speeches also emphasized the principles of international law and the UN Charter as the main avenue through which Ukraine can achieve peace and highlighted the illegality of Russia’s war under international law alongside Russia’s ongoing destabilizing global efforts to enhance its war in Ukraine.[8]
A Russian company is reportedly collaborating with entities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to develop an attack drone for Russia's war in Ukraine. Reuters, citing two European intelligence sources and documents it reviewed, reported on September 25 that Russia has established a secret weapons program in the PRC through Russian and PRC business entities in order to develop long-range attack drones for use in Ukraine.[9] Russian weapons manufacturer IEMZ Kupol reportedly developed and tested the long-range “Garpiya-3” attack drone in collaboration with PRC specialists and informed the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that it can produce these drones at a factory in the PRC. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied knowledge of such a project to Reuters and emphasized the PRC’s strict drone export controls. The White House expressed concern to Reuters about the prospect of a PRC-based entity providing lethal assistance to a sanctioned Russian company and noted that, while it has no evidence that the PRC government is aware of this assistance, the PRC has an obligation to act against such assistance. Reuters reported that IEMZ Kupol has delivered at least seven Garpiya-3 drones to Russia for testing. The Garpiya-3 drones reportedly have a range of 2,000 kilometers and a 50-kilogram payload and are upgraded versions of the Russian-produced Garpiya-A1 attack drones (which have some PRC components). The Reuters report comes amid enhanced Chinese assistance to Russia's war effort.[10] Bloomberg previously reported that unspecified Russian and PRC companies are collaborating in the development of a drone similar to the Iranian-designed Shahed loitering munition for Russian use in Ukraine.[11] The PRC has repeatedly attempted to depict itself as a neutral mediator in the war in Ukraine, and reports of increased military cooperation between Russia and the PRC as well as other assistance to Russia's war effort undermine this claim. Repeated reports of joint Russia-PRC endeavors to enhance military cooperation in areas such as drone production and the ongoing Russia-PRC “Beibu/Interaction-2024” joint naval exercise that started on September 21 represent significant avenues for military knowledge sharing between the two countries.[12] Russian-PRC cooperation may be aimed at countering Western-made air defense systems used in Ukraine and elsewhere and at diminishing Western military influence globally.
Russia continues to deepen its relationship with Iran's Axis of Resistance, this time reportedly via Iran-brokered talks facilitating Russian missile transfers to Yemen's Houthi rebels. Reuters reported on September 25, citing Western and regional sources, that Iran has brokered "secret talks" between Russia and the Houthis to transfer Russian Yakhont (P-800 Oniks) anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis.[13] Reuters' sources noted that Russia has not yet made the decision to transfer the missiles. CNN reported on August 2 that the Kremlin had planned to transfer missiles to the Houthis but reneged due to diplomatic pressure, although Iran's role in brokering the Russia-Houthi talks, or the specifics of the missiles, were unknown at the time of CNN's original reporting.[14] Russia's hypothetical transfer of Yakhont missiles to the Houthis would likely bolster the Houthis' ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against commercial vessels and threaten the security of the Red Sea.[15] Russia has substantial experience employing Yakhont missiles against various targets in Ukraine, and the Houthis could learn from such experience if they are able to procure the missiles.[16] ISW-CTP have recently reported on Russia's efforts to align itself more explicitly with both Iran, on which Russia is reliant for military aid, and with Iran's Axis of Resistance.[17]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to threaten the possibility of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West in order to exert further control over Western decision-making and discourage the West from allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military objects in Russia.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for potential strikes against Ukraine’s three remaining operational nuclear power plants ahead of the coming winter, highlighting the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued commitment to the destruction of the Ukrainian state and its people.
- A Russian company is reportedly collaborating with entities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to develop an attack drone for Russia's war in Ukraine.
- Russia continues to deepen its relationship with Iran's Axis of Resistance, this time reportedly via Iran-brokered talks facilitating Russian missile transfers to Yemen's Houthi rebels.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces continued to regain positions in Vovchansk.
- Russian forces advanced northwest of Kreminna, in Toretsk, and southeast of Pokrovsk.
- Russian forces reportedly advanced within and around Vuhledar (southwest of Donetsk City) amid continued offensive efforts to seize the settlement.
- Veterans of Russia's war in Ukraine continue to commit crimes upon returning to Russia.
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, George Barros, Grace Mappes, Haley Zehrung, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 24, 2024, 8:30pm ET
Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Vuhledar amid what appears to be an intensified offensive push near the settlement, but the capture of Vuhledar is unlikely to afford Russian forces any particular operational edge for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on September 24 shows that Russian forces advanced into eastern Vuhledar up to 12 Desantnykiv Street, confirming reports from Russian and Ukrainian sources that Russian troops broke into eastern Vuhledar between September 23 and 24.[1] Russian forces are additionally trying to advance on Vuhledar's northeast flank via Vodyane and southwestern flank via Prechystivka, likely in an effort to encircle the Ukrainian grouping in Vuhledar and force it to withdraw. ISW geolocated footage published on September 24 that additionally indicates that Russian forces, likely assault elements of the 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District [EMD]), seized the Pivdennodonbaska Mine No. 3 in western Vodyane, which creates a sharper salient about five kilometers north of Vuhledar in the area west of Vodyane.[2] Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have fire control (the ability to prosecute close-range artillery fires on an area to inhibit movement) over the C-051134 Vuhledar-Bohoyavlenka road, which is reportedly Ukraine's final supply route into Vuhledar.[3] Western media and Ukrainian military experts and journalists widely warned on September 23 and 24 that constant Russian assaults and advances on the flanks of Vuhledar are threatening to encircle the Ukrainian garrison within the settlement, which may force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the area, which has been an important Ukrainian stronghold for over two years.[4]
Russian forces may manage to seize all of Vuhledar, but how quickly or easily they are able to do so will likely be contingent on partially on Ukrainian decision-making. If the Ukrainian command decides that the risk of a Russian encirclement of Vuhledar or the costs of defending the settlement itself in urban combat are too great, Ukrainian forces may withdraw, allowing Russian forces to seize Vuhledar relatively rapidly and without engaging in close combat fighting. If Ukrainian forces decide to defend Vuhledar and can prevent Russian efforts to envelop or encircle it, however. Russian forces may struggle to fight through a settlement that Ukrainian forces have had over two years to fortify.[5] If the Russians do not take the settlement relatively rapidly, Russian maneuver along the flanks of Vuhledar may also be impacted by the onset of autumn rains, which would make it much more difficult for Russian forces to advance through the mainly rural and agricultural terrain surrounding Vuhledar as it becomes much muddier. Russian milbloggers have identified Vuhledar's fortifications and the terrain along its flanks as major obstacles to Russia's ability to advance in the area, both during previous offensive efforts and during the current set of attacks.[6] Russia attempted at least two major offensive efforts to seize Vuhledar in late 2022 and early 2023, both of which led to considerable Russian personnel and equipment losses while affording Ukrainian forces the ability to further commit to fortifying the settlement and observe how the Russian grouping in this area plans and prosecutes offensive operations.[7] Elements of the EMD, particularly the Pacific Fleet's 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, have notably been committed to this area and engaged in offensive efforts on Vuhledar since 2022, and the Ukrainian brigade and other Ukrainian formations that have been defending Vuhledar during the same time period have likely learned certain valuable lessons about how these Russian formations fight.[8]
Russia's potential seizure of Vuhledar is unlikely to fundamentally alter the course of offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast, however. Vuhledar is not a particularly crucial logistics node—Russian forces already control most of the main roads running into Vuhledar (the T0509 Vuhledar-Prechystivka road, the C050524 Pavlivka-Vuhledar road, and the T0524 Vuhledar-Marinka road) and are likely already credibly threatening the C051134 route into Bohoyavlenka with close range artillery fires, so the capture of the settlement would not immediately offer Russian forces access to a new roadway, nor cut Ukrainian forces off from a roadway that is crucial to their logistical supply. The potential seizure of Vuhledar will also not necessarily afford Russian forces a beneficial position from which to launch subsequent offensive operations elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast. Vuhledar is 23 kilometers south of the H-15 highway, which runs from Donetsk City to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, but the area between Vuhledar and the highway is mainly comprised of open fields that would require Russian forces to conduct successful mechanized assaults across areas that may soon become too muddy to make more rapid tactical gains.[9] Vuhledar is also about 30 kilometers south of the areas southeast of Pokrovsk that Russian forces are currently prioritizing, and Russian forces would have to maneuver across more than 30 kilometers of open terrain to meaningfully support offensive efforts southeast of Pokrovsk. ISW previously assessed that Russian offensive efforts near Vuhledar and Pokrovsk are mutually reinforcing and intended to stretch Ukrainian forces along a wider front in Donetsk Oblast, but the hypothetical Russian seizure of Vuhledar would not necessarily be operationally significant enough to stretch Ukrainian forces even further in this area.[10]
Recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear ammunition depots demonstrate the extent to which Russian military logistics still benefit from Western-provided sanctuary that secures Russia’s rear. Maxar collected satellite imagery demonstrating dramatic damage to three large Russian ammunition depots in western and southwestern Russia following Ukrainian strikes in September 2024.[11] The imagery of the damage at the Oktyabrskii and Toropets depots in Tver Oblast and the Tikhoretsk depot in Krasnodar Krai depicts the destruction of dozens of ammunition storage buildings, rail cars that Russian forces likely used to transport ammunition to the depots, and masses of probable rocket canisters and other material that Russian forces had haphazardly left in the open. Such a crowded disposition of massed materiel underscores the lack of operational security in Russia’s rear supply depots, demonstrating the extent to which Western restrictions prohibiting Ukraine from firing Western-provided weapons into Russia has granted the Russian command flexibility to not properly protect its rear areas. This flexibility has granted Russia the ability to optimize large rear staging facilities to marshal massed materiel to Ukraine at scale.
The Russian military’s continued use of known large-scale logistics facilities is a considerable vulnerability that Ukraine could exploit if Western states removed restrictions against Ukraine. A Russian milblogger wrote a short essay on September 24 in which he complained about the lack of concealment of Russian military facilities, including warehouses and airfields.[12] The milblogger bemoaned how open sources such as Google Maps and Yandex show all Russian facilities and that private space companies provide regularly updated high-resolution imagery of Russian military objects.[13] The blogger also complained that Russia has not yet created a system for partitioning its ammunition deliveries to ensure that when Ukrainian forces interdict Russian ammo supplies, they would only destroy small caches of ammunition as opposed to strikes that cause catastrophic and widespread damage. ISW continues to assess that Western states can degrade Russia’s ability to leverage mass materiel at scale by eliminating restrictions on Ukraine’s use of precision fires in Russia and by forcing the Russian command to partition ammunition depots into smaller and less efficient facilities, some of which will be further away from Ukraine.[14]
Russia continues to expand and leverage its bilateral relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in order to support its war effort in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 23 that Russia is using unspecified Chinese satellites to photograph Ukraine’s nuclear power plants possibly in preparation to strike them.[15] The US government warned in April 2024 that the PRC is providing Russia with unspecified geospatial intelligence, which coheres with Zelensky's warning about Russia's use of Chinese satellites.[16] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Vladyslav Vlasyuk stated on September 23 that China supplies approximately 60 percent of all foreign components found in the weapons Russia uses against Ukraine.[17] Russian milbloggers circulated images on September 23 showing Russian forces operating Chinese Shaanxi Baoji Tiger armored vehicles equipped with counter-drone technology in Ukraine.[18] Another Russian source noted that Russian forces acquired these vehicles via a third party and not directly from the PRC, but the use of PRC-product military assets in Ukraine, no matter how they were acquired, confirms that Russia is continuing efforts to circumvent sanctions to obtain foreign materiel to support its war effort.[19] These various reports come amid the joint, week-long Russia-PRC ”Beibu/Interaction-2024” naval exercise that started on September 21 and during which Russian Pacific Fleet ships and unspecified Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) warships conducted maneuvers and exercises in the Sea of Okhotsk.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 24 that Russian and PLA ships practiced joint maneuvering, countered mock enemy unmanned boats, conducted reconnaissance and monitored the sea surface situation with deck helicopters.[21] ISW has assessed that Russia seeks to enhance diplomatic, trade, and security ties with non-Western states, particularly the PRC, Iran, and North Korea, in an attempt to boost its war effort in Ukraine by obtaining weapons and critical, dual-use items, machine components, and materiel, through the development of mechanisms aimed at evading Western sanctions.[22] The PRC has repeatedly postured itself as a neutral actor in the war in Ukraine, recently promoting its joint "Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" six-point peace plan (whose key principles nevertheless favor Russia) with Brazil despite a plethora of reports suggesting PRC support to the Russian war effort.[23]
The Russian MoD has failed to appease the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community by downplaying the Russian military command’s responsibility for its insistence on misusing technical specialists in infantry-led frontal assaults in eastern Ukraine. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger who is a member of the Kremlin’s Human Rights Council published the alleged results of the Russian MoD’s and Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Department of Military Counterintelligence investigation into the deaths of drone operators of the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) Junior Sergeant Dmitry Lysakovsky (alias Goodwin) and Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Gritsai (alias Ernest).[24] The drone operators died in combat after the Russian military command disbanded their specialized drone unit and committed them to a frontal assault in Donetsk Oblast (likely in the Pokrovsk direction) as punishment for criticizing their command, resulting in Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov starting an investigation into the case following mass outcry online.[25] The milblogger, citing unnamed sources familiar with the investigation, claimed on September 23 that Russian authorities found that the commander of the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment did not exceed his powers by committing the drone platoon to combat operations given the tactical situation on the ground and the official purpose of the military personnel.[26] The investigation also reportedly did not find any instances of drug trafficking on the frontline — an issue that Lysakovsky, Gritsai, and now arrested assault detachment commander of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) Vladimir Novikov (alias Beliy) reportedly raised to the Russian military command.[27] The investigation reportedly stated the situation is the result of commanders generally neglecting to appropriately select manpower based on professional qualities, and Belousov reportedly appointed two unnamed experienced officers as 87th Separate Rifle Regiment’s chief of staff — deputy commander and deputy commander. The milblogger noted that the Russian MoD “brought to disciplinary liability” a number of military commanders, including 51st CAA, 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade, and 87th Separate Rifle Regiment commanders, but another milblogger pointed out that Belousov did not fire the regiment’s commander (alias “Zloy”) whom the drone operators identified as responsible for disbanding their unit before their deaths.[28] Belousov reportedly ordered the Russian MoD’s Main Directorate for Control and Supervision Activities to inspect the problems of manning and equipping drone units and to assess these units’ effectiveness and tasked the Russian General Staff with submitting proposals on the creation of regular drone units within the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment and other military units.
Russian milbloggers overwhelmingly questioned the legitimacy of the milblogger’s account of the investigation, even though this milblogger is a member of numerous Kremlin initiatives and appears to be downplaying the backlash over these deaths in the information space.[29] Several Russian milbloggers implied that the Russian MoD used the Kremlin-affiliated milblogger to gauge the public reaction to the claimed results of the investigation and urged their audiences to wait for the Russian MoD to publish the official report.[30] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger previously shared parts of the investigation claiming that Gritsai died during a Ukrainian drone strike on a rear position and implied that the platoon used mobile devices during the strike, essentially accusing them of being responsible for the circumstances of their deaths.[31] The Russian MoD had recently intensified its efforts to ban personal devices on the frontlines, and it is likely that the Russian MoD is using the milblogger’s platform to deny responsibility and to advance the Kremlin’s force centralization and information space control efforts.[32]
The claimed results of the investigation indicate that the Russian MoD is disinterested in addressing the systematic misuse of semi-independent Russian military innovators, specialists, and irregular commanders due to its commitment to the force centralization campaign and to maintaining the current tempo of offensive operations. A Russian milblogger and former Storm Z instructor claimed that the unofficial reports of the results of the investigation indicate that the Russian MoD has committed to downplaying the situation in the information space and is disinterested in conducting an objective investigation and improving the overall quality of the Russian Armed Forces.[33] One milblogger, who has remained very critical of the Russian MoD, reported that the Russian military command recently committed a Spetsnaz officer to a regular infantry assault unit because the unit lacked assault elements.[34] The milblogger recalled similar recent instances of misuse of Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) engineers, Baltic Fleet sailors, missilemen, and disabled Russian servicemen in infantry-led assaults. The milblogger recalled that the Russian military command "senselessly” reduced Russian elite airborne (VDV) and Spetsnaz forces at the beginning of the war by committing them to operations for which they were not trained.[35] The Russian military command also formed the 3rd "Frigate” Mechanized Battalion, which fighting in Pokrovsk, northern Kharkiv, and Lyman directions as part of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) with sailors of the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier[36] The systematic misuse of Russian specialists also indicates that Russia is struggling to meet the manpower demands of its war in Ukraine.[37]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Vuhledar amid what appears to be an intensified offensive push near the settlement, but the capture of Vuhledar is unlikely to afford Russian forces any particular operational edge for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.
- Recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear ammunition depots demonstrate the extent to which Russian military logistics still benefit from Western-provided sanctuary that secures Russia’s rear.
- Russia continues to expand and leverage its bilateral relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in order to support its war effort in Ukraine.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has failed to appease the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community by downplaying the Russian military command’s responsibility for its insistence on misusing technical specialists in infantry-led frontal assaults in eastern Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of the Kursk Oblast salient.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk and in eastern Toretsk.
- Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing its own conversations with various unspecified Russian officials close to the Russian Presidential Administration, an interlocutor in the federal government, and regional officials, reported on September 24 that mobilization is a very sensitive topic among Kremlin officials.
Click here to read the full report with maps
Christina Harward, George Barros, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Haley Zehrung, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 23, 2024, 6:15pm ET
The Kremlin continues to publicly signal its disinterest in any peace settlement short of total capitulation of the Ukrainian government and destruction of the Ukrainian state. Zelensky stated in an interview with the New Yorker about Ukraine’s “Victory Plan” published on September 22 that Russia is not interested in ending the war on any reasonable terms and is feigning interest in negotiations.[3] Zelensky highlighted that Ukraine invited Russia to attend Ukraine's second peace summit but that the Kremlin had not demonstrated any interest in participating. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov notably stated on September 22 that there is "no alternative" to Russian victory in Ukraine, reiterating Russia's unwillingness to negotiate on terms other than Ukrainian capitulation.[4] Peskov also identified NATO and the West as a “collective enemy.” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova recently announced that Russia will not participate in the second Ukrainian peace summit or any "such summits."[5] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is not interested in good faith peace negotiations with Ukraine and that the Kremlin will only invoke the concept of “peace plans” and “negotiations” to prompt the West to pressure Ukraine into preemptive concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[6]
Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City for the first time overnight on September 22 to 23.[7] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted seven airstrikes with KAB glide bombs at Zaporizhzhia City overnight, damaging 13 residential buildings and two educational facilities, and injuring at least 21 civilians.[8] Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian forces conducted another strike against a critical infrastructure facility in Zaporizhzhia City on September 23 but did not specify whether Russian forces used glide bombs or another weapon.[9] Some Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed that Russian forces did not use KAB glide bombs, which are largely guided but rather used FAB-250 bombs equipped with unified planning and correction modules (UMPCs).[10] Soviet-era FAB bomb variants are largely unguided, and other iterations of Russian FABs with UMPCs have been unguided, though it is unclear whether the glide bombs that struck Zaporizhzhia City had guidance systems.[11] Russian glide bombs have a glide range of 40-60 kilometers, and Zaporizhzhia City is roughly 25-35 kilometers from the current frontline in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[12] Russian milbloggers celebrated the strike as an inflection in Russian strike capabilities and called on Russian forces to target logistics assets near the city, including bridges across the Dnipro River.[13] Ukrainian forces are only able to counter the threat of Russian glide bombs by shooting down the aircraft that launch them, further demonstrating Ukraine's need for increased air defense capabilities on the frontline and in near rear areas.[14]
A high-ranking Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) commander reportedly recently committed suicide due to conflicts within his unit's leadership. A Russian insider source claimed on September 23 that Yuri Annekov, head of the 678th Communications Center of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), committed suicide at the end of last week in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast.[15] The insider source claimed that Annekov had recently complained about insufficient rest and the command's "inadequate" behavior. The insider source claimed that Annekov had served in the VKS for roughly 20 years and had tried to resist the "chaos and disorder" within the VKS that began after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. ISW cannot verify the insider source's claims.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in the United States on September 23 and reiterated Ukraine's need for timely and uninterrupted US military assistance.
- The Kremlin continues to publicly signal its disinterest in any peace settlement short of total capitulation of the Ukrainian government and destruction of the Ukrainian state.
- Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City for the first time overnight on September 22 to 23.
- A high-ranking Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) commander reportedly recently committed suicide due to conflicts within his unit's leadership.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Hlyboke, Kupyansk, and Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
- The Russian government informally supported a bill on September 23 that would allow Russian authorities to fine individuals who promote “child-free propaganda,” likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to address Russia’s demographic problem.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 22, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 22, 2024, 5:55pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 pm ET on September 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukraine's September 18 strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast reportedly destroyed enough Russian munitions to affect Russian operations in the coming months.[1] Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Head Colonel Ants Kiviselg stated on September 20 that the strike caused 30,000 tons of munitions to explode, noting that the size of the explosion equates to 750,000 artillery shells and that Russian forces on average fire 10,000 shells per week. His calculations suggest the Ukrainian strike destroyed two to three months of Russia’s ammunition supply. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on September 18 that a source within Ukrainian special services stated that the Toropets facility stored Iskander missiles, Tochka-U ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and artillery ammunition.[2] It is unclear if Kiviselg's statement about 30,000 tons of explosives includes both missiles and artillery ammunition, but the strike destroyed significant Russian materiel stockpiles in any case. ISW continues to assess that continued Ukrainian strikes against rear Russian logistics facilities within Russia will generate wider operational pressures on the Russian military, including forcing the Russian military command to reorganize and disperse support and logistics systems within Russia to mitigate the impact of such strikes.[3]
The Kremlin is reportedly reconsidering the effectiveness of nuclear saber-rattling as part of its efforts to influence the ongoing Western policy debate about supporting Ukraine and specifically permitting Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia. The Washington Post, citing officials close to senior Russian diplomats, stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be realizing that Russian nuclear threats are starting to lose their power over Western officials and that Putin may be developing an unspecified more nuanced and limited informational response to future Western approval of long-range strikes into Russia.[4] An unnamed Russian official claimed that Russian officials have realized that nuclear threats "don't frighten anyone," and a Russian academic with close ties to senior Russian diplomats claimed that Russia's partners in the "Global South" are dissatisfied with Russia's nuclear threats. ISW cannot independently verify the veracity of the Washington Post's sources, but these reports are consistent with ISW's various assessments about how the Kremlin uses nuclear saber-rattling to promote Western self-deterrence and that such statements are not an indication of Russia's willingness to use nuclear weapons.[5] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin's thinly veiled threats of nuclear confrontation are aimed at disrupting and delaying key decision points in Western political discussions about further military assistance to Ukraine.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[7]
Satellite imagery of damage at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast captured on September 21 suggests that the Russian military recently conducted an unsuccessful RS-28 "Sarmat" nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test.[8] The imagery shows a large crater at the Yubileynaya launch silo, where Russian forces have previously conducted test launches of the Sarmat missile, and four fire trucks responding to active small fires near the destroyed silo.[9] Open-source intelligence analysts reported that imagery indicates that an unsuccessful Sarmat test caused the damage but offered differing analyses about whether an explosion occurred close to or at launch or before launch during fueling.[10] The silo at the Yubileynaya site was reportedly converted especially to conduct Sarmat launches.[11] Russia intends for the Sarmat ICBM to replace the Soviet-era Voevoda ICBM and accelerated the development of the Sarmat after an agreement to source components parts for Voevoda from Ukraine collapsed following the start of Russia's war against Ukraine in 2014.[12] Sarmat's development has faced repeated delays, however, and this recent apparent failed test would be the fourth reported failed test of the Sarmat to date.[13] Russia has only successfully tested the Sarmat once, in April 2022, and the Russian military reportedly put the missile on combat duty in September 2023.[14] The latest apparent failed Saramat test does not necessarily indicate that Russia's existing nuclear triad is any less effective than it has been but does suggest that Russia continues to struggle with developing new missile capabilities under the pressures of international sanctions and the demands on the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) amid the war in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 21 that Ukraine will increase its production of drones by "several times" in 2025 in order to maintain Ukraine's quantitative superiority over Russian drone production.[15] Umerov stated that Ukraine can produce "several million" drones and that the Ukrainian state budget and funding from Ukraine's partners finance this production. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently discussed ongoing efforts to increase Russian drone production and claimed that Russian companies delivered roughly 140,000 drones to Russian forces in 2023 and that Russia plans to increase its drone production by tenfold (to 1.4 million drones) in 2024.[16] The Russian military, however, continues to make decisions that degrade the overall quality of its technical specialists. Russian authorities recently reportedly arrested an assault detachment commander who developed a counter-drone system to train Russian counter-drone specialists that was against the staff's protocol.[17] Russian field commanders, particularly those amongst units of the 51st Combined Arms Army, are also reportedly often sending drone operators to conduct frontal assaults as punishment for dissent.[18]
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced on September 22 that Russia will not participate in Ukraine's second peace summit later in 2024 or in any "such summits."[19] Zakharova reiterated boilerplate Russian information operations aimed at discrediting Ukraine and the Ukrainian Peace Formula – which is based on the principles of international law – as an unfair "ultimatum."[20] Zakharova claimed that Russia is ready to discuss "serious" peace proposals that account for Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 14 "proposal." Putin outlined uncompromising demands on June 14 for Ukrainian capitulation as prerequisites for any "peace" negotiations, including Ukraine's recognition of Russian control over the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – including the areas of these oblasts that Russian forces currently do not occupy.[21] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is not interested in good faith peace negotiations with Ukraine and that the Kremlin will only invoke the concept of “peace plans” and “negotiations” to prompt the West to pressure Ukraine into preemptive concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[22]
Russia is reportedly expanding intelligence operations in Mexico to undermine the United States and support for Ukraine. NBC News, citing unspecified US officials and former intelligence officers, reported on September 21 that Russian intelligence services have been increasing their presence in Mexico for the past few years in order to spy on the United States and to enhance propaganda meant to undermine the United States and Ukraine.[23] US officials reportedly expressed concern over Russia's addition of dozens of employees to its embassy staff in Mexico City, despite notably lacking strong trade relations with Mexico, and interpreted this growth as a return to Cold War-style tactics to enhance intelligence operations in Mexico. CIA Director Willian Burns recently noted that this increase is a result of the expulsion of Russian spies from Europe.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukraine's September 18 strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast reportedly destroyed enough Russian munitions to affect Russian operations in the coming months.
- The Kremlin is reportedly reconsidering the effectiveness of nuclear saber-rattling as part of its efforts to influence the ongoing Western policy debate about supporting Ukraine and specifically permitting Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia.
- Satellite imagery of damage at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast captured on September 21 suggests that the Russian military recently conducted an unsuccessful RS-28 "Sarmat" nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test.
- Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 21 that Ukraine will increase its production of drones by "several times" in 2025 in order to maintain Ukraine's quantitative superiority over Russian drone production.
- Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced on September 22 that Russia will not participate in Ukraine's second peace summit later in 2024 or in any "such summits."
- Russia is reportedly expanding intelligence operations in Mexico to undermine the United States and support for Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Svatove.
- Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, southwest of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
- A Ukrainian officer in a drone crew stated on September 22 that the Russian military command is forcing soldiers to dig trenches at Russian positions in unspecified areas of Ukraine without weapons and sometimes without armor, helmets, or military uniforms.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 21, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 21, 2024, 9:30pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:15 pm ET on September 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.|
Ukrainian forces conducted another successful drone strike against Russian missile and ammunition storage facilities as well as a mobile radar system in Russia overnight on September 20 to 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 21 that drone operators of the Ukrainian military, Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Tikhoretsk Arsenal just north of Kamenny, Krasnodar Krai and the Russian Main Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense's (MoD) 23rd Arsenal near Oktyabrsky, Tver Oblast (14km south of Toropets).[1] Footage published on September 20 and 21 shows explosions and secondary detonations at both arsenals, and fires continued at both locations during the day on September 21.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Tikhoretsk Arsenal contained at least 2,000 tons of munitions, including munitions from North Korea, at the time of the strike.[3] An SBU source told Ukrainian outlet Hromadske that the Russian 23rd Arsenal contained Iskander and Tochka-U ballistic missiles and that Ukrainian forces also struck the Shaykovka Airfield in Kaluga Oblast, and Hromadske included footage of an explosion though it is unclear whether the footage shows the Shaykovka Airfield.[4] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces intercepted 101 Ukrainian drones overnight, including 18 drones over Krasnodar Krai and three drones over Tver Oblast.[5] Krasnodar Krai regional authorities blamed the Tikhoretsk Arsenal explosion on falling Ukrainian drone debris, declared a local state of emergency, altered railway schedules and routes, and evacuated about 1,200 civilians from the area.[6] The United Kingdom (UK) MoD reported that the Russian Main Artillery Directorate's 103rd Arsenal near Toropets, which Ukrainian forces struck on September 17 to 18, had recently undergone modernization because Russian forces had been improperly storing munitions at their arsenals, causing explosions at several depots.[7]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Podlet K1 mobile long-range radar system that was protecting the Tikhoretsk Arsenal, and this system is at least the fifth Podlet K1 system that Ukrainian forces have reportedly damaged or destroyed since February 2022.[8] The Podlet K1 system can detect up to 200 aerial targets simultaneously at a range of up to 300 kilometers and the Russian military introduced the system into service in 2015.[9] Russian forces use the Podlet K1 system to detect air targets at low and very low altitudes for Russian air defenses, including S-300 and S-400 systems.[10] Ukrainian forces have reportedly damaged or destroyed at least four other Russian Podlet K1 systems since the onset of the full-scale invasion, including in Lazurne, Kherson Oblast as of July 20, 2022; near Zelenotropynske, Kherson Oblast as of July 24, 2022; in Belgorod Oblast as of November 1, 2023; and in an unspecified location as of April 27, 2024.[11] Ukrainian forces also found a destroyed Russian Podlet K1 system in Chornobaivka, Kherson Oblast on November 14, 2022, following Ukraine's liberation of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast as of November 11, 2022, though the cause of this Podlet K1's destruction was unclear.[12]
The Kremlin appears to be reorganizing Russia's decentralized, regional volunteer recruitment campaigns into a federal effort, indicating that Russia is struggling to meet the manpower demands of its war in Ukraine despite previous claims that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast caused a spike in Russia's volunteer recruitment. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on September 20 forming an interdepartmental commission under the Russian Security Council to more fully staff the Russian Armed forces with contract servicemembers (kontraktniki).[13] The commission will coordinate the activities of federal, regional, and municipal government bodies and organizations in selecting candidates for contract military service, including improving the selection process; assessing ongoing efforts to attract candidates to volunteer formations; and considering proposals to improve material incentives and social support for kontraktniki and their families. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev will chair the commission and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov will be the deputy chairperson of the commission. Russian authorities have previously signaled their intention to centralize volunteer recruitment efforts by opening a "Military Service Consulting Center" in Moscow City, posturing Moscow as the center of Russia's federal recruitment efforts, investing in higher-quality recruitment ads, and leveraging national figures in this federal-level recruitment campaign.[14] Russian officials claimed in August and September 2024 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast prompted more people to express interest in becoming volunteers (whom the Kremlin also began to call kontraktniki), but Putin's decision to centralize Russia's volunteer recruitment efforts indicates that Putin assesses that Russia is not recruiting a sufficient number of volunteers to meet Russia's manpower needs.[15] Putin notably signed the decree on the eve of the second anniversary of the Fall 2022 partial mobilization, and this decree further signals his aversion to involuntary mobilization at this time.[16]
Russian federal subjects (regions) have historically formed the basis of Russia's volunteer recruitment campaigns, and at least 36 Russian regions have reportedly increased one-time payments to volunteers/kontraktniki in 2024, indicating difficulties in Russia's ability to recruit additional personnel.[17] Three sources close to the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) told Bloomberg in August 2024 that the Russian military has struggled to recruit enough people to replace increasing Russian manpower losses throughout the war, and one individual told Bloomberg that Russian regions, on average, fell short of their recruitment quotas by about one-third.[18] Medvedev claimed in July 2024 that the MoD's average daily recruitment rate for kontraktniki was 1,000 people, and an unnamed Western official estimated in August 2024 that Russian forces were suffering on average roughly 1,000 casualties per day, presumably throughout the frontline in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, during an interview with UK outlet Independent.[19] ISW cannot independently confirm these numbers, however. The Kremlin will likely be able to continue the current tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine with its current recruitment rate but will likely have to substantially increase its recruitment rates or decrease its daily personnel losses in order to further intensify offensive operations in Ukraine. The Kremlin has likely assessed that it can better control and improve Russia's volunteer recruitment rates by centralizing and consolidating control over recruitment efforts and can no longer rely on underperforming regional recruitment campaigns to meet Russia's manpower needs.
The Russian military leadership and government are continuing to reduce the class of semi-independent Russian military innovators, specialists, and irregular commanders to advance force centralization objectives, maintain the offensive tempo in Donetsk Oblast, and compensate for personnel shortages. Russian actress Yana Poplovskaya, numerous Russian milbloggers (including supporters of arrested former Russian officer Igor Girkin), and Russian neo-nationalist outlet Tsargrad reported as early as September 13 that Russian authorities arrested an assault detachment commander of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic’s [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) Vladimir Novikov, also known under the alias “Beliy.”[20] Poplovskaya published an appeal asking Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov to return Novikov to the frontlines, noting that Novikov had played a key role in the Russian seizure of Avdiivka and Krasnohorivka, has three state courage orders, and has received many of letters from his subordinates demanding his release.[21] Some of Novikov’s subordinates and several milbloggers also noted that they joined the detachment solely because he inspired them.[22] Poplovskaya and a Russian milblogger, who claims to have worked alongside Novikov, claimed that Novikov was arrested after he attempted to stop Chechens from trafficking drugs to his servicemen.[23] Poplovskaya stated that Chechens made a false complaint about Novikov in retaliation, and a milblogger affiliated with Novikov implied that the Russian military command may not have approved of Novikov’s efforts to teach Russian military personnel and Storm-Z convicts to neutralize Ukrainian drone threats because the military command seeks to advance their own career aspirations.[24] The milblogger added that he and Novikov independently developed a counter-drone system called ”seizure of the small sky” with the aim of training Russian counter-drone specialists and that this initiative was against the staff’s protocol.[25] Russian officials did not publicly acknowledge Novikov’s arrest, and Belousov has yet to respond to any appeals.
Tsargrad notably linked Novikov’s arrest to the recent deaths of prominent Russian milbloggers and drone operators of the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment of the 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) Dmitry Lysakovsky (better known under the alias Goodwin) and Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Gritsai (also known as Ernest) possibly overnight on September 12.[26] Tsargrad and several Russian milbloggers familiar with the drone operators claimed that Lysakovsky and Gritsai were suddenly committed to a direct assault operation on September 11 alongside at least 12 other long-range aerial reconnaissance specialists, resulting in 14 people dying in the Pokrovsk direction. Tsargrad implied that the deaths and Novikov’s arrest could be related because both Lysakovsky and Gritsai also expressed concerns over drug usage in combat, and Russian state media amplified claims from Kremlin co-opted milbloggers that drone operators died in the aftermath of a Ukrainian drone strike in an unspecified rear area.[27] The two cases, however, may be linked by the Russian military’s command increasing desperation to generate more infantrymen to maintain the initiative in Pokrovsk and Donetsk City directions. Russian sources noted that the assault took place shortly after the Russian military command disbanded Lysakovsky‘s and Gritsai’s drone detachment.[28] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that the Russian military command increasingly began to use servicemembers in the 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade, especially niche specialized detachments, in assaults and that the leadership of 51st CAA follows the motto of “we do not need smart people, we are smart ourselves. We need assaults [and] meat.”[29] The former Storm-Z instructor noted that the 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade disbanded drone detachments of its 268th Infantry Battalion and committed engineers of the 1st Reserve Battalion to battle as infantrymen.[30]
The particularly close timing between two incidents, the recent formal integration of the 1st DNR AC into the Russian military as the 51st CAA, and complaints about the Russian military command’s disregard for specialists in Donetsk Oblast may be symptoms of Russia’s manpower shortages and poor command culture. Novikov’s efforts to train Storm-Z elements to operate counter-drone systems may have contradicted the Russian military command’s intended use of these elements as purely "disposable" assault infantrymen. ISW had previously observed the Russian higher military command dismiss and imprison some popular and effective military commanders who raised concerns about the tempo of Russian operations and persistent issues with Russia's campaign in Ukraine.[31] The Russian military-political leadership also destroyed the Wagner Group in an effort to reestablish control over and formalize Wagner, despite the fact that the Wagner Group contributed to some Russian innovations and accomplished some tactical military victories.[32]
Iran reportedly did not send mobile launchers for the Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles it recently supplied to Russia, likely due a decision to prioritize sending additional missiles over bulky and easily replaceable launchers. Reuters, citing three unnamed US and EU officials alongside several other experts, reported on September 21 that Iran did not provide mobile launchers for the Fateh-360 missiles it recently supplied to Russia.[33] Reuters reported that it is unclear why exactly Iran withheld the launchers although its sources suggested that Russia might instead use modified Russian-made vehicles to launch the missiles. Both Russia and Iran have repeatedly denied the Iranian supply of Fateh-360 missiles to Russia.[34] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on September 20 that US statements regarding Iranian and North Korean missile supplies to Russia are “fables” and that Russia has a sufficient stockpile of weapons.[35] Iran likely did not supply Russia with the mobile launchers given that shipping the launchers would require additional transportation and because, as noted by Reuters, Russia has alternative capabilities for launching the missiles. This arrangement enables both countries to avoid the logistical burden of transporting the launchers while allowing for more discreet transfer of the Fateh-360 missiles, enabling them to better obscure the supply chain and deny Iranian involvement in the Russian war effort. The fact that Iran did not send launchers does not in itself indicate anything about Iran's commitment to supporting the Russian war effort.
Russian officials have designated 47 countries as having opposing and dangerous moral attitudes to Russia, highlighting that the Kremlin is reviving a Soviet era tactic and mindset that defines a clear ideological division in the world. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin approved the list of 47 countries deemed to have “destructive attitudes” that clash with “Russian spiritual and moral” values on September 20 following a recent presidential decree facilitating immigration to Russia for individuals who reject “destructive neoliberal values” in their home countries.[36] The list includes Western and other allied countries that have largely supported Ukraine, but notably does not include Slovakia, Hungary, Turkey, Moldova, and Georgia.[37] This move underscores a pattern in which Russian officials accuse the West and the US of creating ideological divides supposedly aimed at isolating Russia, while engaging in this Cold War-style behavior, promoting global ideological camps and separation themselves.[38] Russia has recently enhanced efforts at establishing Eurasian security forums and mechanisms such as the Russian-proposed ”Eurasian security architecture” that aim to exclude the West and enhance divides based on these alleged ideological lines.[39] ISW has also observed that the Kremlin recently intensified efforts to codify a state ideology based on vague Russian "traditional values" while bypassing the Russian Constitution, which notably forbids such endeavors.[40]
Russian milblogger analyses of Russia’s war in Ukraine continue to suggest that the Kremlin perceives Western commitment to Ukraine as feeble. Prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger Mikhail Zvinchuk gave an interview to Belarusian state newswire Belta on September 20 describing the war in Ukraine as a “strange under-war" that predominantly operates on a political plane.[41] Zvinchuk claimed that the West’s primary objective of the war in Ukraine is not to achieve a strategic military defeat of Russia, but rather to secure profits and political advantages domestically. He noted that if the West genuinely aimed to defeat Russia, it would have provided Ukraine with more weapons and means of combat along with greater NATO involvement. Zvinchuk argued that the West’s actions have not significantly challenged Russia and suggested that the West’s slow and limited support has given Russia enough time to strengthen its defenses and build up its forces. Zvinchuk also falsely claimed that Ukraine is simply a testing ground for Western artificial intelligence (AI) and command and control (C2) systems, echoing previous Russian statements suggesting that Ukraine is simply a military testing site for the West.[42] Western hesitation in approving Ukraine's ability to use long-range Western-provided weapons to strike military objects in Russia and previous delays in Western aid provision to Ukraine may have further confirmed the Kremlin's assessment that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine.[43] Western-policymakers maintain the power to properly equip Ukraine and challenge the Kremlin's assessment of Western commitment to Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces conducted another successful drone strike against Russian missile and ammunition storage facilities as well as a mobile radar system in Russia overnight on September 20 to 21.
- The Kremlin appears to be reorganizing Russia's decentralized, regional volunteer recruitment campaigns into a federal effort, indicating that Russia is struggling to meet the manpower demands of its war in Ukraine despite previous claims that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast caused a spike in Russia's volunteer recruitment.
- The Russian military leadership and government are continuing to reduce the class of semi-independent Russian military innovators, specialists, and irregular commanders to advance force centralization objectives, maintain the offensive tempo in Donetsk Oblast, and compensate for personnel shortages.
- Iran reportedly did not send mobile launchers for the Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles it recently supplied to Russia, likely due a decision to prioritize sending additional missiles over bulky and easily replaceable launchers.
- Russian officials have designated 47 countries as having opposing and dangerous moral attitudes to Russia, highlighting that the Kremlin is reviving a Soviet era tactic and mindset that defines a clear ideological division in the world.
- Russian milblogger analyses of Russia’s war in Ukraine continue to suggest that the Kremlin perceives Western commitment to Ukraine as feeble.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
- Russian forces advanced north of Kharkiv City and near Kupyansk, Kreminna, Tortesk, and southwest of Donetsk City.
- The Kremlin has not fully suppressed localized protests organized by wives of Russian mobilized servicemen since declaring partial mobilization on September 21, 2022.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Haley Zehrung, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 20, 2024, 7:15 pm ET
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced two new loan mechanisms worth up to 45 billion euros (roughly $50 billion) and 35 billion euros (roughly $39 billion) respectively during a visit to Kyiv on September 20.[1] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with von der Leyen in Kyiv and stated afterward that Ukraine will use part of the 35 billion euro European loan to purchase domestically produced long-range missiles and drones, address Ukraine's energy needs, and construct bomb shelters to defend Ukrainian schools against Russian strikes.[2] The European Commission will distribute the 35 billion euro loan to Ukraine in one installment before December 31, 2024, and Ukraine can further disburse the money in one or more tranches before December 31, 2025.[3] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 14 that Ukraine will be able to domestically produce $20 billion worth of defense equipment in 2025 if Ukraine receives additional funding from its partners.[4] Umerov noted that Ukraine's defense industrial production capabilities significantly exceed the amount of investment that Ukraine can provide alone.
Russian authorities were reportedly aware of the threat of a future Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024 but failed to take adequate steps to address such a threat. The Guardian, citing Russian government and military documents that Ukrainian forces seized in Kursk Oblast, reported on September 20 that Russian forces stationed in Kursk Oblast repeatedly warned the Russian military command about the possibility of a Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast beginning in late 2023.[5] The documents, which The Guardian reviewed but could not independently verify, show that local military commanders repeatedly ordered additional training exercises for Russian military personnel serving in Kursk Oblast, the construction of additional fortifications, and the preparation of decoy trenches and military equipment in preparation for a future Ukrainian incursion. One of the documents noted that Russian military units stationed along the international border were only staffed at between 60 and 70 percent of their intended end strength on average and were primarily staffed by poorly trained reservists as of June 2024. Russian authorities do not appear to have made any substantive efforts to improve the preparedness of the Russian military units serving in border areas of Kursk Oblast or construct additional fortifications along the international border prior to the incursion, and Russian authorities may have decided to ignore these requests due to a miscalculation of Ukraine's ability to advance deep into Kursk Oblast.
These documents support ISW's recent assessment that Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise during the incursion into Kursk Oblast despite Russian authorities' reported awareness of the possibility of an incursion.[6] The American doctrinal definition of surprise is to "attack the enemy in a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared."[7] Although Russian forces were likely aware of various points along the international border at which Ukraine could conduct an incursion, Ukrainian forces were able to leverage ambiguity around their operational intent and capabilities to maintain operational surprise. Ukrainian forces also reportedly experimented with innovative techniques integrating ground activity and unmanned systems that ISW will not cover in-depth to maintain Ukrainian operational security. ISW has previously noted that both Russian and Ukrainian forces have struggled to achieve operational surprise over the past year and a half due to the partially transparent battlefield in Ukraine.[8] Ukraine's campaign in Kursk Oblast demonstrates that surprise is still possible even on a partially transparent battlefield where an adversary can observe force concentrations but not reliably discern an enemy's operational intent and capabilities.
Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to legitimize Russia's occupation of Ukraine and promote false narratives about alleged Ukrainian human rights abuses. ICRC President Mirjana Spoljaric met with Russian officials, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Kremlin Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatiana Moskalkova, and President of the Russian Red Cross (RRC) Pavel Savchuk, in Moscow on September 17.[9] Spoljaric reiterated that states must follow international humanitarian law, including by granting the ICRC access to prisoners of war (POWs), and emphasized the need to protect humanitarian workers following the recent deaths of three ICRC employees due to frontline shelling in Donetsk Oblast.[10] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), however, claimed that the meeting focused on humanitarian issues in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Europe, and Asia as well as the ICRC's activities in Russia.[11] The Russian MFA claimed that the Russian delegation at the meeting spoke about alleged Ukrainian human rights violations, including those concerning the treatment of POWs and civilians. ISW has observed widespread reports of Russian forces abusing and executing Ukrainian POWs and has reported at length on Russia's illegal occupation of Ukraine, including the illegal deportation of Ukrainian civilians and children to Russia.[12] Russia has reportedly not fully opened its POW facilities to ICRC inspectors, whereas Ukraine has regularly opened its main POW camp to the ICRC.[13] Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated in July 2024 that a majority of the Ukrainian POWs who have returned home to Ukraine report that they did not see or communicate with ICRC representatives while in captivity.[14] The RRC is reportedly functioning as a Kremlin propaganda tool in occupied Ukraine.[15] The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent suspended the Belarusian Red Cross due to its involvement in the deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus.[16] The Kremlin is likely attempting to use the participation of the RCC president in the September 17 meeting to legitimize the RCC and its illegal activities in occupied Ukraine. Russian officials have similarly used meetings with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to legitimize Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and Zaporizhzhia Oblast and promote false narratives about a Ukrainian threat to the ZNPP and Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP).[17]
Key Takeaways:
- European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced two new loan mechanisms worth up to 45 billion euros (roughly $50 billion) and 35 billion euros (roughly $39 billion) respectively during a visit to Kyiv on September 20.
- Russian authorities were reportedly aware of the threat of a future Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024 but failed to take adequate steps to address such a threat.
- These documents support ISW's recent assessment that Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise during the incursion into Kursk Oblast despite Russian authorities' reported awareness of the possibility of an incursion.
- Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to legitimize Russia's occupation of Ukraine and promote false narratives about alleged Ukrainian human rights abuses.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kreminna, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk, and Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Vovchansk and Siversk.
- Russian state media is increasingly emphasizing the participation of foreign nationals in the Russian war effort in Ukraine, likely to reassure domestic audiences that Russia continues to recruit sufficient manpower and will not need to declare another mobilization wave.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 19, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Haley Zehrung, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 19, 2024, 9:25pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 13:00 pm ET on September 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to offset Russian losses by declaring another mobilization wave in spring 2024 likely to avoid political costs associated with involuntary reserve call-ups. Putin has since remained committed to his crypto mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), citing a source “briefed” on an exchange between Putin and Russian MoD officials several months prior to the presidential inauguration in May 2024, reported that Putin dismissed the Russian MoD’s calls for another mobilization wave.[1] The source claimed that Putin instead stated his intent to only recruit people who were voluntarily signing military service contracts but that more Russian officials are convinced that mobilization is inevitable. The source added that the Russian military's current manpower is insufficient to achieve Russia's long-term goal of occupying all of Ukraine, degrading overall Ukrainian combat capability, and protecting the Russian state border. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated that Russia continues to rapidly recruit contract servicemen (kontraktniki) and volunteers and that these forces are sufficient for Russia's aggression against Ukraine in response to a request from WSJ. Putin has avoided declaring another partial mobilization call-up of reservists since his decision to mobilize 300,000 troops in late September 2022 in response to successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, and Russia appears to lack the necessary manpower resources to simultaneously sustain the scale and tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and defensive efforts in Russian border regions.[2] A mobilized Russian servicemember and milblogger claimed in late August 2024 that the Russian government continues to rely on the remnants of regular military forces, mobilized personnel, and deceived short-term volunteers to continue Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, even though these elements are ill-prepared and have been suffering significant losses since October 2023.[3]
Mobilization in Russia remains unlikely in the near to medium term due to Putin’s personal fear that mobilization is a direct threat to his regime’s stability. ISW observed reports speculating about the possibility of Russia declaring another mobilization wave prior to Putin’s inauguration and following the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024, but Putin has not yet authorized such mobilization.[4] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that sources close to the Russian government claimed that the Kremlin entertained the idea of mobilization immediately after Ukraine's incursion, but that the Russian Cabinet of Ministers and Kremlin-affiliated businessmen opposed these considerations.[5] Putin has also been consistently signaling throughout the incursion his commitment to recruiting volunteers by boasting about the number of volunteers interested in fighting in Ukraine and meeting with Russian volunteers in response to the incursion.[6] Putin notably did not seize on the incursion as an opportunity to condition Russian society for mobilization in the immediate to medium term, instead choosing to form new irregular formations and expand Russian volunteer recruitment efforts.[7] The Kremlin and the Russian MoD notably shocked Russian society with the declaration of partial mobilization in late September 2022, and Putin likely seeks to avoid societal backlash in response to a new mobilization wave at this time.[8]
Russian authorities have reportedly tasked Russian forces with pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and establishing a "buffer zone" into Ukrainian border areas along the international border with Russia in northeastern Ukraine by the end of October — significant undertakings that the Russian military is very unlikely to achieve in such a short period of time. Ukrainian newswire RBC-Ukraine reported on September 19 that unspecified sources stated that Russian forces have concentrated 37,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast and that Russian authorities have instructed these forces to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October.[9] RBC-Ukraine's sources stated that the Kremlin wanted to concentrate a grouping of forces in Kursk Oblast that had a five-to-one manpower advantage over Ukrainian forces before launching a counteroffensive operation but did not establish such a grouping before launching a "counteroffensive" on September 10.[10] Russian forces have begun counterattacks within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast but have not yet started large-scale combat operations that would indicate a concerted counteroffensive operation aimed at completely expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[11] Sustained Russian counteroffensive operations within Kursk Oblast will require Russian forces to redeploy additional elements from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and/or commit newly generated forces from within Russia to the area instead of the frontline in Ukraine.[12] Ukrainian forces have not established control of all areas throughout the entire salient in Kursk Oblast, but Ukrainian forces most certainly have prepared positions within some areas of the salient that will pose challenges to any concerted Russian counteroffensive effort.[13]
RBC-Ukraine's sources stated that Russian authorities have also tasked Russian forces with creating a "buffer zone" on the territory of "border oblasts bordering Russia" by October 30 — presumably an order to advance into Ukrainian territory along the international border to push Ukrainian fire elements further back from Russian territory.[14] Russian forces aimed to create a "buffer zone" in northern Kharkiv Oblast when they launched their offensive operation in the area on May 10, but have since only advanced roughly 10 kilometers in depth at most in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[15] The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast reportedly spoiled planned Russian offensive operations outside of northern Kharkiv Oblast in the international border area that likely aimed to expand the area of combat operations across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine and further fix and stretch Ukrainian forces along a longer front.[16] A Russian counteroffensive operation to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast followed immediately by a subsequent incursion into Ukrainian border oblasts reminiscent of Russia's offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast would be a massive operational effort that would require a substantial allocation of manpower and materiel. The Russian military command has demonstrated a desire to shield the priority Russian offensive operation in the Pokrovsk direction from the operational pressures caused by Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast, but a Russian counteroffensive followed immediately by an offensive operation along the international border would most certainly generate operational requirements that would impact Russia's already degraded capability to funnel more manpower and materiel into the drive on Pokrovsk.[17]
The Kremlin continues to signal its commitment to improving Russian drone operations in Ukraine and drone production capabilities amid efforts to offset the social and economic impacts of a protracted Russian war effort. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russia's Military-Industrial Commission on September 19 and discussed ongoing efforts to increase Russian drone production.[18] Putin acknowledged that drones are an integral part of modern warfare and that Russia’s war in Ukraine has further confirmed this assessment. Putin claimed that Russian companies delivered roughly 140,000 drones to Russian forces in 2023 and claimed that Russia plans to increase its drone production by ten-fold (to 1.4 million drones) in 2024. Putin emphasized that Russia must "consistently" increase its drone production capabilities and improve the effectiveness of Russian-produced drones in order to meet the needs of the Russian military. Putin praised Russia's private drone production initiatives or "people's defense industry" and noted that these private initiatives have joined forces with state defense enterprises to increase Russia's national drone production capabilities. Putin noted that privately produced drones are not "inferior" to drones produced by state defense companies and that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) extensively tests all drone models before transferring the drones to frontline Russian forces. A DW investigation, however, observed evidence that suggests that some Russian irregular forces may be testing newly-developed drones in strikes on Ukrainian civilians, possibly to speed up the testing periods.[19] Putin thanked Russian volunteer organizations for providing drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems to frontline Russian units. Putin also visited Russia's Special Technology Center in St. Petersburg, which specializes in drone, EW system, and communication systems production and inspected new drone types at the facility.[20] Russian milbloggers also reported that Putin met with and inspected drones from private drone production initiatives and praised the drone producers for their work.[21] Russian milbloggers have consistently complained about the poor quality of state-produced drones and often praise private drone production initiatives for producing more effective drones.[22]
Putin’s claims that Russian plans to increase the drone-production to 1.4 million drones in 2024 is slightly lower than planned Ukrainian drone production rates in 2024. Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Strategic Industrial Hanna Hvozdyar noted in March 2024 that Ukraine intends to produce two million drones in 2024, and Ukrainian officials have repeatedly emphasized that Ukraine is prioritizing modernizing and constantly developing new drones to meet the needs of Ukrainian servicemembers.[23]
Putin claimed that Russia must ensure that there are "no barriers" to the movement of Russian citizens between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast.[24] Putin claimed during a meeting with recently elected heads of Russian federal subjects (regions) and occupied Crimea on September 19 that Kaliningrad Oblast is Russia's "western outpost" and that Russia must strive to ensure that Kaliningrad Oblast is not only an "outpost" or a "fortress" on Russia's western borders but is also well integrated into Russian society and the Russian economy. Putin stated that Russia will never "forget" about Kaliningrad Oblast and that Kaliningrad Oblast must continue to develop in accordance with Russia's social and cultural values. Kaliningrad Oblast is a Russian federal subject situated between Lithuania and Poland on the coast of the Baltic Sea, and some Russians travel between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad by train or car via Belarus and NATO member states Latvia and Lithuania.[25] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed in May 2024 that the Russian government should reassess Russia’s maritime borders in the Baltic Sea, including around Kaliningrad Oblast, so that these borders “correspond to the modern geographical situation,” and Russian authorities repeatedly threatened NATO member states, including Finland and the Baltic States, in late 2023 and early 2024. [26] Putin's comments about maintaining Kaliningrad's cultural and social ties to Russia are likely aimed at his domestic audience, although Putin may be setting conditions for future Russian aggression against the Baltic States under the guise of defending Kaliningrad Oblast.
The reported transfer of Indian artillery shells through European intermediaries to Ukraine is reportedly generating tensions within the Russian–Indian relationship. Reuters, citing 11 Indian and European government officials and unspecified defense industry sources, reported on September 19 that Ukraine has acquired Indian artillery shells procured through European intermediaries for over a year despite Russian objections.[27] Reuters noted that European countries, including Italy and Czechia, have purchased empty artillery shells from India, filled them with explosives, and shipped them to Ukraine. Reuters stated that customs records reveal that shipments to Ukraine included 155mm, 120mm, and 125mm ammunition shells. Reuters stated that the Kremlin has addressed the supply issue with Indian officials on multiple occasions including during a July 2024 meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, but that New Delhi has reportedly not intervened to halt the trade. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs dismissed the Reuters report as “speculative and misleading" on September 19.[28] The Reuters report comes amid complications in Russian–Indian bilateral relations and following Modi’s August 23 visit to Ukraine during which Modi highlighted principles of international law, including sovereignty and territorial integrity, in discussions with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[29] Modi's comments with Zelensky contrast with his July 9 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin during which Modi made rather vague statements of peace.[30]
The European Parliament called on member states to lift restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided long-range systems to strike military objects in Russia. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on September 19 encouraging its members to allow Ukraine to use western-provided weapons to strike “legitimate military targets” in Russia.[31] The European Parliament called on all European Union (EU) and NATO members to commit to providing annual military support to Ukraine at a minimum of 0.25 percent of the member's GDP. The statement comes against the backdrop of ongoing Western hesitation to lift restrictions on long-range strikes into Russia.[32]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to offset Russian losses by declaring another mobilization wave in spring 2024 likely to avoid political costs associated with involuntary reserve call-ups. Putin has since remained committed to his crypto mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential.
- Mobilization in Russia remains unlikely in the near to medium term due to Putin’s personal fear that mobilization is a direct threat to his regime’s stability.
- Russian authorities have reportedly tasked Russian forces with pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and establishing a "buffer zone" into Ukrainian border areas along the international border with Russia in northeastern Ukraine by the end of October — significant undertakings that the Russian military is very unlikely to achieve in such a short period of time.
- The Kremlin continues to signal its commitment to improving Russian drone operations in Ukraine and drone production capabilities amid efforts to offset the social and economic impacts of a protracted Russian war effort.
- Putin claimed that Russia must ensure that there are "no barriers" to the movement of Russian citizens between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast.
- The reported transfer of Indian artillery shells through European intermediaries to Ukraine is reportedly generating tensions within the Russian-Indian relationship.
- The European Parliament called on member states to lift restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided long-range systems to strike military objects in Russia.
- Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kharkiv City, Svatove, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated during a meeting on the development of the Russian Armed Forces on September 18 that the Kremlin aims to improve Russia's federal level training system.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 18, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Haley Zehrung, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 18, 2024, 7:45pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on September 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast on September 18. A source within Ukrainian special services told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on September 18 that drone operators from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck a facility at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Main Missile and Artillery Directorate's 107th Arsenal in Toropets, Tver Oblast.[1] Suspilne's sources stated the facility stores Iskander missiles, Tochka-U ballistic missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, and artillery ammunition and that there were significant secondary detonations following the initial Ukrainian drone strike. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation, Andriy Kovalenko, stated that Russian forces may have also stored ammunition for Grad multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), S-300 and S-400 air defense missiles, and North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles at the facility.[2] Footage published on September 16 shows large secondary detonations, presumably of missile stockpiles and artillery ammunition, following the initial drone strike.[3] Geolocated footage published on September 18 shows several large smoke plumes over the facility and satellite imagery shows significant damage to the building in the southern part of the facility, although most of the facility is obscured by smoke.[4] Russian authorities claimed that wreckage from a downed Ukrainian drone struck the facility and prompted the secondary detonations, and Russian authorities temporarily evacuated the area near the facility.[5] Russian milbloggers largely criticized Russian authorities for poorly constructing the facility and accused Russian forces of possibly mishandling missiles and artillery ammunition stockpiles at the facility.[6] Milbloggers accused the detained former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitri Bulgakov of engaging in corrupt practices leading to poor construction quality at the facility.[7]
Continued Ukrainian strikes against rear Russian logistics facilities within Russia will generate wider operational pressures on the Russian military beyond the individual destruction of ammunition stockpiles and logistics facilities. Suspilne's sources noted that Ukrainian strikes are undermining Russia's ability to conduct long-range missile strikes against Ukraine.[8] Ukrainian forces conducted a series of HIMARS strikes against Russian ammunition depots throughout occupied Ukraine in Summer 2022, prompting Russian forces to disperse ammunition storage facilities and degrading the efficiency of Russian logistics at the time.[9] Repeated strikes against ammunition depots within Russia that cause similar levels of damage to the strike in Toropets may force a similar decision point on the Russian military command to reorganize and disperse support and logistics systems within Russia to mitigate the impact of such strikes. Russian forces may not have addressed vulnerabilities at many logistics facilities within Russia due to the sanctuary space that restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons have generated, although the Toropets facility is not within range of Western systems fired from Ukraine. The lifting of restrictions on the use of Western systems and the continued development of Ukraine's own long-range strike capabilities may allow Ukrainian forces to more effectively exploit such Russian vulnerabilities. Ukrainian forces struck another Russian ammunition depot near Sergeevka, Voronezh Oblast in July 2024 and continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition and missile storage facilities could also destroy an important portion of Russia's materiel reserves.[10] Ukrainian strikes against facilities within Russia could impact offensive operations throughout the theater in Ukraine if Ukrainian forces have the materiel, capabilities, and permission to conduct such a strike campaign against logistics and supports facilities within Russia at scale.
Russian authorities arrested the head of the Central Military District (CMD)'s armor service on September 18 on suspicion of receiving a large bribe, marking yet another corruption case against a high-ranking Russian military official since the April 2024 appointment of Andrei Belousov as Russian Defense Minister.[11] The Russian Investigative Committee announced on September 18 that it opened a case against CMD armor service head Denis Putilov for accepting a 10-million-ruble ($107,000) bribe in exchange for issuing contracts on the repair and maintenance of military vehicles to an individual entrepreneur named "Chudinov."[12] The CMD is notably home to Russia's 90th Tank Division, and Putilov was very likely closely involved in overseeing the repair and maintenance of the suite of tanks and other armored vehicles that the 90th Tank Division uses in combat operations in Ukraine.[13] Since the start of Belousov's tenure as Minister of Defense in April 2024, such corruption cases against senior Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials have become much more frequent — a result of Belousov's apparent commitment to rooting out the corruption and addressing the mismanagement that plagued the MoD under former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.[14] Putilov's links to Shoigu remain unclear as of the time of this publication, but his arrest suggests that Belousov is attempting to crack down on corrupt and ineffective officials who are responsible for the sustainment of Russia's military assets, particularly increasingly scarce armored vehicles.
An unsuccessful armed assault against several offices of Russia's largest online retailer Wildberries in Moscow City highlights the fragility of Russia's domestic stability. Wildberries' press service reported on September 18 that Vladislav Bakalchuk, Wildberries co-founder and ex-husband of Wildberries co-founder CEO Tatyana Bakalchuk, along with 20 to 30 armed accomplices, conducted simultaneous armed assaults against two Wildberries offices in Moscow City.[15] Russian law enforcement closed off the immediate area around the offices and later detained 28 people involved in the assault, although the attackers shot and killed at least two Wildberries security guards and injured two other people before their apprehension.[16] The Bakalchuks filed for divorce in July 2024 after Vladislav appealed to Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov to help prevent Tatyana from taking over Wildberries, and Kadyrov promised to "return" Tatyana to "the family."[17] Wildberries has previously been involved in ongoing Russian efforts to crackdown against migrants in Russia and coerce migrants into joining the Russian military.[18] Russian authorities have attempted to posture themselves as taking steps to address domestic security issues following the March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack and June 2024 shooting in the Republic of Dagestan, although this unsuccessful yet well-planned assault in Moscow City calls into question the existence and effectiveness of any such efforts and particularly highlights vulnerabilities in the security apparatus in Russia's metropolitan core.[19]
Armenian officials continue to criticize the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) amid worsening Armenia-Russia bilateral relations. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on September 18 that Armenia has frozen its CSTO membership due to the bloc’s failure to meet security obligations to Armenia and that, in his opinion, the CSTO is a threat to Armenia’s “security, future existence, sovereignty, and statehood.”[20] Pashinyan stated that if the CSTO fails to provide answers to the reason behind its failures, Armenia will continue to distance itself from the security organization and possibly reach a "point of no return." Pashinyan previously announced on August 31 that Armenia froze its participation in the CSTO, although he has yet to concretely announce a formal de jure Armenian withdrawal from the organization.[21] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Pashinyan by stating that he strongly disagreed with Pashinyan’s assessment and claiming that the CSTO serves to safeguard the sovereignty of all its member states, including Armenia.[22] This spat comes amid an announcement by the Armenian Investigative Committee on September 18 about the arrest of three individuals accused of attempting to form an armed group to overthrow the Armenian government.[23] The Armenian Investigative Committee stated that the three suspects, along with four accomplices not yet in Armenian detention, recruited Armenian citizens to undergo paid three-month military training at the “Arbat” military base in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast. ISW has not been able to confirm the location of this base. ISW has previously observed worsening Armenia-Russia relations particularly following the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Armenia’s recently increasing pro-European foreign policy trajectory under Pashinyan.[24] Armenian officials have repeatedly criticized the CSTO for failing to meet Armenia’s security needs — particularly faulting Russia and Belarus — while Russian officials and the Russian information space have increasingly discredited the Pashinyan government by accusing it of pursuing an allegedly destructive pro-Western agenda aimed at straining their bilateral ties.
Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova condemned Israel for simultaneously detonating thousands of pagers belonging to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) members across Lebanon and Syria on September 17, signaling Russia's continued rhetorical alignment with Iran's Axis of Resistance against Israel.[25] Zakharova called the attack "another act of hybrid war against Lebanon" and warned that the circumstances risk further escalating the situation in the Levant.[26] Kremlin officials have previously voiced their support for LH and other elements of Iran's Axis of Resistance, including by condemning US and UK strikes on Houthi positions in Yemen.[27] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported in February 2024 that LH and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were working together to train Russian drone operators on the use of Iranian-made drones in Syria, and Western media reported in August 2024 that Russia was considering transferring missiles and equipment to the Houthis—strongly suggesting that Russia's backing of and interactions with the Axis of Resistance extend beyond rhetorical support.[28]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast on September 18.
- Continued Ukrainian strikes against rear Russian logistics facilities within Russia will generate wider operational pressures on the Russian military beyond the individual destruction of ammunition stockpiles and logistics facilities.
- Russian authorities arrested the head of the Central Military District (CMD)'s armor service on September 18 on suspicion of receiving a large bribe, marking yet another corruption case against a high-ranking Russian military official since the April 2024 appointment of Andrei Belousov as Russian Defense Minister.
- An unsuccessful armed assault against several offices of Russia's largest online retailer Wildberries in Moscow City highlights the fragility of Russia's domestic stability.
- Armenian officials continue to criticize the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) amid worsening Armenia-Russia bilateral relations.
- Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova condemned Israel for simultaneously detonating thousands of pagers belonging to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) members across Lebanon and Syria on September 17, signaling Russia's continued rhetorical alignment with Iran's Axis of Resistance against Israel.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kursk Oblast salient.
- Russian forces regained positions within Kursk Oblast salient.
- Russian forces recently advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, within Toretsk, east and southeast of Pokrovsk, southwest of Donetsk City, and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
- The Russian State Duma announced on September 18 that it approved a bill in its first reading that proposes releasing Russian servicemembers serving in Ukraine from criminal punishment associated with cases actively being tried in Russia courts.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Haley Zehrung, and George Barros
September 17, 2024, 6:35pm ET
The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office opened an investigation into another case of apparent Russian abuse and execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW). Graphic social media images circulated on September 16 shows the body of a Ukrainian servicemember whom Russian forces evidently executed with a sword bearing the inscription "for Kursk."[1] X (formerly Twitter) users geolocated the images to Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.[2] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov recently confirmed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) and 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized regiment) seized Novohrodivka in early September — potentially implicating members and command of these two formations with the execution.[3] The footage shows the Ukrainian servicemember clearly disarmed, wearing no protective equipment, and with remnants of duct tape around his wrists, suggesting that Russian forces captured, disarmed, and forcibly detained the servicemember.[4] The Geneva Convention on POWs prohibits the "mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture" of POWs, as well as the execution of POWs or persons who are clearly hors de combat.[5] The apparent circumstances of this particular execution, particularly the use of a sword with an inscription that implies that Russian forces executed the POW in some sort of retaliation for Ukraine's Kursk operation, likely fall firmly into the category of mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture of an unarmed POW. This most recent report of Russia's abuse of Ukrainian POWs is consistent with the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU)'s March 2024 report, which documented and verified widespread abuse and executions of Ukrainian POWs at the hands of Russian forces.[6] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office announced that it started an investigation into violation of the laws and customs of war and intentional murder in regard to the apparent execution of the servicemember.[7] Ukrainian law enforcement is also currently investigating 84 cases of potential Russian execution of Ukrainian POWs.[8] ISW has reported on apparent Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs in August 2024, July 2024, June 2024, May 2024, and several different incidents in February 2024 alone and has routinely assessed that Russian commanders are either complacent or enabling their subordinates to engage in such atrocities in clear violation of international law.[9]
Leaked documents outlining large-scale Kremlin information operation campaigns targeting Ukraine and the West continue to demonstrate the Kremlin's commitment to leveraging its global information instruments to advance Moscow’s interests using social media. Meta, which owns Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, banned Russian state media outlet Russia Today (RT) and "other related entities" on September 17 for "foreign interference activity."[10] The US State Department announced sanctions on September 13 against entities and individuals connected with RT, which the State Department accused of engaging in information operations, covert influence, and military procurement efforts for the Kremlin by targeting states in Europe, Africa, and North and South America.[11] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) "Schemes" investigative project analyzed thousands of leaked documents that German and Estonian outlets previously received that outline the work of the Russian "Social Design Agency" (SDA) company, which the US Department of Justice (DoJ) recently announced as part of the Kremlin's "Doppelganger" complex malign influence operations.[12] The "Schemes" project reported that the SDA has distributed fake official documents, including fabricated orders from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi, as part of its self-described efforts to "discredit the military-political leadership of Ukraine and demoralize the [Ukrainian] Armed Forces." The SDA reportedly created fake documents allegedly from European government entities, fake news stories allegedly from European outlets, and anti-Ukrainian memes that spread widely on social media. ISW continues to assess that Russia is continuing its efforts to develop capabilities to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity and conduct election interference, destabilization measures, and sanctions evasion schemes.[13]
Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit on September 17 following recent visits to Syria and North Korea amid ongoing Russian efforts to secure military cooperation and support from non-Western allies. Shoigu met with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian during a previously unannounced visit to Tehran on September 17 and conveyed an unspecified message from Russian President Vladimir Putin.[14] The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) reported that Shoigu and Ahmadian discussed upcoming bilateral agreements and emphasized that Iran continues to support Iran's official policy regarding corridors and communication routes with Azerbaijan.[15] Pezeshkian told Shoigu that the Iranian government will work to increase cooperation and deepen bilateral relations between the two countries to reduce the impact of Western sanctions.[16] Shoigu also met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, Syria on September 16 and discussed strengthening bilateral relations and regional and international security issues.[17] Shoigu previously recently visited Pyongyang, North Korea on September 13 and met with North Korean President Kim Jong Un for unspecified bilateral discussions.[18] Shoigu's international visits are coming against the backdrop of Iran's recent delivery of over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia, ongoing North Korean military support for the Russian war in Ukraine, and Ukrainian reports that Russia is hiring Syrian mercenaries to fight in Ukraine.[19] Russia’s deepening engagement with the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran is part of a wider Kremlin effort to establish a coalition of friendly states which can bolster Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) and secure strategic economic cooperation to support its war in Ukraine.[20]
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow on September 17.[21] Lavrov and Choe discussed further developing Russian-North Korean bilateral relations in unspecified manners, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) noted that Choe will attend the BRICS Women's Forum on the sidelines of the Eurasian Women's Forum in St. Petersburg on September 18-20.[22] Lavrov has recently fostered increased dialogue and cooperation with Russia's non-Western partners through various meetings on the ministerial level, including with Saudi Minister of Hajj and Umrah Tawfiq bin Fawzan Al-Rabieh on September 11, a BRICS foreign ministers meeting on September 12, and a meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty on September 16.[23]
Key Takeaways:
- The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office opened an investigation into another case of apparent Russian abuse and execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW).
- Leaked documents outlining large-scale Kremlin information operation campaigns targeting Ukraine and the West continue to demonstrate the Kremlin's commitment to leveraging its global information instruments to advance Moscow’s interests using social media.
- Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit following recent visits to Syria and North Korea amid ongoing Russian efforts to secure military cooperation and support from non-Western allies.
- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City.
- Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 17 that Russia continues to recruit citizens from Syria to fight in Ukraine.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Haley Zehrung, Annika Ganzeveld, and George Barros
September 16, 2024, 8:45pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:20 pm ET on September 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages, but delays and insufficiencies in Western military aid to Ukraine continue to limit its ability to generate effective combat units that can defend critical areas and contest the theater-wide initiative. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with CNN on September 13 that Ukraine "needs 14 brigades to be ready" for an unspecified requirement and that Ukraine has not been able to equip "even four" of these brigades with slowly arriving Western aid.[1] Zelensky noted that Ukraine has been increasing its domestic production of drones and transferring equipment from warehouses or reserve brigades to attempt to offset insufficient Western military assistance to Ukraine. Zelensky stated that these insufficient provisions, particularly of armored vehicles and artillery ammunition, have led to Ukrainian personnel losses. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Defense Committee Chairperson Oleksandr Zavitnevych told the Financial Times on September 16 that Ukrainian mobilization is "on track" and that newly trained forces could "impact" the battlefield likely in three months.[2] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated in May 2024 that Ukraine was working to stand up 10 new Ukrainian brigades but that equipment, not manpower, was the main bottleneck in Ukraine's defensive operations.[3] ISW has long assessed that Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian offensive operations and challenge the theater-wide initiative heavily depends on both the Western provision of miliary aid and Ukraine's efforts to reconstitute existing units and create new ones — the latter of which Ukraine has taken significant steps to resolve.[4] Ukrainian forces have partially mitigated the artillery ammunition shortages that resulted from delays in Western aid provisions by using first-person view (FPV) drones to blunt Russian infantry and armored vehicle assaults, but current FPV drones are unable to offset the tactical requirements of traditional field artillery.[5] Ukraine has taken steps to boost its domestic production of 155mm artillery ammunition, but Ukraine has had to build these industries largely from scratch during wartime.[6] Ukraine has also been working to increase its production of armored vehicles, including armored personnel carriers (APCs), since 2022, but Ukraine cannot manufacture complete tanks.[7] The US and other foreign allies likely can greatly increase the effectiveness of Ukrainian force-generation and force-reconstitution efforts by providing Ukrainian forces with more mechanized equipment, such as M113 armored personnel carriers, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and main battle tanks. Ukraine’s 155th Infantry Brigade was recently upgraded to a mechanized infantry brigade after the brigade was equipped with Leopard tanks, for example.[8] The generation of more Ukrainian infantry without a commensurate increase in mechanized equipment will not substantially increase Ukraine’s combat power or increase Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities.
Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has forced Russia to redirect some resources from Ukraine to defend in Russia but that Ukraine still needs sufficient resources and Western permission to strike military targets in Russia to mitigate the theater-wide strain on Ukrainian forces. Zelensky stated that the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian artillery ammunition usage was 12-to-1 in favor of Russian forces prior to the incursion in Kursk Oblast and that the incursion intended to force the Russian military to redeploy forces to Russia from Ukraine.[9] Zelensky also emphasized that Ukraine needs permission to use Western-provided precision weapons to strike military targets in Russia, as Russia has already begun to take advantage of Western restrictions and policy delays and move aircraft from airfields within range of Western-provided precision weapons.[10] ISW has previously assessed that there are over 200 military objects in Russia within range of US-provided ATACMS that are not airfields, and significant delays in allowing Ukraine to strike these objects gives the Kremlin more time to fortify or relocate these assets beyond the range of Western-provided weapons before Ukrainian forces are able to strike them with these weapons.[11] ISW has previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to outlast both Western military assistance to Ukraine and Ukraine's own willingness to defend itself through attritional warfare and efforts to undermine the legitimacy of and trust in the Ukrainian government.[12] Zelensky suggested that Ukraine is taking the war to Russian territory, both through strikes in Russia and the ongoing Kursk Oblast incursion, to degrade Russian domestic support for the war.[13] Zelensky emphasized that Russia will not be interested in negotiations with Ukraine unless Ukraine is militarily strong.[14]
Russia continues to build out its long-term military capacity by gradually increasing the size of its armed forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on September 16 establishing the staffing level of the Russian Armed Forces at 1.5 million combat personnel.[15] This marks a 180,000-person increase from the last decree increasing the staffing level of the Russian Armed Forces, which Putin signed in December 2023.[16] The December 2023 decree increased the staffing level of combat personnel by 170,000 compared with August 2022, meaning that the target staffing level of the Russian military has expanded by around 350,000 combat personnel since 2022.[17] The September 16 decree will notably come into force on December 1, 2024, suggesting that Russian military authorities will increase recruitment and force-generation efforts to meet the 1.5 million combat personnel benchmark starting December 2024. This decree is notably not an indicator of a new wave of Russian mobilization — rather it encompasses the breadth of recruitment avenues that the Russian military is currently undertaking.[18] Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu first set the 1.5 million combat personnel goal in December 2022, noting that this number includes a goal of 695,000 contract personnel.[19]
Russian efforts to increase the size of the armed forces are part of a longer-term Russian objective that extends beyond the war in Ukraine and aims to increase the size and overall capacity of the Russian military via long-term, large-scale force reforms. ISW has reported at length on these reforms, which have been ongoing since early 2023 and include the re-establishment of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts and the formation of new army corps, combined arms armies, and mechanized and airborne divisions.[20] Current Russian military reforms appear to be in large part reversing the main tenants of the reforms of former Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov of 2008–2012, which decreased the size of the Russian armed forces from 1.3 million to 1 million combat personnel and tightened and centralized command and control (C2) by eliminating division–level echelons in favor of brigade-level units.[21] As the Russian military begins to stand up new divisions, army corps, and armies, its staffing level must increase in tandem, at least on paper. Russia's ability to properly implement these reforms and integrate the increase in combat personnel, however, is in part contingent on its prosecution of the war in Ukraine, as ISW has previously assessed.[22] Medium- to long-term force-generation and economic constraints will continue to degrade Russia's ability to sustain an increase in the size of its military and to soundly implement its intended reforms.[23]
Iran is simultaneously setting conditions to build a nuclear weapon while continuing to signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. NOTE: A version of this text appears in the September 16 ISW-CTP Iran Update. Russia has increased nuclear cooperation with Iran in recent months in line with “[Iranian] ambitions to obtain atomic weapons,” according to unspecified Western officials speaking to Bloomberg on September 14.[24] It is unclear whether the Western officials meant that Iran has decided to produce a nuclear weapon or that Iran seeks to develop the capability to develop a nuclear weapon but has not actually decided to produce one. The Western officials stated that US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer discussed on September 13 how Russia may be sharing unspecified nuclear technology and secrets with Iran in return for Iran providing Russia with ballistic missiles.[25] Iran recently delivered over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia on September 4.[26] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken similarly stated on September 10 that “Russia is sharing technology that Iran seeks . . . including on nuclear issues.”[27] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Iran and Russia have increased “peaceful nuclear cooperation” during a meeting with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian in St. Petersburg, Russia, on September 12.[28]
The Masoud Pezeshkian administration is simultaneously continuing to signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami emphasized that President Pezeshkian seeks to “expand constructive interactions” with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a speech at the 68th IAEA General Conference in Vienna, Austria, on September 16.[29] Pezeshkian separately suggested that Iran could engage in direct talks with the United States if Washington abandons its "hostile” policy toward Iran.[30] These statements do not necessarily contradict Iran’s growing nuclear cooperation with Russia. Iran could seek Russian assistance with its nuclear program to try to increase pressure on the West and build leverage for itself in future negotiations.
Select Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials continue to face corruption charges as the Russian military leadership is undertaking a wider effort to root out corruption in the MoD. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on September 16 that the Russian Investigative Committee detained the head of the Russian 4924th military representative office, Ivan Papulovsky, and his subordinate Grigory Zorin on the suspicion of accepting 11 million rubles ($120,300) in bribes over the span of three years.[31] Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported that Papulovsky and Zorin received the bribes from two Russian companies contracted to supply the Russian MoD with electrical products and cables in exchange for preferential treatment and lax product inspections.[32] Russian opposition outlet Meduza added that Papulovsky and Zorin awarded a contract worth 1.2 billion rubles ($13 million) to the two electrical and cable product companies.[33] A Russian milblogger noted that such arrests and investigations are becoming more common due to a broader purge within the Russian MoD, spearheaded by new Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov.[34] ISW has observed that the new MoD leadership under Belousov has recently pushed for investigations into similar scandals involving property services, military uniforms, and a military-themed park near Moscow in an effort to curb corruption and mismanagement.[35]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages, but delays and insufficiencies in Western military aid to Ukraine continue to limit its ability to generate effective combat units that can defend critical areas and contest the theater-wide initiative.
- Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has forced Russia to redirect some resources from Ukraine to defend in Russia but that Ukraine still needs sufficient resources and Western permission to strike military targets in Russia to mitigate the theater-wide strain on Ukrainian forces.
- Russia continues to build out its long-term military capacity by gradually increasing the size of its armed forces.
- Iran is simultaneously setting conditions to build a nuclear weapon while continuing to signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West.
- Select Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials continue to face corruption charges as the Russian military leadership is undertaking a wider effort to root out corruption in the MoD.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recaptured territory in the area as of September 16. Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient.
- Ukrainian forces regained territory near Kharkiv City and Pokrovsk.
- Russian forces advanced near Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
- Russia reportedly continues to coerce migrants to fight in the Russian military.
Click here to read the full report with maps
Davit Gasparyan, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, and George Barros
September 15, 2024, 7:50 pm ET
Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine by 2026 before likely medium- to long-term economic and force generation constraints begin to significantly degrade Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov announced on September 15 at the 20th Yalta European Strategy meeting in Kyiv that the Kremlin considers 2025 to be a pivotal year because failure to secure a victory in Ukraine by early 2026 will undermine Russia’s aspirations of remaining a global superpower for the next 30 years.[1] Budanov noted that Russia anticipates a worsening economic and socio-political situation by mid-2025, alongside increasing difficulties with military recruitment.[2] Budanov stated that the Russian military is experiencing personnel shortages and a decrease in the number of new volunteers signing contracts.[3] Recent significant rises in one-time payments to contract military personnel (kontraktniki), with at least 36 Russian federal subjects (regions) reportedly having increased their one-time payments to kontraktniki in 2024 and at least 11 federal subjects paying Russian kontraktniki one million rubles ($11,000) or more, are likely evidence of mounting costs and difficulties with the Russian military's ability to continue recruiting personnel.[4] Budanov also stated that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, coupled with constant Ukrainian strikes into Russian territories, has demoralized Russian citizens and eroded the Russian public’s perception of Russian invincibility.[5] Budanov assessed that mounting issues will force Russian President Vladimir Putin to make a critical decision: either launch another risky and controversial mobilization or reduce the intensity of combat operations in Ukraine. Budanov’s assessment implicitly assumes that Western states will maintain support for Ukraine at current levels over the next one to two years. It remains unclear what Putin may do between now and 2026 or how effective Putin’s efforts to offset the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including via foreign partners like Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), will be. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains averse to announcing another partial mobilization out of fear of domestic discontent and will likely continue to instruct the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to pursue ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts until such efforts begin to fall far short of operational requirements in Ukraine.[6] Putin maintains the option to call another round of mobilization - as he did in Fall 2022 - despite his desire to avoid having to do so. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is also unwilling to accept reducing the intensity of Russian forces’ combat operations because the Kremlin sees maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative.[7] It remains unclear whether Putin will respond with another round of mobilization if faced with another crisis similar to or worse than the crisis the Kremlin faced in Fall 2022, as Russia’s investments to grow Russia’s force generation system, war economy, and international defense relationships have matured over the past two years, and likely will continue to do so through 2026.
Russia will likely face growing challenges in the production and procurement of the materiel that Russian operations in Ukraine require, and the Kremlin will likely become increasingly reliant on foreign partners to meet its materiel needs. The Russian military has extensively relied on refurbishing stocks of Soviet-era weapons and military equipment, particularly armored vehicles, to sustain the tempo of its offensive operations in Ukraine.[8] The Russian government will likely have to further mobilize the Russian economy and defense industry and invest in capacity building if the Russian military intends to sustain its current tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term as Russia depletes its finite Soviet stockpiles, but it is unclear if the Russian defense industry will be able to produce enough to sustain the high level of equipment losses that Russian forces suffer in Ukraine even with further economic mobilization.[9] ISW has previously assessed that Russia’s efforts to expand its DIB are unlikely to be sustainable in the medium- to long-term due to anticipated labor shortages and the impacts of Western sanctions.[10] Putin acknowledged on April 4 that Russia will experience a high demand for human capital and face labor shortages in the coming years.[11] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestiya reported on December 24, 2023, that Russia’s labor shortages, partly driven by the war in Ukraine, reached 4.8 million people in 2023 and would likely worsen and impair Russia's ability to enhance domestic defense industrial initiatives.[12]
Budanov drew attention to North Korea’s role as Russia’s most impactful military ally. Budanov noted that North Korean artillery ammunition deliveries to Russia have a direct and rapid effect on the war's dynamics, with Ukrainian forces experiencing increased Russian operational tempo just days after North Korean-provided artillery ammunition arrives.[13] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in January 2024 that Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce enough artillery ammunition to sustain Russia’s rate of fire and that North Korea delivered one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Russia between September and November 2023, offsetting some of Russia's crucial shortages.[14] North Korea had reportedly delivered 4.8 million artillery shells to Russia as of June 2024.[15] North Korean support has previously enabled Russia to maintain significant artillery advantages over Ukraine, and Russia has used these advantages to support consistent offensive operations designed to prevent Ukrainian forces from being able to contest the initiative.[16] ISW has noted that Russian authorities have recently intensified military cooperation with North Korea, as evidenced by Russian Security Council head Sergei Shoigu’s September 13 visit to Pyongyang and Putin’s visit in June 2024, when Putin signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement with North Korean President Kim Jong Un.[17] Russia's deepening military partnership with North Korea is emblematic of the relationship that Russia aims to create with Iran, the PRC, and other desired partners. Russia will likely face dwindling weapons and equipment stockpiles and struggle to offset these shortages unless it can circumvent Western sanctions at scale and significantly expand its engagements with foreign partners to obtain sufficient military materiel, component parts, and dual-use items. ISW will soon launch an initiative to study Russia’s growing partnerships with other hostile state actors.
Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on September 15 that Ukraine has started domestic serial production of 155mm artillery shells.[18] Kamyshin stated that Ukrainian production of defense products doubled while he oversaw the Ministry of Strategic Industries (March 2023 to September 2024) and will triple by the end of 2024. Ukraine began domestically producing NATO-standard 155mm shells in small volumes no later than September 2023 after having never produced these shells before.[19]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) promptly responded to ultranationalists' outcry surrounding the controversial deaths of two drone operators in Ukraine, highlighting how Russian authorities continue to be highly attentive to backlash from the ultranationalist community. The Russian MoD stated on September 14 that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov personally ordered Head of the MoD's Main Military-Political Directorate and Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Viktor Goremykin and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, alongside the Russian Federal Security Service's (FSB) Military Counterintelligence Department, to "sort out information" related to the death of the two drone operators within the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment of the 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]).[20] Various Russian milbloggers reported on September 13 that two drone operators from the 87th Rifle Regiment died in combat near Pokrovsk after their field commander forced them into an assault detachment as punishment for criticizing their command.[21] The death of the drone operators generated pronounced outrage among Russian ultranationalist milbloggers about poor command discipline, and the Russian MoD appears to be trying to promptly address this outrage by issuing a statement on the matter within 24 hours.[22]
The MoD's response is the latest in a series of incidents in which ultranationalist outcries have influenced Russian officials' decision-making. The Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor published and immediately deleted a draft procedure to implement a recently adopted law designed to deanonymize Russian Telegram channels following backlash from the Russian ultranationalist Telegram community on September 5.[23] Russian ultranationalist outcries about controversies tied to migrants have also previously prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open criminal investigations.[24] Russian officials' attentiveness to the Russian ultranationalist community underscores the importance the Kremlin has placed on leveraging the community's favor to support its war effort in Ukraine and the Kremlin's concerns about the consequences of pronounced ultranationalist discontent.[25]
Russian ultranationalist milbloggers praised the Russian MoD's response to the drone operators' deaths but expressed concern about the MoD's ability to solve the systemic issues that led to the deaths. The Russian milbloggers broadly expressed concern about various systemic issues within the 51st CAA and the Russian military, including a culture of lying to senior military commanders to falsely portray the military situation as positive; the practice of sending soldiers with specializations to conduct attritional, infantry-led "meat" assaults, command and control (C2) issues, and commanders' abuses of power.[26] A milblogger claimed that the Russian military command only ordered the assault that led to the drone operators' deaths because of false reports that Russian forces had seized a settlement near Pokrovsk.[27] Another milblogger noted that the Russian MoD only responded to the drone operators' deaths because of the significant outcry online and claimed that Russian authorities have previously investigated the Russian 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade for sending engineers to conduct infantry assaults.[28] Some milbloggers described the persistent issues within the Russian military as "Augean Stables," comparing the work necessary to eliminate the issues to the mythological Herculean task.[29] One milblogger pointed to another unresolved problem with Russian commanders sending wounded soldiers back to the frontline without treatment - an issue about which milbloggers have widely complained recently, prompting the Russian MoD to posture itself as making an effort to focus on soldiers' medical care.[30] Another milblogger provided insight into the struggles involved in the formalization and force structure of irregular Russian forces, claiming that regiments of the 51st CAA and 3rd Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Army Corps are severely understrength as the regiments have reduced tables of organization and equipment (TO/E) that do not include organic artillery; drone; air defense; or radiation, chemical, and biological defense elements that Russian regulations require of all Russian regiments.[31] The milblogger stated that regiments of the 51st CAA and 3rd CAA are inadequately provisioned, drastically reducing the units' combat capabilities. The Kremlin's efforts are unlikely to be sufficient to solve the broader issues that pervade the 51st CAA and other Russian regular and irregular formations in the near or medium term, especially as the Russian military is in the process of formalizing irregular formations into the regular Russian forces.
Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov aggravated Kremlin efforts to conduct prisoner of war (POW) exchanges for soldiers who defended against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast while balancing his attempts to appeal to both the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and hardline facets of Chechen society. Alaudinov responded on September 15 to requests for help from the relatives of Chechen servicemembers whom Ukrainian forces have captured in Kursk Oblast, claiming that "Chechens have always considered surrender to be the greatest disgrace."[32] Alaudinov claimed that Chechen prisoners of war (POWs) "didn’t deserve to live" and that Chechen soldiers should have attacked the Ukrainian personnel who were guarding them in order to provoke Ukrainian forces to kill them. Alaudinov claimed that he is prepared to help secure the release of other Russian prisoners of war (POWs), however. Alaudinov has been posturing himself as the spokesperson for the Russian forces operating in Kursk Oblast since the start of the Ukrainian incursion, and Russian state media has widely amplified his statements.[33] His September 15 statement denouncing Chechen soldiers who choose surrender over death is likely an attempt to rebalance his posturing to facets of Chechen society that hold similar beliefs and to portray Chechen forces as elite and making extreme sacrifices in the war. Ukraine and Russia conducted two POW exchanges on September 13 and 14, and Russia reportedly returned individuals whom Ukrainian forces captured in the Kursk direction, including many conscripts.[34] Russia has increasingly conducted POW exchanges with Ukraine since the start of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast following months of reportedly rebuffing Ukrainian overtures for POW exchanges - demonstrating the importance the Kremlin is placing on the return of Russian POWs captured in Kursk Oblast, particularly conscripts.[35] Alaudinov similarly recently berated the relatives of Russian conscripts fighting in Kursk Oblast for their complaints about their relatives' participation in combat operations, which likely exacerbated Kremlin efforts to respond to this socially and politically sensitive issue.[36]
Key Takeaways:
- Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine by 2026 before likely medium- to long-term economic and force generation constraints begin to significantly degrade Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.
- Russia will likely face growing challenges in the production and procurement of the materiel that Russian operations in Ukraine require, and the Kremlin will likely become increasingly reliant on foreign partners to meet its materiel needs.
- Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on September 15 that Ukraine has started domestic serial production of 155mm artillery shells.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) promptly responded to ultranationalists' outcry surrounding the controversial deaths of two drone operators in Ukraine, highlighting how Russian authorities continue to be highly attentive to backlash from the ultranationalist community.
- Russian ultranationalist milbloggers praised the Russian MoD's response to the drone operators' deaths but expressed concern about the MoD's ability to solve the systemic issues that led to the deaths.
- Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov aggravated Kremlin efforts to conduct prisoner of war (POW) exchanges for soldiers who defended against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast while balancing his attempts to appeal to both the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and hardline facets of Chechen society.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces reportedly recently recaptured territory in the area as of September 15. Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced in the salient.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Siversk, and Donetsk City.
- Russian authorities continue to strengthen coercive mechanisms to support ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts in order to avoid conducting a wider mobilization.
Davit Gasparyan, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, and George Barros
September 14, 2024, 6:30pm ET
Ukrainian officials and sources indicated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted the Russian authorities to increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast by upwards of a factor of three. Ukrainian Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on September 14 that Russian forces had 11,000 personnel deployed in Kursk Oblast at the start of Ukraine's incursion in early August 2024.[1] Mysnyk stated that there are various estimates that place the current size of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast between 30,000 and 45,000 personnel.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 13 that Russian forces have concentrated 40,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast and aim to concentrate a total of 60,000 to 70,000 personnel in the area.[3] The individual number breakdown for each of the Russian services (Rosgvardia, border guards, regular units, irregular units, and conscript forces) contributing to these figures remains unclear. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 14 that there are roughly 61 various Russian units of various sizes comprised of roughly 35,500 Russian personnel within the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces' Kursk Group (which has responsibility for Glushkovsky, Korenevsky, Sudzhansky, Rylsky, Lgovsky, Kurchatovsky, and Kursky raions).[4] The reported growth in the size of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast is reflective of how operational pressures caused by the incursion have forced the Russian military command to redeploy elements from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and commit newly generated forces from within Russia to the area instead of the frontline in Ukraine.[5] A Russian counteroffensive operation to retake territory seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more manpower and materiel than Russia has already concentrated in the area and therefore additional Russian redeployments from Ukraine.[6]
Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on September 14 — the third POW exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, which appears to have generated the short-term effect of increasing incentives for Russia to engage in POW exchanges. Ukrainian officials reported that Russia returned 103 prisoners to Ukraine including Ukrainian servicemembers who defended the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol in early 2022, servicemembers of the Ukrainian National Police and State Border Service, servicemembers of the Ukrainian State Transport Special Service, and other Ukrainian military personnel.[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 14 that Ukraine returned 103 individuals to Russia whom Ukrainian forces captured in Kursk Oblast.[8] Russian sources suggested that the returned Russian prisoners were conscripts.[9] The POW swap directly follows a similar exchange that Russia and Ukraine conducted on September 13, during which they returned 49 prisoners each.[10] Ukrainian officials have repeatedly emphasized that the Kursk incursion has enhanced Ukraine’s negotiating power in POW exchanges with Russia, following the Kremlin's consistent rejection of Ukraine's attempt to negotiate exchanges.[11] The frequency of POW exchanges between Ukraine and Russia has significantly increased since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on August 6, with both sides exchanging a total of 267 POWs each in three separate exchanges.[12] Russia and Ukraine only conducted three other POW exchanges, encompassing roughly 405 Ukrainian POWs and 423 Russian POWs, between January 1 and August 6, 2024.[13]
Some Russian field commanders continue to make decisions that degrade the overall quality of their subordinate forces—prioritizing infantry-led frontal assault tactics over cultivating technical specialists who would allow the Russian military to better field technologies and innovations in combat operations. Various Russian milbloggers reported on September 13 that two drone operators from the 87th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) died in combat near Pokrovsk after their field commander forced them into an assault detachment as punishment for criticizing their command.[14] The two drone operators posted footage explaining the situation and their forced reassignment to assault tasks before their deaths, which milbloggers widely amplified.[15] Several milbloggers claimed to have heard numerous similar stories and claimed that the practice of sending specialists, such as electronic warfare (EW) specialists, snipers, machine gunners, and drone operators, to conduct frontal assaults as punishment for dissent is commonplace, particularly amongst units of the 51st CAA.[16] DNR First Deputy Information Minister Danil Bezsonov claimed that the commander of the "Komendant" naval Spetsnaz group, which was operating in Kherson Oblast, similarly divided his subordinates into assault groups based on personal vendettas and that a commander operating in Donetsk Oblast sent a talented cyberhacker to an assault unit for disagreeing with the command, after which the hacker died in combat.[17]
Milbloggers argued that this practice is indicative of poor command discipline and is degrading the quality of Russian forces.[18] ISW has previously noted that the Russian military command's reliance on infantry-led frontal assault tactics has flattened the distinctions between formerly elite (such as Airborne and Naval Infantry forces) and ordinary Russian combat services and degraded Russian combat capability throughout the frontline.[19] Reports of Russian commanders forcing personnel with more technical specialties to conduct such frontal assaults are consistent with this wider observed pattern. Machine gunners and snipers are not necessarily specialists in a technical sense, but they possess unique skills that accomplish different effects than foot-mobile infantry conducting a frontal assault against a tactical objective. By using specialists of any variety as additional bodies for frontal assaults, the Russian command is forgoing the opportunity to properly leverage whatever specialties they could integrate into their respective units, further illustrating that most Russian frontline troops have been reduced to understrength and low-quality motorized rifle units.[20] The use of specialists who are familiar with more advanced battlefield technologies, such as drones and EW systems, is likely compounding these effects. While Ukrainian forces have consistently displayed high degrees of tactical and technical innovation, the Russian military appears to be willfully undermining its own ability to integrate innovations into combat operations.[21]
The Kremlin continues efforts to leverage global informational instruments of influence to develop new capabilities to conduct election interference, destabilization measures, and sanctions evasion schemes. The US State Department announced new sanctions on September 13 against entities and individuals connected to Russian state media outlet Russia Today (RT), which the State Department noted is engaging in information operations, covert influence, and military procurement efforts for the Kremlin by targeting states in Europe, Africa, and North and South America.[22] The State Department reported that the Kremlin created a cyber operations entity within RT in Spring 2023 that provided information to Russian intelligence, media, and mercenary groups. RT is reportedly also crowdfunding money to purchase equipment for the Russian military in small orders, including from the People's Republic of China (PRC), "to avoid unwanted scrutiny." The State Department noted that RT is coordinating with the Kremlin to influence the October 2024 Moldovan presidential election and to foment violent protests in Moldova. The State Department stated that the Kremlin is using Russian state-owned bank Promsvyazbank's (PSB) recent pension funding agreement with Moldovan autonomous region Gagauzia to buy votes in support of pro-Kremlin presidential candidates, as ISW similarly assessed in April 2024.[23] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on September 14 that RT is "functioning like a de facto arm of Russia's intelligence apparatus."[24] The US Department of Justice (DOJ) reported on September 4 that the Kremlin is conducting complex malign influence operations called "Doppelganger" to reduce Western support for Ukraine and influence US and foreign elections.[25] ISW assessed at that time that Russia was continuing its efforts to develop a capability to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity.[26]
Officials of Georgia’s ruling Georgia Dream party continue to elevate narratives echoing Kremlin information operations justifying Russia’s occupation of internationally recognized Georgian territories. Georgian Dream party’s founder and former Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili attributed the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and subsequent Russian occupation of Georgian territories to unspecified "external actors" and the former pro-Western Georgian United National Movement (UNM) ruling party during an election rally in Gori, a city bordering Russian-occupied South Ossetia.[27] Ivanishvili notably omitted any mention of Russia and Russian aggression against Georgia. Ivanishvili claimed that Georgian Dream would hold UNM, particularly former pro-Western Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, accountable should Georgia Dream obtain a constitutional majority in the upcoming October 2024 Georgian parliamentary elections. Ivanishvili also stated that the Georgian government, under the Georgian Deam party, would seek reconciliation with South Ossetia and work towards forgiveness for the alleged violence that UNM caused. Ivanishvili’s rhetoric closely echoes the larger Georgian Dream election campaign that seeks to present itself as the party of peace while framing opposition parties, such as UNM, as parties supporting instability and war.[28] ISW previously assessed that Georgian Dream has used narratives that closely mirror Kremlin information operations aimed at justifying Russian aggression against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states that the Russian Empire and Soviet Union formerly colonized by blaming domestic, pro-Western parties who allegedly cooperate with unspecified “external actors” to instigate violence.[29]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian officials and sources indicated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted the Russian authorities to increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast by upwards of a factor of three.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on September 14 — the third POW exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, which appears to have generated the short-term effect of increasing incentives for Russia to engage in POW exchanges.
- Some Russian field commanders continue to make decisions that degrade the overall quality of their subordinate forces—prioritizing infantry-led frontal assault tactics over cultivating technical specialists who would allow the Russian military to better field technologies and innovations in combat operations.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to leverage global informational instruments of influence to develop new capabilities to conduct election interference, destabilization measures, and sanctions evasion schemes.
- Officials of Georgia’s ruling Georgia Dream party continue to elevate narratives echoing Kremlin information operations justifying Russia’s occupation of internationally recognized Georgian territories.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
- Russian forces are reportedly repairing captured Soviet-era Ukrainian equipment to replenish Russian vehicle stocks.
Click here to read the full report with maps
Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan, Haley Zehrung, and George Barros
September 13, 2024, 8:30pm ET
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has reportedly spoiled planned Russian offensive operations along the international border area that likely aimed to expand the area of active combat operations across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 13 that the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast stopped Russian plans to create several buffer zones along the Ukrainian border "from the east to the north," including in Sumy Oblast.[1] Zelensky stated that Russian forces wanted to launch major offensives to seize regional centers, likely referring to the regional capitals of Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Sumy and Kharkiv cities are roughly 25 and 30 kilometers from the international border, respectively – significantly further than the approximately six to 10 kilometers that Russian forces currently occupy near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).
Zelensky's statement suggests that Russian forces planned to start new offensive operations aimed at penetrating at least 25 kilometers deep into Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and activating along a much wider front between at least Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi similarly stated on September 5 that the Ukrainian incursion spoiled a planned Russian attack into Sumy Oblast and "reduced the threat" of Russian incursions into northern Ukraine.[2] ISW previously assessed that the Russian offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast aimed to fix Ukrainian manpower and materiel along the northern border, granting Russian forces opportunities to re-intensify offensive operations in other higher-priority areas of the theater.[3] Ukrainian forces have largely stabilized the frontline in the Kharkiv direction since Summer 2024 and continue to contest the tactical initiative through counterattacks that have regained limited positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[4] The Russian military command may have intended for additional offensive operations along a wider and more continuous front in northeastern Ukraine to significantly stretch Ukrainian forces along the international border following the Ukrainian stabilization of the frontline north and northeast of Kharkiv City.
Zelensky noted that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has also impacted Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast. Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian incursion "slowed" Russian advances throughout Donetsk Oblast and reduced the advantage in artillery ammunition that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction had over Ukrainian forces from 12-to-1 to 2.5-to-1.[5] ISW is unable to verify Zelensky’s statement, though the rate of Russian advance in the Pokrovsk area has notably slowed since the start of September 2024. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated during an interview published on September 7 that Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast complicated Russia's plans for offensive operations, including in Russia's "main direction" (likely referring to the Pokrovsk direction), in August 2024 and later this fall.[6] ISW has recently observed indications that Russian authorities have transferred limited elements of likely Russian reserve units from Donetsk Oblast, including from the Pokrovsk direction, to Kursk Oblast to counter the Ukrainian incursion.[7] Such limited redeployments are unlikely to have an immediate impact on the tempo of Russian offensive operations, although Russian forces may struggle to maintain their current offensive tempo into the future if Russian authorities conduct additional redeployments from reserve forces in Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces continue to counterattack throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, but the Russian military will likely have to redeploy additional elements from elsewhere in the theater to Kursk Oblast to establish a force grouping capable of pursuing a sustained counteroffensive operation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on September 13 that Russian forces have begun counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast, and Pentagon Spokesperson Major General Patrick Ryder stated on September 12 that the US has observed Russian units beginning to try to conduct "some type of counteroffensive" operation that Ryder described as "marginal."[8] ISW continues to track observable Russian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast but has not yet observed large-scale combat operations indicating that Russian forces have started a large-scale concerted counteroffensive operation aimed at completely expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.
Zelensky stated that Russian forces have concentrated 40,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast but did not specify the composition of the Russian grouping, and it remains unclear whether Zelensky’s count is representative exclusively of combat-effective Russian soldiers or a joint force that includes contract soldiers, plus less effective conscripts, irregular forces, border guards, Rosgvardia elements, and Russian Interior Ministry forces.[9] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 13 that there are roughly 33,000 to 35,000 Russian personnel in Kursk Oblast.[10] Zelensky stated that the Russian military command intends to concentrate 60,000 to 70,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast, a number notably higher than the 50,000 personnel that US officials reportedly assessed that Russia would need to push Ukrainians out of Kursk Oblast.[11] Russian authorities have largely relied on poorly-trained and equipped conscripts and small elements of Russian regular and irregular forces to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast thus far, and it is unlikely that most of the current Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast is comprised of combat experienced units.[12]
A Russian counteroffensive operation to retake territory seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more manpower and materiel than Russia has already concentrated in the area — especially if most of the already committed units lack combat experience. Russian Airborne (VDV) forces that recently redeployed to Kursk Oblast from the frontline in Ukraine currently appear to be heavily responsible for counterattacks in Kursk Oblast, suggesting that the Russian military command may intend to field units perceived to be more "elite" or combat effective to regain territory.[13] The Russian military will most certainly have to redeploy units already committed to ongoing offensive operations or operational reserves from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast in order to field the combat-effective units needed for a large counteroffensive operation and then subsequently guard the international border against future Ukrainian incursion.
Russian forces appear to be testing more effective mechanized assault tactics west of Donetsk City, although Russian armored vehicles remain vulnerable to Ukrainian strike and drone capabilities. Geolocated footage published on September 12 shows Russian forces conducting a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault and advancing across the fields southwest of Krasnohorivka and into eastern Hostre (west of Donetsk City).[14] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced during the mechanized assault and one Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control one-third of Hostre.[15] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the attack reported that Russian forces launched four waves of assaults over six hours on the morning of September 12 and that Russian forces used 46 pieces of mechanized equipment, including armored vehicles, tanks, and motorcycles during the assaults.[16] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 15 armored vehicles, tanks, and motorcycles and damaged 11 additional armored vehicles while repelling the assault. Although Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed over half of the armored vehicles that Russian forces used during the mechanized assault near Hostre, Russian forces managed to advance between six and eight kilometers southwest of Krasnohorivka during the battle. Russian forces have historically struggled with rapid mechanized maneuver through open fields due to a lack of cover and concealment from Ukrainian drones and fires, but Russian forces may have assessed that the recent intensification of Russian offensive operations southwest of Pokrovsk and west and southwest of Donetsk City had sufficiently strained Ukraine's defensive capabilities in this area to enable Russian forces to make tactically significant advances.[17]
The commander of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Donetsk direction reported on September 13 that Russian forces are using a new tactic during mechanized assaults in this direction.[18] The commander reported that Russian forces are using a task-organized, small mechanized unit that features a heavily armored "turtle" tank (a tank with extra armored platting) equipped with mine-clearing equipment as the lead vehicle followed by several armored personnel carriers. The armored personnel carriers then carry Russian infantry close to Ukrainian positions before the infantry dismount to begin the assault and the personnel carriers presumably return to the point of departure. The commander reported that Russian forces are still suffering significant armored vehicle losses and estimated that Russian forces are losing up to 90 percent of the vehicles used in mechanized assaults in the Donetsk direction. Russian forces conducted a series of costly mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast in late July 2024 but made very marginal territorial advances in exchange for their comparative heavy armored vehicle losses.[19] Russian forces most recently conducted a tactically significant mechanized assault up to the eastern outskirts of Chasiv Yar in April 2024, and Russian forces may attempt to model future mechanized assaults after these more tactically successful outcomes.[20]
Ukraine and Russia conducted their second prisoner of war (POW) exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on September 13. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine and Russia each returned 49 prisoners and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the swap.[21] Zelensky stated that Ukraine returned servicemembers who defended the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol, servicemembers of the Ukrainian National Police and State Border Service, and civilians. Russian officials have not yet confirmed the details of their returned prisoners, but Russian sources claimed that Russia returned individuals whom Ukrainian forces captured in the Kursk direction, including conscripts.[22] Ukrainian officials have previously suggested that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has forced Russia to more readily consider POW exchanges.[23] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that Russian citizens wrote a record number of 1,927 requests to Russian President Vladimir Putin to search for Russian servicemembers missing or captured in August 2024 following the beginning of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[24]
Russia continues efforts to strengthen strategic military ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran to support its war effort in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin traveled to Beijing on September 13 to partake in the Xiangshan Forum where he highlighted the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and the PRC.[25] Fomin emphasized Russian-PRC plans for over 100 joint military cooperation events in 2024, blamed NATO and the US for intensifying the war in Ukraine, and criticized the US for pursuing an alleged dual containment policy of Russia and the PRC.[26]
Reuters, citing two undisclosed European intelligence sources and obtained documents, reported on September 13 that Russia has been producing the long-range “Garpiya-A1” attack drone using Chinese engines and other dual-use parts since 2023 and that Russian forces have used the drone to strike military and civilian targets in Ukraine.[27] The Garpiya-A1 drone has a range of 1,500 kilometers, similar to the Iranian Shahed-136 drones. Reuters reported that Russian weapons manufacturer IEMZ Kupol reportedly produced over 2,500 Garpiya-A1 drones between July 2023 to July 2024.
TASS also reported on September 13 that Russian Security Council head Sergei Shoigu traveled to Pyongyang, North Korea and met North Korean President Kim Jong Un for unspecified bilateral discussions.[28] This follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea in June 2024, where he signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement with Kim and continued shipments of North Korean artillery shells and ballistic missiles to Russia.[29] Shoigu’s visit also follows Iran’s recent delivery of over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia and Putin's meeting with Iranian Secretary of the National Security Council, Ali Akbar Ahmadian on September 12.[30]
Russia’s deepening engagement with the PRC, North Korea, and Iran is part of a wider Kremlin effort to establish a coalition of friendly states aimed directly at enhancing the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and securing strategic economic cooperation to support its war in Ukraine.[31]
Key Takeaways:
- The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has reportedly spoiled planned Russian offensive operations along the international border area that likely aimed to expand the area of active combat operations across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine.
- Russian forces continue to counterattack throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, but the Russian military will likely have to redeploy additional elements from elsewhere in the theater to Kursk Oblast to establish a force grouping capable of pursuing a sustained counteroffensive operation.
- Russian forces appear to be testing more effective mechanized assault tactics west of Donetsk City, although Russian armored vehicles remain vulnerable to Ukrainian strike and drone capabilities.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted their second prisoner of war (POW) exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on September 13.
- Russia continues efforts to strengthen strategic military ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran to support its war effort in Ukraine.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued Russian and Ukrainian assaults in the area on September 13.
- Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
- Russian authorities continue attempts to coerce minorities and Ukrainian youth living in occupied Ukraine to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to avoid conducting a wider mobilization.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 12, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Haley Zehrung, Katherine Wells, and Karolina Hird
September 12, 2024, 8:45pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces continued counterattacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on September 12 but made only marginal gains, likely due to continued Ukrainian offensive operations and defensive counterattacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on September 12 indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances west of Vishnevka (southwest of Korenevo) and in northern Krasnooktyabrskoye (southwest of Korenevo).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces have recaptured 10 settlements south and southwest of Korenevo since starting counterattacks on the night of September 10 to 11, including Apanasovka, Byakhovo, Vishnevka, Viktorovka, Vnezapnoye, Gordeevka, Krasnooktyabrskoye, Obukhovka, Snagost, and 10-y Oktyabr.[2] All of these settlements are within the existing claimed limit of Russian advances, and ISW has yet to observe visual confirmation that Russian forces have recaptured any of these settlements except parts of Snagost and Krasnooktyabrskoye. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued advancing southeast of Korenevo and northeast of Snagost (southwest of Korenevo), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[3] Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking in areas where Russian forces have launched counterattacks and launched additional attacks outside of the salient, making gains in Glushkovsky Raion (west of Korenevsky Raion). Geolocated footage published September 12 indicates that Ukrainian infantry have advanced across the border and into southwestern Tetkino (about 40km southwest of the current Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast).[4] Additional geolocated footage published on September 12 shows Ukrainian armored vehicles and infantry bypassing Russian dragon's teeth anti-tank obstacles on the Russian-Ukrainian border southwest of Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo) unopposed, indicating that Ukrainian forces have advanced in the area and that Russian forces were not prepared to leverage the obstacles to repel cross-border Ukrainian assaults.[5] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Novy Put, Medvezhye (southeast of Glushkovo), Snagost, Olgovka (east of Korenevo), and Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha).[6]
Russian forces have so far advanced in areas of Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces were not yet fully controlling nor attempting to control, and Russian forces will likely face more difficulty when counterattacking further into areas of the salient where Ukrainian forces do have control. ISW uses the doctrinal definition of "control" when referring to control of terrain in which "control is a tactical mission task that requires a commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations."[7] Russian forces have advanced roughly 58 square kilometers in areas where ISW has observed either maximalist claims or visual evidence of Ukrainian forces operating since starting counterattacks on the night of September 10 to 11. ISW previously was not mapping control of terrain within the Ukrainian salient in Russia, and Russian forces have not advanced in recent days through areas which ISW formally assessed were under Ukrainian control. ISW has been mapping the maximalist extent of claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances, however, and ISW's mapping never excluded the possibility that Russian forces were operating in areas within the maximalist extent of claimed Ukrainian advances. Ukrainian forces have not attempted to consolidate positions everywhere in their salient in Kursk Oblast, and it is likely that Ukrainian forces had fewer consolidated positions in forward areas at the edges of the salient where Russian forces have recently advanced. Ukrainian forces most certainly control territory within some areas of the salient in Kursk Oblast, although ISW will continue to refrain from mapping Ukrainian control of terrain in Russia. Russian counterattacks against better prepared and consolidated positions in territory where Ukrainian forces exert control will likely be far less successful than the counterattacks Russian forces launched on September 10 to 11.
A Ukrainian HIMARS strike reportedly damaged a temporary pontoon bridge across the Seym River and inflicted casualties on a group of nearby Russian troops on September 12. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces published footage on September 12 showing cluster munitions from a Ukrainian HIMARS rocket striking a group of Russian infantry along the bank of the Seym River in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast.[8] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces stated that the Russian troops were preparing to conduct assaults against Ukrainian positions in the area. Ukrainian forces previously struck several Russian pontoon bridges over the Seym River in Glushkovsky Raion in late August 2024.[9]
Russian authorities have reportedly deployed additional elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division to Kursk Oblast and may begin redeploying more combat experienced forces to support ongoing Russian counterattacks and future counteroffensive operations against Ukrainian forces in Russia. Footage published on September 11 purportedly shows elements of the Russian 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) participating in assaults northwest of Snagost.[10] ISW observed reports that elements of the 137th VDV Regiment were operating in the Siversk direction as of late August 2024.[11] Elements of the 106th VDV Division's 51st VDV Regiment are also reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[12] Russian authorities have largely relied on poorly trained and equipped conscripts and small elements of Russian regular and irregular forces to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast thus far and will likely require additional manpower and more combat experienced units to fully push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[13] Russian authorities may concentrate additional elements of the 106th VDV Division and other more combat experienced formations in Kursk Oblast as Russian forces continue counterattacks against the Ukrainian salient.
The United Kingdom (UK) will reportedly allow Ukraine to use UK-provided long-range Storm Shadow missiles to strike military objects in Russia in the coming days. UK outlet The Guardian reported on September 11 that sources within the UK government stated that the UK has already made a decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided Storm Shadow missiles to strike objects in Russia, but that the UK will not announce the policy change until after US President Joe Biden's September 13 meeting with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer.[14] UK outlet The Times reported on September 12 that two sources familiar with the discussions stated that the US may allow Ukraine to use UK- and French-provided Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles to strike military objects in Russia but likely will not allow Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS missiles to strike military objects in Russia.[15] Two unspecified US officials told CNN on September 11 that the Biden administration has not changed its policy of prohibiting Ukrainian forces from using US-provided ATACMS missiles to strike within Russia despite discussing the issue regularly.[16] Biden stated on September 10 that his administration was “working that out” when asked about potential plans to lift US restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range weapons in Russia, however.[17] Zelensky stated on September 12 that Ukrainian officials presented a detailed request to lift Western restrictions on long-range strikes into Russia during recent meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy and emphasized that delays in lifting the restrictions have allowed Russia to move some military objects "deeper" into Russia.[18]
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues rhetorical efforts aimed at influencing the ongoing Western policy debate about granting Ukraine permission to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia, although Russia has not previously escalated militarily against perceived Western violations of Russia's "red lines."[19] Putin reiterated claims on September 11 that Ukrainian strikes against Russia using Western-provided weapons would represent an escalation in the war in Ukraine and directly involve Western countries in the war.[20] Putin and other Kremlin officials routinely accuse the West of escalating and being directly involved in the war as part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign aimed at coercing the West into making policy decisions that benefit the Kremlin, such as not allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military objects in Russia or delaying Western military assistance to Ukraine.[21] The Kremlin has previously threatened military escalation should the West cross its so-called "red lines," but has never significantly responded to any US or Western provision of military assistance to Ukraine.[22] The Kremlin has also demonstrated that it is unwilling to escalate in response to Ukraine's ongoing incursion into Kursk Oblast, which has lasted for over a month and has included Western-provided equipment and conducting strikes with Western-provided HIMARS within Russia.[23] Putin's September 11 rhetoric is therefore not an inflection in typical Russian rhetoric about the risk of escalation of the war in Ukraine and is likely intended to influence the ongoing Western policy debates about Ukraine's ability to strike military targets in Russia with Western-provided precision weapons.[24] Delays in Western policy decisions in support of Ukraine's defense have resulted in critical delays of military assistance to Ukraine, forcing Ukrainian counteroffensives to culminate and allowing Russia to seize the theater-wide initiative, as ISW has previously reported.[25]
Russian forces struck a civilian cargo ship transiting through the Ukrainian grain corridor in the western Black Sea on September 11, likely as part of a renewed Russian effort to undermine international confidence in the safety of the corridor. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a cruise missile strike against a civilian cargo ship under the flag of St. Kitts and Nevis transporting Ukrainian wheat to Egypt as it was leaving Ukrainian territorial waters in the Black Sea on the night of September 11.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that preliminary data suggests there were no casualties but noted that Ukrainian food shipments to countries in Africa and the Middle East are critical for the global market.[27] The Romanian Coast Guard reported that the Russian missile struck the ship while in Romania’s maritime economic zone.[28] Russian forces have previously heavily targeted Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine and have engaged in threatening military posturing in the Black Sea in an effort to damage Ukrainian grain exports and undermine confidence in the Ukrainian grain corridor.[29] Russian strikes against civilian vessels in the grain corridor are almost certainly intended to undermine confidence in Ukraine's ability to enforce and defend the corridor and negatively impact Ukraine's efforts to economically recover amid the ongoing war. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on September 10 that Ukrainian has so far sent 66 million tons of cargo through the trade corridor in the Black Sea in 2024 and that this is close to the level of exports before the full-scale invasion.[30]
Russia continued its efforts to enhance relations with non-Western countries at the meeting of BRICS high-ranking security officials and advisors in St. Petersburg. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with officials from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, and Iran on September 12 to discuss bilateral ties and promote Russia’s BRICS presidency and the upcoming October BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan.[31] Kremlin newswire TASS claimed on September 12 that Putin met with PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi and discussed Russia-China bilateral relations and cooperation within BRICS, while Wang confirmed that PRC President Xi Jinping will attend the upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan.[32] Putin met with Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval with whom he reportedly discussed India’s peace proposal for the war in Ukraine and the possibility of holding a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the BRICS summit.[33] Putin also reportedly discussed with Iranian Secretary of the National Security Council, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, the strengthening nature of Iran-Russia relations, the signing of an interstate agreement at the strategic partnership level, and the development of the proposed north-south corridor passing through Russia into Iran through the South Caucasus.[34] These developments likely demonstrate a broader Russian diplomatic outreach effort to enhance relations with non-Western countries, convey an image of global leadership, and garner support for its war effort.
Iran and Russia are downplaying their disagreement over the Zangezur Corridor project in the Caucasus. NOTE: A version of this text appears in the September 12 ISW-CTP Iran Update. Tension has erupted between Moscow and Tehran since Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov announced on August 19 that Russia supports the Zangezur Corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhchivan Autonomous Region through southern Armenia.[35] Iran has long opposed the development of the Zangezur corridor, arguing that it would sever Iranian land access to Europe and Russia.[36] Ahmadian met Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in St. Petersburg, Russia, on September 10, during which Shoigu insisted that the Russian position vis-a-vis the Zangezur Corridor has not recently changed.[37] Ahmadian similarly said that nothing has changed in the Iran-Russia relationship during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 12.[38] Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova likewise said on September 11 that Russia ”provided all the necessary clarifications,” on the issue, which Tehran has accepted.[39] Neither Iran nor Russia likely seeks to antagonize the other, despite their differing positions, especially as they implemented their agreement to provide Iranian missiles to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[40]
Russia is continuing to balance its relationships with Iran and the Gulf states. Ahmadian and Shoigu also discussed the dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates over ownership of three islands in the Persian Gulf — Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa.[41] Tehran has claimed the three islands as Iranian territory since 1971.[42] Iranian state media reported that Shoigu expressed Russian support for Iranian sovereignty over the three islands, though this Iranian media report should be treated with skepticism.[43] Russia has historically indicated support for the Emirati claim to the islands, which has been a consistent point of tension between Moscow and Tehran.[44]
Russian investigative outlet Dossier Center published an investigation on September 12 into the Kremlin's efforts to consolidate its influence over the Russian information space via Telegram ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Dossier Center obtained documents indicating that the Russian Presidential Administration invested millions of rubles in creating a network of Telegram channels and co-opting existing Telegram channels as part of the Kremlin's efforts to gain further influence and control over information space narratives between 2018 and 2021.[45] The documents acknowledged that the Presidential Administration competed with Russian propagandist and RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan for influence over prominent Russian channels on Telegram. Dossier Center reported that the Presidential Administration also prioritized maintaining the appearance of Telegram as an independent and impartial organization while simultaneously attempting to gain leverage and influence over Telegram employees living in Russia. Dossier Center's investigation is consistent with the ongoing Kremlin effort to consolidate greater control over Telegram and the wider Russian information space, on which ISW routinely reports.[46]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces continued counterattacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on September 12 but made only marginal gains, likely due to continued Ukrainian offensive operations and defensive counterattacks in the area.
- Russian forces have so far advanced in areas of Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces were not yet fully controlling nor attempting to control, and Russian forces will likely face more difficulty when counterattacking further into areas of the salient where Ukrainian forces do have control.
- A Ukrainian HIMARS strike reportedly damaged a temporary pontoon bridge across the Seym River and wounded a group of nearby Russian troops on September 12.
- Russian authorities have reportedly deployed additional elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division to Kursk Oblast and may begin redeploying more combat experienced forces to support ongoing Russian counterattacks and future counteroffensive operations against Ukrainian forces in Russia.
- The United Kingdom (UK) will reportedly allow Ukraine to use UK-provided long-range Storm Shadow missiles to strike military objects in Russia in the coming days.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues rhetorical efforts aimed at influencing the ongoing Western policy debate about granting Ukraine permission to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia, although Russia has not previously escalated militarily against perceived Western violations of Russia's "red lines."
- Russian forces struck a civilian cargo ship transiting through the Ukrainian grain corridor in the western Black Sea on September 11, likely as part of a renewed Russian effort to undermine international confidence in the safety of the corridor.
- Russia continued its efforts to enhance relations with non-Western countries at the meeting of BRICS high-ranking security officials and advisors in St. Petersburg.
- Iran and Russia are downplaying their disagreement over the Zangezur Corridor project in the Caucasus.
- Russia is continuing to balance its relationships with Iran and the Gulf states.
- Russian investigative outlet Dossier Center published an investigation on September 12 into the Kremlin's efforts to consolidate its influence over the Russian information space via Telegram ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
- Russian forces recently north of Chasiv Yar, southeast of Pokrovsk, and west of Donetsk City.
- Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin claimed on September 12 that the first group of the newly-formed "BARS-Sarmat" volunteer detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD and are training for deployment to the frontline in Ukraine.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 11, 2024
click here to read the full report
Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Haley Zehrung, Karolina Hird, and George Barros
September 11, 2024, 8:25 pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on September 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces began counterattacks along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and reportedly seized several settlements northeast and south of Korenevo on September 10 and 11. The size, scale, and potential prospects of the September 11 Russian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast are unclear and the situation remains fluid as of this report. It is premature to draw conclusions about Russia’s new counterattacks and ISW will continue following the situation. Geolocated footage published on September 11 indicates that Russian forces retook positions east of Zhuravli (northeast of Korenevo).[1] Additional geolocated footage published on September 10 indicates that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) advanced north and northeast of Snagost (south of Korenevo) during a company-sized mechanized assault.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces launched the mechanized counterattack from the north near Korenevo and that Russian forces quickly advanced into Snagost.[3] Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces fully seized Snagost, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[4] Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 51st VDV Regiment and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced northwest of Snagost and seized Krasnooktyabrskoye; advanced west of Snagost and seized Komarovka and Vishnevka; advanced southwest of Snagost and seized Apanasovka and 10-y Oktyabr; advanced southeast of Snagost and seized Obukhovka; and advanced south of Snagost and seized Byakhovo, Vnezapnoye, and Gordeevka.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Olgovka (just east of Korenevo).[6]
Ukrainian forces reportedly began new attacks against the Russian counterattack west of Snagost and throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast reported on September 11 that Ukrainian forces began attacking Russian forces' flank west of Snagost after the initial Russian counterattack into Snagost.[7] An open-source X (formerly Twitter) user claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating near Kulbaki (southwest of Snagost and roughly five kilometers from the international border), suggesting that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near the settlement, reportedly after crossing the international border.[8] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting small mechanized cross-border assaults into Glushkovo Raion near Medvezhye (southwest of Snagost and along the international border) and in another unspecified area along the international border.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks south of Snagost near Apanasovka; east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye; and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Fanaseyevka, and Borki.[10] It remains unclear how much force Ukraine has committed to the reported Ukrainian counterattack.
Available visual evidence suggests that Russian forces counterattacking in Kursk Oblast are operating in company-sized units and may be using elements of more combat-experienced units to conduct counterattacks. Geolocated footage published on September 10 shows elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) conducting a company-seized mechanized assault north of Snagost.[11] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian naval infantry and airborne "battalion tactical groups" (BTGs) are conducting offensive operations in Kursk Oblast, although ISW has only observed geolocated footage of a company-sized mechanized assault.[12] The milblogger could be referring to a BTG-sized force (roughly a unit with the strength of a reinforced battalion but not necessarily operating in the structure of a traditional BTG), and Russian forces could theoretically deploy a detached company from a BTG. Russian forces notably have not utilized BTGs at scale on the battlefield since mid-2022, following the widespread failure of BTGs to accomplish Russian offensive objectives in the early stages of the war, as well as damage accrued to BTGs during costly Russian offensive operations on Kyiv, Severodonetsk, Mariupol, and Lysychansk.[13] The Russian military has transitioned away from using BTGs in the past two years as a task-organized unit and their re-emergence in Kursk Oblast, if confirmed, would be a noteworthy inflection.[14] ISW has not observed any confirmation that Russian forces in Kursk Oblast are operating BTG as of this publication. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in Kursk Oblast and involved in the counterattacks.[15] The Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade most notably participated in the failed Russian push for Vuhledar in late 2022 to early 2023, then fought southwest of Donetsk City near Marinka, and deployed to participate in the Russian offensive north of Kharkiv City in May 2024 — largely without significant rest, and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade has been degraded to the point of being reconstituted several times.[16] Elements of the 56th VDV Regiment participated in repelling Ukrainian counteroffensive operations near Verbove in Summer 2023 and were reportedly still operating in the area as of July 2024.[17] The Russian military may be relying on relatively combat-experienced units to conduct assault operations in Kursk Oblast, although it is unclear how effective these operations will be since these units, especially units which have been heavily degraded and reconstituted many times, like the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade. It is also unclear if Russian forces have enough forces necessary to fully repel Ukrainian forces — or defend against reported Ukrainian counterattacks — from Kursk Oblast since the Russian military command likely deployed elements of these units, instead of the entire formations, to Kursk Oblast, making it premature to assess the longer-term strategic-level effects of the Ukrainian incursion.
Russian forces may intend to temporarily bisect the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast before beginning a more organized and well-equipped effort to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory. Russian forces are currently conducting counterattacks along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, in an area that is largely comprised of fields and small settlements. Russian forces may be working to establish more tactically favorable positions during these initial counterattacks before beginning a wider counteroffensive operation against Ukrainian forces operating northeast of Korenevo and near Sudzha. Russian forces may intend to cut the Ukrainian salient and advance to the international border southeast of Snagost to complicate existing Ukrainian logistics routes and fire support positions closer to the international border before beginning a larger-scale counteroffensive operation. The Russian military command appears to be relying on elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and 56th and 51st VDV regiments for these initial counterattacks but will likely introduce other elements of the Russian force grouping in this area in future counterattacks. It remains unclear if the Russian authorities responding to the Kursk incursion assess that the current Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast — largely comprised of conscripts, irregular Russian forces, and smaller elements of regular and more elite Russian units — can successfully push Ukrainian forces from the area. Russian authorities may also plan to transfer additional, more combat-capable Russian units from Ukraine to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, although it is unclear when Russian authorities may conduct such redeployments. It would be premature to assess the impact of two days of Russian counterattacks on the month-long Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, particularly amid ongoing Ukrainian cross-border assaults, and ISW will continue to evaluate the impact of the Russian counterattacks in the coming days.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary Davit Lammy arrived in Kyiv on September 11 and reiterated support for Ukraine but did not clarify current Western policy on Ukraine’s ability to strike military objects in Russia with Western-provided weapons.[18] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal met with Lammy on September 11 and emphasized that Ukraine is still waiting for permission from the UK to use UK-provided long-range weapons to strike military objects in Russia. Two unspecified US officials told CNN on September 11 that the Biden administration has not changed its policy of prohibiting Ukrainian forces from using US-provided ATACMS missiles to strike within Russia despite discussing the issue regularly. One unnamed senior administration official said that there is "no openness" to lifting these restrictions.[19] US President Joe Biden stated on September 10 that his administration was “working that out,” when asked about potential plans to lift US restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range weapons in Russia.[20]
The People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to promote its alternative peace plan for the war in Ukraine. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in St. Petersburg on September 11 and reiterated that the PRC will continue to promote its own vision to end Russia's war in Ukraine and will aim to convince other countries to support the PRC's peace plan.[21] Shoigu reiterated Russia's support for the joint PRC-Brazilian peace plan during the meeting.[22] PRC officials have routinely promoted the PRC-Brazilian peace plan and allowed Russian officials to posture themselves as willing to negotiate with Ukraine in good faith despite consistent Kremlin statements outright rejecting negotiations or otherwise indicating that Russia will only negotiate on terms that amount to complete Ukrainian capitulation.[23]
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated his support for Ukraine on September 11. Erdogan gave a virtual speech to the Fourth Summit of the International Crimea Platform on September 11 in which he reiterated support for Ukraine's territorial sovereignty, independence, and autonomy and asserted that Crimea "must be returned" to Ukraine under international law.[24]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces began counterattacks along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and reportedly seized several settlements northeast and south of Korenevo on September 10 and 11.
- Available visual evidence suggests that Russian forces counterattacking in Kursk Oblast are operating in company-sized units and may be using elements of more combat-experienced units to conduct counterattacks.
- Russian forces may intend to temporarily bisect the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast before beginning a more organized and well-equipped effort to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory.
- US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary Davit Lammy arrived in Kyiv on September 11 and reiterated support for Ukraine but did not clarify current Western policy on Ukraine’s ability to strike military objects in Russia with Western-provided weapons
- The People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to promote its alternative peace plan for the war in Ukraine.
- Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated his support for Ukraine on September 11.
- Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, near Toretsk, and near Pokrovsk.
- Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev reported on September 11 that Russian forces are replenishing their tactical, operational, and strategic reserves.
- Russian occupation authorities illegally held regional elections in occupied Crimea on September 6 to 8 and likely fabricated increased voter turnout numbers to claim that residents broadly support Russia's illegal occupation of Crimea.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 10, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Haley Zehrung, and Karolina Hird
September 10, 2024, 8:15pm ET
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed on September 10 that Iran has sent short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia amid growing international condemnation of Tehran's support for Russia's war in Ukraine.[1] Blinken confirmed that Russia has received an unspecified number of SRBM shipments from Iran and warned that Russian forces will likely use them on the battlefield "within weeks." Iranian officials continue to deny that Tehran has sent weapons to Moscow, however.[2] Blinken and United Kingdom (UK) Foreign Secretary David Lammy affirmed on September 10 that the US and UK are "completely aligned" on the need to tackle Iranian influence both in Ukraine and the Middle East.[3] France, Germany, and the UK jointly condemned Iran's SRBM deliveries and emphasized that they are taking steps to cancel bilateral air services with Iran (including by sanctioning Iranian national airline Iran Air), designate individuals and organizations involved in Iran's ballistic missile program and in the transfer of SRBMs to Russia, and sanction Russian cargo ships.[4] UK outlet The Times, citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported that Iran had delivered over 200 Fateh-360 SRBMs to Russia via a Caspian Sea port on September 4, and ISW continues to assess that Russia will use Iranian-supplied SRBMs to target Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the coming months, thus alleviating the strain on Russia's domestic missile production capacity.[5]
Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) continue to pursue various avenues of military-technical cooperation. US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told POLITICO on September 10 that the PRC is giving Russia's defense industry "very substantial" support in exchange for secretive Russian military technologies.[6] Campbell emphasized that the PRC is not just supplying dual-use products to Russia but is instead engaged in a "substantial effort....to help sustain, build, and diversify elements of the Russian war machine." Campbell warned that Russia is sending the PRC safeguarded submarine, aeronautical design, and missile technologies in return, which Russia has previously been reluctant to share with Beijing. PRC officials continue to deny their support for the Russian war effort and claim that the PRC remains "impartial" when it comes to Russia's war in Ukraine, despite frequent Western reporting of the PRC's material support for Russian defense industrial output and geospatial intelligence capabilities.[7] Reports of more direct PRC support to Russia come against the backdrop of the Russia-led "Okean-2024" international naval exercises, which are currently taking place in the Pacific and Arctic oceans and Mediterranean, Caspian, and Baltic seas with the involvement of three ships, one vessel, and 15 aircraft of the PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA).[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the start of Okean-2024 on September 10 and accused the US of placing pressure on Russia and the PRC, necessitating the conduct of joint naval exercises.[9] PLA and Russian forces are also currently conducting the "Northern/Interaction-2024" joint "strategic collaboration" exercise, comprised of air force and naval drills in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, and a joint maritime patrol in the Pacific.[10]
Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes in Russia on the night of September 9 to 10. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 144 Ukrainian drones in total, including 72 drones over Bryansk Oblast, 20 drones over Moscow Oblast, 14 drones over Kursk Oblast, 13 drones over Tula Oblast, eight drones over Belgorod Oblast, seven drones over Kaluga Oblast, five drones over Voronezh Oblast, four drones over Lipetsk Oblast, and one drone over Oryol Oblast.[11] Footage published on September 10 reportedly shows the aftermath of a drone strike in Ramenskoye, Moscow Oblast, and Ramenskoye Urban Raion Acting Head Eduard Malyshev claimed that Ukrainian drones damaged two buildings in the raion.[12] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov claimed that Russian forces shot down 14 drones near Podolsk, Ramenskoye, Lyubertsy, Domodedovo, and Kolomna.[13] Domodedovo Urban Raion Head Yevgenia Krustaleva claimed that falling drone debris blocked a section of the Kashirskoye Highway from Domodedovo to Moscow City.[14] Russian Federal Aviation Agency Rosaviatsiya stated that it introduced temporary restrictions at the Vnukovo, Domodedovo, and Zhukovsky airports near Moscow City and limited airport operations in Kazan, Tatarstan Republic in response to the drone strikes.[15] Tula Oblast authorities stated that drone debris fell on an unspecified fuel and energy facility in an unspecified location in Tula Oblast but did not damage the facility.[16] Russian milbloggers criticized Russian regional authorities for claiming that falling "debris" caused damage to infrastructure during the strikes and reiterated calls for Russian authorities to allow the Russian military, Rosgvardia, border guards, and private security companies to create mobile fire groups to repel drone strikes.[17]
US President Joe Biden stated on September 10 that the presidential administration is working on lifting restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military objects within Russia.[18] Biden stated that his administration is "working that out now," in response to a question about whether the United States would lift restrictions prohibiting Ukraine from using US-provided long-range weapons to strike within Russia. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated earlier on September 10 during a press conference with UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy that Biden and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer will likely discuss lifting these restrictions during a meeting on September 13.[19] House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Michael McCaul stated on September 10 that he believes that Blinken will use the visit to Kyiv to inform Ukrainian officials that the United States will allow Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS missiles to strike within Russia.[20]
The Kremlin is reportedly allocating roughly 59 billion rubles (about $648 million) to strengthen its technical ability to restrict internet traffic on its sovereign internet. Forbes' Russia service reported on September 9 that it obtained documents on Russia's federal "Cybersecurity Infrastructure" project detailing how Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor will spend 59 billion rubles between 2025 to 2030 to update its "technical means of countering threats" (TSPU) system, which the Kremlin uses to block certain websites.[21] The 59-billion-ruble budget is roughly 86 percent of the 68 billion rubles (about $747 million) that the Kremlin is dedicating to the broader federal "Cybersecurity Infrastructure" project. This TSPU update will reportedly include the modernization of existing TSPU systems and installation of new TSPU systems to account for an increase in user traffic. Forbes noted that modernizing and increasing TSPU systems will increase Roskomnadzor's ability to block virtual private networks (VPNs), which Russians can use to bypass Roskomnadzor's restrictions on which websites they can view while in Russia. Roskomnadzor Head Andrei Lipov previously stated that Roskomnadzor finished equipping all communications nodes with TSPU as of September 2023, and Roskomnadzor's Main Radio Frequency Center's Center for Special Projects Head Sergei Temny stated in June 2024 that Roskomnadzor no longer purchases foreign equipment for TSPU and is working to replace existing foreign TSPU equipment with domestically produced alternatives.[22] Roskomnadzor has previously used TSPU to slow down access to X (formerly Twitter) and likely recently did the same for YouTube.[23] The Kremlin has recently intensified efforts to compel Russians to abandon Western social media sites in favor of Kremlin-approved alternatives, and strengthening TSPU supports technical aspects of this effort.[24] The Kremlin is likely trying to balance encouraging self-censorship as a self-deterrent among Russian ultranationalists and other critics of Russian authorities with imposing actual technical restrictions on the types of information and internet services that Russians can access.[25]
Key Takeaways:
- US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed on September 10 that Iran has sent short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia amid growing international condemnation of Tehran's support for Russia's war in Ukraine.
- Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) continue to pursue various avenues of military-technical cooperation.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes in Russia on the night of September 9 to 10.
- US President Joe Biden stated on September 10 that the presidential administration is working on lifting restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military objects within Russia.
- The Kremlin is reportedly allocating roughly 59 billion rubles (about $648 million) to strengthen its technical ability to restrict internet traffic on its sovereign internet.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 10.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
- The German-based Kiel Institute for the World Economy published a report on September 9 warning that Russia has significantly increased its defense industrial base (DIB) capabilities since 2022 and that depleting weapons and equipment stockpiles may not significantly impact future Russian DIB production.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 9, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Haley Zehrung, and George Barros
September 9, 2024, 8:10 pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:15pm ET on September 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended the Russia–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Joint Ministerial Meeting of Strategic Dialogue in Saudi Arabia on September 9, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to advance the creation of its envisioned “Eurasian security architecture.”[1] Lavrov held talks with GCC Secretary General Jasem Mohamed Al-Budaiwi, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Salman on the sidelines of the Russia-GCC Strategic Dialogue and emphasized Russia’s interest in enhancing cooperation with Gulf states.[2] Lavrov and Saudi officials discussed strengthening trade, cultural relations, and bilateral investments, and Lavrov invited bin Salman to the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia in October 2024.[3] Lavrov claimed in July 2024 that Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are advocating within the GCC for the creation of a Eurasian security architecture, and Lavrov likely used his meetings with Gulf state leaders to promote this agenda.[4] ISW previously assessed that Russia's proposal of a Eurasian security architecture is consistent with Russia's long-term strategic goal of disbanding Western unity, disbanding NATO from within, and destroying the current world order.[5]
Kremlin officials are likely trying to shape international peace mediation efforts in the war in Ukraine while demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on the sidelines of the Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting in Saudi Arabia on September 9.[6] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Lavrov discussed the war in Ukraine with Vieira and Jaishankar but did not offer details.[7] Brazil and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have promoted their "Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" six-point peace plan — whose key principles favor Russia — since May 2024.[8] Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi notably recently reaffirmed India's support for peace in Ukraine based on principles of international law such as respect for territorial integrity and the sovereignty of states.[9] Lavrov, however, reiterated boilerplate Kremlin narratives on September 9 demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine, claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's Peace Formula — which is indeed based on principles of international law — is an "ultimatum" and that Russia has never seriously considered the plan.[10] Ukrainian officials have openly invited a Russian representative to attend Ukraine's second peace summit later in 2024.[11]
The Kremlin leveraged Russian regional elections from September 6 to 8 to integrate trusted Russian military veterans of the war in Ukraine into the Russian government, likely as part of an ongoing attempt to appease Russian servicemembers, boost domestic support for the war, and build out a cadre of Kremlin-affiliated local officials. Acting Secretary of Russia's ruling United Russia political party Vladimir Yakushev stated on September 9 that 308 of the total 380 Russian veterans (or 81 percent) who ran for various positions in regional Russian elections won.[12] United Russia announced in July 2024 that it would nominate over 300 Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine, some of whom were participants of the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program to run in the elections, and Yakushev stated in August 2024 that United Russia's main priority was to support veteran candidates during the September 2024 election cycle.[13] Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the Time of Heroes program in February 2024 to prepare Russian veterans to serve in the Russian government, and ISW assessed that the program may also aim to incentive Russians to fight in Ukraine by portraying Russian military service as a pathway to a government career.[14]
The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on September 9 that former United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak won the regional election in Altai Republic and officially became the head of the Altai Republic for the next five years.[15] The Kremlin reportedly originally tasked Turchak with expanding the Time of Heroes program before the Russian presidential election in March 2024.[16] Putin later demoted Turchak to acting head of Altai Republic — one of the most economically depressed regions in Russia over 4,000 kilometers from the Kremlin — possibly due to Putin's perception of Turchak's disloyalty in 2023 due to his prior affiliation with the Wagner Group and Turchak's failure to integrate veterans into the government.[17] Several Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers publicly celebrated Turchak’s electoral victory and highlighted his efforts to support the war.[18] Turchak’s electoral victory and the surrounding media campaign celebrating his accomplishments during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine may be part of the Kremlin’s effort to advance the Time of Heroes program. The Kremlin may be attempting to rebrand United Russia as a leading party in veteran affairs to prepare Russian society for a long-term war effort by preempting the rise of alternative political parties or movements that could court Russian veterans. The Time of Heroes program also indicates that the Kremlin is increasingly militarizing its society and government, which may have long-term implications on Russian domestic and foreign policy.
The Kremlin refrained from replacing Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov during the Russian regional elections, likely in support of an ongoing effort to downplay the societal impacts of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on September 9 that Smirnov won the Kursk Oblast gubernatorial election with over 65 percent of the vote.[19] Sources close to the Kremlin told Russian opposition outlet Meduza that the Kremlin did not consider canceling the Kursk Oblast gubernatorial and local elections because such an approach would create panic in the region and undermine the Kremlin’s efforts to condition Russians to accept the incursion as a ”new normal.”[20] CEC Chairperson Ella Pamfilova also claimed on September 7 that Kursk Oblast had one of the highest turnouts in the gubernatorial elections, likely as part of the Kremlin’s effort to convince Russians that Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast has not impacted Russian society.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin similarly claimed on September 5 that Ukraine intended for the incursion to divide Russian society but that the incursion instead further unified Russia — likely to undersell the implications of the incursion on Russia’s territorial integrity and society.[22]
Ukrainian officials continue to warn that Russian forces are increasingly using chemical weapons in Ukraine. Ukraine's Support Forces Command reported on September 9 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with dangerous chemicals and chemical agents 447 times in August 2024 and 4,035 times between February 15, 2023 and August 24, 2024.[23] The Ukrainian Support Forces Command stated that Russian forces are using K-51 and RG-VO gas grenades to deliver munitions containing banned chemical agents and are also using unidentified chemical compounds. Ukrainian officials, and a Russian military unit, have previously reported on increasingly common instances of Russian forces using chemical agents in combat that are banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.[24]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended the Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Joint Ministerial Meeting of Strategic Dialogue in Saudi Arabia on September 9, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to advance the creation of its envisioned “Eurasian security architecture.”
- Kremlin officials are likely trying to shape international peace mediation efforts in the war in Ukraine while demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.
- The Kremlin leveraged Russian regional elections from September 6 to 8 to integrate trusted Russian military veterans of the war in Ukraine into the Russian government, likely as part of an ongoing attempt to appease Russian servicemembers, boost domestic support for the war, and build out a cadre of Kremlin-affiliated local officials.
- The Kremlin refrained from replacing Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov during the Russian regional elections, likely in support of an ongoing effort to downplay the societal impacts of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian officials continue to warn that Russian forces are increasingly using chemical weapons in Ukraine.
- Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 9.
- Russian forces recently advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Siversk, near Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Siversk.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin expanded Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s powers on September 9 by allowing him to grant eligible parties within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) access to Russian state secrets (classified information).
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2024
click here to read the full report
Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros
September 8, 2024, 5:45 pm ET
Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William Burns cautioned the West against concern about boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling, which ISW has long identified as part of a Kremlin effort to promote Western self-deterrence and influence key moments in Western policy debates about support for Ukraine. Burns stated during a panel with United Kingdom Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Chief Richard Moore on September 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will continue to issue periodic threats of direct confrontation against the West but that these threats should not intimidate the West.[1] Burns stated that the CIA had assessed that Russian forces may have considered using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine in the fall of 2022 and that he was in contact with Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin on the matter.[2] The CIA's assessment of possible Russian readiness to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine in the fall of 2022 corresponded with intensified Russian rhetoric about nuclear confrontation amid the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts.[3] This rhetoric was likely more a part of a routine information operation designed to deter Western security assistance to Ukraine than an indicator of Russian readiness to use nuclear weapons, however.[4] The Kremlin has repeatedly invoked thinly veiled threats of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West during key moments in Western political discussions about further military assistance to Ukraine, such as in the fall of 2022, to induce fear among decision makers.[5] ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[6]
Russian milbloggers continue to offer insights into how the Kremlin is co-opting select milbloggers to regulate the spread of information in Russia. Prominent Russian milblogger Alexander Sladkov claimed on September 7 that former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and his team in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) punished milbloggers, including Sladkov, for being "too frank and harsh" about Russian military failures and disasters.[7] Sladkov claimed that the Russian Main Military Prosecutor's Office opened a criminal case against him for discrediting the Russian military at an unspecified time, presumably several months ago during Shoigu's tenure in the Russian MoD. Sladkov implied, however, that the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, for which Sladkov works as a war correspondent, and the Russian Presidential Administration stopped the case and "protected" him. Sladkov claimed that Russian MoD officials under Shoigu, many of whom Russian authorities have arrested for bribery and fraud in recent months, were hypocritically trying to teach milbloggers how to "act morally" and "state-like." Sladkov complained that Russian MoD officials were trying to punish milbloggers despite the fact that select milbloggers had personally met with Russian President Vladimir Putin four times to inform Putin about issues on the frontline and within the Russian MoD. Sladkov claimed that milbloggers "breathed a sigh of relief" with the appointment of current Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, whom Sladkov praised for "seriously increasing" the Russian military's capabilities. Sladkov’s anecdote and mention of the Russian Presidential Administration imply that the Kremlin intervened and spared Sladkov (and other Russian milbloggers) from criminal prosecution, likely as part of a Kremlin effort to co-opt pliable milbloggers who tended to be critical of the Russian state’s conduct of the war in Ukraine, to ensure that they do not pose a liability to the Kremlin in the future.[8] The Kremlin began an effort to co-opt pliable Russian milbloggers in late 2022 and continues to use awards to co-opt Russian milbloggers and buy their loyalty.[9] The Russian state-funded Union of Journalists awarded Russian milblogger Yevgeny Poddubny with the Solidarity Prize on September 8 for "demonstrating courage" while exposed to danger during professional duties and for "demonstrating a civic position in defending the freedom of speech."[10] ISW assessed in 2022 and 2023 that the Kremlin was trying to co-opt Sladkov and Poddubny, both of whom previously had been more critical of the Russian military's failures in Ukraine before being co-opted.[11]
The Kremlin has not yet succeeded in co-opting or silencing all Russian milbloggers, however. Another Russian milblogger, who is often openly critical of the Kremlin and Russian MoD, posted three since-deleted videos on September 8 in which he claimed that "traitors are sitting in the Kremlin" and that Russian authorities have "removed" and imprisoned "inconvenient people," such as imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin.[12] The administration that runs the milblogger's channel later posted an audio recording on September 8, claiming that the milblogger was emotional due to his strong nationalism.[13] The administration claimed that most Russians in private have said something to "discredit" others, likely in an attempt to prevent Russian authorities from charging the milblogger with discrediting the Russian military.
The milbloggers’ insights into such incidents suggest that the Kremlin is attempting to co-opt milbloggers or encourage them to self-censor, as opposed to a more aggressive policy of direct censorship. The initial publication of the milblogger's critical videos demonstrates how the Kremlin has not been successful at co-opting or silencing the entire Russian information space, but the channel's later retraction of the videos suggests that the Kremlin has been successful at coercing milbloggers (and their administrative teams) to self-censor out of fear of punishment. Sladkov's claims about the Russian Presidential Administration's intervention into his case and Putin's attention to milblogger complaints further suggest that Putin did not support the Russian MoD's previous attempts to directly censor milbloggers, preferring a policy aimed at co-opting prominent milbloggers, likely in order to maintain a veneer of freedom of speech in Russia and prevent an inadvertent viral spread of explicitly censored dissident material. ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin will likely continue its efforts to establish full control over the Russian information space in the future but is still sensitive to the sentiments of the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community.[14]
The Russian Investigative Committee is investigating a "mass brawl" between Russian ultranationalists and Central Asian residents in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, amid increased xenophobia against migrants and ethnic minorities in Russia. The Investigative Committee stated on September 8 that its Krasnodar Krai office is investigating a mass brawl in Afipsky between local residents and "people of non-Slavic appearance."[15] Footage published on September 8 purportedly from the incident in Afipsky shows a large crowd of people and limited fighting.[16] The regional Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) reported that law enforcement detained 43 people at the scene of the fight.[17] Russian opposition outlet SOTA noted that the Russian ultranationalist online community "Russian Sword," which espouses xenophobia against migrants and ethnic minorities in Russia, promoted the incident and likely influenced more ultranationalists to join the crowd. SOTA also reported that a subscriber to the Russian Sword online community claimed that Russian authorities conducted a raid against migrant communities after the brawl.[18] SOTA noted that members of another Russian far-right ultranationalist online community, the "Russian Community," have previously organized demonstrations against migrants.[19] BBC Russian Service reported in June 2024 that affiliates of Russian Tsargrad outlet founder and Russian Orthodox nationalist Konstantin Malofeev founded the "Russian Community" project in late 2020.[20]
Ukrainian officials continued to announce a series of appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 8. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed presidential decrees on September 8 appointing Iryna Vereshchuk and Viktor Mykyta to the positions of Deputy Heads of the Presidential Office and appointing Oleksandr Kamyshin and Dmytro Lytvyn as his advisors.[21] Kamyshin will advise Zelensky on strategic issues, and Lytvyn will advise him on communications. Zelensky reassigned Mykyta from his previous position as the Head of the Zakarpattia Oblast Military Administration on September 8 and Vereshchuk resigned from her previous post as Ukrainian Minister for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories (TOT) on September 3.[22]
Key Takeaways:
- Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William Burns cautioned the West against concern about boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling, which ISW has long identified as part of a Kremlin effort to promote Western self-deterrence and influence key moments in Western policy debates about support for Ukraine.
- Russian milbloggers continue to offer insights into how the Kremlin is co-opting select milbloggers to regulate the spread of information in Russia.
- The Kremlin has not yet succeeded in co-opting or silencing all Russian milbloggers, however.
- The milbloggers’ insights into such incidents suggest that the Kremlin is attempting to co-opt milbloggers or encourage them to self-censor, as opposed to a more aggressive policy of direct censorship.
- The Russian Investigative Committee is investigating a "mass brawl" between Russian ultranationalists and Central Asian residents in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, amid increased xenophobia against migrants and ethnic minorities in Russia.
- Ukrainian officials continued to announce a series of appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 8.
- Russian forces conducted counterattacks in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 8.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and marginally advanced near Chasiv Yar.
- A Russian milblogger who formerly served as a "Storm-Z" unit instructor claimed on September 8 that the Russian military needs to improve the training of drone unit commanders.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 7, 2024
click here to read the full report
Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Riley Bailey, and Kateryna Stepanenko
September 7, 2024, 5:20pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on September 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov noted that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast is having theater-wide impacts on Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and addressed the prospects for continued Russian offensive operations in Winter 2024–2025. Budanov stated during an interview published on September 7 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast complicated Russia's plans for offensive operations in August 2024 and later this fall.[1] Budanov noted that the Russian military command is committing any available manpower and equipment to achieve their objective in Russia's "main direction," likely referring to the seizure of Pokrovsk, and that Russian forces are focusing their attention on this direction. Russian forces recently intensified offensive operations and made further advances near Pokrovsk and west and southwest of Donetsk City, but ISW has not observed intensified Russian offensive operations in other frontline areas in Ukraine.[2] The Russian military command has almost certainly decided to prioritize Russian advances near Pokrovsk and is committing available manpower and materiel to the area at the expense of Russian offensive operations in other directions.[3] A Russian milblogger claimed that manpower constraints are forcing the Russian military command to adjust their plans in Donetsk and Kursk oblasts and that Russian officials do not have a "systemic solution" to generate the forces necessary to reinforce offensive operations in Ukraine and repel Ukraine‘s incursion into Kursk Oblast.[4] The milblogger noted that Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction have begun to slow as Russian units are suffering personnel losses and are increasingly understaffed and that Russian forces are continuing offensive operations in the area despite being "exhausted."[5] The Russian military command will likely be able to funnel enough forces into the area to continue Russia's ongoing offensive operations and possibly eventually seize Pokrovsk, although Russian forces may culminate before seizing the city.[6]
Budanov noted during the interview that winter weather conditions will likely complicate Russian offensive operations in the coming months, but that this does not mean that Russian forces will completely stop assaults on Ukrainian positions.[7] The fall mud season has historically hampered Russian and Ukrainian ground maneuver, but periods of prolonged freezing temperatures that typically begin in late December freeze the ground and allow armored vehicles to move more easily than in autumn and spring months.[8] Russian forces notably fought to seize the initiative and pursued offensive operations in Fall 2023 during the most challenging weather conditions of the year instead of waiting for improved weather conditions later in Winter 2023–2024, however.[9] Fall and winter weather conditions will likely complicate Russian and Ukrainian battlefield activity but are very unlikely to completely stall activity along the frontline.
Iran reportedly recently delivered more than 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[10] UK outlet The Times, citing a Ukrainian military intelligence source, reported on September 6 that a Russian ship delivered the Fateh-360 missiles to an undisclosed port in the Caspian Sea on September 4. US and European officials recently confirmed that Iran began supplying Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, and ISW assessed that Russian forces will likely use the Iranian-supplied missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and civilian infrastructure over the coming fall and winter.[11]
Ukraine continues to successfully adapt and develop its anti-drone capabilities, allowing Ukrainian forces to leverage lower-end systems to offset Russian pressures on Ukraine's limited air defense umbrella. Ukrainian military analyst Petro Chernyk stated on September 7 that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems are disrupting radar-guided Shahed-136/131 drones, causing the drones to change course and crash after running out of fuel.[12] Ukrainian officials have recently reported that some Russian Shahed drones have not reached their targets for unspecified reasons, but the Ukrainian Air Force acknowledged on August 31 and September 6 that Ukrainian EW affected the drones.[13] Ukrainian drone production company Besomar stated on September 7 that it developed an interceptor drone that can shoot down unspecified Russian drones and that Ukrainian forces are already using these interceptor drones in the combat zone.[14] ISW has also recently observed reports of Ukrainian forces using first-person view (FPV) drones to down Russian helicopters and reconnaissance and strike drones.[15] These Ukrainian countermeasures are part of wider efforts aimed at offsetting the pressure that repeated, large-scale Russian strike series exert on Ukraine's limited air defense umbrella in the face of delayed and inconsistent deliveries of Western security assistance.[16] Ukraine's use of EW to counter Shahed drones will notably allow Ukrainian forces to conserve the limited air defense systems and missiles that Ukraine needs to protect against Russian missile strikes targeting Ukrainian frontline areas, critical infrastructure, and major population centers. ISW continues to assess that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in a technological offense-defense race and that Ukraine's ability to field technological innovations at scale ahead of Russian adaptations is crucial for Ukraine's ability to offset Russia's current materiel advantages.[17]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov noted that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast is having theater-wide impacts on Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and addressed the prospects for continued Russian offensive operations in Winter 2024–2025.
- Iran reportedly recently delivered more than 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.
- Ukraine continues to successfully adapt and develop its anti-drone capabilities, allowing Ukrainian forces to leverage lower-end systems to offset Russian pressures on Ukraine's limited air defense umbrella.
- Russian forces recently regained territory and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 7.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City and in the Dnipro River Delta.
- Russian officers continue to mistreat and abuse their subordinates likely due to poor command training and discipline.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, Annika Ganzeveld, and George Barros
September 6, 2024, 9pm ET
US and European officials reported that Iran delivered hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.[1] An anonymous US official confirmed to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) that Iran delivered the missiles to Russia and a senior European official stated that more shipments of Iranian missiles to Russia are expected.[2] Iran and Russia previously signed a contract in December 2023 to send Iranian Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[3] It is unclear, however, exactly what kind of missiles are included in the recently delivered shipment to Russia. Reuters reported on July 7 that Iran expanded at least two of its defense industrial sites outside Tehran since August and October 2023 to support the production of drones and missiles, some of which are meant to go to Russia.[4] Russia recently intensified missile and drone attacks against Ukraine, notably continuing to use Iranian-developed Shahed-131/136 drones and North Korean ballistic missiles.[5] Russia will likely use Iranian-provided ballistic missiles to target Ukrainian energy. military, and civilian infrastructure over the coming fall and winter to further destabilize Ukrainian society and disrupt Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).
The transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles is part of the deepening strategic partnership between Iran and Russia. CTP-ISW has reported extensively on how Moscow and Tehran have expanded their economic, media, military, and political cooperation since Russian forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[6] Iran seeks to benefit economically and militarily from its expanding partnership with Russia. Iran has sought cash for its ailing economy in return for selling weapons to the Kremlin, as CTP-ISW reported in September 2023.[7] Iran has also sought to procure Russian Su-35 fighter jets and Iranian officials “pressed” Russia for the delivery of Su-35s during a meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in Tehran in August 2024.[8] The acquisition of Su-35s could enable Iran to more readily and independently project air power, given that the current Iranian air fleet is outdated and poorly maintained.[9] Iranian leaders have separately sought Russian support in upgrading their cyber capabilities and missile and space programs as part of the expanding military collaboration.[10] The United States and unspecified European countries have reportedly prepared a sanctions package against Iran for this contingency.[11]
US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on September 6 that no specific weapon would be a "game changer" for Ukraine and that allowing Ukrainian forces to use US-provided weapons for long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would not change the status of the war.[12] Austin is correct that no single weapon system will change the course of the war, but his comments ignore how weapon systems and their accompanying rules of engagement do affect Ukrainian capabilities, and that changes in capabilities can change the course of wars. Western military assistance remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend itself, and Austin’s statement ignores the Ukrainian long-range strike capability requirement necessary to disrupt Russian rear staging areas. Austin reiterated a Biden Administration talking point that since Russia has moved aircraft conducting glide bomb strikes out of range of US-provided ATACMS missiles, it somehow renders Ukraine’s request to use ATACMS in Russian territory against hundreds of known stationary military objects moot.[13] ISW has previously noted there are at least 209 of 245 (over 85 percent) known Russian military objects in range of ATACMS that are not air bases and not within range of US-provided HIMARS that the US does allow Ukraine to use in Russia under limited circumstances.[14] Austin also argued that Ukraine has its own domestically produced capabilities that can attack Russian targets well beyond the range of Western-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles.[15] Most of Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities come from domestically produced long-range drones, which Ukraine cannot use to cause the same level of damage as long-range missiles due to drone payload limitations. Russian forces can also more easily harden facilities against Ukrainian drones than Western-provided missiles. Ukraine has begun to produce and successfully field long-range precision weapons with payloads more comparable to Western-provided long-range missiles but currently lacks the quantity of these domestically produced systems to significantly threaten Russian military targets within Russia at scale.[16]
Ukraine therefore can only use a limited number of domestically produced long-range strike systems and Western-provided HIMARS to significantly threaten a limited number of Russian military objects within Russia. This scarcity is not reflective of all the long-range strike capabilities that Ukraine possesses, and Western decision-making continues to artificially suppress Ukraine's overall long-range strike capability. ISW has assessed at length that long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would degrade Russia's ability to leverage sanctuary space in Russia for offensive operations in Ukraine and place significant operational pressures on the deployment of Russian air defense, electronic warfare (EW), logistics, command and control (C2), and military support assets.[17] Russia, on the contrary, continues to actively expand its ability to maintain deep precision strikes against Ukraine by increasingly procuring ballistic missiles from Iran and North Korea, and continuing to expand its missile production.[18]
Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Airbase in Germany on September 6, a significant portion of which will reportedly not be delivered in the immediate future. The US Department of Defense (DOD) announced that it will provide an aid package for Ukraine worth $250 million from the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), which includes missiles for RIM-7 anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems; Stinger missiles, HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery shells; Tube-Launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Bradley infantry fighting vehicles; and M113 armored personnel carriers.[19] United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary John Healey announced that the UK will provide Ukraine with 650 Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM) worth £162 million (about $212 million) in order to strengthen Ukraine's air defense capabilities.[20] Healey stated that the UK expects to deliver the LLMs by the end of 2024. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced a new military aid package for Ukraine worth 150 million euros (about $166 million), including 12 Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled howitzers – six of which Germany will deliver in 2024 and six of which will arrive in 2025.[21] Pistorius also stated that Germany will deliver 77 Leopard 1A5 tanks "as quickly as possible." Canadian Defense Minister Bill Blair announced that Canada will send 80,840 CRV-7 rocket motors, 1,300 unspecified warheads, 970 C6 machine guns, and 10,500 9mm pistols to Ukraine and that the rocket motors will arrive in the coming months.[22] Blair also stated that Canada will provide decommissioned chassis from 29 M113 and 64 Coyote LAV armored personnel carriers that Ukraine can use for spare parts. Blair stated that 10 of the 50 armored combat support vehicles (ACSVs) that Canada donated to Ukraine in June 2024 will arrive in Ukraine in September 2024 and that the remaining 40 will begin arriving in Spring 2025. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated that the Netherlands will provide Ukraine with 80 million euros (about $88 million) worth of maintenance equipment, spare parts, and air-to-air missiles for Ukraine's F-16 aircraft but did not specify a timeline for delivery.[23] Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles announced the immediate dispatch of a complete HAWK air defense system battery, including six missile launchers that Spain donated to Ukraine and that are already in Poland.[24]
Russian forces are increasingly executing surrendering Ukrainian soldiers throughout the frontline likely in part because Russian commanders appear to be endorsing the proliferation of such war crimes. CNN reported on September 6 that it obtained footage showing Russian forces executing surrendering Ukrainian soldiers near Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast in late August 2024 and Zaporizhia Oblast in May 2024.[25] Ukrainian defense intelligence reportedly gave CNN transcripts of audio intercepts from the May 2024 execution that showed that a Russian commander gave his subordinates the order to kill the surrendering Ukrainian soldiers. Ukrainian defense intelligence sources also reportedly gave CNN a list of 15 cases of Russian forces executing surrendering Ukrainian soldiers on the frontline since November 2023 - most of which included supporting drone footage or audio intercepts, and an anonymous Ukrainian official told CNN that the "pattern" of such executions has increased in 2024. Ukraine's Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin told CNN that the Prosecutor General's office has investigated at least 28 such executions since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. Kostin stated that different Russian units operating in different sectors of the front have committed these crimes leading Ukraine to assert that this Russian policy could amount to crimes against humanity. A United Nations (UN) investigative source told CNN that the "pattern" of these Russian executions "suggests complacency, if not orders to give no quarter" and that together they could amount to crimes against humanity. Attacking soldiers who are hors de combat, specifically those who have clearly expressed an intention to surrender, is a violation of Article 41 of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Victims of International Arms Conflict.[26] ISW has extensively reported on previous footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and observed a wider trend of prolific Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appeared to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and upheld by Russian field commanders.[27]
Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi to pursue longstanding efforts to legitimize Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and Zaporizhia Oblast, while also promoting false narratives about a Ukrainian threat to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) to weaken Western support for Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. Grossi met with Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom CEO Alexei Likhachev; Russian Chief of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection (CBRN) Forces Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov; and representatives from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the Russian Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor) in Kaliningrad Oblast on September 6.[28] Likhachkev repeatedly accused Ukrainian forces of threatening the safety of the ZNPP and KNPP and claimed that Ukrainian forces are targeting ZNPP employees and occupation officials operating near the ZNPP.[29] The Kremlin routinely accuses Ukraine of endangering the Russian-occupied ZNPP and extended this information operation to the KNPP shortly after Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.[30] The Kremlin aims to convince the IAEA and the West that Ukrainian forces pose a threat and could cause a radiological incident at the KNPP in order to encourage Western fears about continued Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast and weaken Western support for the incursion.[31] The Kremlin has long sought to use Russia's physical control over the ZNPP to force the IAEA to meet with Russian officials to legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP, and by extension, Russia's occupation of Ukrainian territory.[32]
Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor published and immediately deleted a draft procedure to implement a recently adopted law designed to deanonymize Russian Telegram channels, possibly after receiving backlash from the Russian ultranationalist Telegram community. The published draft document appeared on the Russian federal portal of legal acts on September 5, before promptly disappearing from the website overnight on September 6.[33] The deleted draft stated that Russian social media bloggers and Telegram channels with over 10,000 followers would be required to provide their personal information, such as their names, phone numbers, email, and IP addresses, to Roskomnadzor in accordance with the new federal law that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed into effect on August 9.[34] The deleted draft stated that these procedures would come into force in November 2024. Roskomnadzor later told Russian state outlet RBK that it deleted the draft after it was "prematurely” published due to a technical error.[35] Russian milbloggers immediately criticized the draft on September 5 and 6, stating that these procedures would threaten milbloggers’ safety due to potential data leaks and observed that the law had already ”scared” many independent bloggers away – leaving behind only well-funded and foreign Telegram channels.[36] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian officials may have rushed the draft to meet a certain deadline and speculated that Roskomnadzor deleted the draft following a backlash online to further revise it for a later publication.[37] One milblogger forecasted that the Kremlin will directly mandate authorization and deanonymization of all Internet users in Russia by the end of the 2020s.[38] The sudden deletion of the draft suggests that the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community still has some influence over the Kremlin’s decisions and that the Kremlin continues to fear backlash from this community.
The Kremlin signaled its commitment to establish full control over the Russian information space in the future and will likely reattempt to deanonymize Russian social media and Telegram channels even though Roskomnadzor withdrew its recently proposed regulations for now. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 5 that censorship is justified during periods of war and implied that freedom of information would return in peacetime.[39] Peskov also added that Russian media outlets often compete with international media for Russian domestic audiences and argued that Russian content and technological means should not lag in such a “tough” information environment. The Kremlin passed a law in 2014 that tasked Roskomnadzor with creating a registry of all social media users with an audience of over 3,000 people, but Roskomnadzor stopped updating this registry by 2017 and instead created a list of ”information dissemination organizers.”[40] These ”information dissemination organizers” include social media platforms and websites that were visited by more than 500,000 Russian users per day such as Yandex, VK, HeadHunter, and Qiwi. Roskomnadzor’s recent reversal is not indicative of a permanent policy shift, as the Kremlin has passed laws and regulations that Russian milbloggers have vocally opposed before. The Kremlin recently passed laws that Russian milbloggers avidly scrutinized in the past, such as banning the use of personal cell phone devices on the frontlines in Ukraine, for example.[41]
The Kremlin continues to appoint Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko to positions overseeing Russia's informational efforts as part of efforts aimed at shaping Russian identity and ideology. Russian President Vladimir Putin created the "Rossiya" National Center in Moscow on July 1 to preserve the "Rossiya" (“Russia”) Exhibition and Forum that ran from November 2023 to July 2024.[42] Putin signed a decree on September 6 creating an organizing committee for the "Rossiya" National Center, which will "demonstrate [Russia's] achievements, strengthen national identity,...create a sense of pride for the country, [and] develop the professional skills of children and youth."[43] Putin appointed Kiriyenko as the chairperson of the center's organizing committee, which will plan the center's activities, propose events that include representatives of foreign governments, and assist Russian media with their coverage of the center's events. Kiriyenko has a prominent role overseeing multiple Kremlin information operations targeting Russian, Ukrainian, and Western information spaces, and his appointment to supervise the development of the center suggests that the center will play a role in shaping domestic and foreign perceptions of Russia.[44] The "Rossiya" National Center will likely continue these informational efforts to legitimize Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories and to promote Russia's justification of its war against Ukraine. The eight-month-long "Rossiya" exhibition forum featured exhibits claiming that Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts are part of Russia.[45] The Kremlin has recently appeared to be taking steps to codify a Russian state ideology while bypassing the Russian Constitution, which forbids Russia from establishing a state ideology, by vaguely defining Russia's "traditional values," and the "Rossiya" National Center's emphasis on Russia's "national identity" will likely further these Kremlin ideological efforts.[46]
Russia continues efforts to develop a capability to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity and has been using the Ukrainian information space for several years to hone this capability.[47] The US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced on September 4 the ongoing seizure of 32 internet domains that the Russian government used in foreign malign influence campaigns called "Doppelganger."[48] Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko directed the campaigns, which promoted Russian propaganda in order to reduce Western support for Ukraine and influence US and foreign elections. The US DOJ stated that the Doppelganger campaigns registered domain names that imitated Western media websites in order to publish Russian narratives falsely presented as content from legitimate news outlets. The Doppelganger campaigns also used "sleeper" channels on social media claiming to be Ukrainian news outlets that would start to disseminate Russian-friendly information after spending at least four months developing trust among their Ukrainian audiences. The US DOJ noted that the Kremlin developed the tactic of using "sleeper" channels after many Ukrainians started rejecting messages that favored Russia during the war. The US DOJ reported that the "Morning Dagestan" Telegram channel, which the DOJ labeled as "anti-Russian," is the most "famous recent" example of such a "sleeper" channel. The "Morning Dagestan" channel notably promoted rumors that sparked antisemitic riots at the Makhachkala airport in the Republic of Dagestan in October 2023.[49] The description of the Doppelganger campaigns' tactics, particularly the use of "sleeper" channels to provoke riots, indicates that the Kremlin is developing ways to trigger kinetic activity via information operations promoted on social media platforms, and the current Ukrainian information space offers the West the best opportunity to study this latent, growing Russian threat.
Key Takeaways:
- US and European officials reported that Iran delivered hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.
- The transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles is part of the deepening strategic partnership between Iran and Russia.
- US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on September 6 that no specific weapon would be a "game changer" for Ukraine and that allowing Ukrainian forces to use US-provided weapons for long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would not change the status of the war.
- Austin is correct that no single weapon system will change the course of the war, but his comments ignore how weapon systems and their accompanying rules of engagement do affect Ukrainian capabilities, and that changes in capabilities can change the course of wars. Western military assistance remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend itself, and Austin’s statement ignores the Ukrainian long-range strike capability requirement necessary to disrupt Russian rear staging areas.
- Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Airbase in Germany on September 6, a significant portion of which will reportedly not be delivered in the immediate future.
- Russian forces are increasingly executing surrendering Ukrainian soldiers throughout the frontline likely in part because Russian commanders appear to be endorsing the proliferation of such war crimes.
- Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi to pursue longstanding efforts to legitimize Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and Zaporizhia Oblast, while also promoting false narratives about a Ukrainian threat to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) to weaken Western support for Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.
- Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor published and immediately deleted a draft procedure to implement a recently adopted law designed to deanonymize Russian Telegram channels, possibly after receiving backlash from the Russian ultranationalist Telegram community.
- The Kremlin signaled its commitment to establish full control over the Russian information space in the future and will likely reattempt to deanonymize Russian social media and Telegram channels even though Roskomnadzor withdrew its recently proposed regulations for now.
- The Kremlin continues to appoint Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko to positions overseeing Russia's informational efforts as part of efforts aimed at shaping Russian identity and ideology.
- Russia continues efforts to develop a capability to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity and has been using the Ukrainian information space for several years to hone this capability.
- Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting throughout the Ukrainian salient on September 6.
- Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.
- Open-source tracking of confirmed Russian military deaths in Ukraine suggests that more Russian volunteers have died in Ukraine than Russian convict recruits and mobilized personnel.
click here to read the full report
Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 5, 2024, 8:30 pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces have recently intensified their longstanding offensive effort to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk City and advance up to and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway. Apparently coordinated Russian offensive operations from the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around Vuhledar likely aim to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending in western Donetsk Oblast and set conditions for further gains in Russia's prioritized offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces have recently significantly intensified their offensive operations near Vuhledar as of September 1 (southwest of Donetsk City) and have so far made marginal tactical gains in the area.[1] Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Prechystivka (west of Vuhledar) during a roughly company-sized mechanized assault.[2] Additional geolocated footage published on September 5 shows reported elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising a Russian flag in northwestern Prechystivka, indicating that Russian forces have likely seized the settlement.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from Zolota Nyva (immediately west of Prechystivka) and that Russian forces are continuing to advance in the area.[4] Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced immediately east of Vuhledar near the Pivdennodonbaska Mine No. 1.[5] A Ukrainian open-source account published additional footage showing Russian forces conducting several platoon-sized mechanized assaults near Makarivka (south of Velyka Novosilka and west of Vuhledar) and Prechystivka in recent days.[6] The Ukrainian account stated that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD), 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD), and 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) attacked near Makarivka and that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), and 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit) are attacking near Prechystivka.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the intensified Russian offensive operations in the area during a speech at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai on September 5, claiming that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (responsible for the front roughly from Vuhledar to Hulyaipole) seized "a triangle" of territory five to seven kilometers deep on September 3.[8]
Russian forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in the near-term. A Ukrainian airborne brigade operating southwest of Donetsk City published footage on September 4 of Ukrainian forces repelling a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault comprised of four tanks and 17 armored combat vehicles near Kostyantynivka.[9] Russian forces intensified both the regularity and size of mechanized assaults west and southwest of Donetsk City in late July 2024 and have since routinely conducted relatively large mechanized assaults in the area — although these assaults have only resulted in marginal tactical gains.[10] Russian forces appeared to initially intensify offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City in late July in order to achieve their longstanding tactical objective of cutting the 0-0532 (Kostyantynivka-Vuhledar) highway, but have since continued large mechanized assaults in the area after achieving this objective.[11] Intensified Russian efforts to exploit gains in the Pokrovsk direction and Russian redeployments in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast have yet to disrupt the Russian offensive tempo west and southwest of Donetsk City, however. Continued large and costly Russian mechanized assaults suggest that the Russian military command has tasked elements of both the Eastern and Southern Grouping of Forces in the area with a wider operational objective.
Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Vuhledar shortly after starting to widen the southern flank of the Pokrovsk salient, suggesting that Russian forces intend to conduct mutually reinforcing offensive operations along the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, immediately west of Donetsk City, along the 0-0532 highway, and near Vuhledar. Russian forces began an immediate tactical effort in late August 2024 along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction and eliminating the salient's vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks.[12] Russian forces have already succeeded in partially widening the southern section of the Pokrovsk salient and are continuing efforts to tactically envelop limited Ukrainian positions in rural areas east of Hirnyk and north of Krasnohorivka. Russian forces have reportedly advanced to the outskirts of Ukrainsk and are approaching the outskirts of Hirnyk, and the seizure of these towns would allow Russian forces to assault Kurakhove — a significant Ukrainian defensive node for the front west and southwest of Donetsk City — from the north as well as from the east from Krasnohorivka and Maksymilyanivka. Russia's intensification near Vuhledar likely aims to pressure the western flank of the Ukrainian defense in the area west and southwest of Donetsk as Russian forces approach Kurakhove on the eastern flank. Russian offensive operations along the O-0532 highway between Kostyantynivka and Vuhledar offer Russian forces avenues for advance that would support both an effort to seize Kurkahove to the north and Russian efforts to envelop and seize Vuhledar to the west. Russian forces conducted a failed offensive effort in western Donetsk Oblast in Winter 2022–2023 characterized by mass frontal mechanized assaults against Vuhledar itself, but Russian forces now appear to be pursuing gradual advances along multiple mutually supporting lines of advance — a Russian campaign design that has become more common as the Russian military has abandoned attempts at operationally significant break throughs through mechanized maneuver.[13]
The Russian military command likely aims for the intended seizure of Kurakhove and Vuhledar to allow Russian forces to make more rapid tactical gains up to and along the H-15 highway, although Russian forces will likely face challenges in leveraging the envisioned seizure of these settlements to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast. The envisioned Russian seizure of Vuhledar would remove a Ukrainian strongpoint that Ukrainian forces have successfully leveraged to prevent Russian efforts to advance to the H-15 highway from the south, although seizing Vuhledar will not be the decisive factor for whether Russian forces can reach the highway. Vuhledar is 23 kilometers south of the H-15 highway, and the area between Vuhledar and the highway is mainly comprised of open fields that would require Russian forces to conduct successful mechanized assaults to make more rapid tactical gains. Intensified Russian mechanized assaults west and southwest of Donetsk City since late July have so far facilitated only a couple of kilometers of advance, and Russian forces have historically proven inept at conducting effective operational-level mechanized maneuver.[14] The intended Russian seizure of Kurakhove would take another significant defensive point away from Ukrainian forces, but the settlements west of Kurakhove along the H-15 highway also provide opportunities for defense and there is no reason to assess that Russian forces would be able to advance more rapidly west of Kurakhove if Ukrainian forces decide to defend in these settlements. The Russian Eastern and Southern groupings of forces have generally proven ineffective at conducting successful offensive operations, and more combat effective elements of the Central Grouping of Forces that are driving on Kurakhove's northern flank may improve Russian prospects for seizing Kurakhove.[15] It is unlikely that the Russian military command will commit Central Grouping of Forces elements to a prolonged effort to advance further along the H-15 highway and away from the Central Grouping of Force's priority effort to seize Pokrovsk, however.[16]
The Russian military command continues to prioritize the offensive effort on Pokrovsk and will likely treat the intensified effort in western Donetsk Oblast as a secondary effort. The Russian military command likely intends for this secondary effort, regardless of its success, to fix Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk Oblast and prevent Ukrainian redeployments to reinforce the defense of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command has shown a pronounced desire to insulate its offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction from the operational pressures caused by Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast and is likely holding back its remaining operational reserves for the effort to seize the city of Pokrovsk itself.[17] This level of prioritization will likely remain regardless of the success of the intensified Russian offensive effort in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces began efforts to widen the Pokrovsk salient along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line as a preparatory step for the upcoming attempt to seize Pokrovsk itself, and any participation by elements of the Central Grouping of Forces in the offensive effort in western Donetsk Oblast will likely be further conditions-setting for the Pokrovsk effort.[18] The Russian military command has pursued a theater wide campaign design aimed at stretching Ukrainian forces through consistent offensive pressure and appears to be replicating this theater-wide effort in a more intensified way along the frontline in Donetsk Oblast.[19] Russian forces will not be able to retain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine indefinitely, and multiple intensified offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast, in addition to the persisting operational pressures caused by Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast, will likely cause Russian offensive operations to culminate sooner than the Russian military command intends.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to downplay the theater-wide operational impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continues efforts to convince the Russian people that the Kremlin's delayed and disorganized response to the Kursk incursion is an acceptable price to pay for further Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast. Putin claimed during his speech at the Eastern Economic Forum on September 5 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has failed to force Russia to redeploy forces from frontline areas in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast or stop Russia's offensive operations in "key directions" of eastern Ukraine.[20] Putin claimed that the incursion has not impacted Russia's "primary goal" of seizing the remainder of Donbas. Putin claimed that Ukraine also intended for the incursion to divide Russian society, but that instead the incursion has further unified Russia and there has been a sharp increase in the number of people interested in signing military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Putin claimed that Russian forces have "stabilized" the situation in Kursk Oblast and are beginning to push Ukrainian forces from Russian territory. Putin claimed that Russian forces are making significant territorial advances in Ukraine and have accelerated their offensive operations. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian forces are suffering "heavy" manpower and equipment losses, but did not provide specific numbers for these losses. Putin's claims about the Kursk incursion having no operational impacts are demonstrably false, however, as ISW has reported.[21]
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has had theater-wide impacts and these impacts will likely continue to affect Russian offensive and defensive capabilities beyond the culmination of the Pokrovsk offensive. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated during an interview with CNN published on September 5 that the Ukrainian incursion spoiled a planned Russian attack into Sumy Oblast and "reduced the threat" of Russian incursions into northern Ukraine.[22] Syrskyi stated that Ukraine's key objectives for the incursion were to stop Russian forces from using Kursk Oblast as a sanctuary to prepare offensive operations into Ukraine, divert Russian forces from other unspecified areas in Ukraine, create a "security zone," take Russian prisoners of war (POWs), and boost Ukrainian morale. Syrskyi stated that Russian forces have moved "tens of thousands" of troops previously intended to reinforce Russian offensive operations in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, including small elements of several elite Russian Airborne (VDV) units. Russian forces have reportedly redeployed elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and the 11th and 83rd VDV brigades to Kursk Oblast.[23] The Russian military command has largely relied on conscripts and regular and irregular forces redeployed from lower priority sectors of Ukraine, such as northern Kharkiv Oblast, to conduct defensive operations in Kursk Oblast.[24] These forces are extremely unlikely to be sufficient to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk if the Ukrainians choose to defend. The Russian military command may have also redeployed at least a company of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) from the Pokrovsk direction in mid-August 2024.[25] The redeployment of elements of the CMD — which is reportedly tasked with completing the seizure of Pokrovsk — suggests that the Russian military command has not be able to fully insulate its priority offensive operations from the impacts of the Ukrainian incursion, despite Putin's claims.
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has also allowed Ukraine to challenge Russia's control of the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine. Russia has possessed the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine since at least November 2023, which has allowed the Russian military command to determine the location, time, scale, and requirements of fighting in Ukraine at will and has forced Ukraine to expend manpower and materiel in reactive defensive operations.[26] Syrskyi recently stated that Russia has redeployed roughly 30,000 troops from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast to respond to the Ukrainian incursion.[27] A significant additional redeployment of Russian troops from the frontline in Ukraine would very likely be necessary to let Russia regain control of its territory in Kursk, as US intelligence officials have reportedly assessed, and would significantly impact Russia's offensive operations and Russia's ability to prepare for future operations.[28]
Putin's informational efforts are likely intended to convince the Russian public that an ongoing Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast is tolerable in exchange for the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk. The Kremlin is reportedly trying to condition Russian society to accept that the limited Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast is a "new normal," possibly in order to afford itself time and space to respond to the incursion after seizing Pokrovsk.[29] Putin delayed declaring a "counterterrorism operation" for several days following the incursion and has largely avoided redeploying the large numbers of experienced and combat effective forces that Russia will likely need to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[30] ISW continues to assess that Putin is likely prioritizing Russian offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over pushing Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, and Putin's rhetorical efforts further support this assessment.[31] Putin also attempted to marginally rehabilitate the Russian MoD's public image during his speech by claiming that the MoD is "objective" and by presenting battlefield reports from the MoD as accurate.[32] Putin may also intend to influence select Western audiences with his comments about the Ukrainian incursion. Putin may assess that he can encourage Western decision-makers to pressure Ukraine into withdrawing its forces from Kursk Oblast, which would allow Putin to continue his offensive operations in Ukraine without having to redeploy additional forces to Kursk Oblast. Putin's ostensible comfort with allowing Ukrainian forces to hold Russian territory for a protracted time is a stunning reversal of longstanding Russian rhetoric and doctrine about the inviolability of Russia's borders and calls into question the significance of Russia's supposed "red lines."[33]
Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast do not portend the imminent collapse of the frontline throughout Ukraine, despite Putin's efforts to portray the advances in Donetsk Oblast as dramatic. Russian forces have advanced at most roughly 40 kilometers from the 2022 frontline in Pokrovsk Raion since the beginning of the Russian offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and appear to have suffered significant manpower and armored vehicle losses in exchange for these territorial gains.[34] A Russian seizure of Pokrovsk would almost certainly complicate Ukrainian logistics, and further Russian advances west and southwest of Donetsk City will challenge Ukraine's defensive positions in the area to be sure. The loss of Pokrovsk, and the loss and occupation of any Ukrainian territory and people, would be a significant blow to Ukrainian morale. The Russian seizure of Pokrovsk is by no means inevitable, however. Russian forces have failed to seize Chasiv Yar and threaten Ukraine's fortress belt from Slovyansk to Kostyantynivka after months of assaults, and Ukrainian forces have proven their ability to limit Russian advances elsewhere in the theater, particularly when well-staffed and equipped. It remains too soon to forecast the outcome of the current Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast, and far too soon to assess the effects of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk that were intended to go far beyond affecting the immediate situation around Pokrovsk.
The US, Ukraine's other supporters, and Ukraine itself maintain the ability to make decisions that can impact the battlefield situation — including by addressing Ukraine's manpower and training restraints and adequately arming and equipping Ukraine so that the Ukrainian military command can properly prepare for future defensive and counteroffensive operations.
Russia continued its efforts to bolster economic relations with non-Western countries on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai. Russian President Vladimir Putin shared the stage during his speech with officials from Malaysia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on September 5 to discuss bilateral cooperation and multilateral projects.[35] Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim told Putin during a plenary session that Malaysia is interested in joining BRICS and claimed that Russian-Malaysian collaboration on what Ibrahim called “Islamic finance” would help Russia attract more investment from majority Muslim countries.[36] Indian Ambassador to Russia Vinay Kumar stated that India expects to increase imports of Russian oil until 2030 and that India and Russia are developing a new interbank exchange system.[37] Kumar also expressed hope that Russia will increase its exports of fertilizer to India. Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom CEO Alexei Likhachev highlighted Rosatom’s ongoing work with India and Vietnam to develop the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic, a shipping route between western Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region.[38] Putin also discussed joint PRC-Russian efforts to address and mitigate external challenges to bilateral cooperation between the two countries with PRC Vice President Han Zheng.[39] This conversation occurred against the backdrop of a statement by the CEO of Russian metals and renewables company En+, Vladimir Kolmogorov, at the EEF, who claimed that a large joint Russia-PRC coal project in Siberia is facing financial difficulties due to concern among PRC companies about Western secondary sanctions.[40] ISW previously noted that Russian efforts at the EEF are largely centered around diplomatic efforts with non-Western countries to evade Western sanctions.[41]
Ukrainian officials announced a series of appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 5. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Yaroslav Zheleznyak reported on September 5 that that the Verkhovna Rada voted to appoint First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha as Foreign Minister; Head of Ukraine's state-owned defense enterprise Ukroboronprom, Herman Smetanin, as Strategic Industries Minister; former Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Olha Stefanishyna as Justice Minister; Presidential Office Deputy Head Oleksiy Kuleba as Development of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Minister; and Deputy Defense Minister Nataliya Kalmykova as Veterans Affairs Minister.[42]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces have recently intensified their longstanding offensive effort to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk City and advance up to and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway.
- Apparently coordinated Russian offensive operations from the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around Vuhledar likely aim to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending in western Donetsk Oblast and set conditions for further gains in Russia's prioritized offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction.
- Russian forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in the near-term.
- Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Vuhledar shortly after starting to widen the southern flank of the Pokrovsk salient, suggesting that Russian forces intend to conduct mutually reinforcing offensive operations along the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, immediately west of Donetsk City, along the 0-0532 highway, and near Vuhledar.
- The Russian military command likely aims for the intended seizure of Kurakhove and Vuhledar to allow Russian forces to make more rapid tactical gains up to and along the H-15 highway, although Russian forces will likely face challenges in leveraging the envisioned seizure of these settlements to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast.
- The Russian military command continues to prioritize the offensive effort on Pokrovsk and will likely treat the intensified effort in western Donetsk Oblast as a secondary effort. The Russian military command likely intends for this secondary effort, regardless of its success, to fix Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk Oblast and prevent Ukrainian redeployments to reinforce the defense of Pokrovsk.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to downplay the theater-wide operational impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continues efforts to convince the Russian people that the Kremlin's delayed and disorganized response to the Kursk incursion is an acceptable price to pay for further Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast.
- The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has had theater-wide impacts and these impacts will likely continue to affect Russian offensive and defensive capabilities beyond the culmination of the Pokrovsk offensive.
- Putin's informational efforts are likely intended to convince the Russian public that an ongoing Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast is tolerable in exchange for the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk.
- Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast do not portend the imminent collapse of the frontline throughout Ukraine, despite Putin's efforts to portray the advances in Donetsk Oblast as dramatic.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, southeast of Kupyansk, and in the Kherson direction and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions north of Kharkiv City.
- Russian forces continue to forcibly redeploy mobilized Russian military personnel from occupied Ukraine to frontline positions to bolster Russia's crypto-mobilization efforts.
Click here to read the full report.
Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 4, 2024, 8:15pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:25pm ET on September 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russia appears to be relying on several countries, including India, Serbia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as part of its efforts to evade Western sanctions. The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 4, citing leaks from Russian state correspondence, that Russia’s Industry and Trade Ministry devised a plan to spend nearly $1 billion on securing critical electronic components in October 2022, which reportedly included the possibility of building facilities in India to gain access to such components.[1] FT reported that the leaked documents reveal that Russia has been covertly acquiring sensitive dual-use electronics from India with “significant reserves” of Indian rupees amassed by Russian banks from increasing oil sales to India. The extent to which Russia has implemented this plan remains unclear, although ISW assesses Russia is engaged in a wider effort to evade Western sanctions and procure sanctioned electronic components and machinery necessary for Russia's defense industry production via foreign actors.[2]
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin on September 4 on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai.[3] Putin and Vulin discussed the removal of bilateral trade barriers to reverse declining trade levels, and Vulin stated that Serbia will not impose sanctions on Russia and will not allow its territory to be used for “anti-Russian” actions. Vulin’s comment may have been intended in part to avert some of Putin’s annoyance following Serbia’s recent purchase of 12 Rafale jets from France in a likely effort to diversify the country’s arms suppliers away from Russia.[4] Putin stated that he hopes to see Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic at the upcoming October 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan.[5] Putin also met PRC Vice President Han Zheng on September 4 and emphasized that the EEF serves as a valuable platform for enhancing mutual understanding and fostering Russia–PRC economic cooperation.[6] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 3 that Putin briefed PRC officials about the outcomes of his recent trip to Mongolia, during which Putin emphasized growing regional trade and cooperation with the PRC and Mongolia.[7] ISW has previously observed indications that foreign companies and banks, including in the PRC, have been increasingly reluctant to conduct transactions with Russian actors due to fears of Western secondary sanctions, which could be affecting Russia's sanctions evasion efforts.[8]
Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Lviv City, Lviv Oblast and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during another mid-sized combined drone and missile strike on the night of September 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from MiG-31K aircraft over Tula Oblast; two Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 strategic bombers over the Black Sea; six Kh-101 cruise missiles from Tu-95 strategic bombers from Volgograd Oblast airspace; three Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea; and 29 Shahed-136/131 drones from launch areas in Kursk Oblast.[9] Ukrainian forces shot down four Kh-101 missiles, three Iskander-K missiles, and 22 Shahed drones; six other Shaheds did not reach their targets likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) suppression, and one Shahed flew into Belarusian airspace. Russian missiles struck civilian objects in both Kryvyi Rih and Lviv City, wounding and killing civilians. Kryvyi Rih City Head Oleksandr Vilkul stated that the Russian strike on Kryvyi Rih damaged a hotel in the city center, apartment buildings, four educational institutions, and other civilian facilities and wounded up to six people.[10] Russian missiles also struck Lviv City and killed seven civilians, including two children, and damaged up to 188 buildings, including residential and historical heritage buildings as well as schools.[11] International humanitarian law forbids strikes on civilian objects (defined as any object that does not have an explicit military purpose or objective), and furthermore prohibits strikes that indiscriminately target both military and civilian objects.[12] Russian sources attempted to justify the strikes as targeting military objects, but under international law even strikes on military objects do not justify indiscriminate collateral harm to civilians or civilian objects.[13]
Ukrainian authorities are investigating another report of apparent Russian war crimes against Ukrainian soldiers. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported on September 3 that the Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office launched a pre-trial investigation into footage published on a Telegram channel purportedly showing Russian forces executing three Ukrainian servicemen point-blank near Toretsk after they had clearly surrendered and been disarmed.[14] ISW cannot independently verify the footage. Attacking soldiers who are hors de combat, specifically those who have clearly expressed an intention to surrender, is a violation of Article 41 of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict.[15]
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on September 4 that Germany will provide 17 additional IRIS-T air defense systems to Ukraine by 2026.[16] Scholz stated that Germany has already delivered seven IRIS-T systems previously pledged to Ukraine and that Germany will send four of the 17 additional systems by the end of 2024. A German government official told Bloomberg on September 4 that Ukraine will receive 12 medium-range and 12 shorter-range IRIS-T systems from Germany by 2026.[17] Other European countries also continue to demonstrate their support for Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Simon Harris signed a ten-year bilateral agreement on support and co-operation on September 4 during Harris' visit to Kyiv.[18] The agreement stipulates that Ireland will continue diplomatic efforts promoting Ukraine's peace formula, security support, and the provision of non-lethal military aid to Ukraine.[19]
Ukrainian officials announced a series of resignations and appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 3 and 4. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Chairperson Ruslan Stefanchuk announced on September 3 and 4 that Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, Strategic Industries Minister Oleksandr Kamyshin, Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Olha Stefanishyna, Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territory Iryna Vereshchuk, State Property Fund Head Vitaliy Koval, Justice Minister Denys Maliuska, and Ecology Minister Ruslan Strilets submitted their resignation letters.[20] Vereshchuk and Kamyshin will both reportedly transition to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's office, and the Verkhovna Rada is still considering several of the resignations.[21] Zelensky responded to the reshuffling on September 3 and stated that he intends to "weight" areas of Ukraine's foreign and domestic policy differently in the future.[22]
Key Takeaways:
- Russia appears to be relying on several countries, including India, Serbia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as part of its efforts to evade Western sanctions.
- Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Lviv City, Lviv Oblast and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during another mid-sized combined drone and missile strike on the night of September 3 to 4.
- Ukrainian authorities are investigating another report of apparent Russian war crimes against Ukrainian soldiers.
- German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on September 4 that Germany will provide 17 additional IRIS-T air defense systems to Ukraine by 2026.
- Ukrainian officials announced a series of resignations and appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 3 and 4.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly made marginal advances in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting throughout the Ukrainian salient on September 4.
- Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions west of Donetsk City.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to portray itself as suitably addressing its obligations towards Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 3, 2024
click here to read the full report
Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan and Frederick W. Kagan
September 3, 2024, 8:10pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on September 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
NOTE: ISW is introducing a new section of the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, "Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation," in which ISW will track Ukrainian ground attacks, offensive operations, and long-range strikes within Russia. ISW will hereafter report on tactical updates on Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast in this section, unless there is a major inflection in the situation on the ground. ISW will also track Ukrainian long-range strikes on targets within the Russian Federation in this section. ISW will not, however, offer assessments about Ukrainian objectives or capabilities in this new section.
Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure and a military educational facility in Poltava City with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, killing and wounding a significant number of people, as part of a wider strike series on the night of September 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea, a Kh-59/69 cruise missile from Kursk Oblast, and 35 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 27 Shahed drones over Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts, that six Shaheds did not strike their target, and that two Shahed drones flew toward Belgorod Oblast and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that two Iskander missiles struck a military educational institution and a nearby hospital in Poltava City, partially destroying a building at the Poltava Military Communications Institute.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated the strike killed at least 51 and injured at least 271.[4] Zelensky highlighted Ukraine's need for more air defense systems and interceptors and called on Western countries to lift restrictions on Ukrainian forces conducting long-range strikes against military targets within Russia as such restrictions inhibit Ukraine from defending against long-range Russian strikes.[5] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told CNN on September 3 that only Patriot and SAMP/T air defense systems are capable of intercepting Russia's ballistic missiles.[6] Russian milbloggers celebrated the strike and amplified footage of the strike and its aftermath.[7]
The wider impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on the war and any envisioned diplomatic solution to the war are not yet clear, and assessments of these impacts are premature. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during an interview with NBC on September 3 that Ukrainian forces are "conceptually" planning to hold territory in Kursk Oblast for an unspecified period of time, but did not offer further details about Ukraine's objectives for the incursion due to concerns about operational security.[8] Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian incursion is an aspect of Ukraine's "victory plan" to end the war on just terms and bring Russia to the negotiating table.[9] Zelensky noted that Ukraine intends to exchange Russian prisoners of war (POWs) captured in Kursk Oblast for Ukrainian POWs currently in Russian captivity and reiterated that one of the goals of the incursion was to force Russia to redeploy troops from the frontline throughout Ukraine, particularly eastern Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Russia has diverted roughly 60,000 troops from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on August 27 that Russia has redeployed over 30,000 troops from the frontline in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast.[10] ISW has observed indications for several weeks that the Russian military command was redeploying forces from northern Kharkiv Oblast, the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast and recently observed indications that the Russian military command is redeploying forces likely intended for future higher priority offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction to Kursk Oblast.[11] Russian President Vladimir Putin has thus far avoided redeploying the type of combat effective and experienced frontline units that will likely be necessary to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, and Zelensky's statement suggests that Ukrainian forces will likely maintain positions in the over 1,100 square kilometers of territory where Ukrainian forces are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast until Putin choses to commit such forces. ISW assesses that Putin is attempting to preserve the Russian drive on Pokrovsk at the expense of delaying the clearing of Kursk but that the incursion is likely to have a variety of other important impacts on Russian military operations over various time periods regardless of its impact on the current Pokrovsk operation.[12]
While the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast appears to be having operational-level impacts on the Russian military, the incursion has likely not yet shifted Putin's strategic-level thinking. ISW assesses that Putin maintains that Russia can slowly and indefinitely subsume Ukraine through grinding advances and that Russia can achieve its goals through a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces and by outlasting Western support for Ukraine — assessments that make Putin averse to peace negotiations on terms other than Ukrainian and Western capitulation to his demands.[13]
Attempts to assess the impacts of the Ukrainian incursion at this premature stage will likely come to partial and inaccurate conclusions about Ukraine's ability to change the trajectory of the conflict and the Kremlin's appetite for peace negotiations on acceptable terms. Ukrainian counteroffensives in Fall 2022 both successfully pushed the frontline back from Kharkiv City – Ukraine's second largest city – and liberated Kherson City and established a defensible frontline along the Dnipro River.[14] Ukraine demonstrated its ability to conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations and liberate large swaths of territory when properly aided and equipped by the West in Fall 2022, and the assumption that Ukraine is permanently unable to conduct future counteroffensive operations that result in operationally significant gains with timely and reliable deliveries of Western aid is premature. Delays in the provision of Western aid, among other factors, hindered the Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive and generated a military crisis in Ukraine in 2024 from which Ukraine is still attempting to recover.[15] Russian forces were able to make tactically significant advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Donetsk Oblast in Spring and early Summer 2024 in large part because of the shortages of artillery and air defense munitions caused by the suspension of US military assistance.[16] ISW continues to assess that prompt and reliable Western security assistance will be critical to Ukraine's ability to conduct future counteroffensive operations, and that the US and wider Western alliance can make decisions to redress Ukrainian materiel constraints caused by delays in Western security assistance.[17]
Russia will very likely resolve to continue its genocidal war against Ukraine unless faced with significant battlefield setbacks and strong Western support for Ukraine, and it is highly unlikely that any foreseeable Russian leader after Putin will be more amenable to peace negotiations and a just resolution to the war. The Kremlin has spent years denying the existence of a Ukrainian nation and delegitimizing Ukrainian sovereignty, and this effort has had widespread and likely long-term impacts on Russian society and elite opinion.[18] Russian officials in both Putin's inner circle and the wider Russian government have publicly stated their aversion to peace negotiations with Ukraine on terms other than capitulation, and Putin's successor is far more likely to hold such views than to reject them in the absence of significant Russian setbacks.[19] A negotiated ceasefire on current lines and under current circumstances will only benefit Russia and will afford the Kremlin time to further radicalize and militarize Russian society against Ukraine and the Russian military time to rest and reconstitute, likely before conducting a future attack on Ukraine.[20] The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has highlighted that the war in Ukraine is not indefinitely stalemated, however, and shown that Ukraine, Russia, and the West maintain the ability to make decisions that significantly impact current battlefield realities and the future end state of the war.
Reuters reported that the US is considering providing Ukraine with long range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) but that Ukraine would not receive the missiles for months. Reuters reported, citing three sources including US officials, that the US is close to an agreement to provide JASSMs to Ukraine and that the missiles would be announced in a military assistance package in Fall 2024 but that the US has not yet finalized the deal.[21] Reuters noted that the JASSM has only been integrated into US-designed aircraft, and one US official told Reuters that "there were efforts" to integrate the JASSM with other fighter jets in Ukraine's air fleet. The standard JASSM has a range of roughly 370 kilometers, and the extended-range JASSM (JASSM-ER) has a range of about 1,000 kilometers.[22] Reuters reported that it is unclear which variant the US would send to Ukraine under this deal, although both variants have ranges longer than the maximum range of ATACMS missiles that the US has already provided to Ukraine.[23] ISW has previously assessed that there are at least 245 Russian military objects — at least 85 percent of which are not airfields — within range of ATACMS, and even just the standard JASSM launched from over Ukrainian airspace would likely further expand the set of military objects within Russia that would be in range of Ukrainian missiles.[24] It is unclear whether Ukraine would be able to take advantage of the JASSM's extended range given that current US policy restricts Ukraine from using the US-provided long-range precision weapons to strike military targets in Russia.[25] ISW continues to assess that current US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military targets within Russia and the slow provision of small numbers of such weapons are actively hindering Ukraine's ability to conduct offensive operations and substantially disrupt Russian operations.[26]
Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded his trip to Mongolia by signing agreements that strengthen bilateral economic ties and trilateral energy relations between Russia, Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).[27] Putin and Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh emphasized increasing projects under the Mongolia-Russia-China Economic Corridor program, which supports the Russian “Greater Eurasian partnership” economic initiative, China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative, and Mongolia’s “Steppe Road” development plan.[28] Putin emphasized that the Soyuz Vostok gas pipeline connecting Russia, Mongolia, and the PRC is fully constructed and awaits state examination.[29] Putin invited Kurelsukh to the BRICS forum in Fall 2024 and suggested that Mongolia join the BRICS Plus/Outreach format.[30] Mongolia is also reportedly close to completing a temporary trade agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).[31] Russia and Mongolia also signed bilateral agreements to increase oil and petroleum product exports from Russia to Mongolia, and Putin announced that Russian energy company Inter RAO will assist in restoring Ulaanbaatar Thermal Power Plant No. 3 (TPP-3).[32]
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping issued a joint statement praising each other’s purported efforts to address the war in Ukraine. The two presidents released a joint statement on September 2 expressing support for the joint PRC–Brazilian proposal on the “Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” and the African Union’s efforts to solve the war in Ukraine.[33] The two leaders affirmed that inclusive dialogue and peaceful negotiations are essential for a lasting solution to the war and called on Russia and Ukraine to adhere to three key principles that favor Russia: avoiding battlefield expansion, preventing escalation of fighting, and refraining from provocations. ISW continues to assess that the PRC's peace plan is favorable to Russia and that several African states seek to balance Ukraine and Russia to maintain longstanding bilateral relationships with Russia without officially voicing support for Russia.[34]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure and a military educational facility in Poltava City with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, killing and wounding a significant number of people, as part of a wider strike series on the night of September 2 to 3.
- The wider impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on the war and any envisioned diplomatic solution to the war are not yet clear, and assessments of these impacts are premature.
- Attempts to assess the impacts of the Ukrainian incursion at this premature stage will likely come to partial and inaccurate conclusions about Ukraine's ability to change the trajectory of the conflict and the Kremlin's appetite for peace negotiations on acceptable terms.
- Reuters reported that the US is considering providing Ukraine with long range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) but that Ukraine would not receive the missiles for months.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded his trip to Mongolia by signing agreements that strengthen bilateral economic ties and trilateral energy relations between Russia, Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
- South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping issued a joint statement praising each other’s purported efforts to address the war Ukraine.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City.
- Russian occupation authorities continue to advertise Russian military service to civilians in occupied Ukraine.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Annika Ganzeveld, and Frederick W. Kagan
NOTE: ISW is introducing a new section of the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, "Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation," in which ISW will track Ukrainian ground attacks, offensive operations, and long-range strikes within Russia. ISW will hereafter report on tactical updates on Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast in this section, unless there is a major inflection in the situation on the ground. ISW will also track Ukrainian long-range strikes on targets within the Russian Federation in this section. ISW will not, however, offer assessments about Ukrainian objectives or capabilities in this new section.
Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[1] NOTE: A version of this text appears in the September 2 ISW-CTP Iran Update. An unspecified European official told Bloomberg on September 2 that Iran could begin shipping ballistic missiles to Russia "within a matter of days.”[2] European intelligence sources previously told Reuters in August 2024 that Iran and Russia signed a contract in December 2023 for Iran to deliver Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia.[3] The intelligence sources added that dozens of Russian military personnel are currently in Iran training to operate Fateh-360 missiles. Russia’s acquisition of Ababil or Fateh-360 ballistic missiles would likely allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian near-rear targets while preserving Russia's stockpiles of domestically-produced missiles, such as Iskanders, for deep-rear Ukrainian targets, as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[4]
Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an interview to Mongolian outlet Unuudur ahead of his visit to Mongolia on September 2-3, emphasizing historical and modern Russian-Mongolian relations and current trilateral economic and energy initiatives with Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Putin emphasized Soviet-Mongolian relations and the 2019 Russian-Mongolian comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in the interview published on September 2.[5] Putin also highlighted economic and energy cooperation initiatives to deepen relations between Russia, Mongolia, and the PRC and expressed confidence in developing the Russia-Mongolia-China Economic Corridor and the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, which will run from Russia through Mongolia to the PRC upon its completion. Putin also asserted that the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Mongolia have made significant progress in drafting a temporary free trade agreement. Putin notably published articles in North Korean and Vietnamese state newspapers before his visits to the countries in June 2024 and is likely attempting to pursue stronger relations with countries that historically had friendly ties to the Soviet Union to form a coalition to act as an alternative to the West.[6]
Russian and Mongolian officials indicated that the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for Putin's arrest will not impact Putin's ongoing visit to Mongolia, despite Mongolia's legal obligation to enforce this warrant. Putin arrived in Ulaanbaatar on September 2, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) noted that Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh invited Putin and that Putin will discuss bilateral relations and sign bilateral agreements during the visit.[7] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on August 30 that the Kremlin is not worried about Mongolia's obligation to arrest Putin as Russia and Mongolia maintain an "excellent dialogue," and Peskov reiterated similar sentiments on September 2.[8] Russian state media claimed that Mongolian Presidential Spokesperson Ulziibayar Zolbayar reportedly rejected reports that the ICC appealed to Mongolia to enforce the arrest warrant for Putin.[9] Russian authorities have previously stated that Russia does not recognize the ICC's jurisdiction, but Mongolia has been party to the Rome Statute (which gives the ICC its power) since 2002.[10]
Russian authorities detained Leningrad Military District (LMD) Deputy Commander Major General Valery Mumindzhanov on corruption charges on September 2. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the Russian Investigative Committee suspects that Mumindzhanov accepted bribes worth over 20 million rubles (about $222,000) while he was the Resource Provision Head within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and oversaw contracts for the supply of Russian military uniforms.[11] A Russian insider source, who has previously correctly predicted several command changes within the Russian MoD, claimed that Mumindzhanov was a direct subordinate of former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitry Bulgakov, whom Russian authorities arrested on corruption charges on July 26.[12] The insider source also claimed that Mumindzhanov had ties to current Russian Security Council Secretary and former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.[13] A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Mumindzhanov's arrest indicates that the Kremlin does not intend to curtail current Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's efforts to "cleanse" the Russian MoD and that arrests are not limited to several high-profile MoD officials but have been ongoing for five months.[14] The milblogger also claimed that continued investigations into high-ranking Russian MoD officials will satisfy the public's demand for justice and the fight against corruption.
Key Takeaways:
- Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an interview to Mongolian outlet Unuudur ahead of his visit to Mongolia on September 2-3, emphasizing historical and modern Russian-Mongolian relations and current trilateral economic and energy initiatives with Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
- Russian and Mongolian officials indicated that the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for Putin's arrest will not impact Putin's ongoing visit to Mongolia, despite Mongolia's legal obligation to enforce this warrant.
- Russian authorities detained Leningrad Military District (LMD) Deputy Commander Major General Valery Mumindzhanov on corruption charges on September 2.
- Russian forces recently regained lost positions east of Korenevo amid continued Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast on September 2.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk directions and southwest of Donetsk City.
- Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials are highlighting Russian military training capabilities, likely in an attempt to promote military recruitment and as part of long-term efforts to rebuild the Russian officer corps.
- Russian occupation officials announced the start of the school year in occupied Ukraine, highlighting Russia's various efforts to coopt the educational system and forcibly Russify and militarize Ukrainian children and youth.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 1, 2024
Click here to read the full report
September 1, 2024, 6:00 pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on September 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted the largest series of drone strikes against targets within Russia on the night of August 31 to September 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed 158 Ukrainian drones over 16 oblasts: 46 drones over Kursk Oblast, 34 over Bryansk Oblast, 28 over Voronezh Oblast, 14 over Belgorod Oblast, nine over Moscow City and Oblast, eight over Ryazan Oblast, five over Kaluga Oblast, four over Lipetsk Oblast, three over Tula Oblast, two over Tambov and Smolensk oblasts each, and a drone each over Oryol, Tver, and Ivanovo oblasts.[1] Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that Russian forces shot down two Ukrainian drones near the Moscow Oil Refinery in Kapotnya and that drone debris damaged a technical room at the facility and caused a fire.[2] Russian sources posted footage of the Ukrainian drone striking the Moscow Oil Refinery and a small fire in the area, although some characterized the fire as a normal gas flare at the facility.[3] Kashira Raion Head Mikhail Shuvalov stated that Ukrainian forces targeted the Kashira State District Power Plant in Kashira Raion, Moscow Oblast with three drones, and Russian sources amplified footage of Russian air defense activating and explosions near the plant.[4] The Tver Oblast press service stated that a Ukrainian drone caused a fire in Konakovo Raion, and Russian sources amplified footage of the drone striking the Konakovo State District Power Plant, a subsequent large fire at the plant, and damage within the plant.[5] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that there was also a fire at the Konakovo gas distribution network along the "KGMO-Konakovo" main gas pipeline following Ukrainian drone strikes in Tver Oblast.[6] Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed that a Ukrainian drone damaged a cell tower in Tarusa Raion, Kaluga Oblast.[7] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii noted that data available from NASA FIRMS shows heat anomalies at the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant (NLMK) in Lipetsk Oblast, a military facility for a unit of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division in Tula Oblast, two cement plants in Voskresensk and Kolomna, Moscow Oblast, and the Ferzikovo cement plant in Kaluga Oblast on the night of August 31 to September 1.[8] Only the FIRMS data from the site in Tula Oblast appears to be anomalous, as the other facilities routinely give off heat signatures due to normal industrial activities.
Ukrainian forces continued to conduct assaults in Kursk Oblast on September 1, but there were no confirmed Ukrainian advances. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults near Korenevo; east of Korenevo near Matveyevka; northeast of Korenevo near Aleksandrovka; northwest of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya and Pogrebki; north of Sudzha near Kamyshevka; and northeast of Sudzha near Nizhnyaya Parovaya, Bakhtinka, and Nechayev.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced west of Pogrebki, and geolocated footage published on September 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating within Pogrebki.[10] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces failed to establish a foothold in Borki (southeast of Sudzha) and continue to attack Ukrainian positions within the settlement.[11] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back from Korenevo, cleared Komarovka (southwest of Korenevo), and counterattacked near Kauchuk (northeast of Korenevo).[12] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz's "Varvar" detachment are reportedly operating near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha).[13] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]), the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz's "Aida" group are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[14]
Recent Russian domestic polls suggest that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has not yet degraded Russian domestic support of the war in Ukraine in the short-term following the Kursk incursion and that Russian support for the war has remained high since 2022. Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center published the results of a monthly poll on August 30 and found that about 78 percent of respondents support Russian military operations in Ukraine — an increase from 75 percent in July 2024 and 77 percent in June 2024.[15] The Levada Center's polling indicates that the lowest Russian support for the war in Ukraine was in February 2022 with 68 percent of respondents supporting the war and that war support among poll respondents has not fallen below 70 percent since March 2022. The Levada Center also asked respondents in August 2024 about the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and found that 91 percent of respondents are concerned about Ukrainian military operations on Russian territory. The Levada Center also reported that 57 percent of respondents do not expect a second wave of mobilization and 60 percent do not see a need for a second wave of mobilization in the coming months — both decreasing from 65 percent and 69 percent, respectively. Levada Center's polling data indicates that the Kremlin's refusal to fully transition Russian society at large to a wartime footing and the Kremlin’s ongoing domestic information operations aimed at normalizing the war to Russian society have mitigated against domestic war weariness thus far and that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has not changed this mindset. The fact that Russian society in general appears to not be experiencing war fatigue likely grants the Kremlin flexibility in how it strategizes to wage a protracted war of attrition against Ukraine.[16]
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed at an August 31 press conference that "Armenia has frozen its participation in the [Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization] CSTO at all levels," after Armenia has effectively abstained from participating in the CSTO for nearly a year.[17] Pashinyan also acknowledged that other government officials and the public may have differing views on Armenia's decision to freeze its participation in the CSTO but noted that the Armenian government does not currently see the need to reconsider the decision. Pashinyan stated that Armenia may "see the need to make another decision" in the future, however.[18] Armenia has effectively abstained from participating in the CSTO since Pashinyan and Armenian representatives failed to attend several consecutive CSTO events — both political meetings and military exercises — starting in mid-to-late 2023.[19] Pashinyan acknowledged in February 2024 that Armenia had "essentially" frozen its participation in the CSTO because the CSTO "failed to fulfill its obligations in the field of security" to Armenia, particularly in 2021 and 2022.[20] Armenia has also appeared to be reducing its bilateral security relations with Russia, and Russian border guards left the Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan — where Russian border guards had been serving previously since 1992 — on July 31, 2024.[21]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted the largest series of drone strikes against targets within Russia on the night of August 31 to September 1.
- Ukrainian forces continued to conduct assaults in Kursk Oblast on September 1, but there were no confirmed Ukrainian advances.
- Recent Russian domestic polls suggest that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has not yet degraded Russian domestic support of the war in Ukraine in the short-term following the Kursk incursion and that Russian support for the war has remained high since 2022.
- Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed at an August 31 press conference that "Armenia has frozen its participation in the [Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization] CSTO at all levels," after Armenia has effectively abstained from participating in the CSTO for nearly a year.
- Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City, southeast of Kupyansk, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 31, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, and George Barros
August 31, 2024, 7:20pm ET
The Russian military command may have redeployed limited elements intended to reinforce Russia's priority offensive operation in the Pokrovsk direction to defend against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast — suggesting that operational pressures from the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast are impacting Russian operations in every sector throughout the theater. Russian sources, including social media users, claimed on August 14 and 17 that at least a company of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) redeployed from the Pokrovsk direction to Kursk Oblast.[1] Select Russian and Ukrainian open-source communities also stated that unspecified elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade redeployed to Kursk Oblast.[2] Elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade have been committed to Russian offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction. ISW observed reports that elements of the brigade are operating east of Pokrovsk in mid-August and as recently as today.[3] A volunteer-led OSINT organization Evocation.info stated on August 19 that Russia has also redeployed elements of the 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) from the Donetsk direction to Kursk Oblast, and ISW observed claims that elements of the brigade were operating in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions in late July and August 2024.[4] ISW has observed no indications that these redeployed elements were previously engaged in frontline combat in Russia's assessed priority Toretsk and Pokrovsk direction, and the Russian military command likely remains extremely averse to pulling combat effective units from frontline areas in these directions.[5] The redeployed units were likely reserve units that the Russian military command intended to use to reinforce the Russian grouping in these directions and stave off the threat of pre-mature operational culmination, however.
The Russian military command's decision to redeploy limited elements to Kursk Oblast instead of committing the elements to the operation to seize Pokrovsk or Toretsk suggests that the Russian military command has not been able to fully insulate its priority offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast from the manpower demands brought about by the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast. The Russian military command thus far has avoided redeploying any forces slated to participate in offensive operations in the Toretsk or Pokrovsk directions to defensive operations in Kursk Oblast and thus far mainly has pulled forces from lower priority directions — northern Kharkiv Oblast, the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and western Zaporizhia Oblast.[6] The redeployment of limited elements of the 15th and 1st motorized rifle brigades will not have an immediate impact on the battlefield situation in the Pokrovsk or Toretsk directions, as these are small forces, however. It remains unclear if the Russian military command has already or will redeploy additional reserve forces intended for Russia's offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian forces continued to conduct assaults in Kursk Oblast on August 31, but there were no confirmed or claimed Ukrainian advances. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults southwest of Korenevo near Komarovka and Krasnooktyabrskoye; south of Korenevo near Snagost; near Korenevo itself; east of Korenevo near Matveyevka and Kremyanoye; northwest of Sudzha near Bakhtinka and Malaya Loknya; north of Sudzha near Kamyshevka and Kireyevka; northeast of Sudzha near Nechayev and Martynovka; south of Sudzha near Plekhovo; and southeast of Sudzha near Borki and Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[7] Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Nizhnyaya Parovaya (northeast of Sudzha), while another milblogger claimed that the settlement is a contested "gray zone."[8] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces regained 1.5 kilometers of territory near Korenevo and pushed Ukrainian forces out of Nechayev.[9] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian unmanned systems and rocket artillery conducted a combined mission and struck a Russian pontoon crossing over the Seim River, likely in Glushkovo Raion.[10] Elements of the "Kashtan" detachment (Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz), the "Arbat" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps), the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Troops), and unspecified Ossetian volunteer elements are reportedly operating near Nechayev.[11] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 11th and 83rd Airborne (VDV) brigades, 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and "Shir" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[12]
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov reported on August 30 that Russian forces continue to use airfields in Russia within Ukrainian ATACMS range — further highlighting how US restrictions against Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia are allowing Russia to leverage sanctuary space in deep rear areas to support military operations against Ukraine. Umerov met with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in Washington, D.C. on August 31 and discussed the battlefield situation; Ukraine's air defense, weapons, and training needs; and the development of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).[13] Umerov stated in an interview with CNN published on August 30 that he presented a list of military targets within Russia to senior US government officials.[14] Umerov noted that the list included Russian airfields that are within range of US-provided weapons and that Russian forces are using to conduct strikes against Ukraine. Senior US officials reportedly recently stated that Russian forces moved 90 percent of the aircraft that conduct glide bomb strikes against Ukraine from Russian airspace away from airfields within range of Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles.[15] ISW additionally recently assessed that there at least 209 of the 245 known Russian military objects in range of ATACMS are not air bases.[16]
The Russian military command reportedly reorganized the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR and LNR) 1st and 2nd army corps (AC) to create two new combined arms armies (CAA): the 51st CAA and 3rd CAA, respectively.[17] A Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian military force restructuring claimed on August 28 that the 1st DNR AC became the Russian 51st CAA and that the 2nd LNR AC became the Russian 3rd Guards CAA, and a Donetsk City-based source claimed on August 29 that the newly reformed 51st CAA is based out of occupied Donetsk Oblast.[18] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger identified Lieutenant General Sergey Milchakov both as the commander of the 51st CAA and the commander of the 1st DNR AC on August 28 in a post announcing that Milchakov received the title “Hero of Russia” following his successes in the Avdiivka and Toretsk directions.[19] A volunteer-led OSINT organization Evocation.info on July 20 also identified Milchakov as the commander of the 51st CAA, noting that this army was created on the basis of the 1st DNR AC.[20] Evocation.info also identified former Commander of the 138th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) Major General Alexei Kolesnikov as the commander of the 3rd CAA, which reportedly “replaced” the 2nd LNR AC. Evocation.info observed that the 51st CAA and 3rd CAA structurally are significantly larger in size than their previous formations as army corps and thus the Russian military command is likely to recruit more personnel to staff the two new army-sized formations permanently based in occupied Ukraine. One Russian social media user questioned on August 17 whether the 1st DNR AC was no longer operationally subordinate to the command of the 8th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) and whether the Russian military command was reviving the Soviet 51st Army.[21] Ukrainian officials started describing the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) as part of the ”51st Army” as early as late June 2024.[22] ISW observed Russian reports in early August 2024 that the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, ”Sparta” Reconnaissance Battalion, and ”Somalia” Battalion (all historically part of the 1st DNR AC) were also operating as part of the 51st Army, which suggests that the Russian military likely reformed the Second World War-era 51st Army using longstanding DNR military units.[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has yet to officially confirm the reformation of the 1st DNR and 2nd LNR ACs into combined arms armies, although this restructuring is consistent with the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to officially integrate these legacy irregular forces into the Russian Armed Forces.[24]
The source who reported the creation of these two combined arms armies has accurately reported major Russian force restructuring in the past. The Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian military restructuring also previously accurately reported that the Russian military command created the 69th Motorized Rifle Division on the basis of the 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade and as part of the 6th CAA in May 2024.[25] ISW has routinely observed elements of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division operating in the Kharkiv direction.[26] The milblogger added that the Russian military command also reformed the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division and the "128th Assault Brigade” (likely referring to the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade) as part of the 44th AC (LMD) and formed the 11th Tank Brigade as part of the 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]). ISW observed elements of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction and elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division operating in the Kursk direction.[27]
The milblogger also noted that the Russian MoD recently mentioned an unspecified 114th Artillery Brigade (likely a restored World War II unit) operating in the Donetsk direction, and Russian media reported that the Russian military command formed a new 673rd Airborne (VDV) Regiment in Omsk City and deployed the regiment to Luhansk Oblast.[28] It is unclear to which formation the 673rd VDV Regiment is subordinated, though the VDV’s principal training center and two training regiments are based in Omsk. The milblogger assessed that the creation of the 673rd VDV Regiment may support the formation of a new VDV division.
The Kremlin continues efforts to define Russia's traditional and cultural values as part of ongoing efforts to codify a Russian state ideology. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on August 26 tasking the Russian Presidential Administration's recently formed Directorate for State Humanitarian Policy to oversee the strengthening of Russia's "spiritual and moral foundations," preservation of Russia's "traditional values," and implementation of state historical education policies.[29] The Kremlin formed the directorate in June 2024, and the directorate will also oversee Putin's interactions with unspecified "specialized organizations" and Putin's Council for Culture and Art and advise Putin on issues related to monitoring and implementing policy in correlation with Russia's values.[30] A source within the Russian Presidential Administration told Kremlin newswire TASS on August 31 that Russian propagandist Vladimir Medinsky will oversee the recently formed directorate.[31] The Kremlin has recently intensified efforts to codify a state ideology based on vague "traditional values" while bypassing the Russian Constitution, which notably forbids Russia from establishing a state ideology and requires the Russian state to recognize ideological diversity.[32]
The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) announced on August 31 that Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi officially appointed Captain First Rank Roman Hladkyi as the Chief of Staff of the newly created Unmanned Systems Forces.[33] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Spokesperson Major Vitaly Medvedev stated on August 30 that Hladkyi has been acting Unmanned Systems Forces Chief of Staff for several weeks.[34]
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian military command may have redeployed limited elements intended to reinforce Russia's priority offensive operation in the Pokrovsk direction to defend against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast — suggesting that operational pressures from the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast are impacting Russian operations in every sector throughout the theater.
- Ukrainian forces continued to conduct assaults in Kursk Oblast on August 31, but there were no confirmed or claimed Ukrainian advances.
- Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov reported on August 30 that Russian forces continue to use airfields in Russia within Ukrainian ATACMS range — further highlighting how US restrictions against Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia are allowing Russia to leverage sanctuary space in deep rear areas to support military operations against Ukraine.
- The Russian military command reportedly reorganized the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR and LNR) 1st and 2nd army corps (AC) to create two new combined arms armies (CAA): the 51st CAA and 3rd CAA, respectively.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to define Russia's traditional and cultural values as part of ongoing efforts to codify a Russian state ideology.
- The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) announced on August 31 that Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi officially appointed Captain First Rank Roman Hladkyi as the Chief of Staff of the newly created Unmanned Systems Forces.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
- Russian forces are reportedly unable to fight in Ukraine at full strength due to manpower and equipment shortages that resulted from the Kremlin’s ineffective wartime policies.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 30, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and George Barros
August 30, 2024, 8:10pm ET
European Union (EU) member state officials continue to express divergent views about Ukraine's ability to use European-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia. EU High Commissioner Josep Borrell stated on August 30 that the decision to lift such restrictions is up to each EU member state individually, as not all EU states have provided Ukraine with long-range weapons.[1] Czech President Petr Pavel stated on August 30 that Ukraine should decide how to use its Western-provided weapons in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter.[2] Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur urged Western partners to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.[3] Polish Deputy Defense Minister Pawel Zalewski stated on August 30 that Poland supports lifting restrictions on Ukraine's ability to conduct long-range strikes against military targets in Russia using Polish-provided weapons.[4] Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stated on August 29 that Italy will not allow Ukraine to use Italian-provided weapons for strikes against military targets on Russian territory as neither NATO nor Italy are at war with Russia.[5] Italy has reportedly supplied Ukraine with Storm Shadow missiles.[6] The United Kingdom reportedly seeks to allow Ukrainian forces to use UK-provided Storm Shadows for strikes into Russia, but US prohibitions are preventing the United Kingdom from unilaterally doing so.[7] Italy's refusal to allow Ukraine to use Italian-provided Storm Shadows for such strikes suggests that Ukrainian forces may have to abide by different rules for the use of the same missile type depending on the country of origin. ISW has previously assessed that Western allies' divergent policies on weapons use complicate logistics for Ukrainian forces, who must carefully navigate the origins and guidelines of the weapons to abide by specific regulations.[8]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces made marginal gains in Kursk Oblast on August 30. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the southern outskirts of Korenevo, in the fields north of Olgovka (east of Korenevo), and south of Sheptukhovka (northeast of Korenevo).[9] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye and Nizhnyaya Parovaya (both north of Sudzha).[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults southwest of Korenevo near Snagost and Krasnooktyabrskoye; near Korenevo itself; east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye; north of Sudzha near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Kamyshevka, and Kireyevka; northeast of Sudzha near Martynovka; and southeast of Sudzha near Borki on August 30.[11] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha).[12]
Russian state-owned polling agencies are recognizing limited upticks in Russian domestic discontent towards Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian authorities amid the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Public Opinion Foundation, a Russian state-owned polling institution, published a poll on August 30 that it conducted on August 25 showing that 28 percent of respondents expressed outrage or dissatisfaction with the actions of Russian authorities over the past month.[13] This is up from 25 percent and 18 percent in polls that the Public Opinion Foundation conducted on August 11 and July 28, respectively.[14] Respondents to the Public Opinion Foundation poll have not expressed such high dissatisfaction since polling conducted in November 2022, following the first month of the deeply unpopular partial mobilization in Russia.[15] The Russian state-owned Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) noted that Putin's approval rating fell by 3.5 percent to 73.6 percent between August 12 and 18 — a record fall in Putin's approval rating, even among Kremlin pollsters, since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[16] VCIOM released its latest polling on Putin's approval rating on August 30, showing an additional 1.2 percent decline to 72.4 percent between August 19 and 25.[17] These polls from Russian state-owned polling agencies do not suggest particularly pronounced discontent nor are they reliable reflections of the actual sentiments in Russian society. The polls do suggest, however, that the Kremlin assesses that it must recognize that societal discontent has risen since the start of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Kremlin likely hopes that limited acknowledgment of societal discontent will guard against accusations that it is ignoring Russian society's concern about the Ukrainian incursion. The Kremlin appears to have launched an intricate messaging campaign aimed at justifying to its domestic audience why Russia is prioritizing the maintenance of offensive operations in eastern Ukraine over immediately expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, and limited acknowledgments of discontent may be a part of this campaign.[18]
Venezuela extradited Colombian citizens who fought as members of the Ukrainian military to Russia, demonstrating growing Russian-Venezuelan cooperation and Venezuelan support for Russia's war. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested two Colombian citizens for fighting as mercenaries in the Ukrainian military on August 30.[19] The Colombian citizens were flying from Ukraine to Colombia via Caracas in July 2024, and Venezuelan authorities in Caracas detained and extradited them from Venezuela to Russia. Foreign states have charged their citizens for mercenarism for fighting with Russian forces, and Russia has placed accused ”mercenaries” who served in the Ukrainian military on the Russian wanted list.[20] Politico noted on August 30, however, that this is the first public case of a foreign state extraditing accused mercenaries from other states to Russia.[21] Venezuela's extradition comes against the backdrop of recent growing Russian-Venezuelan ties and Russian efforts to demonstrate its influence among "friendly" states in the Western hemisphere.[22]
Hungary and Russia continue to deepen their bilateral cooperation. Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto met with Alexey Miller, the head of Russian state energy company Gazprom, to discuss Russia's export of gas to Hungary and bilateral cooperation.[23] Russian state news outlet TASS reported that Hungary imports more than half of its gas from Russia, importing 4.8 billion cubic meters of Russian gas through the Turkish Stream pipeline in 2022 and 5.6 billion cubic meters in 2023.[24] Miller has recently made or sought to make gas deals with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Iran - both of which are close Russian partners - so his meeting with Szijjarto is notable. Intensified Russian-Hungarian cooperation follows Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's recent efforts to posture himself as a possible mediator between Russia and Ukraine and statements amplifying several Kremlin information operations.[25]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk as Ukrainian Air Force Commander on August 30.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi appointed the commander of Ukraine's Central Air Command, Lieutenant General Anatoly Kryvonozhko, as acting Ukrainian Air Force Commander.[27]
Key Takeaways:
- European Union (EU) member state officials continue to express divergent views about Ukraine's ability to use European-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.
- Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces made marginal gains in Kursk Oblast on August 30.
- Russian state-owned polling agencies are recognizing limited upticks in Russian domestic discontent towards Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian authorities amid the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.
- Venezuela extradited Colombian citizens who fought as members of the Ukrainian military to Russia, demonstrating growing Russian-Venezuelan cooperation and Venezuelan support for Russia's war.
- Hungary and Russia continue to deepen their bilateral cooperation.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk as Ukrainian Air Force Commander on August 30.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
- French outlet Le Monde reported on August 30 that about 100 mercenaries from the Russian "Bear Brigade" private military company departed Burkina Faso to join Russian forces fighting in Kursk Oblast.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 29, 2024
click here to read the full report
Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros
August 29, 2024, 8:50pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces are currently pursuing two immediate tactical efforts as part of their ongoing offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk — a tactical effort along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line east of Pokrovsk to seize Myrnohrad and advance up to Pokrovsk's outskirts, and another tactical effort along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction and eliminating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks. The Russian military command likely views both of these tactical efforts as desired prerequisites for launching an intensified offensive effort against Pokrovsk itself. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 29 that the most intense battles in the Pokrovsk direction are ongoing on the eastern outskirts of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk), southwest of Hrodivka near Krasnyi Yar, within Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), and immediately east of Selydove near Mykhailivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[1] ISW has observed Russian gains in these areas in recent days, but Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces have made more significant tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction than what observed visually confirmed evidence currently supports.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the southeastern outskirts of Myrnohrad (immediately east of Pokrovsk) and have begun small arms battles with Ukrainian forces in the town, although a Ukrainian military observer described the Russian forces operating in the town as sabotage and reconnaissance groups.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have advanced in much of eastern Selydove and have reached the center of the town.[4] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are fighting on the northeastern outskirts of Ukrainsk (southeast of Pokrovsk), seized Memryk (immediately northeast of Ukrainsk), and entered Halitsynivka (immediately east of Ukrainsk).[5]
Russian forces appear to be attempting to maintain their rate of advance along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line to quickly seize Myrnohrad and reach the outskirts of Pokrovsk. The reported Russian advance from Novohrodivka to Myrnohrad's outskirts likely aims to bypass what Russian sources have characterized as major Ukrainian defensive positions northwest and west of Hrodivka.[6] Russian forces recently enveloped Ukrainian positions southeast of Pokrovsk along the Karlivske Reservoir and prompted Ukrainian forces to withdraw from limited positions in the area.[7] Russian forces likely hope to achieve a similar effect by trying to envelop Ukrainian positions between Myrnohrad and Hrodivka, although it remains unclear if Russian forces can maintain their relatively rapid rate of advance through the comparatively larger town of Myrnohrad and its surroundings. Russian forces may attempt to fight directly through Ukrainian defensive positions along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line, despite the higher costs, in order to maintain their rate of advance and try to seize Myrnohrad more quickly. Russian efforts to seize Myrnohrad do not preclude Russian forces from advancing up to the eastern outskirts of Pokrovsk, and the Russian military will likely pursue these tactical goals in tandem.
Reported Russian advances into Selydove and in the direction of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk likely aim to eliminate a relatively large Ukrainian salient on the southern edge of the wider Russian salient in the Pokrovsk direction that could threaten Russia's offensive effort in the area. Ukrainian positions east of the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line offer Ukrainian forces opportunities to threaten the Russian rear in the Pokrovsk direction, and the Russian military command is likely concerned about Ukrainian counterattacks and fires disrupting Russian offensive efforts as Russian forces deploy logistics, artillery elements, and force concentrations westward into the forward part of the salient to support the intensified effort on Pokrovsk itself. The Russian military command also likely aims to expand and stabilize the southern flank of the Russian salient in the area in order to prevent Ukrainian forces from threatening the gains Russia has made in its 2024 offensive effort once Russian offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction culminate.[8] The Russian salient is roughly 21 kilometers wide at its base from the Ukrainian salient east of the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line to Ukrainian positions north of Avdiivka along the H-20 (Avdiivka-Kostyantynivka) highway. Russian positions along the E-50 (Donetsk City-Pokrovsk) highway southwest of Avdiivka are roughly 13 kilometers from Avdiivka, whereas the current line of Russian advance along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line is 30 kilometers from Avdiivka. Significant Ukrainian counterattacks from the base of the salient towards Avdiivka could threaten to encircle the Russian force grouping deployed forward in the salient, and the Russian military command likely aims to preempt this possibility by eliminating the Ukrainian salient on the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction.
Russian forces likely hope that advances in the direction of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk will mutually support ongoing offensive operations west of Donetsk City and that offensive pressure from both directions will overwhelm Ukrainian forces or prompt Ukraine to withdraw from the limited positions in the rural open areas east of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk. The area north of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) is mainly comprised of open fields with limited cover or concealment from relatively few windbreaks, and Russian advances through this terrain would likely require significant successful mechanized assaults, which Russian forces have routinely struggled to conduct.[9] Russian forces have proven more adept at advancing from settlement to settlement with small infantry groups in the Pokrovsk direction, although it remains to be seen if Russian infantry groups can maintain their rate of advance as they approach Ukrainsk and Hirnyk.[10]
The Russian military command likely aims to achieve both of these tactical efforts before launching the more resource-intensive effort to seize Pokrovsk itself, although Russian forces may begin urban combat in Pokrovsk regardless, if progress stalls on these preparatory efforts. It remains unclear if the Russian military command intends for Russian forces to fight their way entirely through Pokrovsk in frontal urban combat, as they have through the smaller towns east and southeast of Pokrovsk, or aims to envelop or encircle the city as Russian forces previously attempted and failed to do against Bakhmut and Avdiivka.[11] The Russian military command's calculus about what preparatory actions are required for launching offensive operations on the city of Pokrovsk and how Russian forces will attempt to seize the city will likely depend on where Ukrainian forces decide to engage in significant defensive efforts. ISW will not speculate or forecast about future Ukrainian defensive efforts, however.
Russian authorities are creating new volunteer territorial defense units in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, highlighting Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to counter the incursion more seriously with a mobilization due to the risks of societal discontent or with large-scale redeployments due to possible disruptions to Russia's ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov publicly announced on August 29 the creation of the "BARS-Kursk" volunteer detachment and stated that the detachment's main function will be to "ensure security" in Kursk Oblast during the incursion and the re-settlement of border settlements in Kursk Oblast at an unspecified later date.[12] Smirnov stated that the detachment will cooperate with the Russian military and the counterterrorism operational headquarters — which are overseeing the ongoing Russian response in Kursk Oblast — and will also provide humanitarian support for residents of border settlements. Smirnov stated that volunteers will sign six-month contracts, undergo training, and receive any "necessary" weapons to perform their duties. Kursk Oblast officials published a recruitment ad for the detachment on August 24.[13] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev reported that Russian authorities are also forming "BARS-Bryansk" and "BARS-Belgorod" detachments and that the three detachments will support the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces.[14] Sarantsev estimated that the three detachments will be comprised of 4,921 volunteers in total.
The formation of these new BARS (Russian Army Combat Reserve) volunteer detachments is consistent with the Kremlin's apparent strategy to avoid re-deploying experienced or combat effective units engaged in fighting in the Pokrovsk or Toretsk directions to Kursk Oblast due to concerns about slowing the tempo of Russian offensive operations in these higher priority directions. ISW previously noted that the Kremlin appears to be largely relying on conscripts and irregular forces redeployed from lower-priority directions in Ukraine to defend against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[15] Putin indicated a possible desire to continue relying on Russian volunteer servicemembers (dobrovoltsy) to address the Ukrainian incursion during his August 12 meeting with Russian military, security, and civilian officials by alluding to increased willingness to sign military service contracts among prospective dobrovoltsy.[16] Putin has consistently relied on volunteer and irregular formations to alleviate Russia's manpower constraints during the war and has avoided declaring general mobilization or another round of partial mobilization, both of which would be incredibly unpopular among Russian society.[17] Putin almost certainly remains extremely averse to declaring general mobilization and will likely continue to rely on irregular formations to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast until Russian offensive operations culminate in eastern Ukraine — at which point Putin may consider re-deploying more combat effective Russian forces from these directions to push Ukrainian units back across the border.
Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced north of Sudzha as Russian forces recaptured some areas of Kursk Oblast on August 29. Geolocated footage published on August 29 shows that Ukrainian forces have reached Nizhnyaya Parovaya (north of Sudzha) and advanced into the northwestern part of the settlement.[18] Additional geolocated footage published on August 29 shows that Russian forces have likely recaptured Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha) and eastern Korenevo.[19] Ukrainian forces continued attacking near Korenevo, Komarovka (southwest of Korenevo), Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo), Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo), Leonidovka (northwest of Sudzha), Malaya Loknya and Russkoye Porechnoye (both north of Sudzha), Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha), and within Borki (southeast of Sudzha).[20] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are continuing to storm Korenevo to try to create a route to Rylsk (northwest of Korenevo).[21] Elements of the Russian "Kaskad" Operational Combat Tactical Formation (formerly of the Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], reportedly since subordinated to Rosgvardia) are reportedly fighting near Korenevo, though the Russian military command reportedly previously dissolved the formation.[22]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet recently crashed while defending against a large-scale Russian drone and missile strike.[23] An unnamed US official told Western media on August 29 that the jet crashed on August 26, and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed a special commission to determine the cause of the crash.[24] The loss of equipment and aircraft during combat operations is not particularly novel, and it is expected that Ukraine will lose some Western-provided military equipment during combat. However, any loss among Ukraine's already limited allotment of Western-provided F-16s and trained pilots will have an outsized impact on Ukraine's fledging ability to operate F-16s in the near term as part of its combined air defense umbrella or in an air-to-ground support role.
Russian authorities arrested and charged former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Pavel Popov with large-scale fraud on August 29. The Russian Investigative Committee charged Popov with embezzling money meant for the maintenance of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Patriot Park, a Russian military exhibition in Moscow.[25] Russian authorities did not disclose how much money Popov is suspected of embezzling personally but noted his case is connected to the large-scale fraud cases of the Patriot Park Head Vyacheslav Akhmedov and MoD Directorate for Innovative Development Deputy Head Major General Vladimir Shesterov, whom Russian authorities arrested on August 5 for embezzling over 40 million rubles (roughly $471,000).[26] Russian state news outlet TASS reported, citing Russian law enforcement sources, that Akhmedov testified against Popov.[27] A Russian source that has previously correctly preemptively reported several command changes within the Russian MoD assessed on August 5 that Popov could be the next high-ranking MoD official to be arrested.[28] Russian sources have previously theorized that the arrests of high-ranking MoD officials who served under former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu may be part of an effort to "clean house" of Shoigu's affiliates within the MoD, which the sources claimed indicates that Shoigu's influence within the Kremlin may be declining.[29]
Russian President Vladimir Putin will conduct an official visit to Mongolia despite Mongolia's status as a signatory to the Rome Statue and Mongolia’s legal obligation to enforce an arrest warrant for Putin from the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Kremlin press service announced on August 29 that Putin will travel to Mongolia on September 3, marking his first visit to a state party to the Rome Statute since the ICC issued the arrest warrant in March 2023 for Putin's role in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[30] Putin notably avoided traveling to South Africa for a BRICS summit in August 2023 on similar grounds.[31] Putin's upcoming visit to Mongolia for negotiations on a "strategic partnership" suggests that Mongolian authorities likely will not enforce the ICC arrest warrant.[32] This visit also follows the annual “Selenga” bilateral Russian–Mongolian military exercises which began on August 15, further highlighting the strong bilateral relations between the two countries.[33] Russia has previously stated that it does not recognize the ICC's jurisdiction, and Russian officials have not yet commented on the possibility of Putin’s arrest in Mongolia. [34]
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 29 that Ukrainian forces struck the Atlas Oil Refinery in Rostov Oblast and the Zenit Oil Depot in Kirov Oblast on the night of August 27 to 28.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that members of Ukraine's Special Operations Forces, Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Ukrainian forces struck the Atlas Oil Refinery, causing a fire at the refinery's vertical reservoirs. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Zenit Oil Depot and a field artillery warehouse of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces in Voronezh Oblast and are clarifying the effect of these strikes. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated on August 28 that Ukrainian forces struck targets in Rostov, Kirov, and Voronezh oblasts.[36]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces are currently pursuing two immediate tactical efforts as part of their ongoing offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk — a tactical effort along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line east of Pokrovsk to seize Myrnohrad and advance up to Pokrovsk's outskirts, and another tactical effort along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction and eliminating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks.
- The Russian military command likely aims to achieve both of these tactical efforts before launching the more resource-intensive effort to seize Pokrovsk itself, although Russian forces may begin urban combat in Pokrovsk regardless, if progress stalls on these preparatory efforts.
- Russian authorities are creating new volunteer territorial defense units in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, highlighting Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to counter the incursion more seriously with a mobilization due to the risks of societal discontent or with large-scale redeployments due to possible disruptions to Russia's ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced north of Sudzha as Russian forces recaptured some areas of Kursk Oblast on August 29.
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet recently crashed while defending against a large-scale Russian drone and missile strike.
- Russian authorities arrested and charged former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Pavel Popov with large-scale fraud on August 29.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin will conduct an official visit to Mongolia despite Mongolia's status as a signatory to the Rome Statue and Mongolia’s legal obligation to enforce an arrest warrant for Putin from the International Criminal Court (ICC).
- The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 29 that Ukrainian forces struck the Atlas Oil Refinery in Rostov Oblast and the Zenit Oil Depot in Kirov Oblast on the night of August 27 to 28.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
- The Russian government continues to expand pathways for accused criminals to sign military service contracts.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 28, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, and George Barros
August 28, 2024, 7pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on August 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Multiple reports from Western media indicate that the US government is prohibiting the United Kingdom (UK) from allowing Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets in Russia. The Financial Times (FT) reported on August 27 that a source familiar with the matter stated that Ukraine's use of British and French Storm Shadows may require access to American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in areas where Russian forces are jamming the GPS signals that the missiles use for targeting.[1] FT reported that "well-placed" sources stated that the UK government sent a request to both the US and France earlier in summer 2024 to grant Ukraine permission to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia, and French President Emmanuel Macron stated in May 2024 that Ukraine should be allowed to strike military sites in Russia from which Russian forces attack Ukraine. The Telegraph reported on August 27 that the UK government supports Ukraine's ability to strike military targets in Russia with Storm Shadow missiles but that the missiles also use unspecified, classified American systems, whose use requires US permission.[2] The Telegraph stated in a since-deleted section of its original web article that the UK has not formally asked the US to allow Ukraine to use Storm Shadows to strike military targets within Russia, and that a White House source stated that the US is concerned about how the use of the missiles — even without US approval — could escalate the situation and draw the US into the war in Ukraine. The Telegraph reported that British Prime Minister Keir Starmer is taking a "consultative approach" to negotiations with the US and does not want to spark a disagreement over the issue. A source in the UK government reportedly stated that Russia is aware that Ukraine is asking for permission to strike military targets in Russia, so Russia has moved its "most critical assets" out of range of long-range missile systems. ISW continues to assess that although Russian forces have moved aircraft out of range of Western-provided Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles, a significant number of Russian military objects remain within striking distance of Western weapons, which is allowing Russian forces to leverage sanctuary space in deep rear areas within Russia to support military operations against Ukraine.[3]
Several Russian milbloggers claimed on August 28 that the tempo of Ukrainian attacks in Kursk Oblast has slowed and that Ukrainian forces are now attempting to dig in and hold select areas they recently seized. These milbloggers claimed the intensity of Ukrainian attacks within Kursk Oblast has decreased and that Ukrainian forces are attempting to hold and fortify select areas, amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations within the salient in Kursk Oblast.[4] Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are gradually stabilizing the situation in Kursk Oblast.[5] Geolocated footage published on August 28 showing Russian forces operating in eastern Korenevo indicates that Ukrainian forces likely recently withdrew from the area and that Russian forces regained some lost positions.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced past Vetreno, Kremyanskoye, and Sheptukhovka (all east and northeast of Korenevo); within eastern Nechayev and Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (both northeast of Sudzha); and in the fields south of Spalnoye (southeast of Sudzha).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) cleared Spalnoye and that Russian forces have regained control of the settlement.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked east of Korenevo near Olgovka, north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya, east of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka, and southeast of Sudzha near Borki.[9] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 28 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attempts to cross the international border near Zhuravlevka, Belgorod Oblast (southwest of Belgorod City and north of Kharkiv City).[10]
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied reports on August 28 that Russian conscripts are fighting in Kursk Oblast and called such reports a "distortion of reality," despite a plethora of evidence, including Russian evidence and admissions, to the contrary.[11] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov, and other Russian sources have notably acknowledged that Russian conscripts are fighting in Kursk Oblast.[12] Russian opposition outlet Horizontal 7x7 reported on August 28 that Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) removed a local Ivanovo Oblast news outlet's post claiming that the Russian military is sending Airborne Forces (VDV) conscripts to Kursk oblast.[13] Horizontal 7x7 noted that the Ivanovo Oblast Human Rights Ombudsman previously stated that a conscript from Ivanovo Oblast returned to Russia during a prisoner-of-war exchange.[14] Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported that the Russian military plans to deploy Russian conscripts from the 290th Missile Regiment (7th Missile Corps, 27th Missile Army, Strategic Missile Forces) and 2187th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Brigade) to Kursk Oblast.[15]
Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against oil infrastructure in Rostov and Kirov oblasts and reportedly conducted a drone strike against Voronezh Oblast overnight on August 27 to 28. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that sources within the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Main Military Directorate (GUR) and Special Operations Forces conducted a strike with Ukrainian-made drones against the Atlas oil depot in Rostov Oblast.[16] Suspilne reported that the Atlas oil depot is part of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and supplies Russian forces. Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubev claimed that a drone strike caused a fire at a fuel depot in Kamensky Raion.[17] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that wreckage of one of the downed drones fell near the oil depot, starting a fire in one of the technical buildings that spread to tanks containing flammable materials.[18] Suspilne also reported that GUR conducted a strike with Ukrainian-made drones against the "Zenit" oil depot near Kotelnich, Kirov Oblast — the first time Ukrainian drones have struck Kirov Oblast, which is more than 1,200 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[19] Suspilne stated that the "Zenit" oil depot provides fuel to the Russian military. Kirov Oblast Governor Alexander Sokolov claimed that Russian forces shot down two drones but that a third drone fell on a plant in Kotelnich and started a fire.[20] Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti reported that regional dispatch services stated that there was a small fire at the "Vyatka" Federal State Institution in Kotelnich that stores oil and refined products.[21] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian forces destroyed a drone in Rossoshansky Raion and that falling drone debris caused a fire near explosive objects but there was no detonation.[22] A prominent milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces were likely targeting the Minudobreniya agricultural chemical manufacturing plant south of Rossosh.[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed eight drones over Voronezh Oblast and four over Rostov Oblast overnight.[24] Russian sources denied claims on August 28 that there was also a fire at the Ryazan State District Power Plant in Pronsky Raion, Ryazan Oblast, alleging that dry grass caught fire on August 27.[25]
The prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram project's continued meetings with Iraqi officials appear to be supporting Iranian-backed Iraqi efforts to gain greater control of their information and media space. The Rybar team announced on August 28 that they met with the head of the media service of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Muhhanad al Aqaabi to discuss the role of foreign media organizations in Iraq's information environment.[26] Iran has notably co-opted the PMF and uses the organization to covertly enable its objectives in Iraq.[27] Rybar claimed that al Aqaabi spoke about Western media "propaganda" and information space manipulations during the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), particularly in 2015 to 2017, and praised Russian and Chinese media for reporting "impartially" on the war with ISIS. The Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (controlled by Iranian-aligned factions within Iraq), has taken efforts over the past year to institute media and information space controls to stifle opposition voices.[28] Russia has undertaken its own multifaceted and multidomain efforts to similarly restrict and control domestic media and information space, including by co-opting well-known media voices such as the Rybar project.[29] Iranian-backed Iraqi political actors may seek to learn similar tactics from Rybar and other Russian sources as they continue efforts to crack down on opposition in the information space.
Kremlin newswire TASS will soon open an office in Iran, supporting Moscow's efforts to deepen its partnership with Tehran.[30] TASS Director General Andrei Kondrashov announced on August 28 that TASS plans to open a correspondent office in an unspecified location in Iran, adding to the 62 international offices that TASS has in 57 countries.[31] Russia and Iran have deepened their military, economic, financial, technical, industrial, and political control over the backdrop of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and TASS's expansion into Iran is likely intended in part to extend that cooperation into the media sphere.[32] TASS's expansion into Iran indicates growing media cooperation between Moscow and Tehran as well.
Russia's allies appear to be increasingly restricting their transactions with Russian companies and financial institutions amid ongoing concern about the impact of secondary US sanctions. Kremlin-affiliated business outlet Kommersant reported on August 28 that "market participants" stated that banks in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), specifically in Dubai, began blocking payments for electronic components and equipment from Russian companies in August 2024.[33] Kommersant noted that the UAE has previously served as a payment point between Russian importers and electronics companies in the People's Republic of China (PRC), but that UAE banks are growing increasingly concerned about the risk of secondary sanctions. General Director of Russian Beshtau Electronics company Oleg Osipov confirmed to Kommersant that the issues with the banks in Dubai began roughly at the end of July to the beginning of August 2024 and claimed that the "PRC side" is initiating the blocking, but did not provide additional details. Another source told Kommersant that Russian companies previously paid for PRC electronics via banks in the UAE, although the goods themselves were immediately sent to Russia, and that the UAE banks were accepting a commission of only 1–3 percent on the transactions. UAE electronic company Jacky's Electronics founder Guseyn Imanov told Kommersant that he is also aware of issues with paying for consumer electronics and components through banks in Dubai and claimed that Russian companies have found an unspecified alternative way to conduct financial transactions at an increased commission. Russian and Kyrgyz media recently reported that at least 12 Kyrgyz commercial banks have suspended personal monetary transfers through Russian banks, including Sberbank, T-Bank, and MTS Bank, for an indefinite period.[34] Kyrgyzstan's National Bank told Kyrgyz outlet 24.kg that commercial banks in Kyrgyzstan are taking measures to prevent negative consequences of international sanctions.[35] The US Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a series of additional sanctions on August 23 against Russian and Chinese companies and actors accused of being involved in Russia's war effort and supporting Russia's defense industry.[36] Russia's allies appear to be responding more strongly to these more recent sanctions, and additional foreign banks may take steps to avoid the wider risk of secondary US sanctions in the coming weeks and months.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly prevented a terrorist attack in the Republic of Ingushetia on August 28. The FSB detained six residents of the Republic of Ingushetia on August 28 for preparing sabotage and terrorist attacks on law enforcement officers and a Russian Orthodox church in Sunzha.[37] The FSB claimed that "supporters of international terrorist organizations" contacted one of the suspects, who received orders from a militant in Syria to attack the church.[38] The Investigative Committee for the Republic of Ingushetia opened a criminal case against three residents for participating in a terrorist organization and organizing a terrorist act and against three other locals for illegal possession of explosives.[39] ISW is unable to verify the FSB’s claims.
Key Takeaways:
- Multiple reports from Western media indicate that the US government is prohibiting the United Kingdom (UK) from allowing Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets in Russia.
- Several Russian milbloggers claimed on August 28 that the tempo of Ukrainian attacks in Kursk Oblast has slowed and that Ukrainian forces are now attempting to dig in and hold select areas they recently seized.
- Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against oil infrastructure in Rostov and Kirov oblasts and reportedly conducted a drone strike against Voronezh Oblast overnight on August 27 to 28.
- The prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram project's continued meetings with Iraqi officials appear to be supporting Iranian-backed Iraqi efforts to gain greater control of their information and media space.
- Kremlin newswire TASS will soon open an office in Iran, supporting Moscow's efforts to deepen its partnership with Tehran.
- Russia's allies appear to be increasingly restricting their transactions with Russian companies and financial institutions amid ongoing concern about the impact of secondary US sanctions.
- The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly prevented a terrorist attack in the Republic of Ingushetia on August 28.
- Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in the Siversk direction.
- Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, within Toretsk, southeast of Pokrovsk, and northeast of Vuhledar.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly supporting the creation of a new type of combat unit that will specialize in using and countering drones, unmanned systems, and other electronic equipment in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 27, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros
August 27, 2024, 8:45pm ET
Russian forces have made significant tactical advances in the Pokrovsk direction amid reports that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from select areas southeast of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on August 27 confirms that Russian forces have advanced over two kilometers from their last confirmed position into northwestern Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) along Dubinina Street, suggesting that Russian forces additionally hold positions within the central part of the town.[1] A Ukrainian soldier reported in a now-deleted Telegram post that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Novohrodivka, which Russian state media and several Russian milbloggers amplified and used to claim that Russian forces control the majority of the settlement.[2] Additional geolocated footage published on August 27 indicates that Russian forces have marginally advanced in southeastern Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk and northeast of Novohrodivka) and have seized Kalynove (further southeast of Pokrovsk and southeast of Novohrodivka).[3] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces "lost" Marynivka (directly south of Novohrodivka) and that elements of the 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) seized Memryk (southeast of Novohrodivka), although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Russian forces operating in these settlements.[4] Some Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces advanced into southern Mykhailivka (south of Novohrodivka) and are attacking into northeastern Selydove (southwest of Novohrodivka).[5]
The recent rate of Russian advance in the Pokrovsk direction has been relatively rapid, and Russian forces have advanced through most of Novohrodivka in a matter of days. Russian forces appear to be prioritizing advancing along the railway line in Novohrodivka toward Pokrovsk instead of fighting through the entire urban area of the settlement. The comparatively rapid Russian advance into Novohrodivka over the past 24 hours is likely in part enabled by apparent Ukrainian withdrawals from Novohrodivka. Russian forces in theory could advance with relative ease through Novohrodivka despite its relative urban build-up if there are no Ukrainian defenders receiving their advances. ISW previously assessed that it would take Russian forces longer to seize Novohrodivka, but that assessment has been proven as incorrect and was premised on Ukrainian forces maintaining a positional defense within the urbanized areas of Novohrodivka—which does not appear to currently be the case.[6] Urbanized areas without sufficient defending forces are not inherent battlefield obstacles, and the Ukrainian command likely deemed that defending Novohrodivka was not worth the potential losses. Novohrodivka is not an operationally significant town in isolation—its potential capture would in theory open the road to Pokrovsk (Russia's articulated operational objective on this sector of the front), but Pokrovsk is larger, more fortified, and ultimately more significant than Novohrodivka due to its central position as a key logistics node in western Donetsk Oblast, and Ukrainian forces are unlikely to withdraw from Pokrovsk without defending the city.[7] The Russian military command will likely be forced to expend significant manpower and materiel in order to seize the more defendable and significant town of Pokrovsk if the Ukrainian military command chooses to reinforce this direction. Advancing Russian forces are therefore unlikely to be able to sustain the current rate of gains indefinitely, especially if they begin assaults on Pokrovsk itself.
Russia's most combat-capable troops are currently sustaining Russian advances towards Pokrovsk, and Russia's offensive operations are emblematic of the wider Russian theory of victory in Ukraine, premised on seemingly indefinite grinding tactical advances. Russia's continuous and complete prioritization of the Pokrovsk direction will likely impact Russia's overall combat capabilities in Ukraine in the aftermath of any Pokrovsk scenario, especially as the Kremlin tries to balance gains in Pokrovsk with defending against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated during a press conference on August 27 that one of Ukraine's main goals in launching the Kursk incursion was to divert Russian forces from critical areas of the front, and that Russia anticipated this goal and is instead concentrating its main efforts and strengthening its presence in the Pokrovsk direction.[8] Syrskyi also reported that Russia has redeployed over 30,000 troops from other unspecified sectors of the frontline in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and forecasted that this number will continue to grow while noting that Russia is simultaneously intensifying its efforts in the Pokrovsk direction. Syrskyi's observations cohere with ISW's current assessment that the Russian military command continues to prioritize the Pokrovsk front over pushing Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. ISW has previously noted that ISW has not observed evidence of Russia redeploying units currently engaged near Pokrovsk to Kursk Oblast but has observed evidence of Russia instead deploying reserve units and units from non-critical sectors of the front, which likely accounts for the bulk of the 30,000 troops redeployed to Kursk Oblast that Syrskyi noted.[9] Syrskyi's statements suggest that the Russian military command remains unwilling to redeploy troops currently fighting near Pokrovsk and will continue to prioritize using these relatively more combat-capable troops to secure tactical gains and maintain the initiative in Donetsk Oblast. The apparent continued Russian prioritization of territorial gains near Pokrovsk is consistent with Russian President Vladimir Putin's articulated theory of victory in Ukraine, which assumes that Russian forces maintain the initiative and pursue a constant grinding war of attrition to outlast Ukraine and Ukraine's partners.
The Russian offensive effort around Pokrovsk will eventually culminate, although the timeline for which Russian forces will reach culmination remains unclear. ISW is not prepared to forecast an imminent culmination, especially as Russian forces escalate the rate of advances in this area and Ukrainian forces retreat to prepared defensive positions west of Hrodivka that in principle should be more advantageous to defend. The redeployment of 30,000 Russian troops to Kursk Oblast could eventually degrade Russian capabilities in the Ukrainian theater writ large, however, following the culmination of the Pokrovsk offensive. ISW has previously assessed that Ukraine's operations in Kursk Oblast have already had theater-wide operational and strategic effects on Russian forces, and Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has challenged Putin's theory of victory by seizing the initiative in a new area of operations while degrading Russia's ability to maintain the long-term initiative in certain sectors of the front within Ukraine.[10] The Russian command is clearly currently prioritizing Pokrovsk, but that calculus will likely change depending on when Russian forces culminate in the area, and the command will eventually need to fully reckon with reorienting its priorities to repelling Ukrainian troops from Kursk Oblast. Russian forces have notably advanced fewer than 10 km west of Bakhmut following Russia’s pyrrhic seizure of Bakhmut in May 2023 and Russian forces that expend themselves in the Pokrovsk direction may face similar exhaustion following their culmination. ISW maintains that it is too early to draw definitive conclusions on the long-term effects of the Kursk operation but offers an assessment of the implications of Syrskyi's statements to provide an analysis of how and to what effect Russian battlefield priorities may impact their future offensive capacity.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast was in part an effort to preempt a Russian offensive operation into Sumy or Chernihiv oblasts and noted that the incursion is an aspect of Ukraine's wider efforts to achieve a just and lasting diplomatic solution to the war based on the principles of international law and the inviolability of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Zelensky stated on August 27 that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast stalled Russia's ongoing offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and preempted an apparent Russian plan to conduct cross-border attacks into either Sumy or Chernihiv oblasts.[11] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have defeated a large number of Russian troops during the incursion into Kursk Oblast. Zelensky added that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast is one aspect of Ukraine's plan to resolve the war and that Ukraine's plan also includes aspects of "Ukraine's strategic place in the global security architecture," "powerful coercion" against Russia, and unspecific economic policies aimed at bringing Russia to the negotiating table. Zelensky stated that he will present Ukraine's plan to US policymakers in September 2024. Pentagon Spokesperson Major General Patrick Ryder reiterated US support for the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast during a press conference on August 26 and noted that Ukraine has the right to conduct its own operations and hold its own calculus regarding the incursion.[12]
Ukrainian forces reportedly attempted to advance into two areas of Belgorod Oblast on August 27 amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed on August 27 that Russian authorities restricted access to Vyazovoye (less than two kilometers from the Sumy Oblast border and northwest of Grayvoron) due to an unspecified "difficult operational situation" in the area and later claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to cross the international border into Belgorod Oblast.[13] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also repelled several Ukrainian attacks near Nekhoteevka and Zhuravlyovka (both southeast of Grayvoron and south of Belgorod City), although Russian sources issued competing claims about the size of these attacks.[14] Select Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked near the Shebekino border checkpoint (south of Belgorod City), which is currently behind ISW's assessed Russian forward line of owned troops (FLOT) in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[15] Geolocated footage published on August 26 and 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces continue to operate immediately southeast of Korenevo and near Viktorovka (south of Koreveno); near Sudzha; and north of Sudzha within Cherkasskoye Porechnoye and Mikhailovka.[16] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces re-took Nizhnyaya Parovaya and Nechayev (both northeast of Sudzha) in Bolshesoldatsky Raion, suggesting that Ukrainian forces were recently operating in the area.[17] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces, possibly elements of the 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (a mobilized unit reportedly subordinated to the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), repelled several Ukrainian attacks near Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha) and are preparing defensive positions near a penal colony in the settlement.[18]
Russian officials attempted to use International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi's visit to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) to falsely portray Ukraine as threatening a radiological incident, likely to undermine Western support for Ukraine by stoking unfounded fears about Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. Grossi stated on X (formerly Twitter) on August 27 that the situation at the KNPP is "serious" and that "attacking any NPP is unacceptable, no matter the location."[19] Grossi reportedly stated that the KNPP is particularly vulnerable because its reactor has no containment vessel and is located in an "ordinary building," leaving it vulnerable to shelling or drone strikes.[20] Russian government-affiliated news outlets claimed that Grossi stated that he saw evidence of "nearby" combat operations including drones and drone debris.[21] Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom CEO Alexei Likhachev claimed that Russian authorities presented evidence of Ukrainian strikes against the KNPP and claimed that "there can be no ambiguity about who conducted these strikes."[22] Kremlin newswire TASS also purposefully misrepresented Grossi's previous statement about his plans to visit the KNPP, claiming that Grossi stated that Ukrainian forces' actions endangered the KNPP.[23] The IAEA acknowledged that Russia informed the IAEA that it found drone debris at the KNPP, but the IAEA did not provide any assessments from where the drone came or verifications of Russia's claim.[24] ISW previously noted that Ukrainian forces have consistently demonstrated capabilities to conduct rear area strikes within Russia and occupied Ukraine at distances exceeding the roughly 60 kilometers between the KNPP and the international border or the roughly 30-40 kilometers from the current Ukrainian FLOT within Kursk Oblast, suggesting that the Ukrainian military command has deliberatively avoided striking the KNPP.[25]
The Kremlin routinely attempts to portray Ukraine as endangering the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and extended this information operation to the KNPP shortly after Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.[26] Russian government-affiliated media has also purposefully misrepresented IAEA statements to cohere with Russian information operations aimed at portraying Ukraine as threatening the ZNPP and legitimizing Russia's occupation of the ZNPP.[27] The Kremlin likely also attempting to obfuscate its own routine endangerment of the Russian-occupied ZNPP - through its routine militarization of the ZNPP - by drawing focus onto Ukraine's alleged endangerment of the KNPP. Russian forces fired at the ZNPP during their seizure of the ZNPP in March 2022 and have since stored and operated military equipment within the territory of the plant.[28]
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized India's commitment to ending the war in Ukraine to Russian President Vladimir Putin following Modi's recent visit to Ukraine. In a call with Putin on August 27, Modi informed Putin about his visit to Ukraine on August 23 and emphasized India’s commitment to supporting a swift, abiding, and peaceful solution to the war.[29] The Kremlin’s readout reported that Putin provided Modi with a detailed assessment of the West’s and Ukrainian authorities’ “destructive” actions while outlining Russia’s approaches to the solution to the war.[30] The Indian government readouts did not emphasize Putin's accusations against the West and Ukraine, instead using neutral language focusing on bilateral relations. The two leaders also discussed the enhancement of economic ties and cooperation within the BRICS framework.[31] ISW previously reported on the importance of Modi’s visit to Ukraine and highlighted Modi’s emphasis on principles of international law in discussions of peace with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and assessed that enhanced Ukraine-India bilateral relations could indicate an inflection point in Indian foreign policy that has traditionally featured close relations with Russia.[32] Putin was likely hoping to further court Modi following Modi's visit to Russia in early July, and Modi's visit and positive impressions of Ukraine may be challenging Putin's perception of Indian-Russian relations.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on August 27 that Ukrainian forces used F-16 fighter jets to down missiles during Russia's most recent massive drone and missile strike against Ukraine.[33] Zelensky previously noted that Ukraine intended to use F-16s are part of a combined air defense and fighter aircraft system to protect Ukrainian positions and cities from Russian air, drone, and missile strikes.[34]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces have made significant tactical advances in the Pokrovsk direction amid reports that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from select areas southeast of Pokrovsk.
- Russia's most combat-capable troops are currently sustaining Russian advances towards Pokrovsk, and Russia's offensive operations are emblematic of the wider Russian theory of victory in Ukraine, premised on seemingly indefinite grinding tactical advances. Russia's continuous and complete prioritization of the Pokrovsk direction will likely impact Russia's overall combat capabilities in Ukraine in the aftermath of any Pokrovsk scenario, especially as the Kremlin tries to balance gains in Pokrovsk with defending against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast was in part an effort to preempt a Russian offensive operation into Sumy or Chernihiv oblasts and noted that the incursion is an aspect of Ukraine's wider efforts to achieve a just and lasting diplomatic solution to the war based on the principles of international law and the inviolability of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly attempted to advance into two areas of Belgorod Oblast on August 27 amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast.
- Russian officials attempted to use International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi's visit to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) to falsely portray Ukraine as threatening a radiological incident, likely to undermine Western support for Ukraine by stoking unfounded fears about Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized India's commitment to ending the war in Ukraine to Russian President Vladimir Putin following Modi's recent visit to Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
- The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has reportedly heightened willingness among Russian citizens to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 26, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, and George Barros
August 26, 2024, 7:30pm ET
Russia conducted one of the largest combined series of drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure to date on August 26. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched three Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missiles from Ryazan and Lipetsk oblasts; six Iskander-M or North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts and occupied Crimea; 77 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers from Volgograd Oblast and the Caspian Sea; 28 Kalibr cruise missiles from both surface and underwater missile carriers in the eastern Black Sea; three Kh-22 cruise missiles from Voronezh Oblast; 10 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from an unspecified number of Su-57 fighter aircraft and Su-34 fighter-bombers in airspace over Belgorod Oblast and occupied Mariupol; and 109 Shahed drones from Yeysk and Primorsk-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, Kursk Oblast, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] Oleshchuk noted that Ukrainian forces shot down one Kh-47 "Kinzhal," one Iskander-M, one Kh-22, 99 total Kh-101s, Kalibrs, and Kh-59s, and 99 Shaheds, and that an unspecified number of Shaheds missed their targets and crashed elsewhere in Ukraine, while two more crossed into Belarusian airspace. Polish Armed Forces Commander Major General Maciej Klisz noted that at least one drone temporarily crossed into Polish airspace during the Russian strike series.[2] The massive Russian strike series damaged objects in 15 Ukrainian oblasts, largely targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure and causing significant damage to Ukraine's energy grid.[3] Geolocated footage published on August 26 shows the aftermath of a likely Russian missile strike against the Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) dam in Vyshhorod (just north of Kyiv City), although Kyiv Oblast Head Ruslan Kravchenko noted that the strike on the dam did not cause significant damage to Kyiv HPP infrastructure.[4] Ukrainian officials reported additional damage to critical infrastructure and energy disruptions as a result of Russian strikes in Lviv, Odesa, Volyn, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[5]
Russian milbloggers largely responded gleefully to the August 26 strikes, framing them as a Russian "retaliation" for Ukraine's offensive into Kursk Oblast.[6] One milblogger noted, however, that such massive and devastating strikes should not be a one-off, calling for Russian military commanders to conduct such strikes on a regular basis to accomplish strategic and systemic impacts of Ukraine -- echoing similar milblogger calls for sustained Russian strike series following larger strikes targeting Ukrainian infrastructure.[7] Russia likely lacks the defense-industrial capacity to sustain such massive strikes at a similar scale with regularity, but Ukrainian officials emphasized that this strike series shows the exigent need for Ukraine to receive more air defense systems from its partners, and for Ukraine's partners to remove limitations on Ukraine's ability to conduct long-range strikes into Russia with Western provided weapons.[8] ISW recently assessed that there are at least 250 military and paramilitary objects in Russia within range of US-provided ATACMS missiles, which US policy prevents Ukraine from using to strike inside of Russia.[9]
Ukraine issued a warning to Belarus amid the recent buildup of Belarusian forces at the Ukrainian border in Belarus' Gomel Oblast. Ukrainian intelligence services reported on August 25 that Belarus amassed forces in Gomel Oblast (which shares a border with northern Ukraine) and has deployed a significant number of personnel, including special operations forces (likely in reference to Spetsnaz units), weapons, military equipment, and fighters from the former Wagner Group.[10] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reported on August 25 that the Belarusian forces deployed under the pretext of a military exercise near the border with Ukraine and are particularly close to the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, which raises security concerns for Ukraine.[11] A Belarusian milblogger claimed on August 25 that the Ukrainian reports were correct and confirmed that Belarusian forces are amassing at the border.[12] The Ukrainian MFA urged Belarus to withdraw its troops from the border and warned that any violation of the Ukrainian state border would prompt Ukraine to take necessary defensive measures in accordance with international law.[13] The Ukrainian MFA also cautioned Belarus against succumbing to Russian pressure and supporting Russia’s war efforts against Ukraine. Ukraine's State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko announced on August 26 that Ukrainian forces are fortifying the border area with Belarus in response.[14]
The current Belarusian build-up along the Ukrainian border is likely intended to divert and stretch Ukrainian forces along a wider frontline, as ISW continues to assess that Belarusian forces remain unlikely to invade Ukraine due to constraints facing Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. An analysis by Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight and Rochan Consulting suggests that Belarusian combat units typically operate at only 30 to 40 percent of their total end strength and rely on mobilization to staff units, indicating that serious preparations for a major Belarusian invasion of Ukraine would be more apparent as Belarus has not announced general mobilization.[15] The Fronttelligence investigation stated the scale of a hypothetical Belarusian attack into Ukraine would likely be limited and suggested that the Belarusian forces could be conducting this operation to distract Ukrainian forces from their efforts elsewhere along the frontline, consequently supporting Russian forces committed throughout Ukraine and Kursk Oblast. Andriy Demchenko reported on August 26 that the current number of Russian forces in Belarus is insufficient for a significant coordinated invasion of Ukraine from the Gomel Oblast border.[16] A Belarusian invasion of Ukraine, or even Belarus' military involvement in the war, would degrade Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko‘s ability to defend his regime (and be very unpopular domestically), and ISW has previously assessed that Lukashenko is extremely unlikely to risk combat with Ukraine that could weaken his regime or drastically increase Belarusian domestic discontent.[17] Belarusian presidential elections are approaching in February 2025, and Lukashenko likely desires to retain control over public sentiment, as well as access to his military to crack down on any protests surrounding the elections, as he did in late 2020. Lukashenko leveraged his military to crack down against previous mass protests against Lukashenko's staged presidential elections in 2020, and a loss of capabilities among the Belarusian military that could result from combat operations in Ukraine would degrade Lukashenko’s ability to crush future protests. Lukashenko likely also seeks to avoid being dragged into Russia’s war with Ukraine to avoid the domestic political costs that such involvement would incur. Possible Belarusian mobilization expected battlefield casualties, Belarus’ further international isolation, and negative economic ramifications would likely increase public discontent and undo Lukashenko’s efforts to restore his regime’s stability since 2020. Additionally, Lukashenko has worked to maintain some level of Belarusian autonomy and sovereignty vis-a-vis Russia while portraying Belarus as Russia‘s equal partner in order to safeguard his power from the Kremlin’s increased desire to subordinate Belarus to Moscow through the Union State.[18] Belarus directly joining Russia’s war would indicate that Moscow has succeeded in eliminating Lukashenko’s maneuvering space and established suzerainty over Belarus. ISW has previously observed Belarus deploy personnel to the Ukrainian border at the end of 2022 and early 2023 in a similar manner to current deployments and assessed that these efforts served primarily to stretch Ukrainian forces along the theater of war and disrupt their operations thereby supporting Russian operations.[19] Belarus may be once again conducting such activity to fix Ukraine’s limited forces near Ukraine’s international border with Belarus in support of a Russian campaign design that seeks to stretch Ukrainian forces thin throughout the theater. Belarus’ support of Russian efforts is a strong indicator of the extent to which the Kremlin has been consolidating its control over Belarus since 2020.
Ukrainian forces reportedly attempted to strike Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast and an oil refinery in Yaroslavl Oblast with drones on the morning of August 26. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 26 that Russian forces intercepted nine drones over Saratov Oblast, three over Kursk Oblast, two each over Belgorod, Bryansk, and Tula oblasts, and one each over Oryol and Ryazan oblasts on the night of August 25 to 26.[20] Geolocated footage published on August 26 shows a fixed-wing drone striking a building in Saratov City.[21] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed all of the drones near Saratov City and Engels (just across the Volga River southeast of Saratov City), but that falling drone debris damaged infrastructure in both cities.[22] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated source speculated that Ukrainian forces attempted to strike the Engels Air Base, which Ukrainian forces have struck previously - most recently in March and April 2024.[23] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Yevrayev claimed on August 26 that Russian forces shot down a drone attempting to strike an oil refinery in Yaroslavl City.[24] Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed that Russian forces destroyed three Ukrainian drones over Oryol Oblast on the morning of August 26.[25] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed that Russian forces downed several drones over Yelansky Raion but that falling drone debris damaged several buildings.[26] ISW has not observed any official Ukrainian sources commenting on the strikes.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations within their salient in Kursk Oblast on August 26, but neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made any significant confirmed or claimed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Komarovka (southwest of Korenevo).[27] Several Russian sources claimed on August 26 that fighting is ongoing in Olgovka and Kremyanoye (both east of Korenevo) despite claims on August 25 that Russian forces had recaptured these settlements.[28] One Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces previously seized Matveevka (east of Korenevo), although ISW has not observed other Russian or Ukrainian sources making a similar claim within the past several days.[29] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing near Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha), although one Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are advancing in the area.[30] Geolocated footage published on August 26 shows Ukrainian forces operating just west of Nechayev (northeast of Sudzha), and Russian claims of fighting near the settlement also indicate that Ukrainian forces continue operating near Nechayev.[31] Geolocated footage published on August 25 shows Ukrainian forces operating in Borki (southeast of Sudzha), and Russian sources claimed on August 26 that fighting is ongoing near the settlement.[32] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly counterattacking in the Plekhovo-Borki-Spalnoye area (south to southeast of Sudzha).[33] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade are operating in Kursk Oblast, which ISW most recently observed operating in the Kharkiv direction.[34]
The Kremlin may be leveraging the leadership of the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to set cultivate increased Russian influence in Iraq. The Rybar channel claimed on August 26 that members of the Rybar team – likely including its founder Mikhail Zvinchuk - met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on August 25 in Baghdad, marking the team's first engagement with a current leader of a foreign country.[35] Rybar claimed that al Sudani emphasized the importance of allowing foreign journalists to report from Iraq to boost Iraq's global image, and Rybar assessed that Iraqi officials understand the importance of Telegram in the "modern information war" given that they are inviting Russian media representatives to the country. Members of the Rybar team also claimed on August 25 that they met with former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and argued that Russia should pursue cooperation with Iraq and other countries in the Middle East and the "Global South."[36] This is the first time ISW has observed reports of a Russian milblogger meeting with a senior foreign official. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there.[37] An increased Kremlin-affiliated media presence in Iraq may be part of a Russian effort to deepen non-security related relations with Iraq as Russia is likely wary of complex Iran-Iraq relations, given Russia's increasing alignment with Iran. Russia has continued efforts to court Iranian-backed proxies within Iraq, notably.[38]
Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko was reportedly in charge of a Kremlin think tank that tried and failed to establish rhetorical justifications for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine after the fact, underscoring the Kremlin's rhetorical failures in the first months of the war and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued prioritization of loyalty over competency in officials. Russian-language opposition outlet Meduza reported on August 26 that Kiriyenko established and appointed political strategists to the Expert Institute for Social Research (EISI), a think tank that was supposed to take responsibility for the Kremlin's informational justifications for the Kremlin’s political decisions and establish the "image of the future" of Russia, in 2017 but that EISI has largely failed in this mission.[39] Meduza assessed that EISI instead managed to eliminate challengers to Putin's regime, monitor alleged "stability" amid regional elections, and praise Putin.[40] Meduza cited several sources affiliated with the Russian presidential administration and noted that creating EISI was not Kiriyenko's "idea" but a precedent set by then-Presidential Administration first deputy heads Vladislav Surkov and Vyacheslav Volodin, who each established separate think tanks responsible for the Kremlin's "public and private" political "steps."[41] Meduza noted that the EISI did not have advance notice for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and had to develop informational justifications for the invasion after the Kremlin realized it could not rapidly conquer Ukraine.[42] Meduza's sources claimed that Russians failed to understand Russian President Vladimir Putin's concepts of "denazification" and "demilitarization."[43] Meduza reported that the EISI did develop rhetorical lines to justify the war, including portraying the war as Russia's struggle against Western colonialism, framing Russia as "fated" to lead a coalition of several "friendly" states, and Russia as the "guardian" of "correct" European culture and values – but Meduza's sources stated that the EISI realized it was "impossible" to completely justify the war, much less incorporate the war into EISI's vision for Russia's future.[44] ISW is unable to confirm this report, but if true, this Kremlin messaging failure coheres with ISW's observations about Russian information operations and Kremlin information space incompetence throughout the war. The Kremlin largely failed to establish coherent messaging about the war in Ukraine in 2022 and throughout much of 2023, and Putin has prioritized leaders who are personally loyal to Putin over those who are competent.[45] Kiriyenko has a prominent role in Kremlin information operations and oversees Kremlin information operations to undermine support for Ukraine and NATO outside of EISI, so it is feasible that Kiriyenko has prioritized these other efforts over rehabilitating EISI following the onset of the full-scale invasion.[46]
Key Takeaways:
- Russia conducted one of the largest combined series of drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure to date on August 26.
- Ukraine issued a warning to Belarus amid the recent buildup of Belarusian forces at the Ukrainian border in Belarus' Gomel Oblast.
- The current Belarusian build-up along the Ukrainian border is likely intended to divert and stretch Ukrainian forces along a wider frontline, as ISW continues to assess that Belarusian forces remain unlikely to invade Ukraine due to constraints facing Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly attempted to strike Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast and an oil refinery in Yaroslavl Oblast with drones on the morning of August 26.
- Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations within their salient in Kursk Oblast on August 26, but neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made any significant confirmed or claimed advances.
- The Kremlin may be leveraging the leadership of the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to set cultivate increased Russian influence in Iraq.
- Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko was reportedly in charge of a Kremlin think tank that tried and failed to establish rhetorical justifications for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine after the fact, underscoring the Kremlin's rhetorical failures in the first months of the war and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued prioritization of loyalty over competency in officials.
- Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City, north of Chasiv Yar, southeast of Pokrovsk, and west of Donetsk City.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to recruit foreigners to fight with the Russian military in Ukraine.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 24, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros
August 25, 2024, 5:35pm ET
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid reports of continued Ukrainian attacks in the area on August 25. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 25 that Russian forces regained lost positions in Komarovka (southwest of Korenevo) and are repelling small Ukrainian attacks in the area.[1] Several Russian milbloggers claimed on August 25 that Russian forces recaptured Olgovka and Kremyanoye (both east of Korenevo) and that Russian forces are advancing west of Kremyanoye.[2] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still control Kremyanoye, however.[3] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces encircled elements of the Russian 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha) and that elements of either the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) or 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Troops) broke through the Ukrainian encirclement and allowed the personnel of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division to withdraw.[4] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues within Malaya Loknya, although fighting in the settlement does not preclude Ukrainian forces from operating deeper into Kursk Oblast in the area.[5] Russian forces likely continue to operate within select areas of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast as Ukrainian forces likely do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov similarly claimed on August 25 that elements of the Russian 14th Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) successfully evacuated 51 conscripts from combat near Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha).[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking near Russkoye Porechnoye, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, and Martynovka (all northeast of Sudzha).[7] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Russian forces retook and cleared Spalnoye (southeast of Sudzha), following similar claims from August 23 that Russian forces retook the settlement.[8] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the direction of Borki and Spalnoye on August 25.[9] Russian opposition outlets reported that conscripts of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) deployed from Ivanovo City - where the regiment's and division's garrison is located - to Kursk Oblast.[10]
The Russian military likely continues to redeploy forces from lower priority sectors of the frontline in Ukraine to the frontline in Kursk Oblast. Commanders of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD], 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) briefed Russian President Vladimir Putin on combat missions in Russian territories bordering Ukraine (likely referring to Kursk Oblast) on August 24.[11] Earlier in the day, Putin met with Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and Chief of the General Staff's Main Operations Directorate Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy to discuss the Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[12] ISW has observed elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, and 11th VDV Brigade fighting in Kursk Oblast and has observed evidence that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the 56th VDV Regiment from the Robotyne area in western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast.[13] ISW has not yet observed reports of elements of the 51st VDV Regiment fighting in Kursk Oblast, but the fact that the 51st VDV Regiment commander briefed Putin alongside the commanders of other units that have recently redeployed elements to Kursk Oblast suggests that the elements of the 51st VDV Regiment have also likely redeployed to the area. Elements of the 51st VDV Regiment have been fighting in the Siversk direction in recent months alongside other units of the 106th VDV Division.[14] Russia appears to have redeployed elements of the 810th and 155th naval infantry brigades from the frontline in northern Kharkiv Oblast and likely redeployed elements of the 11th VDV Brigade from the wider Chasiv Yar area.[15] The Russian military command is resisting operational pressures to redeploy forces away from its high priority offensive effort to seize Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast and will likely continue to draw forces from lower priority offensive operations elsewhere throughout the theater to defend in Kursk Oblast.[16]
French authorities arrested Telegram founder Pavel Durov on August 24, prompting concern among Russian ultranationalist milbloggers about their ability to report freely on the war in Ukraine. ISW has not observed any direct evidence indicating that Durov's arrest will affect Telegram operations in the near term, however. Western media reported citing sources in French law enforcement that French authorities arrested Durov (who has French citizenship) at the Le Bourget Airport near Paris as part of a preliminary investigation into multiple crimes involving inadequate Telegram moderation and lack of Telegram’s cooperation with law enforcement.[17] The Russian Embassy in France claimed that it immediately demanded that French authorities explain the reasons for Durov's arrest but that French authorities have not responded.[18] Russian milbloggers broadly reacted by expressing fear about their continued ability to communicate on Telegram, with some worried about Telegram's ability to continue operating without its head, while others expressed concern that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor will block domestic access to Telegram.[19] Some milbloggers advertised newly-created or existing pages on Kremlin-controlled social media site Vkontakte (VK) as an alternative method to access their war reporting if Telegram suddenly stopped functioning or if Roskomnadzor suddenly blocked Telegram.[20] The Kremlin has long sought to compel Durov and Telegram into complying with Russian censorship efforts and to strengthen its control over Russian ultranationalist milbloggers.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Durov were both in Baku, Azerbaijan on August 20, and Putin reportedly refused an invitation to meet with Durov for unspecified reasons.[22] Durov's arrest does not necessarily portend significant changes to Telegram's content moderation or access to Telegram in Russia and Ukraine, and ISW has not yet observed any changes in how Russian sources use Telegram to report on the war in Ukraine following Durov's arrest.
The potential loss of Telegram within Russia would further hamper Russian milbloggers' ability to speak relatively freely under the Putin regime. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers and other groups have routinely used Telegram to levy complaints about the Russian conduct of the war in Ukraine, Russian government policies, and even specific officials without being subject to direct censorship on Telegram.[23] Russian authorities have resorted to public arrests of prominent information space figures, quietly fostering a culture of self-censorship, and creating a group of Kremlin-loyal milbloggers to exert control over the ultranationalist information space on Telegram.[24] An exodus of Russian milbloggers and other groups from Telegram to VK would allow the Kremlin more direct control to censor such voices on the platform itself, as VK – though founded by Durov – is currently headed by Vladimir Kiriyenko, son of Presidential Office Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko.[25]
Russian milbloggers reacted to Durov's arrest by focusing on how Russian soldiers rely on ad-hoc communications, including Telegram, for organizing operations in Ukraine and called on the Russian military command to establish an adequate official communication system. Milbloggers widely characterized Telegram as the main alternative to official communications for Russian military personnel in Ukraine and argued that it is now vital for the Russian military command to establish an official communications system.[26] The Russian milbloggers could not agree, however, whether the Russian military command has already created such a centralized communications system and that it is just poorly implemented or if there is no such system.[27] Russian forces have broadly struggled with effective communications throughout the war. Russian milbloggers have previously described official communications systems as overcentralized to the point of inhibiting Russian indirect fire operations, and more recently Russian forces have failed to establish adequate command and control (C2) structures to support their offensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast and defense in Kursk Oblast.[28] Russian forces have largely compensated for this lack of adequate official communications by relying on their insecure personal devices to organize frontline C2, logistics, and combat operations, and the Kremlin has recently temporarily sought to criminalize Russian forces' use of these devices without offering a meaningful alternative.[29] The sudden uncertainty around Telegram's continued ability to operate within Russia and any falter in Telegram operations will likely impact Russian frontline operations, and if blocked completely, degrade these operations in the near term. Russian military Telegram users may start migrating from Telegram, anyway, out of fear of the system being compromised while Durov is under arrest, and Russian forces may start decoupling from Telegram communications even if Telegram’s operations are not ostensibly or actually impacted by Durov’s arrest.[30]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid reports of continued Ukrainian attacks in the area on August 25.
- The Russian military likely continues to redeploy forces from lower priority sectors of the frontline in Ukraine to the frontline in Kursk Oblast.
- French authorities arrested Telegram founder Pavel Durov on August 24, prompting concern among Russian ultranationalist milbloggers about their ability to report freely on the war in Ukraine. ISW has not observed any direct evidence indicating that Durov's arrest will affect Telegram operations in the near term, however.
- Russian milbloggers reacted to Durov's arrest by focusing on how Russian soldiers rely on ad-hoc communications, including Telegram, for organizing operations in Ukraine and called on the Russian military command to establish an adequate official communication system.
- Russian forces recently advanced near and within Toretsk and southwest of Donetsk City.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 24, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros
August 24, 2024, 8:20pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia’s rear are crucial for degrading Russian military capabilities throughout the theater, and the lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons would allow Ukrainian forces to strike a wide range of significant targets undergirding Russia’s war effort. An unnamed senior Biden administration national security official reportedly stated that Ukrainian strikes with Western-provided weapons against targets within Russia would not be effective because the Russian military has redeployed military aircraft from Russian airbases near Ukraine — but this assessment ignores how Russian forces are leveraging sanctuary space in deep rear areas within Russia for a wide array of infrastructure besides airfields to support military operations against Ukraine. Politico reported on August 23 that an unnamed senior Biden administration national security official stated that Russian officials have moved some targets out of range of Western-provided Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles and that Ukrainian forces only have a limited supply of these missiles.[1] An unnamed administration official also reportedly stated that Russian forces have moved 90 percent of the aircraft that conduct glide bomb strikes from Russian airspace away from airfields within range of Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles.[2] ISW has observed confirmation of redeployments of Russian aircraft to airfields out of range of Western-provided long-range weapons; and the reported decreased Russian aviation activity throughout the theater is consistent with reports that Russian forces have been redeploying aviation assets.[3]
The redeployment of Russian air assets from Russian air bases in range of ATACMS does not remove the utility of using ATACMS against other Russian military targets, however. ISW assesses that there are at least 250 military and paramilitary objects in Russia within range of ATACMS missiles that the United States has provided Ukraine. The United States currently prohibits Ukrainian forces from using ATACMS missiles to strike military targets in Russia, however, and only allows strikes using US-provided HIMARS equipped with GMLRS — at maximum permitting Ukraine to strike only 20 out of the 250 objects it could strike with ATACMS. Only 17 of these 250 objects are airfields, and it is unlikely that the Russian military has redeployed assets away from all the other 233 objects to the same degree as it has reportedly done with aviation assets.
US officials’ comments centered on Russia’s redeployment of air assets have so far largely ignored the majority of targets in range of ATACMS that Ukrainian forces could strike if US prohibitions were lifted. Many of the 233 military and paramilitary objects in range of ATACMS are large military bases, communications stations, logistics centers, repair facilities, fuel depots, ammunition warehouses, and permanent headquarters that would be extremely difficult or impossible to quickly redeploy assets from or rapidly harden. ISW has not collected open-source evidence of redeployments of military assets from the majority of Russia’s rear areas. The mass redeployment of assets away from such facilities would present significant challenges to Russian logistics throughout the theater, and open sources and US officials have not indicated that Russian forces have engaged in such logistical upheavals. Such disruptions to Russian logistics throughout the deep rear would have also constrained ongoing Russian offensive operations throughout the frontline, and ISW has not observed evidence of such widespread logistical constraints. The 233 Russian military and paramilitary objects within ranges of ATACMS missiles that are not airfields support Russian command and control (C2), intelligence, reconnaissance, logistical, and repair support for Russian forces fighting in Ukraine and in Kursk Oblast, and the assessment that there is no utility in granting Ukraine the ability to use ATACMS in Russia on the basis of limited redeployments of air assets from some airfields ignores these facilities. Any assessment that argues that there is no point in allowing Ukraine to strike targets in Russia on the exclusive basis of air asset redeployments is incomplete without also accounting for the hundreds of other facilities supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine and would thus be incorrect.
Ukrainian forces do not have to strike every single Russian military and paramilitary object in Russia within range of Western-provided weapons to start generating significant operational pressures on the Russian military. The lifting of the current Western restrictions would generate a serious Ukrainian long-range strike threat that would force a decision point on the Kremlin and likely prompt the Russian military command to significantly reconfigure assets throughout the deep rear to protect against Ukrainian strikes. Ukraine's successful use of HIMARS against Russian logistics, C2, and aviation facilities in occupied Ukraine in Summer and Fall 2022 eventually forced the Russian military to disperse many of these assets, causing disruptions to Russian operations throughout the theater and significantly contributing to Russia’s pace of advance grinding to a halt by late 2022.[4] Russian forces have since appeared adapted many of their logistics systems in occupied Ukraine to protect against Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities at the expense of sacrificing logistical efficiency in part by offloading many requirements to military and paramilitary facilities out of range of HIMARS and within sanctuary space in Russia.[5] Russia also deployed air defense and electronic warfare assets to protect vulnerable targets against Ukrainian precision fires, degrading the effectiveness of those fires. It is unlikely that Russian forces have been hardening all facilities in Russia against potential Ukrainian strikes or dispersing assets throughout the deep rear at scale without a pressing threat to do so. Persistent Ukrainian drone strikes into the Russian rear have threatened some of these facilities but not to the extent that would compel the Russian military command to consider the highly disruptive process of redeploying logistics and support systems at scale. Bringing Russia’s rear areas under threat would likely also prompt the Russian military command to make decisions about how to allocate its limited air defense and electronic warfare assets to protect a largest geographic area.
The Russian military could seek to avoid such redeployments in the event of lifted Western restrictions by heavily concentrating air defense and electronic warfare assets to protect military and paramilitary facilities in the rear, although it is not clear if Russian forces have the available air defense assets to do so. Ukraine's drone strike campaign against Russia has illustrated that many rear areas within Russia have poor air defense coverage or none at all.[6] Russian forces would likely have to redeploy air defense and electronic warfare assets from all over Russia as well as from the frontline in Ukraine to generate the necessary protection coverage for rear areas in Russia within range of Western-provided weapons, possibly setting conditions for Ukraine to scale up aviation operations of its own along the frontline. The lifting of the restrictions would therefore allow Ukraine to start striking significant Russian military targets while also immediately forcing a decision point on Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command about the allocation of limited air defense and electronic warfare assets and the configuration of Russian military logistics and support systems across the theater and the deep rear.
Recent successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian military targets within ATACMS range with Ukraine’s own domestically produced precision weapons demonstrate that Ukraine still has a requirement to conduct strikes that lifting the US restrictions could help fill. Ukrainian forces have been able to develop deep-strike capability throughout two and a half years of war primarily with long-range strike drones and partially with modified Neptune anti-ship missiles. Ukrainian strike campaigns with domestically-produced weapons pushed the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) out of the western Black Sea and most recently, Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries compelled the Kremlin to entertain negotiations for a possible moratorium against strikes on Ukraine's own energy infrastructure. Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian ammunition depot near Ostrogozhsk, Voronezh Oblast on August 24, sparking fires in the area and reportedly causing at least three explosions. [7] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that this large depot contained artillery and tank shells, small arms rounds, and surface-to-air missiles for the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (responsible for the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line).[8] This facility is within range of ATACMS fired from Ukrainian-controlled areas of Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on August 24 that Ukraine has produced and successfully fielded the "Palyanytsia missile-drone" for the first time, and Ukrainian Strategic Industries Minister Oleksandr Kamyshin stated that Ukrainian forces used this "missile-drone" to hit an unspecified Russian military facility in occupied Ukraine.[9] Ukrainian officials have not provided details on the drone's range or technical specifications but did confirm that this weapon meets the technical specifications of both a drone and missile, and Zelensky called it a "new class of weapon."[10]
Some US officials assess that the Russian military will likely need to redeploy significant forces from Ukraine and/or operational reserves to repel Ukrainian forces from Russian territory. The New York Times (NYT) reported on August 23 that unspecified US officials assess that Russia likely needs 15 to 20 brigades — at least 50,000 troops — to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast.[11] The US assess that the Russian military would likely need to redeploy significant elements from Ukraine or draw on operational reserves accumulated for its planned summer 2024 offensive effort to Kursk Oblast, or both, to successfully retake territory. ISW has already observed reports that the Russian military has redeployed elements of several Russian battalions, regiments, and brigades mostly from lower priority sectors of the frontline to Kursk Oblast.[12] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on August 17 that a source familiar with the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast stated that Russian forces have redeployed roughly 5,000 personnel from unspecified areas in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast by August 14 and assessed that Russian forces would likely need over 20,000 properly trained personnel to retake territory in the area.[13]
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations within their salient in Kursk Oblast on August 24, and neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made any significant claimed advances. Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured Borki (southeast of Sudzha), but a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that these reports are unconfirmed.[14] A milblogger claimed that fighting also continued southeast of Borki near Spalnoye, Krupets, and Kamyshnoye.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to bypass Korenevo by attacking near Olgovka and that Russian forces also repelled attacks near Komarovka (southwest of Korenevo) and Snagost.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are attacking near Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha) Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (northeast of Sudzha), and Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha).[17] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz, and likely elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 22nd Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly defending Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha) from Ukrainian assaults with small infantry groups and armored vehicle support.[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Kamyshevka (northeast of Malaya Loknya).[19]
Ukrainian open-source intelligence project Frontelligence Insight published satellite imagery on August 24 indicating that Russian forces are rapidly building field fortification defensive lines south and southwest of Kurchatov (west of Kursk City).[20] The satellite imagery captured on August 14 and 18 indicates that Russian forces rapidly developed and began reinforcing a trench line near Dolgiy (south of Kurchatov) between August 14 and 18.[21] Frontelligence Insight also reported that Russian forces may be extending these defensive lines into windbreaks that would conceal these defensive lines from view in satellite imagery.[22]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky commented on some of the objectives of the Ukrainian operation into Kursk Oblast on August 24. Zelensky characterized the Ukrainian operation into Kursk Oblast as a spoiling attack that successfully prevented Russian forces from attempting to encircle part of Sumy Oblast and seize Sumy City.[23] A Russian attack into Sumy Oblast would likely have been part of the ongoing Russian theater-wide attempt to stretch Ukrainian forces across the entire frontline to pressure overall weakened Ukrainian defenses.[24] Russian forces attempted to divert and fix Ukrainian forces by launching an offensive operation into Kharkiv Oblast on May 10 while maintaining the existing tempo of offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, and the Russian military may have assessed that opening a new front in Sumy Oblast would further weaken Ukrainian forces defending throughout the theater.[25] A Russian attack into Sumy Oblast would have allowed Russian forces to maintain the theater-wide initiative, would have forced the Ukrainian military to defend in an additional sector of the frontline, and could have forced the Ukrainian military command to reassess their defensive prioritization. Ukrainian forces instead conducted a spoiling attack into Kursk Oblast and seized the battlefield initiative in this sector of the frontline.[26]
Ukraine and Russia conducted their first prisoner of war (POW) exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian and Ukrainian sources announced on August 24 the 55th official POW exchange between the two countries since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[27] The United Arab Emirates mediated the exchange that reportedly occurred at a border checkpoint in Belarus, which saw Russia and Ukraine return 115 POWs each.[28] The Ukrainian POWs primarily included servicemembers who fought in Mariupol, while Russian milbloggers claimed that all the Russian POWs were conscripts that the Ukrainian forces captured during the recent Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[29]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia’s rear are crucial for degrading Russian military capabilities throughout the theater, and the lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons would allow Ukrainian forces to strike a wide range of significant targets undergirding Russia’s war effort.
- An unnamed senior Biden administration national security official reportedly stated that Ukrainian strikes with Western-provided weapons against targets within Russia would not be effective because the Russian military has redeployed military aircraft from Russian airbases near Ukraine — but this assessment ignores how Russian forces are leveraging sanctuary space in deep rear areas within Russia for a wide array of infrastructure besides airfields to support military operations against Ukraine.
- The redeployment of Russian air assets from Russian air bases in range of ATACMS does not remove the utility of using ATACMS against other Russian military targets, however.
- Ukrainian forces do not have to strike every single Russian military and paramilitary object in Russia within range of Western-provided weapons to start generating significant operational pressures on the Russian military.
- Recent successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian military targets within ATACMS range with Ukraine’s own domestically produced precision weapons demonstrate that Ukraine still has a requirement to conduct strikes that lifting the US restrictions could help fill.
- Some US officials assess that the Russian military will likely need to redeploy significant forces from Ukraine and/or operational reserves to repel Ukrainian forces from Russian territory.
- Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations within their salient in Kursk Oblast on August 24, and neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made any significant claimed advances.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky commented on some of the objectives of the Ukrainian operation into Kursk Oblast on August 24.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted their first prisoner of war (POW) exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
- Kursk Oblast officials announced the creation of the BARS-Kursk volunteer detachment on August 24 and stated that the detachment will fight solely within Kursk Oblast.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 23, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, George Barros
August 23, 2024, 7:05pm ET
Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance near Sudzha amid continued Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast on August 23. Geolocated footage published on August 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced further in southern Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha).[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced north of Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha) along the Sudzha-Sukhodolovka R-200 highway.[2] Russian sources claimed that there are conflicting reports about fighting east of Sudzha near Samoryadovo and Kozyrevka, but that Ukrainian mobile groups may be operating in the area.[3] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces re-took Spalnoye and Krupets (both southeast of Sudzha), although the situation in the area remains unclear.[4] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a platoon-sized Ukrainian mechanized assault near Aleksandrovka (northeast of Korenevo).[5] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces re-took positions west of Korenevo on August 23, suggesting that Ukrainian forces were recently operating west of the settlement.[6] Russian sources claimed that fighting continued throughout the line of contact in Kursk Oblast on August 22 and 23.[7]
Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated on August 22 that the US is gaining "a better understanding" of Ukraine's goals in Kursk Oblast and noted that Ukraine wants to create a buffer zone in Kursk Oblast.[8] Singh stated that the US is still working to determine how the buffer zone fits into Ukraine's strategic objectives and that the US continues to provide materiel to support Ukraine's battlefield needs. Singh clarified that current US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian border areas allows Ukrainian forces to engage in counterfire while defending against Russian attacks across the international border, including in Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian officials continue to highlight how Ukrainian forces can leverage tactical and technological advantages to offset Russian materiel advantages. Ukrainian First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated in an interview with Ukrainian outlet Ukrinform published on August 23 that the Ukrainian military has been able to inflict heavy losses against significantly larger quantities of Russian armored vehicles, artillery, and other equipment due to Ukrainian tactics and Ukraine's effective use of available weapons.[9] Havrylyuk stated that Ukrainian forces have destroyed over 8,500 Russian tanks, 17,000 artillery systems, 1,000 air defense systems, about 370 aircraft, and 2,500 cruise missiles since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.[10] ISW cannot confirm these figures, however. Havrylyuk stated that Russian forces have fired roughly 300,000 artillery shells throughout the theater each month on average and aimed to overwhelm Ukrainian forces with Russia's large artillery advantage.[11] Havrylyuk stated that more precise (and effective) Western artillery systems can offset these advantages as long as Russian forces do not have an artillery advantage greater than three-to-one.[12] Ukrainian forces have leveraged GMLRS rocket artillery and NATO 155mm artillery systems and ammunition capable of striking targets at longer ranges than Russian / Soviet field artillery to conduct superior counterbattery fire throughout the war in Ukraine.[13] Havrylyuk added that Ukrainian artillery units also use tactics that provide greater mobility than Russian artillery units and therefore conduct more effective counterbattery fire.[14] Havrylyuk noted that Ukraine's rapidly growing use of unmanned systems is another example of how Ukrainian forces can reduce costs while inflicting high losses on Russian forces and that increased Ukrainian drone use in 2024 has led to higher Russian artillery and armored vehicle losses.[15] Havrylyuk stated that long-range precision strikes into Russia would allow Ukraine to prevent Russia from transferring larger quantities of ammunition and equipment to the frontline and that strikes against military bases, arsenals, and logistic routes within Russia would heavily degrade Russian artillery advantages.[16] Western self-imposed restrictions on military aid provisions to Ukraine and policies restricting Ukrainian long-range strikes against military targets within Russia are constraining Ukrainian capabilities to degrade Russian materiel advantages.[17]
US President Joe Biden announced a new military assistance package for Ukraine following a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on August 23.[18] The package is valued at $125 million and includes: Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) equipment and munitions; ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition and additional ammunition for small arms and demolitions; Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; medical and mine-clearing equipment; and additional materiel and training services.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted another drone strike against the oil depot in Proletarsk, Rostov Oblast on August 23. Russian opposition media reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the oil depot at about 0500 on August 23, following a strike against the depot on August 18 that caused a fire that Russian authorities have been battling since August 18.[19] Satellite imagery captured on August 22 of the Marinovka airbase in Volgograd Oblast shows that the Ukrainian strike on August 22 may have destroyed at least one Russian Su-24 or Su-34 fighter aircraft parked at the base, and additional imagery shows that several Russian fighter jets parked in the hangars also sustained damage.[20] An aviation-focused Russian milblogger claimed on August 22 that the light hangars at the Marinovka base did not protect Russian aircraft and called for Russian authorities to build reinforced concrete hangars wherever possible and only build light hangars when they cannot build stronger structures.[21]
Islamic State (IS)-affiliated inmates took prison employees and other inmates hostage at a penal colony in Surovikino, Volgograd Oblast, Russia, on August 23. Four inmates took eight employees and four other inmates of the IK-19 prison hostage.[22] The hostage-takers displayed an ISIS flag during the attack.[23] The attackers stated that they were taking revenge "for their Muslim brothers" whom Russian authorities detained in connection with the March 2024 terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall.[24] The attackers inflicted stab wounds upon four of the employees, three of whom died, and four other hostages were hospitalized, one of whom later died.[25] Rosgvardia snipers reportedly killed the four hostage-takers.[26] Two of the attackers were citizens of Uzbekistan and two were from Tajikistan.[27] Three of the attackers were imprisoned for drug trafficking and one was convicted for beating a man to death during a fight. Russian sources claimed that one of the attackers wore a suicide vest but disagreed on what happened, with some sources claiming that the vest malfunctioned and others claiming that Russian forces killed the attacker before he could activate the vest.[28] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii stated that locals in the Kalmykia Republic and Volgograd and Rostov oblasts reported problems accessing Telegram, WhatsApp, and Viber shortly after the start of the attack and that Russian authorities likely blocked the messenger platforms.[29] Russian President Vladimir Putin convened a meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council on August 23 during the hostage situation and heard reports from Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Federal Security Service Head Alexander Bortnikov, and Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov.[30] Mufti of the Volgograd Oblast Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims Bat Kifah stated that Russian authorities should not negotiate with the hostage-takers, but kill them and should punish those who allowed the "negligence" in penal colonies.[31] Acting Chairperson of the Russian Spiritual Directorate of Muslims Mufti Damir Mukhetdinov stated that the organization disagreed with the attackers' actions and that the hostage-takers may have been inspired from abroad in order to discredit Russia's strengthening relations with Muslim states.[32]
Russian milbloggers reacted to the hostage crisis with criticisms of the Russian prison system and migration policy. Russian milbloggers claimed that the IK-19 prison is known for bribes, with some of the prison employees reportedly selling knives to inmates.[33] Russian sources complained that prisoners are becoming radicalized within Russian penal colonies and claimed that this problem has increased since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the mobilization of prisoners to fight in Ukraine, and alleged increased flows of previously convicted Central Asian migrants to Russia.[34] Russian milbloggers called for the Russian government to take action to resolve these issues, including by reforming Russia's prison system.[35] The Volgograd Oblast Prosecutor's Office stated that it organized inspections of the IK-19 prison to ensure its compliance with its personnel's safety, taking measures to prevent inmates from using prohibited items, and other laws and regulations.[36] Six reportedly IS-affiliated inmates at a pretrial detention center in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast similarly took two employees of the pretrial detention center hostage in June 2024, evoking similar criticisms from Russian milbloggers about Russian authorities' failure to crack down on extremist groups and maintain security in penal colonies.[37] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has attempted to posture that it has been cracking down against domestic extremism since the Crocus City Hall attack, but the prison hostage crises undermine this Kremlin effort.[38]
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reaffirmed India's support for peace in Ukraine on the basis of India's participation in Ukraine's July 2024 peace summit and signed several bilateral cooperation agreements during a visit to Ukraine. Modi arrived in Kyiv on August 23 following his visit to Poland on August 21, marking the first time an Indian prime minister has visited Ukraine since the establishment of bilateral relations in 1992.[39] Modi and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky issued a joint statement emphasizing their commitment to ensuring a "just and lasting peace in Ukraine" based on principles of international law such as “respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of states.”[40] This statement contrasts with Modi’s previous and more general calls for peace and diplomacy during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in July 2024.[41] The Ukrainian side emphasized that the Joint Communique on the Foundation of Peace established at the June 2024 peace summit can serve as a guiding framework for setting the terms of a peace deal, although India has not signed the document despite its participation in June 2024.[42] Modi and Zelensky also signed four bilateral cooperation agreements in agriculture, economics, development, and culture.[43] Modi and Zelensky agreed to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation, particularly in manufacturing, and to hold a second Joint Ukrainian-Indian Working Group meeting on military-technical cooperation in the near future.[44] Modi’s visit to Ukraine marks a significant political inflection in India’s foreign policy towards Ukraine and may indicate an Indian effort to take a stronger pro-Ukraine position than New Delhi has before, despite India’s historical close and longstanding relationship with Moscow.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance near Sudzha amid continued Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast on August 23.
- Ukrainian officials continue to highlight how Ukrainian forces can leverage tactical and technological advantages to offset Russian materiel advantages.
- US President Joe Biden announced a new military assistance package for Ukraine following a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on August 23.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted another drone strike against the oil depot in Proletarsk, Rostov Oblast on August 23.
- Islamic State (IS)-affiliated inmates took prison employees and other inmates hostage at a penal colony in Surovikino, Volgograd Oblast on August 23.
- Russian milbloggers reacted to the hostage crisis with criticisms of the Russian prison system and migration policy.
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reaffirmed India's support for peace in Ukraine on the basis of India's participation in Ukraine's July 2024 peace summit and signed several bilateral cooperation agreements during a visit to Ukraine.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
- Russian authorities continue efforts to leverage conscripts to free up manpower elsewhere for combat operations in Ukraine.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 22, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Frederick W. Kagan
August 22, 2024, 9:30pm ET
The Russian military command recently redeployed elements of at least one Russian airborne (VDV) regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast in response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast, possibly in an effort to stabilize the lines and improve command and control (C2) over Russian conscripts. A Crimean occupation official, who had volunteered to fight as part of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), claimed on August 19 that his platoon redeployed from the Robotyne and Verbove area in western Zaporizhia Oblast to “defend” Kursk Oblast.[1] A Russian relative also claimed on Telegram that elements of the 1st Assault Company (56th VDV Regiment) began redeploying to unspecified area in Russia on August 15, and a Russian VDV-affiliated Telegram channel announced a crowdfunding effort on August 17 in support of elements of the 56th VDV Regiment that were reportedly already in Kursk Oblast.[2] Elements of the 56th VDV Regiment have been operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast since at least Summer 2023.[3] ISW has also observed proprietary, commercially-available data appearing to support reports of these redeployments. The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind posted footage on August 22 of Russian military trucks reportedly transferring a “large amount of military equipment” from occupied Sevastopol and Perevalne, Crimea in the “northern direction.”[4] OSINT analysts on X (formerly Twitter) observed tactical insignia on the trucks seen in Crimean Wind’s footage that reportedly belongs to the 56th VDV Regiment and analyzed other footage of Russian military equipment and trucks moving through Voronezh Oblast towards Kursk Oblast.[5] A Russian milblogger also claimed on August 22 that elements of the 56th VDV “Brigade” were operating in Russkaya Konopelka (just east of Sudzha and 12km from the international border) alongside former Wagner Group elements before editing the post to claim that elements of the 11th VDV Brigade were operating in the area.[6] Russian sources recently amplified footage purportedly showing elements of the 11th VDV Brigade allegedly leading conscripts out of an encirclement in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast, and ISW observed elements of the 11th VDV Brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction in early July 2024.[7]
The scale of the redeployment of the 56th VDV Regiment is unclear from available information in the open source, although this reported redeployment is consistent with ISW’s observation that Russia has been pulling forces from less critical sectors of the frontline such as western Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[8] The Russian military command notably redeployed elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) and elements of two unspecified VDV battalions from the Kherson direction to Kursk Oblast, and ISW has also observed claims that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were operating near Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast in June 2024.[9] The Russian military command generally regards VDV and naval infantry elements as “elite” forces (even though many Russian elite units have lost their eliteness over the course of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine) and tends to deploy these forces to prioritized directions.[10] The scale of such redeployments serves as a greater indicator of the Russian military’s prioritization, however. ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military will likely continue prioritizing Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine – namely in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff notably observed a decrease in Russian combat operations in western Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts on August 22.[12] The effects of redeploying elements of the 56th VDV Regiment and other elite elements from southern Ukraine will also depend on the scale of the redeployments. The Russian military command may be redeploying limited numbers of elite forces to improve C2 in Kursk Oblast and oversee inexperienced conscripts.
The Russian military command reportedly heavily committed elements initially intended for the Russian offensive effort in northern Kharkiv Oblast to the defense of Kursk Oblast. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported on August 19 that appeals from relatives on Russian social media, reports about missing soldiers, and OSINT assessments indicate that Russia has committed elements of the following units to fighting in Kursk Oblast: the 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment's 17th and 18th battalions (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD), the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment's 31st Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]), the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz units, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA, LMD), 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD), Nizhnyi Novgorod’s "Kulibin" detachment, the DNR "Pyatnashka" Brigade, "Veterany" 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade's "Oleg Mamiev" 3rd reconnaissance and assault detachment and "Otvazhnye" assault squad (Russian Volunteer Corps), unspecified BARS volunteer formations, and the 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (6th Air Defense Army).[13] Novaya Gazeta noted that elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, "Veterany" 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade that were committed to Kursk Oblast were either recently deployed or about to deploy to Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[14] ISW has observed that significant redeployments of elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces (which is responsible for the Kharkiv direction) to Kursk Oblast suggest that the Russian military command has determined that disruption to the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast is a necessary sacrifice to appropriately respond to the Ukrainian incursion while avoiding redeployments from higher priority sectors of the frontline.[15] The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast will continue to generate theater-wide operational pressures on Russian forces, and it is unlikely that the Russian military will be able to restrict significant disruptions to just the Northern Grouping of Forces particularly if and when it undertakes to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk.[16]
The Kremlin may be taking steps to address its border vulnerabilities amid the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and following a series of unsuccessful long-term efforts to improve Russian border security. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the heads of Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts and several Russian officials to discuss the updated socio-economic situation in Russia's oblasts bordering Ukraine on August 22 amid the larger-scale Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and more limited Ukrainian attacks into Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts.[17] Bryansk Oblast Head Alexander Bogomaz reported during the meeting that the Bryansk government formed a territorial defense force during October 2023 on Putin's orders and that an unnamed Russian airborne forces (VDV) major general commands Bryansk Oblast's territorial defense forces. Bogomaz claimed that Rosgvardia recently provided light and heavy weapons for the forces and stated that Rosgvardia and the territorial defense forces are currently jointly patrolling the international border. Bogomaz asked Putin to consider financing regional territorial defense forces from the Russian federal budget in order to alleviate strain on regional budgets and incentivize participation in the territorial defense forces by offering regular wages to participants. Belgorod Oblast Head Vyacheslav Gladkov also expressed his support for this initiative, and a series of Kremlin officials, including Putin, insinuated that the Russian government will work to resolve the issue and provide federal funding for regional territorial defense forces.
The Russian government has previously hesitated to fully allocate federal materiel to territorial defense forces. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) allocated military weapons and equipment to the Belgorod and Kursk territorial defense forces in August 2023, although a Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities would store the weapons in a centralized, locked location and noted that it is unclear how the territorial defense forces will be able to access the weapons in an emergency.[18] Bogomaz's claim that a VDV commander is leading Bryansk Oblast's territorial defense forces may be indicative of the Kremlin's wider intentions to allocate better-trained, "elite" commanders to lead units comprised of poorer-trained territorial defense forces or conscripts. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin may have attempted to balance the need for increased border security with a desire to avoid empowering decentralized military formations following the Wagner Group's armed rebellion in June 2023.[19] The Kremlin may be recalculating such assessments in the wake of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, however, and may be more willing to allocate greater materiel and manpower support to territorial defense forces.
Putin may also hope to use this meeting and the promise of improved funding and materiel for territorial defense units to alleviate concerns about the long-term use of Russian conscripts for Russian border security operations. A Ukrainian source in the military-political leadership told Ukrainian newswire RBC-Ukraine on August 21 that Putin tasked Russian forces with repelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast by October 1 without re-deploying forces from key frontlines areas.[20] October 1 is notably the first scheduled day of the semi-annual conscription cycle in Russia, and Russian conscripts notably serve for 12 months - suggesting that the 130,000 personnel conscripted in October 2023 should be released from their duties in the coming months.[21] Russian authorities are largely relying on conscripts (in some cases under the leadership of Russian regular and irregular forces) to defend against Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast and are likely considering how to address the upcoming outflow of conscripts from the pool of manpower available to serve in Kursk Oblast.[22] It is unclear if the Russian military will adequately train Russian conscripts to defend Russian border areas, and even the most experienced Russian conscripts will likely continue to be woefully underequipped to push back the highly trained and organized Ukrainian units attacking in Kursk Oblast. The Kremlin may attempt to press outgoing conscripts into signing military service contracts, although ISW previously noted that the Kremlin is highly sensitive to the societal backlash that such an effort could generate.[23]
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued Russian efforts to stop these advances on August 22. Geolocated footage published on August 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced into eastern Komarovka (south of Korenevo and east of Sudzha), although Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the area.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces operating northeast of Korenevo seized Semyonovka and advanced into southern Levshinka and that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced within northern Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha).[25] Additional geolocated footage published on August 22 that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced within southern Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian "Dikaya Division of Donbas" including the "Arbat," "Pyatnashka," and "Sarmat" battalions re-took Nechayev (north of Sudzha).[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to engage with Russian forces throughout Glushkovo, Korenevo, Sudzha, and Belovo raions in Kursk Oblast.[28] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a reconnaissance-in-force operation near Zabrama, Bryansk Oblast on the evening of August 21 but that Russian forces — including Russian border guards and Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz personnel - repelled the attack.[29]
Recent Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction appear to have prompted Ukrainian withdrawals from limited positions southeast of Pokrovsk, and Russian forces have likely failed to achieve their apparent objective of tactically encircling Ukrainian forces in the area. Geolocated footage published on August 22 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Ptyche (southeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced further south of the settlement, and ISW assesses that this confirms Russian claims that Russian forces had previously seized the remainder of the east bank of the Karlivske Reservoir in the area.[30] Recent Russian advances south and southwest of the T-0511 (Ocheretyne-Hrodivka) highway have leveled the Russian salient east and southeast of Pokrovsk instead of setting conditions for the tactical encirclement of Ukrainian forces, however. Russian forces likely aimed to advance westward of the Karlivske Reservoir from Yasnobrodivka and Karlivka in order to encircle Ukrainian forces east of the Hrodivka-Novohrodivka-Selydove line but failed to make such gains in concert with their advances in the direction of Novohrodivka and Selydove from the south of the T-0511 highway.[31] Russian forces enveloped Ukrainian forces as they advanced towards the E-50 (Donetsk City-Pokrovsk) highway in recent weeks, however, and the threat of tactical encirclement likely prompted Ukrainian withdrawals. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction acknowledged on August 22 that Russian advances have encouraged Ukrainian forces to conduct withdrawals to level the front and preserve the lives of Ukrainian personnel.[32] Several Ukrainian commanders operating in the Pokrovsk direction told the Associated Press in an article published on August 22 that newly generated Ukrainian recruits in the Pokrovsk direction have retreated from positions in some instances.[33] ISW has not observed widespread reporting of chaotic Ukrainian withdrawals in the Pokrovsk direction, and the lack of rapid Russian tactical gains in the area suggests that Ukrainian forces managed to withdraw from enveloped positions in recent weeks. ISW has also not observed widespread reporting of Russian forces encircling and destroying Ukrainian personnel at positions southeast of Pokrovsk in recent weeks, and previous conversations among Russian milbloggers about an envisioned tactical encirclement in the area have subsided.[34]
The tempo of Russian aviation operations is reportedly decreasing throughout most of the theater, although this decreased tempo may be temporary, and its cause is unclear. Spokespeople for Ukrainian brigades operating in the Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar directions both reported a general decrease in the number of glide bomb strikes and decreased Russian aviation activity on August 22.[35] The spokesperson for the Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction suggested that Russian aircraft shortages and Ukrainian air defense capabilities in this sector of the front may be prompting the Russian military to decrease aviation activity.[36] ISW has not yet observed confirmation of decreased Russian aviation operations in the Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar directions. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev reported on August 18 that Russian forces conducted 30 to 40 strikes per day in the Kharkiv direction a few weeks ago but have decreased the number of glide bomb strikes to roughly one to four strikes per day in the previous several days.[37] Sarantsev stated that Russian forces may be conducting fewer glide bomb strikes to prioritize aviation operations in the Pokrovsk, Kursk, and Sumy directions or because of the effects of Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear areas (likely referring to Ukrainian strikes against Russian airfields).[38] Data available from NASA FIRMS may partially corroborate Sarantsev's statements about the tempo of Russian aviation operations in the Kharkiv direction.[39] Ukrainian Northern Operational Command Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on August 15 that Russian forces launched half as many glide bombs against Sumy Oblast as compared to August 14, although it is unclear if the decreased tempo of Russian glide bomb strikes against Sumy Oblast will persist.[40]
Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched 10 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast largely against frontline Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast on the night of August 21 to 22 and that Ukrainian forces shot down two of the drones.[41] Russian forces routinely use Shahed drones for rear area strikes against Ukraine, and the use of Shaheds for frontline strikes may indicate that Russian forces are looking for ways to compensate for decreased glide bomb strikes in certain sectors of the frontline. Ukraine has recently struck several airfields within Russia and has destroyed ammunition warehouses holding glide bombs, and these strikes may have generated temporary disruptions to Russian aviation operations.[42] The Russian military is also committing aviation assets to the defense of Kursk Oblast, although not at a scale that would prevent Russian forces from fielding aviation throughout most of the theater.
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of successful strikes against targets in Volgograd Oblast and Krasnodar Krai on August 22. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian media on August 22 that SBU and Special Operations Forces (SSO) personnel successfully struck several warehouses filled with glide bombs and fuel at the Marinovka airfield in Volgograd Oblast.[43] The sources stated that Russian aircraft based at the Marinovka airfield were involved in bombing frontline Ukrainian settlements and populations and noted that there were secondary detonations at the warehouses following the strike. Footage published on August 22 shows smoke plumes and explosions at the airfield, and satellite imagery shows significant damage to hangars at the airfield, although it is unclear if Ukrainian forces damaged any aircraft based on the footage and imagery.[44] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed on August 22 that a Ukrainian strike sank a railway ferry carrying fuel tanks that was moored in the port of Kavkaz, Krasnodar Krai.[45] The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind stated that Ukrainian forces used a missile to strike the ferry and published footage showing the aftermath of the strike.[46] Russian authorities stated that the ferry was carrying 30 fuel tanks, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces may have used a Neptune anti-ship missile to strike the ferry.[47] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov told the War Zone defense outlet that the GUR conducted drone strikes against a Russian signals intelligence center and the Ostafyevo airport near Moscow City and the Millerovo Airbase in Rostov Oblast on August 21.[48] Budanov stated that Ukrainian forces are clarifying the extent of any damage to these targets. Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian S-300 air defense system near Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast on the night of August 20 and 21, and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces downed a Ukrainian drone over Murmansk Oblast on August 21.[49]
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian military command recently redeployed elements of at least one Russian airborne (VDV) regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast in response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast, possibly in an effort to stabilize the lines and improve command and control (C2) over Russian conscripts.
- The Russian military command reportedly heavily committed elements initially intended for the Russian offensive effort in northern Kharkiv Oblast to the defense of Kursk Oblast.
- The Kremlin may be taking steps to address its border vulnerabilities amid the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and following a series of unsuccessful long-term efforts to improve Russian border security.
- Ukrainian forces marginally advanced throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued Russian efforts to stop these advances on August 22.
- Recent Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction appear to have prompted Ukrainian withdrawals from limited positions southeast of Pokrovsk, and Russian forces have likely failed to achieve their apparent objective of tactically encircling Ukrainian forces in the area.
- The tempo of Russian aviation operations is reportedly decreasing throughout most of the theater, although this decreased tempo may be temporary, and its cause is unclear.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a series of successful strikes against targets in Volgograd Oblast and Krasnodar Krai on August 22.
- Russian forces recently advanced north of Siversk, within Chasiv Yar and southeast of Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
- Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Head Alexander Khinshtein stated on August 21 that the Russian Union of Journalists and Ministry of Digital Development submitted a bill to the Cabinet of Ministers proposing to grant veteran status to journalists who have worked in Ukraine, the "counter-terrorism operation" zone in Kursk Oblast, and other unspecified combat zones.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 21, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros
August 21, 2024, 8:40pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The Kremlin appears to have launched an intricate messaging campaign aimed at justifying to its domestic audience why Russia is prioritizing maintaining the initiative in eastern Ukraine over immediately expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. Russian government sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration told Russian independent outlet Meduza that the Kremlin is actively trying to condition Russian society to accept the limited Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast as a “new normal” and downplay the significance of the incursion.[1] The sources noted that the Kremlin will use propaganda to encourage Russians to wait for Russian forces to retake these territories after an “inevitable” Ukrainian defeat in eastern Ukraine. The sources also added that the Kremlin is redirecting Russians’ concerns over Kursk Oblast by preoccupying domestic society with humanitarian assistance drives to assist the affected residents of Kursk Oblast and noted that the Kremlin decided against canceling the upcoming Kursk Oblast gubernatorial elections scheduled for September to minimize panic in the region.[2] The Russian Central Election Commission, however, decided to postpone local elections in the seven raions in Kursk Oblast that are impacted by the Ukrainian incursion due to security risks, and the Kremlin may have decided to maintain gubernatorial elections as scheduled to replace the interim Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, who has overseen much of the local Russian response to the incursion.[3] Meduza also highlighted Russian state media’s coverage of the incursion, which began increasingly portraying Kursk Oblast and its residents as supporting the Russian war effort in Ukraine, despite encountering some mild wartime disruptions to residents’ ordinary lives.[4] The Kremlin may be also attempting to weaponize state media's coverage of its months-long offensive in eastern Ukraine to advance its messaging campaign about the incursion. Russian state TV channels are notably covering Ukraine’s incursion in Kursk Oblast as a limited operation, while actively contrasting it with Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction, which Russian media is painting as major victories.[5]
The Kremlin may be using this messaging campaign to afford itself time and space to respond to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast after achieving its offensive objectives in eastern Ukraine. Russian government sources told Meduza that the Kremlin was initially shocked and worried about Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast but calmed down within a week because Ukrainian forces’ advances were far from more densely populated regional centers such as Kursk City.[6] Meduza reported that all interviewed officials expressed confidence that battles in Kursk Oblast will continue at their current scale for months, indicating that the Kremlin may not be rushing to repel Ukrainian forces from the region and will instead continue to prioritize its offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. A Ukrainian source in the military-political leadership, on the contrary, told Ukrainian news wire RBC-Ukraine that Putin tasked Russian forces with repelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast by October 1 without re-deploying forces from key frontlines areas – namely from the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions. ISW previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military command likely view maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative to win the war of attrition against Ukraine and are continuing to prioritize the Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.[7] Putin’s reported October 1 deadline assumes a long time for Russia’s territorial integrity to have been contested given that the incursion began on August 6th. Such a protracted occupation of Russian territory undermines the Kremlin’s longstanding narratives about why Russia is at war in the first place; the Kremlin had been justifying its war in Ukraine as a defensive war that aims to protect Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity.[8] The Kremlin’s relaxed approach to the temporal aspect implies that the Kremlin has decided to prioritize tactical advances in Ukraine over rapidly restoring Russia’s territorial integrity in Kursk, and this apparent decision undermines a series of long-standing narratives about Russian “red lines.”
Putin notably appears to be demanding that Russia defeat Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast without sacrificing the stability of his regime, deprioritizing the offensive in eastern Ukraine, or firing his incompetent but loyal lieutenants. The results of such a strategy are too early to forecast. Meduza’s sources also noted that the Kremlin also considered the need for a new mobilization wave at the start of the incursion, but that the Russian Cabinet of Ministers and Kremlin-affiliated businessmen immediately opposed general mobilization due to ongoing labor shortages in Russia — although it is unclear whether Kremlin even considered this argument.[9] Meduza’s sources assessed that the Kremlin is much more likely to double down on the use of conscripts in Kursk Oblast, which if true, would mark another example of Putin making unrealistic demands of the Russian military command without providing the command appropriate manpower and resources to achieve its objectives. ISW has repeatedly assessed that Putin has neglected the need to declare general mobilization throughout the course of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine out of concern for his regime’s stability on numerous occasions, and his recent decision to announce a counterterrorism operation in Kursk Oblast (as opposed to declaring war or mobilization) may indicate that he is not prepared to respond to the incursion with mobilization at this time.[10] Meduza’s sources also observed that there are currently no rumors within the Kremlin about the removal of Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov due to his ongoing involvement in the Russian offensive in Donbas or the ongoing crisis in Kursk Oblast. The sources noted that the Kremlin might need to appoint a scapegoat for the incursion in the future but is not currently considering placing Gerasimov in that position. ISW cannot independently verify these reports, but they appear to be consistent with ISW's assessments about the Kremlin's prioritization of the offensive in eastern Ukraine and Putin’s, inability to dynamically adjust objectives, and his aversion to taking risks.[11] The Kremlin’s reported approach to command changes appears to be consistent with Putin’s observed pattern of withholding command changes until he is no longer actively facing a crisis.[12]
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations throughout the Kursk Oblast salient on August 21 and have made additional marginal advances. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces posted footage on August 21 showing Ukrainian strikes on several pontoon bridges and staging areas along the Seim River in Glushkovsky Raion, west of the current Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.[13] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces suggested that Ukrainian forces may have used HIMARS in some of the strikes against pontoon bridges, while milbloggers speculated that Ukrainian forces used air-launched small-diameter glide bombs.[14] Geolocated footage published on August 21 shows drone operators of Russia's 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) striking Ukrainian forces in and around Vishnevka (south of Koreveno and 14km from the international border), confirming that Ukrainian forces have likely advanced into and beyond the settlement.[15] A Russian milblogger claimed that a reinforced platoon-sized Ukrainian element unsuccessfully attacked from Vishnevka towards Komarovka (southwest of Koreveno and 12km from the international border), but that Russian drone strikes and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) fire stopped Ukrainian forces from establishing positions within Komarovka.[16] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a platoon-sized mechanized attack towards Korenevo but were unsuccessful.[17] Additional geolocated footage published on August 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions in forest areas east of Aleksandrovka (northeast of Koreveno and 33km from the international border).[18] Geolocated footage published on August 21 also shows that elements of the Russian 200th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) hold positions along the 38H-564 road east of Zhuravli (east of Koreveno and 21km from the international border), indicating that Russian forces either recently retook these positions or that Ukrainian forces have not yet closed the small salient along the 38H-564 road near Zhuravli.[19] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are advancing north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya and are encircling Russian forces in Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha and 19km from the international border).[20] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly facing encirclement in Martynovka, and Russian milbloggers lauded a soldier from the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade for allegedly leading conscripts out of an encirclement in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast, potentially in reference to the Martynovka pocket.[21] Geolocated footage published on August 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced into southern Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha and 12km from the international border).[22] The Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade appears to be deployed particularly sporadically throughout the Kursk Oblast salient — various Russian sources have reported that its elements are operating as far north as the Kauchuk area (30km from the international border) and between Martynovka and Spalnoye (southeast of Sudzha and 45km away from Kauchuk).[23]
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Republic of Chechnya for the first time in 13 years on August 20, likely in an effort to shift domestic focus away from the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and posture normalcy and stability. Putin met with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov in Grozny, Chechnya, and praised Kadyrov for his socio-economic development programs.[24] Kadyrov claimed that Chechnya has sent 47,000 military personnel to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion, including 19,000 volunteers who trained at the Spetsnaz University in Gudermes, Chechnya. Kadyrov also claimed that Chechnya has "several tens of thousands" of trained and equipped military personnel in reserve. Putin visited Spetsnaz University, which trains military personnel from across Russia and spoke to a group of military commanders, instructors, and volunteers. Putin claimed that all Russians — no matter their ethnicity or religious affiliations — are united by their morals, ethics, love for the Fatherland, respect for elders, respect for Russia's history, and faith in Russia's future.[25] Putin also ostentatiously kissed a Quran to demonstrate his purported respect for the Islamic faith and the people of Chechnya. Putin consistently attempts to portray Russia as a harmonious multi-ethnic and multi-religious country despite growing xenophobia against migrants and ethnic and religious minorities[26] Putin additionally emphasized Russian soldiers' alleged heroism for putting themselves at risk to protect Russia by fighting in Ukraine.[27] Putin also may have intended to use his visit to Chechnya to commend Chechen leaders for dedicating forces to the defensive effort in Kursk Oblast and address concerns about the reportedly significant number of Chechen military personnel that Ukrainian forces have taken as prisoners of war in Kursk Oblast.[28]
Recent US intelligence assessments highlight Ukraine's efforts to develop alternative and asymmetric capabilities in the face of Russian manpower and materiel advantages, as well as Ukraine's continued dependence on Western security assistance. The US Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General's Office published a series of assessments by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the DoD's quarterly review of US military assistance to Ukraine on August 15.[29] DIA's assessments largely cohere with trends and phenomena observable in the open source, although it is unclear what conclusions policymakers should draw from DIA's assessments given that some of these assessments assume that certain battlefield conditions are totally static, whereas ISW assesses the same conditions to be in flux.
The DIA assesses that recent US military assistance to Ukraine will "almost certainly" be insufficient in helping Ukraine match or overcome Russia's artillery advantage in Ukraine and the estimated Russian daily fire rate of 10,000 artillery rounds.[30] Ukrainian servicemembers have consistently expressed concern about Ukrainian artillery shortages following significant delays in US aid in Winter 2023–2024 and Spring 2024, and Ukrainian officials have previously acknowledged the impact of artillery constraints on Ukraine's defensive and offensive capabilities, particularly in Donetsk Oblast.[31] Destructive Russian shelling and glide bomb strikes appear to be a fundamental aspect of the Kremlin's theory of victory in Ukraine, which posits that Russian forces can continue slow, grinding advances aided by razing Ukrainian settlements to the ground regardless of Russian manpower losses and premised on the assumption that Russian forces can deprive Ukraine of the ability to contest the theater-wide initiative in perpetuity.[32] Ukrainian forces have, on the contrary, demonstrated their commitment and ability to develop and employ alternative and asymmetric capabilities, namely drones and long-range strikes, to partially counter Russia's artillery advantage in Ukraine and to defend against Russian mechanized and infantry assaults, often to outsized effect compared to the smaller-scale systems Ukrainian forces are employing. Ukrainian forces successfully defended against a series of large-scale Russian mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast in late July 2024 with drone strikes and limited artillery support, and Russian milbloggers have previously warned about the threat of targeted Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes throughout the frontline in Ukraine.[33] Ukrainian forces have also used long-range strikes against Russian military targets and oil depots supplying military equipment in Russia to complicate Russian logistics, force Russia to reallocate air defense assets, and disrupt Russia's oil and gas industry.[34] The most recent allotment of US aid to Ukraine is undoubtedly insufficient to address the ongoing artillery disparity between Russian and Ukrainian forces and asymmetric means are not a replacement for artillery and other conventional means, but the US and wider Western alliance remain capable of addressing Ukraine's constraints caused by delays in Western security assistance.
The DIA also assesses that Ukraine "probably" remains capable of continuing defensive operations in Ukraine but is not capable of conducting large-scale counteroffensive operations for at least the next six months.[35] ISW recently assessed that both Russian and Ukrainian forces lack the capability to conduct individual decisive war-winning operations and must instead conduct multiple successful operations with limited operational objectives that, in the aggregate, can achieve strategic objectives.[36] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces could use smaller-scale Ukrainian counterattacks and localized counteroffensive operations to liberate territory while avoiding the challenges associated with conducting large-scale counteroffensive operations amid continued Western delays and hesitancy in allocating further military assistance to Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have conducted several localized counterattacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast and towards Kreminna (in the Luhansk-Donetsk Oblast border area) in recent months, suggesting that Ukrainian forces are already attempting to contest the tactical initiative in select frontline areas.[37] Ukrainian forces have also succeeded in launching a localized offensive operation into Kursk Oblast and seizing the operational initiative in this sector of the frontline, which is drawing Russian forces from other, lower-priority frontline areas in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have identified drawing Russian forces from lower-priority frontline areas as a key goal of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast, and this effort could force Russia to leave some of these areas vulnerable to further Ukrainian counterattacks.[38] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces can contest the battlefield initiative and eventually set conditions to conduct both limited and eventually large-scale counteroffensive operations provided timely and appropriate Western security assistance.[39] The US and the international coalition supporting Ukraine retain significant influence over Ukrainian warfighting capabilities and Western decisions about Ukraine’s resourcing levels and rules of engagement regarding Russian military targets can substantially alter the trajectory of the war.
Ukraine continues efforts to attrit Russia's air defense and aviation capabilities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that overnight on August 20 to 21, Ukrainian naval forces and other Ukrainian units conducted a coordinated strike with unspecified weapons and hit a Russian S-300 air defense system's position near Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that it is still clarifying the results of the strike but reported explosions near the S-300 site. Russian Rostov Oblast officials claimed that Russian air defense forces shot down an unspecified type of missile over Rostov Oblast early in the morning on August 21, and social media footage shows a fire at an oil refinery in Novoshakhtinsk reportedly caused by debris from the downed missile.[41] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian ATACMS missile over Novoshakhtinsk, alleging that this is the first ATACMS strike against Russian territory.[42] ISW has not observed any visual evidence or additional reports of the purported use of ATACMS, however.
Russian opposition sources and milbloggers also claimed that Ukraine conducted a long-range drone strike against targets in Russia's far-northern Murmansk Oblast (nearly 2,000 kilometers away from Ukraine) on August 21.[43] Geolocated Russian social media footage shows Russian forces shooting down a small aircraft-type drone flying at low altitude over Vysokiy, Murmansk Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that this is the fourth day in a row that attack drones have been targeting Murmansk Oblast.[44] The Russian Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsya) temporarily restricted the airspace over the Murmansk and Apatity airports on August 21, likely due to the operation of drones in the airspace.[45] Several Russian sources speculated that the drones were targeting Olenya airfield, which is co-located with the village of Vysokiy and from which Russia launches Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 strategic bomber aircraft.[46] Ukrainian sources previously confirmed that Ukrainian long-range drones damaged a Tu-22M3 strategic bomber at Olenya on the night of July 26 to 27.[47] ISW has not observed visual evidence or official Ukrainian or Russian confirmation of drones impacting the Olenya airfield at the time of this publication, however.
Russian authorities may have attempted to block Telegram and other non-Russian internet communications services on August 21. Russian sources stated that Russian internet users reported outages of multiple internet communication, internet streaming, and telecommunication services on August 21.[48] Russian state media censor Roskomnadzor claimed that distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks caused the outages, but that it successfully repelled the attack.[49] Russian activist and Director of the Internet Defense Society Mikhail Klimarev told Russian opposition outlet Agentstvo Novosti that such outages usually occur when Russian authorities activate the "anti-messenger mode" and noted that similar outages occurred during the antisemitic pogroms in Dagestan Republic in November 2023, and during protests in the Sakha and Bashkortostan republics in January 2024.[50] Experts from Roskomsvoboda, an independent Russian organization that supports internet freedom and digital rights, told Agentstvo Novosti that a centralized impact likely caused the outages and assessed that Roskomnadzor attempted to block Telegram, which inadvertently blocked other internet-based services in Russia. The experts also noted that similar outages occurred in 2018 when Russian authorities tried to block Telegram.[51] Russian authorities have also been attempting to further censor the Russian information space by disconnecting Russia from the global internet, and also temporarily disconnected Russia at least partially from the global internet during a test of its “sovereign internet” system overnight on July 4–5, 2023.[52]
The Russian government is reportedly supporting a bill that would allow Russian authorities to draw up administrative protocols against Russian citizens who violate Russian law while living aboard. Kremlin-affiliated business outlet Kommersant reported on August 21 that the bill would allow the Russian government to charge Russian citizens living abroad under vague charges of extremism, abuse of freedom of speech, and discrediting the Russian Armed Forces.[53] Unnamed Russian lawyers told Kommersant that Russian courts have previously prosecuted Russian citizens living outside of Russia for social media posts under similar charges.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) Premier Li Qiang discussed deepening bilateral economic and trade relations in Moscow on August 21. Putin stated that Russia and the PRC have jointly developed large-scale economic and humanitarian plans, and Li stated that the PRC is ready to develop a multifaceted mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia.[54] Li also met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on August 21, and they signed a joint communique that includes a plan for Russian–PRC investment cooperation and 15 other unspecified intergovernmental and interdepartmental documents.[55] Li also noted during his meeting with Mishustin that Russia and the PRC are increasing cooperation in the energy sector.[56]
Key Takeaways:
- The Kremlin appears to have launched an intricate messaging campaign aimed at justifying to its domestic audience why Russia is prioritizing maintaining the initiative in eastern Ukraine over immediately expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.
- Putin notably appears to be demanding that Russia defeat Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast without sacrificing the stability of his regime, deprioritizing the offensive in eastern Ukraine, or firing his incompetent but loyal lieutenants. The results of such a strategy are too early to forecast.
- Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations throughout the Kursk Oblast salient on August 21 and have made additional marginal advances.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Republic of Chechnya for the first time in 13 years on August 20, likely in an effort to shift domestic focus away from the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and posture normalcy and stability.
- Recent US intelligence assessments highlight Ukraine's efforts to develop alternative and asymmetric capabilities in the face of Russian manpower and materiel advantages, as well as Ukraine's continued dependence on Western security assistance.
- Ukraine continues efforts to attrit Russia's air defense and aviation capabilities.
- Russian authorities may have attempted to block Telegram and other non-Russian internet communications services on August 21.
- The Russian government is reportedly supporting a bill that would allow Russian authorities to draw up administrative protocols against Russian citizens who violate Russian law while living aboard.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) Premier Li Qiang discussed deepening bilateral economic and trade relations in Moscow on August 21.
- Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk, southwest of Donetsk City, and northeast of Robotyne.
- Russian occupation authorities continue to create Cossack organizations in occupied Ukraine, likely to build out Russia's military reserves and law enforcement bodies in occupied Ukraine.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 20, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros
August 20, 2024, 7:45pm ET
Ukrainian forces continued attacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on August 20 and recently made additional advances. Ukrainian forces appear to be continuing efforts to strike Russian pontoon bridges and pontoon engineering equipment west of the current Kursk Oblast salient over the Seim River in Glushkovo Raion—geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Ukrainian drones striking Russian equipment bringing pontoons to a staging area near the Seim River about 3km north of Glushkovo. Satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces have destroyed at least one pontoon bridge across the Seim as of August 19 that was visible on August 17.[1] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Vishnevka (southwest of Koronevo and 14km from the international border), consistent with the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) reporting from August 19 that tacitly acknowledged Ukrainian advances in the Vishnevka area.[2] Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced westward along Sudzhanskiy Shlyakh Street (38K-030 highway) in eastern Korenevo as well as in fields northeast of Korenevo.[3] Russian milbloggers widely claimed on August 20 that Ukrainian forces continued mechanized assaults on the outskirts of Korenevo and that Russian forces were conducting artillery and airstrikes to contain Ukrainian advances.[4] Russian milbloggers indicated that Russian forces regained some lost positions and advanced in fields south of Safonovka (northeast of Koreveno and 30km from the international border).[5] Geolocated footage published on August 20 shows that Ukrainian forces have also advanced in forested areas north of Russkoye Porechnoye (northeast of Sudzha and 20km from the international border), consistent with Russian milblogger maps that depict Ukrainian advances over the entire administrative boundaries of Russkoye Porechnoye.[6] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 20 that Ukrainian forces have also advanced up the western outskirts of Russkaya Konopelka, just east of Sudzha.[7] Geolocated footage published on August 20 showing Ukrainian forces towing a captured Russian T-90M tank along the Snagost-Liubimivka road (southeast of Koreveno and 8km from the international border) indicates that Ukrainian forces continue operating well within the maximalist claimed limit of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast.[8]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi displayed a map depicting the situation in Kursk Oblast on August 20, and ISW will use the boundaries of this map to update its assessment of maximalist claimed limits of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, consistent with ISW's mapping methodology for the Ukrainian incursion thus far. During a televised meeting of the Ukrainian Congress of Local and Regional Authorities on August 20, Syrskyi shared a map showing the purported current Ukrainian forward line of troops (FLOT) in Kursk Oblast.[9] Syrskyi's map indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced slightly beyond ISW's assessed FLOT, namely near Viktorovka (southwest of Koreveno); between Snagost and Koreveno; northeast of Koreveno in the areas north of Kremyanoye and northwest of Pogrebki; east of Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha); and southeast of Sudzha.[10] Heat anomalies from NASA FIRMS/VIIRS are located in very close proximity to the FLOT depicted in Syrskyi’s map. ISW will expand its maximalist limit of claimed Ukrainian advances to match Syrskyi's map, but will not recess maximalist claims in areas where they extend beyond Syrskyi's FLOT (the southeasternmost part of the salient, for example), to reflect ISW's methodological commitment to mapping events in Kursk Oblast based off of the maximal claims made by both Ukrainian and Russian sources in the wider information space. ISW does not question Syrskyi's presentation of the location of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and presents them in alignment with Syrskyi's presentation. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces do not control all the territory behind the FLOT according to the doctrinal definition of "control" that ISW uses to shape its control of terrain assessments.[11] The expansion of ISW's map in accordance with Syrskyi's, therefore, should be taken as a recognition of maximal Ukrainian and Russian claims, and not an assessment of Ukraine's control of the area behind the FLOT. Syrskyi's map notably depicts Russian units operating behind the FLOT, especially in the northwestern part of the salient, consistent with ISW's assessment that large portions of the salient are likely contested zones.[12]
Ukrainian officials continued to clarify some of the objectives of the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast and reported on the extent of additional Ukrainian advances. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 20 that Ukrainian forces advanced between 28 to 35 kilometers deep into Kursk Oblast and that they "control" 93 settlements (1,263 square kilometers).[13] Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast are pressuring Russian forces to redeploy elements of unspecified units from the frontline in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, which may impact the tempo and prospect of Russian offensive efforts in Ukraine.[14] Syrskyi also stated that Ukrainian forces aim to establish a buffer zone in Russian territory to prevent Russian forces from shelling Sumy Oblast and to “outpace” the efforts of the Russian forces at large. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 19 that the “preventative defense” of the Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast is the most effective countermeasure against Russian forces and that Ukrainian forces have largely "cleared" the Russian border area close to Sumy Oblast of Russian forces.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 20 that Ukrainian forces are exhausting the combat potential of Russian forces particularly in Kursk Oblast, acknowledging the Kursk operation.[16] Deputy Chair of the Committee on Ukraine‘s Integration into the European Union (EU) Maria Mezentseva-Fedorenko stated on August 19 that Ukraine is preparing a new round of exchange of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian hostages with Russia and that Ukraine’s operations in Kursk Oblast comply with international humanitarian law.[17]
The Russian military command continues to complicate and bureaucratize its thus-far ineffective command and control (C2) structure for the Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov announced on August 20 that he appointed Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov as Deputy Head of the "Coordinating Council" within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for military and security issues in Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and stated that Yevkurov is already currently in Kursk Oblast.[18] Belousov's decision to appoint Yevkurov — who heads the Russian MoD's Africa Corps and has been the face of Russian military outreach and cooperation with African countries since the dissolution of the Wagner Group in 2023 — may suggest that the Russian MoD removed Yevkurov from his position in Africa Corps, as a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger previously speculated, and that that the Russian MoD is temporarily deprioritizing defense cooperation efforts in Africa in response to the incursion into Kursk Oblast.[19]
Belousov also tasked five members of the Coordinating Council with addressing specific issues related to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Belousov announced that Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Andrei Bulyga is responsible for resolving logistics, transport, and assisting civilian authorities in civilian evacuations; that Deputy Defense Minister Alexei Krivoruchko is responsible for solving problems related to military-technical support; that Deputy Defense Minister Pavel Fradkov is responsible for engineering and construction; and that the Russian MoD's Main Military Medical Directorate Head Dmitry Trishkin is responsible for medical support.[20] Belousov also announced the creation of the Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod groupings of forces and stated that their unspecified commanders and an unspecified representative of the Russian General Staff are responsible for protecting civilians from drone strikes and other attacks.[21] The Russian MoD additionally created a special task force at the National Defense Control Center to monitor issues in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts.[22] The National Defense Control Center's Deputy Head Lieutenant General Yuri Korsachev claimed that the center's task force has already resolved 25 issues voiced by the Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod operational headquarters, of which most requested additional drone supplies, mobile electronic warfare (EW) systems, radios, radio jammers, and all-terrain vehicles.[23] Belousov did not comment on how the Coordination Council officials, the National Defense Control Center's task force, and the newly-created groupings of forces will interact with the existing C2 structure that the Kremlin established when it tasked that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) with conducting a counterterrorism operation in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts. The increasing bureaucratization of the Coordination Council and other Russian MoD structures dedicated to defending against the incursion into Kursk Oblast will likely create additional confusion within the Russian MoD and friction among the Russian MoD, FSB, and Rosgvardia, all of which are attempting to operate in Kursk Oblast. ISW continues to assess that complex and overlapping responsibilities and seemingly ever-growing list of actors the Kremlin has tasked with responding to the Ukrainian incursion impedes Russia's ability to establish effective joint C2 structures.[24]
Russian authorities have reportedly re-deployed Russian units from the Chasiv Yar direction to Kursk Oblast amid efforts to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast with Russian forces previously in the area and re-deployments from lower priority sectors of the frontline in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 20 that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade struck a Ukrainian armored vehicle in southern Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha), and elements of the Russian 11th VDV Brigade were reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar as of late July 2024.[25] The Russian military command likely re-deployed elements of the 11th VDV Brigade intended to relieve or reinforce frontline units and not units that have been engaged in combat on the frontline, however. ISW previously noted that such deployments could affect the tempo of Russian offensive operations, but that it would likely take several weeks to observe any possible impacts of such redeployments on Russian operations in Donetsk Oblast.[26] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is likely extremely averse to pulling Russian military units engaged in combat from higher priority sectors in Donetsk Oblast due to concerns about further slowing the tempo of Russian operations in these directions.[27]
Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces re-deployed elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 22nd Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to Kursk Oblast, and elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment were reportedly operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast as of mid-July 2024.[28] A Ukrainian military observer claimed that an unspecified element of the 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) is also operating in Kursk Oblast, although the military observer insinuated that the element was operating in the area prior to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[29] ISW has previously observed additional indications that Russian authorities are largely relying on an amalgamation of conscripts, irregular Russian forces, and regular Russian forces re-deployed from lower priority frontline areas in Ukraine to counter the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[30]
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the site of the 2004 Beslan school siege on August 20, likely in an effort to link the Russian "counterterrorism" response to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast to a "successful" Russian counterterrorism operation in the early 2000s. Putin arrived in the North-Ossetia Alania Republic on August 20 and visited the memorial to the 2004 Beslan school siege as well as the site of the siege itself.[31] This was Putin's first visit to the school and his second to the city since August 2008.[32] Terrorists affiliated with the Chechen separatist Riyad-us Saliheen Brigade took over 1,000 adults and children hostage in a Beslan school over three days in September 2004, resulting in the deaths of more than 330 people, including 186 children.[33] The Russian response to the 2004 terrorist attack was documented to be inefficient and dangerous. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2017 that local Russian authorities knew about the 2004 terrorist attack beforehand but did not increase security or warn the public.[34] The European Court also stated that the Russian security services' response lacked formal leadership and rules about how to engage terrorists, resulting in uncoordinated actions that endangered the hostages. Putin alleged on August 20 that Russia is currently fighting terrorists in Kursk Oblast and Ukraine, just as Russia fought terrorists in Beslan in 2004, claiming that Russia will emerge similarly victorious against Ukraine.[35]
Putin met with representatives of the "Mothers of Beslan" Association of Victims of Terrorist Acts organization on August 20, and the Kremlin's reporting on the meeting attempted to portray Putin as sympathetic to mothers' complaints – likely in response to the potential growing threat to Putin's regime posed by family members complaining about the ongoing involvement of Russian conscripts in Kursk Oblast.[36] Russian opposition news outlet Agentsvo reported that Aneta Gadieva, one of the "Mothers of Beslan" representatives present at the meeting, stated that most of the conversation focused on why Russian officials had not closed the investigation into the 2004 attack.[37] Gadieva noted that Putin promised the organization during their last meeting in 2005 that he would take control of the investigation. Putin reportedly attempted to shift the blame for this inaction away from himself during the August 20 meeting, claiming that he was unaware of the prolonged investigation and that he would contact Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin about the matter. Gadieva also stated that the women told Putin that unspecified Russian officials are not conveying the whole truth to him about the situation in Kursk Oblast and that Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, conscripts, and other servicemembers from the North Ossetia-Alania Republic have been captured, calling for Putin to secure their release.[38]
The Kremlin has not publicized the reported discussions about the Beslan investigation or conscripts in Kursk Oblast, instead highlighting Putin's statements that he is aware that the women of the "Mothers of Beslan" organization cannot take advantage of sanatorium programs due to the lack of childcare at the facilities — a relatively extraneous point compared to the women's reported emphasis during the meeting on the shortcomings of the 20-year-long official investigation. Putin also notably incorrectly claimed during the meeting that 136 children died in the 2004 siege, when in fact 186 children died.[39] Mothers' organizations have been able to steer large Russian social movements in the past, as with the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers (later renamed the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers), which rallied around issues with Soviet conscripts in the late 1980s and early 1990s and successfully called for greater transparency in the Soviet military, and Putin showed great concern in 2022 about societal backlash about Russia's use of conscripts in the war in Ukraine following appeals made by conscripts' mothers.[40]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces continued attacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on August 20 and recently made additional advances.
- Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi displayed a map depicting the situation in Kursk Oblast on August 20, and ISW will use the boundaries of this map to update its assessment of maximalist claimed limits of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, consistent with ISW's mapping methodology for the Ukrainian incursion thus far.
- Russian authorities have reportedly re-deployed Russian units from the Chasiv Yar direction to Kursk Oblast amid efforts to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast with Russian forces previously in the area and re-deployments from lower priority sectors of the frontline in Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the site of the 2004 Beslan school siege on August 20, likely in an effort to link the Russian "counterterrorism" response to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast to a "successful" Russian counterterrorism operation in the early 2000s.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
- Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to increase monetary incentives for signing Russian military contracts in order to bolster Russia's force generation efforts.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, and George Barros
August 19, 2024, 7pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on August 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance in Kursk Oblast on August 19 amid continued fighting throughout the Ukrainian salient in the area. Geolocated footage published on August 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in Vishnevka (southwest of Koronevo and 14km from the international border).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian aviation and artillery struck Ukrainian forces operating near Vishnevka, potentially tacitly acknowledging that Ukrainian forces advanced in the area.[2] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced within Russkoye Porechnoye (northeast of Sudzha and 17km from the international border), east of Agronom (just east of Sudzha and 15km from the international border), and east of Spalnoye (southeast of Sudzha and 5km from the international border).[3] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance attempts south of Skrylevka and Sheptukhova (both northeast of Korenevo and 22km from the international border), and other Russian sources claimed that fighting continued near Korenevo, Olgovka (just east of Korenevo), western Sudzha, and Martynovka (just northeast of Sudzha).[4] Russian milbloggers also claimed that clashes continued along the international border near Tetkino.[5] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating near Olgovka; elements of the "Aida" Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz group are reportedly operating in Sudzha; and the "Varangian" Reconnaissance-Strike Company of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) is reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[6] Elements of the Russian "Feniks" Mining Battalion, which were reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar area as of late May 2024, are reportedly operating near Martynovka.[7]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an airstrike that destroyed a bridge over the Seim River in Karyzh (southwest of Korenevo) — the third and last bridge over the Seim River in Glushkovo Raion, Kursk Oblast.[8] ISW has not yet observed evidence of a strike against a bridge near Karyzh, however. Geolocated footage published on August 16 and 18 showed Ukrainian strikes respectively destroying a bridge across the Seim River in Glushkovo and damaging a bridge across the Seim River in Zvannoye (southwest of Korenevo).[9]
Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov aggravated a situation that the Kremlin has historically treated with extreme caution by calling for conscripts to participate in combat operations in Kursk Oblast and dismissing concerns from relatives of conscripts. Alaudinov responded in a video message on August 19 to the "sobs and outbursts" about Russian conscripts fighting in Kursk Oblast, complaining that parents of conscripts are treating 18-year-olds as children.[10] Alaudinov claimed that Russian conscripts are employees of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and must defend Russia. Alaudinov complained that conscripts are just "eat[ing] the state's bread for free ... and then go home." Alaudinov responded to complaints that conscripts are paid little, calling on conscripts to sign a contract with the MoD if they want to receive higher salaries. Alaudinov called for all Russians young and old to "stand in formation" since "the enemy has come to [Russia], stating that "no one will die who is not destined to die, but if you die defending [Russia] and your faith in God, you will go to heaven." A Telegram channel associated with the Akhmat "Aida" group also claimed on August 19 that the conscripts they have encountered in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast are not 18-year-olds, but 21-to-25-year-olds.[11] The "Aida"-affiliated channel suggested that the fact that Ukrainian forces are on Russian territory is more important than any discussions about casualties among Russian conscripts.
Family members of Russian conscripts have recently complained about the involvement of Russian conscripts in Russian border-defense operations.[12] The Kremlin has shown great concern about societal backlash regarding issues concerning conscripts, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has previously taken action to appease the complaints of conscripts' relatives. The continued presence of Russian conscripts in the border areas during the Ukrainian incursion threatens the Kremlin with a potential political crisis regarding casualties among Russian conscripts. Alaudinov has postured himself as a spokesperson for the Russian defense in Kursk Oblast, and Russian newswire TASS has repeatedly amplified his statements following the Ukrainian incursion.[13] Blatant calls from Alaudinov — a widely promoted Russian authority — for conscripts’ relatives to stop complaining, for conscripts to participate in combat operations in Russia’s border area, and for Russian citizens to embrace casualties among conscripts and other servicemembers may exacerbate tensions in Russian society and potentially threaten the stability of Putin’s regime. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov has notably made only limited public statements about the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast, despite Alaudinov's and Akhmat Spetsnaz's pronounced roles in the Russian response.[14]
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Azerbaijan on August 18, likely in an effort to shift focus away from the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and present himself as a continually effective diplomat. Putin arrived in Baku on August 18 with a Russian delegation, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, for a two-day visit to meet Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to discuss Russian–Azerbaijani bilateral relations.[15] The delegations reportedly discussed bilateral energy ties, Russian-language initiatives in Azerbaijan, and Russia’s willingness to mediate a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[16] The timing of this visit is noteworthy given the ongoing situation in Kursk Oblast and the Kremlin’s continued efforts to downplay the Ukrainian incursion’s magnitude and impact. Russian state media focused on Putin's trip to Azerbaijan, amplifying minute details, likely in part to divert attention from the uncomfortable situation in Russia by saturating the information space with a showcase of the Kremlin's global diplomatic engagement and alleged successes.
The Kremlin's response to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has emphasized how the Kremlin's internal priorities have increasingly oriented towards regime stability, especially over the past year. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on August 19 that Russian President Vladimir Putin's reaction to the "Kursk situation" has exposed certain shifts within the Kremlin's power vertical, many of which have been underway over the last several months.[17] Putin appointed Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin to supervise the ongoing "counterterrorism" operation against Ukrainian activities in Kursk Oblast, which Vazhnye Istorii noted means that Putin distrusts the Russian General Staff and the Russian Ministry of Defense (which would be the bodies theoretically in charge of defensive military activities) and relies on individuals that he personally trusts. An insider source reportedly told Vazhnye Istorii that Dyumin is now in conflict with representatives of the Russian Presidential Administration, further suggesting that Putin continues to align himself with those who have his personal favor at the expense of officials better technically suited for certain positions. Vazhnye Istorii also cited sources familiar with the Russian security services as claiming that Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov will "leave his post this year" and theorizing that his potential replacement may be Vladislav Menshchikov, head of the FSB's counterintelligence service, or Sergei Korolev, Bortnikov's first deputy. Russian investigative journalist Andrei Soldatov noted that the FSB has generally shifted its mandate away from controlling Russian oligarchs and towards controlling Russia’s military and Russia’s military-industrial complex as well as countering "saboteurs and terrorists," and Vazhnye Istorii reported that several long-time Russian economic oligarchs are also gradually losing their influence within the Kremlin's wider power vertical.[18]
Vazhnye Istorii's reporting strongly suggests that the Kremlin has increasingly oriented its main priorities towards regime stability. ISW has reported at length on Putin's efforts to maintain a core cadre of loyal siloviki (Russian strongmen with political influence) within the Russian power vertical, particularly since the risks to Putin's regime first introduced by the Wagner Group's armed rebellion in June 2023.[19] The Kremlin's general shift towards siloviki such as Dyumin, whom Putin personally trusts, and security officials with strong and well-documented reputations in counterterrorism and counterintelligence, suggests that the Kremlin is increasingly looking towards such individuals as regime safeguards. Ukraine's operation into Kursk Oblast has particularly exposed this dynamic, and the Kremlin's continued response to the incursion further emphasizes the ever-increasing reliance on security officials and structures over more politically or economically focused internal structures.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on August 19 further codifying a vague Russian state ideology into Russian law without concretely modifying the Russian Constitution. Putin's decree allows foreigners and stateless persons "who share traditional Russian spiritual and moral values”; have expressed interest in moving to Russia permanently; and disagree with their home state's policies "that impose destructive neoliberal, ideological guidelines" to apply for a temporary Russian residence permit without meeting the Russian language, legal, and cultural knowledge requirements.[20] Putin instructed the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to create a list of countries allegedly "imposing [these] neoliberal values."[21] The Kremlin has recently intensified efforts to codify a state ideology based on vague Russian "traditional values" while bypassing the Russian Constitution, which notably forbids Russia from establishing a state ideology and requires the Russian state to recognize ideological diversity.[22] This new policy favoring increased migration of certain "traditionally and ideologically aligned" individuals to Russia is contrary to recent Russian state efforts to crack down against illegal migration into Russia and coerce migrants into military service, both of which likely undermine any Russian efforts to attract more migrants to settle in Russia.[23]
Putin's effort to codify a specific ideology may be intended to counter the Russian ultranationalist community's own efforts to establish an accepted national ideology. Russian ultranationalist voices have largely criticized Russian migration policy for being too lenient and have fervently called for Russian authorities to tighten immigration requirements, especially for migrants to learn the Russian language, culture, and law to better integrate into Russian society — requirements that Putin's decree allows select migrants to bypass.[24] Many ultranationalist voices have also been hypercritical of the Kremlin and Russian defense officials for perceived wartime and ideological failures, and some even directly opposed Putin either politically, as was the case with imprisoned ardent nationalist Igor Girkin, or militarily, like deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.[25] The Kremlin has been cracking down on these milbloggers by creating a cadre of milbloggers loyal to the Kremlin, creating an environment of self-censorship, and directly censoring certain commentators as necessary.[26] Putin's effort to establish himself as the sole arbiter of the accepted Russian national ideology may aim to counter Russian milbloggers who disagree with him and eliminate possible domestic threats to his regime, especially as the Kremlin has sought to portray Russians who oppose the war in Ukraine and Putin himself as "extremist," unpatriotic, and enemies of the state.[27]
Russian officials continued attempts to falsely frame Ukraine as responsible for the lack of negotiations to end the war. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov responded to a question about possible negotiations with Ukraine on August 19, claiming that Russia will not talk to Ukraine given Ukraine's "adventure" with its incursion into Russia.[28] Ushakov claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposals — which called for Ukraine to surrender territory that Russian forces currently do not occupy — still stand but that it would be "inappropriate" for negotiations to take place at the moment.[29] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on August 19 Putin's statement from August 12 that there can be no talk of negotiations after the Ukrainian incursion and claimed that Putin said that Russia "will certainly give an assessment of this situation a little later."[30] Lavrov also dismissed a recent Washington Post article about Russia's temporary postponement of discussions with Ukraine in Qatar about a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure as "rumors."[31] ISW continues to assess that Russia is and has been uninterested in meaningful negotiations with Ukraine and that the Kremlin has attempted to portray Ukraine — and not Russia — as preventing negotiations.[32]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance in Kursk Oblast on August 19 amid continued fighting throughout the Ukrainian salient in the area.
- Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov aggravated a situation that the Kremlin has historically treated with extreme caution by calling for conscripts to participate in combat operations in Kursk Oblast and dismissing concerns from relatives of conscripts.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Azerbaijan on August 18, likely in an effort to shift focus away from the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and present himself as a continually effective diplomat.
- The Kremlin's response to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has emphasized how the Kremlin's internal priorities have increasingly oriented towards regime stability, especially over the past year.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on August 19 further codifying a vague Russian state ideology into Russian law without concretely modifying the Russian Constitution. Putin's effort to codify a specific ideology may be intended to counter the Russian ultranationalist community's own efforts to establish an accepted national ideology.
- Russian officials continued attempts to falsely frame Ukraine as responsible for the lack of negotiations to end the war.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Svatove, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
- Local Sakhalin Oblast media outlet Sakhalin Media reported on August 19 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service in Sakhalin Oblast and other federal subjects within the Russian Far East, Northwestern, and North Caucasian federal okrugs has resumed conscription for the first time in an unspecified "long" length of time.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 18, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 18, 2024, 5:10pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on August 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces continued assaults throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast on August 18 and marginally advanced southeast of Sudzha. Geolocated footage published on August 17 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian armored vehicle in northern Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into northern Martynovka.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 18 that Ukrainian forces seized Troitskoye (south of Korenevo and roughly two kilometers from the international border) and advanced to Semenovka (north of Sudzha and roughly 24 kilometers from the international border).[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults on the outskirts of Korenevo, southwest of Korenevo near Komarovka; east of Korenevo near Olgovka; northeast of Korenevo near Alekseevsky, Safonovka, Kromskiiye Byki, Kauchuk, and Sheptukhovka; north of Sudzha near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye and Russkoye Porechnoye; and southeast of Sudzha near Ozerka, Giri, and Borki.[3] Geolocated footage published on August 17 and 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces continue to operate throughout the maximalist claimed limit of Ukrainian advances within Kursk Oblast.[4]
A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces entered Otruba (north of Tetkino and on the west [right] bank of the Seim River), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating near Tetkino.[5] Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk posted geolocated footage on August 18 showing Ukrainian forces conducting an airstrike against a bridge across the Seim River in Zvannoye (southeast of Korenevo), creating a large hole along the roadway.[6] Russian milbloggers and opposition media disagreed about the impact of the damage on Russian logistics, with some sources claiming that the strike only partially damaged the bridge, while others claimed that the strike rendered the bridge unpassable and that there is only one other usable bridge left in the area near Karyzh (west of Zvannoye).[7] Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge across the Seim River in Glushkovo (southeast of Zvannoye) and reportedly struck but did not destroy the Zvannoye bridge on August 16.[8]
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast continues to force Russia to redeploy forces from elsewhere in the theater, and likely subsequent phases of fighting within Russia will require more Russian manpower and materiel commitments to the area. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on August 17 that a source familiar with the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast stated that Russian forces had redeployed "several" understrength brigades totaling 5,000 personnel from elsewhere in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast by midweek from August 6 to 13.[9] WSJ's source stated that Russian forces redeployed an understrength brigade from Donetsk Oblast, possibly referring to elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] "Pyatnashka" Brigade, which ISW observed arriving in Kursk Oblast around August 8 alongside other smaller Russian irregular units from Donetsk Oblast.[10] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) also arrived in Kursk Oblast as of August 15, and ISW has observed elements of the brigade fighting near Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast in recent months.[11] The WSJ's report of 5,000 Russian personnel partially coheres with a report that Russian forces had redeployed up to 11 battalions to the frontline in Kursk Oblast as of August 11.[12] The Russian "Tigr" Battalion of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) announced on August 17 that elements of the battalion are deploying to Kursk Oblast, and ISW observed elements of the "Tigr" Battalion operating near Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast as of July 31.[13] Russian forces have redeployed additional forces to Kursk Oblast since the first week of the Ukrainian incursion and have likely redeployed more than 5,000 personnel to Kursk Oblast over all.
Russian redeployments have allowed Russian forces to slow initially rapid Ukrainian gains in Kursk Oblast and start containing the extent of the Ukrainian incursion, but containment is only the first and likely least resource-intensive phase of the Russian response in Kursk Oblast.[14] Russian forces will likely launch a concerted counteroffensive effort to retake territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized, although it is too early to assess when Russian forces will stop Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast completely and seize the battlefield initiative to launch such an effort.[15] This likely future Russian counteroffensive effort will very likely require Russia to commit even more manpower, equipment, and materiel to Kursk Oblast.[16] WSJ reported that its source familiar with the Ukrainian operation stated that Ukrainian forces have up to 6,000 personnel within Kursk Oblast and that Russian forces will need substantially more personnel, possibly 20,000, to retake territory in the area.[17] The exact amount of manpower and materiel Russia will need to bring to bear in Kursk Oblast to conduct sustained counteroffensive operations that push Ukrainian forces back across the border will depend on how heavily Ukrainian forces defend occupied positions within Russia.[18]
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in Rostov Oblast that supplies oil to the Russian military on the night of August 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian military and Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the "Kavkaz" oil depot in Proletarsk, Rostov Oblast, causing at least two explosions at the facility.[19] Geolocated footage published on August 18 shows two large smoke plumes near the "Kavkaz" oil depot.[20] Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubev claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted a Ukrainian drone and that falling debris caused a fuel storage facility at an industrial warehouse in Proletarsk to catch fire.[21] A Russian milblogger responded to Golubev on August 18 by criticizing all Russian regional officials who claim that "falling debris" causes fires instead of acknowledging successful Ukrainian drone strikes and calling these officials "clowns."[22]
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova denied that Russia planned to engage in reported negotiations with Ukraine and Qatar on a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure. Zakharova, responding to a recent Washington Post article about Russia's temporary postponement of discussions with Ukraine in Qatar about a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure, claimed that there was no disruption to talks because "there was nothing to disrupt" and that Ukraine and Russia have not been conducting direct or indirect negotiations regarding a possible moratorium of strikes on energy infrastructure.[23] The Washington Post reported on August 17 that the Ukrainian operation into Kursk Oblast prompted Russian authorities to postpone these moratorium discussions that had been scheduled for August 2024 in Doha.[24]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces continued assaults throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast on August 18 and marginally advanced southeast of Sudzha.
- The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast continues to force Russia to redeploy forces from elsewhere in the theater, and likely subsequent phases of fighting within Russia will require more Russian manpower and materiel commitments to the area.
- Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in Rostov Oblast that supplies oil to the Russian military on the night of August 17 to 18.
- Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova denied that Russia planned to engage in reported negotiations with Ukraine and Qatar on a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and Donetsk City. Ukrainian forces regained previously lost positions near Siversk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 17, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 17, 2024, 10:50pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are not in themselves decisive military operations that will win the war. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces lack the capability to conduct individual decisive war-winning operations and must instead conduct multiple successive operations with limited operational objectives that are far short of victory, but that in aggregate can achieve strategic objectives. It is too early to assess the outcomes and operational significance of the Ukrainian incursion into Russia and the ongoing Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine. The significance of these operations will not emerge in isolation, moreover, but they will matter in so far as they relate to a series of subsequent Russian and Ukrainian campaigns over time.
The scale of the war in Ukraine prevents either side from resolving the war in a single decisive campaign. ISW recently published "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War," wherein Dr. Frederick W. Kagan and Dr. Kimberly Kagan noted that Ukraine and Russia both have the ability to establish deep defensive positions and reserves that will prevent any single campaign from achieving strategic war aims before it culminates.[1] Russia's and Ukraine's ability to generate enough combat power to man continuous defensive positions with no open flanks and establish tactical depth at significant points along the frontline has forced both sides to attempt penetration battles that are so costly that subsequent exploitation is often not feasible.[2] (Ukraine, in fact, took advantage of a flank the Russians had left open in Kursk Oblast, but Russia has enough combat power to cover its frontiers if it so chooses at the cost of pursuing other objectives). Russia and Ukraine can usually establish defensive positions at some distance in the rear and sufficiently stabilize the frontline even in the event of a successful penetration and exploitation.[3] Effective Ukrainian and Russian campaign design therefore requires forethought and planning for multiple successive operations that each set conditions for the subsequent operation.[4] Rarely has either side been able to conduct successive operations without interruption, however, since operational pauses or decreased operational tempo have offered the other belligerent the opportunity to contest and seize the initiative.[5]
Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command likely view maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative to win a war of attrition against Ukraine, and both the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine will impact whether Russian forces can retain the initiative in the short-term. Russian forces seized the theater-wide initiative in November 2023 and have since conducted consistent offensive operations throughout eastern and northeastern Ukraine as part of a campaign designed to stretch Ukrainian forces and prevent Ukraine from accumulating the resources necessary to contest the initiative.[6] The Russian military has not pursued a new large-scale offensive operation in recent months in order to maintain a consistent offensive tempo in Ukraine, particularly in Donetsk Oblast, and Putin and the Russian military command have accepted that months of fighting will continue to result in marginal tactical gains.[7] Putin has expressed a theory of victory in Ukraine that posits that Russian forces will be able to continue these gradual creeping advances indefinitely, however, while preventing Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations.[8] Putin likely assesses that as long as Russia can retain the initiative and prevent Ukraine from conducting operationally significant counteroffensive operations, Russia can inflict decisive losses on Ukraine over the long-term while outlasting Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of Ukraine's economy and population for the war effort.[9]
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has temporarily allowed Ukrainian forces to seize the battlefield initiative on one sector of the frontline and begin contesting Russia's theater-wide initiative.[10] The Russian military appears to be attempting to maintain its offensive pressure in Donetsk Oblast, especially its offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk, and likely hopes that sustained offensive tempo in Donetsk Oblast will draw enough Ukrainian resources to defensive operations in the area to prevent Ukraine from contesting the battlefield initiative elsewhere by exploiting the theater-wide impacts of the incursion into Kursk Oblast.[11] Just because Russian forces are prioritizing the offensive operation on Pokrovsk does not mean that Ukraine must decide to prioritize the defense of Pokrovsk over efforts elsewhere, however.
Putin and the Russian military command appear to measure success in eastern Ukraine in explicitly territorial terms and have likely pursued efforts to create wider operational pressures solely to support efforts to achieve stated territorial objectives. Russian forces currently aim to seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and the Russian military likely measures the success of Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine by how much closer they bring Russian forces to this goal. ISW has long assessed that the Russian efforts to seize Chasiv Yar or push Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast are pursuing operationally significant objectives, but Russian forces have instead increasingly prioritized the efforts to seize Pokrovsk and advance west and southwest of Donetsk City, an objective that is of relatively less operational significance.[12] Russian forces may be focusing on advancing in these areas because these sectors of the front provide opportunities for greater territorial gains and because these areas allow Russian forces to advance closer to the borders of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have sought to create theater-wide pressures on Ukrainian forces similar to the ones that Ukraine is now inflicting on Russia with the incursion in Kursk Oblast, but Putin and the Russian military command have only sought to leverage these pressures to pursue limited territorial objectives and have forgone pursuing more operationally significant objectives or wider attempts to generate more significant theater-wide effects.
Ukrainian officials have indicated that Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast does not have long-term territorial objectives but instead aims to generate theater-wide operational and strategic pressures on Russian forces. Ukrainian officials have publicly stated that Ukraine is not interested in holding territory in Kursk Oblast over the long term and aims in part to protect itself from Russian strikes while forcing Russian forces to redeploy forces from elsewhere in the theater and complicating Russian logistics.[13] There are no discernable operationally significant territorial objectives in the area where Ukraine launched the incursion into Kursk Oblast, and Ukraine has not committed the resources to the operation necessary to pursue actual operationally significant territorial objectives further into Kursk Oblast, such as seizing Kursk City. The success of the Ukrainian incursion should thus not be evaluated in terms of Russian territory seized by Ukrainian forces.
The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast has already generated theater-wide operational and strategic pressures on Russian forces, and subsequent phases of fighting within Russia will likely generate even greater pressures on Putin and the Russian military. The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted the Russian military to redeploy up to 11 battalions from within Kursk Oblast and four Russian force groupings elsewhere in the theater to the frontline in Kursk Oblast so far.[14] US officials reportedly told the New York Times in an article published on August 15 that Russia has committed reserves to Kursk Oblast that it otherwise would have committed to grinding offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the coming months.[15] The redeployment of Russian forces and the commitment of elements of operational reserves has allowed Russian forces to slow initially rapid Ukrainian gains in Kursk Oblast and start containing the extent of the Ukrainian incursion.[16] Containment is only the first and likely least resource-intensive phase of the Russian response in Kursk Oblast, however. Putin and the Kremlin will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized, as persisting Ukrainian occupation of Russian territory would be a strategic blow to Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence.[17]
A Russian counteroffensive operation to retake territory seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more manpower, equipment, and materiel. Russian sources have claimed that Ukrainian forces are consolidating their positions within Kursk Oblast and building fortifications, although it is too early to assess how hard Ukraine forces will defend occupied positions within Russia against likely Russian counteroffensive operations.[18] It is also too early to assess when Russian forces will stop Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast completely and seize the battlefield initiative to launch a larger counteroffensive operation. Russian forces have expended considerable combat power on the effort to seize Pokrovsk, which they began in mid-February 2024 after seizing Avdiivka, and have since advanced roughly 23 kilometers in the area over six months of the most intense fighting in Ukraine in 2024.[19] The current Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast appears to be roughly 56 kilometers wide and up to 28 kilometers deep, although the area where Ukrainian forces are consolidating positions is likely smaller in size. Russian forces will likely have to conduct a prolonged counteroffensive effort to retake all of the territory seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast unless they bring overwhelming force to bear, and the Russian military command will likely have to commit additional operational reserves and newly generated forces to sustain the effort.
The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast has also forced a decision point on Putin about the long-term strategic requirements of defending the thousand-kilometer-long international border with northeastern Ukraine, and it is unlikely that Russia will conduct intensive counteroffensive operations to push Ukrainian forces back across the border only to neglect the international border area once again and leave it vulnerable to future Ukrainian incursions.[20] Putin will likely order the Russian military command to consider the manpower and materiel requirements for defending the international border, although it is unclear how he will weigh these requirements against Russian military requirements in Ukraine. The Russian military will have to consider manpower and materiel requirements for defending the international border as part of its theater-wide campaign design, which will impose long-term operational planning constraints that Russia previously did not face.[21]
Russian forces will not be able to retain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine indefinitely, and the culmination of Russian offensive operations will present Ukrainian forces with opportunities to contest the initiative further. Russia's possession of the theater-wide initiative has allowed Russia to determine the location, time, intensity, and requirements of fighting in Ukraine, and Russian forces have leveraged these benefits to determine an offensive tempo in Ukraine that has allowed the Russian military to conduct more sustainable offensive efforts and largely avoid culmination.[22] Russian forces pursued a prolonged effort to establish strategic and operational reserves ahead of Summer 2024 to support ongoing offensive efforts, and the Russian military has likely expended and committed many of these reserves to offensive operations throughout eastern and northeastern Ukraine in Spring 2024 and over the course of this summer.[23] The Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the heightened Russian priority of maintaining the tempo of offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast will likely place greater strain on Russia's remaining operational reserves and likely begin to impact Russia's ability to sustain consistent offensive operations throughout the theater. Further Russian redeployments to Kursk Oblast would also further weaken Russia's ability to sustain offensive operations in northeastern and eastern Ukraine, although Russian forces are more likely to begin decreasing offensive activity on lower-priority sectors of the front than to do so equally throughout the frontline.
The Russian offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk is emblematic of the Russian approach to the war in Ukraine that embraces positional warfare for gradual creeping advances and seeks to win a war of attrition. The Russian military command tasked the Central Grouping of Forces with identifying and exploiting weaknesses in Ukraine's defensive line following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in mid-February 2024.[24] Mechanized elements of the Central Grouping of Forces achieved a notable tactical breakthrough northwest of Avdiivka in mid-April 2024 by exploiting exhausted and poorly equipped Ukrainian forces, and the Russian military command continued to invest additional manpower from Russia's operational reserves to prevent offensive operations east of Pokrovsk from culminating for several months.[25] Russian forces applied consistently intense offensive pressure all along the front east and southeast of Pokrovsk and opportunistically exploited weaknesses in Ukraine's defenses to advance in this direction, and the Russian military command has tolerated significant manpower losses in exchange for advancing roughly two square kilometers per day (roughly 406 square kilometers in total) in Pokrovsk Raion over the last six months. Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction have focused on frontal infantry assaults from small village to small village in their gradual advance to Pokrovsk and have spent weeks at times trying to seize small villages in the area without attempting advance by maneuver.
The Russian military command appears to have abandoned its efforts to make rapid tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction and embraced positional warfare.[26] Putin's calculus that Russia can continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely during a prolonged state of positional warfare is predicated on Russia's manpower and materiel advantage.[27] Russia's ongoing force generation rates have allowed Russian forces to sustain their current tempo of offensive operations throughout the frontline by generating roughly as many new forces as the Russian military loses in a given period.[28] Russia's defense industry is reportedly capable of producing or refurbishing enough armored vehicles to sustain Russia's current rate of armored vehicle losses in Ukraine for at least two or three years.[29] Putin's theory of victory rests on the assumption that Ukrainian forces cannot acquire and sustain the manpower and material required to prevent indefinite, gradual Russian advances or contest the initiative, and Ukrainian forces appear to be actively challenging this assumption in Kursk Oblast.[30]
Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast illustrates how Ukrainian forces can use maneuver warfare to offset Russian manpower and materiel advantages. Russian forces have overall occupied 1,175 square kilometers of territory throughout the entire Ukrainian theater in the seven months from January and July 2024, as ISW recently assessed.[31] In stark contrast, ISW has observed claims that Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast advanced roughly 800 square kilometers over six days from August 6 to 12 and advanced roughly 28 kilometers deep as of August 17.[32] Again, the size of the area seized by Ukrainian forces is not an indicator of the success of that operation--it is offered here to show that restoring maneuver can produce much more rapid advances than positional warfare. The initial Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast attacked largely unprepared, unequipped, and unmanned Russian defensive positions along the border, but Ukraine has continued to leverage maneuver to make rapid advances in Kursk Oblast following the deployment of Russian reinforcements to the area.[33] Ukraine's use of maneuver in Kursk Oblast serves as an example of how Ukrainian maneuver, coupled with operational surprise, can result in comparably sized gains in significantly shorter periods of time with less manpower and materiel. Prolonged positional warfare, in contrast, will only make Ukraine's resource disadvantages more pronounced and protracted war will increase the costs to Ukraine and its partners.[34] Drs. Frederick and Kimberly Kagan noted that the challenge of restoring operational maneuver to the war remains the central problem for both sides at the operational level of war, and Ukraine's ability to achieve rapid maneuver in Kursk Oblast suggests that Ukrainian forces have internalized lessons from the past months of positional warfare that may help Ukraine leverage maneuver warfare in the future.[35]
It is simply too early to draw dispositive conclusions about the lasting effects that the two very different Russian and Ukrainian efforts will have on the course of the war. ISW will continue to refrain from commenting on Ukrainian operational intent in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere in the theater beyond what Ukrainian officials themselves have said in order to protect Ukrainian operational security, but it is safe to conclude that the operational significance of the incursion in Kursk Oblast will depend on how Ukrainian forces leverage the theater-wide pressures the operation has created in subsequent operations that pursue operationally significant objectives. ISW also considers assessments about the operational significance of the possible Russian seizure of Pokrovsk to be premature given the possibility that Russian offensive operations throughout Donetsk Oblast will culminate in the coming weeks and months at yet-to-be-determined positions. The operational significance of Pokrovsk will likely depend on Russia's ability to leverage the seizure of the city in wider maneuver in Donetsk Oblast, which will be extremely difficult for Russian forces if offensive operations elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast culminate and in the absence of large operational reserves. It also remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to seize Pokrovsk before Russian forces culminate on this sector of the front.
ISW offers these observations about the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the months-long Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine to provide a balanced framework for assessing the significance of the current Russian and Ukrainian operations on the course of the entire war, which will remain uncertain for the foreseeable future.
Russia and Ukraine were reportedly planning to meet in Qatar in August 2024 to discuss a possible moratorium on Ukrainian and Russian strikes on energy infrastructure, but Russia temporarily postponed the summit after the start of the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. The Washington Post reported on August 17 that unspecified officials and diplomats familiar with the matter stated that Ukraine and Russia were planning to send delegations to Doha in August 2024 to attend Qatari-mediated discussions about the proposed moratorium.[36] An unspecified diplomat reportedly told the Washington Post that Russia postponed the meetings following Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast but did not call off the talks entirely. The Washington Post reported that two sources familiar with the talks stated that unspecified senior Ukrainian officials believed that the summit had a 20 percent or less chance of succeeding even if Ukrainian forces had not conducted the operation into Kursk Oblast. Russia and Ukraine have reportedly been discussing such a moratorium since June 2024 following Qatari proposals to both Ukraine and Russia. The Washington Post's diplomatic source stated that after Russia postponed its participation in the talks, Ukraine wanted to hold bilateral meetings with Qatar, but that Qatar did not view one-sided meetings as beneficial. The Washington Post reported that the Ukrainian presidential office stated that the meetings in Qatar were postponed "due to the situation in the Middle East" and that the discussions would take place via videoconference on August 22. It is unclear if the discussions on August 22 will include the Russian delegation or not.
Russia remains uninterested in any broader, meaningful negotiations regardless of Russia's willingness to entertain or agree to a possible moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes. The Washington Post reported that unspecified officials stated that some people involved in the negotiations hoped that discussions in Qatar could lead to a more comprehensive agreement to end the war.[37] A source identified only as a Russian academic with close ties to unspecified senior Russian diplomats reportedly stated that the Kremlin would be less motivated to agree to the moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes since Russia assesses it can more significantly damage Ukraine's energy infrastructure than Ukraine can damage Russian oil refineries. The Russian academic reportedly stated, however, that Russia may be more willing to consider the energy strike moratorium to push Ukraine to engage in negotiations on a broader ceasefire.
ISW has repeatedly assessed that despite the Kremlin's longstanding information operations feigning interest in meaningful negotiations, Russia is not interested in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine to end the war.[38] Putin and the Kremlin have notably intensified their expansionist rhetoric about Ukraine since December 2023 and have increasingly indicated that Russia intends to conquer more territory in Ukraine and is committed to destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity.[39] Russia has been preparing for a possible conventional war with NATO in the future, and the Kremlin likely views anything short of Ukrainian capitulation as an unacceptable threat to Russia's ability to fight such a war.[40] Putin outlined uncompromising demands on June 14 for Ukrainian capitulation as prerequisites for any "peace" negotiations, including Ukraine's recognition of Russian control over the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – including the areas of these oblasts that Russian forces currently do not occupy.[41] Putin outright rejected any negotiated ceasefire during a press conference with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on July 5, claiming that a ceasefire would allow Ukraine to regroup and rearm.[42] Putin stated that Russia instead favors a "complete" and "final" end to the war. Putin continued to demonstrate his unwillingness to negotiate with Ukraine during a meeting on August 12, during which he portrayed Ukraine as an actor with whom Russia is not interested in negotiating.[43]
Russia would likely continue strikes against deep-rear military objects and industrial enterprises in Ukraine even if it were to agree to a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure. The Russian strike campaign targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure is at least in part meant to constrain Ukraine's defense industrial production capacity and degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian aggression.[44] Russia would likely continue to pursue this objective even if it were to agree to the moratorium on strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure and may resort to striking Ukrainian defense industrial enterprises more directly to achieve the same effect. Russia would likely also continue its large-scale strike series to force Ukraine to use a considerable portion of its air defense missile stockpile and fix limited air defense systems away from frontline areas to protect Ukrainian cities in the rear, allowing Russian aviation to more securely strike Ukrainian frontline forces.[45]
Russia is almost certainly only considering a possible moratorium on energy strikes due to Ukraine's months-long strike campaign against Russian oil refineries — demonstrating a secondary effect of Ukraine's strike campaign. The Washington Post noted that Ukraine was open to the moratorium discussions because Kyiv viewed such discussions as part of Ukraine's 10-point peace plan, which includes calls for Russia to stop striking Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure.[46] The Washington Post, however, did not offer an explanation for Russia's interest in the discussions. Ukraine has been conducting a strike campaign against Russian oil refineries since at least late January 2024.[47] Russia's reported temporary postponement — as opposed to complete cancellation — of the discussions in Qatar demonstrates that Russia is likely still interested in the possible moratorium and that the Kremlin views the Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure as significant and distressing.
Russia has pulled out of past wartime agreements with Ukraine, and Ukraine is reportedly planning to create conditions to prevent Russia from terminating another Ukrainian-Russian agreement. A Ukrainian official familiar with the potential moratorium agreement reportedly stated that Ukraine would "talk with [its] partners to be sure that the deal will work" and would not only speak "one-to-one with Russia."[48] Ukraine's efforts to include unspecified partners to enforce the deal are likely aimed at preventing Russia from using false justifications to terminate any future agreement - as Russia has done in the past. Russia refused to renew the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023, but Ukraine has been able to continue exports through its grain corridor due to Ukraine's missile and drone campaign targeting Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets and vessels and inhibiting Russia's ability to halt maritime activity in the western Black Sea.[49] The Washington Post noted that Russia attempted to justify its suspension of the grain deal with claims that only a small percentage of the exported grain went to the states that needed it the most – despite data from the United Nations (UN) to the contrary.[50]
Ukrainian forces continue to marginally advance in Kursk Oblast amid ongoing Russian efforts to stop further Ukrainian advances and begin to push Ukrainian forces back across the international border. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 17 that Russian forces destroyed several bridges across the Seim River in Tetkino and Popovo-Lezhachi (both southwest of Korenevo and along the international border) in order to stop Ukrainian forces advancing from the international border and that Ukrainian forces have consolidated positions in Otruba and up to the west bank of the river.[51] A prominent Kremlin propagandist claimed that Ukrainian forces continued unspecified activity near Tetkino, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may have been operating in the Tetkino area previously, and several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces maintain positions in Tetkino itself.[52] The propagandist claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting an offensive operation from the international border towards Troitskoye (south of Korenevo and one kilometer from the international border) and that Ukrainian forces advanced west and south of Snagost (south of Korenevo).[53] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are also conducting assaults northeast of Korenevo, including near Kauchuk and Alekseyevsky, but the exact contours of Ukrainian operations in this area remain unclear.[54] Geolocated footage published on August 17 indicates that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in western Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha).[55] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukranian forces recently advanced northeast of Sudzha in Mykhailovka and southeast of Sudzha in Ulanok and Nizhnemakhovo and that fighting is ongoing southeast of Sudzha along the Kamyshnoye-Krupets-Giri line.[56] Russian milbloggers suggested that Russian forces operating southeast of Sudzha may have recently retaken Ozerki, Kamyshnoye, and Giri.[57]
The United Kingdom (UK) is reportedly waiting for US approval before greenlighting Ukrainian forces to use UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles for long-range strikes against military targets in Russia. UK outlet The Times reported on August 16 that an unnamed source within the UK government stated that the UK submitted a request for US approval over a month ago (roughly mid-July 2024) and is still waiting for a response from the Biden Administration.[58] A second source within the UK government told The Times that discussions about Storm Shadows are "ongoing" with the UK's allies, and a third source described the approval process as "routine." The Times stated that the UK, US, France, and another unspecified NATO ally must unanimously approve the policy change. The UK's policy on Ukraine's ability to use Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets in Russia has grown increasingly unclear in recent months following several contradictory statements by UK officials.[59]
The Kremlin has revived its absurd information operation claiming that Ukrainian forces are preparing false-flag attacks, potentially with "dirty bombs," against Russia's Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) and the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), likely to undermine broader Western support of Ukraine amid Russian battlefield setbacks in Kursk Oblast. Several prominent Russian authorities, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), nuclear energy operator Rosatom, Russian diplomats, and occupation authorities claimed on August 17 that Ukrainian authorities are preparing a false-flag attack against the KNPP and ZNPP.[60] Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti claimed, citing a source in Russian law enforcement, that Ukrainian forces are planning to conduct this attack with warheads containing radioactive material, and several Russian milbloggers and prominent Kremlin mouthpieces broadly amplified this "dirty-bomb" narrative.[61] Russian authorities, most notably then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, last pushed the dirty bomb narrative at this scale in October 2022 amid Ukraine's ongoing counteroffensive efforts in southern Ukraine and just weeks before those efforts forced Russian forces to withdraw from west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.[62] Shoigu's October 2022 statements also intended to scare Western officials into withholding support from Ukraine amid Russian battlefield setbacks, and this objective remains unchanged.
The Russian false-flag information operation rests on assumptions that contradict or undermine this narrative and ignores the fact that Russia has proven itself an unsafe operator of the ZNPP. Ukrainian forces have consistently demonstrated their ability to conduct rear area strikes within Russia and occupied Ukraine at distances farther than the roughly 60 kilometers between the KNPP and the international border or the roughly 30-40 kilometers from the current limit of claimed Ukrainian advances within Kursk Oblast with their current capabilities.[63] Prominent Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers undermined this information operation, noting that Ukrainian forces have the capability to strike at this distance already and assessing that a dirty bomb would be "too complicated."[64] The Kremlin is also trying to turn legitimate complaints about Russia's militarization of the ZNPP back against Ukraine. Russian forces fired at the ZNPP during their seizure of the plant in March 2022 and since occupying the plant have stored and operated military equipment within the ZNPP.[65] Russian forces reportedly recently set a tire fire at one of the ZNPP's cooling tower in an apparent attempt to intimidate Ukraine following the start of the incursion into Kursk Oblast.[66]
Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian soldiers. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on August 16 that he has appealed to the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) concerning a Russian video of a Russian serviceman demonstratively displaying the desecrated body of a Ukrainian servicemember.[67] Lubinets called the desecration of the Ukrainian's body a violation of international humanitarian law and stated that Russian forces often record and spread such videos to intimidate and demoralize Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office announced on August 17 that it has opened an investigation into the case and that Ukrainian law enforcement are in the process of authenticating the video and the circumstances surrounding it.[68] A Ukrainian source claimed on August 16 that Russian forces recorded the video at the Kolotilovka border checkpoint in Belgorod Oblast on August 12 and that the video has the logo of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) elements of which have previously operated in Bucha.[69] It is unclear whether this soldier was a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW), and ISW is unable to verify the Ukrainian source's claims.
Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted his "niece" (first cousin once removed) Anna Tsivileva to the position of State Secretary and Deputy Defense Minister.[70] Putin signed the decree on August 17 relieving Tsivileva of her former Deputy Defense Minister post. Tsivileva's new position is likely a promotion. Independent Russian-language outlet Meduza noted on August 17 that each Russian federal agency has several deputies but only one State Secretary. Tsivileva will be responsible for the Ministry of Defense's (MoD) communication with parliament, other governmental agencies, and public organizations.[71] Tsivileva's promotion is the latest in Putin's recent efforts to place his relatives and the children of other senior Russian officials in Russian government positions.[72]
Key Takeaways:
- The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are not in themselves decisive military operations that will win the war. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces lack the capability to conduct individual decisive war-winning operations and must instead conduct multiple successive operations with limited operational objectives that are far short of victory, but that in aggregate can achieve strategic objectives.
- It is too early to assess the outcomes and operational significance of the Ukrainian incursion into Russia and the ongoing Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine. The significance of these operations will not emerge in isolation, moreover, but they will matter in so far as they relate to a series of subsequent Russian and Ukrainian campaigns over time.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command likely view maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative to win a war of attrition against Ukraine, and both the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine will impact whether Russian forces can retain the initiative in the short-term.
- Ukrainian officials have indicated that Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast does not have long-term territorial objectives but instead aims to generate theater-wide operational and strategic pressures on Russian forces.
- The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast has already generated theater-wide operational and strategic pressures on Russian forces, and subsequent phases of fighting within Russia will likely generate even greater pressures on Putin and the Russian military.
- Russian forces will not be able to retain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine indefinitely, and the culmination of Russian offensive operations will present Ukrainian forces with opportunities to contest the initiative further.
- The Russian offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk is emblematic of the Russian approach to the war in Ukraine that embraces positional warfare for gradual creeping advances and seeks to win a war of attrition.
- Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast illustrates how Ukrainian forces can use maneuver warfare to offset Russian manpower and materiel advantages.
- It is simply too early to draw dispositive conclusions about the lasting effects that the two very different Russian and Ukrainian efforts will have on the course of the war.
- ISW offers these observations about the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast and the months-long Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine to provide a balanced framework for assessing the significance of the current Russian and Ukrainian operations on the course of the entire war, which will remain uncertain for the foreseeable future.
- Russia and Ukraine were reportedly planning to meet in Qatar in August 2024 to discuss a possible moratorium on Ukrainian and Russian strikes on energy infrastructure, but Russia temporarily postponed the summit after the start of the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.
- Russia remains uninterested in any broader, meaningful negotiations regardless of Russia's willingness to entertain or agree to a possible moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes.
- Russia is almost certainly only considering a possible moratorium on energy strikes due to Ukraine's months-long strike campaign against Russian oil refineries — demonstrating a secondary effect of Ukraine's strike campaign.
- Ukrainian forces advanced within Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kreminna, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
- The Russian government continues efforts to use the "Time of Heroes" program to integrate trusted Russian military veterans into Russian government roles.
Click here to read the full report with maps
Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 16, 2024, 7:10pm ET
Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance southeast of Sudzha on August 16 amid continued Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Mirny and south of Spalnoye (both southeast of Sudzha), and geolocated imagery published on August 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently operated within Borki (southeast of Sudzha).[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued north of Sudzha near Russkoye Porechnoye, east of Sudzha near Agronom, and southeast of Sudzha along the Giri-Kamyshnoye-Krupets-Spalnoye line.[2] Russian milbloggers noted that small Ukrainian mobile groups continued limited assaults behind the existing line of contact in Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Korenevo and west of Snagost (south of Korenevo).[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian armored assault in the Gordeevka direction (south of Korenevo) and Ukrainian attacks west of Anastasyevka and southeast of Kauchuk (both northeast of Korenevo and roughly 27km from the international border).[4] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian forces operating near Otruba (southwest of Korenevo and along the international border).[5] Geolocated footage published on August 15 and 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces continue to operate throughout the maximalist claimed limit of Ukrainian advances within Kursk Oblast, including near Sudzha.[6]
Ukrainian strikes reportedly destroyed two bridges in Glushkovo Raion, Kursk Oblast. Russian sources claimed on August 16 that Ukrainian HIMARS strikes destroyed bridges in Glushkovo and Zvannoye (both southeast of Korenevo).[7] Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows that the bridge in Glushkovo collapsed following the strike.[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that the destruction of the bridge will complicate Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area.[9]
Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced further into western Belgorod Oblast during recent cross-border assaults than previously reported, but available open-source reporting and evidence indicates that Ukrainian forces no longer maintain positions within Belgorod Oblast as of August 16. The Washington Post reported on August 15 that Ukrainian personnel who participated in cross-border assaults into Belgorod Oblast stated that Ukrainian groups conducted mechanized assaults near the Kolotilovka border checkpoint (on the international border northwest of Belgorod City) on August 11 and advanced up to roughly 10 kilometers in the area.[10] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces repeatedly attacked near Kolotilovka in recent days and temporarily seized the Kolotilovka checkpoint on August 15 but did not claim that Ukrainian forces advanced anywhere close to 10 kilometers beyond the checkpoint.[11] The Washington Post reported that Ukrainian forces held positions within Belgorod Oblast while under heavy Russian airstrikes and artillery fire and that Ukrainian armored vehicles crossed into Belgorod Oblast to evacuate remaining Ukrainian personnel from these positions on August 15.[12] ISW has not observed any Russian claims or evidence suggesting that Ukrainian forces remain in Belgorod Oblast as of August 16. Ukrainian soldiers told the Washington Post that Russian forces in Belgorod Oblast were more prepared to repel cross-border Ukrainian assaults than Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and that Russian forces had established an extensive array of "dragon's teeth" anti-tank fortifications along the border and heavily mined the area.[13] The Ukrainian soldiers reportedly stated that Russian artillery units, drone operators, and aircraft almost immediately began striking Ukrainian forces as they attempted to cross the border into Belgorod Oblast on August 11.[14] The Ukrainian soldiers' description of the Russian response suggests that the operational surprise, which Ukrainian forces achieved on August 6 when launching the incursion into Kursk Oblast, had largely dissipated by August 11 and that Russian forces in Belgorod Oblast had prepared to repel Ukrainian cross-border assaults.[15] Ukrainian forces have made subsequent rapid advances across other sections of the border with Kursk Oblast since starting the incursion on August 6, however, and it is likely that Russian forces are more heavily defending some sections of the border than others.[16]
Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to advance in Kursk Oblast and suggested that the incursion has forced Russia to more readily consider prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 16 that Ukrainian forces advanced between one and three kilometers in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast.[17] Syrskyi also stated that Major General Eduard Moskalyov has begun heading the newly created military commandant's office in Kursk Oblast.[18] Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on August 14 that Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatiana Moskalkova initiated a conversation about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges and that Ukrainian forces have taken 2,000 Russian personnel prisoners in the last two weeks, including conscripts, border guards from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and personnel from Chechen "Akhmat" units.[19] This was reportedly the first time Russia has initiated discussions about a possible POW exchange. Ukrainian officials have previously reported that Russian officials have rebuffed Ukrainian overtures for POW exchanges in the past.[20] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate Kyrylo Budanov stated on August 15 that Ukraine will prioritize the return of the seriously wounded and ill, women, and those who have been in Russian captivity the longest.[21] Budanov stated that Ukraine will also try to return civilian prisoners, especially those whom Russian forces have held in captivity since 2014. A Ukrainian officer from the Military Law and Order Service reported on August 15 that 80 percent of the more than 200 Russian POWs located in one Ukrainian POW detention facility are conscripts.[22] The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast threatens Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to maintain support for the war and his regime, and the Kremlin may be highly attuned to the political impacts of large numbers of Russian POWs being captured on Russian territory, particularly conscripts.[23]
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Office (UN OHCHR) requested that Russian authorities allow UN representatives to visit Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts as part of a human rights monitoring mission.[24] UN OHCHR Spokesperson Liz Throssell confirmed the request on August 15 and noted that the office previously asked Russian authorities for access to areas in Russia and occupied Ukraine "to no avail."
US officials reiterated that US policy on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to conduct long-range strikes against Russian military targets has not changed amid the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated during a press briefing on August 15 that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has not changed the type or volume of weapons that the US will provide to Ukraine and that the parameters of the US policy regarding long-range Ukrainian strikes against military targets in Russia with US-provided weapons have also not changed.[25] The Biden Administration reportedly approved a policy change in May 2024 allowing Ukraine to use US-provided weapons for "counter-fire purposes" against the Russian forces conducting assaults into northern Kharkiv Oblast and preparing to conduct assaults from other Russian oblasts immediately bordering Ukraine.[26] Singh reiterated that the United States supports Ukraine's right to defend itself against Russia's illegal invasion.
The Kremlin reportedly fired former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s advisor on information policy Andrei Ilnitsky possibly as part of an ongoing effort to shift control of Russia's wartime information policy from the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to the Russian Presidential Administration. Russian state media outlets observed that Kremlin newswire TASS promptly issued a correction to a report on August 15 stating that Ilnitsky is a former advisor to the MoD.[27] Russian state media outlets reported that Ilnitsky’s title change indicates that he was recently fired and observed that Russian President Vladimir Putin fired several of Shoigu’s deputies in mid-June, although the Russian MoD did not officially announce Ilnitsky’s dismissal.[28] Ilnitsky’s dismissal also appears to be relatively recent since many Russian outlets referred to him by his MoD title at least as of July 2024.[29] One Russian source claimed that Ilnitsky resigned after Shoigu’s dismissal, however.[30] Russian media claimed that Ilnitsky may have been the creator of the ”Z” symbol that Russian forces have used during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and noted that he had advised the Russian MoD since 2015.[31] A prominent Russian social media propagandist reacted to the news by accusing Ilnitsky of creating a harmful and confusing information policy at the Russian MoD and recalled an instance in which Ilnitsky attempted to teach him how to wage ”information war” in April 2022.[32] Some Russian milbloggers implied that Ilnitsky advocated against daily war coverage and blamed Ilnitsky for misleading Russian state coverage of the war in Ukraine.[33]
One critical Russian milblogger condemned Ilnitsky’s dismissal, noting that his removal indicates that the Kremlin is advancing its efforts to transfer the control of Russia's wartime information policy from the MoD’s Department of Information and Mass Communications to the Russian Presidential Administration.[34] The milblogger noted that members of the Presidential Administration attended the first meeting of newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Russian milbloggers on June 10 and that this was the first indicator of the expansion of the administration’s control over the entire Russian media infrastructure. The milblogger claimed that the Presidential Administration’s apparent consolidation of two separate information mechanisms – the domestic propaganda machine aimed at ensuring political stability in Russia and external information warfare mechanisms – is a dangerous undertaking for Putin during a period of information war since simplified media control systems are more susceptible to external influence. ISW has consistently observed reports that First Deputy Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko has been increasingly expanding the administration’s control over the Russian information space and policy since at least the Wagner Group mutiny in June 2023.[35] ISW also assessed on August 15 that the Kremlin appears to be trying to hastily create a new information space that predominantly features Kremlin-affiliated sources in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, and the Russian government continued to blacklist select Russian milbloggers, political commentators, and other Russian internet personalities on August 15 and 16.[36]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance southeast of Sudzha on August 16 amid continued Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian strikes reportedly destroyed two bridges in Glushkovo Raion, Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced further into western Belgorod Oblast during recent cross-border assaults than previously reported, but available open-source reporting and evidence indicate that Ukrainian forces no longer maintain positions within Belgorod Oblast as of August 16.
- Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to advance in Kursk Oblast and suggested that the incursion has forced Russia to more readily consider prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges.
- The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Office (UN OHCHR) requested that Russian authorities allow UN representatives to visit Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts as part of a human rights monitoring mission.
- US officials reiterated that US policy on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to conduct long-range strikes against Russian military targets has not changed amid the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.
- The Kremlin reportedly fired former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s advisor on information policy Andrei Ilnitsky possibly as part of an ongoing effort to shift control of Russia's wartime information policy from the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to the Russian Presidential Administration.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
- Russian milbloggers claimed on August 16 that Russian drone operators are limiting their use of Mavic drones amid claims that Russian commanders are forcing operators to either personally pay to replace drones lost outside of combat or risk being sent to an infantry assault unit as punishment for losing a drone.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 15, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 15, 2024, 7:05pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on August 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian officials are taking steps to consolidate and coordinate the management of ongoing Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast while continuing to highlight Ukrainian advances. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky held a meeting with the Stavka (Ukrainian high command) on August 15 and heard reports from military leadership on the situation in Kursk Oblast.[1] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi announced to the Stavka that Ukraine has created a military commandant's office in Kursk Oblast under the leadership of Major General Eduard Moskalyov to "maintain law and order and ensure the priority needs of the population."[2] Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets also stated on August 14 that Ukraine is prepared to coordinate prisoner of war (POW) exchanges with Russia and that he is communicating with his Russian counterpart about the possibility of exchanging "hundreds" of Russian POWs that Ukraine has reportedly captured since the beginning of the Kursk operation for Ukrainian POWs currently in Russian captivity.[3] Syrskyi also reported that since the beginning of the day on August 15, Ukrainian forces advanced between 500 meters and 1.5 kilometers in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast and have advanced 35 kilometers deep since the beginning of the Ukrainian operation into Kursk Oblast on August 6.[4] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces do not doctrinally control all the territory within the maximalist extent of claimed Ukrainian advances, but the creation of the commandant's office will likely allow Ukrainian forces to coordinate military actions in the area that falls under maximal Ukrainian claims and safeguard the civilian population.[5]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued advancing in some areas in Kursk Oblast amid a generally slower tempo of Ukrainian operations in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 14 that Ukrainian forces seized Gordeevka (just north of the international border and south of Korenevo).[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Korenevo without any significant changes to the frontline.[7] Geolocated footage published on August 15 showing Ukrainian forces operating in Safonovka (northeast of Korenevo and 28km from the international border) indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[8] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking near Kauchuk (northeast of Korenevo and 27km from the international border).[9] Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed that Russian forces cleared Martynovka (just northeast of Sudzha) of Ukrainian forces, although Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing near the settlement.[10] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Bondarevka (just east of Sudzha), and geolocated footage published on August 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced within the settlement.[11] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Plekhovo (south of Sudzha and 2km from the international border), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces control the entire settlement.[12] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 13 and 14 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces from Giri (southeast of Sudzha and 12km from the international border), and geolocated footage published on August 13 showing a Russian journalist reporting from the center of Giri indicates that Ukrainian forces likely withdrew from the settlement.[13] Geolocated footage published on August 14 and 15 showing Ukrainian forces operating well within the maximalist claimed limit of Ukrainian advances indicates that Ukrainian forces also continue operating closer to the international border within Kursk Oblast and within Sudzha.[14]
Several Ukrainian outlets reported on August 15 that sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated that Ukrainian forces took 102 Russian military personnel from the 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army, Moscow Military District) and unspecified Chechen "Akhmat" units as prisoners of war in Kursk Oblast.[15] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and “Grom-Kaskad” Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Brigade, possibly Russia's first-ever specialized drone brigade, are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[16] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces temporarily seized the Kolotilovka border checkpoint in Belgorod Oblast (on the international border southeast of Sudzha and northwest of Belgorod City) on the night of August 14 to 15 but that Russian forces swiftly responded and pushed Ukrainians back across the international border.[17] ISW has not observed visual evidence suggesting that Ukrainian forces have seized the Kolotilovka checkpoint.
Russian forces are maintaining their relatively high offensive tempo in Donetsk Oblast, demonstrating that the Russian military command continues to prioritize advances in eastern Ukraine even as Ukraine is pressuring Russian forces within Kursk Oblast. Russian forces are continuing to pursue a tactical encirclement of Ukrainian forces southeast of Pokrovsk.[18] Geolocated footage published on August 14 and 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk within Hrodivka and southeast of Pokrovsk within Mykolaivka, Zhelanne, and Orlivka, and ISW assesses that Russian forces likely seized Orlivka and Zhelanne.[19] Russian forces have also continued mechanized assaults near Donetsk City over the past several weeks. Geolocated footage published on August 13 and 15 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly company-sized Russian mechanized assault near Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City) and a reduced company-sized Russian mechanized assault near Mykilske (southwest of Donetsk City).[20] Geolocated footage published on August 11 shows Russian forces conducting a roughly company-sized mechanized assault southeast of Heorhiivka.[21] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi stated on August 15 that there have also been no significant changes to the Russian force grouping in southern Ukraine and that Russian forces are not decreasing their offensive operations in the area.[22]
Russia has begun moving certain elements from Ukraine to respond to the situation in Kursk Oblast, but the types of units that are redeploying, and where they are redeploying from, is a strong indicator that the Russian military command is still prioritizing ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. CNN reported on August 15 that two senior US officials stated that the Russian military command has redeployed multiple "brigade-sized" elements made up of at least 1,000 personnel each from unspecified areas to Kursk Oblast.[23] Two sources familiar with Western intelligence reportedly stated that the Russian military command is not moving larger and better-trained elements from unspecified areas of Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, with one source stating that the lack of substantial Russian redeployments may be because the Russian military command is just starting this process or because there are not enough forces to conduct redeployments. CNN also reported that US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated that Russia has not "given up" military operations in northeastern or southern Ukraine, where active fighting is ongoing. ISW has not observed reports in the open source that the Russian military command is redeploying entire brigades from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast but has observed reports of elements of Russian regiments redeploying to the area.[24] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is pulling select elements of Russian irregular units from Donetsk Oblast to address the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast but will likely be extremely averse to pulling Russian military units engaged in combat from priority sectors in Donetsk Oblast out of concerns about slowing the tempo of Russian operations in these areas.[25]
The Kremlin and the Russian military command are creating a complicated, overlapping, and so far, ineffective command and control (C2) structure for the Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov announced on August 15 the creation of a "coordination council" within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for military and security issues in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[26] Belousov stated that the coordination council aims to improve support for Russian forces covering the state border and will specifically oversee the effective provision of materiel and equipment to forces in the area, coordination between forces responding to threats along the state border, engineering development in the area, and military medical support.[27] Belousov added that the coordination council will assist civilian authorities with evacuations and take additional measures to protect civilians and infrastructure in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[28] Belousov did not comment on how the coordination council will interact with the existing C2 structure that the Kremlin established when it tasked the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) with conducting a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 9.[29] The MoD's coordination council and the FSB's counterterrorism operation will likely generate continued confusion about what structures are responsible for what aspects of the Russian defensive operation in Kursk Oblast and will likely lead to friction between the FSB and the Russian military.[30] Russian President Vladimir Putin has provided overlapping tasks to the Russian MoD, FSB, and Rosgvardia in Kursk Oblast, and these entities have not yet taken visible steps to establish a clearer division of responsibilities.[31] Russian forces have reportedly redeployed up to 11 battalions from areas of Kursk Oblast and elsewhere in the theater to respond to the Ukrainian incursion, and this hastily assembled force grouping will likely struggle to coordinate combat operations given the Kremlin's confused approach to C2 so far.[32]
The delayed establishment of a complicated Russian C2 structure in Kursk Oblast continues to highlight the fact that the Kremlin failed to plan for the possibility of a significant Ukrainian incursion into Russia. The Kremlin and the Russian military command have treated the Russian border with northeastern Ukraine as a dormant sector of the front since Fall 2022 and likely did not sufficiently plan contingencies for defending Russian territory.[33] The Kremlin and the Russian military command would likely have established a more cohesive and clearer C2 structure more quickly if they had had standing plans for defending against a Ukrainian incursion. Putin's continued reluctance to declare martial law and acknowledge that Russia is in a state of war — as opposed to the "special military operation" he declared when he launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and has maintained in the subsequent two and a half years — has likely heavily shaped the contingencies that the Kremlin and the Russian military command assess Russia must plan for and what types of activities in Ukraine and Russia the Kremlin is willing to publicly acknowledge.[34] The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast will likely expand the Kremlin's consideration for what type of Ukrainian operations are possible along the border and highlight that Putin and the Kremlin have suffered from a strategic failure of imagination.[35]
The Kremlin appears to have a more coordinated approach to securing its control over the Russian information space than to addressing its military and C2 problems in Kursk Oblast. Russian government officials and propagandists have seemingly begun a concerted campaign to discredit non-Kremlin affiliated milbloggers and social media sources that amplify information about the Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast in the immediate aftermath of the incursion.[36] Russian State Duma Deputy Dinar Gilmutdinov publicly accused Russian milbloggers and war correspondents (voyenkory in Russian) on August 15 of spreading "fake” information, likely as part of the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to silence Russian milbloggers that it has not coopted.[37] Gilmutdinov called on the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Russian General Prosecutor’s Office, and the Federal Security Service (FSB) to harshly censor information appearing on social media, claiming that such information creates panic and is advantageous for Ukrainian forces. Gilmutdinov added that fellow State Duma Deputy Yevgeniy Revenko similarly expressed his concern that select Russian milbloggers are responsible for committing “information sabotage.” Russian propagandists and local officials have similarly been encouraging Russians not to trust social media reports about the situation in Kursk Oblast and have even accused some Russian milbloggers of deliberately spreading Ukrainian misinformation.[38] Some Russian milbloggers interpreted Gilmutdinov’s and Russian state media’s recent attacks on the broader milblogger community as an attempt to “jail bloggers and voyenkory” and censor accurate reporting about the situation in Kursk Oblast so that propagandists can claim that Russia repelled the Ukrainian incursion.[39] Some milbloggers pointed out that Russian milbloggers, such as imprisoned former Russian officer Igor Girkin, had long warned about the vulnerability of the Russian international border.[40]
The Kremlin is likely trying to hastily create a new information space that predominantly features co-opted Russian milbloggers and established Russian state propagandists. The Head of the United Russia Party’s Central Executive Committee, Alexander Sidyakin, called on Gilmutdinov to leave milbloggers alone and argued that some milbloggers routinely meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian MoD leadership.[41] Sidyakin claimed that Russian milbloggers also help Russia counter Ukrainian misinformation, although his defense of the Russian milblogger community likely aims to defend the credibility of a few Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers that the Russian government had successfully coopted since at the earliest late 2022. A Kremlin insider source claimed that the Kremlin had been working on co-opting Russian milbloggers and voyenkory who had previously disseminated alarmist messages about the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[42] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also claimed that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov notably met with Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers during the “Army-2024” forum, which took place during the incursion.[43] Putin signed a law on August 8 that obliges all Russian milbloggers and social media users with over 10,000 followers to register with Russian state censor Roskomnadzor, and Russian military and political bloggers referenced the passage of this law in their responses to Gilmutdinov.[44] The Kremlin is likely attempting to expedite its long-term efforts to censor non-Kremlin affiliated milbloggers to prevent any political or social threats against Putin's regime amidst the incursion, instead of focusing on committing necessary military means to address the incursion.
Ukrainian forces are reportedly using Western-provided equipment in Kursk Oblast but remain limited in their ability to strike Russian military targets within Russia with Western-provided weapons. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) stated on August 15 that Ukraine has the right to defend itself, including by conducting operations inside Russia, and can use British-provided equipment and weapons in line with international law to defend itself, but emphasized that restrictions on Ukraine's use of British-provided Storm Shadow missiles to strike Russian territory remain in place.[45] Reuters and BBC reported that a British source stated that Ukrainian forces have used UK-provided Challenger 2 tanks during the incursion in Kursk Oblast.[46] Politico reported that an official in the Biden administration and two sources familiar with policy discussions stated that the White House is "open" to sending Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) to Ukraine but has not made a final decision.[47] The White House is reportedly working on the details of the possible transfer of sensitive technology to Ukraine, and the Pentagon is reportedly working with Ukraine to ensure that Ukrainian F-16 aircraft could launch the JASSM.
Ukraine is organizing the creation of a humanitarian corridor through which to evacuate Russian civilians who are impacted by the ongoing Kursk operation, filling an apparent vacuum left by the Kursk Oblast administration and fulfilling international legal requirements for the evacuation of civilian populations. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories Iryna Vereshchuk announced on August 15 that Ukrainian officials are currently working with the Ukrainian military to create a possible humanitarian corridor to evacuate civilians from Kursk Oblast to Sumy Oblast.[48] Vereshchuk also noted that the Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration is running a 24-hour hotline for Kursk Oblast residents who need humanitarian aid or want to evacuate to Ukraine.[49] Vereshchuk also emphasized that Russia has not yet made a request to Ukrainian authorities to open a humanitarian corridor running further into Russia (as opposed to into Ukraine), so Ukraine is currently unable to legally facilitate the creation of such an evacuation route.[50] Kursk Oblast authorities appear to be hesitant to fully respond to the situation, likely out of fear of reacting in a way that is dissonant with the Kremlin's disjointed response to Ukrainian military operations within Russia.[51]
International humanitarian law holds certain legal requirements for the evacuation of civilian populations in specific conflict situations in order to safeguard civilian life, and Ukrainian authorities so far appear committed to fulfilling these requirements.[52] Protocol 4 of the Geneva Convention, which pertains to the protection of civilians during war, requires that the "occupying power" (in this case Ukraine, as Ukraine is exercising some extent of control over territories within Russia) "undertake total or partial evacuation" of an area if necessitated by the military situation in the area.[53] The Geneva Convention also requires that the occupying power does not remove civilians from the occupied territory unless it is "impossible to avoid such displacement." Vereshchuk's statements about the humanitarian corridor strongly suggest that Russian authorities are doing little to nothing to coordinate with Ukraine to enable civilian evacuations further into Russia, which means that some civilians may choose to go to Ukraine for safety in the absence of a viable alternative provided by Russian authorities. Ukrainian authorities also continue to emphasize that whether and where Russian civilians evacuate to is entirely a matter of personal choice — consistent with the international legal prohibition on forced population transfers.[54] ISW has long reported on Russia's apparent violation of this legal stipulation in Ukraine and has detailed Russia's forced population transfers of Ukrainian civilians since 2022.[55]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces successfully conducted drone strikes against Russian air bases in Russia on the night of August 13 to 14.[56] The Ukrainian General Staff stated on August 14 that Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO), Air Force, Security Service (SBU), and Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted drone strikes against four Russian air bases: Khalino in Kursk City, Savasleyka in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and Borisoglebsk and Baltimor in Voronezh Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the Russian military bases Su-34 fighter-bombers and Su-35 fighter aircraft at these airfields and that the strikes damaged fuel storage facilities and unspecified aviation weapons. Radio Svoboda published satellite imagery captured on August 14 indicating that Ukrainian strikes damaged a warehouse at the Savasleyka Air Base.[57]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian officials are taking steps to consolidate and coordinate the management of ongoing Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast while continuing to highlight Ukrainian advances.
- Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued advancing in some areas in Kursk Oblast amid a generally slower tempo of Ukrainian operations in the area.
- Russian forces are maintaining their relatively high offensive tempo in Donetsk Oblast, demonstrating that the Russian military command continues to prioritize advances in eastern Ukraine even as Ukraine is pressuring Russian forces within Kursk Oblast.
- The Kremlin and the Russian military command are creating a complicated, overlapping, and so far, ineffective command and control (C2) structure for the Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.
- The delayed establishment of a complicated Russian C2 structure in Kursk Oblast continues to highlight the fact that the Kremlin failed to plan for the possibility of a significant Ukrainian incursion into Russia.
- The Kremlin appears to have a more coordinated approach to securing its control over the Russian information space than to addressing its military and C2 problems in Kursk Oblast.
- The Kremlin is likely trying to hastily create a new information space that predominantly features coopted Russian milbloggers and established Russian state propagandists.
- Ukrainian forces are reportedly using Western-provided equipment in Kursk Oblast but remain limited in their ability to strike Russian military targets within Russia with Western-provided weapons.
- Ukraine is organizing the creation of a humanitarian corridor through which to evacuate Russian civilians who are impacted by the ongoing Kursk operation, filling an apparent vacuum left by the Kursk Oblast administration and fulfilling international legal requirements for the evacuation of civilian populations.
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces successfully conducted drone strikes against Russian air bases in Russia on the night of August 13 to 14.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions.
- The Russian government submitted a bill on August 15 to lower the admission age for the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) from 18 years of age to 14.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 14, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros
August 14, 2024, 8pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00pm ET on August 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. [NOTE: Russian sources are currently shifting much of their reporting to cover the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and as a result are not providing the same level of detail about the situation along the frontline in Ukraine.]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast amid a generally slower tempo of Ukrainian operations as Russian forces continue attempts to stabilize the frontline in the area. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on August 14 that its sources in the Ukrainian military stated that the tempo of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast has slowed due to the increasing Russian resistance in the direction of Kursk City.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are gradually stabilizing the frontline in Kursk Oblast and that unspecified Russian reinforcements are arriving from unspecified areas and are establishing communications with Russian units already in the area.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced into Krasnooktyabrskoye (southwest of Korenevo and 15km from the international border).[3] Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows Ukrainian forces operating in eastern Zhuravli (west of Korenevo and 20km from the international border), indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced in the eastern part of the settlement.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Skrylevka, Levshinka, Semenovka, and Alekseevsky (all northeast of Korenevo near Kauchuk, which is 27km from the international border).[5] Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed that Ukrainian forces do not control Sudzha, although several other Russian sources claimed that fighting is ongoing in and around Sudzha and that neither side fully controls the settlement.[6] Geolocated footage published on August 14 showing a Ukrainian journalist reporting from central Sudzha indicates that Ukrainian forces control at least part of the settlement and like parts of its surroundings.[7] Suspilne's sources in the Ukrainian military stated that Ukrainian forces advanced beyond Martynovka (just northeast of Sudzha), although Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is still ongoing in the settlement.[8] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Mikhailovka (also northeast of Sudzha) remains under Ukrainian control, implying that Ukrainian forces had seized Mikhailovka at an unspecified previous date.[9] Geolocated footage published on August 14 showing Ukrainian forces operating just northwest of Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha) indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[10] Additional geolocated footage published on August 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in western Kamyshnoye (southeast of Sudzha).[11] Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows a Russian journalist reporting from Giri and Ozerki (both southeast of Sudzha and just east of Kamyshnoye), although Russian sources later claimed on August 14 that Ukrainian forces began operating near Giri and Belitsa (just north of Giri), suggesting that Ukrainian forces may be contesting the area east of Kamyshnoye.[12] Geolocated footage published on August 13 and 14 showing Ukrainian forces operating well within the maximalist claimed limit of Ukrainian advances indicates that Ukrainian forces also continue operating closer to the international border within Kursk Oblast.[13] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 14 that Russian forces continued to repel Ukrainian attempts to cross the Kolotilovka border checkpoint in Belgorod Oblast (on the international border southeast of Sudzha and northwest of Belgorod City).[14]
Ukrainian officials continue to discuss ongoing Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast and offer their interpretations of the political impact that Ukraine may aim to generate. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky held a meeting with Ukrainian officials on August 14 to discuss security, humanitarian aid, and military aspects of "the situation in Kursk Oblast."[15] Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets participated in the meeting and stressed that Ukrainian forces formed a "buffer (sanitary) zone" in Kursk Oblast for self-defense purposes.[16] Zelensky similarly stated that that Ukraine is focusing on the Kursk Oblast border area to ensure the safety of Ukraine's borders with Russia, echoing prior statements made by Ukrainian officials highlighting that Ukraine has the right to defend itself from Russian aggression.[17] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Mykhailo Podolyak emphasized in an interview with independent Russian-language outlet Meduza that Ukraine's main political goals of the ongoing Kursk operation are to push Russian artillery away from areas from which Russian forces can target Ukrainian civilians; to interdict Russian logistics lines that allow Russian forces to supply reserves throughout the entire theater; to bring domestic and international attention to Russia's civil and military leadership failures; and to bring the war directly to Russian territory.[18]
Ongoing Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast are generating tangible defensive, logistical, and security impacts within Russia. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Maxar on August 12 shows a newly dug series of field fortifications, including trenches and anti-vehicle ditches southwest of Lgov along the E38 Lgov-Rylsk-Hlukhiv highway (northwest of Sudzha).[19] Additional satellite imagery published on August 13 and collected between August 6 and 11 shows the recent appearance of field fortifications near the 38K-024 highway just south of Lgov.[20] These new fortifications are about 17 kilometers north of the furthest claimed limit of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, which suggests that Russian forces are concerned about potential continued and rapid Ukrainian mechanized northward advances within Kursk Oblast. Russian forces appear particularly concerned about major highways and are likely trying to preemptively safeguard important ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to inhibit Ukrainian maneuver, particularly along the E38 and 38K routes. Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast are also reportedly impacting Russian railway logistics — the Belarusian Railway Workers Community claimed on August 13 that its internal sources are reporting that Russian state-owned railway company Russian Railways informed Belarusian state-owned railway company Belarusian Railways to stop directing trains from all Belarusian Railway stations to stations along the Oryol-Kursk branch of the Moscow Railway starting on August 12 due to a "large-scale operational transfer of troops in the direction of Kursk Oblast" and the movement of freight trains for military logistical purposes.[21] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov also announced a state of emergency in Belgorod Oblast on August 14, which will allow Belgorod Oblast authorities the power to restrict movement within emergency areas likely either to secure Russian logistical support for Belgorod Oblast border areas or Russian defensive measures within Kursk Oblast.[22]
The Russian government continues recruitment efforts to support operations in Kursk Oblast. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on August 14 that Russian forces will send conscripts of the spring draft class from Moscow, Leningrad, Kaliningrad, Sverdlovsk, Murmansk, and Samara Oblasts to aid Russian forces fighting in Kursk Oblast, drawing backlash from human rights activists and relatives who are protesting the use of conscripts in active combat.[23] Russian opposition outlets reported on August 14 that Russian forces are forcing conscripts who survived the initial Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast to sign contracts with the Russian MoD return to the front in Kursk Oblast.[24]
Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov seems to be posturing himself as the spokesperson for the Russian defense in Kursk Oblast, but his claims have consistently been false and largely contradict claims made by relatively reliable Russian milbloggers. Alaudinov has portrayed himself as a spokesperson for Russian forces defending Kursk Oblast since the start of the Ukrainian incursion on August 6, leveraging his position as a seasoned Chechen commander as well as the position of Chechen forces operating in the area to establish himself as an authority on the defense of Kursk Oblast to Russian state media.[25] Alaudinov has repeatedly claimed that Russian forces have stabilized the situation and achieved various victories in Kursk Oblast, and claimed on August 14 that Ukrainian forces do not control Sudzha and that Russian forces have "blocked" Ukrainian forces within Kursk Oblast – claims that are both demonstrably false given available visual evidence and which contradict the majority of Russian milblogger claims.[26] Many Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces control either significant parts or all of Sudzha as of August 14 and have consistently claimed that Russian forces are struggling to respond to the Ukrainian incursion - very far from Alaudinov's claims that Russian forces have completely stabilized the situation.[27] Alaudinov's claims have focused on portraying Russian forces as a capable defensive force that is defeating inept Ukrainian forces and have therefore leaned on several Kremlin information operations to this effect.[28] Alaudinov's framing of himself, and by extension of the Chechen forces under his command, as a capable defensive body is also dissonant with the widespread perception of the efficacy of Chechen forces within the wider Russian information space. Russian milbloggers have consistently criticized Chechen units operating in Ukraine and near the international border for avoiding combat missions and having poor discipline, and Russian sources made similar complaints about Chechen forces operating in Kursk Oblast following the start of the incursion.[29] Alaudinov may be attempting to rehabilitate the image of Chechen forces by portraying himself as a trustworthy source of information, but at his claims highlight the dissonance between the messaging of prominent Russian military commanders, the Russian information space, and the current battlefield reality in Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russian air bases in Russia on the night of August 13 to 14, damaging several airfields. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked the Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Ukrainian military on August 14 for conducting drone strikes against unspecified Russian air bases.[30] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on August 14 that its sources in the SBU stated that the Ukrainian SBU, GUR, Special Operations Forces (SSO), and Unmanned Systems Forces conducted drone strikes against Russian military air bases in Kursk City, Voronezh City, Borisoglebsk in Voronezh Oblast, and Savasleyka in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and characterized the strike as the largest Ukrainian attack on Russian air bases since the start of the war.[31] The SBU sources also stated that Ukraine targeted these air bases to prevent Russian forces aircraft from using these bases to conduct glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian frontline forces and civilian areas. Geolocated footage published on August 13 demonstrates the sound of explosions resulting from Ukrainian strikes as heard from somewhere near Voronezh City, roughly 3.5 kilometers north of the Baltimor Air Base in Voronezh City.[32] Satellite imagery captured on August 14 of the Borisoglebsk Air Base indicates that Ukrainian strikes damaged several hangars, likely near the location aircraft repair and maintenance building, and may have damaged an aircraft.[33] Geolocated footage published on August 14 shows a drone striking the Savasleyka Air Base and the subsequent explosion, and a Ukrainian source speculated that the strike damaged a Russian MiG-31 supersonic interceptor aircraft, which can carry Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles.[34] ISW cannot independently verify the results of the Ukrainian strikes at this time.
Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party furthered a narrative echoing a Kremlin information operation meant to justify Russia’s violence against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states formerly colonized by the Soviet Union and Russian Empire. The Georgian Dream party accused former Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili on August 13 of provoking Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 and the Kremlin's subsequent illegal occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at the behest of unspecified "external actors."[35] Georgian Dream's Political Council stated that it must conduct a “legal process” informing the Georgian public of Saakashvili's and his United National Movement Party's reportedly "treasonous actions." Georgian Dream's statements blame Saakashvili, not Russia, for the 2008 war and occupation of Georgian territory and instead justified Russia’s actions, which have been condemned by the international community.[36] The narrative of the Georgian Dream party closely echoes the Kremlin’s information operations regarding the Russo-Georgian war, wider information operations used to justify Russia‘s war against Ukraine, and increasing threats against Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.[37] Russia has repeatedly accused pro-Western and pro-democratic leaders in neighboring countries of cooperating with "external actors" at the detriment of Russian interests while simultaneously conducting lawfare to in an attempt to justify invasion, occupation, and hybrid operations against sovereign countries. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger took note Georgian Dream's statements and amplified the Kremlin’s previous accusations against Saakashvili and the West at large, suggesting that this narrative may gain traction in the wider information space.[38]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast amid a generally slower tempo of Ukrainian operations as Russian forces continue attempts to stabilize the frontline in the area.
- Ukrainian officials continue to discuss ongoing Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast and offer their interpretations of the political impact that Ukraine may aim to generate.
- Ongoing Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast are generating tangible defensive, logistical, and security impacts within Russia.
- The Russian government continues recruitment efforts to support operations in Kursk Oblast.
- Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov seems to be posturing himself as the spokesperson for the Russian defense in Kursk Oblast, but his claims have consistently been false and largely contradict claims made by relatively reliable Russian milbloggers.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russian air bases in Russia on the night of August 13 to 14, damaging several airfields.
- Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party furthered a narrative echoing a Kremlin information operation meant to justify Russia’s violence against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states formerly colonized by the Soviet Union and Russian Empire.
- Russian forces advanced north of Kharkiv City and southeast of Pokrovsk.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 13, 2024, 9:30pm ET
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian officials provided updates about the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and outlined several Ukrainian objectives of the operations in the area. Zelensky stated on August 3 that Ukrainian forces "control" 74 localities in Kursk Oblast.[1] It is unclear if Zelensky meant that Ukrainian forces are operating in 74 settlements or if he was referring to another type of geographic administrative units. ISW has observed claims and geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces are operating in or near roughly 41 settlements in Kursk Oblast as of August 13, although there are many extremely small settlements and localities within this area that ISW has not included in this count. Discrepancies between Ukrainian official reporting and ISW's observed claims and geolocated footage are not a refutation of Ukrainian official reporting but rather are a result of the inherent limitations of ISW's open-source methodology and commitment to using only publicly available information. ISW does not assess that Ukrainian forces control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of claimed Ukrainian advances according to the definition of "control" that ISW uses. Zelensky also stated that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in Kursk Oblast and grow Ukraine's "exchange fund," likely referring to Russian military personnel taken as prisoners of war (POWs).[2] Zelensky stated that Russian forces had conducted almost 2,100 artillery strikes from Kursk Oblast against Sumy Oblast since June 1, 2024, and that Ukraine's operations into Kursk Oblast are intended to secure Ukraine's borders from the Russian military.[3] Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi stated on August 13 that Ukraine is not interested in seizing territory in Kursk Oblast.[4] Tykhyi stated that Ukraine needs to protect itself from Russian strikes and push Russian forces away from Russian border areas that Russia uses to strike Ukraine. Tykhyi also noted that Ukrainian operations into Kursk Oblast prevent the Russian military from transferring additional military units to Donetsk Oblast and complicate Russian military logistics.
Tykhyi emphasized that Ukraine is not violating international law and is within its rights to defend itself from Russian aggression, and US officials reiterated a similar sentiment on August 12 and 13. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby and US State Department Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel stated on August 12 and 13 in response to questions about Russia's reactions to Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast that Russia is conducting a war of aggression against Ukraine and that a quick solution to the Ukrainian incursion into Russia would be for Russian forces to leave Ukraine.[5]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in Kursk Oblast amid Russian attempts to stabilize the frontline in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have not completely stabilized the situation in Kursk Oblast despite ongoing efforts to stabilize the frontline and repel Ukrainian attacks.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in the fields north of Snagost (south of Korenovo), and geolocated footage published on August 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Korenovo.[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Obshchy Kolodez (northeast of Korenevo and 30 kilometers from the international border) and Alekseevsky (northwest of Korenovo and 27km from the international border), and geolocated footage published on August 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Alekseevsky.[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue attacking Koronevo and Tolpino (just north of Koronevo).[9] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Pogrebki (north of Sudzha and 17km from the international border).[10] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to gain a foothold near Bolshoye Soldatskoye (northeast of Sudzha and 27km from the international border).[11] Geolocated footage published on August 12 shows Ukrainian forces operating in eastern Plekhovo (south of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting was ongoing in the settlement as of the evening of August 12, although a milblogger later claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces from the settlement on August 13.[12] Geolocated footage published on August 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Giri (southwest of Sudzha), although ISW cannot confirm a Ukrainian presence in Giri at this time.[13] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack in Giri, however.[14] Geolocated footage published on August 12 and 13 showing Ukrainian forces operating well within the maximalist claimed limit of Ukrainian advances indicates that Ukrainian forces continue operating closer to the international border in Kursk Oblast and within Sudzha.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 13 that Russian forces continued to repel Ukrainian attempts to cross the Kolotilovka border checkpoint in Belgorod Oblast (on the international border southeast of Sudzha and northwest of Belgorod City).[16]
The Russian military command may be pulling select elements of Russian irregular units from Donetsk Oblast to address the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast. Russian sources claimed as of August 12 and 13 that elements of the Russian "Pyatnashka" Brigade's "Sarmat" Battalion and the Russian Volunteer Crops recently transferred to Kursk Oblast.[17] ISW has recently observed claims that elements of the "Sarmat" Battalion and other elements of the "Pyatnashka" Brigade and Russian Volunteer Corps are operating in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions in Donetsk Oblast.[18] Russian milbloggers previously claimed that elements of the "Dikaya Division of Donbas," the "Pyatnashka" Brigade, the "Arbat" Separate Guards Special Purpose Battalion, and the "Night Wolves" drone detachment responded to the incursion and quickly redeployed to Kursk Oblast, and ISW had previously observed these units purportedly operating throughout Donetsk Oblast.[19] Irregular battalions such as the "Sarmat" Battalion are almost never fully staffed to the doctrinal end strength and even when deployed in full are still largely comprised of relatively small units. Some elements of these irregular units likely remain in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions as these are the Russian military's assessed priority sectors of the frontline in Ukraine and the Kremlin and Russian military command are unlikely to pull entire units actively engaged in combat operations from these priority sectors to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[20]
The Russian military command could also be redeploying units that were previously intended to relieve or reinforce frontline units from rear areas in Donetsk Oblast to Kursk Oblast, and such a redeployment could affect the tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Russian military's assessed priority sectors over time. ISW would likely not observe confirmation of such re-deployments in the open source and is not prepared to offer assessments about the tempo of Russian operations in those sectors at this time. A prominent Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on August 9 that the Russian military command is redeploying operational reserves from the Kharkiv direction and other unspecified directions where Russian forces have achieved "limited successes" in recent months.[21] The Russian military command may have re-deployed unspecified units that were previously intended to relieve or reinforce frontline Russian units from rear areas of the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, or Pokrovsk directions, which could affect Russia's ability to sustain the tempo of its offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in the medium-term. It is unlikely that such redeployments would immediately affect the tempo of Russian offensive operations, however, and recent reports that Russian forces are struggling to make further advances in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions are not likely indicative of such redeployments.[22] It is not uncommon for Russian offensive operations to stall in one sector before intensifying in another as Russian forces have historically struggled to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations and are prone to conducting offensive operations in "pulses" along different sectors of the front.[23] Russian forces may be entering a brief lull before renewing offensive operations in one of these three sectors, and it would likely take several weeks to observe any possible impacts of such redeployments on Russian operations in Donetsk Oblast. Russian authorities will likely remain extremely averse to pulling Russian military units engaged in combat from the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, or Pokrovsk directions and will likely continue deploying limited numbers of irregular forces to Kursk Oblast due to concerns about further slowing the tempo of Russian operations in these higher priority directions.
Russian authorities appear to be largely relying on Russian conscripts, and elements of some regular and irregular military units pulled from less critical sectors of the frontline to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian Federal Security Service [FSB] border guards, Russian conscripts and reserves, and elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz responded to the Ukrainian incursion on August 6 and 7, and Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz forces, including elements of the "Aida" Battalion, have continued to engage Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast.[24] Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz are also reportedly operating throughout the frontline in Ukraine, including in Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts.[25] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and two unspecified airborne (VDV) battalions have also reportedly redeployed from the Kherson direction to Kursk Oblast, and ISW has also observed recent claims that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were recently operating near Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast.[26] The Russian MoD confirmed on August 13 that artillery elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces were redeployed from northern Kharkiv Oblast to Kursk Oblast following previous Russian and Ukrainian reporting about such redeployments.[27]
Two Ukrainian military observers recently stated that elements of the Russian 38th and 64th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently re-deployed to Kursk Oblast, and unspecified elements of the 38th and 64th motorized rifle brigade were recently reportedly operating near Hulyaipole (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[28] The Ukrainian military observers also stated that elements of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and elements of the 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) recently redeployed from the Kupyansk direction to Kursk Oblast, which is consistent with recent claims about these units' locations.[29] Russian conscripts, including conscripts of the Russian 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), have also reportedly engaged Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast.[30] ISW cannot independently verify any of these reports. Redeployments of conscripts, elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and select units from less critical frontline areas in Ukraine would suggest that the Russian military command has determined that possible disruptions to the offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and other less-critical frontline areas are an acceptable risk to adequately respond to the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly appointed Russian Presidential Aid Aide Alexei Dyumin to supervise Russia’s “counterterrorism operation” in Kursk Oblast on August 12.[31] Russian State Duma Deputy from Kursk Oblast Nikolai Ivanov claimed that his unnamed sources confirmed that Putin entrusted Dyumin with overseeing the counterterrorist operation in Kursk Oblast after inviting him for an evening meeting on August 12.[32] Dyumin was the only non-cabinet member not connected with the military or security services who was present at Putin‘s meeting with Russian military, security, and federal and regional government officials about the situation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 12.[33] Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers and Russian insider sources similarly claimed that Dyumin assumed full powers to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, but the Kremlin did not publish an official confirmation of Dyumin’s assignment.[34] One insider source claimed that Putin directed Dyumin to coordinate all agencies involved in repelling Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.[35]One Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that he had seen a state media report announcing that Dyumin became the commander of the Russian Sever (northern) direction in Ukraine, but later claimed that he received information to the contrary.[36] Dyumin is a trusted official within Putin’s close circle who is Putin’s former bodyguard and former Tula Oblast governor and reportedly played a decisive role in negotiations to end the Wagner Group armed rebellion in June 2023.[37] Dyumin’s appointment is not inherently noteworthy as it is likely part of Putin’s efforts to ensure that his agencies are actively working in a coordinated fashion and under the direct control of his presidential administration to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and that he remains apprised of the situation.
Dyumin’s alleged appointment sparked widespread speculation among Russian milbloggers and political commentators about Putin’s disappointment in Russian security agencies and speculations about an upcoming military-political reshuffling. Several Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers claimed that Dyumin’s appointment was a sign that “Putin’s team” was taking full control over the situation in Kursk Oblast after Russian security forces failed to resolve the situation without Moscow’s direct intervention over the past week.[38] Several milbloggers also suggested that Dyumin’s appointment means that Putin seeks to find out why and how he was deceived about the real situation in Kursk Oblast, and many speculated that Dyumin’s report will determine the fate of several high-ranking Russian officials and commanders.[39] Some milblogggers and political commentators continued to speculate that Dyumin is preparing to become the next defense minister.[40] This speculation is not new, however, given that some Russian milbloggers have long advocated for Dyumin’s to become defense minister.[41]
Russian officials continue to undermine a long-standing Kremlin information operation that falsely portrays Ukraine as unwilling to engage in legitimate, good-faith negotiations and places the onus for peace negotiations on Ukraine. Russian First Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Dmitry Polyansky claimed on August 13 that Ukrainian authorities chose "escalation" and further military operations when Ukraine began its incursion into Kursk Oblast.[42] Polyansky claimed that Ukraine deserves nothing but "total defeat and unconditional capitulation" in response to its incursion. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is only interested in a negotiated settlement that results in complete Ukrainian capitulation and that any Russian statements to the contrary are intended to delude the West into making pre-emptive concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and territory integrity.[43]
Russian authorities fined Telegram and WhatsApp four million rubles ($44,000) each for failing to remove "prohibited" content on August 13.[44] Moscow’s Tagansky District Court fined Telegram four million rubles in November 2023 for failing to remove false information about the Russian Armed Forces and information aimed at destabilizing Russia.[45] ISW has previously observed reports that the Russian government is considering stricter measures to directly censor critical voices on Russian social media as part of its efforts to cement control over the Russian information space. This includes requiring applications such as Telegram to develop new rules for user verification and content moderation.[46]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian officials provided updates about the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and outlined several Ukrainian objectives of the operations in the area.
- Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in Kursk Oblast amid Russian attempts to stabilize the frontline in the area.
- The Russian military command may be pulling select elements of Russian irregular units from Donetsk Oblast to address the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.
- Russian authorities appear to be largely relying on Russian conscripts, and elements of some regular and irregular military units pulled from less critical sectors of the frontline to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion, however.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly appointed Russian Presidential Aid Aide Alexei Dyumin to supervise Russia’s “counterterrorism operation” in Kursk Oblast on August 12
- Russian officials continue to undermine a long-standing Kremlin information operation that falsely portrays Ukraine as unwilling to engage in legitimate, good-faith negotiations and places the onus for peace negotiations on Ukraine.
- Russian authorities fined Telegram and WhatsApp four million rubles ($44,000) each for failing to remove "prohibited" content on August 13.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to use the Army-2024 International Military-Technical Forum in Moscow to expand its international defense ties.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 12, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 12, 2024, 8:30pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. [NOTE: Russian sources are currently shifting much of their reporting to cover the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and as a result are not providing the same level of detail about the situation along the frontline in Ukraine.]
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray himself as an effective and knowledgeable manager of the situation along the Ukrainian-Russian border and to shift responsibility for ongoing challenges in responding to the Ukrainian incursion in the area to other Russian military and government officials. Putin held a meeting on August 12 with Russian military, security, and federal and regional government officials about the situation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts during which he assigned tasks to the Russian military and security structures in Kursk Oblast and offered his assessments of the political situation surrounding Ukraine's incursion into Russia.[1] Putin chastised Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexei Smirnov for speaking about issues that Putin deemed to be solely under the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) purview and instructed Smirnov to only speak about the socio-economic situation in Kursk Oblast. Putin also responded to First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov's claim that "all other issues are under control," noting that Manturov failed to speak about several key social issues. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov asked Putin directly to implement certain social policies to help civilians in Belgorod Oblast but Gladkov and Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz both avoided Putin's ire by not commenting on military issues. Putin's assertion that each official has only one responsibility contrasts with his attempt to frame himself as capable of overseeing and competently understanding the political, socio-economic, and military situation along the international border. The Kremlin published footage and text of the Bryansk, Belgorod, and Kursk oblasts heads' reports to Putin about the issues Russian regional authorities are currently facing — likely in order to publicly depict the regional heads as responsible for these issues and in need of Putin's help. The Kremlin notably did not publish footage or text from the part of the meeting in which the Russian military and security officials likely reported to Putin.
The Kremlin's decision to publish footage showing Putin chastising senior Russian officials is likely a warning to other Russian officials to refrain from commenting about the Ukrainian incursion into Russia. The Kremlin published a half-hour video of Putin meeting with senior Russian military, security, and government officials showing Putin reprimanding Russian federal and regional officials for their perceived effort to address matters outside of their designated responsibility and for their perceived failure to address civilian issues.[2] The Kremlin's decision to publish a video of the meeting alongside a transcript of Putin's meeting with Russian officials sends a clear message to other government officials to refrain from commenting on the Kremlin's, the Russian military's, and Russian security forces' decision-making and operations to repel Ukrainian forces from Russia and mitigate related civilian issues. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on August 8 that a source close to the Russian Federation Council's defense committee stated that the Russian Presidential Administration recommended that Russian deputies and senators not comment on the events in Kursk Oblast "until further notice" or discuss it as briefly as possible and refer only to official statements.[3] Putin and senior Russian military and security officials are likely attempting to control official narratives about the situation in Kursk Oblast and prevent domestic discontent that could threaten the Kremlin's stability.
Putin delegated overlapping tasks to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Federal Security Service (FSB), and Rosgvardia in the Ukrainian-Russian border area — further highlighting how the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast is struggling to establish the joint command and control (C2) structures necessary to coordinate operations. Putin stated that the Russian MoD's main task is to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory.[4] Putin tasked the Russian MoD and Border Service (subordinated to the FSB) to "ensure reliable coverage of the state border." Putin stated that the FSB and Rosgvardia must "fight against [Ukrainian] sabotage and reconnaissance groups," while Rosgvardia also conducts "its own combat missions." Putin stated that the FSB and Rosgvardia must also ensure the counterterrorism operation regime and that the FSB, with Rosgvardia's support, is standing up a "headquarters" — likely referring to a headquarters to manage the ongoing counterterrorism operation.[5] Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexei Smirnov claimed that Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov, who is reportedly the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces, arrived in Kursk Oblast and is coordinating "with all security forces."[6] It is unclear at this time if the Kremlin has designated Nikiforov as an overall commander of Russian military and security forces in Kursk Oblast or if Nikiforov is operating within the FSB-led counterterrorism operation headquarters.
Smirnov claimed that Russian forces are having unspecified issues since there is "no clear front line" and it is unclear where the "military units" are located — likely referring to Ukrainian forces quickly engaging Russian forces near a settlement and then withdrawing from the area, which is reportedly leading to conflicting Russian reporting from the ground about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast.[7] Putin appears to be tasking the FSB and Rosgvardia with countering Ukrainian "mobile groups" that have been operating deeper into Kursk Oblast, while simultaneously tasking the FSB, Rosgvardia, and Russian MoD with conducting defensive and offensive operations in the region. ISW continues to assess that the disparate Russian force grouping responding to the Ukrainian incursion is complicating Russia's ability to establish the C2 structures necessary to coordinate operations.[8]
Putin offered several assessments about Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast, including one that undermined a long-standing Kremlin information operation falsely portraying Ukraine as unwilling to engage in legitimate, good-faith negotiations and putting the onus for peace negotiations on Ukraine. Putin claimed that Ukraine is "indiscriminately strik[ing] civilians, [striking] civilian infrastructure, and threaten[ing] nuclear power facilities" and implied that Russia cannot conduct good-faith negotiations with an actor who commits such actions.[9] Putin unironically but hypocritically accused Ukraine of striking civilians and endangering the nuclear power plants — actions that ISW has thoroughly documented Russia committing in Ukraine with strikes against civilian targets since the start of the full-scale invasion and the endangerment of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) since the Russian military occupied it in March 2022.[10] Putin also claimed, however, that Ukraine may be conducting operations into Kursk Oblast in order to "improve its negotiating position in the future."[11] Putin's assessment inherently implies that Ukraine is interested in negotiations — undermining the Kremlin's ongoing attempts to portray Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate. Putin also claimed that Ukraine may be conducting operations into Kursk Oblast to prevent Russian advances in eastern Ukraine and to destabilize the Russian domestic political situation. Putin notably did not present one assessment of Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast as more likely than another and did not present them as mutually exclusive. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast or Putin's claims of Ukrainian intent.
Ukrainian forces appear to be advancing further within Kursk Oblast despite recent milblogger claims that Russian forces were stabilizing the frontline in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 11 that Ukrainian offensive activity decreased in Kursk Oblast; however, a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger refuted these claims on August 12 and noted that Russian forces are far from stabilizing the situation, in part due to poor C2.[12] Ukrainian forces reportedly launched new incursions into western Kursk Oblast near Slobodka-Ivanovka (northwest of Sumy City and two kilometers from the international border), Tetkino (south of Slobodka-Ivanovka along the international border), Gordeevka, Uspenka, and Viktorovka (all north of Sumy City along the international border and south of Korenevo).[13] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Slobodka-Ivanovka, Uspenivka, and Viktorovka.[14] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Snagost (south of Korenevo) and Kremyanoye (east of Snagost) and that Ukrainian forces are attacking north and south of Korenevo in an attempt to bypass the settlement.[15] Geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Kremyanoye and east of Zhuravli (northeast of Korenevo), and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Zhuravli towards Obshchy Kolodez (northeast of Korenevo and 30 kilometers from the international border).[16] Additional geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in a forest area north and east of Semenovka (south of Lgov and roughly 24 kilometers from the international border) during a likely battalion-sized mechanized assault in the direction of Kauchuk (south of Lgov and 27 kilometers from the international border), although the exact contours of Ukraine's advance are unclear.[17]
Geolocated footage published on August 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating in Sudzha and northern Zaoleshenka (west of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized Sudzha and Spalnoye (southeast of Sudzha).[18] Additional geolocated footage published on August 12 shows Ukrainian vehicles operating in northern Giri (southeast of Sudzha and 13 kilometers from the international border) and Russian forces ambushing Ukrainian forces in central Giri, indicating that Ukrainian forces at least temporarily advanced into the settlement, although it is unclear if Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Borki (southeast of Sudzha), suggesting that Ukrainian forces likely advanced into Giri from the west.[20] Geolocated footage published on August 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating in Darino (northwest of Sudzha and three kilometers from the international border).[21] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted cross-border incursions with armored vehicle support from Sumy Oblast northwest of Grayvoron, Belgorod Oblast near Kolotilovka and Prelesye and south of Grayvoron near Bezymeno.[22]
Regional Russian officials appear to be offering notably frank assessments of the ongoing Ukrainian incursion. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov expressed concern on August 12 about "alarming" Ukrainian activity along the border with Belgorod Oblast.[23] Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov claimed on August 12 that Ukrainian forces have seized 28 settlements in Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces have advanced roughly 12 kilometers deep along a 40-kilometer-long front into Kursk Oblast.[24] ISW has observed claims and geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces are operating in or near 29 settlements in Kursk Oblast as of August 11 and 40 settlements as of August 12. ISW has observed geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces have recently operated up to 24 kilometers from the international border, and Smirnov's assessed width of the frontline appears to cohere with the area where the majority of fighting is ongoing between Snagost and Plekhovo.
Senior Ukrainian officials provided updates about the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and warned that Russian forces may stage war crimes in Kursk Oblast in order to discredit Ukraine and Western support for Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 12 that Ukrainian force "control" roughly 1,000 square kilometers of Russian territory, presumably within Kursk Oblast.[25] ISW has observed claims that Ukrainian forces have advanced roughly 800 square kilometers as of August 12, although ISW does not assess that Ukrainian forces control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of claimed Ukrainian advances. ISW assesses that Russian forces occupied an additional 1,175 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory between January and July 2024, including areas seized both in the face of prepared Ukrainian defenses and during the Russian attack into northern Kharkiv Oblast. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive operations into Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged the ongoing Ukrainian operation.[26] Zelensky noted that the Ukrainian government is preparing a plan to address humanitarian issues in areas of Kursk Oblast where Ukrainian forces are operating. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that Russian special services are seizing on the ongoing Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast to falsely accuse Ukrainian forces of committing war crimes and warned that Russian special services may stage crimes against civilians in Kursk Oblast in order to further accuse Ukrainian forces of committing war crimes.[27]
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a drone strike against a Russian airbase in Moscow Oblast on the night of August 11 to 12. Russian opposition outlet Astra amplified footage on August 12 purportedly of Russian air defense systems intercepting Ukrainian drones over Shchyolkovo, Moscow Oblast near Chkalovsky Military Air Base.[28] Astra reported that unspecified pro-war Russian Telegram channels claimed that Russian forces successfully repelled a Ukrainian drone strike. No Russian official sources commented on the strike.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray himself as an effective and knowledgeable manager of the situation along the Ukrainian-Russian border and to shift responsibility for ongoing challenges in responding to the Ukrainian incursion in the area to other Russian military and government officials.
- The Kremlin's decision to publish footage showing Putin chastising senior Russian officials is likely a warning to other Russian officials to refrain from commenting about the Ukrainian incursion into Russia.
- Putin delegated overlapping tasks to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Federal Security Service (FSB), and Rosgvardia in the Ukrainian-Russian border area — further highlighting how the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast is struggling to establish the joint command and control (C2) structures necessary to coordinate operations.
- Putin offered several assessments about Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast, including one that undermined a long-standing Kremlin information operation falsely portraying Ukraine as unwilling to engage in legitimate, good-faith negotiations and putting the onus for peace negotiations on Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces appear to be advancing further within Kursk Oblast despite recent milblogger claims that Russian forces were stabilizing the frontline in Kursk Oblast.
- Regional Russian officials appear to be offering notably frank assessments of the ongoing Ukrainian incursion.
- Senior Ukrainian officials provided updates about the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and warned that Russian forces may stage war crimes in Kursk Oblast in order to discredit Ukraine and Western support for Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a drone strike against a Russian airbase in Moscow Oblast on the night of August 11 to 12.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) emphasized Russia's international defense ties at the Army-2024 International Military-Technical Forum in Moscow, likely in an effort to expand international military-technical cooperation and posture strong defense relations with Russia-friendly states
Click here to read the full report with maps
Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros
August 11, 2024, 9:15pm ET
Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast has allowed Ukrainian forces to at least temporarily seize the battlefield initiative in one area of the frontline and contest Russia's theater-wide initiative. Russia's possession of the theater-wide initiative since November 2023 has allowed Russia to determine the location, time, scale, and requirements of fighting in Ukraine and forced Ukraine to expend materiel and manpower in reactive defensive operations.[1] The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast, however, has forced the Kremlin and Russian military command to react and redeploy forces and means to the sector where Ukrainian forces have launched attacks. Russian forces, however, were notably not conducting active operations in Kursk Oblast. Russia has been leveraging its possession of the theater-wide initiative to pressure Ukraine and attempt to prevent Ukrainian forces from accumulating manpower and materiel for future counteroffensive operations while determining a tempo of fighting that would allow Russian forces to sustain consistent ongoing offensive operations.[2] Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command likely incorrectly assessed that Ukraine lacked the capability to contest the initiative, and Ukraine's ability to achieve operational surprise and contest the theater-wide initiative is challenging the operational and strategic assumptions underpinning current Russian offensive efforts in Ukraine.
The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast and further possible Ukrainian cross-border incursions force a decision point on the Kremlin and the Russian military command about whether to view the thousand-kilometer-long international border with northeastern Ukraine as a legitimate frontline that Russia must defend instead of a dormant area of the theater as they have treated it since Fall 2022. Moscow’s response may require the Russian military command to consider the manpower and materiel requirements for defending the international border as part of its theater-wide campaign design and can therefore impose long-term operational planning constraints that Russia previously did not face. The Russian military command has essentially treated the international border with northeastern Ukraine as the dormant front of the theater following the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts in Spring 2022 and the Ukrainian liberation of significant territory in Kharkiv Oblast in Fall 2022. Russian and Ukrainian forces have conducted routine sabotage and reconnaissance activities, indirect fire, and cross-border strikes along the border since Fall 2022, but none of this routine activity has appeared to generate wider Russian operational concerns for defending Russian territory in the area. Russia has sought to use the threat of cross-border incursions to draw and fix Ukrainian forces along the border by concentrating rear elements in the border zone, but Ukrainian concentrations in the area do not appear to have generated such responses among Russian forces.[3] The Russian military activated part of this "dormant frontline" when it launched the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast in early May 2024 — a Russian effort to extend the frontline further into northeastern Ukraine to draw and fix Ukrainian forces along the border in hopes of weakening the overall Ukrainian frontline in aggregate.[4]
Previous notable incursions into Russia did not change the Kremlin's perception of the international border area, but the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast will force the Kremlin to make a decision. All Russian pro-Ukrainian forces have conducted several cross-border raids into Russia since Fall 2022, but the Kremlin and the Russian military command resisted calls for redeploying forces to protect the border at that time.[5] Russian President Vladimir Putin assessed at that time that those limited raids posed no medium- to long-term threat to Russian territory and that redeployments to the international border would be a less effective allocation of resources that could otherwise support large-scale defensive and offensive operations in Ukraine.[6] The current Ukrainian incursion, however, poses significant threats to Russian military operations in Ukraine and Putin's regime stability and demands a response.[7] The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast will likely expand the Kremlin's consideration for what type of Ukrainian operations are possible along the border. Russia's prolonged treatment of the international border area as a dormant frontline is a strategic failure in imagination.
Russia's treatment of the international border area as a dormant front has given Russia more flexibility to accumulate and commit manpower and material to military operations in Ukraine. Russia has spent considerable resources to build fortifications along the international border area but has not allocated the manpower and materiel to significantly man and defend those fortifications.[8] Sparsely manned and equipped border fortifications proved insufficient at preventing Ukrainian gains at the outset of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, and the Russian military command will likely conclude that further manpower and equipment commitments to the international border will be required to effectively leverage fortified positions to prevent possible future Ukrainian cross-border incursions and deter larger Ukrainian incursion efforts in the long-term.[9] This conclusion will narrow the flexibility Russia has enjoyed in committing manpower and materiel to its ongoing offensive efforts in Ukraine, and the Russian military command will have to consider the requirements for border defense when determining what resources it can allocate to future large-scale offensive and defensive efforts in Ukraine.
Geolocated footage and Russian and Ukrainian reporting from August 10 and 11 indicate that Ukrainian forces advanced westward and northwestward in Kursk Oblast, although Russian sources largely claimed that Russian forces have stabilized the situation. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian offensive activity decreased in Kursk Oblast and that there were no significant changes to the frontline.[10] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in Snagost (south of Korenevo), and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to the settlement.[11] Geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating southeast of Korenevo.[12] Additional geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo).[13] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Olgovka (east of Korenevo and west of Kremyanoye), whereas other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only advanced near Olgovka and Kremyanoye.[14] Geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha).[15] Further geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating west of Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha).[16] Russian and Ukrainian sources offered contradictory statements about the status of Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha), with some Russian milbloggers claiming that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attempts to retake the settlement, and other Russian sources and Mashovets stating that Ukrainian forces reentered and seized Martynovka.[17] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are present in western Sudzha and west of Sudzha in Goncharovka and Zaoleshenka, but that central and eastern Sudzha are contested "gray zones."[18] Geolocated footage published on August 10 and 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating near Zaoleshenka, southeast of Goncharovka, and southwest of Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha).[19] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces are operating near Borki and Spalnoye (both southeast of Sudzha).[20] Additional geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating within Guevo (south of Sudzha).[21]
The hastily assembled and disparate Russian force grouping responding to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast is comprised of Russian units likely below their doctrinal end strength and ill-prepared to establish the joint command and control (C2) structures necessary to coordinate operations. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 11 that Russian forces have thus far redeployed roughly 10 to 11 battalions from across the theater to Kursk Oblast but suggested that these battalion units are below their intended end strength, likely further exacerbating the disorganization of the Russian response.[22] Mashovets reported that Russian forces have deployed to defend in Kursk Oblast: a reinforced motorized rifle battalion of the 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and up to three battalions from the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (both of the 44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) from the Northern Grouping of Forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast; one motorized rifle battalion of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) from the Kupyansk direction; up to two airborne (VDV) assault battalions of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) from within Kursk Oblast; units of an unspecified echelon of the 104th VDV Division from Kherson Oblast; one battalion possibly of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) from the Kherson direction that Mashovets assessed is more likely of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (BSF) from northern Kharkiv Oblast; and additional battalions of the 38th and 64th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), likely from the Zaporizhia direction.[23] Mashovets' reporting largely coheres with a report from another Ukrainian source on August 9 and contradicts widespread Russian milblogger claims on August 10 and 11 that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade are fighting near Sudzha and Martynovka.[24]
Russia’s redeployment of battalion and lower-level units rather than full brigades and regiments to defend in Kursk Oblast is likely contributing to Russian forces' difficulty in quickly establishing effective C2 in the area. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight reported that both Russian and Ukrainian forces will redeploy battalions across the frontline and that these battalions are often at the strength of reinforced companies due to manpower and materiel shortages, including newly-created units that are not fully staffed.[25] Frontelligence Insight noted that drone units often deploy separately from their parent units due to their higher mobility and combat effectiveness, and so observing drone activities in any given area of the theater does not necessarily mean that the drone element’s parent unit is operating in the vicinity.[26] The disorganized nature of regular Russian battalions, combined with the Russian decision to assign the defense of Kursk Oblast to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) rather than to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as well as the integration of conscripts, FSB personnel, and Rosgvardia elements in combat, will hinder the Russian effort to establish effective C2. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are likely attempting to buy time for further, more comprehensive force redeployments to defend in Kursk Oblast and focusing on minimizing the Ukrainian offensive effort rather than establishing a joint C2 structure.[27] A prominent, Kremlin-awarded, Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in Kursk Oblast are struggling to communicate with each other and often do not know the units operating on their flanks due to rapid redeployments of Russian units from different force groupings, ultimately undermining the integrity of the Russian defensive lines.[28]
Confusion about the status of Russian conscripts fighting in Kursk Oblast is a consequence of ineffective C2 and will likely continue to further strain Russia’s C2 structures to respond to the Kursk operation. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported that conscripts serving in the Kursk Oblast border area at the start of the Ukrainian operation received no orders prior to the start of the operation and were unable to carry out an order to retreat due to Ukrainian mortar fire.[29] Verstka assessed that Russian forces are likely attempting to gather conscripts in Kursk Oblast to return them to their units and noted that one source stated that there were about 100 conscripts in the oblast on August 6 and that conscripts may be at up to 15 positions near Sudzha.[30] Russian opposition outlet Agentstvo Novosti reported, citing a source within a Russian legal aid organization and a mother of two Russian conscripts, that Russian forces are declaring conscripts fighting in Kursk Oblast to be part of combat units in order to keep them fighting rather than allowing them to transfer to rear areas.[31] The poor communication among units indicates that Russian forces will likely struggle to interact with units comprised of conscripts without pressing them into conventional Russian units that deployed to Ukraine and that are now fighting in the Kursk area. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are withdrawing conscripts from the frontline, however.[32] Should conscripts remain in combat in Kursk Oblast, it may risk a political crisis and the Kremlin may need to explain conscript causalities to Russian society, as ISW has recently assessed.[33]
Russian officials acknowledged that Ukrainian mobile groups advanced upwards of 25 kilometers into Belovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast on the night of August 10 to 11, but there are no indications that these groups remain in the area or that Ukrainian forces are operating beyond the immediate border area in Belovsky Raion. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 11 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian "breakthrough attempt" in Belovsky Raion and that Russian aviation destroyed Ukrainian equipment near Ozerki (roughly 8 kilometers from the border with Sumy Oblast and 13 kilometers southwest of Belaya) and Ivanovsky (roughly 25 kilometers from the border with Sumy Oblast and three kilometers east of Belaya).[34] Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexei Smirnov claimed that Russian forces stabilized the situation after Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups entered Belovsky Raion and that there are no ongoing engagements in the area.[35] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces with a significant number of equipment and armored vehicles crossed the border with Sumy Oblast near Kucherovka and Goptarovka on the evening of August 10 and rapidly advanced to Belaya and the surrounding area.[36] Russian milbloggers described the event as a Ukrainian breakthrough and claimed that Ukrainian forces had rapidly seized tactically significant territory, although subsequent Russian claims suggest that the Ukrainian groups did not attempt to seize ground and that select Russian sources had initially exaggerated the size of the Ukrainian groups.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting was ongoing near Milyaevka and Goptarovka (within four kilometers of the border with Sumy Oblast) on the evening of August 10 but have yet to report fighting in the area on August 11.[38]
The reported rapid Ukrainian maneuver in Belovsky Raion suggests that Russian forces along the international border remain poorly prepared to respond to further Ukrainian cross-border incursions. Select Ukrainian mobile groups made rapid gains and similarly appeared not to attempt to hold territory in the first days of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.[39] The Russian military's continued inability to prevent rapid Ukrainian maneuver following the operational surprise that Ukrainian forces achieved at the outset of the operation in Kursk Oblast indicates that there are enduring exploitable Russian vulnerabilities along the international border with Ukraine.[40] The Kremlin and the Russian military command currently appear to be concentrating redeployments to stabilize the immediate frontline near Korenevo and Sudzha, and reinforcing positions in other border areas in Kursk Oblast and elsewhere along the international border appears to be a lower priority.[41] Poorly manned Russian positions along the border in part facilitated Ukraine's initial rapid gains in Kursk Oblast, and significant sectors of the border in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts and parts of Belgorod Oblast are likely sparsely manned.[42] The persisting issues with Russian C2 in Kursk Oblast will also further complicate Russia's ability to prevent rapid Ukrainian maneuver and quickly respond to any other possible Ukrainian cross-border incursions. Poor Russian communication, unclear delineation of responsibilities, and subpar coordination for reconnaissance and fire between Russian units along the border will likely create gaps that highly maneuverable Ukrainian groups can exploit.
Russian sources claimed on August 11 that small Ukrainian groups attempted unsuccessful limited cross-border incursions into western Belgorod Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that squad-sized Ukrainian mechanized groups unsuccessfully attempted to cross the border near Bezymeno (nine kilometers south of Grayvoron) and posted footage purporting to show Russian forces striking Ukrainian equipment in the area.[43] Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted similar unsuccessful cross-border assaults near Kolotilovka (13 kilometers west of Krasnaya Yaruga), although the majority of Russian sources denied these claims.[44] ISW has yet to observe geolocated evidence of Ukrainian forces operating in Belgorod Oblast.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky officially acknowledged the Ukrainian cross-border incursion into Kursk Oblast for the first time on August 10. Zelensky stated that he received reports from Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi about the frontline situation and Ukrainian forces' efforts to push the war onto Russian territory.[45] A Senior Ukrainian official reportedly told Agence-France-Presse (AFP) in an article published on August 11 that “thousands” of Ukrainian soldiers are participating in Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.[46] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov previously claimed on August 7 that about 1,000 Ukrainian soldiers attacked in Kursk Oblast.[47]
A top Ukrainian defense official reportedly stated that Russian forces have somewhat reduced the intensity of assaults in eastern Ukraine but that otherwise the situation remains largely unchanged amid the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast, which is consistent with ISW's observations of Russian offensive tempo across the theater.[48] The Ukrainian official told AFP that Russian forces continue to pressure Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine and that the Russian military command has not pulled back troops from eastern Ukraine.[49] Russian forces have maintained their tempo of offensive operations, particularly throughout Donetsk Oblast, since the start of the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast and are maintaining a similar pace of advance in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces also continue significant mechanized assaults southwest of Donetsk City.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast has allowed Ukrainian forces to at least temporarily seize the battlefield initiative in one area of the frontline and contest Russia's theater-wide initiative.
- The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast and further possible Ukrainian cross-border incursions force a decision point on the Kremlin and the Russian military command about whether to view the thousand-kilometer-long international border with northeastern Ukraine as a legitimate frontline that Russia must defend instead of a dormant area of the theater as they have treated it since Fall 2022. Moscow’s response may require the Russian military command to consider the manpower and materiel requirements for defending the international border as part of its theater-wide campaign design and can therefore impose long-term operational planning constraints that Russia previously did not face.
- Geolocated footage and Russian and Ukrainian reporting from August 10 and 11 indicate that Ukrainian forces advanced westward and northwestward in Kursk Oblast, although Russian sources largely claimed that Russian forces have stabilized the situation.
- The hastily assembled and disparate Russian force grouping responding to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast is comprised of Russian units likely below their doctrinal end-strength and ill-prepared to establish the joint command and control (C2) structures necessary to coordinate operations.
- Russia’s redeployment of battalion and lower-level units rather than full brigades and regiments to defend in Kursk Oblast is likely contributing to Russian forces' difficulty in quickly establishing effective C2 in the area.
- Confusion about the status of Russian conscripts fighting in Kursk Oblast is a consequence of ineffective C2 and will likely continues to further strain Russia’ C2 structures to respond to the Kursk operation.
- Russian officials acknowledged that Ukrainian mobile groups advanced upwards of 25 kilometers into Belovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast on the night of August 10 to 11, but there are no indications that these groups remain in the area or that Ukrainian forces are operating beyond the immediate border area in Belovsky Raion.
- The reported rapid Ukrainian maneuver in Belovsky Raion suggests that Russian forces along the international border remain poorly prepared to respond to further Ukrainian cross-border incursions.
- Russian sources claimed on August 11 that small Ukrainian groups attempted unsuccessful limited cross-border incursions into western Belgorod Oblast.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky officially acknowledged the Ukrainian cross-border incursion into Kursk Oblast for the first time on August 10.
- A top Ukrainian defense official reportedly stated that Russian forces have somewhat reduced the intensity of assaults in eastern Ukraine but that otherwise the situation remains largely unchanged amid the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast, which is consistent with ISW's observations of Russian offensive tempo across the theater.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Donetsk City.
- Russian propagandists are attempting to use the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast to promote Russian force generation efforts.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros
August 10, 2024, 8:35pm ET
The Russian National Antiterrorism Committee announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 9 in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Federal Security Service (FSB) Head and National Antiterrorism Committee Chairperson Alexander Bortnikov announced counterterrorism operations in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts in response to "sabotage and reconnaissance units" conducting "terrorist acts" in Russia and "units of the Ukrainian armed forces" conducting a "terrorist attack" in Kursk Oblast.[1] The counterterrorism operation allows Russian authorities to take a number of measures, including suspending or restricting communications services, monitoring telecommunication channels, confiscating vehicles, and entering private property.[2] Russian authorities previously announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod Oblast for one day in May 2023 in response to raids by all-Russian pro-Ukrainian elements.[3] The Kremlin notably did not elect to declare a formal state of war against Ukraine or martial law — more serious responses that would marshal greater Russian state resources through wider, and more domestically disruptive, mobilization.
The Kremlin likely decided to declare a counterterrorism operation — as opposed to a state of war or martial law — to downplay the scale of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and prevent domestic panic or backlash — demonstrating the Kremlin's reluctance to take more drastic measures to respond to the situation. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on August 8 that a source close to the Russian Federation Council's defense committee stated that the Russian Presidential Administration recommended that Russian deputies and senators not comment on the events in Kursk Oblast "until further notice" or discuss it as briefly as possible and refer only to official statements.[4] Russian milbloggers have been suggesting that the Kremlin formally declare war against Ukraine and criticized the Kremlin for failing to declare martial law instead of the counterterrorism operation.[5] The declaration of martial law notably would have allowed Russian authorities to take more drastic measures, such as prohibiting rallies and demonstrations, enacting curfews, and organizing the production of defense articles for the military.[6] Russian President Vladimir Putin has refrained from officially declaring a state of war, has repeatedly demonstrated his unwillingness to transfer Russian society fully to a war-time footing, and has forgone declaring general mobilization as part of wider efforts to prevent domestic discontent that could threaten the stability of Putin's regime.[7]
Putin likely appointed Bortnikov as the head of the counterterrorist operation because Bortnikov had previously proven himself to be an effective manager during crises that threatened Russian domestic stability and the Kremlin regime. Article 13 of the Russian federal law "On Countering Terrorism" states that "the person who made the decision to conduct a counterterrorism operation...is the head of the counterterrorism operation and bears personal responsibility for its conduct" — indicating that Bortnikov will head the counterterrorism operation.[8] Bortnikov reportedly secured security guarantees for now-deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in negotiations to end Wagner's June 24, 2023 rebellion, and Putin publicly praised the FSB for guaranteeing Russian security and sovereignty directly following his reelection in March 2024.[9] The declaration of the counterterrorism operation under Bortnikov suggests that Putin was dissatisfied with the Russian military command's handling or ability to handle the situation in Kursk Oblast. Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov attempted to portray the Northern Grouping of Forces and FSB as effectively controlling the situation and stopping Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast during a meeting with Putin on August 7.[10] Putin led a meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council on August 9 that discussed "combatting terrorism" in Russia.[11] The Kremlin stated that Bortnikov gave a report during the meeting, and the Security Council likely discussed the counterterrorism operation in the border area. Gerasimov is notably not a permanent member of the Security Council and was not present at the meeting, but Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov is.
A complicated command and control (C2) arrangement for the FSB-led counterterrorism operation under Bortnikov may degrade the effectiveness of the Russian response to Ukraine’s operation. Article 9 of the law on counterterrorism operations states that "units and formations of the Russian Armed Forces are involved in the conduct of a counterterrorism operation by decision of the head of the counterterrorism operation."[12] Rosgvardia stated on August 10 that elements from Rosgvardia, the FSB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) are participating in the counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts.[13] The Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts border areas are within the area of responsibility (AOR) of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, and elements under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are likely the best equipped to push Ukrainian forces back in the area. It is unclear how the FSB and Bortnikov will establish a clear joint C2 organization among these disparate elements, and there will likely be friction and bureaucratic obstacles between the FSB and other structures that will reduce Russian forces' overall combat effectiveness.
The Russian MoD appears to be relying on a combination of Russian conscripts already operating in Kursk Oblast, elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and elements redeployed from lower-priority frontline areas in Ukraine to defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast, likely exacerbating the disorganization of Russia’s chosen response. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 9 and 10 that Russian forces began laterally redeploying some units from elsewhere on the frontline and transferring reserves to defend in Kursk Oblast, with one milblogger claiming that Russian forces are redeploying up to nine unspecified brigades to Kursk Oblast.[14] A prominent Ukrainian Telegram channel stated on August 9 that Russian forces redeployed elements of the following units from frontline areas to defend in Kursk Oblast: two airborne (VDV) battalions and elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) from the Kherson direction; elements of the 38th and 64th motorized rifle brigades (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) from the Zaporizhia direction; several unspecified infantry battalions from the Pokrovsk direction in Donetsk Oblast; "bearded" (borodatie) fighters from Luhansk Oblast (likely referring to Chechen Akhmat units); elements of the 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], LMD), 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), and 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA, LMD) from northern Kharkiv Oblast; an infantry battalion of the 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) from the Kupyansk direction; a company of an unspecified motorized rifle brigade operating in Grayvoron Raion, Belgorod Oblast; and a motorized rifle regiment that was operating near Sotnytskyi Kozachok, Kharkiv Oblast.[15] The Russian military command appears to be avoiding redeploying significant elements of combat effective units from the Pokrovsk and Toretsk sectors — Russia‘s assessed priority sectors in eastern Ukraine.[16]
The Ukrainian source noted that these redeployments are a combination of frontline units, units with no combat experience, conscripts, and elements of Russia’s operational reserve.[17] ISW is unable to confirm the entirety of the Ukrainian source's claims of Russian redeployments but has observed some corroborating reporting. Russian sources largely claimed and posted footage of elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade fighting near Sudzha and Martynovka on August 10.[18] Ukrainian forces reportedly took conscripts of the 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) as prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast.[19] ISW has also previously observed elements of the Chechen "Aida" detachment redeploying to Kursk Oblast and elements of the "Pyatnashka" volunteer brigade redeploying from Donetsk Oblast to Kursk Oblast.[20] A Ukrainian military expert assessed that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (BSF) may also be fighting in Kursk Oblast following recent reporting that the 155th Brigade was operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[21]
Russian forces' usage of conscripts and forces already in Kursk Oblast, nearby forces fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and lateral redeployments across the theater to defend against the Ukrainian incursion is consistent with a number of likely Russian courses of action (COAs) that ISW forecasted.[22] ISW forecasted four likely COAs involving the forces the Russian command could choose to defend against the Ukrainian incursion, including: COA 1, forecasting that the Russians could decide to use existing forces and conscripts already defending in the international border area; COA 2, forecasting that the Russian command could pull from the Northern Grouping of Forces within and nearby Kursk Oblast; and COA 3, forecasting that Russia could redeploy operational reserves or frontline units from elsewhere in the theater.[23] Redeployments of conscripts, elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and select units from frontline areas in Ukraine suggest that the Russian military command has determined that possible disruptions to the offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and other less-critical frontline areas are an acceptable risk to adequately respond to the Ukrainian incursion. The Kremlin has seemingly chosen to avoid redeployments from higher priority sectors on the frontline in Donetsk Oblast. A prominent Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor assessed that these redeployments are weakening frontline units in other operational directions and demonstrate that Russia largely lacks operational reserves.[24] Should the Russian command choose to keep these redeployed reserves and frontline units in Kursk Oblast in the near- to medium-term, it will likely further exacerbate the C2 struggles in Kursk Oblast that will likely emerge from treating the Russian defense against Ukraine's conventional military operation as a "counterterrorism operation" that is subordinated to the FSB and Bortnikov. These decisions can present vulnerabilities and opportunities that Ukrainian forces can exploit.
The Russian MoD appears to be relying on select, battle-hardened units to conduct offensive and defensive operations in its most critical sectors of the front. The Russian command has previously laterally redeployed elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, the "Pyatnashka" volunteer brigade, and VDV units across multiple sectors of eastern and southern Ukraine to conduct offensive operations during intense Russian offensive efforts. The Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade most notably participated in the failed Russian push for Vuhledar in late 2022 to early 2023, then fought southwest of Donetsk City near Marinka, and deployed to participate in the Russian offensive north of Kharkiv City in May 2024 - largely without significant rest and reconstitution.[25] The Pyatnashka Brigade defended against the Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive in southern Ukraine and fought for Avdiivka in the Spring of 2024.[26] The 810th Naval Infantry Brigade fought for Volnovakha and Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, and defended against the Ukrainian effort in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky.[27] Many of these units reportedly have been completely destroyed and reconstituted multiple times due to the Russian command's reliance on them on the battlefield, and their redeployment to Kursk Oblast from elsewhere on the frontline could degrade Russian forces' capabilities within Ukraine.
Russian forces appear to be more adequately defending against Ukrainian assaults following the arrival of additional conscripts and more combat effective personnel from frontline areas in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces’ rate of confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast has slowed following the reported introduction of various Russian military units in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 10 that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), repelled company-sized Ukrainian mechanized assaults in the directions of Korenevo (north of Sumy City and roughly 23 kilometers north of the international border), Snagost (south of Korenevo), Lgov, and Martynovka (northeast of Suzhda) on the night of August 9 and 10.[28] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were previously reported in both the Kharkiv and Kherson directions as of June 2024.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that an unspecified "newly formed and untested" Russian unit repelled a Ukrainian armored assault near Korenevo on August 9.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, particularly elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Aida" Detachment, seized Martynovka and Zamostye (just south of Sudzha).[31] The “Aida” Detachment was reportedly operating in the vicinity of Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast as of mid-June 2024.[32] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces re-took Makhnovka (south of Sudzha), although geolocated footage published on August 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement, assuming the footage is recent.[33]
Geolocated footage and Russian reporting from August 10 indicate that Ukrainian forces largely maintain previously reported positions in Kursk Oblast and have advanced slightly further than their previously confirmed positions. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating in a forest area north of Lyubimovka (south of Korenevo).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are also maintaining positions northwest of Sudzha near Kazachya Loknya and Yuzhny and west of Sudzha near Zaoleshenka and Goncharovka.[35] Additional geolocated footage published on August 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces previously held positions north of Sudzha near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, though this footage is likely not from the past 24 hours.[36] Geolocated footage published on August 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions north of Sverdilkovo (northwest of Sudzha) and within Rubanshchina (just west of Sudzha).[37] Additional geolocated footage published on August 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within northern Sudzha, and most Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating on the western outskirts of Sudzha.[38] Geolocated footage published on August 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions south of Sudzha near Melovoi and Guyevo.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are continuing operations south of Sudzha along the Gornal-Guyevo-Plekhovo line, and one Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Plekhovo.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted isolated raids into Poroz and Mokraya Orlovka (west of Belgorod City and along the international border), Belgorod Oblast on August 10, but that Ukrainian forces do not maintain positions in these settlements.[41]
Russian sources claimed that they conducted a successful Iskander-M ballistic missile strike against Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed on August 10 that Russian forces struck a command post of the Ukrainian forces near the Kursk Oblast border area.[42] Geolocated footage published on August 10 purportedly shows that Russian forces struck a position of the Ukrainian forces east of Sheptukhovka, Kursk Oblast.[43] An OSINT analyst on X reported on August 10 that the footage published by the Russian MoD indicates that the Russian forces missed nearby vehicles of the Ukrainian forces that they were aiming at.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack just north of Sheptukhovka near Kauchuk on the night of August 9 to 10.[45]
Ukraine’s cross-border operation into Kursk Oblast threatens the Kremlin with a potential political crisis regarding causalities among Russian conscripts, whom the Kremlin has increasingly relied upon to defend the Russian state border with Ukraine. Russian opposition and social media outlets began disseminating initial complaints from the family members of Russian conscripts on August 10 about the involvement of Russian conscripts in the Russian border defense operations.[46] Although these complaints are limited in number and have not resulted in a unified movement, the Kremlin has previously expressed grave concern over public responses to its illegal use of conscripts in combat operations. The Kremlin previously faced notable societal backlash in the spring of 2022 for illegally committing Russian conscripts to the frontlines in Ukraine and faced criticism for relying on conscripts to repel previous pro-Ukrainian border raids and respond to the Wagner Group mutiny in the summer of 2023.[47] Russian President Vladimir Putin notably attempted to appease Russian conscripts’ mothers by emphasizing on March 8, 2022, that Russia would not use conscripts in combat operations.[48] Putin, however, continued to institute contradictory policies that further involved conscripts in the defense of the Russian-Ukrainian international border, likely in an effort to shuffle conventional combat forces previously on border guard duty so they could be deployed for operations in Ukraine. Putin notably signed a bill in December 2023 allowing conscripts to serve in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) — the primary Russian service responsible for border security.[49] The Kremlin may need to justify its controversial reliance on conscripts in border security operations to appease Russian society, as Putin had done so following controversies in 2022 and 2023. Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev recently stated on Russian state television that conscripts’ participation in combat operations is normal given that Russia had previously used conscripts in the Soviet Union’s Afghan and Russia’s Chechen wars.[50] Several Russian conscripts are confirmed to have been taken prisoner in Kursk Oblast since August 6.[51]
Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian ship and a gas platform in the western Black Sea. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 10 that the GUR's "Group 13" unit struck a Russian "Tunets" KS-701 project high-speed patrol boat near occupied Chornomorske, Crimea on the night of August 8 to 9.[52] Geolocated footage published on August 10 shows a Ukrainian naval drone approaching the boat in Vuzka Bay, and the GUR reported that Ukrainian naval drones also damaged three other Russian watercraft, which the GUR is working to identify.[53] Geolocated footage published on August 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a strike on a Russian gas platform in the Black Sea.[54] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on August 10 that Russian forces stationed military personnel and equipment on the platform less than a day before the strike and were using the gas platform for GPS spoofing to endanger civilian shipping in the Black Sea, particularly to disrupt the Ukraine grain corridor.[55]
Iran will reportedly deliver "hundreds" of ballistic missiles to Russia in the near future. Reuters, citing multiple intelligence sources including two European intelligence sources, reported on August 9 that Russian MoD representatives signed a contract with Iran on December 13, 2023, for the delivery of Fath-360 close range ballistic missiles and that Iran will deliver these missiles at an unspecified “soon” time.[56] The Fath-360 missiles have a maximum range of 120 kilometers and a warhead weighing 150 kilograms. Multiple intelligence sources also told Reuters that dozens of Russian military personnel are currently training in Iran to operate Fath-360 missile systems. Western and Ukrainian sources have previously warned that Iran may be preparing to provide Russia with short range ballistic systems, including multiple systems with maximum ranges and payloads significantly greater than the limits imposed upon Russia under its Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) obligations.[57] These short-range ballistic missiles will likely allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian near-rear targets while reserving its own missile stockpiles (such as Iskander missiles) for deep-rear Ukrainian targets.
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian National Antiterrorism Committee announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 9 in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.
- The Kremlin likely decided to declare a counterterrorism operation - as opposed to a state of war or martial law - to downplay the scale of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and prevent domestic panic or backlash - demonstrating the Kremlin's reluctance to take more drastic measures to respond to the situation.
- Putin likely appointed Bortnikov as the head of the counterterrorist operation because Bortnikov has previously proven himself to be an effective manager during crises that threatened Russian domestic stability and the Kremlin regime.
- A complicated command and control (C2) arrangement for the FSB-led counterterrorism operation under Bortnikov may degrade the effectiveness of the Russian response to Ukraine’s operation.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be relying on a combination of Russian conscripts already operating in Kursk Oblast, elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and elements redeployed from lower-priority frontline areas in Ukraine to defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast, likely exacerbating the disorganization of Russia’s chosen response.
- Russian forces' usage of conscripts and forces already in Kursk Oblast, nearby forces fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and lateral redeployments across the theater to defend against the Ukrainian incursion is consistent with a number of likely Russian courses of action (COAs) that ISW forecasted.
- The Russian MoD appears to be relying on select, battle-hardened units to conduct offensive and defensive operations in its most critical sectors of the front.
- Russian forces appear to be more adequately defending against Ukrainian assaults following the arrival of additional conscripts and more combat effective personnel from frontline areas in Ukraine.
- Geolocated footage and Russian reporting from August 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces largely maintain previously reported positions in Kursk Oblast and have advanced slightly further than their previously confirmed positions.
- Ukraine’s cross-border operation into Kursk Oblast threatens the Kremlin with a potential political crisis regarding causalities among Russian conscripts, whom the Kremlin has increasingly relied upon to defend the Russian state border with Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian ship and a gas platform in the western Black Sea.
- Iran will reportedly deliver "hundreds" of ballistic missiles to Russia in the near future.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
- A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has begun to form the "Black Raven" strike drone volunteer unit and asked readers to donate to the 16-million-ruble (about $184,324) goal to supply the unit with drones and equipment.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 9, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, and George Barros
August 9, 2024, 8:15pm ET
Russian sources claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced further east in Kursk Oblast but are likely no longer operating as far north or as far west as Russian sources previously claimed on August 8. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces conducted another cross-border incursion northeast of Sumy City and advanced towards Kucherov (roughly one kilometer from the international border) but have not entered the settlement.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast advanced as far east as Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha) on the left bank of the Psyol River.[2] ISW is recessing the claimed limit of Ukrainian advances up to Snagost (south of Korenevo), given that a Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Russian forces began clearing the settlement.[3] ISW is also recessing the claimed limit of Ukrainian advances to the northern outskirts of Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha and roughly 13 kilometers from the international border) as Russian milbloggers claimed on August 9 that Russian forces counterattacked near the settlement.[4]
Geolocated footage published on August 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating west of Sudzha, within the settlement, north of Sudzha near Kazachya Loknya, and northeast of Leonidovo (northwest of Sudzha and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border) and in Dmitriukov.[5] Russian milbloggers continued to issue contradictory statements about Ukrainian positions in Sudzha (northeast of Sumy City and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border), however. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are not operating within Sudzha, whereas another source claimed that Ukrainian forces are located in the settlement but cannot operate freely.[6] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces partially control Sudzha and that the town is a contested "gray zone."[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are also operating northeast of Sudzha near Martynovka; north of Sudzha near Vtoroy Knyazhiy, Ivnitsa, Zaoleshenka, Russkoye Porechnoye (16 kilometers from the international border); and west of Sudzha near Goncharovka.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control the area near Korenevo (north of Sumy City and roughly 23 kilometers north of the international border) and denied reports of fighting on the settlement's outskirts.[9] The Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Ukrainian forces control Novoivanovka (southeast of Korenevo) and Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo).[10] Another Russian source claimed on August 9, however, that Russian forces regained lost positions in Novoivanovka and Leonidovo.[11] A Russian source claimed that there is no confirmation of Ukrainian forces operating in Kromskiy Byki (30 kilometers from the international border and 13 kilometers south of Lgov), and the vast majority of Russian reporting about Kursk Oblast on August 9 is not consistent with previous claims that mobile Ukrainian groups were operating beyond 20 kilometers into Kursk Oblast.[12]
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian military convoy east of Rylsk near Oktyabrskoye, Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 9 shows the aftermath of the strike and destroyed Russian trucks along the 38K-017 highway.[13] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that there were 14 Ural and KAMAZ covered trucks carrying Russian reserves intended to reinforce Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and that the strike likely killed several Russian personnel traveling in the trucks.[14] Russian sources suggested that the column may have been transporting personnel from the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces' 44th Army Corps (Leningrad Military District) or the "Pyatnashka" Brigade.[15] Russian milbloggers theorized about which weapons system Ukraine may have used to conduct this strike, although ISW is not prepared to comment on which system Ukraine may have used during the strike.
The Russian military command appears to be relying on existing units deployed to the international border area and readily available forces in the rear, most of which are units staffed with conscripts and irregular forces, to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. These units would likely be the first to respond even if the Russian military command has decided to transfer additional, more experienced units from elsewhere in the theater. The Russian military command may currently be resisting operational pressures to redeploy forces from other operational directions to prevent the Ukrainian incursion from disrupting Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 9 that it sent additional multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), artillery, and heavy tracked vehicles to strengthen forces in Sudzha Raion, and Russian milbloggers amplified footage showing additional Russian forces arriving in Kursk Oblast.[16] Russian Minister of Emergency Situations Alexander Kurenkov ordered additional forces and resources from the Tula Oblast rescue center to deploy to Kursk Oblast to assist with de-mining and civilian evacuations.[17] Russian conscripts, FSB border guards, and elements of Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz units operating under the Russian MoD were reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast as of the beginning of the Ukrainian incursion.[18] The Russian military command has reportedly transferred forces from unspecified operational reserves, additional units staffed by conscripts, Spetsnaz (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]), Special Operations Forces (SSO), additional Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz operating under the Russian MoD, and the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps (DNR AC) and former Wagner Group personnel to unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast to defend against further Ukrainian advances and retake territory.[19] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command has tasked Russian Spetsnaz and SSO forces with "clearing" the breakthrough zone and pushing Ukrainian forces back across the international border, and several Russian milbloggers expressed confidence that Russian Spetsnaz forces are likely the most capable Russian forces to respond to Ukrainian mechanized maneuver.[20] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also claimed that the Russian military command has transferred reserves of the Russian Africa Corps to Kursk Oblast from Krasnodar Krai, though ISW is unable to verify this claim.
Other irregular Russian forces, including those previously deployed to other areas of the frontline, are also reportedly arriving in Kursk Oblast. Elements of the DNR's irregular forces, including the "Dikaya Division of Donbas" and the "Pyatnashka" Brigade, reportedly arrived in Kursk Oblast following offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast.[21] The Wagner Group Commanders' Council issued a statement on August 9 declaring Wagner's willingness to deploy to the Kursk Oblast border area "at the first call," and Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified former Wagner personnel have begun to arrive in Kursk Oblast.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz are operating throughout Kursk Oblast, including in Bolshoye Soldatskoye, and elements of the Chechen "Aida" Detachment are operating near Sudzha.[23] Elements of the Russian SSO are reportedly also operating throughout Kursk Oblast's border areas, including near Sudzha.[24] Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov is reportedly in Kursk Oblast to oversee the Chechen forces, and Alaudinov expressed confidence on August 9 that the Russian military has sufficient forces and resources to stop Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, although it is unclear if the Russian military command intends to transfer additional, more combat effective and well-equipped forces to the border area.[25]
The Russian military command may currently be transferring more experienced and better-provisioned frontline units from eastern or southern Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, but it would likely take additional time for such units to arrive in Kursk Oblast. One Russian milblogger claimed on August 9 that elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Force's 44th Army Corps (Leningrad Military District) are operating near Rylsk, however, suggesting that the Russian military command may be transferring elements that the Northern Grouping of Forces accumulated for its offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast to respond to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.[26] This milblogger's claim, if accurate, would suggest that the Russian military command is assessing Ukraine's operation to be more significant. Significant redeployments of elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces to Kursk Oblast would suggest that the Russian military command has determined that disruptions to the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast is a necessary sacrifice to appropriately respond to the Ukrainian incursion while avoiding redeployments from more priority sectors of the frontline.[27] Larger Russian re-deployments from frontline areas will likely be slower, and more combat-effective frontline units could begin to arrive in Kursk Oblast in the coming days.
Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against a Russian military airfield in Lipetsk Oblast and other Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast on August 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck warehouses storing glide bombs and other facilities at the Lipetsk military airfield near Lipetsk City.[28] Russian sources amplified footage of explosions at the airfield, and satellite imagery collected on August 9 shows that the Ukrainian strikes destroyed several ammunition warehouses at the airfield.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces base Russian Su-34, Su-35, and MiG-31 fixed-wing aircraft at the Lipetsk airfield, and Russian forces debated whether Russian aircraft preemptively took off to avoid the strikes or were present at the time of the Ukrainian strikes.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also targeted Russian anti-aircraft missile units in an unspecified location in occupied Donetsk Oblast and struck two radars for S-350 air defense systems and a radar for an S-300 air defense system.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff clarified that it confirmed the destruction of one radar for a Russian S-350 air defense system but is verifying the results of the strikes on the other two radars.[32] Russian sources, including Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev, claimed that the Russian force shot down a Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missile and up to five aerial drones and destroyed seven naval drones targeting occupied Crimea, particularly near Sevastopol.[33]
Russian forces are reportedly increasing the use of chemical agents in Ukraine in continued apparent violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory. The Ukrainian Support Forces Command reported on August 9 that Russian forces in Ukraine are increasing their use of chemical attacks and are largely using K-51 and RG-VO hand gas grenades with riot control agents (RCAS) that are prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces used chemical agents and possibly weapons 358 times in July 2024 and 3570 times from February 15, 2023, to July 24, 2024.[34]
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new military assistance package worth $125 million for Ukraine on August 9. The military assistance package is the 63rd tranche provided from DoD inventories for Ukraine since August 2021 and includes ammunition for HIMARS systems; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; Stinger missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-tank systems; Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) anti-tank guided missiles; multi-purpose radars; HMMWV multi-purpose wheeled vehicles; small arms ammunition; explosive munitions; and additional equipment and munitions.[35]
Russian authorities have passed several laws aimed at preventing Russians from using telecommunications services or anonymously operating prominent social media channels amid intensified efforts to coerce Russians away from Western social media platforms. Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a law on August 8 compelling owners of social media channels with over 10,000 followers to register their personal details with Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor starting on November 1.[36] This law also contains a provision limiting the number of registered SIM cards per person to 20 for Russian citizens and 10 for foreigners and stateless persons as well as forbidding people in Russia to pay for communications services in cash or other untraceable methods.[37] These new laws are part of the Kremlin's ongoing campaign to codify pro-Kremlin behavioral norms in the information space into Russian law and establish a standard for acceptable behavior among populations whose behavior has recently threatened the Kremlin, as ISW has previously reported.[38] Roskomnadzor announced on August 9 that it blocked the Signal encrypted messaging service for violating Russian law, and Russians are already reporting that they cannot access the service.[39] Russians are also increasingly reporting severe speed throttling and an inability to access YouTube following recent acknowledgments that the Russian government is throttling YouTube's speeds, likely to push Russians to use deanonymized, Kremlin-controlled social media sites that the Kremlin can more easily exert influence.[40]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian sources claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced further east in Kursk Oblast but are likely no longer operating as far north or as far west as Russian sources previously claimed on August 8.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian military convoy east of Rylsk near Oktyabrskoye, Kursk Oblast.
- The Russian military command appears to be relying on existing units deployed to the international border area and readily available forces in the rear, most of which are units staffed with conscripts and irregular forces, to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.
- These units would likely be the first to respond even if the Russian military command has decided to transfer additional, more experienced units from elsewhere in the theater.
- The Russian military command may currently be resisting operational pressures to redeploy forces from other operational directions to prevent the Ukrainian incursion from disrupting Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.
- The Russian military command may currently be transferring more experienced and better-provisioned frontline units from eastern or southern Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, but it would likely take additional time for such units to arrive in Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against a Russian military airfield in Lipetsk Oblast and other Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast on August 9.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to posture itself as providing sufficient medical care to Russian servicemembers.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 8, 2024, 10pm ET
The data cut-off for this product was 2:45pm ET on August 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Note: Russian sources are currently shifting much of their reporting to cover the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and as a result are not providing the same level of detail about the situation along the frontline in Ukraine.
Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on August 6 are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security. ISW will not make forecasts about what Ukrainian forces might or might not do or where or when they might do it. ISW will continue to map, track, and evaluate operations as they unfold but will not offer insight into Ukrainian planning, tactics, or techniques. ISW is not prepared to map control of terrain within Russia at this time and will instead map observed events associated with the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory as well the maximalist extent of claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances. Maximalist claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances within Russia do not represent territory that ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have seized or control. Inferring predictions about Ukrainian operations from ISW maps and assessments that do not explicitly offer such predictions is inappropriate and not in accord with their intended use.
Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced as far as Kromskiye Byki and Molyutino (up to 35 kilometers from the international border and 17 kilometers southeast of Lgov) but noted that these are small groups not immediately trying to hold territory.[1] Russian milbloggers issued contradictory claims about Ukrainian positions in Sudzha (northeast of Sumy City and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border), with some milbloggers claiming that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only seized part of the settlement.[2] Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced towards Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced further north of Sudzha along the 38K-024 highway near Anastasyevka.[3] Geolocated footage published on August 7 and 8 shows Ukrainian forces operating within Goncharovka (just west of Sudzha) and north of Zaoleshenka (northwest of Sudzha), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Goncharovka.[4] A geolocated photo shows Ukrainian forces operating within Novoivanovka (10km north of the international border and northwest of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novoivanovka and Bogdanovka (northwest of Sudzha).[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced northwest of Sudzha into Malaya Loknya and to the outskirts of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; northeast of Sudzha near Kruglenkoye, Martynovka, and Bolshoye Soldatskoye; and east of Sudzha near Mirny, although two Russian milbloggers denied claims that Ukrainian forces are operating near and within Bolshoye Soldatskoye.[6] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Korenevo (north of Sumy City and roughly 23 kilometers north of the international border) and that Ukrainian forces attacked within Snagost (south of Korenevo) and near Olgovka (east of Korenevo).[7]
Russian milbloggers claimed that small Ukrainian armored groups are advancing further into the Russian rear and bypassing Russian fortifications before engaging Russian forces and then withdrawing from the engagements without attempting to consolidate control over their furthest advances.[8] Russian milbloggers noted that the prevalence of these armored groups is leading to conflicting reporting because Ukrainian forces are able to quickly engage Russian forces near a settlement and then withdraw from the area.[9] Ukrainian forces appear to be able to use these small armored groups to conduct assaults past the engagement line due to the low density of Russian personnel in the border areas of Kursk Oblast. Larger Ukrainian units are reportedly operating in areas of Kursk Oblast closer to the international border and are reportedly consolidating and fortifying some positions.[10]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are successfully fielding novel and innovative tactics and technological capabilities during operations in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers have provided details on Ukrainian tactics and technological capabilities that they regard as innovative, but ISW will not describe such details at this time or point to specific sources in order to preserve Ukrainian operational security.
The Kremlin will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and stop Ukrainian activity further into Russia, as substantial Ukrainian advances within Russia would be a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence. Putin held a virtual meeting with Kursk Oblast Acting Head Alexey Smirnov on August 8 about Ukraine's operations into the oblast and stated that he "generally know[s] the situation" but still would like to hear Smirnov's assessment of the situation.[11] Smirnov and Putin did not discuss Russian attempts to repel Ukrainian forces and portrayed the Russian government as effectively working to ensure civilian safety and social and monetary compensation. Russian milbloggers have highlighted concerns over the safety of Russian civilians and disorganized civilian evacuations.[12] Putin likely assesses that he must respond to the perceived threat to civilians in order to assure the Russian public that the situation is under control and avoid significant domestic discontent. Smirnov claimed on August 7 that the situation is "under [Putin's] personal control," directly linking Russian success in repelling Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and mitigating related civilian issues to Putin.[13] The Kremlin previously has portrayed itself as capable of swiftly responding to pro-Ukrainian raids into Russia, and the Kremlin likely assesses that significant Ukrainian territorial gains in Russia would pose a threat to the Kremlin's efforts to frame itself as a stable regime in control of the internal security situation within Russia and an effective manager of the war in Ukraine.[14]
If Russian reporting on the situation in Kursk Oblast is accurate and if the Russian military command perceives the situation to be the same as Russian sources have described, then the Russian military command has an array of likely courses of action (COAs) it could pursue to respond to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW is not prepared at this time to assess which of these possible COAs is most likely, and it is possible that the Russian military command may not rely on only one COA to respond to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Russian military command's decision-making will be influenced by its perception of the size and capability of Ukrainian forces in the area, about which ISW makes no assessment. The following COAs are not presented in order of likelihood.
- COA 1: The Russian military command may decide to use existing conscripts, Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and other irregular forces already deployed to the international border area to push Ukrainian forces back and defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. Russian authorities have repeatedly assured Russians that conscripts will not deploy to combat operations along the frontline in Ukraine, and instead, the Russian military command has relied on conscripts for staffing units in charge of border security functions along the international border with Ukraine.[15] Russian conscripts, FSB border guards, and elements of Chechen "Akhmat" units operating under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are reportedly currently operating in Kursk Oblast.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) irregular forces, including elements of the "Dikaya Division of Donbas," the "Pyatnashka" Brigade, the "Arbat" Separate Guards Special Purpose Battalion, and the "Night Wolves" drone detachment, arrived in Kursk Oblast.[17] Elements of a battalion of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division's 217th VDV Regiment were reportedly defending a section of the border in Kursk Oblast as of late May 2024, suggesting that there may be some relatively more combat effective forces in the area, but the majority of Russian reporting indicates that most Russian forces operating in Kursk Oblast are elements of less combat effective units.[18] The Russian military command may pursue this COA should it assess that lower quality forces that would likely be less well equipped could effectively stop Ukrainian forces that have been reportedly successfully employing innovative tactics and technological capabilities. All of these forces are operating in the area of responsibility (AOR) of Russia's Northern Grouping of Forces, but it is unclear to what degree the Northern Grouping of Forces has authority over these elements' border security functions.
- COA 2: The Russian military command may decide to use the existing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border to respond to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reportedly had roughly 35,000 personnel deployed to the border area in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts as of early May 2024 and reportedly intended to establish a grouping in the area that is between 50,000 to 75,000 personnel in size.[19] The Northern Grouping of Forces likely launched the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast before it reached its reported planned end strength and has since suffered heavy casualties that have likely constrained Russian efforts to build out the grouping. The Russian military command reportedly transferred an unspecified number of forces to the international border area near Kharkiv Oblast in late May and early June 2024, but it was unclear if the Russian military command planned to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength.[20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on August 8 that the Russian military command began to redeploy forces likely from the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) from the Belgorod group of the Northern Grouping of Forces operating in the Vovchansk direction northeast of Kharkiv City to the group defending the international border in Kursk Oblast.[21] Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov attempted on August 7 to portray the Northern Grouping of Forces (as well as the FSB) as an effective defensive force, claiming that these forces stopped Ukraine's advances in Kursk Oblast and inflicted significant casualties.[22] The Northern Grouping of Forces has failed to achieve even its limited tactical objectives in northern Kharkiv Oblast since early May 2024 and its ability to conduct effective defensive operations and significant counterattacks is unclear. The redeployment of significant elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces to focus on pushing back Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast would likely further stretch these elements and create vulnerabilities in Russian defenses elsewhere along the border. The Russian military command may also seek to pursue this COA should it deem the Northern Grouping of Forces' offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast to be less of a priority than defensive operations in Kursk Oblast.
- COA 3: The Russian military command may choose to redeploy operational reserves that it accumulated for its planned Summer 2024 offensive effort and/or relatively better provisioned and more combat effective frontline units to Kursk Oblast from elsewhere in the theater. The Russian military command may assess that it will need to deploy Russian units to Kursk Oblast that have more experience fighting in Ukraine, higher end strengths, more equipment, more effective fire and strike capabilities, and more advanced technology and tactics than the current Russian elements deployed along the border. The Northern Grouping of Forces could theoretically provide these forces, but the Russian military command may determine that the grouping lacks the available manpower and materiel to sustain the current Russian offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City while also engaging in a large-scale defensive effort in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces gradually established operational reserves ahead of its planned Summer 2024 offensive effort and are currently relying on these reserves to maintain a consistent offensive tempo throughout eastern and northeastern Ukraine.[23] Russian forces still maintain significant operational reserves and could decide to commit these reserves to a large-scale defensive operation in Kursk Oblast. The Russian military command may determine that these operational reserves are critical for current Russian offensive operations, however, especially reserves intended to support the higher offensive tempo that Russian forces are attempting to maintain along much of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast.[24] The Russian military command may determine that maintaining Russia's current offensive tempo in select sectors of the front is a greater priority than sustaining offensive operations in other sectors and could decide to preserve existing operational reserves intended for prioritized sectors of the front and instead redeploy frontline units from less prioritized sectors to Kursk Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are already redeploying elements of an operational reserve of the 20th Combined Arms Army (Moscow Military District), which has several units committed to offensive operations northwest and west of Kreminna, and unspecified Russian Spetsnaz (Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) elements to areas southwest of Kursk City, although ISW has not observed wider reporting or confirmation of this claim.[25]
- COA 4: The Russian military command may seek to maintain the forces it currently has committed to Kursk Oblast but could redeploy significant aviation and strike elements to the area in an effort to improve Russia's ability to retake territory. Russian aviation currently conducts routine sorties to strike frontline and rear Ukrainian positions throughout the frontline, and the Russian military command may seek to leverage available aviation assets should it determine that the current forces in Kursk Oblast are ill-fitted to retake territory while aiming to avoid redeployments from elsewhere in the theater. The Russian military command may envision that both rotary- and fixed-wing aviation operations at scale in airspace over Kursk Oblast would allow Russian forces to blunt Ukrainian maneuver and prevent Ukrainian forces from securely consolidating positions and thereby allow the current Russian forces deployed in the area to more effectively conduct counterattacks and defensive operations. It is unclear whether the current Russian forces deployed to Kursk Oblast would be able to exploit the effects of large-scale Russian aviation operations over Kursk Oblast, however. It is also unclear if large-scale aviation operations over Kursk Oblast would disrupt Russia's ability to routinely use tactical aviation for glide bomb strikes throughout the frontline. Russian sources have indicated that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, including the "mobile groups" operating further into Russian territory, have significant air defense capabilities that would likely make large-scale Russian aviation operations in the area challenging.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating rotary-wing aircraft in certain areas of Kursk Oblast, which would suggest that current Russian air defense coverage in the area may be sparse and may facilitate even limited Ukrainian aviation operations that would further complicate the Russian military's ability to field aviation at scale over Kursk Oblast.[27] ISW has not yet observed confirmation of reported Ukrainian air and air defense capabilities in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces could also deploy ground-based strike capabilities at scale to areas in and near Kursk Oblast to constrain Ukrainian advances and disrupt Ukrainian consolidation at positions within Russia, but Russian forces have generally proven incapable of using longer-range strike capabilities to set conditions for the type of ground maneuver needed to quickly retake territory in Kursk Oblast.
The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise along the border with Russia. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have struggled to achieve operational surprise in the past year and a half of fighting due to the partially transparent battlefield in Ukraine. Ukraine's ability to achieve operational surprise highlights that the widespread visual and sensor-based transparency that both sides have established does not translate into a fully transparent battlefield, however, and that the belligerents in Ukraine can leverage ambiguity around operational intent to achieve operational surprise. One Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military command for failing to observe and react to Ukrainian forces allegedly massing on the border near Kursk Oblast.[28] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continually warned the Russian high command about a massing of Ukrainian forces along the border near Kursk Oblast but that the Russian command failed to adequately prepare for potential Ukrainian offensive operations.[29] Ukrainian forces would have successfully concealed their operational intent in order to achieve operational surprise if milblogger claims that Russian forces observed a buildup of Ukrainian forces in border areas are accurate. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces have failed to internalize lessons learned about the difficulties of mechanized maneuver on an assumed transparent battlefield in Ukraine.[30] Ukraine, however, appears to be learning and adapting to this aspect of the battlefield given its ability to achieve apparent operational surprise in this instance.
Ukrainian officials have yet to comment directly on Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 8 that Russia "brought the war to Ukraine" and must "feel what it has done" in response.[31] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Mykhaylo Podolyak acknowledged the ongoing "events" in Kursk Oblast and noted that Russia is to blame for the situation, and an unnamed advisor to Zelensky also acknowledged the ongoing Ukrainian military operation into Kursk Oblast during an interview with the Washington Post on August 8.[32]
US officials noted that Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast is not a violation of US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia's border areas. Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated during a press briefing on August 8 that Ukraine's operation into Kursk Oblast is consistent with US policy and that the US supports Ukraine's right to defend itself against attacks across the international border.[33] White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller also noted the Biden Administration's support for Ukraine's "common sense" and defensive actions on August 7.[34] Unnamed "US and Ukrainian officials" told CNN on August 8 that Ukrainian forces hope to disrupt and demoralize Russian forces and partially divert Russian forces from frontline areas in eastern Ukraine.[35]
Russian-backed Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba told Kremlin newswire TASS on August 8 that there are no plans to construct a Russian naval base at the Ochamchire port in Russian-controlled Abkhazia, Georgia.[36] Shamba noted that Russian forces have stationed border patrol boats at the port. Shamba stated in January 2024 that Russia was designing a permanent naval base in Abkhazia, however, and Russian-backed Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania announced in October 2023 that he signed an agreement with Russian authorities to construct the base near Ochamchire.[37] Naval News reported in July 2024 that the Russian Project 22870 support ship, which had been previously docked at its home port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, arrived at the Ochamchire port.[38] It is unclear why the Russian government would abandon its plans to construct a permanent naval base in Abkhazia, as Ukrainian strikes against Black Sea Fleet assets have largely rendered naval basing in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea useless and have forced Russia to seek a more permanent basing pattern in the eastern Black Sea.[39]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on August 6 are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security.
- Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however.
- The Kremlin will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and stop Ukrainian activity further into Russia, as substantial Ukrainian advances within Russia would be a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence.
- COA (Course of Action) 1: The Russian military command may decide to use existing conscripts, Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and other irregular forces already deployed to the international border area to push Ukrainian forces back and defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.
- COA 2: The Russian military command may decide to use the existing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border to respond to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Oblast.
- COA 3: The Russian military command may choose to redeploy operational reserves that it accumulated for its planned Summer 2024 offensive effort and/or relatively better provisioned and more combat effective frontline units to Kursk Oblast from elsewhere in the theater.
- COA 4: The Russian military command may seek to maintain the forces it currently has committed to Kursk Oblast but could redeploy significant aviation and strike elements to the area in an effort to improve Russia's ability to retake territory.
- The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise along the border with Russia.
- Ukrainian officials have yet to comment directly on Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast.
- US officials noted that Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast is not a violation of US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia's border areas.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 7, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 7, 2024, 7:15pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on August 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up to 10 kilometers into Russia's Kursk Oblast amid continued mechanized offensive operations on Russian territory on August 7. Geolocated footage published on August 6 and 7 shows that Ukrainian armored vehicles have advanced to positions along the 38K-030 route about 10 kilometers from the international border.[1] The current confirmed extent and location of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast indicate that Ukrainian forces have penetrated at least two Russian defensive lines and a stronghold.[2] A Russian insider source claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized 45 square kilometers of territory within Kursk Oblast since they launched the operation on August 6, and other Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces have captured 11 total settlements, including Nikolaevo-Daryino (1.5 kilometers north of the Sumy Oblast border), Darino (three kilometers north of the Sumy Oblast border), and Sverdlikovo (east of the Nikolaevo-Darino-Darino area), and are operating within Lyubimovka (eight kilometers north of the Sumy Oblast border).[3] Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian forces are trying to advance along the 38K-030 Sudzha-Korenovo highway, and a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that by 1800 local time on August 7 Ukrainian forces had advanced both northwest and southeast along the highway and are now fighting on the outskirts of Korenovo (in the northwest direction) and Sudzha (in the southeast direction).[4] The Russian insider source and several other Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces fought for and seized the Sudzha checkpoint and the Sudzha gas distribution station (southwest of Sudzha along the 38K-004 highway, 500 meters from the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border).[5] Geolocated imagery posted on August 7 shows that Ukrainian forces captured over 40 Russian prisoners of war (POWs) at the Sudzha checkpoint, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Russia service posted satellite imagery that shows heavy damage to buildings at the Sudzha checkpoint.[6] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 7 that an unspecified unit of the Chechyna-based 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) has deployed directly to the Sudzhenskyi Raion—generally consistent with some reports from Ukrainian and Russian sources that social media footage shows Chechen "Akhmat" units in the Sudzha area since over a week ago.[7] Chechen units reportedly suffered very heavy losses in Ukrainian attacks in the Korenovo Raion on August 7.[8]
The Kremlin's response to Ukrainian offensive activities in Kursk Oblast has so far been contradictory, as Russian officials are attempting to balance presenting the effort as a notable Ukrainian escalation with avoiding overstating its potential implications and risking domestic discontent. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with members of the Russian government on August 7, accusing Ukrainian forces of a "large-scale provocation" in Kursk Oblast and instructing First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov and regional authorities to coordinate assistance in Kursk Oblast.[9] Putin also met with Defense Minister Andrey Belousov, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov, and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on August 7 about the Kursk Oblast attack.[10] Gerasimov portrayed the situation as largely under control, however, claiming that Ukrainian forces attacked with about 1,000 personnel and that Russian FSB and the Northern Grouping of Forces have stopped Ukraine's advance and inflicted significant casualties.[11] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces will complete their operation when they have defeated Ukrainian forces and reached the Kursk Oblast-Ukraine border. Other Russian officials doubled down on these contradictory points, often seeking to strike a balance between the alarmism of a Ukrainian mechanized assault and penetration into Russian territory and the status quo reassurances that the Kremlin "has the situation under control." The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably edited a post on August 6 to remove claims that the attacking Ukrainian forces were just a sabotage and reconnaissance group and that the Ukrainian forces retreated, likely to avoid backlash from making demonstrably false claims about the scale and tactics of the ongoing Ukrainian penetration.[12] Kursk Oblast Acting Head Alexey Smirnov claimed that the situation is "under [Putin's] personal control" and stated that several thousand Kursk Oblast civilians have already evacuated the area.[13] Manturov instructed the Russian Ministry of Finance to allocate a first tranche of 1.8 billion rubles (about $20.9 million) to assist Kursk Oblast residents in resettling.[14] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin announced that the Investigative Committee has opened an investigation into the Ukrainian "provocation."[15] The Kremlin likely seeks to balance its messaging against two contradictory objectives to both discredit Ukraine internationally for conducting this attack into Russian territory and avoid inciting domestic panic about the scale, impacts, and potential outcomes of the Ukrainian operation. The Kremlin risks, however, discrediting itself among certain communities by seemingly dismissing the significance of the attack by framing it only as a "provocation."
Select Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the Russian military command for not detecting preparations for or preventing Ukrainian offensive operations into Kursk Oblast. Several Russian milbloggers complained that Russian forces should have prevented the Ukrainian offensive operations into Kursk Oblast as Russian forces knew that Ukrainian forces had been accumulating forces and means in the area for the past several months.[16] Some of the milbloggers complained that the Russian military command's inadequate reaction was due to a lack of concern about the Ukrainian accumulations, unrealistic confidence in Russian defenses in the border area, assumptions about Ukrainian forces' fatigue, or false reports about the situation.[17] A prominent Russian milblogger criticized Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov for not auditing the combat command system to remove ineffective commanders upon assuming his position as Minister of Defense and called for Russian authorities to punish incompetent commanders and liars.[18] The milblogger further claimed that Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast prove that the Russian military command made "strategic miscalculations" and that nepotism in the Russian military is protecting ineffective military officials.[19] One Russian milblogger, who is often critical of the Russian military, notably applauded the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for editing its Telegram post to correct statements that were "overly optimistic" and blamed unspecified sources in the information space for spreading "excessively bravura" information about the situation.[20]
Ukrainian forces reportedly used a first-person view (FPV) drone to down a Russian Mi-28 helicopter over Kursk Oblast, indicating that Ukrainian forces continue to successfully adapt their drone capabilities. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne in an August 6 article that SBU special forces downed a Russian Mi-28 helicopter over Kursk Oblast "with the help of an FPV drone" for the first time.[21] Suspilne published footage from Ukrainian law enforcement agencies showing a Ukrainian FPV drone striking the rear propeller of the Mi-28 helicopter.[22] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged the Ukrainian FPV drone strike against the Russian Mi-28 but claimed that the helicopter managed to safely land without injuring its crew.[23] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces also downed a Russian Ka-52 helicopter over the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border area on August 6, but did not specify the means that Ukrainian forces used to down it.[24] Russian sources recently debated if Ukraine used an FPV drone to down a Russian helicopter near Donetsk City in late July and published footage purportedly showing Ukrainian FPV drones unsuccessfully attempting to strike rotary wing aircraft mid-flight.[25] Ukrainian drone operators also appear to be improving their capabilities to interdict longer-range strike and reconnaissance Russian drones in mid-air using FPV drones.[26] A widespread Ukrainian capability to use relatively cheap and widely-available drones to interdict expensive Russian helicopters and reconnaissance and strike drones would likely allow Ukrainian forces to hinder the Russian military's short- and medium-range strike capabilities while conserving Ukraine's short- and medium-range air defense interceptors for more rare and significant Russian air targets. ISW has yet to observe Ukrainian forces using FPV drones to successfully strike Russian rotary wing aircraft or conventional reconnaissance drones regularly and throughout the theater, however. Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in a technological offense-defense race and Ukraine's ability to field technological innovations at scale ahead of Russian adaptations is crucial for Ukraine's ability to offset Russia's current materiel advantages.[27]
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov assessed on August 7 that Russian offensive potential will culminate within one and a half to two months, generally consistent with ISW's assessment on current Russia's offensive capabilities.[28] Budanov noted that the main Russian offensive "should end" in about two months, because it "has already dragged on." Budanov emphasized that Ukrainian troops will be proactive in the meantime and not simply let the Russian offensive run out of steam without doing anything, suggesting that Ukrainian forces will continue local tactical counterattacks in areas of the front where they deem such attacks to be the most promising. Budanov's statements are consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian forces are currently committing the breadth of their present materiel and manpower capabilities to pursuing offensive operations throughout the theater, particularly in Donetsk Oblast, and that Russian forces are unlikely to launch a new distinct offensive operation this summer due to mounting constraints to their capabilities.[29] Even as Russian forces continue to make tactically significant advances towards Pokrovsk, the rate of their gain is not indefinite, and Russian forces will likely struggle to sustain their offensive efforts as they come up against more built-up urban areas along the line of settlements directly east of Pokrovsk.[30] Russian forces are executing their summer offensive operation with mechanized assaults that often lead to high armored vehicle losses, and the Russian command's apparent willingness to accept these materiel losses on relatively small sectors of the front will eventually burden the Russian military in the long-term, pushing them closer to culmination.[31]
Head of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), Danielle Bell, stated that Russia has tortured 95 percent of Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) in Russian detention. Bell stated in an interview with Dutch TV channel NOS that Russian authorities torture Ukrainian POWs starting at their first interrogations and characterized the Russian practice of torturing Ukrainian POWs as "widespread and systematic."[32] Bell emphasized that the torture of Ukrainian POWs constitutes a war crime. The torture of a POW is a violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.[33] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade reported on August 7 that Russian authorities tortured and "brutally" killed a Ukrainian POW who served in his brigade in a pre-trial detention center in Rostov Oblast.[34] Bell's statements and previous HRMMU reports on Russian violations of Ukrainian POWs' rights are consistent with ISW's longstanding assessments about Russia's systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in occupied Ukraine and toward Ukrainian POWs.[35]
The Moldovan Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced on August 7 that it would not register the pro-Kremlin Victory electoral bloc in the October 2024 Moldovan presidential election and referendum. The Moldovan CEC stated on August 7 that it identified problems with the Victory bloc's registration documents on August 3 and requested that the bloc correct the errors by August 6, but that the bloc denied that there were any errors and ignored the CEC's request.[36] The Moldovan CEC announced on August 7 that it refused to register the Victory electoral bloc in the presidential election and referendum.[37] The Moldovan CEC stated that people on the "international restrictive lists" listed in a Moldovan 2016 law, including EU sanctions lists, cannot freely manage the bloc's funds, cannot ensure the rights and obligations of the bloc, and therefore cannot represent the bloc.[38] EU-sanctioned Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor heads the Victory bloc.[39] The CEC also cited its July 2023 decision regarding the registration of electoral blocs, which states that the name of an electoral bloc cannot be the same as a political party.[40] The Victory political party is a member of the Victory electoral bloc.[41] Moldovan outlet NewsMaker reported that six CEC members voted for the decision, one voted against, and two abstained.[42]
A Russian court sentenced Andrey Kurshin, administrator of the "Moscow Calling" Russian ultranationalist milblogger Telegram channel, to six and a half years in prison on August 7 for publishing "fake" information about the Russian military.[43] Russian authorities arrested Kurshin on August 31, 2023 for allegedly spreading "fake" information about the Russian military.[44] Kurshin's arrest likely aimed to make an example of a hypercritical milblogger to encourage self-censorship among the wider ultranationalist milblogger community, and Kurshin's August 7 sentencing continues to make an example of him to discourage other information space voices from growing too critical of the Kremlin or Ministry of Defense (MoD).[45]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up to 10 kilometers into Russia's Kursk Oblast amid continued mechanized offensive operations on Russian territory on August 7.
- The Kremlin's response to Ukrainian offensive activities in Kursk Oblast has so far been contradictory, as Russian officials are attempting to balance presenting the effort as a notable Ukrainian escalation with avoiding overstating its potential implications and risking domestic discontent.
- Select Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the Russian military command for not detecting preparations for or preventing Ukrainian offensive operations into Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly used a first-person view (FPV) drone to down a Russian Mi-28 helicopter over Kursk Oblast, indicating that Ukrainian forces continue to successfully adapt their drone capabilities.
- Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov assessed on August 7 that Russian offensive potential will culminate within one and a half to two months, generally consistent with ISW's assessment on current Russia's offensive capabilities.
- Head of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), Danielle Bell, stated that Russia has tortured 95 percent of Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) in Russian detention.
- The Moldovan Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced on August 7 that it would not register the pro-Kremlin Victory electoral bloc in the October 2024 Moldovan presidential election and referendum.
- A Russian court sentenced Andrey Kurshin, administrator of the "Moscow Calling" Russian ultranationalist milblogger Telegram channel, to six and a half years in prison on August 7 for publishing "fake" information about the Russian military.
- Ukrainian forces recently regained positions south of Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces advanced northeast of Siversk, southwest of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
- Russian Army Combat Reserve (BARS) units continue recruitment efforts.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 6, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 6, 2024, 6:40pm ET
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of cross border raids into Kursk Oblast on August 6. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed on August 6 that Russian border troops and FSB personnel repelled several raids by Ukrainian forces equipped with roughly a battalion's worth of tanks and armored vehicles against Russian positions near Nikolayevo-Darino and Oleshnya, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City and along the Russia-Ukraine international border).[1] Geolocated footage published on August 6 shows damaged and abandoned armored vehicles roughly seven kilometers north of the international border west of Lyubimovka, Kursk Oblast; Russian sources claimed that the footage shows Ukrainian vehicles, but ISW cannot confirm whether these armored vehicles are Russian, Ukrainian, or both.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked from two directions: from the Sudzha checkpoint (on the border northeast of Sumy City along the H-07/R-200 highways) in the direction of Sudzha and Oleshnya; and from Novehke, Sumy Oblast (northeast of the Sudzha checkpoint and Sumy City) towards Nikolayevo-Darino, Kursk Oblast.[3] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian reserve forces also responded to the supposed Ukrainian raids, and a Russian insider source claimed that elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz also responded to the raids, but ISW cannot verify these claims.[4] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed 16 Ukrainian armored vehicles during the supposed raids and that Russian forces conducted retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[5] Russian milbloggers posted footage claiming to show the aftermath of the supposed Ukrainian raids, although most of the damage shown in the footage appears to be the result of routine Ukrainian shelling and does not indicate that there was ground activity in the area.[6] Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov and several Russian milbloggers warned that fighting is ongoing in the border areas of Kursk Oblast's Sudzhansky and Korenevsky raions, contrary to the Russian MoD's and FSB's reporting.[7]
Russian milbloggers largely dismissed the supposed Ukrainian raids into Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian officials have largely yet to comment on the raids. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian military personnel and members of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) were involved in the raids, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[8] Ukrainian outlet New Voice of Ukraine reported that a source within Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that RDK forces were "definitely not involved" in the raids but declined to comment further on the supposed raids.[9] Representatives of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) also declined to comment on the raids.[10] Russian milbloggers largely dismissed the supposed raids as "unsuccessful" and a "media stunt."[11] Several Russian milbloggers warned that there could be additional raids in the coming days and that Ukrainian forces may be trying to divert Russian manpower and material from ongoing Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[12]
Russian Security Council Secretary and former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu heavily overexaggerated Russian advances in Ukraine since mid-June 2024. Shoigu stated on August 6 that Russian forces have seized 420 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory since June 14, 2024, when Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined his uncompromising demands for Ukraine’s capitulation as a prerequisite for "peace" negotiations in Ukraine.[13] ISW has observed evidence confirming that Russian forces have seized approximately 290 square kilometers since June 14. Russian forces increased the intensity of their assaults in the Toretsk direction on the night of June 18 after being generally inactive in this sector of the front throughout 2024.[14] ISW has not observed large or operationally significant Russian gains in the Toretsk or Avdiivka direction since July 14, although Russian forces have made tactical gains in these directions since July 14. The Russian military command has repeatedly exaggerated Russian territorial advances in Ukraine.[15]
Russian officials continue coordination and military cooperation with Iran ahead of the Iranian retaliatory strike against Israel out of concern for Russian interests in the region. NOTE: a version of this text appears in ISW-CTP's August 6 Iran Update. Reuters reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a message via Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu that Iran should act with restraint and avoid targeting civilians when retaliating against Israel.[16] An unspecified Iranian diplomat told IranWire that Russia is against Iranian strikes that could lead to the deaths of civilians due to the large number of Russian citizens who live in Israel.[17] The report did not specify how this Iranian diplomat has insight into the calculus behind the Russian decision making.
Russia is also reportedly assisting Iranian efforts to improve its air defenses against Israeli attacks. The New York Times (NYT), citing two unspecified Iranian officials including one Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) official, reported on August 5 that Russia began delivering unspecified advanced radars and air defense systems to Iran.[18] The NYT noted that Iranian media has previously reported that Iran sought to acquire Russian air defense systems to improve Iran’s air defense network and defend against an Israeli strike. ISW-CTP continues to assess that Russia is increasing its cooperation with Iran, especially leaning into its growing military partnership, to shape Western decision-making into decisions favorable to Russia, particularly into pushing the West to self-deter against providing further military assistance to Ukraine.[19] Russia's reported decision to provide Iran with radar and air defense systems, which could significantly benefit Russian forces on the ground if instead deployed to Ukraine, also underscores Russia's ongoing reliance on Iran for other critical weapons, including high-precision weapons and weapons components.[20]
Armenia continues to abstain from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Armenian and Russian sources stated on August 6 that Armenia will not participate in the upcoming CSTO exercises in Novosibirsk, Russia in mid-August 2024.[21] Armenia has de-facto frozen its CSTO membership by not participating in high-level meetings, military exercises, and other CSTO activities since mid-to-late March 2023.[22] Armenian authorities have repeatedly cited the CSTO’s failure to adequately address Armenia’s security needs as the reason that Armenia refuses to participate in the CSTO and have accused CSTO members like Belarus of helping Azerbaijan prepare for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.[23] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger who routinely criticizes Armenia claimed that Armenia’s refusal to participate in the upcoming CSTO military exercises is predictable and that Armenia will soon withdraw from CSTO due to Armenia's intensifying relations with the United States.[24] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has previously stated that Armenia will decide “when to leave” the CSTO, but Armenian officials have yet to officially confirm Armenia's intended timeline for withdrawing from the CSTO or suggest that enhanced security cooperation with the United States is a reason for Armenia’s withdrawal from the Russian-led security bloc.[25]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of cross border raids into Kursk Oblast on August 6.
- Russian milbloggers largely dismissed the supposed Ukrainian raids into Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian officials have largely yet to comment on the raids.
- Russian Security Council Secretary and former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu heavily overexaggerated Russian advances in Ukraine since mid-June 2024.
- Russian officials continue coordination and military cooperation with Iran ahead of the Iranian retaliatory strike against Israel out of concern for Russian interests in the region. NOTE: a version of this text appears in ISW-CTP's August 6 Iran Update.
- Armenia continues to abstain from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
- Russian forces advanced east of Toretsk.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly issued a formal reply denying a request from the wives of the mobilized Russian personnel to meet with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 5, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 5, 2024, 5:40pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian authorities detained the head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Patriot Park, Vyacheslav Akhmedov, and Deputy Head of the Russian MoD's Directorate for Innovative Development Major General Vladimir Shesterov on suspicion of large-scale fraud as of August 5.[1] Russian law enforcement told Kremlin newswire TASS that they suspect Akhmedov and Shesterov of embezzling over 40 million rubles (roughly $471,000) during public procurement for the park and warned that there may be additional defendants in the case.[2] Patriot Park was reportedly the personal project of former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, and recently detained former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov reportedly oversaw construction of the park.[3] A Russian milblogger who is particularly critical of the Russian military command praised Akhmedov's and Shesterov's arrests and claimed that Akhmedov and Shesterov were part of the "old team" that controlled the Russian MoD under Shoigu's leadership, suggesting that their arrests are "indicative" of Shoigu's diminishing influence.[4] A Russian insider source who has previously correctly predicted several command changes within the Russian MoD suggested that recently dismissed former Deputy Defense Minister Army General Pavel Popov, who is reportedly involved with Russia's National Defense Control Center, could be the next high-ranking MoD official to be arrested.[5] Russian officials have arrested several senior Russian defense officials since April 2024 on similar corruption charges.[6] Russian milbloggers previously theorized that the arrests of Ivanov and other high-ranking defense officials affiliated with Shoigu could be indicative of Shoigu's declining influence within the Kremlin, as well as the Kremlin's desire to "clean house" of Shoigu's old guard affiliates under the Russian MoD's new leadership.[7]
A Russian insider source who has previously correctly predicted several command changes within the Russian MoD claimed on August 5 that the Head of the Russian MoD's Main Armored Directorate, Lieutenant General Alexander Shestakov, will leave his position in the near future.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Shestakov as head of the MoD's Main Armored Directorate days before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Shestakov is responsible for the MoD's efforts to plan and mobilize Russia's production of armored vehicles.[9] ISW cannot confirm this potential command change at this time.
Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met with various high-ranking Iranian officials in Tehran on August 5, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akhbar Ahmadian.[10] CTP–ISW's August 5 Iran Update will cover Shoigu's meetings and their regional context in greater depth.
Russia is tightening pre-departure standards for Tajik migrants hoping to work in Russia, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to address security threats from the Islamic State's Afghan branch IS-Khorasan (IS-K) following the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in March 2024. The Tajik Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Employment reported on August 5 that it jointly launched a Russian passport and visa service representative office in Dushanbe with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in May 2024.[11] The representative office will conduct preliminary checks on Tajik citizens who want to work in Russia and will allow Tajik citizens to undergo fingerprinting registration and check bans on entry into Russia while remaining in Tajikistan. The Tajik Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Employment stated that it discussed pre-departure procedures for Tajik migrants heading to Russia and improvements in the "safe, legal, and orderly migration" of Tajik citizens to Russia with Russian authorities. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that new Russian procedures require Russian businesses to interview prospective employees from Tajikistan before they travel to Russia in order to ensure that the individual has all the necessary documents to work in Russia.[12] The Tajik Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Employment also announced that Tajikistan and Russia agreed to organize Russian language courses and Russian language, history, and law exams for Tajik citizens attempting to work in Russia. Russia intensified its engagement with Tajik authorities following the Crocus City Hall attack to strengthen security and has previously refused entry to migrants from Central Asian countries at airports and land border crossings.[13] Russia is also likely emphasizing efforts to test potential migrants' knowledge of Russian language, cultural norms, and laws in order to placate the Russian ultranationalist community, which regularly levies xenophobic criticism against Central Asian migrants and advocates for Russia to issue them an ultimatum of assimilating fully to Russian culture or leaving Russia.[14]
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), citing satellite imagery, reported that Ukrainian drone strikes destroyed an Su-34 bomber aircraft and an ammunition warehouse at the Morozovsk Airfield in Rostov Oblast on August 3.[15] The GUR reported on August 5 that the imagery shows that debris from falling Ukrainian drones also damaged two more aircraft, four "technical buildings,” and two hangars at the airfield. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 4 that 18 Ukrainian drones struck their targets and destroyed an Su-34 bomber aircraft and a warehouse with aviation weapons and damaged a flight control point and engineering equipment during the August 3 strike.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of successful drone strikes against likely military targets in Rostov, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts, including the Morozovsk Airfield, on August 3.[17]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian authorities detained the head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Patriot Park, Vyacheslav Akhmedov, and Deputy Head of the Russian MoD's Directorate for Innovative Development Major General Vladimir Shesterov on suspicion of large-scale fraud as of August 5.
- A Russian insider source who has previously correctly predicted several command changes within the Russian MoD claimed on August 5 that the Head of the Russian MoD's Main Armored Directorate, Lieutenant General Alexander Shestakov, will leave his position in the near future.
- Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met with various high-ranking Iranian officials, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akhbar Ahmadian in Tehran on August 5.
- Russia is tightening pre-departure standards for Tajik migrants hoping to work in Russia, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to address security threats from the Islamic State's Afghan branch IS-Khorasan (IS-K) following the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in March 2024.
- Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), citing satellite imagery, reported that Ukrainian drone strikes destroyed an Su-34 bomber aircraft and an ammunition warehouse at the Morozovsk Airfield in Rostov Oblast on August 3.
- Russian forces advanced east of Toretsk and Pokrovsk and near Donetsk City and Robotyne.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to position Russian veterans who have fought in Ukraine in domestic political roles.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 4, 2024
click here to read the full report
Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 4, 2024, 3:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on August 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against an oil depot in Rostov Oblast and missile strikes against fuel storage warehouses in occupied Luhansk City on August 4. Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage and reported on August 4 that Ukrainian drones struck an oil depot in Azov, Rostov Oblast.[1] Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubev announced on August 4 that fire fighters were extinguishing a large fire at a warehouse in Azov, but specifically noted that Russian authorities would establish the cause after extinguishing the fire.[2] Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on August 4 that Ukrainian forces launched eight ATACMS missiles and four Storm Shadow missiles at Luhansk City.[3] Pasechnik claimed that Russian air defense shot down four missiles, that some missiles struck warehouses containing fuel storage, and that some falling missile debris caused dry grass to catch fire.[4] Footage published on August 4 purportedly shows two smoke plumes over Luhansk City.[5] Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported fires at the Luhansk machine-building plant in Luhansk City, where Russian forces reportedly repair and store military equipment.[6] ISW cannot confirm what type of missiles Ukrainian forces used in the Luhansk City strike at this time.
Ukraine confirmed that it has received the first batch of US-made F-16 fighter jets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on August 4 that Ukraine received an unspecified number of F-16s from unspecified Western countries and specifically thanked Denmark, the Netherlands, and the US.[7] The Economist reported on August 4 that Ukraine has so far received 10 of the promised 79 jets and that Ukrainian forces should be able to fly 20 F-16s by the end of 2024.[8] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine will need a substantial number of F-16 jets in order to field them at the scale necessary for Ukraine to succeed in integrating fixed wing aircraft into its wider air defense umbrella.[9] Ukraine will also notably need to continue efforts to target Russian air defense assets within the Russian rear and in occupied Ukraine with Western-provided long-range weapons to enable its use of F-16 jets.
Russian milbloggers responded to the arrival of F-16s by trying to downplay their potential battlefield effects—directly undermining Russian information operations intended to frame the delivery of F-16s and other Western weapons systems as an uncrossable "red line." Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Western and Ukrainian media are "overhyping" the arrival of F-16s in order to distract from battlefield failures, and many milbloggers turned to immediately discussing how Russian forces will begin targeting and destroying the aircraft.[10] Russian information space commentators and officials have frequently claimed that the delivery of Western weaponry to Ukraine constitutes a red line, that if crossed, will force Russia into an escalatory response.[11] Russia has repeatedly proven, however, that the invocation of supposed "red lines" is a reflexive control technique intended to force the West into self-deterring against providing Ukraine with additional military aid.[12] Western and Ukrainian policies have crossed Russia's self-defined "red lines" multiple times since the beginning of the war without drawing a significant Russian reaction, which Russian milblogger comments suggest will prove to be the case with Russia's response to F-16s.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against an oil depot in Rostov Oblast and missile strikes against fuel storage warehouses in occupied Luhansk City on August 4.
- Ukraine confirmed that it has received the first batch of US-made F-16 fighter jets.
- Russian milbloggers responded to the arrival of F-16s by trying to downplay their potential battlefield effects—directly undermining Russian information operations intended to frame the delivery of F-16s and other Western weapons systems as an uncrossable "red line."
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances east of Pokrovsk, west of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
- The Russian defense industry reportedly continues to produce missiles using Western-sourced components.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 3, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 3, 2024, 4:45pm ET
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck four Russian S-400 air defense missile launchers, an S-500 air defense system, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet's (BSF) Rostov-on-Don Kilo-class submarine in occupied Crimea on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 3 that the strikes significantly damaged four Russian S-400 missile launchers in unspecified areas in occupied Crimea.[1] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on August 3 that Ukrainian forces successfully destroyed a Russian S-400 and S-500 air defense system that the Russian military had deployed to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge.[2] ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Ukrainian forces striking Russian air defense systems in occupied Crimea on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian strike sank the Rostov-on-Don at the Sevastopol port.[3] Ukrainian forces previously struck and significantly damaged the submarine at the Sevastopol port in September 2023, after which it underwent repairs at the port.[4] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian MGM-140 ATACMS strike against occupied Sevastopol on August 2.[5] Satellite imagery captured on August 2 shows some damage to a structure purportedly protecting the Rostov-on-Don in the Sevastopol port, but ISW cannot yet independently verify reports that the Ukrainian strike destroyed the submarine.[6]
Ukrainian forces also conducted a series of successful drone strikes against likely military targets in Rostov, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts on August 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the Morozovsk Airfield and nearby ammunition and glide bomb storage facilities with an unspecified number of drones and that Ukrainian forces are conducting a battle damage assessment.[7] Footage published on August 3 shows secondary explosions near the Morozovsk Airfield consistent with strikes against an ammunition depot, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched roughly 55 drones at targets in Rostov Oblast.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the SBU and GUR also targeted a number of oil depots and fuel and lubricant storage facilities in Rostov, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts.[9] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that sources within Ukrainian special services stated that the GUR struck the Atlas oil refinery in Rostov Oblast with 15 drones and that Russian forces were using the Atlas oil refinery to fuel military equipment in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[10] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed that Ukrainian drones also struck the Gubkinsky oil depot in Belgorod Oblast, which reportedly supplies motor fuels to the Russian military.[11] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 75 drones over Russia and the Sea of Azov on the night of August 2 to 3.[12]
The Kremlin reportedly planned to transfer unspecified missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis in Yemen but did not transfer the materiel following diplomatic pressure. Russia's reported plan highlights its growing military partnership with Iran and suggests that Russia likely aims to leverage Iranian proxies to indirectly confront the West and shape Western decision making. CNN reported on August 2 that US officials and other sources familiar with the matter stated that Russia was preparing to deliver unspecified missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis in late July 2024 but backed down from the plan following US and Saudi diplomatic outreach.[13] US officials reportedly stated that they are unsure if Saudi protests were the determining factor for ending the planned transfer, however.[14] CNN's sources stated that at least three Russian military officials traveled to Yemen in late July 2024 to advise the Houthis and possibly assist the Houthis with live fire exercises, which the Houthis later cancelled.[15] US officials reportedly stated that Russia viewed arming and advising the Houthis as a retaliatory measure for lifting some US restrictions on Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons for strikes within Russia.[16] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on June 6 that Russia would provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West as a "symmetrical response" to the lifting of some of these restrictions.[17] Russia's reported plans to support the Houthis in order to indirectly confront the West and threaten further escalation cohere with several Russia information and hybrid operations that aim to encourage the West to self-deter from supporting Ukraine over fears of confrontation with Russia.[18]
Putin's willingness to consider supporting the Houthis as they attack Israel and international shipping is part of deepening Russian-Iranian military cooperation and Russia's increasing reliance on Iran for high-precision weapons and components.[19] Russia's deepening partnership with Iran will likely encourage Russia to consider supporting other Iranian proxies and leveraging these groups in other indirect attempts to threaten the West with escalation. Increased Russian willingness to use Iran and its proxies to indirectly confront the West will disrupt Russian attempts to portray Russian foreign policy in the Middle East as balanced and may further complicate Russian relations with countries concerned about Russian-Iranian cooperation.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces reportedly struck four Russian S-400 air defense missile launchers, an S-500 air defense system, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet's (BSF) Rostov-on-Don Kilo-class submarine in occupied Crimea on August 2.
- Ukrainian forces also conducted a series of successful drone strikes against likely military targets in Rostov, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts on August 3.
- The Kremlin reportedly planned to transfer unspecified missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis in Yemen but did not transfer the materiel following diplomatic pressure. Russia's reported plan highlights its growing military partnership with Iran and suggests that Russia likely aims to leverage Iranian proxies to indirectly confront the West and shape Western decision making.
- Putin's willingness to consider supporting the Houthis as they attack Israel and international shipping is part of deepening Russian-Iranian military cooperation and Russia's increasing reliance on Iran for high-precision weapons and components.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, and Chasiv Yar.
- Russian authorities continue efforts to financially incentivize Russian military service in Ukraine.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2, 2024
Click here to read the full report with maps
Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 2, 2024, 5:55pm ET
Ukrainian Joint Forces and Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andriy Hnatov stressed that Russia is pursuing an effort to force Ukraine to commit its available manpower to ongoing defensive operations in order to prevent the accumulation of Ukrainian resources for future counteroffensive operations. Hnatov stated in an interview with Ukrainian outlet Glavcom published on August 2 that the Russian military command launched the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast in early May 2024 because it was concerned that Ukraine's recent efforts to strengthen its force generation apparatus would allow Ukrainian forces to leverage newly generated manpower to stabilize the frontline and conduct counteroffensive operations.[1] Hnatov stated that Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast aimed to prevent Ukraine from building out reserves and addressing personnel shortages in already committed combat brigades by drawing Ukrainian forces to Kharkiv Oblast from elsewhere along the front, complicating rotations, and forcing Ukraine to commit newly generated forces to defensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast instead of offensive or defensive operations elsewhere in the theater.[2] Hnatov stated that Russia continues efforts to prevent Ukraine from accumulating the manpower necessary to conduct counteroffensive operations, consistent with ISW's assessment that ongoing Russian offensive operations throughout eastern and northeastern Ukraine aim to degrade Ukraine's ability to accumulate the manpower and materiel Ukraine requires to contest the battlefield initiative.[3] The Russian military command likely views retaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative and will continue efforts to sustain Russia's current offensive tempo in Ukraine in order to constrain Ukraine's ability to seize the initiative on select sectors of the frontline.[4]
Russian Airborne (VDV) and "Dnepr" Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky addressed VDV forces in an article and recorded video on the 94th anniversary of the VDV's formation on August 2, attempting to highlight the VDV's performance in Ukraine as an elite professional force despite the fact that VDV elements are fighting essentially as understrength motorized rifle units in Ukraine.[5] This is Teplinsky's first appearance since Russian milbloggers began speculating that Teplinsky suffered serious injuries (or even may have died) in a Ukrainian strike on a Russian command post in occupied Kherson Oblast in late June. ISW remains unable to confirm whether Teplinsky was affected by the strike or even present when it occurred.[6] Teplinsky published an article in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s official Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, congratulating VDV forces on their 94th anniversary and for their role in the war in Ukraine, particularly emphasizing the VDV's role in operations on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[7] Teplinsky also reported that during the war in Ukraine, 70 VDV personnel have received "Hero of Russia" awards; 71,000 VDV personnel have received state awards; and 32,000 VDV personnel have received departmental insignia. Russian military commanders will typically congratulate combat services on the anniversaries of their formations, but Teplinsky's praise of the VDV is noteworthy after the VDV has suffered consistently high losses in Ukraine—the 83rd VDV Brigade recently sustained high casualties during offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and the 104th VDV Division suffered substantial losses after its elements deployed to Krynky, Kherson Oblast in late 2023 with little to no training.[8] Over the course of the war, VDV forces have become so degraded that they are conducting the same attritional infantry-heavy frontal assault tactics as understrength motorized rifle units in Ukraine, despite the VDV's prior reputation as an "elite force" before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[9] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military's reliance on such assault tactics has largely eroded the distinctions between various Russian combat services and degraded the efficacy of Russian frontline troops, especially for once "elite" VDV forces.[10] Teplinsky's speech and article emphasize that the Russian military command remains interested in preserving the VDV's reputation as an elite fighting force.
Russian authorities arrested the former deputy rear commander of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) Colonel Dmitry Peshkov on August 2. Russian state newswire TASS reported on August 2 that Russian law enforcement arrested and charged Peshkov for the embezzlement of food rations for Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine, to which he pleaded not guilty.[11] Peshkov’s arrest is likely part of a concerted Kremlin effort to remove high-ranking Russian officials from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), potentially to indirectly punish commanders for the failures of their troops or to maintain a cadre of loyal and compliant officers within the highest ranks of the Russian military.[12] Elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division have reportedly been conducting offensive operations in the Terny-Nevske area of Luhansk Oblast with limited success and have recently lost some territory to limited Ukrainian counterattacks in this area.[13]
The Russian Federation Council passed an updated version of an amendment that will allow commanders to punish subordinates for "gross disciplinary offenses," including the use of personal electronic devices, in frontline areas following significant backlash from Russian milbloggers. The Russian Federation Council approved updated language on August 2 that clarifies that commanders cannot punish servicemembers for using personal devices to perform combat operations, such as using personal phones or tablets to operate reconnaissance or strike drones.[14] Russian milbloggers widely criticized the original version of the amendment for being out of touch with reality and failing to reflect Russian forces' dependence on personal devices for command and control (C2) and drone operations, which prompted the Russian State Duma to revise the amendment.[15] It remains unclear if the Russian military command will be able or willing to enforce punishment for the use of personal devices for non-combat purposes in Ukraine, and the Russian military would likely find it extremely difficult to eliminate its dependence on insecure personal devices for many frontline tasks.[16]
The Russian Federation Council also passed a series of bills strengthening the Russian government's control over the Russian information space and further restricting the rights of migrants in Russia. The Federation Council approved a series of bills on August 2, including bills requiring the owners of social media channels with over 10,000 subscribers to provide personally identifying information to Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor; limiting the number of SIM cards that foreigners can purchase; allowing the Russian government to terminate the naturalized citizenship of migrants who do not immediately register for military service; and further restricting migrants’ rights to open bank accounts, drive cars, get married, and purchase property in Russia.[17] ISW previously assessed that these proposed bills were intended to further Kremlin efforts to crack down against behavior in the Russian information space and within migrant communities that the Kremlin views as undesirable.[18]
The pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc announced its candidate for the October 2024 Moldovan presidential election on August 2. Victory bloc founder and US-sanctioned Moldovan politician Ilan Shor announced that the Victory bloc nominated Vasile Bolea to run in the Moldovan presidential election, and Bolea later announced that Shor-affiliated Moldovan parliament member Marina Tauber will be his Chief of Staff for the campaign.[19] The Victory bloc stated that Bolea's election platform will prioritize restoring Moldova's relations with Russia and the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), ensuring Moldova's accession to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and BRICS, and increasing cooperation with the CIS and European Union (EU).[20] Bolea claimed that Moldova has more viable economic prospects and "a future" in its relationship with BRICS "unlike" its relationship with the EU and emphasized that his platform will promote "traditional values" and Eastern Orthodoxy.[21] Bolea is reportedly the elected chairperson of the Victory bloc's parliamentary group and announced the creation of the bloc's parliamentary group in May 2024.[22] Bolea has been a member of the Moldovan parliament since 2014 and was previously a member of Moldova's Socialist and Revival parties.[23] Bolea appears to be running on a more openly pro-Russian platform than other Moldovan oppositionist presidential candidates, including former pro-Russian Moldovan president and current head of the Moldovan Socialist Party Igor Dodon's candidate, former Moldovan Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo.[24] The Victory bloc's decision to run its own presidential candidate suggests that Moldova's pro-Russian opposition remain divided, which may challenge the Kremlin's efforts to co-opt pro-Russian actors into its wider plans to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova's accession to the EU.[25]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian Joint Forces and Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andriy Hnatov stressed that Russia is pursuing an effort to force Ukraine to commit its available manpower to ongoing defensive operations in order to prevent the accumulation of Ukrainian resources for future counteroffensive operations.
- Russian Airborne (VDV) and "Dnepr" Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky addressed VDV forces in an article and recorded video on the 94th anniversary of the VDV's formation on August 2, attempting to highlight the VDV's performance in Ukraine as an elite professional force despite the fact that VDV elements are fighting essentially as understrength motorized rifle units in Ukraine.
- Russian authorities arrested the former deputy rear commander of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) Colonel Dmitry Peshkov on August 2.
- The Russian Federation Council passed an updated version of an amendment that will allow commanders to punish subordinates for "gross disciplinary offenses," including the use of personal electronic devices, in frontline areas following significant backlash from Russian milbloggers.
- The Russian Federation Council also passed a series of bills strengthening the Russian government's control over the Russian information space and further restricting the rights of migrants in Russia.
- The pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc announced its candidate for the October 2024 Moldovan presidential election on August 2.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
- A Russian government official weighed in on ongoing milblogger criticism of Russia's drone production industry.
- A delegation of Kremlin officials visited occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts on August 2 to highlight Russian efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into the Russian Federation.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 1, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
August 1, 2024, 6:20pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on August 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces continue to make slow, steady advances in the Pokrovsk direction (west of Avdiivka), largely enabled by Ukrainian manpower shortages and the terrain in the area immediately northwest of Avdiivka. Russian advances will likely slow further as Russian forces advance into a line of larger and more urban settlements. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky identified the Pokrovsk direction as the Russian military's current priority on August 1 and noted that Russian forces are currently able to advance in certain areas of the front because Ukraine is still struggling with manpower shortages and challenges in properly staffing and equipping new brigades.[1] Zelensky observed that some Ukrainian brigades are unable to conduct rotations because their replacement brigades are not yet staffed or equipped, which creates exploitable weaknesses that Russian forces can attack.[2] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that Ukrainian defenders in the Pokrovsk direction have inferior equipment and defensive means and are therefore currently unable to slow Russian advances.[3] Delays in the provision of Western and especially US military assistance have contributed to delays in equipping newly-raised Ukrainian units and re-equipping those that have been fighting.[4]
Russian forces appear to be exploiting such weakness to make gradual tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka, where ISW recently assessed that Russian forces are attempting to achieve a limited tactical encirclement of Ukrainian forces east of the T0511 (O0544) Ocheretyne-Hrodivka-Myrnohrad highway, particularly on the left bank of the Vovcha River.[5] Geolocated footage published on August 1 shows that Russian forces have advanced further within Vesele towards the T0511 road, placing the current furthest confirmed Russian advance about 3.5 kilometers from the outskirts of Hrodivka.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking south of Vesele along the railway line and windbreaks towards Serhiivka and Zhelanne (just south of Vesele), which could further efforts to tactically encircle Ukrainian forces in this area if Russian forces properly exploit it.[7] Ukrainian and Russian sources also reported that Russian forces seized Tymofiivka (north of the O0544 road and the Vesele area).[8] Mashovets characterized recent Russian advances in the area southeast of the O0544 road as a tactical penetration of Ukrainian lines and stated that Russian forces have advanced 6.5 kilometers deep and 7.5 kilometers wide from Sokil to Serhiivka, crossing both the Vovcha and Kazennyi Torets rivers (running through Prohres-Vovche and Lozuvatske, respectively) in recent weeks.[9] Mashovets warned that Russian forces are close to achieving an operationally significant breakthrough in the Pokrovsk direction by the end of August.
Russia's current rate of tactical advance towards Pokrovsk will likely not continue indefinitely, however, as Russian forces are approaching a line of larger and more urban settlements. Current Russian efforts in the Pokrovsk direction are concentrated on achieving a tactical breakthrough near Zhelanne and Novohrodivka.[10] The next defensible line between the current forward Russian line of advance and Pokrovsk runs between the towns of Selydove, Novohrodivka, and Hrodivka, with many of the current Russian tactical advances focused specifically on the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka sector of the line (about five kilometers west of Russian positions in the Vesele area). Novohrodivka and Hrodivka had pre-war populations of about 14,000 and 2,000, respectively, and are larger and relatively more urban than many of the smaller settlements that Russian forces have seized since they began moving west of Avdiivka in February 2024.[11] These towns are by no means as large and urban as Mariupol or even Bakhmut, for example, but they pose a very different tactical problem set for advancing Russian forces, who have recently been mostly advancing across open fields, small windbreaks, and settlements that are a few blocks long. Russian forces in Ukraine have historically struggled with completing combat operations rapidly in more urbanized or residential areas—for example Russian forces fought in earnest over five months to seize Avdiivka, which is only a little larger than Novohrodivka. Ukrainian troops are notably more exhausted and attrited now than they were in early 2024 when Russian forces seized Avdiivka, which was also heavily fortified, and Russian troops will likely continue to exploit that reality to enable tactical advances. The rate of Russian advance is likely to slow nevertheless as Russian forces become engaged near and in these larger towns and settlements.
Russia's Central Grouping of Forces appears to be more rapidly redeploying and committing forces between different sectors of its recently expanded area of responsibility (AOR) in Donetsk Oblast than has been the norm in most of the theater recently. The Russian military recently expanded the Central Grouping of Forces AOR to include both the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions and possibly to support select operations west and southwest of Donetsk City.[12] The Russian Central Grouping of Forces committed operational reserves of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division's 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) to the start of offensive operations in the Toretsk direction in June 2024 while the majority of the CMD's other elements remained committed in the Pokrovsk direction.[13] Elements of the 41st CAA's 90th Tank Division reportedly conducted a roughly reinforced battalion-size mechanized assault southwest of Donetsk City on July 24, although the majority of the 90th Tank Division's regiments appear committed to operations west of Avdiivka.[14] Mashovets stated on August 1 that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces regrouped ahead of the start of the Toretsk offensive operation in mid-June 2024 and planned to assign responsibility for the Toretsk front to the 41st CAA's three motorized rifle brigades (the 35th, 74th, and 55th motorized rifle brigades) and responsibility for the Pokrovsk effort to the 2nd CAA and the 90th Tank Division.[15] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command was attempting to opportunistically exploit relatively rapid tactical gains by committing elements of two regiments of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division to the Toretsk effort and that the Russian military command is now recommitting these elements to achieve the desired tactical encirclement in the Pokrovsk direction.[16] Mashovets stated that elements of the 35th, 74th, and 55th motorized rifle brigades are currently conducting offensive operations in the Toretsk area, although ISW has observed widespread reporting of these elements fighting northwest of Avdiivka in recent weeks, and elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating in the Avdiivka area as recently as July 19.[17]
ISW has yet to observe confirmation that elements of the 41st CAA are operating near Toretsk beyond comments made by Mashovets, although Mashovets' reporting is consistent with what appears to be more rapid deployments between different sectors of the front within the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR. It is possible that the Russian military command is splitting formations and units between different sectors and committing smaller elements of the same units to exploit tactical opportunities in different areas. ISW will continue to track the Russian order of battle (ORBAT) in the Central Grouping's AOR to determine the contours of these apparently more rapid redeployments.
The Central Grouping of Forces may have established a more flexible command and control (C2) structure and may be responding more quickly to potential Ukrainian tactical vulnerabilities than other Russian groupings of forces in Ukraine. Russian forces have rapidly redeployed forces across different operational directions on several occasions to address vulnerabilities and strengthen groupings of forces conducting offensive and defensive operations, but rarely have groupings of forces rapidly redeployed the same elements multiple times in quick succession across different sectors within their AORs.[18] Russian groupings of forces in Ukraine have increasingly tasked smaller sectors of their AORs to the same units and formations in order to create more cohesive C2 and have typically only redeployed elements after regrouping those units in the rear for reconstitution and replenishment.[19] The Central Grouping of Forces' reported redeployment and commitment of elements of the same units in rapid succession suggests that the grouping has established a more flexible C2 structure and is attempting to improve how quickly Russian forces can commit forces to areas where tactical opportunities emerge. The Russian military command established the Central Grouping of Forces as an operational maneuver force following the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, and flexible and more rapid force redeployments and commitments to exploit tactical Ukrainian vulnerabilities on separate smaller sectors of a wider front are consistent with that purpose.[20] The Central Grouping of Forces' expanded AOR has lengthened the front along which the grouping is attempting to exploit Ukrainian vulnerabilities, but the Central Grouping of Forces appears to be maintaining the more flexible C2 it likely created while trying to make significant tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka in Spring 2024.[21]
The Russian military command is pursuing consistent offensive operations throughout eastern and northeastern Ukraine in an effort to stretch Ukrainian forces and weaken Ukrainian defenses, but the Russian military has largely failed to exploit these effects to achieve significant tactical gains or further meaningful operational objectives.[22] The Central Grouping of Forces may be more capable of achieving this goal than other Russian forces in Ukraine, however, if it can maintain its apparent flexible C2 structure and retain enough combat power to continue operations for a long enough period. The Central Grouping of Forces may be able to intentionally create pressure that generates tactical vulnerabilities along a wider front in Donetsk Oblast and then quickly seize on those tactical opportunities by redeploying forces within its AOR in a manner that other Russian force groupings have not demonstrated a capacity for.
A limited number of F-16 fighter jets have reportedly arrived in Ukraine, but it will likely be several months before Ukraine will be able to field the jets at scale. Western media reported on July 31 that the first batch of F-16s recently arrived in Ukraine and that Ukraine will receive more jets soon at an unspecified time.[23] Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis confirmed that an unspecified number of F-16s were in Ukraine on July 31 and recent footage purportedly shows an F-16 operating over Ukrainian airspace, but Ukrainian officials have declined to comment on the matter.[24] Ukrainian officials have previously discussed their intention to use F-16 and other fixed-wing aircraft as part of Ukraine's broader air defense umbrella in coordination with Ukraine's existing air defense systems but have repeatedly stressed that Ukraine will need to receive a substantial number of jets in order to implement this vision.[25] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky urged Western countries to support Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia during an interview on August 1 and noted that the survival of the Ukrainian state depends on Western support for long-range Ukrainian strikes into Russia.[26] Ukrainian forces will almost certainly not be willing or able to integrate F-16s into routine air defense or long-range strike missions until they receive additional jets.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will not compromise its sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for a diplomatic resolution to Russia's invasion. Zelensky stated during an interview with French media on August 1 that Ukraine is willing to pursue a diplomatic solution with Russia, but that Ukraine will never make territorial concessions to do so.[27] Zelensky emphasized that the Ukrainian government does not have the right to unilaterally renounce Ukrainian territory, stating that this would violate the Ukrainian constitution because this decision must take into account the will of the Ukrainian people. Zelensky noted that the Ukrainian government would have to hold a referendum to formally renounce any territory but did not suggest that the Ukrainian government or population has any interest in or intention to hold such a referendum. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly stated that Ukraine will not violate its sovereignty and territorial integrity by conceding any Ukrainian territory to Russia, and recent polling suggests that most Ukrainian citizens do not support territorial concessions.[28] Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will have a plan for a second Global Peace Summit by November 2024 and that Ukraine's plan has wide international support. Kremlin officials, meanwhile, continue to demand complete Ukrainian capitulation and the revocation of Ukraine's NATO aspirations while engaging in information operations intended to portray Ukraine's commitment to its sovereignty and territorial integrity as an outrageous ultimatum.[29]
Russia, Belarus, the US, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Turkey, and Norway conducted a high-profile prisoner exchange involving 26 prisoners from multiple countries on August 1. Turkey mediated the 26-prisoner swap, which took place in Ankara.[30] US officials confirmed the release of three US citizens — retired US Marine Paul Whelan, Wall Street Journal (WSJ) journalist Evan Gershkovich, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) journalist Alsu Kurmasheva — seven Russian political prisoners, including Russian opposition politician Vladimir Kara-Murza — four German citizens from Russian detention — and one German citizen from Belarusian detention.[31] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed pardons for the 15 individuals released from Russian detention, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a pardon for the German individual released from Belarusian detention.[32] The US, Germany, Poland, Norway, and Slovenia released eight imprisoned Russian nationals, including Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) contract killer Vadim Krasikov, Russian intelligence agents Artem and Anna Dultsev, Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) agent Pavel Rubtsov, hacker Roman Seleznev, and businessman Vladislav Klyushin, and also returned two minors (reportedly the children of two of the released Russians).[33] Putin met the returned Russian prisoners on the tarmac at Vnukovo-2 airport in Moscow and stated that he is nominating them for state awards.[34]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces continue to make slow, steady advances in the Pokrovsk direction (west of Avdiivka), largely enabled by Ukrainian manpower shortages and the terrain in the area immediately northwest of Avdiivka. Russian advances will likely slow further as Russian forces advance into a line of larger and more urban settlements.
- Russia's current rate of tactical advance towards Pokrovsk will likely not continue indefinitely, however, as Russian forces are approaching a line of larger and more urban settlements.
- Russia's Central Grouping of Forces appears to be more rapidly redeploying and committing forces between different sectors of its recently expanded area of responsibility (AOR) in Donetsk Oblast than has been the norm in most of the theater recently.
- The Central Grouping of Forces may have established a more flexible command and control (C2) structure and may be responding more quickly to potential Ukrainian tactical vulnerabilities than other Russian groupings of forces in Ukraine.
- A limited number of F-16 fighter jets have reportedly arrived in Ukraine, but it will likely be several months before Ukraine will be able to field the jets at scale.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will not compromise its sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for a diplomatic resolution to Russia's invasion.
- Russia, Belarus, the US, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Turkey, and Norway conducted a high-profile prisoner exchange involving 26 prisoners from multiple countries on August 1.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Chasiv Yar, and Donetsk City.
- Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on August 1 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may have significantly overstated the number of contract soldiers it claims to have recruited between Fall 2022 and April 2024.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 31, 2024
Click here to read the full report
Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan
July 31, 2024, 6:20pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on July 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Israel conducted an airstrike killing Hamas Political Bureau Chairperson Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran to derail attempts to establish peace in the Middle East.[1] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also responded to Haniyeh's death, stating that it "strongly condemned" Haniyeh's assassination and emphasized that Haniyeh's assassination occurred during his visit to Tehran for Masoud Pezeshkian's presidential inauguration.[2] The Russian MFA did not explicitly implicate Israel but claimed that the "organizers of this political assassination" were aware of the "dangerous consequences" Haniyeh's death would have on the entire region. Russia's decision to publicly blame Israel for destabilizing peace prospects in the Middle East and indirectly threaten Israel with "dangerous consequences" demonstrates Russia's increasing willingness to publicly align with Iran amid deepening Russian-Iranian military cooperation.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin has increasingly expressed anti-Israel positions since the start of the Israel–Hamas war in October 2023 and notably amplified information operations designed to justify Iranian aggression against Israel, including the April 13 large-scale missile and drone strikes against Israel.[4]
The Russian State Duma revised some aspects of a recent bill criminalizing Russian soldiers' use of personal devices on the battlefield following outcry in the Russian ultranationalist community. The Russian State Duma Defense Committee recommended on July 30 that the Duma repeal its prior approval of the bill, and the State Duma adopted a new version of the bill on July 31 clarifying that Russian soldiers will not be subject to disciplinary arrest for using or wearing devices to perform combat operations.[5] Russian milbloggers largely celebrated the revision, with most praising the State Duma for its willingness to listen to the Russian ultranationalist information space.[6] Some milbloggers were still cautious, however, advocating for the State Duma to completely repeal the law and noting that the State Duma should repeal other unspecified laws in line with "common sense."[7] One milblogger continued to criticize the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for this bill, claiming that the MoD has failed to change ineffective structural entities responsible for the MoD's public relations and noting that the MoD should consider how this bill hurts its image.[8] Russian milbloggers largely ignored the fact that the State Duma's revisions do not address many of the milbloggers' initial concerns, including the lack of MoD-provided devices for Russian soldiers to use for their duties, the lack of criteria for distinguishing between a personal device and a service device, using this bill as an excuse to justify harsh punishments against conscripts or disliked subordinates, and depriving Russian soldiers of their ability to contact family members and raise awareness of corruption or incompetence of their commanders.[9] It remains unclear if the Russian military command will be able or willing to enforce punishment for the use of personal devices in Ukraine, and the Russian military will likely find it extremely difficult to eliminate its dependence on insecure personal devices for many frontline tasks.[10]
Russian officials may be taking steps to address domestic security issues following the March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack and June 2024 shootings in the Republic of Dagestan. Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov stated on July 31 that the Crocus City Hall and Dagestan attacks challenged Russian law enforcement and society and showed that the Russian government has made "mistakes" in its counter-terrorism policies.[11] Krasnov stated that the Russian government needs to inspect its policies and respond to terrorist threats in a "fundamentally different way." Actors affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) conducted the Crocus City Hall and likely conducted the Dagestan attacks, and Russian security personnel largely failed to rapidly and sufficiently respond to both events.[12] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed it prevented a terrorist attack in the Republic of Adygea on July 11, and Russian security forces may by intensifying proactive counter-terrorism operations in response to government pressure, although ISW cannot confirm the veracity of the FSB's reporting.[13] The Russian government, however, has largely chosen to posture that it is adequately combating the threat of domestic terrorism, but it is unclear what change, if any, in Russian counterterrorism policies may come from Krasnov's proposals.[14]
Ukrainian forces struck a weapons and equipment warehouse in Kursk City on the night of July 30 to 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a warehouse in Kursk City and that Ukrainian forces are conducting a battle damage assessment.[15] Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified facility in Kursk Oblast and caused the facility to catch fire.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed an unspecified number of Ukrainian drones and missiles, including at least one Neptune anti-ship missile, over Kursk Oblast.[17] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov told Radio Svoboda on July 31 that recent "explosion[s]" at the Olenya Airfield in Murmask Oblast damaged the frames of two Tu-22M3 bombers.[18] Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a successful drone strike against the airfield on the night of July 26 to 27.[19]
Russian border guards withdrew from Armenia’s main international airport. Armenian and Russian sources reported on July 31 that Russian border guards left Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan, Armenia.[20] Armenian authorities requested in March 2024 that Russia remove its border guards from the airport by August 1 because Armenia can conduct its own border control without the help of Russian border guards who had been stationed at the airport since 1992.[21]
Key Takeaways:
- Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Israel conducted an airstrike killing Hamas Political Bureau Chairperson Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran to derail attempts to establish peace in the Middle East.
- The Russian State Duma revised some aspects of a recent bill criminalizing Russian soldiers' use of personal devices on the battlefield following outcry in the Russian ultranationalist community.
- Russian officials may be taking steps to address domestic security issues following the March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack and June 2024 shootings in the Republic of Dagestan.
- Ukrainian forces struck a weapons and equipment warehouse in Kursk City on the night of July 30 to 31.
- Russian border guards withdrew from Armenia’s main international airport.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Svatove, Chasiv Yar, Torestsk, and Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 31 increasing financial incentives for signing a Russian military service contract, likely to support ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 30, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
July 30, 2024, 7:15pm ET
Russian forces conducted five platoon- to battalion-sized mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast on July 29 and 30. Such localized mechanized pushes are likely the manifestation of Russia's forecasted summer offensive—Russian forces likely lack the wider operational capacity to mount a separate renewed offensive operation in Donetsk Oblast or elsewhere on the front this summer. Geolocated footage published on July 29 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced on the southwestern outskirts of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) during a reinforced-battalion sized mechanized assault.[1] The same Ukrainian brigade that repelled the July 24 reinforced-battalion sized mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka reported that Russian forces committed 10 tanks, 47 armored fighting vehicles, 10 motorcycles, and a "buggy" to the July 29 assault and that Ukrainian forces struck eight tanks, 12 armored fighting vehicles, nine motorcycles, and the buggy.[2] Additional geolocated footage and Ukrainian reporting indicate that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful reduced-company sized mechanized assault southwest of Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City) on the morning of July 29 and that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of the settlement during a separate reinforced-platoon sized mechanized assault on July 30.[3] Ukrainian sources published footage and reported on July 29 that Russian forces also conducted an unsuccessful reinforced-company sized mechanized assault in an unspecified area of the Kurakhove direction (west of Marinka) and an unsuccessful reinforced-platoon sized mechanized assault near Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[4] Ukrainian forces previously blunted a reinforced-battalion sized Russian mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka on July 24 and a reinforced-company sized assault near the settlement on July 25.[5] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are likely attempting to seize Kostyantynivka and cut the Vuhledar-Kostyantynivka T-0524 highway, forcing Ukrainians to retreat from the area.[6]
Periodic and pulsating Russian mechanized assaults likely represent the extent of Russia's current offensive capacity, and Russia is unlikely to mount a distinct new summer offensive operation due to material and manpower constraints. ISW previously noted that Russian forces have struggled to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations throughout the war but are prone to conducting offensive operations in "pulses" along different sectors of the front, with one sector decreasing in intensity as another sector increases.[7] Russian forces have conducted periodic platoon and company-sized mechanized assaults in the Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Avdiivka directions in Donetsk Oblast throughout the summer, and have more recently intensified assaults west and southwest of Donetsk City.[8] Russian forces also reportedly recommitted elements of the Central Military District's (CMD) 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA]) from Avdiivka to southwest of Donetsk City, suggesting that the Russian military command may assess that Russian forces are unlikely to make rapid tactical gains near Avdiivka and are re-prioritizing the Donetsk City area.[9] Russian forces are likely to commit additional mechanized forces to the area in order to exploit weak spots in the Ukrainian line and achieve some territorial advances, however limited, during the summer of 2024.
The Russian military command may assess that these periodic, pulsating mechanized assaults are either sufficient to accomplish the command's revised, more limited objectives for the summer of 2024 or that these assaults are the extent of Russian forces' current capabilities. Western media, citing unspecified Ukrainian sources, reported in December 2023 and January 2024 that Russian forces planned to seize the remaining territory of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts during a large-scale offensive operation in the summer of 2024, but Russian forces likely revised those plans following the passage of US military assistance to Ukraine in April 2024.[10] The Kremlin, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, has also previously tried to oversell the seizure of tiny frontline settlements west of Avdiivka as major battlefield victories for informational purposes.[11] The Russian military command may intend to present limited tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast (an area of Ukraine whose geography the average Russian has no familiarity with), including cutting the Vuhledar-Kostyantynivka highway, as a major victory to the Russian people. The Russian military command may also be trying to push degraded Russian forces in the area to advance as far as possible before their combat capabilities culminate, regardless of the losses those forces take in the process.
The Russian military command's willingness to accept costly armored vehicle losses without conducting a large-scale, multi-directional offensive operation or making operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast will likely burden the Russian military in the long-term.[12] Russian forces currently appear to have enough armored vehicles to conduct periodic company-sized and larger mechanized assaults throughout the frontline in the near- to medium-term. It is unclear, however, if Russian forces have the necessary armored vehicle reserves to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in several sectors of the front and to replace increased armored vehicle losses that would result from intensified mechanized operations. The Russian military command's willingness to pursue limited tactical advances in exchange for significant armored vehicle losses will become increasingly costly as Russian forces burn through finite Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks in the coming years.[13] The cost of this approach will continue to be high if the Russian military command continues to fail to internalize lessons learned about the difficulties of mechanized maneuver on a nearly transparent battlefield in Ukraine and if the Russian government remains averse to further mobilizing the Russian defense industry.[14]
The ongoing Russian offensive operations are also costly for Ukrainian defenders and are likely meant to degrade Ukrainian capabilities through attrition whether or not they gain much ground. This attritional approach is consistent with Putin's overall strategy for Ukraine that relies on the assumption that Russia will be able to hold any ground Russian forces take and that Russia will win by outlasting Western support for Ukraine.[15]
Russian milbloggers have been uncharacteristically quiet about recent Russian mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast. Many Russian milbloggers who usually flout Russian advances and criticize perceived and actual ineptitudes in Russian offensive operations were notably silent about the reinforced-battalion sized Russian mechanized assault on July 24 and several reinforced-battalion sized and smaller mechanized assaults on July 29 and 30. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 29 that Russian forces are suffering high losses near Donetsk City, suggesting that Russian milbloggers may be purposefully self-censoring commentary about heavily attritional Russian assaults to avoid damaging Russian morale and drawing increased potential censorship measures from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Kremlin.[16] The Russian MoD has been promoting self-censorship among Russian milbloggers since Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's June 2023 rebellion and has been attempting to co-opt Russian milbloggers to create a cadre of loyal military commentators, so the majority of milbloggers' silence could be due to overt state- and self-censorship efforts.[17] A prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger was one of the first milbloggers to comment on the recent Russian mechanized assaults near Donetsk City on July 30.[18] Other less prominent and well-connected milbloggers may assess that it is safe to discuss the July 29 and 30 Russian mechanized assaults after a more authoritative source indicated the permissibility of discussing the topic.
North Korea may be expanding the volume and variety of weapons it is providing to Russia. A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Ukraine-Belgorod Oblast border area reported on July 30 that Russian forces northwest of Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast are fielding a North Korean provided Bulsae-4 anti-tank guided missile system mounted on a North Korean-M2010 wheeled armored personnel carrier (APC).[19] Several Russian milbloggers cautiously amplified the Ukrainian report but questioned its veracity.[20] ISW cannot independently confirm if Russian forces in Belgorod Oblast are using a North Korean-provided system, but if confirmed, this report would indicate a step up in the types of weapons that North Korea has been providing to Russia. North Korea-focused outlet NK Pro reported on July 26 that satellite imagery indicates that North Korea is intensifying its production of anti-tank missiles, likely due to growing Russian interest in procuring North Korean munitions.[21] NK Pro found that North Korea started building a large production facility at the Sinuiju Measuring Instrument Factory in May 2024 and began upgrading several production facilities at the Taegwan Glass Factory in June 2024, both of which produce anti-tank missiles. The increase in volume and variety of North Korean weapons provisions to Russia is likely a stipulation of the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un signed during Putin's visit to Pyongyang in June 2024.[22]
The Kremlin is likely attempting to corral Russian information space actors onto social media sites that the Kremlin can more directly influence to directly control their rhetoric, prompting some backlash from Russian ultranationalist milbloggers and opposition journalists. The Russian State Duma approved a series of bills on July 30, including one that requires administrators of social media accounts with more than 10,000 subscribers to submit their personal identification information to Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor and requires owners of social media sites with more than 500,000 users to provide users' personal data to Roskomnadzor or the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) starting on November 1.[23] Duma Information Policy Committee Head Alexander Khinshtein, who spearheaded the bills, noted that the change about administrators' personal data will create a closed register of approved social media channels, provide approved channels with a visual designator to mark them as approved to social media users, and that Russian channels not registered with Roskomnadzor will be prohibited from publishing advertisements or soliciting donations on their channels.[24] Russian milbloggers largely rely on income from advertisements to sustain their channels documenting the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin has previously restricted Russian businesses' abilities to advertise on channels owned by those designated as "foreign agents."[25] Some prominent Russian ultranationalist voices criticized this measure, expressing concerns that providing their personal data to Roskomnazdor may compromise their personal safety if malign actors obtain that data.[26] Russian-backed former Ukrainian separatist politician Oleg Tsaryov, who previously accused the Russian MoD of spearheading the milblogger deanonymization bill, expressed concern about how Russian social media networks will implement these measures and collaborate with the Russian government.[27] Russian opposition journalists and media outlets have also expressed concern that ongoing Russian censorship measures will impact their ability to operate safely within Russia.[28] The Kremlin has also recently been attempting to set conditions to compel Russians to stop using YouTube and pivot to Russian state-controlled alternatives by throttling streaming speeds.[29] A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger similarly criticized these slowdowns, noting that the Russian government has not improved the speed and infrastructure of Kremlin-affiliated Vkontakte (VK), whose video service has been floated as a likely replacement for YouTube in the coming months.[30]
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in Vozy, Kursk Oblast on the night of July 29 to 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and other Ukrainian forces struck the oil depot in Vozy causing a fire and noted that the Ukrainian forces are still confirming the damage to the oil depot.[31] Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at three fuel tanks at an oil depot in Kursk Oblast.[32] Smirnov also claimed that Russian forces destroyed four Ukrainian missiles over Oktyabrsky and Kurchatovsky raions on the night of July 29 to 30.[33]
The Russian government continues to support educational programs on "information and hybrid warfare" aimed at training Russians to conduct and counter information operations, use open-source research methodology, and to effectively analyze and counter hybrid threats for the Kremlin. An ultranationalist Russian milblogger and journalist advertised on July 30 applications to a six-month professional training program at the Alter Academy of Political Science in Moscow that will teach Russian professionals to defend against and conduct information and hybrid operations.[34] The Russian milblogger who advertised this course on information and hybrid warfare is one of the several Russian military-focused journalists listed as teachers of the program.[35] The Alter Academy of Political Science stated that it created this course and several others on "proxy intelligence and intelligence support for information operations" and "proxy intelligence for non-governmental organizations (NGOs)" in accordance with the February 28, 2024, Russian Presidential Decree to improve Russia's scientific and technological development.[36] These programs feature experts who are current and former employees of Russian state security organs, including the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Rosgvardia. The Russian government has previously tried to promote similar educational programs on conducting information and hybrid warfare at Moscow State University (MGU), although the university reportedly disbanded its master's program in information and hybrid warfare in December 2023 due to student concerns over job prospects and faculty problems.[37] The Russian government will likely continue attempts to expand its educational programs on information and hybrid warfare to grow the cadre of civilian Russian youth and professionals interested and capable of conducting information, influence, and hybrid operations against Russia's enemies and allies.
Russian officials and Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) representatives are advocating for the Kremlin to codify a state ideology premised on the idea that the sovereign Ukrainian state should not exist, into Russian federal law. The Second All-Russian Forum of the "Russian World" (Russkiy Mir) World Russian People's Council occurred in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, on July 29.[38] The main objective of the forum was to "discuss and develop mechanisms for the political, scientific, and legal recognition and consolidation of the doctrine of the trinity of the Russian people."[39] Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, have frequently invoked the "trinity doctrine," or the ideological concept suggesting that Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are a "triune" and forcibly separated people, to make the claim that Ukrainians are not a sovereign people, with the implication that Ukraine has no right to be a sovereign state.[40] The Second All-Russian Forum sought to codify this ideology and submitted a resolution and draft regulatory acts entitled "On the Trinity of the Russian People" and "On the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation for the Protection, Preservation, and Strengthening of the Trinity of Russian People" to Russian legislative and executive bodies following the forum. These draft laws seek to make real the fallacy that Ukraine and its people are ideologically inextricable from Russia and privilege the idea of "reunification" of Ukrainians with Russia as the core of the ideology supporting Russia's occupation of Ukraine. If these laws should pass, they may allow Russian authorities an even more extensive legal framework on which to legislate the occupation of Ukraine by codifying the definition of Ukrainians living in occupied Ukraine as "Russians" who must be reunited with their "homeland." Codifying an ideology into Russian law would legally require an amendment to the Russian Constitution, as Article 13 forbids Russia from proclaiming a state ideology and commits the Russian state to recognizing ideological diversity.[41]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces conducted five platoon- to battalion-sized mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast on July 29 and 30. Such localized mechanized pushes are likely the manifestation of Russia's forecasted summer offensive—Russian forces likely lack the wider operational capacity to mount a separate renewed offensive operation in Donetsk Oblast or elsewhere on the front this summer.
- The Russian military command's willingness to accept costly armored vehicle losses without conducting a large-scale, multi-directional offensive operation or making operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast will likely burden the Russian military in the long-term. The ongoing Russian offensive operations are also costly for Ukrainian defenders and are likely meant to degrade Ukrainian capabilities through attrition whether or not they gain much ground.
- North Korea may be expanding the volume and variety of weapons it is providing to Russia.
- The Kremlin is likely attempting to corral Russian information space actors onto social media sites that the Kremlin can more directly influence to directly control their rhetoric, prompting some backlash from Russian ultranationalist milbloggers and opposition journalists.
- Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in Vozy, Kursk Oblast on the night of July 29 to 30.
- The Russian government continues to support educational programs on "information and hybrid warfare" aimed at training Russians to conduct and counter information operations, use open-source research methodology, and to effectively analyze and counter hybrid threats for the Kremlin.
- Russian officials and Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) representatives are advocating for the Kremlin to codify a state ideology premised on the idea that the sovereign Ukrainian state should not exist, into Russian federal law.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and southwest of Donetsk City.
- Authorities in St. Petersburg have joined other Russian regional authorities in increasing financial incentives for recruits to sign military service contracts.
- UK newspaper The Times published a story on July 29 detailing how Russian authorities are indoctrinating deported Ukrainian children through military-patriotic education programs.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 29, 2024
Click here to read the full report.
Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
July 29, 2024, 8pm ET
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on July 29. ISW w