



Iran Crisis Update, November 30

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Protest activity may increase on December 5-7. An increasingly wide range of protest coordinators and organizations have called for countrywide demonstrations on these days. These organizers include neighborhood youth groups and Shirin—a Persian-language social media account that previously tweeted a political manifesto calling for the establishment of a democratic, secular Iranian republic.¹ Protest activity did not surge during the last planned demonstrations on November 24-26, however, possibly due to poor coordination.²

The recent calls for protests may highlight the increasing organization and sophistication of the protest movement as well as some fractures. Thirty neighborhood youth groups published a joint statement on November 27 announcing the planned protests on December 5-7.³ More neighborhood youth groups signed this joint statement than the last one on November 22, which had 29 signatories.⁴ A neighborhood youth group from Tehran notably signed the November 22 statement but not the November 27 one—the only group missing from the original 29 signatories. The Karaj neighborhood youth group refused to explain when a social media user asked why the Tehran group did not sign the second statement.⁵

The nature of the planned protests furthermore suggests that at least some protest organizers are adapting to more effectively counter regime repression. The Tehran Neighborhood Youth released on November 30 its own call for demonstrations on December 5-7 and offered more specific instructions.⁶ The group advised against simultaneous protests and strikes because the reduction in regular traffic caused by strikes allows security forces to more easily crack down. The group accordingly called for countrywide strikes on December 5, scattered protests on December 6, and concentrated protests around universities on December 7.

Anti-regime outlet *Iran International* published on November 30 a purportedly internal regime memo discussing the protests.⁷ *Iran International* claimed that it received the document from Black Reward—the anti-regime group that hacked *Fars News Agency* and claimed to have recovered internal data, documents, and files on November 25.⁸ CTP cannot verify this document and is treating it with great skepticism. We offer no assessment of its authenticity apart from noting that the style and word choice of portions of the document seem unusual for native Persian speakers. We are nevertheless reporting some of the key points of the document to make them accessible in English.⁹ The document claims the following:

- Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei believes that protests will continue for the foreseeable future. Khamenei called on the state security apparatus to more effectively fight in the “media war” against the West.
- Khamenei criticized President Ebrahim Raisi, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami over their handling of the protests. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf similarly criticized Raisi’s indecisiveness.
- Khamenei ordered the regime to discredit prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid for his role in inspiring protests. Khamenei ordered Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari to threaten to arrest Abdol Hamid after he refused to stop publicly criticizing the regime.
- The Interior Ministry found that most Iranians do not believe the protests will soon end nor do they trust state media. The ministry also concluded many protesters are no longer afraid of the security forces.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with US-sanctioned Astan Quds Razavi (AQR) Custodian Ahmad Marvi in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province on November 30, possibly to discuss commercial or financial cooperation.¹⁰ AQR is a parastatal economic conglomerate that is responsible for the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad and controls a vast network of commercial interests active in agriculture, energy, financial services, information technology, and manufacturing.¹¹ AQR is a “vital economic artery” for regime officials and has ties to the IRGC.¹² Marvi is a close associate of Supreme Leader Khamenei and has headed AQR since March 2019.¹³ The US has sanctioned both AQR and Marvi for their ties to Khamenei.¹⁴ Iranian state media has not explicitly reported on the Sudani-Marvi meeting at the time of this writing but has published photos depicting the two together.¹⁵

Key Takeaways

- **Protest activity may increase on December 5-7.**
- **The recent calls for protests may highlight the increasing organization and sophistication of the protest movement as well as some fractures.**
- **Anti-regime outlet *Iran International* published a purportedly internal regime memo discussing the protests.**

- **Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with US-sanctioned Astan Quds Razavi (AQR) Custodian Ahmad Marvi in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, possibly to discuss commercial or financial cooperation.**
- **At least nine protests took place in seven cities across six provinces.**
- **An Intelligence and Security Ministry member died due to an unspecified cause in Zabol, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.**

Anti-Regime Protests

At least nine protests took place in seven cities across six provinces on November 30. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province¹⁶

- Crowd Size: Small

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province¹⁷

- Crowd Size: Small
- Demographic: Medical workers
- Protest Type: Strike and protest

Bandar Anzali, Gilan Province¹⁸

- Crowd Size: Small
- Protest Type: Mehran Samak's funeral

Saghez, Kurdistan Province¹⁹

- Crowd Size: Small
- Demographic: Highschool students

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province²⁰

- Crowd Size: Small
- Demographic: Kurdistan University students

Khorramabad, Lorestan Province²¹

- Crowd Size: Medium
- Protest Type: Masoud Doulat Shahi's funeral

Tehran City, Tehran Province²²

- Crowd Size: Small
- Demographic: Highschool students

Tehran City, Tehran Province²³

- Crowd Size: Undetermined


- Protest Type: Fires lit in street

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations on November 30:

Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province²⁴

- Crowd Size: Undetermined
- Demographic: Medical workers
- Protest Type: Strike and protest

Note: CTP defines small protests as fewer than 100 individuals, medium protests as between 100 and 1,000, and large protests as over one thousand.



An Intelligence and Security Ministry member died due to an unspecified cause in Zabol, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on November 30.²⁵ Anti-regime militants commonly operate around Zabol and may have killed the intelligence officer. Over 60 security personnel have died since the protests began on September 16.²⁶

IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi stated on November 30 that many of Iran's problems are due to unspecified officials not properly following the orders of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.²⁷ Fadavi may have been criticizing regime officials who have less enthusiastically supported the regime protest crackdown in his remarks. Fadavi expressed implicit support for the regime using greater brutality in its crackdown on November 21, as CTP previously reported.²⁸

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

There was nothing significant to report today.

- ¹ https://twitter.com/javanane_k/status/1596829675376070656; https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1598028102633857024;
<https://twitter.com/MahsaAmini40/status/1597892449036222464>; <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-18>
- ² <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-27>
- ³ https://twitter.com/javanane_k/status/1596829675376070656
- ⁴ https://twitter.com/javanane_k/status/1595095807480717313
- ⁵ https://twitter.com/javanane_k/status/1597145574008311809
- ⁶ https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1598028102633857024
- ⁷ <https://www.iranintl.com/202211304302>
- ⁸ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-25>
- ⁹ https://issuu.com/iranintl/docs/b29_2_1_
- ¹⁰ www.mashreghnews dot ir/photo/1441464
- ¹¹ <https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/supreme-leadership-iran/>
- ¹² <https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/supreme-leadership-iran/>
- ¹³ www.leader dot ir/fa/content/22874
- ¹⁴ <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1234>
- ¹⁵ www.mashreghnews dot ir/photo/1441464
- ¹⁶ https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597903493117120514?s=20&t=_mzZldmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw;
https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597936702450176001?s=20&t=_mzZldmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw
- ¹⁷ https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598047954954293248?s=20&t=_mzZldmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw
- ¹⁸ https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597938615740690434?s=20&t=_mzZldmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw;
https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1597966768768704513?s=20&t=_mzZldmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw
- ¹⁹ https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597883756370878464?s=20&t=_mzZldmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw
- ²⁰ https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597939089009168385?s=20&t=_mzZldmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw
- ²¹ https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597976527471226881?s=20&t=_mzZldmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw
- ²² https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597950112025972738?s=20&t=_mzZldmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw;
https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1597967679658528769?s=20&t=_mzZldmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw
- ²³ https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598023296129585152?s=20&t=_mzZldmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw
- ²⁴ https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1598025524173213696?s=20&t=_mzZldmeBeTK8P9qizDrQw
- ²⁵ www.isna dot ir/news/1401090906289
- ²⁶ <https://twitter.com/Alfoneh/status/1595434754589196288>
- ²⁷ <http://www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/559007>
- ²⁸ <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-22>