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IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES:

ORDERS OF BATTLE



JESSA ROSE DURY-AGRI, OMER KASSIM, AND PATRICK MARTIN,
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR

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The background of the entire page is a detailed topographic map, showing contour lines and geographical features in a light tan color. The map is oriented vertically, with the top of the page showing higher elevations and the bottom showing lower elevations. The lines are closely spaced in some areas, indicating steeper slopes, and more widely spaced in others, indicating flatter terrain.

Jessa Rose Dury-Agri, Omer Kassim, and Patrick Martin, Institute for the Study of War

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Cover: *Armored vehicles of Iraqi security forces with Popular Mobilization Forces Units are driven past smoke arising from a clash with Islamic State militants in the town of al-Alam March 10, 2015. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani*

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Patrick Martin is a former Iraq Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). Patrick received his B.A. from Colby College with a major in History and is a M.A. candidate at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs.

Omer Kassim is an Iraq Research Assistant at ISW. Omer received his B.A. from the University of Texas at Austin with a major in Middle East Studies. He previously conducted research on Iraqi Politics at the Middle East Institute.

Jessa Rose Dury-Agri is the Evans Hanson Fellow at ISW. Rose received her B.A. from Claremont McKenna College with a major in International Relations concentrating on Middle East and North African Security.

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IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES: ORDERS OF BATTLE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

8	Introduction	28	POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES
9	Methodology	30	Popular Mobilization Forces Chain of Command
10	IRAQI SECURITY FORCES	34	Directorates
10	Chain of Command	36	Regional Committees
11	Counter Terrorism Services	36	Iranian Proxy Militias
11	Presidential Brigades	42	“Iraqi Syrian Battalions” / “Syrian Hezbollah” Units
12	Prime Minister’s Special Forces Division	43	Lesser Proxies
12	Ministry of Defense	45	Minority Militias
12	Operations Commands	47	Hawza Militias
12	Joint Operations Command and CTS Director	48	Co-opted Hawza Militias
12	Regional Operations Commands	49	Politically Affiliated Militias
14	Anbar Operations Command	49	Sadrism Trend
14	Babil Operations Command	50	Co-opted Sadrism Militias
14	Baghdad Operations Command	50	Islamic Supreme Council Brigades
16	Basra Operations Command	52	Other Politically Affiliated Militias
17	Dijla Operations Command	56	Appendix A: Acronyms and Abbreviations
18	Jazeera and Badia Operations Command	57	Appendix B: Operations Commands: Areas of Responsibility
19	Mid-Euphrates Operations Command	58	Appendix C: Graphics
20	Ninewa Operations Command	64	Appendix D: Iraqi Security Forces Commanders
22	Salah al-Din Operations Command	67	Endnotes
23	Samarra Operations Command		
23	Rafidain Operations Command		
24	Temporary Operations Commands		
24	Ministry of Interior		
24	Federal Police		
26	Emergency Response Division		
27	Border Guards Command		
28	Provincial Emergency Police Battalions		
28	Facilities Protection Service and Oil Police		

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AND POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES: ORDERS OF BATTLE

Pushing back on Iran in Iraq and preventing ISIS from returning require a clear assessment of the nature of the security forces on the ground.

Introduction

The liberation of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham's (ISIS) urban holdings in Iraq was necessary but not sufficient to secure America's vital national interests. ISIS has lost neither the will nor the capability to fight, even as it withdraws into desert hideouts and sleeper cell formations in November 2017. Rather, dispersed ISIS militants have begun an insurgent campaign in northern and western Iraq as some of its foreign fighters have returned to their home countries to serve in ISIS's external operations network.

ISIS reconstituted from the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq in just three years by exploiting political and security conditions. The U.S. must therefore ensure conditions do not allow jihadist groups to continue this cycle by forming under a new banner in coming years. The U.S. has partnered with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to defeat ISIS in Iraq and progress toward this objective. The ISF must clear remaining ISIS cells, secure liberated areas, stabilize them, and enable their reconstruction. Ethnic, sectarian, and political tensions will likely prolong the conflict and potentially create openings for jihadists to exploit. U.S. decision makers will determine the number of troops and other forms of assistance necessary to stabilize the country and facilitate a viable political outcome that secures an independent, representative, and unitary Iraqi state.

The U.S. must also ensure Iraq does not become a safe haven for, or beholden to, the leading state sponsor of terror, Iran. Iranian-backed actors have compromised formal Iraqi security structures. Iraq's Ministry of Interior (MoI) is led by a member of the Badr Organization, which Iran created in the 1980s. The MoI is augmenting ISF operations in Ninewa and Diyala Provinces. The predominantly-Shi'a

Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have filled critical gaps left by thinning ISF in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Salah al-Din Provinces in particular.

A spectrum of Iraqi groups comprise the PMF, including some loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraqi clergy, Iraqi tribes, and Iranian actors. This wide spectrum of groups should not obscure the dangerous threat the PMF poses to Iraqi state institutions and U.S. interests. The PMF are a vector by which Iranian-backed proxies have compromised some of the ISF. The PMF are not guarantors of Iraqi state security because they challenge the Iraqi government's monopoly on the use of force, even as they are nominally integrated into the state through complex structures.

The formal, nominal integration of the PMF into state-tolerated structures obfuscates rather than controls Iranian-backed powerbrokers. The Deputy Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) that oversees the PMF, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was designated by the U.S. Treasury as a terrorist in 2009. He is a dual Iranian-Iraqi citizen. He advised Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) — Quds Force Commander Qassim Suleimani, facilitated attacks against U.S. forces in 2007 and 2008 as the commander of the terrorist organization Kata'ib Hezbollah, and has been convicted by Kuwait of bombing Western embassies in that country in the 1980s.¹ The official PMF spokesperson, Ahmad al-Asadi, overtly threatened U.S. forces in Iraq on August 14, 2017.² An Iranian signature weapon, the Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP), killed a U.S. soldier in Iraq less than two months later on October 1, 2017.³

PMF units, including Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Harakat al-Nujaba, conduct operations based on Iran's priorities in both Iraq and Syria. They have occupied positions along both sides of the Iraq-Syria border

to block anti-ISIS operations by U.S.-backed forces in eastern Syria. The PMF and the Iranian-directed forces have expanded their role in Iraq following the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum in September 2017. Iranian proxies and ISF launched military operations against Iraqi Kurdish forces in October 2017. They seized Kirkuk and surrounding security and economic infrastructure before advancing further north and forcing Iraqi Kurdish forces to retreat across Iraq's disputed internal boundaries.

Iranian proxies extended their control of terrain through this campaign against Iraqi Kurdistan and the campaign to recapture ISIS' last urban holdings in western Anbar Province. Iran now has increased leverage over Iraq's federal government and greater ability to coerce Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. Iranian proxy forces are positioned in increasing numbers along the Iraq-Syria border and poised to seize key border crossings as of November 2017. Iranian proxies are destabilizing Iraq, creating opportunities for jihadists, and positioning themselves to further disrupt the U.S. ability to operate against jihadists across the Iraq-Syria border. The effects of this destabilization will prevent the establishment of a stable and secure Iraqi state capable of defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The PMC will likely endure as a permanent security institution in Iraq. The PMF's elaborate command structure includes directorates that deliver meaningful combat support and combat service support to Iranian proxies. The PMF is, therefore, likely to constitute a permanent wing of Iranian-led forces within Iraq's security apparatus, undermining Iraq's monopoly on the use of force essential to its sovereignty. The U.S. should not accept the PMC as a component of the ISF, even if the Iraqi government does. The U.S. must constrain Iran by supporting Iraqi forces intelligently and robustly as operations to clear ISIS from Iraq's cities conclude.

Any U.S. strategy relying on a partnered force must proceed from a realistic assessment of its capabilities and intentions. The Institute for the Study of War completed an Order of Battle study to evaluate the capabilities and disposition of the ISF. This study also presents an Order of Battle of the PMF to

help U.S. decision makers and forces on the ground recognize and remediate the presence of Iranian-backed militias within the ISF. The study updates and deepens previous scholarly works.⁴ The data cutoff for unit locations presented in this study is August 17, 2017; however, this report's text and conclusions are based on unit movements through late November 2017.

This work juxtaposes the original areas of responsibility of the various Iraqi Army (IA) and Federal Police (FP) divisions with what were assessed to be their areas of deployment in August 2017, highlighting potential future security risks outside of the current battle zones in Iraq. It also provides information on IA brigades' affinity toward and cooperation with the PMF, highlighting increasing Iranian influence within the ISF.

Methodology

The authors derived this Order of Battle from unit sightings and positions publicly reported by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD), Iraqi media, ISF units, the PMC's War Media Team, and individual militias' social media accounts. Picture intelligence from regional media organizations, Iraqi soldiers' social media accounts, and reporters supplemented this material. Reporting consistently resolved unit designation to the brigade level. Units for which current locations are uncertain are listed according to their last known location. The dates of information are specified in each case. Many of the units within this Order of Battle are assessed to occupy multiple positions at once. IA units generally display unit integrity at the brigade level. FP and PMF units often deploy as small detachments, such that one unit may be depicted in multiple geographically disparate locations. This Order of Battle does not include data on the Iraqi Air Force, Army Aviation, or Navy, or Iraqi Kurdish security forces, such as the Peshmerga. It organizes ISF units by their original assignments to Operational Commands in 2013.⁵ It organizes ISF units by their original assignments to Operational Commands in

2013. It organizes militias within the PMF according to their affiliations. It lists their most current locations as of August 17, 2017 and comments upon their capabilities when known. The authors have withheld citations when they have judged that their publication could lead to significant changes to the Iraqi information and social media environment. Professional readers may contact the Institute for the Study of War for more information regarding withheld citations or unit location data citations.

Iraqi Security Forces

The ISF consists of the formal military and security forces that report to the MoD, MoI, and Council of Ministers. This Order of Battle outlines the known combat units within both ministries and their assessed locations as of their last documented sighting. It is organized according to the framework of the Operational Commands that had been in place prior to the fall of Mosul in 2014. The majority of operations commands are still functional. They likely function as Corps-level headquarters for units deployed forward in their operating areas rather than as administrative headquarters for the units that had previously been assigned to them. This Order of Battle depicts units based on their June 2014 administrative assignments in order to showcase the geographic disparity between points of origin and current locations of each unit.

ISIS' capture of Mosul and other terrain fundamentally changed the disposition and organization of the ISF. The U.S. replaced the 2nd and 3rd IA Divisions with the 15th and 16th IA Divisions after their dissolution in Mosul. The 4th and 12th IA Divisions, formerly headquartered in Tikrit and Kirkuk respectively, have not been replaced. The 10th, 11th, and 14th IA Divisions are deployed to northern Baghdad and Anbar, away from Iraq's restive southern provinces. The principal unit assigned to the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC), the 6th IA Division, is deployed forward. FP Divisions are fully engaged in clearing operations across Iraq. There is no available reserve force. There is no mission

from which forces can be withdrawn to prepare for follow-on operations. Meanwhile, intra-Shi'a violence plagues security in southern Iraq and ISIS remains operational throughout the country.

Chain of Command

Prime Minister / Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces: Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi – Shi'a

Minister of Defense:

Mag. Gen. Irfan Mahmoud al-Hayali – Sunni

- Joint Operations Command (JOC) Commander: Lt. Gen. Talib Shughaiti al-Kinani – Shi'a
- Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) Commander: Lt. Gen. Abdul-Ghani al-Asadi⁶ (JOC Field Commander) – Shi'a
Iraqi Air Force Commander: Lt. Gen. Anwar Hamamayn – Unknown
- Iraqi Navy and Coastal Defense Commander: Marine General Salam Muhammad Ahmed – Unknown
- Iraqi Air Defense Commander: Lt. Gen. Jabar Obeid Kadhim – Shi'a

Minister of the Interior:

Qasim al-Araji – Shi'a

- Federal Police Commander: Maj. Gen. Raid Shakir Jawdat – Shi'a
- Border Guards Commander: Lt. Gen. Hamid Abdullah – Shi'a
- Emergency Response Division Commander: Brig. Gen. Thamir Muhammad Ismail – Shi'a

Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi is the Commander in Chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces. He overhauled much of the ISF's leadership cadre upon taking office. He replaced the previous Iraqi Ground Forces Commander and Ninewa Operations Commander with Lt. Gen. Tawfiq and Maj. Gen. Najm al-Juburi, respectively, both of whom are Sunnis, marking a departure from Maliki's disproportionately large appointment of Shi'a officers to division commands and other senior leadership positions.⁷ Prime Minister Abadi also abolished the Maliki-era Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC), allowing the JOC to supersede it. The echelons of the MoI, however, fall largely out of the Prime Minister's reach, as the Minister of Interior

is an Iranian proxy militia leader and the ministry's top leadership support Iranian proxies.

Counter Terrorism Services (CTS)

— Lt. Gen. Talib Shughaiti al-Kinani, Lt. Gen. Abdul-Ghani al-Asadi (Field Commander)⁸

The CTS is a force attached to the Council of Ministers. It exists outside the MoD and MoI. The CTS reports directly to the Prime Minister and coordinates operations with the JOC.⁹ U.S. Special Operations Forces trained the CTS from its inception into 2017, even after the U.S. withdrawal in December 2011.¹⁰ ISF utilize the CTS as an elite light infantry force to spearhead its most important operations, including defense of the Green Zone and major clearing operations such as in Tikrit and Mosul. It had as many as 13,000 members prior to ISIS's capture of Mosul.¹¹ The CTS has a reputation for sectarian and ethnic inclusivity and for professionalism stemming from their long relationship with U.S. trainers, surpassing most of Iraq's other security branches.¹²

The CTS is not a perfect force. Former Prime Minister Maliki expanded the CTS faster than U.S. advisers recommended and attempted to insert Dawa Party loyalists into the CTS's battalion-level leadership, eroding the quality of the junior leadership.¹³ Maliki-era appointees, notably Abdul-Ghani al-Asadi, remain in their positions. Politicization and militia ties remain an issue even in the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF). One junior commander in Salah al-Din, who was linked to the Dawa Party and killed in action in January 2017, wore a PMF badge on his uniform, reflecting the Dawa Party's affinity for the PMF.¹⁴ The CTS's upper leadership ranks remain largely uncompromised by the Dawa Party, as shown by the unflattering rumors that Dawa media puts out about senior CTS commanders.¹⁵ The CTS remains largely responsive to Prime Minister Abadi and is Iraq's most professional and capable ground force.

The CTS is comprised of three ISOF units that are not geographically bound. Maj. Gen. Fadhil Barwari leads the first of the ISOF units, known as the Golden Division. The Golden Division is the most capable unit in the ISF. It is also the oldest of

the three CTS units and has the longest relationship with U.S. special operations advisers. It is so effective that the ISF relies on it to lead all major clearing operations and divides its battalions across multiple operations commands. The Golden Division has therefore faced the most difficult fighting, and consequently incurred the most casualties during counter-ISIS operations. Maj. Gen. Maan al-Saadi leads the 2nd ISOF unit. The 2nd unit is less capable than the Golden Division, and its units forward deploy for major operations less frequently. Mag. Gen. Sami al-Aridhi leads the 3rd ISOF unit. The 3rd ISOF unit is the newest of the three and has far less exposure to U.S. training or mentorship than the Golden Division. It is the least capable of the three ISOF units, though it is still more advanced than many regular IA units.

1st ISOF unit, aka Golden Division:

- Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
[as of August 10, 2017]

2nd ISOF unit:

- Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of November 14, 2016]

3rd ISOF unit:

- Tel Afar, Ninewa Province
[as of August 10, 2017]

Unattributed [ISOF]:

- Mosul, Ninewa Province
[as of July 12, 2017]¹⁶
- Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province
[as of July 12, 2017]

Presidential Brigades

The Presidential Brigades are nominally assigned for the protection of Iraq's President, who is customarily a Sunni Kurd from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Party under the Iraqi political quota system (*muhasasa*). They are predominantly Kurdish units, which has raised questions about their loyalty and efficacy in the protection of key facilities in the Green Zone such as the Council of Representatives Building.¹⁷ They are not Peshmerga units, are not exclusively Kurdish, and technically operate under the MoD, but are ultimately loyal

to current President Fuad Masoum.¹⁸ Previously, Maliki used them in addition to the 56th Brigade of the Prime Minister's Special Forces Division to secure personal control over key security forces in Baghdad. However, they are closely linked with the PUK and deploy into Iraqi Kurdistan as PUK-controlled security forces.¹⁹ They also have some responsibilities for securing parts of Baghdad, especially during Shi'a pilgrimages. They are not readily available for forward deployment.²⁰

1st Presidential Brigade:

- Possibly deployed to PUK-controlled Iraqi Kurdistan [as of February 12, 2016]

2nd Presidential Brigade:

- South of Baghdad [as of July 3, 2016]

Prime Minister's Special Forces Division (SFD) — Maj. Gen. Karim Aboud Muhammad al-Tamimi²¹

The Prime Minister's SFD is responsible for security in Baghdad's Green Zone and for protecting the Prime Minister.²² The SFD answers to the MoD through the BOC and JOC.²³ Its primary role is as a bodyguard unit – SFD units accompany senior Iraqi government officials, including the Prime Minister or the Minister of Interior, on tours of frontline areas. The SFD, rather than the 56th Brigade itself, has this responsibility. Abadi reshuffled the previous security arrangement, in which the historically Maliki-aligned 56th Brigade controlled Green Zone security. The SFD is not likely manned as a full division, however, it possesses some advanced capabilities and armored vehicles. It is not a unit able to forward deploy easily, though some of its members deployed to the Makhoul Mountains in Salah al-Din for reasons that remain unclear.²⁴

56th Mechanized Brigade:

- Green Zone, Baghdad [as of April 17, 2016]

57th Brigade:

- Green Zone, Baghdad [as of April 5, 2016]
- Amiriyat al-Fallujah, Dawilibah, SE of Fallujah / SW of Baghdad [as of November 6, 2014]

61st Brigade:

- Baghdad International Airport [as of March 6, 2016]

Ministry of Defense

Operations Commands

Joint Operations Command (JOC) and CTS Director — Talib Shughaiti al-Kinani

The JOC forms the highest headquarters of ISF leadership and has oversight of all operations commands. The JOC frequently assumes direct command of an operations command and its subordinate units during security crises or major operations, such as the anti-ISIS operation in Mosul. All operations commands report to the JOC.²⁵

Regional Operations Commands

ISF units are mobile rather than permanently assigned to any regional operations command. ISF divisions maintain headquarters across Iraq, however, an ISF division's forces are typically forward deployed far from their headquarters. This paper organizes ISF divisions by their June 2014 assignments in order to display the geographic disparity between security requirements during the Maliki-era and those under Prime Minister Abadi in August 2017.

Regional operations commands act as standing operational-level headquarters that supervise all types of ISF units within a geographically-bounded area of responsibility. Prime Minister Abadi appointed new commanders for the Anbar, Baghdad, Basra, and Samarra Operations Commands in November 2014 to reform the ISF. A Maliki loyalist nevertheless commands the Dijla Operations Command (DOC). The Babil, Salah al-Din, and Samarra, Operations Commands did not exist in 2013 and were likely created to support forward operations in the fight against ISIS.²⁶

Regional Operations Commanders

Operations Command	Formation Date	Commander – as of November 2017	Predecessor
Anbar Operations Command	August 2008	Maj. Gen. Mahmoud al-Felahi (2017–present) ²⁷	Ismail al-Mahalawi (2015–2017) ²⁸
Babil Operations Command	March 2014	Riad al-Khikhani (2016–present)	Unknown
Baghdad Operations Command	February 2007	Jalil Jubbar al-Rubaie (2016–present) ²⁹	Abdul-Amir al-Shammari (2013–2016) ³⁰
Basra Operations Command	August 2007	Jamil al-Shammari (2016–present) ³¹	Samir Abdul-Karim (2014–2016) ³²
Dijla Operations Command	July 2012	Mazhar al-Azzawi (2015–present) ³³	Abd al-Amir al-Zaydi (2012–2015) ³⁴
Jazeera and Badia Operations Command	February 2013	Qassim al-Muhammadi (2016–present) ³⁵	Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Dab’oun al-Maqsusi (2014–2016) ³⁶
Middle Euphrates Operations Command	Prior to November 2010	Qais Khalaf Rahimah	Othman al-Ghanimi (2011)
Ninewa Operations Command	January 2008	Maj. Gen. Najim Abdullah al-Jobouri (2015–present) ³⁷	Lt. Gen. Mahdi al-Gharrawi (2014) ³⁸
Rafidain Operations Command	November 2012	Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Dab’oun al-Maqsusi (2016–present) ³⁹	Lt. Gen. Jamil al-Shammari (2015–2016) ⁴⁰
Salah al-Din Operations Command	2014, after ISIS takeover of Mosul	Lt. Gen. Juma Anad al-Jobouri (2015–present) ⁴¹	Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saidi (2014–2015) ⁴²
Samarra Operations Command	2006, post al-Askari Mosque bombing	Imad Yassin al-Zuhairi (2014–present) ⁴³	Lt. Gen. Sabah al-Fatlawi (2012–2014) ⁴⁴

Anbar Operations Command (AOC) – Maj. Gen. Mahmoud al-Felahi⁴⁵

The AOC is responsible for the security of Ramadi and Fallujah, as well as surrounding desert areas. ISF leadership replaces AOC commanders frequently, either for performance issues or because they are wounded on the frontlines. The AOC commander is always a Sunni, though not always of the same tribe. Maj. Gen. Mahmoud al-Felahi replaced former AOC Commander Ismail al-Mahlawi in January 2017. Mahlawi was fired for disobeying orders during a bungled operation to advance toward the then-ISIS-held town of Anah that the JOC appears to have not approved.⁴⁶

1st Iraqi Army Rapid Intervention Division (RID) – Musa Kata Kadhim

The 1st IA RID was heavily damaged during fighting in June 2014 and operates at low strength. It was originally part of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) alongside the 4th, 7th, and 9th IA Divisions.⁴⁷ The 4th IA Brigade was destroyed in June 2014.⁴⁸ Originally deployed to secure the western Baghdad Belts, the mobile force has been split and redeployed to priority areas after the ISF cleared Fallujah in June 2016.

1st Brigade:

- Akashat, Anbar Province [as of November 14, 2016]

2nd Brigade:

- Possibly Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of November 17, 2016]

3rd Brigade:

- Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of July 23, 2016]
- Harariyat, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 11, 2016]

Unattributed:

- Al-Mithaq, southeast of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 1, 2017]
- Rutba, Anbar Province [as of October 7, 2016]
- Garma, near Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of March 24, 2015]

Babil Operations Command (BabOC) – Riad al-Khikhani

The BabOC is responsible for Babil Province and the southern Baghdad Belts. Its commander deployed to southwestern Ramadi during shaping efforts to recapture Ramadi, particularly around the 7 Kilo area. It is unclear how he secured this supporting role during the Ramadi operation. The BabOC's area of responsibility includes Jurf al-Sakhr, an old ISIS stronghold and the first major area ISF and PMF cleared in October 2014. Northern Babil remains intentionally depopulated more than two years after it was recaptured from ISIS, as the BabOC and the PMF prevent internally displaced persons (IDPs) from returning.⁴⁹ The BabOC did not exist in 2013.⁵⁰

Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) – Jalil Jubbar al-Rubaie⁵¹

The BOC is responsible for security in both Baghdad and much of the Baghdad Belts that surround the capital. The BOC's area of responsibility is a merger of the former Karkh and Rusafa Operations Commands' areas of responsibility. Iraqi Shi'a militias, including lethal proxy militias and Sadrist loyalists, operate outside the BOC's command and control. They have conducted crimes and kidnappings with impunity, established bases and unilateral control zones in northeastern and southern Baghdad, and even clashed with the ISF on rare occasions.⁵² Meanwhile, the Prime Minister's SFD, attached to the JOC, maintains security in the Green Zone and for critical infrastructure around Baghdad. The BOC is nevertheless ordinarily one of the best-resourced of the ISF's operations commands. It is assessed to have the most frontline on-duty strength of all the operations commands given its role in securing the capital.⁵³

Karkh Area Command

6th Iraqi Army Division (Ahmed Salim Bahjat)

Ahmed Salim Bahjat replaced a Maliki appointee as Commander of the 6th IA Division, and is the youngest Major General in the IA. He favors support, including airstrikes, from the U.S.-led

anti-ISIS coalition.⁵⁴ The 6th IA Division is one of several units allocated to securing the western Baghdad Belts. It is thus a critical unit for preventing the resurgence of Salafi-Jihadi groups in the former ISIS stronghold of Fallujah.

22nd Brigade:

- Al-Salman and Abu Shalal, north of Baghdad [as of January 23, 2017]
- Hayy al-Tadbir, north of Baghdad [as of April 2, 2016]
- Tarmiyah, north of Baghdad [as of June 19, 2015]
- Tel Tasa, north of Baghdad [as of December 19, 2014]

24th Brigade:

- Al-Maqalah, northeast of Baghdad [as of July 4, 2017]
- Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad [as of April 15, 2017]
- Al-Abbad and al-Kabishat, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of February 14, 2016]

54th Brigade:

- Qadisiyah, northwest of Baghdad [as of June 11, 2015]
- Mansour, central Baghdad [as of April 14, 2017]
- Al-Shurtan, west of Baghdad [as of December 11, 2016]

59th Brigade:

- Al-Halabsa, north of Baghdad [as of March 6, 2017]
- Tarmiyah, north of Baghdad [as of June 19, 2015]
- Jazirat al-Garma, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 7, 2015]
- Al-Manari and al-Zambaniyah, south of Baghdad [as of May 18, 2016]

Unattributed:

- Amiriyat al-Fallujah, southwest of Baghdad [as of December 16, 2015]
- Al-Qinatir crossing, north of Garma, Anbar Province [as of March 9, 2015]
- Abu Shajal, west of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 28, 2016]

- Kadhimiyah, northwest of Baghdad [as of April 28, 2016]
- Nuamiyah, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of February 2, 2016]

Rusafah Area Command

9th Iraqi Army Division (Qassim Jassim Nazal al-Maliki)

The 9th IA Armored Division is the IA's only armored division. The ISF frequently splits the 9th IA Division into detachments and forward deploys them to any area requiring armored support. The 9th IA Division therefore has a functional rather than a geographical area of responsibility. It has played a major role in Mosul operations and, based on its performance, is the most capable of the IA Divisions fielded against ISIS.

34th Brigade:

- Bab Sinjar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 15, 2017]
- Hamdaniyah, southeast of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of October 18, 2016]

35th Brigade:

- Al-Hitawin, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of April 24, 2016]
- Southeast of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 11, 2016]

36th Brigade:

- Gwer, southeast of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of October 17, 2016]
- Southeast of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 11, 2016]

37th Brigade:

- Halilah, northwest of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 12, 2017]
- North of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 18, 2016]

1st Federal Police Division (Dhafir al-Muhammadawi)

The 1st FP Division contains four brigades. The 1st FP Brigade is responsible for securing southwest Baghdad, an area especially important for Sh'a pilgrims.⁵⁵ The 2nd FP Brigade is split between Baghdad and northern Salah al-Din. Its participation in

operations around Baiji indicate it coordinates with the PMF, as the majority of security forces in the Baiji area and the Alas and Ajil oil fields are composed of Iraqi Shi'a militias operating under the PMF banner. The 3rd FP Brigade's disposition likewise suggests it cooperates closely with the PMF. All its operating areas outside of Baghdad have significant PMF presence. Units from the 3rd FP brigade clashed with Harakat al-Nujaba, an Iranian proxy militia, in the Zafraniyah area of East Baghdad, according to one report in September 2016.⁵⁶

1st Brigade:

- Al-Suwaib, southwest of Baghdad [as of July 1, 2016]

2nd Brigade:

- Al-Ghadir, east of Baghdad [May 17, 2017]
- West of Baghdad [as of October 2, 2016]

3rd Brigade:

- Zafraniyah, southeast of Baghdad [as of May 2, 2017]
- Al-Fatha, east of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of October 12, 2016]
- Canal Zone, east of Baghdad [as of October 2, 2016]
- Alas and Ajil Oil Fields, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 24, 2016]

4th Brigade:

- Central Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of May 5, 2017]
- South of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 31, 2017]
- Umm Obeid, northwest of Baghdad [as of October 16, 2016]
- Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 29, 2016]

Basra Operations Command (BasOC) – Jamil al-Shammari⁵⁷

The BasOC has *de jure* responsibility for all of Basra Province, Iraq's commercial hub, including Umm Qasr, Iraq's only major port. The BasOC has been unable to assert itself as the predominant security

institution in Basra because it lacks manpower. The majority of Basra-based 14th IA Division forward deployed to Baghdad in June 2014, allowing Iraqi Shi'a militias and criminal gangs to operate in Basra with impunity.⁵⁸ The PMF views Basra as a key hub due to its wealth and position as a recruitment pool for Shi'a youth. The most dominant PMF units operating in Basra and its ports reportedly include the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Saraya al-Salam, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Saraya Talia al-Khorasani, and Kata'ib Jund al-Imam.⁵⁹ They fiercely defend their freedom of action in Basra and resist any effort by the ISF to establish control over the province. The most prominent sign of resistance to the ISF came in January 2016 when they ejected units from the 9th IA Armored Division deployed to Basra by Prime Minister Abadi to suppress criminality and tribal violence.⁶⁰

14th Iraqi Army Division (Abd Muhsin al-Abbas)

The 14th IA Division is based in Basra, but all its brigades other than the 64th Brigade deployed out of Basra Province.

50th Brigade:

- Al-Hamdiyyah, northeast of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of June 3, 2016]
- Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of February 25, 2016]

51st Brigade:

- Shuhada, Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of January 24, 2017]
- Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 23, 2016]

52nd Brigade:

- West of Baghdad [as of May 15, 2016]

53rd Brigade:

- Jazeera Khalidiyah, northeast of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of October 8, 2016]
- West of Baghdad [as of May 15, 2016]
- Jisr Yabani, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of January 7, 2016]

64th Brigade:

- Basra, Basra Province [as of June 14, 2016]

Unattributed:

- Saqlawiyah, Albu Shajal, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 25, 2016]
- Albu Khanfar, Garma, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 24, 2016]
- Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of February 2, 2016]
- North of Baghdad [as of February 2, 2016]

Dijla Operations Command (DOC) – Mazhar al-Azzawi⁶¹

The DOC currently has responsibility for areas Iran and the Badr Organization prioritize. This includes all of Diyala Province, eastern Salah al-Din Province and its mixed Kurd-Turkmen-Arab town of Tuz Khurmatu, the Alas and Ajil oil fields, and the Hamrin Mountain Range. Diyala is a vital military and economic entry point for Iran into Iraq. Salah al-Din holds religious significance for Shi'as due to the Samarra Mosque, and serves as Iran's gateway to a land bridge from Iran to Syria through central Iraq. Control over Diyala and Salah al-Din Provinces also provides Iranian proxies the necessary staging grounds to intervene in Iraqi Kurdistan, as they did alongside ISF in October 2017 following the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum of September 2017.

Mazhar al-Azzawi nominally commands the DOC, but the DOC responds to the leader of the Iranian proxy Badr Organization, Hadi al-Ameri. Former Prime Minister Maliki put Hadi al-Ameri in charge of the Diyala Province security portfolio in 2014. Prime Minister Abadi has since left the DOC largely under Ameri's control.⁶² The DOC, created in 2012, commanded the Diyala-based 5th Division and the now-dissolved 12th Division in Kirkuk.⁶³ The DOC amassed power in Disputed Internal Boundaries contested by Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), particularly in Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salah al-Din Provinces. The DOC's development destabilized pre-existing

security arrangements between the central Iraqi government and the Kurds, particularly in Kirkuk, before the 12th Division dissolved. The 12th Division's dissolution following the rise of ISIS in 2014 allowed Peshmerga forces to hold the oil-rich Kirkuk Province after clearing it of ISIS presence until October 2017, when Iranian proxies and the ISF ejected them from key terrain.⁶⁴

5th Iraqi Army Division (Akram Saddam Mudannaf)

The 5th IA Division is compromised by the Iranian proxy Badr Organization, to which it is more responsive than the Prime Minister and the formal Iraqi chain of command.⁶⁵ It has responsibility for Diyala and the Hamrin Mountains stretching into northern Salah al-Din and west towards al-Alam sub-district.⁶⁶ It operates as an extension of the Badr Organization, though it was briefly led by a commander with a negative view of the PMF.⁶⁷

18th Brigade:

- Alas, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 12, 2016]
- Hamrin mountains, northern Diyala Province [as of July 3, 2016]
- Buhriz, south of Baqubah, Diyala Province [as of May 1, 2016]
- Udhaim, north of Baqubah, Diyala Province [as of February 15, 2015]

19th Brigade:

- Udhaim, north of Baqubah, Diyala Province [as of January 29, 2017]
- Khan Bani Saad, south of Baqubah, Diyala Province [as of June 30, 2016]
- Hamrin mountains, eastern Salah al-Din Province and northern Diyala Province [as of July 12, 2015]

20th Brigade:

- Lake Hamrin, northeast of Muqdadiah, Diyala Province [as of June 16, 2017]
- Abu Saida, northeast of Baqubah, Diyala Province [July 23, 2016]
- Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [April 2, 2016]

- Al-Saidat, near Qara Tapa, Diyala Province [as of June 15, 2015]
- Udham Dam, north of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of November 12, 2014]
- Shalgham al-Nida, east of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of April 13, 2016]

21st Brigade:

- Alas and Ajil Oil Fields, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 16, 2017]
- Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 11, 2016]
- Hamrin mountains, eastern Salah al-Din Province [as of June 5, 2016]
- Udham, north of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of March 27, 2016]

Unattributed:

- Ghalibiyah and al-Hashimiyat, west of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of June 13, 2017]
- Mtaibijah, north of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of August 10, 2016]
- Al-Khawalis, south of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of December 3, 2016]
- Muqdadiyah, Diyala Province [as of September 7, 2016]
- Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 30, 2016]
- Abu Saida, southwest of Muqdadiyah, Diyala Province [as of June 15, 2016]
- Al-Zarga, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [April 25, 2016]
- Alas and Ajil Oil Fields, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [March 18, 2016]
- Hamrin mountains, eastern Salah al-Din Province [as of December 16, 2015]
- Sansal and al-Sadour, north of Muqdadiyah, Diyala Province [as of January 15, 2015]
- Saadiyah and Jalula, Diyala Province [as of November 18, 2014]
- Udham, north of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of October 26, 2014]

Jazeera and Badia Operations Command (JBOC) – Qassim al-Muhammadi⁶⁸

The JBOC has responsibility for most of Anbar west of Ramadi, including the western Euphrates

River Valley, the far western district of Rutba, and the Baghdad-Amman highway. It also has responsibility over much of the Jazeera and Badia Deserts, giving JBOC one of the largest geographic areas of responsibility. JBOC is undermanned. It consists of one understaffed IA Division, the 7th IA Division, and one FP brigade, the 18th FP Brigade – which has since redeployed to fight in Mosul – supported by tribal fighters and a small number of Iraqi Shi'a militiamen.

7th Iraqi Army Infantry Division (Nauman Abdul-Zobaie)

The 7th IA Division is responsible for western Anbar, though it received temporary support from the 16th IA Division until the latter redeployed for Mosul operations in 2016.⁶⁹ It is one of the most severely undermanned units in the IA. It relies heavily on assistance of Jughaifi tribal fighters, who view the key district of Haditha as their fiefdom. Small Iraqi Shi'a militias also operate alongside the 7th IA Division and deploy as a hold force in recaptured Sunni villages from the villages south of Haditha and as far west as the Walid Border Crossing with Syria. The 7th IA Division also works alongside Border Guards brigades, which cluster near the Walid and Trebil Border Crossings and the Baghdad-Amman highway.

27th Brigade:

- Haditha-Baiji road, northeast of Haditha, Anbar Province [as of June 13, 2017]
- Al-Baghdadi, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of September 23, 2016]
- Al-Dulab, west of al-Baghdadi, Anbar Province [as of April 24, 2016]
- Amlijiya, south of Haditha, Anbar Province [as of July 10, 2015]

28th Brigade:

- Southeast of Anah, Northwest of Haditha, Anbar Province [as of June 13, 2017]
- Al-Sakra, northwest of Haditha, Anbar Province [as of March 6, 2016]
- Al-Baghdadi, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of September 23, 2016]
- Albu Hayah, south of Haditha, Anbar Province [March 16, 2016]

29th Brigade:

- Hit, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of July 5, 2017]
- Hit and Kubaisa, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of December 11, 2016]
- Kilo 160, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of June 15, 2015]

Unattributed:

- Kilo 35, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of June 18, 2016]
- Jazeera al-Dulab, east of Haditha, Anbar Province [as of September 28, 2016]
- Al-Baghdadi, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of March 16, 2016]
- Al-Sakra, west of Haditha, Anbar Province [as of February 13, 2016]
- Hit-Baghdadi road, south of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of February 5, 2016]

Mid-Euphrates Operations Command (MEOC)

– Qais Khalaf Rahimah

The MEOC has responsibility over the key shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf, their prodigious desert sectors, and the southern Anbar district of Nukhaib. Chief among the MEOC's priorities is ensuring the security of Shi'a religious pilgrims and preventing ISIS from infiltrating through the desert into Karbala, Najaf, and Iraq's southern provinces. Large numbers of Iraqi Shi'a militias supplement security in the MEOC, and many of them have headquarters in Karbala, obtaining legitimacy and popular support by securing pilgrimage routes.

8th Iraqi Army Division (Ali al-Maliki)

The 8th IA Division is based in Babil and falls under BabOC Commander Riad al-Kikhani's command, though it reportedly has detachments, including a logistics company, in Najaf and Karbala for the purposes of protecting holy sites.⁷⁰ The 8th Division was originally part of the MEOC before transitioning operations to Babil, where it worked with the BOC, the AOC, the MEOC, and more recently the JBOC in different military operations. The 8th IA Division operated under BabOC control during the Ramadi operation rather than the MEOC, AOC, and BOC.

8th Brigade:

- Amiriyat al-Fallujah, south of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 14, 2016]
- Albu Duayij, south of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of February 26, 2016]

30th Brigade:

- Amiriyat al-Fallujah, south of Fallujah, Anbar Province [November 22, 2016]
- Al-Hossa and al-Nasaf, east of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of November 14, 2016]
- Zankurah, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of November 14, 2016]
- Albu Harat, near Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of April 13, 2016]
- Albu Duayij, south of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of February 26, 2016]

31st Brigade:

- Al-Hossa and al-Nasaf, east of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of November 14, 2016]
- Zankurah, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of February 3, 2016]
- Amiriyat al-Fallujah, south of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of February 3, 2016]

32nd Brigade:

- Rutba, Anbar Province [as of April 25, 2017]
- Al-Felahat, southwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of December 4, 2016]
- Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of April 14, 2016]

33rd Brigade:

- Albu Alwan, west of Baghdad [as of March 2, 2015]

39th Brigade:

- Al-Felahat, southwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of January 30, 2015]

Unattributed:

- Al-Tash al-Awla, south of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of June 14, 2017]
- Juwaybah and Husaybah, east of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of August 2, 2016]
- Jazeera Khalidiyah, northwest of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of July 30, 2016]
- Fallujah Dam, south of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 26, 2016]

- Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 22, 2016]
- Zankurah, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of April 14, 2016]
- Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 18, 2015]
- Al-Mlahimah, east of Ramadi, Anbar Province [May 18, 2015]

17th Iraqi Army Division (Jabbar Naima)

23rd Brigade:

- South of Baghdad [as of December 24, 2016]
- Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad [as of October 21, 2014]

25th Brigade:

- Latifiyah, south of Baghdad [as of February 25, 2016]
- Tel al-Thahab, south of Baghdad [as of November 20, 2016]
- Al-Akhsaf, south of Baghdad [as of September 12, 2016]

55th Brigade:

- Dawilibah, south of Baghdad [as of June 8, 2017]
- Al-Bzaibiz Bridge, southeast of Baghdad [as of July 19, 2016]
- Bustan al-Tikriti, southwest of Baghdad [as of March 23, 2016]

60th Brigade:

- Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province [as of March 17, 2017]⁷¹
- East of Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province [as of December 4, 2016]
- Al-Abadi, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 23, 2016]
- Albu Obeid, west of Baghdad [as of April 24, 2016]

Unattributed:

- East of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 24, 2016]
- Al-Kuam, Jurf al-Sakhar, south of Baghdad [as of February 17, 2016]
- Nuamiyah, south of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of February 2, 2016]

- Amiriyat al-Fallujah, south of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of December 16, 2015]
- West of Ishaqit, south of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 26, 2015]
- Al-Qinatir crossing, north of Garma, Anbar Province [as of March 9, 2015]

Ninewa Operations Command (NOC) – Maj. Gen. Najim Abdullah al-Jabouri⁷²

The NOC dissolved in June 2014 when ISIS seized Mosul. It was reinstated in April 2015.⁷³ The NOC held responsibility for all operations to recapture Ninewa Province from ISIS control.⁷⁴ The 15th and 16th IA Divisions are the units from the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th IA Divisions that the U.S. and its partners trained and reconstituted. They are combat capable, but struggled with tactical tasks such as “seize” and “clear” during the Mosul operation. Elements of the U.S.-trained 15th IA Division never deployed to Mosul from the northern Baghdad Belts, where ISIS has historically had a presence and in which numerous Iraqi Shi’a militias are present.

15th Iraqi Army Division (Imad al-Silawi)

The 74th Brigade, 15th Division was relegated to holding towns in southern Salah al-Din Province like Dujail and Sayyid Gharib. It was intended to deploy to Anbar in April 2016, but the Salah al-Din provincial government blocked the move.⁷⁵ The 91st Brigade, 15th Division is an all-Kurdish brigade that pre-dates the 15th Division’s formation. It has operated primarily around Mosul and southwestern Arbil Province.⁷⁶ The 92nd Brigade is an all-Shi’a Turkmen brigade. It operates near militias with significant Shi’a Turkmen components as well, raising questions about whether it is fully responsive to Baghdad or is more aligned with lethal Iranian proxy Shi’a militias. It played a leading role in the fight to recapture the Turkmen town of Tel Afar, where it fought alongside Iranian proxy Shi’a militias like Kata’ib Hezbollah.⁷⁷

52nd Brigade:

- Last known location: Sur Shanas, north of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of December 9, 2014]

71st Brigade:

- Rihanah, northwest of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of July 4, 2017]
- Al-Milayeen, north of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 22, 2017]
- Qayyarah, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of July 8, 2016]
- Makhmour, southwest of Arbil [April 13, 2016]
- Nasr, west of Makhmour, southwest of Arbil [as of February 4, 2016]

72nd Brigade:

- Sheikh Ibrahim, near Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of May 11, 2017]
- Qayyarah, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of July 8, 2016]
- West of Makhmour, southwest of Arbil [as of June 5, 2016]

73rd Brigade:

- Al-Zinjili, west Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 20, 2017]
- South of Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 20, 2016]
- Albu Risha, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of February 2, 2016]

74th Brigade:

- Yathrib, south of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 2, 2017]
- Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 25, 2016]
- Muthanna Facility, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 27, 2016]
- Sayyid Gharib, southeast of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 27, 2016]

91st Brigade:

- Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 15, 2017]
- Qayyarah, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 2, 2016]

92nd Brigade:

- Qayyarah, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of July 8, 2016]
- Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 13, 2016]

Unattributed:

- Al-Buwayr, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 15, 2017]
- Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of November 19, 2016]
- Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 22, 2016]
- Qayyarah, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of August 19, 2016]
- Asariyah, northwest of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of March 25, 2016]
- Sijariyah, east of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of March 25, 2016]

16th Iraqi Army Division (Sabah Fadhil Matar al-Azzawi)**75th Brigade:**

- Al-Balgha, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 11, 2017]
- Qayyarah, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of October 15, 2016]

76th Brigade:

- Baysan al-Rashidiyah, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of February 26, 2017]
- Bawiza, north of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of November 12, 2016]

91st Brigade:

- Last known location: Juizat Tahtani and Juizat Fuqani, near Makhmour, southwest of Arbil [as of January 2, 2015]

Unattributed:

- Shalalat, north of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of November 1, 2016]
- Khazar, east of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of September 29, 2016]
- Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 22, 2016]

3rd Federal Police Division (Saleh al-Amiri)

The 3rd FP Division is compromised by Iranian proxies within the PMF. The disposition of the 9th Brigade suggests it operates alongside Iranian proxy militias like Kata'ib al-Imam Ali in Baiji. The 10th Brigade is concentrated in Samarra and participates in PMF-led clearing operations in the Jazeera Desert. The 11th Brigade commander Hussein

al-Bahadali appears to be friendly with senior (Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada) KSAS members, including official spokesperson Faleh al-Khazali.⁷⁸ The 12th Brigade appears to be mostly based in Salah al-Din Province in areas that see a significant number of PMF fighters. The 21st Brigade is a predominantly Turkmen FP unit that is customarily led by a Turkmen commander.⁷⁹

9th Brigade:

- Al-Jawsaq, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [February 25, 2017]
- South of Mosul [as of October 22, 2016]
- North of Qayyarah, Ninewa Province [as of October 21, 2016]
- Siniyah, west of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [October 2, 2016]

10th Brigade:

- Fourth Bridge, Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of March 2, 2017]
- Near Camp al-Ghazlani, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of December 20, 2016]
- Al-Harariat area, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of November 3, 2016]
- Lake Thar Thar, Anbar Province [as of June 14, 2016]

11th Brigade:

- Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 31, 2017]
- Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 22, 2016]

12th Brigade:

- Hamrin Mountains, east of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 11, 2016]
- Thar Thar, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 10, 2016]

21st Brigade:

- HQ at Muthanna Facility, near Thar Thar, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 1, 2015]
- Nadhim al-Thar Thar, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 1, 2015]
- Diyala Province [as of December 3, 2016]

Salah al-Din Operations Command (SDOC) – Lt. Gen. Juma Anad al-Jabouri⁸⁰

The SDOC, which formed after ISIS captured Iraqi terrain, has responsibility for the northern half of Salah al-Din Province, including the cities of Tikrit, Baiji, and Shirqat. The PMF operates freely in Salah al-Din Province without coordinating with the SDOC. Iranian proxy militias operate out of Baiji and the Speicher Air Base, northwest of Tikrit, and station themselves along the key Baiji-Haditha highway. Iranian proxy militias ousted the previous SDOC commander, Abdul-Wahhab al-Saadi, during operations to recapture Tikrit in May 2015 because he insisted on introducing U.S.-led Coalition airstrikes to what was until then a militia-dominated operation. The PMF have since cowed the SDOC and exercise freedom of movement and action within its area of responsibility.

20th Iraqi Army Infantry Division (Proposed)

The 20th IA Division has yet to be formed. A leaked MoD document from February 14, 2017 indicates four brigades from pre-existing divisions would consolidate into the 20th IA Division and base out of Speicher Air Base, northwest of Tikrit.⁸¹ The new division would deploy for operations in SDOC and Samarra Operations Command (SOC) areas of responsibility. The new division appears to be a method of consolidating MoD forces in Salah al-Din Province and improving the ability of IA units stationed in SDOC and SOC to operate as a unit. The 66th Brigade appears to be attached directly to the SDOC as of October 2017. It was originally intended to be part of the 18th IA Division based in Maysan, however, the 66th Brigade was the only unit of the division that actually formed. Limited picture intelligence suggests the unit has low capabilities and exhibits signs of poor discipline.⁸²

The proposed units in the 20th Division are:

43rd Brigade, 11th IA Division

60th Brigade, 17th IA Division

66th Brigade (new)

- Hariariat, near Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 10, 2016]

- Salah al-Din Province [as of August 27, 2016]

74th Brigade, 15th IA Division (SOC)

Samarra Operations Command (SOC) – Imad Yassin al-Zuhairi⁸³

The SOC has responsibility over Samarra, much of the Jazeera Desert west of Samarra, and southern Salah al-Din Province including part of the northern Baghdad Belts. The 5th FP Division, particularly the 17th Brigade, also operates in Samarra. It is unclear to which operations command the 5th Division was originally attached to upon creation, but former SOC head Sabah Fatlawi stated the 5th Division was formed under his command in March 2014.⁸⁴ The 5th FP Division was absent from the news until 2014. The 74th Brigade, 15th IA Division operates in Samarra but is originally designated to be with the NOC. The 12th FP Brigade, 3rd FP Division also operates in this area of responsibility but is originally linked to the NOC. Iraqi Shi'a militias proliferate the SOC area of responsibility, given their interest in protecting the holy al-Askari Shrine in central Samarra. Its area of responsibility has a significant Sunni population, and the SOC focuses on either returning Sunni IDPs to their homes – with mixed effects – or securing Samarra alongside the PMF. Prime Minister Abadi appointed Zuhairi to replace a less capable commander, just one year after being removed from his division command to make room for a Maliki loyalist.⁸⁵ However, the freedom of movement and action of the PMF indicates it is unlikely Zuhairi is able to shape PMF operations in his own area of responsibility. The SOC did not exist in 2013.

Rafidain Operations Command (ROC) – Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Dab'oun al-Maqsusi⁸⁶

The ROC oversees security in Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Qadisiyah, and Wasit Provinces. The majority of ISF based in the ROC area of responsibility forward deployed to fight ISIS or protect Baghdad. The ROC deployed several of its Emergency Police Battalions, police units that are rarely forward deployed from their home provinces, to protect Samarra or to secure pilgrimage routes.⁸⁷ Security remains vulnerable as the ROC's security

forces are stretched thin. Intra-Shi'a violence escalated in September 2016 to a point that Prime Minister Abadi personally intervened with a large military force from Baghdad and to work towards reconciliation between warring tribes.⁸⁸

10th Iraqi Army Division (Hamid al-Fatlawi)

The 10th IA Division is responsible for securing Ramadi and much of the Jazeera Desert north of Ramadi. It currently bases at the AOC headquarters north of Ramadi. The 10th IA Division's area of responsibility is small compared to the units of JBOC, though more populous, but the 10th IA Division was also undermanned after facing tough ISIS resistance during the months-long operation to clear Ramadi.

4th Brigade:

- Last known location: Dawilibah, south of Baghdad [as of October 23, 2014]

38th Brigade:

- Albu Bali, northeast of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of May 26, 2017]
- Albu Thaib and al-Juraishi, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of September 15, 2016]

39th Brigade:

- Al-Juraishi, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of October 2, 2016]
- Al-Bakr, near Hit, Anbar Province [as of September 12, 2016]

40th Brigade:

- Al-Bakr, near Hit, Anbar Province [as of April 17, 2017]
- Al-Juraishi, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of April 17, 2016]

41st Brigade:

- al-Bakr, near Hit, Anbar Province [as of September 12, 2016]
- Thar Thar, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of April 16, 2016]
- Albu Obeid, east of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of March 21, 2016]
- Jazeera Khalidiyah, northeast of Ramadi, Anbar Province [February 7, 2016]

Unattributed:

- Tarabsha, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province [June 14, 2017]
- Jazeera Khalidiyah, northeast of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of July 31, 2016]

11th Iraqi Army Division (Sa'ib Obeid Mohsin Alwan)

42nd Brigade:

- Rashidiyah, north of Baghdad [as of September 25, 2016]
- Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad [as of August 17, 2016]
- Al-Madain, south of Baghdad [as of August 2, 2016]
- Garma, Abu Awdah, al-Sajar, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 28, 2016]

43rd Brigade:

- Rashidiyah, north of Baghdad [as of September 25, 2016]
- Al-Khadr, east Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 12, 2016]

44th Brigade:

- Adhamiyah, north Baghdad [as of November 19, 2016]
- Karrada, central Baghdad [as of October 10, 2016]
- Hayy al-Basatin, north Baghdad [as of January 26, 2016]

45th Brigade:

- Sadr City, northeast Baghdad [as of December 20, 2016]
- Al-Dhabitiah, northwest of Baghdad [as of December 2, 2016]
- North of Baghdad [as of June 10, 2016]
- Al-Anaz, west of Baghdad [as of January 16, 2016]

Temporary Operations Commands

The JOC establishes temporary operations commands specific to a major operation. Major operations previously fell under the target area's operations commander: Ramadi fell under the AOC, while Tikrit fell under SDOC. The practice

of temporary operations commands began with the Fallujah operation in 2015, when the JOC appointed the former SDOC commander Abdul-Wahhab al-Saadi as the overall commander for operations in the area, with the BOC and AOC acting in supporting roles. Similarly, the ISF established the Mosul Liberation Operations Command under the JOC deputy director's leadership for the Mosul operation. There were persistent rumors the ISF would establish the East DOC, a temporary operations command to recapture Hawija, but the JOC denied any such body ever formed.⁸⁹

Ministry of Interior

Federal Police (FP) — Raed Shakir Jawdat

The FP is a deployable gendarmerie under the MoI. Its capabilities fall on the spectrum between an IA Army unit and the local police. FP units possess anti-tank rockets, Humvees, Infantry Fighting Vehicles such as Russian BMP-2s, and pickup trucks outfitted with heavy weapons. They are recruited at the provincial level but forward deploy outside of their home provinces. FP units, including a "Sniper Battalion" received training from the Italian Carabinieri, a historical partner for police training partnerships.⁹⁰ Italy trains local police and FP (as many as 900) but it is unclear which units receive training, as local Emergency Police Battalion uniforms are identical to those of the FP.⁹¹ Italy's training program is based in Baghdad while the Danish trainers are based at Ain al-Asad. This suggests that the 18th FP Brigade has received FP training, as they are the only FP unit based in western Anbar.⁹²

FP units accompany the PMF during every major PMF-led operation. The current FP commander, Qasim al-Araji, and his predecessor are both members of the Badr Organization, an Iranian proxy.⁹³ FP commanders who are not sympathetic to PMF are likely intimidated into cooperating with PMF or ordered to do so by the sympathetic FP senior leadership.⁹⁴ Non-compliant FP commanders may be retired or moved to administrative positions to free up positions for Badr Organization and other

militia members.⁹⁵ The FP is more likely to become more compromised during Arajī's tenure.

The 1st Federal Police Division [*listed under the Baghdad Operations Command*]⁹⁶

2nd Federal Police Division (Ahmed al-Asadi)

The 2nd FP Division is the only mechanized FP division, and it is deployed to secure Baghdad.⁹⁷ The 2nd FP Division's units are largely occupied with counterterrorism operations around Baghdad and the Baghdad Belts, securing pilgrimage routes, and law enforcement. Haidar Yusuf Abdullah, also known as Abu Dargham al-Maturi, commanded both the 5th FP Brigade and the 5th Badr Brigade until his promotion to command the 6th FP Division in February 2017. The unit is effectively an extension of the Badr Organization. At least one of its units, the 6th Brigade, forward deployed some of its forces to Mosul for clearing operations.

5th Brigade:

- Hammam al-Alil, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of May 11, 2016]
- Cement Plant, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 23, 2016]
- Sayyid Muhammad Shrine, Balad district, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 13, 2016]

6th Brigade:

- Ghaziliyah, northwest of Baghdad [as of June 17, 2017]
- Hamam al-Alil, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [November 8, 2016]
- Al-Harariyat, near Garma, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 23, 2016]

7th Brigade:

- Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad [as of June 3, 2017]
- Al-Rayy, south of Baghdad [as of September 14, 2016]

8th Brigade:

- Saba al-Bour, north of Baghdad [as of January 10, 2017]
- Kadhimiyah, northwest of Baghdad [as of November 15, 2016]
- Taji, north of Baghdad [as of September 28, 2016]

- Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad [as of September 9, 2016]
- Al-Zaidan, south of Baghdad [as of September 1, 2016]

3rd Federal Police Division [*listed under the Ninewa Operations Command, as it has been based there since its creation.*]⁹⁸

4th Federal Police Division (Majid Ghadir Ghazal)

The 4th FP Division appears to have responsibility for southern Baghdad and areas south of the capital, such as the Karkh Prison.⁹⁹ The 13th Brigade has connections with the Iranian-backed Kata'ib al-Imam Ali militia as a result of their overlapping areas of responsibility in Salah al-Din Province.¹⁰⁰ It is also one of the few units with a security presence in southern Iraq, maintaining a detachment in Basra. The 16th Brigade is concentrated in western Karbala and the desert district of Nukhaib, west of Karbala. Iraqi Shi'a militias heavily supplement security forces in the Karbala area to protect Karbala's provincial borders and to monitor the expansive Jazeera Desert. It also maintains presence in southern Iraq with a detachment in Wasit Province.

13th Brigade:

- Makhoul, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 10, 2016]
- Basra Prison, Basra Province [as of July 22, 2016]

14th Brigade:

- Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 14, 2017]
- Nasiriyah Prison, Dhi Qar Province [as of June 13, 2015]

15th Brigade:

- Al-Shathra, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [May 17, 2017]
- Al-Hweish, north of Baghdad [as of December 19, 2016]

16th Brigade:

- Western Karbala Province [as of October 9, 2016]
- Wasit Province [as of October 9, 2016]

5th Federal Police Division (Imad Ali al-Lami)

The 5th FP Division participated in the Mosul operation's southern axis, which was dominated by FP units compromised by Iranian proxies.¹⁰¹ The 5th FP Division currently operates alongside the 6th FP Division, led by a Badr Organization commander.¹⁰² The 17th Brigade has responsibility for security in south and east Salah al-Din Province and the Jazeera Desert west of Samarra, which place it proximate to PMF units. The 19th Brigade exhibits close coordination with the Sadrist militia Saraya al-Salam due to their overlapping areas of responsibility around Samarra.¹⁰³

17th Brigade:

- Al-Zankur, near Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 31, 2017]
- Jazeera west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of November 24, 2016]
- Mtaibijah, northwest of Baqubah, Diyala Province [August 10, 2016]
- Al-Jilam, east of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [July 19, 2016]
- Dhuluiya, Salah al-Din Province [as of March 22, 2016]

18th Brigade:

- West Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 28, 2017]
- South of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 31, 2017]
- Akashat, Trebil Border area, Anbar Province [as of September 18, 2016]
- 70 Kilo, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [February 15, 2016]
- Kilo 110, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of December 5, 2015]

19th Brigade:

- South of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 31, 2017]
- Jazeera, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of November 24, 2016]
- Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 1, 2016]
- Khat al-Lein, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of February 11, 2016]

20th Brigade:

- South of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 31, 2017]
- Alas and Ajil Oil Fields, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 15, 2016]

Unattributed:

- Al-Dandan, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 15, 2017]
- Southeast of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of December 12, 2016]
- Umm al-Asafir, Lake Thar Thar, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of March 3, 2016]

6th Federal Police Division – Abu Dargham al-Maturi

The 6th FP Division formed in 2016 and contains, according to an unconfirmed report, the 4th, 5th, and 6th FP Brigades of the 6th FP Division. It is closely tied with and appears to operate alongside Iranian proxy militias. The FP promoted the 5th Badr Brigade commander, Abu Dargham al-Maturi, to command the 6th FP Division in February 2017, effectively placing Iranian proxy militias inside Mosul under the formal chain of command.¹⁰⁴ The 6th FP Division originally intended to integrate Sunnis into the FP, according to Anbar officials.¹⁰⁵ The behavior of the 6th FP Division, however, indicates it is a compromised unit and not representative of Anbari Sunni populations.

Unattributed:

- Mosul Old City, Ninewa Province [as of May 21, 2017]
- Al-Tayran and Wadi al-Hajar, southern Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of February 28, 2017]
- Saqlaqiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [May 30, 2016]

Emergency Response Division (ERD) –Thamir Muhammad Ismail al-Husseini (“Abu Turab”)

The ERD (sometimes referred to as the Rapid Response Division or Emergency Response Brigades) is a mobile special operations force under

MoI control. It was formed with the intention of consolidating into the ISOF after the liberation of Mosul from ISIS. It has remained under MoI, rather than MoD, chain of command, however.¹⁰⁶ It operates mostly in AOC, BOC, and SDOC areas of responsibility, but it can be expected to shift locations depending on manpower requirements given its more advanced capabilities. All three ERD brigades have deployed in some capacity to Ninewa for operations to recapture Mosul.¹⁰⁷

The unit and its commander have close ties to the Badr Organization.¹⁰⁸ The U.S. Joint Forces Special Operations Command Component — Iraq temporarily ended its relationship with the unit because of indigenous leadership failures.¹⁰⁹ The U.S. has since rekindled its advising relationship with the ERD. U.S. and European advisers accompanied the ERD into southern Mosul during clearing operations.¹¹⁰ No discernible change to the ERD's leadership explains the return of U.S. advisors.¹¹¹ It has been less disciplined than other ISOF units and likely more compromised. Abu Turab is a Maliki appointee whose unit operates alongside the PMF. He was rumored at one point to be Prime Minister Abadi's replacement for Minister of Interior, again implicitly linking him with the Badr Organization.¹¹²

1st Brigade:

- Maysan Province [as of September 25, 2016]

2nd Brigade:

- Subaihat, east of Fallujah, Anbar Province [May 4, 2016]

3rd Brigade:

- West of Baghdad [as of May 16, 2016]
- Al-Fatha, East of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 1, 2016]

Unattributed:

- Central Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of May 4, 2017]

Border Guards Command

The Border Guards are a motorized infantry force attached to the MoI. They oversee Iraq's ports of entry and its borders from watchtowers and border

forts. Border Guards in Iraqi Kurdistan are responsive to the KRG, not the MoI. The Border Guards operate under five distinct border regions:¹¹³

- 1st Region of Iraqi Kurdistan's borders with Iran and Turkey
- 2nd Region of western Anbar's borders with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia
- 3rd Region of the Diyala-Wasit border with Iran
- 4th Region of Basra and Maysan's borders with Iran and Kuwait
- 5th Region of Najaf and Muthanna's borders with Saudi Arabia

The Border Guards are heavily concentrated in the 2nd Region as of August 2017, particularly around Trebil Border Crossing with Jordan, the Ar Ar Border Crossing with Saudi Arabia, the al-Walid Border Crossing with southeastern Syria, and along the International Highway running between Trebil and Ramadi. The Border Guard 3rd, 4th, and 5th Regions with Kuwait, southern Saudi Arabia, and Iran are undermanned. Lack of manpower at Iran-Iraq border posts may have contributed to a stampede by Iranian pilgrims in November 2016.¹¹⁴ Most of the Syria-Iraq border has few Border Guards present, though the Kurdish Peshmerga controlled a portion of it in northern Iraq as of August 2017.

Border Guards Division (Hamid Abdullah)

1st Brigade:

- Mahfur Majna border crossing, Iraq-Saudi Arabia border [as of February 28, 2015]

2nd Brigade:

- *Historically operated in Arbil Province*

3rd Brigade:

- Daquq, Kirkuk Province [as of January 25, 2016]

4th Brigade:

- Arkaban border crossing, Iraq – Jordan border [as of January 25, 2015]

5th Brigade:

- Rutba, Anbar Province [as of December 12, 2015]

6th Brigade:

- Najaf, Najaf Province [as of December 16, 2015]
- Iraq – Jordan border [as of September 27, 2015]

7th Brigade:

- Ar Ar Border Crossing, Iraq-Saudi Arabia border [as of January 13, 2016]

8th Brigade:

- Diyala Province, Iraq-Iran border [as of January 1, 2012]

9th Brigade:

- Anbar Province [as of June 16, 2014]

10th Brigade:

- Al-Tib border crossing, Iran-Iraq border [as of February 28, 2015]

11th Brigade:

- Najaf, Najaf Province [as of December 16, 2015]

12th Brigade:

- *Historically responsible for the border area between Saudi Arabia and Najaf*

14th Brigade:

- *Historically responsible for the border between Iran, Basra, and Maysan*

Provincial Emergency Police Battalions

Emergency Police Battalions are localized combat formations of local police tied to provincial police commands that fall under the leadership of the FP. They are not intended to mobilize like the FP, and most often remain in the area in which formed. They are only forward deployed in unique circumstances, the most common being the allocation of southern provinces' emergency battalions to pilgrimage routes or sites, such as the al-Askari Shrine in Samarra.¹¹⁵ Emergency Police Battalions near the frontlines have limited combat capabilities and are most frequently used to hold rather than to clear territory.¹¹⁶

Facilities Protection Service (FPS) and Oil Police

Iraq's FPS forces are essentially security guards protecting critical infrastructure, such as electricity stations, power lines, railways, government offices, and other infrastructure.¹¹⁷ They fall nominally under the MoI but respond more regularly to the ministry whose facilities they protect. The FPS generally have limited maneuver and firepower. The Iraqi Oil Police are more capable than the other FPS forces and have slightly better equipment. They are motorized units attached to the Ministry of Oil and responsible for the protection of the country's oil fields. Most of the oil police concentrate around the oil fields in Basra and southern Iraq. Oil police in Kirkuk and Iraqi Kurdistan are responsive to the KRG, not the Ministry of Oil or the MoI.¹¹⁸

Popular Mobilization Forces

The PMF are led by senior Iranian proxy leaders who respond to Iran's IRGC-Quds Force. PMF institutions are responsive to the directives of an unofficial executive commission, or "Shura Council," dominated by senior leaders of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, and other pro-Iranian figures.¹²¹

The PMC was first created by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in 2014 after the collapse of the ISF against ISIS.¹²² The PMC gained increasing power and popular legitimacy among Shi'as as its subordinate militias participated actively in the fight against ISIS. Prime Minister Abadi maintained the PMC and its militias after he took office in 2014 due to the precariousness of security in Iraq. The Iraqi CoR approved the "Popular Mobilization Commission's Law" in November 2016, legalizing both the entity as an independent body within the ISF and its subordinate militias.¹²³ The PMC oversees the administrative needs of its forces, from training, arming, and the provision of salaries and



ABOVE: A February 8, 2016 meeting of senior Iranian proxy leaders to discuss Mosul operations.¹¹⁹ Senior leaders like Qais al-Khazali, Hadi al-Ameri, and Abu Alaa al-Wila'i frequently hold meetings, either bilaterally or as a group, to discuss major developments and plan for operations. Picture intelligence suggests that there is an agreed-upon PMF leadership cadre composed of the most senior militia commanders that oversees the operations and activities of the PMF and PMC.¹²⁰

supplies to the planning of military operations. The PMC's deputy chairman, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, controls the PMC's subordinate directorates.¹²⁴ The centralization of the PMF's command structure under Muhandis' leadership has increased the coherence of the organization's military and administrative operations over time.

The PMC has created several directorates for overseeing the planning and execution of military operations since its inception in mid-2014. This administrative structure has enabled Iranian proxy militias to conduct joint operations with one another and with non-Iranian affiliated units and increased the speed and efficiency of such operations. The operations directorate manages forward operations and examines the readiness of forward troops, directly supervised by Muhandis and heavily overseen by Badr Organization head Hadi al-Ameri. A highly effective military engineering directorate augments this work. The intelligence directorate provides signals intelligence and drone surveillance, while the logistics directorate supplies ammunition, fuel, and other needs to deployed units.

The presence of Iranian advisers with several PMF groups throughout the campaign to defeat ISIS,

particularly IRGC Ground Forces Commander Muhammad Pakpour and IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassim Suleimani, demonstrates that the IRGC and its Quds Force exercise influence over PMF campaign design.¹²⁵ Consistent Iranian advisory presence suggests that the PMF require Iranian assistance to operate capably in high-end combat.

Iran initially provided military and financial backing to the PMF, particularly its proxy units.¹²⁶ The PMC Law — championed by pro-Iranian parties in the Iraqi CoR — not only legalized the PMF as part of the state security apparatus but also provided funding from the Iraqi budget, thereby alleviating financial pressure on Tehran.¹²⁷ The PMF received \$1.63 billion from the GoI in 2017 — about six percent of Iraq's security budget — which exceeds the \$683 million allotted to the CTS.¹²⁸ This budget increase followed a three percent cut to the salaries of civilian employees in the government following the decline in oil prices. The Iraqi CoR also voted to match PMF salaries to those of ISF service members in the 2018 federal budget, further expanding the PMF's financial standing and institutionalization.¹²⁹

The implementation of a centralized administration has also streamlined PMF finances, recruitment,



ABOVE: *Iraqi Vice President Nouri al-Maliki holds a meeting with PMF leaders in January 2015, the first major meeting by a senior Iraqi state official.¹³⁰ Senior proxy militia leaders are notably absent except for commander of Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, Shibl al-Zaidi, whose face is obscured but sits on the far left of the photo. Maliki attempts to position himself as a leader of the PMF, and frequently meets with the organization's leaders and praises them in an attempt to curry favor among Iran's proxies.*

and the provision of care for fighters and their families. The administrative directorate also professionalized recruitment procedures using the MoD model. Medical care and rehabilitation assistance is provided to PMF fighters through a separate directorate. A specialized directorate oversees the provision of administrative and financial assistance to wounded fighters and their families as well as the families of deceased fighters. A new directorate was established as the lobbying arm of the PMC within the government. It advocates for favorable laws, regulations, and budgetary increases for the PMC. A media directorate was also established to be the official source of all PMF activities.

Popular Mobilization Forces Chain of Command

The PMF's formal chain of command may run from the Prime Minister down, but power and political realities create an informal chain of command that

responds to the IRGC-Quds Force and, thus, to Tehran. Such parallel structures steered by Iranian proxies had emerged in Iraq in 2005–2007.¹³² The U.S. campaign plan to create an effective Iraqi Army involved removing militia control over the National Police. Iran's theory and implementation of the "deep state" in Hezbollah also creates parallel structures and serves as a model for its engagement in Iraq.¹³³

The PMF is a critical mechanism of Iran's deep state in Iraq. The formal chain of command obscures the power relationships. Iranian proxies within the PMF operate outside the Government of Iraq's chain of command and in many cases contrary to the Government of Iraq's interests. Prime Minister Abadi and the ISF issue formal orders to the PMF, but Iranian proxy commanders decide whether to implement or take a different approach. The relationships between Abadi and the proxies and the manner in which they are expressed have evolved over time.



ABOVE: Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi meets with senior PMF leaders on July 22, 2017 and praises the PMF as an essential security institution that is a part of the Iraqi state.¹³¹ Senior proxy militia leaders like Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Qais al-Khazali, Hadi al-Ameri, Akram al-Kaabi, Sami al-Masouri, and Abu Alaa al-Wila'I are shown meeting with Abadi, who did not hold such meetings or take such photos early in his tenure as premier.

The PMF and senior IRGC “advisors” like Qassim Suleimani played a lead role in the April 2015 anti-ISIS operation in Tikrit.¹³⁴ When Iraqi Shi’a militias began shelling civilian areas near Tikrit, the senior U.S. military officer in Iraq from 2013 to July 2015 Lt. Gen. Mick Bednarek stated “the Iraqi security forces had no clue. And Abadi had no idea...They didn’t seek his permission.”¹³⁵ The U.S. withheld its air support from the Tikrit operations until the PMF backed down, stung by their failure to secure Tikrit from ISIS. Yet the tense relationship between Abadi’s campaign plans and Iranian proxies’ campaign plans continued, and could be observed in places such as Fallujah and Tal Afar. Prime Minister Abadi lamented the PMF’s insubordination in June 2017, stating “The [PMF] have not implemented a plan by which they agreed to recapture the areas surrounding Tel Afar District where they were ordered to four months ago to cut off ISIS supplies from Syria.”¹³⁶

Iranian proxy forces in the PMF not only operate in a separate chain of command from the ISF, but in fact can command ISF units or dictate ISF actions with use of force. PMF commanders also have exercised near wholesale control of components of the ISF. Iranian proxy Hadi al-Ameri has been seen leading the 5th Army Division Commander and others in prayer¹³⁷ and advising on military maneuvers over a map.¹³⁸ Picture intelligence suggests Hadi al-Ameri is commanding what appear to be ISF officers at the Bai Hasan oil field after ISF and PMF forces assumed control of it in October 2017. Ameri is also seen in a commanding position with an ERD officer walking next to him.¹³⁹ PMF Deputy Chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis has been seen in the center of a group of ISF officers, including the commander of the ERD Thamir al-Husseini, greeting the commander of the 3rd PMF brigade of Asad Amerli, Abu Turab al-Tamimi.¹⁴⁰ Iraqi Shi’a militias operating in Basra City expelled units from the 9th IA Armored Division deployed by Prime

Minister Abadi to suppress crime and tribal violence in the province in January 2016.¹⁴¹ Finally, PMF do not abide by the same military standards and practices as the ISF often upholds, despite claims to be subordinate to Iraqi law, often engaging in intimidation of and vindictive attacks against Sunni Arabs.¹⁴²

Top PMF commanders Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Hadi al-Ameri have also both acknowledged the PMF's dependence on Iran rather than the government of Iraq. Muhandis has stated "It's no secret" that he seeks guidance from Iran's leadership and that the PMF gets material support from Tehran.¹⁴³ He further stated the "Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police say they cannot operate without the support of the *Hashed*," using a shortened Arabic word referring to the PMF.¹⁴⁴ Hadi al-Ameri has gone further, stating "If it wasn't for Iran's support, Iraq would have fallen into the hands of the Islamic State...We had a real issue with weapons, preparation. When the battle started, the army and the police didn't even have ammunition...The volunteer forces are the main force defending Iraq. The international coalition is there but we can't see any impact at all. It's like an anesthetic for the government, which makes them think it will lead to Iraq's freedom. If we get rid of this anesthetic and believe that we can liberate our country ourselves, I don't believe it would take longer than a year to do it...This experience has proved to the state that it needs another force."¹⁴⁵

The PMC heads deliberately obscure the PMF subordination to Iranian leaders through public statements regarding subordination to Prime Minister Abadi. Top

PMF commanders frequently state the PMC is subordinate to Prime Minister Abadi and exists at the will of the Iraqi government. *De facto* commander of the PMF Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis has described the PMF's relationship with Abadi as "soldiers with a commander,"¹⁴⁶ The PMC Chairman has stated the PMF serve "...under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,"¹⁴⁷ and spokesperson for Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq Naim al-Aboudi has stated the PMC belongs "to the Iraqi government,"¹⁴⁸ to cite several examples. The PMC has released visualizations of a chain of command

that does not reach up to Prime Minister Abadi, but does place the Chairman of the PMC and Iraqi National Security Advisor Faleh al-Fayadh as the lead commander.¹⁴⁹



LEFT: An official PMF infographic on the organization's structure, originally posted on the PMC's Ideological Directorate website.¹⁵⁰ From top to bottom and left to right, the text of the infographic reads: Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Commission; Deputy Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Commission; Logistics Support Directorate, Operations Directorate, Planning Directorate, Financial Directorate, Administrative Directorate, General Inspections Directorate; Training Directorate, Medical Directorate, Religious Guidance Directorate, Media Directorate, Martyrs and Injured Directorate, Scouts Directorate, Central Security Directorate, Communications Directorate, Military Engineering Directorate, Intelligence Directorate; Tank Companies, Anti-Tank Companies, Artillery Companies; Popular Mobilization Brigades. This infographic pre-dates the Aviation Directorate, formed in 2017 to coordinate between the Popular Mobilization Forces, Iraqi Army Aviation, and Iraqi Air Forces.

The PMF has also obscured its real chain of command by using a numerical ranking system akin to that of the IA in order to increase the veneer of professionalism and integration into the IA, as few Iraqi media outlets are able or choose to define a unit as belonging to the IA or the PMF.¹⁵¹ Conscious of significant, overt evidence for the PMF's subordination to Iranian leaders, the PMC's Media Directorate has gone so far as to release media in which PMF soldiers recount allegiance to the Iraq government and upholding the country's laws and values.¹⁵²

The PMF is not subordinate to the ISF, but it does coordinate many activities. Many ISF units in Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din Provinces are coordinating with Iranian-backed Shi'a PMF units to clear or hold terrain as of November 2017, as ISF and PMF units jointly swept up formerly Kurdish-held terrain in October 2017 following the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum in September 2017.¹⁵³ The PMC media directorate published photos of Combined JOC Director, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Lt. Gen. Abdul-Amir Rashid Yarallah, CTS Commander and JOC Field Commander Lt. Gen. Abdul-Ghani al-Asadi, and PMC Deputy Chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis sitting together, reportedly near al-Qaim, to "oversee operations" on October 27, 2017.¹⁵⁴ Lt. Gen. Yarallah has also coordinated with unofficial PMF Field Commander Hadi al-Ameri and ERD Commander Thamir al-Husseini.¹⁵⁵ Coordination is not always smooth, as ISF and PMF units do clash occasionally.¹⁵⁶ Coordination which produces images of horizontal communication also obscures the formalities of hierarchical command and control.

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces: Haidar al-Abadi. The PMC and Iranian proxy militia leaders insist Prime Minister Abadi, in his capacity as the head of all security forces in Iraq, commands the PMF. Iranian proxy militia leaders who are responsive to Iran play at least an equally important role in commanding and controlling the PMF in reality.

Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Commission: Faleh al-Fayadh (Dawa Party). Fayadh, the National Security Adviser, is a pro-Iranian Dawa Party figure

who is believed to maintain good relations with the U.S and the Arab states in the region. Maliki appointed Fayadh as the head of the PMF when it formed in 2014. Abadi kept him in his position as a counterweight to the Iranian proxy PMF operations commanders such as Muhandis and Ameri. Fayadh's appointment also allows Abadi to balance against the Maliki wing of his own party, as Fayadh is a close ally of the Foreign Affairs Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. Although Fayadh, who has very minimal media appearances, is nominally the top official, Muhandis leads the *de facto* hierarchy of the PMF as he oversees the operational, administrative, and financial dynamics within the force.

Deputy Chairman of the Popular Mobilization Commission: Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (Kata'ib Hezbollah [KH]) is the U.S.-designated terrorist serving as the functional head of the PMF, answering to the IRGC - Quds Force.

Assistant Chairman of the Population Mobilization Commission: Thamir al-Tamimi (Badr Organization). Tamimi is a representative of the Badr Organization and an assistant to Muhandis.

Deputy Chairman of the Popular Mobilization for Administrative and Provisional Matters: Lt. Gen. Mohsen al-Kaabi. Prime Minister Abadi appointed Kaabi, a former ISF senior officer, on February 17, 2016 as co-deputy chairman in charge of the PMF's finances and monitoring all PMF institutions.¹⁵⁷ Muhandis was reportedly put in charge of military operations.¹⁵⁸ Kaabi's appointment led to speculation that Prime Minister Abadi was attempting to oust Muhandis from his position. Pro-Iranian media circulated false reports that Kaabi immediately resigned in a blatant attempt to pressure Kaabi into leaving his post. Muhandis successfully sidelined Kaabi, who dropped out of the news cycle shortly after his appointment. Muhandis continues to represent the face of the force and is intimately involved in both the administrative and military operations of the force.

Chief of Staff: Sadiq al-Saadawi. Saadawi is a Badr Organization member. He joined the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq war.¹⁵⁹

PMC Central Administration Director: Majid Rahim Saleh al-Wasiti. The PMC Central Administration is the body responsible for the administrative affairs, including payroll, distribution of recruits, and martyrs affairs.¹⁶⁰

PMC Central Operations Director: Abu Muntadhir al-Husseini. The PMC Central Operations Directorate is likely responsible for overseeing the execution of PMF forward operations. His presence at meetings of senior proxy leaders suggests that he is a senior figure within the PMC and a key deputy to the PMC's field commanders.

Field Commander: Hadi al-Ameri. Media formally refers to Ameri as the “secretary general” of the Badr Organization, and he does not have a formal title within the PMC leadership. Ameri, in addition to overseeing the DOC's operations on top of its formal chain of command, is the top field commander of the PMF alongside Muhandis and may have a role in commanding PMF elements outside of the Badr Organization. He is often present on the front lines and plays an integral role in major clearing operations in a way that distinguishes him from other senior leaders such as Qais al-Khazali.

Directorates

Muhandis is the deputy-chairman of the PMC, and supervises directorates that manage administrative affairs. Iranian proxy militia leaders likely maintain independent access to PMC combat support and service support capabilities, such as ambulances, engineering, and intelligence.¹⁶¹ PMC directorate personnel deliberately obscure the militias with which they are affiliated as part of the PMC's transition to an independent and professional military force with the legal backing to pursue Iranian interests in both Iraq and the region.¹⁶² All PMC directorate leaders are assessed to be affiliated with Iranian proxy militias either by membership or by willing collaboration with them.

Administrative Directorate: Majid Rahim Saleh al-Wasiti. The PMC Central Administration is responsible for the administrative affairs, including payroll, distribution of recruits, and managing elements of “martyrs' affairs.”¹⁶³ The directorate

has tight control over operational expenses of the force without much input from the government. This has reportedly allowed Muhandis to focus resources, arms, and salaries, to the pro-Iranian factions creating tensions with Grand Ayatollah Sistani and Sadr-affiliated factions.¹⁶⁴ The PMC in collaboration with the MoI reportedly manage the recruitment process within the force, likely favoring the recruitment of pro-Iranian factions.¹⁶⁵ The Central Administration Directorate manages a range of issues from the issuance and modification of recruitment forms, medical examinations, and background and security checks, likely through the regional PMC directorates and governorates.¹⁶⁶

Aviation Directorate:¹⁶⁷ This directorate was formed in 2017 to coordinate between the PMF, Iraqi Army Aviation (IAA), and Iraqi Air Force (IAF). The directorate does not yet have any formal responsibilities, though PMF sources highlighted using IAA helicopters to medivac wounded PMF fighters.¹⁶⁸

Central Security Directorate:¹⁶⁹ Abu Zaynab al-Lami.¹⁷⁰ The Central Security Directorate provides internal security mechanisms and aims to prevent violations or criminal activities by PMF members.¹⁷¹ It is highly unlikely to be a well-resourced or important branch of the PMF, given its near-total absence of promotional materials.

Communications Directorate:¹⁷² Assad Malek al-Zabidi.¹⁷³ There is insufficient information available on the Communications Directorate's functions.

Financial Directorate:¹⁷⁴ Qassim Dahif.¹⁷⁵ The Financial Directorate presumably manages PMF finances.¹⁷⁶ It may be subordinate to the Central Administration Directorate.

General Inspections Directorate:¹⁷⁷ There is insufficient information openly available on the General Inspection Directorate's functions. Iraqi state inspectors most frequently handle corruption issues, so presumably the Directorate handles internal investigations. However, it is unclear as to how large, well-resourced, or important the Directorate is to the PMC leadership.

“High Committee of the PMC (for administrative and legal status of the PMC):” - Muhammad al-Ghabban. The High Committee does not have a formal name, but it drafts legislation to solidify the legal status of the PMF and pass PMF-related laws, including those setting salaries, pensions, and regulations.¹⁷⁸ The Committee head is Muhammad al-Ghabban, a senior Badr Organization member and the former Minister of the Interior.¹⁷⁹

Intelligence Directorate:¹⁸⁰ The Intelligence Directorate manages the rudimentary intelligence capabilities of the PMF, including signals intelligence and drone surveillance.¹⁸¹

Logistics Support Directorate:¹⁸² Abu Hawra’ al-Ahmedi.¹⁸³ The PMF logistics wing is responsible for resupplying the PMF with food, water, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies. It manages fleets of trucks, some of which may be contracted private trucks, to transport supplies and on occasion IDPs.¹⁸⁴

Martyrs and Injured Directorate:¹⁸⁵ Ibrahim al-Quraishi.¹⁸⁶ The Martyrs and Injured Directorate handles the affairs of PMF fighters killed or wounded during battle.¹⁸⁷ It distributes financial assistance and support for deceased fighters’ families, such as rebuilding their homes.¹⁸⁸

Media Directorate:¹⁸⁹ Mihnad al-Aqabi.¹⁹⁰ The Media Directorate operates the War Media Team, the official PMF media outlet.¹⁹¹ It centralizes PMF reporting and communications, produces graphics and infographics, and manages PMF war correspondents and photographers. Individual militias also operate their own media and social media outlets separately, however.

Medical Directorate:¹⁹² Dr. Ali al-Khafaf.¹⁹³ The Medical Directorate manages the care and rehabilitation of wounded PMF fighters and FP members.¹⁹⁴ It also manages the deployment and maintenance of a standardized fleet of ambulances for PMF fighters that accompany the PMF during forward operations.¹⁹⁵ PMF medical staff are largely based in major hospitals and use advanced medical equipment.¹⁹⁶ It is likely that they co-opted or commandeered civilian hospital capabilities for their own purposes in addition to medical services already provided by the state to the force.¹⁹⁷ Picture intelligence suggests the

PMF have forward medical teams in field hospitals to care for PMF fighters.¹⁹⁸ The Medical Directorate organizes blood drives, sets up emergency hospitals for IDPs, and coordinates with IA medical staff, in some cases using IAA helicopters.¹⁹⁹

Military Engineering Directorate:²⁰⁰ Zulfikar al-Ardhi.²⁰¹ PMF Engineers erect headquarters, build trench and berm systems, maintain bulldozers used for construction and IED clearing, conduct construction tasks, and disarm IEDs.²⁰² Individual militias also maintain their own engineering units that disarm IEDs as well, however, so this capability may not be fully centralized.²⁰³

Operations Directorate:²⁰⁴ Abu Muntadhir al-Husseini.²⁰⁵ The Operations Directorate is likely responsible for overseeing the execution of forward operations. Directorate personnel oversee the readiness of forward-deployed PMF units and their positions during regular tours alongside senior PMF leaders like Hadi al-Ameri.²⁰⁶ Husseini is likely a senior Iranian proxy leader, given his presence alongside other proxy leaders during major meetings such as an October 2016 meeting between the PMF leadership and Sadr in Najaf.²⁰⁷

Planning Directorate:²⁰⁸ Haidar al-Furaiji.²⁰⁹ There is insufficient information openly available on the Planning Directorate’s functions.

Religious Guidance Directorate:²¹⁰ There is insufficient information openly available on the Religious Guidance Directorate’s functions.

Scouts Directorate:²¹¹ Abu Aqil (Abdul-Rahman) al-Kadhimi.²¹² The PMF Scouts unit is a youth organization designed to give military training and cultural courses to students and youth volunteers.²¹³ The Directorate also organizes youth events and summer courses for students.²¹⁴

Training Directorate:²¹⁵ Abu Bilal al-Jabiri.²¹⁶ The Training Directorate reportedly oversees training camps for PMF fighters, providing them training on subjects such as weapons usage, intelligence, and military engineering.²¹⁷ It is unclear how much of this is centralized, as militias usually operate their own training camps. Iranian proxy militias operate their training camps in Syria that the PMC cannot

monitor.²¹⁸ The Directorate may standardize some elements of training or run basic training courses for new PMF recruits, but the delineation of responsibilities and their execution remains unclear.

Regional Committees

PMC Regional Committees are smaller components of the Central Administration that deal with provincial-level administrative issues. The regional committees handle martyrdom benefits, local-level logistics, and civil society outreach. The placement of smaller militia leaders and non-proxy figures to regional committee, rather than directorate level positions, suggests a direct relationship between militia strength and political capital within the PMC organization. It therefore follows that smaller militias are more dependent on large proxy forces for regional resource distribution and political support.

Anbar: Rashid Fleih.²¹⁹ Fleih is a former 7th IA Division, SOC, and AOC leader appointed under former PM Nouri al-Maliki.²²⁰

Babil: Hassan Fadaam al-Janabi.²²¹ Janabi is also the deputy chairman of the Babil Provincial Council and a leader in ISCI-affiliated Saraya al-Jihad. Janabi became the deputy chairman of the Provincial Council on May 28, 2015 as a member of the Mowatin Bloc.²²²

Basra: Ammar Faris Matouq al-Jaafari / Abu Yasser.²²³ Abu Yasser al-Jaafari assumed this role on July 26, 2015 after the former leader, a Badr Organization official, died in July 2015. Abu Yasser, prior to his promotion, was the Assistant Director for PMC in Basra and is also a member of the Badr Organization.²²⁴

Dhi Qar: Abu Da' al-Shatri.²²⁵ Shatri assumed his position around November 2015 and appears to have been a fighter previously.²²⁶ Shatri likely remains a commander of the Badr Organization military wing in Dhi Qar Province.²²⁷

Diwaniyah: Ahmed al-Awadi.²²⁸ Awadi is a member of the Badr Organization.²²⁹

Diyala: Faraj al-Maghmas.²³⁰ Maghmas was a leader in Liwa al-Mukhtar al-Thaqafi, a small Diyala-based

militia.²³¹ Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri's role as the head of Diyala security renders this position inert.

Karbala: Hussein Ismail Khalil.²³³ Khalil may be affiliated with Liwa Ali al-Akbar, a militia associated with the Hawza, Iraq's indigenous Shi'ite clerical establishment.²³⁴

Kirkuk: Unknown. The Kirkuk PMC regional office head does not give his name, but he is affiliated with Turkmen militias and may be related to the Kirkuk PMF spokesperson Ali al-Husseini.²³⁵

Maysan: Haidar Jabar al-Baidhani.²³⁶ Baidhani is likely a member of Liwa Ansar Allah al-Awfiyah, a Maysan-based pro-Iranian militia.²³⁷

Muthanna: Ahmed al-Hassani.²³⁸ Hassani is likely a member of the Badr Organization.²³⁹

Salah al-Din: Asham Sabhan al-Jubouri.²⁴⁰ Sabhan is the commander of Liwa Salah al-Din, a Sunni tribal fighter formation based in Salah al-Din Province that works closely with Iranian proxy militias in eastern Salah al-Din.²⁴¹

Najaf: Karim al-Khaqani.²⁴² Khaqani is the commander of Firqat al-Imam Ali al-Qitaliyah, a Hawza militia.²⁴³

Ninewa: Luwais Yusuf Ashaq Yusuf. Yusuf is a Christian figure who may have defected from Atheel al-Nujaifi's Ninewa Guards militia.²⁴⁴

Wasit: Jaafar al-Safi.²⁴⁵ Safi is possibly affiliated with Kata'ib Jund al-Imam.²⁴⁶

Iranian Proxy Militias

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi'a militias act as armed proxies of the Iranian regime acting under the direction of the IRGC-Quds Force. Iranian proxies are generally the most capable militias active inside of Iraq. Iranian proxy militias operate independent of one another. Each unit is led by a secretary general with subordinate commanders, and each unit operates its own battalions with fighters who self-identify as members of the militia and openly display its logos. The PMC masks militia identity by assigning unit numbers to many of them.²⁴⁷

Badr Organization – Hadi al-Ameri

Iran formed the Badr Brigade during the Iran-Iraq War in 1983 to fight Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime. The Badr Organization was the armed wing of a Shi'a political party that Iran had protected during the Saddam era, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, led by the prominent cleric Ayatollah Abdul Aziz al-Hakim until his death. The Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq used the Badr Organization to capture Iraqi security institutions when the U.S. and the Iraqi government co-opted its units wholesale into the MoI in 2005.²⁴⁸ The party renamed itself the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in June 2007.

Hadi al-Ameri broke the Badr Organization from ISCI in 2012, fracturing ISCI's parliamentary bloc.²⁴⁹ Ameri, a prominent figure within the ISCI party, was reportedly angered by the selection of the then inexperienced Ammar al-Hakim as the leader of ISCI following the death of Hakim's father in 2009. Hakim began reorienting the council away from Iran and closer to the leadership of Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who leads a "quietist" and non-politicized Shi'a tradition. Ameri disagreed with this shift as a supporter of Vilayat al-Faqih, an ideology that accords full political and religious authority to Iran's Supreme Leader, and prompted the split. The Badr Organization dedicated time and resources to augmenting Iranian efforts to support the Bashar al-Assad regime's campaign to crush the Syrian opposition. It allowed Iranian resources to pass through Iraqi airspace and airports, which its leader Hadi al-Ameri regulated as Minister of Transportation, a position he held from 2010 to 2014.²⁵⁰

The Badr Organization is one of the largest components of the PMF and remains a loyal Iranian proxy. It frequently operates alongside FP units and the ERD. The organization's fighters are active inside of Syria as evidenced by videos portraying the return of its fighters killed in pro-Assad operations to Iraq for burial.²⁵¹ Badr formed a Syrian expeditionary force of 1,500 fighters named Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr to fight in support of the Syrian regime along with the expeditionary forces of other Iraqi militias in 2013.²⁵² The organization was

likely involved in the Syrian war earlier by sending fighters along with other Iraq militias, particularly Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada.²⁵³

Badr 1st Brigade (Liwa al-Imam Muhammad al-Jawad) – Abu Jinan al-Basri²⁵⁴

- Tel Safuq, Iraq-Syrian border, Ninewa Province [as of July 7, 2017]
- Iraq-Syria Border west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 1, 2017]
- Qayrawan, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of May 25, 2017]
- Badush, northwest of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of May 16, 2017]
- Alas and Ajil Oil Fields, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 10, 2017]
- Hamrin Mountains, northeast Salah al-Din Province [as of May 9, 2017]
- Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 22, 2016]
- Dujail, southeast of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 23, 2016]

Badr 3rd Brigade (Special Tasks – Lions of Amerli Formation) – Hajj Abu Turab²⁵⁵

- Tel Safuq, Iraq-Syria border, Ninewa Province [as of July 7, 2017]
- Qayrawan, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of May 22, 2017]
- West of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of December 21, 2016]
- "Baghdad Belts" in vicinity of Baghdad [as of May 1, 2016]
- Diyala Province [as of January 22, 2015]

Badr 4th Brigade – Abu Hana al-Kinani²⁵⁶

- Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 9, 2017]
- Hamam al-Alil in vicinity of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of December 4, 2016]
- "Baghdad Belts" in vicinity of Baghdad [as of May 1, 2016]

Badr 5th Brigade – Abu Dargham al-Maturi²⁵⁷

- South of Sinjar, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 1, 2017]
- West of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of March 28, 2017]

- Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 24, 2016]
- “Baghdad Belts” in vicinity of Baghdad [as of May 1, 2016]
- Albu Shajal, west of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of February 14, 2016]
- Hamrin Mountains, likely northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 19, 2016]

Badr 9th Brigade (Liwa Karbala) – Abu Sadiq al-Hali²⁵⁸

- Iraq-Syria Border west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of June 5, 2017]
- “East Diyala Operations command” for Hawija operations, likely in northern Diyala Province [as of March 29, 2017]
- Al-Dour, south of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 11, 2017]
- Tel Afar Airport, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of November 16, 2016]
- “Albu Dalaf,” Salah al-Din Province [as of February 25, 2016]
- Jurf al-Sakhr, north of Hilla, Babil Province [as of February 23, 2016]

Badr 10th Brigade – “Special Force” – Abu Huda al-Saadi,²⁵⁹ formerly Abu Taha al-Nasiri²⁶⁰

- Tel Safuq, Iraq-Syria border, Ninewa Province [as of June 7, 2017]
- Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of March 27, 2017]
- Eastern Diyala Province [as of January 12, 2017]
- Possibly Mtaibijah, northwest of Baqubah, Diyala Province [as of December 31, 2016]
- Fallujah operations, Anbar Province [as of June 30, 2016]
- “Baghdad Belts” in vicinity of Baghdad [as of May 1, 2016]
- Possibly al-Zirai neighborhood in vicinity of Tuz Khurmatu, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 25, 2016]
- Damascus, Syria [as of April 2, 2016]
- Makhoul mountains, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of February 15, 2016]
- Muqdadayah, Diyala Province [as of January 26, 2016]

Badr 16th Brigade Turkmen Force – Abu Thaer al-Bashiri²⁶¹

- Al-Kata, southwest of Hawija, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 21, 2017]
- Hajirat, in vicinity of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of November 28, 2016]
- Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 6, 2016]
- Bashir, southwest of Kirkuk, Kirkuk Province [as of May 8, 2016]

Badr 21st Brigade – Khudair al-Matruhi,²⁶² Diwanayah branch Secretary General²⁶³

- Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of December 18, 2016]
- Hamrin Mountains, northern Diyala Province [as of July 26, 2016]
- “Baghdad Belts” in vicinity of Baghdad [as of May 1, 2016]
- Meeting with SDOC commander and Hadi al-Ameri [as of April 9, 2016]
- Dujail, southeast of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 9, 2016]
- Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 9, 2016]
- Alas and Ajil oil fields, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 28, 2016]

Badr 22nd Brigade – Karim Ulaiwi Jahoush al-Muhammadawi,²⁶⁴ Badr commander of Maysan²⁶⁵

- Qahtaniyah, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of June 1, 2017]
- North of Baghdad [as of May 13, 2017]
- Alas and Ajil Oil Fields, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 11, 2017]

Badr 23rd Brigade – Ali Salim al-Anbaki²⁶⁶

- West of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of May 31, 2017]
- Safra, near Udham, north of Baqubah, Diyala Province [as of May 13, 2017]
- Mtaibijah, northwest of Baqubah, Diyala Province [as of April 26, 2017]
- Alas and Ajil oil fields, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 24, 2016]

Badr 24th Brigade – Mahdi Zayni al-Tamimi²⁶⁷

- Naft Khana, east of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of January 19, 2017]
- Hamrin Mountains, northern Diyala Province [as of January 4, 2017]
- Mansouriyah, Muqdadiah, Qara Tapa, Hamrin Dam, northeast of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of December 7, 2016]
- Hamrin Dam, Diyala Province [as of December 7, 2016]
- Qara Tapa, Diyala Province [as of December 7, 2016]
- Muqdadiah, northeast of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of January 7, 2016]

Badr 27th Brigade – Abu Ahmed al-Talibawi²⁶⁸

- Eastern Anbar Province [as of April 4, 2017]
- West of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of March 18, 2017]
- Tel al-Kurd, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of February 18, 2017]

Badr 30th Brigade – Shabak and Turkmen Forces

- Iraq-Syria border, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 12, 2017]
- Southwest of Baaj, Ninewa Province [as of June 5, 2017]

Badr 52nd Brigade – Mahdi Taqi al-Amirli²⁶⁹

- Tuz Khurmatu and Amerli, eastern Salah al-Din Province [as of May 22, 2017]
- Udham Dam, north of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of February 16, 2017]
- Tel Kasiba, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 30, 2017]
- Al-Dour southeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 30, 2017]
- Al-Jilam, east Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 30, 2017]
- Mtaibija, northwest of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of January 3, 2017]
- Hajirat, near Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of November 28, 2016]
- Shirqat, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of October 30, 2016]
- Jisr al-Sarha, south of Amerli, northern Diyala Province [as of September 15, 2016]

Badr 55th Brigade – Liwa Malik al-Ashtar²⁷⁰

- Special Tasks²⁷¹ – leader unknown
- Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 17, 2016]
- Garma, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of April 20, 2015]

Badr 110th Brigade – formerly Haidar Ali al-Haidari,²⁷² current leader unknown

- Saadiyah, northeast of Muqdadiah, Diyala Province [as of March 29, 2017]
- Naft Khana-Khanaqin Road, eastern Diyala Province [as of October 1, 2016]
- Naft Khana, eastern Diyala Province [as of September 30, 2016]

Harakat al-Nujaba – 12th PMF Brigade²⁷³ – Akram al-Kaabi

Harakat al-Nujaba is the most prominent Iraqi Shi'a militia in Syria. Its leader, Akram al-Kaabi, was a close associate of Qais al-Khazali, who split from the Sadrist Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and formed Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) in 2006. The newly-formed militia conducted attacks on Coalition forces from the summer of 2006 until Coalition forces arrested Khazali. Kaabi led the militia in Khazali's absence, expanding its political, social, and religious activities to secure increased influence in Iraq.²⁷⁴ Kaabi left AAH following the U.S withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 to complete his religious studies.²⁷⁵ He founded the Harakat al-Nujaba in 2013 in conjunction with Iranian efforts to support the Syrian regime. The movement has since actively pursued Iranian interests in both the Syrian and Iraqi theaters.

Harakat al-Nujaba's March 10, 2017 announcement that it would form a "Golan Heights Brigade" aimed at securing the Golan Heights from Israel demonstrates that it operates in support of Iran's regional objectives, not Iraqi government objectives.²⁷⁶ Signs of Akram al-Kaabi's rising profile include television interviews in Iran and meetings with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Harakat al-Nujaba officials also meet with Syrian parliamentary and religious figures as well as senior Iranian proxy militias like Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis regularly.²⁷⁷

- Um al-Rahil, Abu Khachba, Barakt al-Miyah, near al-Tanaf, Syria [as of July 12, 2017]
- Possibly Daraa, south of Damascus, Syria [as of May 31, 2017]
- Halfiyah, northwest of Hama, Syria [as of April 16, 2017]
- Suwaydah, Syria [as of March 17, 2017]
- Matih Abyad, northeast of Aleppo, Syria [as of March 8, 2017]
- Kweris Air Base, south of Aleppo, Syria [as of February 4, 2017]
- Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 2, 2017]
- Aleppo, Syria [as of December 18, 2016]
- West of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of October 31, 2016]
- Qamishli Airport, Syria [January 23, 2016]
- Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of February 17, 2015]

Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH) – 45th PMF Brigade²⁷⁸ – Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis

KH is one of the most lethal Iranian proxy Shi'a militias, and it operates in both Iraq and Syria. It keeps its activities largely secret whenever possible. Iran has likely retained a core element of KH's armed members separate from the wider PMF apparatus as an asset to carry out terrorist and criminal activities. The militia, which was designated by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2009 as a terrorist organization, participated in multiple rocket-propelled grenade and improvised rocket-assisted mortar (IRAM) attacks against U.S. forces between 2007 and 2008. Its members have received weapons training and funding from Iran.²⁷⁹ It is linked to high-profile criminal and terrorist activities, such as the kidnapping of Qatari royals in December 2015.²⁸⁰

KH does not have an active political wing, but its media apparatus has grown more vocal in supporting the PMF's participation in the political process, suggesting it may start an independent political party.²⁸¹ Vice President Nouri al-Maliki met with KH members on May 18, 2017, suggesting Maliki is courting the most hardcore of the proxy militias for

his own political purposes.²⁸² KH is a smaller force than other proxies, consistent with its secret and elite profile. It has access to MIAI tanks, however is otherwise a light infantry force with technical vehicles, Armored Personnel Carriers, and Humvees.²⁸³

- Rutba, Anbar Province [as of July 5, 2017]
- Al-Walid, western Anbar Province [as of June 21, 2017]
- Al-Tanaf, Syria [as of May 31, 2017]
- Iraq-Syria, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of February 19, 2017]
- South of Aleppo, Syria [as of February 11, 2016]
- Jurf al-Sakhr, north of Hilla, Babil Province [as of December 11, 2016]
- Jazeera Khalidiyah, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of August 20, 2016]
- Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 23, 2016]
- Amiriyat al-Fallujah, south of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 15, 2016]
- Borders of Karbala, Karbala Province [as of May 8, 2016]
- Palmyra, Syria [as of July 23, 2016]
- Thar Thar, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of March 2, 2016]
- Iraq-Saudi Arabia Border, southwest of Karbala [as of February 10, 2016]
- Tuz Khurmatu, east of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 18, 2016]
- Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 16, 2016]
- Eastern Baghdad [as of September 4, 2015]
- Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of March 31, 2015]
- Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of February 6, 2015]
- Al-Hayakil, near Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of January 30, 2015]
- Shula, north of Baghdad [as of May 27, 2015]
- Balad, southeast of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 2, 2014]
- Amerli and Suleiman Beg, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 1, 2014]

Saraya al-Difaa al-Shaabi (SaDaSh) – 46th PMF Brigade, 47th PMF Brigade²⁸⁴

Saraya al-Difaa al-Shaabi is a lesser wing of KH, which likely formed to absorb an overflow of recruits without diluting the most capable combat units. SaDaSh members are buried with funeral ceremonies as if they are KH members in KH flag-draped coffins.²⁸⁵ Actual KH members have no SaDaSh logos on their funeral posters.²⁸⁶

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) – Qais al-Khazali

- 41st PMF Brigade²⁸⁷
- 42nd PMF Brigade (Abu Musa al-Amiri Brigade)²⁸⁸
- 43rd PMF Brigade (Saba' al-Dujail-“Dujail Lions”)²⁸⁹

AAH is a lethal Iraqi Shi'a militia and one of Iran's most potent proxies inside of Iraq and Syria. AAH was one of the original “Special Groups” formed from the Mahdi Army along with KH. AAH leader Qais al-Khazali, whom U.S. forces detained from 2007 to 2009 for orchestrating the kidnapping and death of five American soldiers, styles himself a political leader and frequently voices hardliner positions on Iraqi politics. AAH's political party, al-Sadiqoun Bloc, has one seat in Iraq's parliament. Khazali will likely seek to expand AAH's representation in Iraq's southern provinces based on its participation in anti-ISIS operations.

- Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 16, 2017]
- Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 8, 2017]
- Rutba, Anbar Province [as of July 5, 2017]
- Tuz Khurmatu, east of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 8, 2017]
- Near Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 7, 2017]
- Southeast of al-Baaj District, Ninewa Province [as of June 3, 2017]
- Al-Qayrawan, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province (41st) [as of May 29, 2017]
- Balad District, southeast of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province (43rd) [as of May 25, 2017]
- Al-Hadar District, Ninewa Province [as of April 29, 2017]

- Eastern Ghouta, near Damascus, Syria [as of March 30, 2017]
- Garma and Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of March 23, 2017]
- Near Aleppo, Syria [as of March 23, 2017]
- Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of March 17, 2017]
- Jazirat Samarra, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of March 16, 2017]
- Lake Tharthar, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of March 2, 2017]
- Siniyah and al-Hajaj, near Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of March 9, 2017]
- Sayyida Zaynab Shrine, Damascus, Syria [as of December 27, 2016]
- Al-Aziziyah, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 29, 2017]
- Tel Abtah, south of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of January 20, 2017]
- Desert west of Najaf, Najaf Province [as of January 1, 2017]
- Jazirat al-Khalidiyah, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of September 27, 2016]
- “Baghdad Belts” [as of September 7, 2016]
- Hama, Syria [as of September 22, 2016]
- Shirqat, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 22, 2016]
- Al-Muqdadadiyah, northeast of Baquba, Diyala Province [as of June 10, 2016]
- Sayyid Gharib, southeast of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 22, 2015]
- Alas and Ajil oil fields, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of March 10, 2015]
- Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of February 26, 2015]
- Hamrin, northeast of Muqdadadiyah, Diyala Province [as of November 28, 2014]
- South of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of November 20, 2014]
- Hamrin Mountains, northeast of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of November 5, 2014]
- Jurf al-Sakhar, southwest of Baghdad [as of October 31, 2014]
- Udhaim, northwest of Baqubah, Diyala Province [as of October 21, 2014]
- Amerli and Suleiman Beg, Salah al-Din Province [September 1, 2014]

“Iraqi Syrian Battalions” / “Syrian Hezbollah” Units

“Iraqi Syrian Battalions” is a generic term used to refer to Iraqi Shi’a militias other than the established Iranian proxy militias formed to fight in Syria. Iraqi Syrian battalions tend to be small and pro-Iranian. Images from their headquarters often display Syrian Arab Republic flags, images of Assad regime commanders, and images of Iranian leaders. They may rotate between Iraq and Syria. Some Iraqi Syrian battalions, such as Kata’ib A’ima al-Baqiyah, report infrequently and may have disbanded or been integrated into larger militias.

Kata’ib al-Sabiroun – No PMF Number – Leader unknown

Kata’ib al-Sabaroun is a small unit judging from training and muster images.²⁹⁰ They identify as Iraqi but clearly operate inside of Syria, style themselves after KH, and have adopted Iranian leaders as their religious authorities.²⁹¹ Their initial logo was almost a direct copy of the IRGC logo, but was later transformed into one more reflective of KH.²⁹²

- South of Aleppo, Syria [as of March 10, 2017]
- Aleppo, Syria [as of February 27, 2017]
- Northern Latakia, Syria [as of December 1, 2016]

Quwat Asad Allah al-Ghalib – No PMF Number – Abdullah al-Sheibani²⁹³

The militia has close links with another “Iraqi Syrian Battalion,” Liwa Zulfiqar, and is either linked to or intentionally mimics KH.²⁹⁴ Members move back and forth between Iraq and Syria, including sending their wounded to Iraq, but do all of their fighting inside of Syria.²⁹⁵ Members meet with Syrian and Iranian leaders, likely in Iraq, including a representative for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.²⁹⁶ Sheibani has a PMF flag in his office but otherwise it is almost impossible to tell that it is an Iraqi unit, given the fact that the present images are a Syrian Arab Republic flag, militia flags, and images of Khamenei and Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the post-1979 Iranian regime.²⁹⁷

- Charged with protecting Sayyida Zeinab shrine near Damascus, Syria [as of June 7, 2017]

Faylaq Waad al-Sadiq²⁹⁸ – No PMF Number – Muhammad Hamza al-Tamimi²⁹⁹

Falaq Waad al-Sadiq is a staunchly pro-Iranian militia with reverence for Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.³⁰⁰ It alternately has described itself as the 3rd Brigade, a Badr unit, and the 43rd Brigade, an AAH unit.³⁰¹ It was present inside of Ramadi’s al-Sufiyah area, east of Ramadi, in 2017 clearing IEDs, as well as briefly inside of the city limits since 2016.³⁰² Other Iraqi Shi’a militias have largely stayed away from Ramadi. Its members engaged in a gun battle with Ramadi police and likely were forced to withdraw.³⁰³ It previously had been more active in Syria than Iraq and likely redeployed in some capacity.³⁰⁴

- Garma, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of February 24, 2017]
- “Borders of Hawija,” likely northeastern Salah al-Din Province and possibly near Kirkuk, Kirkuk Province [as of February 1, 2017]
- Al-Sufiyah, east of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of April 7, 2017]
- Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad [as of February 28, 2016]

Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein³⁰⁵ – No PMF Number – Asaad al-Bahadali³⁰⁶

- Qaboun, near Damascus, Syria [as of May 13, 2017]
- Harasta, near Damascus, Syria [as of April 26, 2017]

This pro-Iranian Sadrist group supports Assad regime operations and identifies itself as a component of the “Islamic Resistance,” a self-designation used by pro-Iranian forces.³⁰⁷ Sadrist militias are active inside of Syria but tend to be smaller and largely confined to the Sayyida Zeinab neighborhood and Damascus, rarely venturing outside of the city. Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr most likely does not control these formations, which should be considered splinters.

Lesser Proxies

Liwa al-Hussein – 53rd PMF Brigade,³⁰⁸ previously 77th Brigade³⁰⁹ – Sayyid Mukhtar

Liwa al-Hussein is a majority Shi'a Turkmen militia, but includes a minority Yazidi unit, the "Lalish Battalion."³¹⁰ It may be a component of the Badr Brigades.

- Kojo, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of May 15, 2017]
- Tel Afar Airport, south of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of January 29, 2017]
- Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of November 13, 2015]

Harakat al-Abdal – No PMF number – Abu Akram al-Majidi.³¹¹

Harakat al-Abdal is an Iranian proxy group that primarily draws its strength from Basra. It is small but has a presence in Syria. It is also active on the front lines of military operations and was the first group to reach the Iraq-Syria border during western Ninewa Province clearing operations.³¹² Its activities have largely been restricted to Garma, the western Baghdad Belts, and the southern Iraq-Syria border, likely because of small size and a manpower split between Iraq and Syria. Harakat al-Abdal is likely linked to Iranian proxy militia KH.

- Rutba, Anbar Province [as of July 4, 2017]
- Likely north of of al-Walid, western Anbar Province [as of June 20, 2017]
- Iraq-Syria border, eastern Syria [as of May 29, 2017]
- Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 29, 2017]
- Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of February 24, 2017]
- Khalidiyah and 1070 Apartments, near Aleppo, Syria [as of September 2, 2016]
- Garma, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 15, 2016]
- Thar Thar basin, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of February 10, 2016]
- Eastern Husaybah, east of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of January 8, 2016]
- Sayyida Zeinab Shrine, near Damascus, Syria [as of January 1, 2016]

Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSAS) – 14th PMF Brigade – Abu Alaa al-Wala'i.³¹³

KSAS is an Iranian proxy militia formed to fight in Syria. Unlike many of the "Syrian Battalions," KSAS is a fully capable militia with members active in both Iraq and Syria in the vein of the Nujaba Movement, though on a smaller scale. Its most notable engagement was with an IA detachment in Basra in January 2016, when members of KSAS clashed with IA members at a checkpoint. The clash led PMF groups to band together and demand the expulsion of the IA force, which exited Basra Province later that month.³¹⁴

- Likely North of al-Walid, western Anbar Province [as of June 20, 2017]
- Tanaf, Syria [as of May 20, 2017]
- Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 10, 2017]
- Sayyida Zeinab Shrine, Syria [as of October 4, 2016]
- Aleppo, Syria [as of September 9, 2016]
- Palmyra, Syria [as of August 21, 2016]
- Near Homs, Syria [as of August 2, 2016]
- Khanasser, southeast of Aleppo, Syria [as of June 12, 2016]
- Baiji, north of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 14, 2016]
- Bashir, south of Kirkuk [as of May 1, 2016]
- Al-Maamir, west of Baghdad [as of April 14, 2016]

Qiyadat Quwat Abu Fadl al-Abbas (QQAFA) – No PMF number – Aws al-Khafaji.³¹⁵

Khafaji founded the small pro-Iranian militia of Qiyadat Quwat Abu Fadl al-Abbas in 2015 after a split within the Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, which he also founded in 2012 to be one of the first conglomerations of Iraqi Shi'a militiamen active in Syria.³¹⁶ Khafaji was the former head of Promised Day Brigade – the Sadrist successor to the JAM – before splitting from JAM after Sadr expelled him in 2010.³¹⁷ Khafaji has called for the execution of prisoners against the Iraqi government's wishes and has been effectively advocating for the ethnic cleansing of Fallujah.³¹⁸ He affirmed in June 2017 his readiness to run in the upcoming elections – in

violation of the PMC law – adding that “nobody can deny the PMF from entering the elections.”³¹⁹ It is likely that Khafaji is using his militia as a platform to enter Iraqi politics and to appeal to hardliner Iraqi Shi’a elements.

- Near Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 7, 2017]
- Western Karbala, Karbala Province [as of May 11, 2017]
- Karbala, Karbala Province [as of May 10, 2017]
- Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of November 6, 2016]
- Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 9, 2016]
- “Baghdad Belts” in vicinity of Baghdad [as of April 30, 2016]
- Jazeera Samarra, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of March 4, 2016]

Kata’ib Ansar al-Hojja (KAAH) – 29th PMF Brigade³²⁰ – Ahmed al-Furajji³²¹

Kata’ib Ansar al-Hojja is a pro-Iranian militia possibly with embedded Iranian advisers. It has close links with other proxy militias, including Saraya Talia al-Khorasani and Nujaba.³²² Maliki is courting its political and military support as well.³²³ A Dawa Party militia attempted to mimic Kata’ib Ansar al-Hojja by adopting almost identical names and logos, indicating Maliki’s early and failed attempts to mimic the success of the proxies and build his own militia base using Dawa Party loyalists.³²⁴ Maliki instead courts established militias rather than trying to build his own.

- Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of December 10, 2016]
- Baiji, north of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 24, 2016]
- Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 11, 2017]

Kata’ib al-Imam Ali (KAIA) – 40th PMF Brigade³²⁵ – Shibl al-Zaidi.³²⁶

Kata’ib al-Imam is a lethal Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia that operates in both Iraq and Syria. It models itself after the CTS, using black-painted Humvees. Its commander largely avoids media appearances and statements, suggesting he is more interested in operations than politics. KAIA is best known for being the militia of Abu Azrael, a celebrity Iraqi Shi’a militia fighter known for carrying a sword or an axe in battle and his popular catchphrase, “Ila al-Tahin,” which roughly translates into “nothing but flour,” meaning “you will be pulverized.”³²⁷

- South of al-Tanaf, Iraq-Syria border [as of July 21, 2017]
- Rutba, Anbar Province [as of July 5, 2017]
- Iraqi-Syrian border, Ninewa Province [as of May 31, 2017]
- Al-Qayrawan, northwestern Ninewa Province [as of May 25, 2017]
- Al-Tanaf, Syria [as of May 19, 2017]
- Al-Hadar District, southwest of Qayyarah, Ninewa Province [as of May 9, 2017]
- Tel Afar District, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of May 7, 2017]
- Hama, Syria [as of April 4, 2017]
- Damascus, Syria [as of March 13, 2017]
- Diyala Province [as of November 15, 2016]
- Aleppo, Syria [as of October 14, 2016]
- Al-Siniyah, near Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 6, 2016]
- Palmyra, Syria [as of July 23, 2016]
- Al-Saqlawiyah, Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 25, 2016]
- Karbala Province [as of May 24, 2016]
- Jazirat Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of March 5, 2016]



ABOVE: A PMF convoy, in a promotional video from the Iranian proxy militia *Kata'ib al-Imam Ali* in May 2016 during Fallujah operations.³²⁸ The PMF is a largely motorized force, making it adept at covering terrain quickly. The still shows, from left to right, typical vehicles that PMF units deploy in their operations, including a commandeered police technical, a Toyota Hilux pickup truck model popular among PMF units for its reliability to transport supplies and fighters, an ambulance to care for the wounded, and several Humvees. The video also shows buses to transport fighters, U.S.-made Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, trucks to transport ammunition and supplies, and flatbed trucks to transport armored vehicles and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) platforms, often surrounded by a fleet of repurposed civilian Sports Utility Vehicles and sedans. PMF units often deploy Iranian *Safir* light tactical vehicles with recoilless rifles and construction equipment as well, including armored bulldozers, though these are not shown in the video.

Saraya Talia al-Khorasani (STaK) – 18th PMF Brigade³²⁹ – Ali al-Yassiri,³³⁰ supported by Hamid al-Jaza'iri.³³¹

STaK, often referred to simply as Saraya al-Khorasani, is an Iranian proxy militia reportedly formed by now-deceased IRGC commander Hamid Taghavi.³³² It formed quickly after June 2014 with direct assistance from Iran.³³³ Its fighters have deployed to Syria, but its role in Iraq has been minor compared to the main proxy forces, as it is primarily tasked with holding the Hamrin Mountain ridge and southern Salah al-Din Province. STaK has a history of poor discipline, including gun battles with the police and the Peshmerga in Salah al-Din.³³⁴

- Hamrin Mountains, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 2, 2017]
- Al-Hadar District, southwest of Qayyarah, Ninewa Province [as of April 28, 2017]

- Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 20, 2017]
- Tel Abtah, Ninewa Province [as of December 29, 2016]
- Kirkuk, Kirkuk Province [as of November 27, 2016]
- Damascus Airport, near Damascus, Syria [as of November 11, 2016]
- Aleppo, Syria [as of November 11, 2016]
- Darayya, Syria [as of September 3, 2016]
- Al-Zarka bridge and Yankaja, near Tuz Khurmatu, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 22, 2016]
- Damascus, Syria [as of August 28, 2016]
- Amerli, near Tuz Khurmatu, eastern Salah al-Din Province [as of July 13, 2016]
- “Baghdad Belts” in vicinity of Baghdad and Baghdad [as of May 4, 2016]
- Al-Sadiyah, northeast of Muqdadiah, Diyala Province [as of March 26, 2016]

Minority Militias

Iranian proxy militias have tried to co-opt militias from minority populations in Iraq since the PMF's inception. These include Sunni tribal fighter formations, Christian self-defense militias, and Yazidi militias linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The PMF cultivates an image of inclusivity and nationalism to increase its legitimacy and shrouds Iranian influence. PMF co-optation of minority militias often exacerbates intra-communal political divisions, empowering a localized armed element of a minority group and giving them localized political power at the expense of other communal leaders. Shabak militias east of Mosul, for example, align themselves with the Badr Organization and prominent Shabak politician Hanin Qado. Qado opposes integration of the Shabak territories into the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, which other Shabak leaders close to the Kurdish political blocs advocate.³³⁵ Qado is positioned to influence the ultimate direction of the Shabak community given his control over the local security forces in Shabak villages.

Kata'ib Babilun – 50th PMF Brigade³³⁶ – Rian al-Kaldani,³³⁷ though his brother Osama al-Kaldani is likely the field commander.³³⁸

Kata'ib Babiliun is a Chaldaean Christian militia from the Ninewa Plains area east of Mosul. It is a small, low-capability militia with close ties to Iranian proxies. Rian al-Kaldani attended the funeral of a Lebanese Hezbollah leader, Mustafa Zulfikar, in the Dahia area in south Beirut on May 20, 2016, along with official PMF spokesperson Ahmed al-Asadi.³³⁹ Kata'ib Babiliun members pictured at graduation processions have been seen wearing images of a Shi'a Imam along with the logo of KAIA, a proxy militia.³⁴⁰ Kaldani is also the head of the Harakat Babiliun political office and behaves like a political party leader, meeting with political leaders and even traveling abroad as a representative of the PMF.³⁴¹ The Iraqi Chaldaean Church has denounced Kata'ib Babiliun, stating that it has no connection with the militia and that Rian al-Kaldani does not represent Iraq's Chaldaean Christian community.³⁴²

- Al-Tanak, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 25, 2017]
- East Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of February 13, 2017]
- Tel Kayef, East of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 26, 2017]
- Zab River, southeast of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of November 5, 2016]

Liwa Salah al-Din – 51st PMF Brigade³⁴³ – Asham al-Sabhan al-Jubouri.³⁴⁴

Liwa Salah al-Din is a tribal fighter formation drawn from Jubour tribesmen in Salah al-Din Province. Liwa Salah al-Din received assistance from U.S. and Coalition airstrikes, but it was also armed by Iran and is far closer to Iranian proxy forces than to other tribal fighters.³⁴⁵ The PMF generated intra-Jubour tribal tension by sponsoring Liwa Salah al-Din. Many prominent Jubouris, such as Salah al-Din governor Ahmed Abdullah al-Jubouri and Parliament Speaker Salim al-Jubouri from Diyala, oppose Iranian proxy militias and are nervous about the PMF structure as a whole.³⁴⁶ Other Jubour tribal figures are closer to the PMF and pro-Iranian figures. These include Liwa Salah al-Din's commander and prominent Sunni politician Mishaa al-Jubouri, a Sunni figure with a history of opposition to the U.S. and whose son, Yazan, is one of the unit's commanders.³⁴⁷

Unconfirmed sources claim that Liwa Salah al-Din is a component of the Badr Organization.³⁴⁸

- Al-Shirqat and Tulul al-Baj, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 13, 2017]
- Baiji, north of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 7, 2016]

Quwat al-Shahida Omayyat al-Jibara (QSOJ) – 88th PMF Brigade – Wans Ahmed Naji al-Jibara.³⁴⁹

QSOJ is a small, pro-Iranian Sunni tribal militia from al-Alam sub-district, north of Tikrit. Al-Alam is a major Iranian proxy support base. It is closely integrated with Badr Organization units like the 21st IA Brigade.³⁵⁰ It may be a sub-component of the 21st Badr Organization, who has responsibility for much of the eastern sector of Salah al-Din Province, and has close ties with Liwa Salah al-Din.³⁵¹ The QSOJ hometown of al-Alam is unusual in that it is an almost exclusively Sunni town that is a strong Shi'a militia support zone; other QSOJ figures serve in Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, which has a strong support base.³⁵²

- Al-Fatha, northeast of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 1, 2017]
- Al-Dour, south of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 1, 2017]
- Shirqat, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 10, 2017]
- Hamrin Mountains, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 9, 2017]
- Alas and Ajil Oil Fields, northeast of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 18, 2017]
- Al-Aith, east of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 26, 2017]

Liwa Kirkuk al-Thani (Second Kirkuk Brigade)

The PMF established Liwa Kirkuk al-Thani in August 2017 in anticipation of anti-ISIS operations in Hawija. It is based in Daquq district, Kirkuk Province. It is composed of 1,500 Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen. The brigade's spokesman indicated the brigade is under the supervision of the Mufti of Iraqi Sunnis, Mahdi al-Samid'i. There are no obvious connections to Iranian proxies, but the creation of the brigade fits the overall pattern of establishing local minority brigades attributed to Iranian proxies elsewhere.³⁵³

Hawza Militias

Hawza militias are smaller PMF groups affiliated with the Najaf Shi'a religious establishment (Hawza) and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Unlike other PMF groups, Hawza militias are not connected to political parties. They are instead linked to a shrine complex ('utbah). Liwa Ansar al-Marjaiyah leader Hamid al-Yasiri postulated in July 2016 that Hawza militias would likely enter Mosul, however, they did not.³⁵⁴

Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliyah (FAQ) – 26th PMF Brigade³⁵⁵ – Maitham al-Zaidi.³⁵⁶

FAQ is linked to the Abbasiyah shrine establishment in Karbala and is the least integrated Shi'a militia within the PMF establishment after Saraya al-Salam. FAQ denies it will run in elections.³⁵⁷ Senior proxy militias and the PMF leaders have failed to release the group's salaries and the deleted FAQ members' names from PMF registries, causing tensions.³⁵⁸ The PMF leadership over time have worked to include FAQ within the PMF superstructure, including resolving differences between FAQ and Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri.³⁵⁹ FAQ appears in well-funded promotional pictures and military parades that show matching uniforms, Hazmat suits, and FAMAS rifles associated with the ERD.³⁶⁰ FAQ possesses arms factories and manufactures its own MLRS rocket systems,³⁶¹ sniper rifles,³⁶² and repurposed T55 tanks to acquire AT guns / recoilless rifles.³⁶³

- Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of August 16, 2017]
- Khanifis, near al-Hadar, south of Qayyarah, Ninewa Province [as of July 14, 2017]
- Badush, northwest of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of March 21, 2017]
- Tel Kaysoum, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of February 20, 2017]
- Nukhaib-Ar Ar road, southwest of Karbala Province, Anbar Province [as of August 20, 2016]
- Balad District, southeast of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 24, 2016]
- Karbala borders, Karbala Province [as of June 30, 2016]

- Bashir, southwest of Kirkuk [as of April 27, 2016]
- Kilo 160, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of April 13, 2016]

Liwa Ansar al-Marjaiyah – No PMF number – Hamid al-Yasiri.³⁶⁴

Liwa Ansar al-Marjaiyah is the smallest of the four Hawza militias and the least capable. It is linked to the Abbasiyah shrine complex in Karbala.

- Tel al-Misraj al-Faraj, west of Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 4, 2017]
- Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 16, 2017]
- Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of November 11, 2016]
- Amiriyat al-Fallujah and Zoba, south of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 14, 2016]

Firqat al-Imam Ali al-Qitaliyah (FIAQ) – 2nd PMF Brigade – Karim al-Khaqani.³⁶⁵

FIAQ is a large Hawza militia that exists in an unusual space between FAQ and Liwa Ali al-Akbar. It is largely uncompromised by Iranian proxies but operates alongside Iranian proxy militias during forward operations. It is linked to the Alawiyah shrine complex in Najaf.

- Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of August 16, 2017]
- Qayrawan, Ninewa Province [as of July 23, 2017]
- Iraq-Syrian border, Ninewa Province [as of July 16, 2017]
- Al-Jurn, southwest of Mosul, Ninewa [as of July 13, 2017]
- Sinjar air base, Ninewa Province [as of July 9, 2017]
- Umm al-Shababit, near Qayrawan, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of May 12, 2017]
- Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 29, 2017]
- Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of April 20, 2017]
- Badush, northwest of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of March 12, 2017]
- Najaf borders with Anbar Province [as of February 8, 2017]

- West of Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of December 20, 2016]
- Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 29, 2017]
- Jazeera Khalidiyah, north of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of August 20, 2016]
- Balad, southeast of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 22, 2016]
- Bashir, southwest of Kirkuk, Kirkuk Province [as of May 1, 2016]
- Tuz Khurmatu, east of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 30, 2016]
- Thar Thar, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of March 2, 2016]

Liwa Ali al-Akbar – 11th PMF Brigade³⁶⁶ – Ali al-Hamdani.³⁶⁷

Liwa Ali al-Akbar is the most active of the Hawza militias in forward operations. It is linked to the Husseiniyah shrine complex in Najaf, is the Hawza militia most integrated into the PMF structure, and is the closest militia to Iranian proxy militias. It operates alongside Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi'a militias and explicitly follows the PMF leadership, unlike FAQ. Human rights organizations have accused Liwa Ali al-Akbar of abuses in areas with Iranian proxy militia activity.³⁶⁸

- Al-Risala, near Baaj, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province (with AAH) [as of June 3, 2017]
- Qayrawan, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of May 23, 2017]
- Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 29, 2017]
- Shirqat, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 5, 2016]
- Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of August 4, 2016]
- Harariyat, north of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 20, 2016]
- Bashir, south of Kirkuk [as of March 27, 2017]
- Karbala Borders with Anbar Province [as of March 27, 2017]
- Baiji, north of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 30, 2017]

Liwa al-Tufuf – 13th PMF Brigade³⁷⁰ – Qasim Musleh.

Liwa al-Tufuf is a splinter group from Liwa Ali al-Akbar, led by the former Liwa Ali al-Akbar commander Qasim Musleh. Hamdani replaced Musleh as commander of Liwa Ali al-Akbar in late 2015 or early 2016, though it is unclear why.³⁷¹ Liwa Ali al-Akbar maintains good relations with Liwa al-Tufuf, suggesting the split was amicable.³⁷² Liwa al-Tuff appears to be sanctioned by the Hawza, as it receives visits from senior shrine officials like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's official spokesperson Abdul-Mahdi al-Karbalai.³⁷³ The PMF may rely on Liwa al-Tufuf more for technical skills, such as re-opening water infrastructure, assigned to engineering and IED removal tasks, protecting engineers, delivering aid to IDPs in camps, and trench digging than combat tasks.³⁷⁴

- Sahl Sinjar Airbase, south of Qayrawan, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of May 18, 2017]
- Al-Saadiyah, east of al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 26, 2017]
- Wadi Amhufah, west of Karbala [as of May 4, 2017]
- Tel Abtah, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of February 14, 2017]
- Anbar border northwest of Karbala [as of February 14, 2017]

Co-opted Hawza Militias

Hawza militias compete with Iranian proxy militias because they embody different values. Hawza militias reject participation in politics and are loyal to a religious establishment opposed to Iran's ruling ideology. Some PMF leaders have tried to fracture Hawza militias from their parent units in order to consolidate those rival forces under more pro-Iranian leadership.

Liwa al-Tiff – 20th PMF Brigade – Abu Sajad³⁷⁶ / Engineer Hashim Ahmed al-Tamimi.³⁷⁷

The PMF split Liwa al-Tiff, composed of approximately 850 fighters from its parent unit, FAQ, in late 2016 without permission of FAQ or the Abbasiyah shrine complex.³⁷⁸ FAQ leader Maitham al-Zaidi alleged that the PMF “tricked” fighters in FAQ into joining the new unit, calling it a

move to weaken FAQ. Funeral marches for Liwa al-Tiff members often include FAQ members and signs that the deceased identify as FAQ members, suggesting that the split was not voluntary.³⁷⁹ The creation of Liwa al-Tiff may have been an attempt by the PMF leadership to weaken FAQ's main fighting force, al-Ilqami Brigade, as its leader may have been the leader of al-Ilqami Brigade at the time of the split.³⁸⁰ Social media suggests that the overlap between units was not voluntary.³⁸¹

- Possibly Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of March 4, 2017]
- North of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 2, 2017]
- Mtaibijah, northwest of Baqubah, Diyala Province [as of June 1, 2016]
- Jazeera Salah al-Din, west of Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 8, 2016]

Politically Affiliated Militias

Political party-linked militias are the armed wings of political parties. Only Saraya al-Salam and the ISCI militias have meaningful military capabilities. The remainder of these militias largely promote their political party or act as outlets for party patronage. These militias will nevertheless become important constituencies and sources of leverage in provincial and parliamentary elections in 2018.

The political parties and organizations law – passed by the Iraqi Council of representatives in November 2015 – stipulates that the activities of political parties or organizations must not be that of military or semi-military organizations.³⁸² The PMF law also stipulates that members of the PMC must relinquish all political, social and party affiliations. PMC members are also prohibited from any political engagements while they remain within its ranks.³⁸³ The Iranian-backed PMF, however, are determined to turn their military victories on the ground into political capital to block attempts for PMF integration into the army. This independence may give them leeway to pursue Iranian interests in the country. It may also deter any future Iraqi government from taking measures against Tehran's interests.

Sadrism Trend

Saraya al-Salam / Peace Brigades (PB) – 313 PMF Brigade – Abu Zahra al-Saadi.³⁸⁵ Saraya al-Salam is the armed wing of the Sadrism Trend loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr. Saadi is commander of Samarra operations, which is the militia's most important area of responsibility. Sadrism media avoids using the official designation of Liwa 313 to refer to Saraya al-Salam. Saraya al-Salam organizes itself into a division, brigade, battalion, and company structure separate from the PMF.³⁸⁶ The separate structure and masking of the Liwa 313 designation reflects Sadr's reluctance to integrate Saraya al-Salam into the PMF. Saraya al-Salam deploys primarily around Samarra. It also has presence in Karbala as well as the northern Baghdad Belts area. Each division's subordinate units likely rotate into Samarra from their home provinces. Saraya al-Salam units can have as many as 30 companies per battalion, though companies are closer to platoon-sized formations and mostly consist of low-capability fighters with limited arms and training.³⁸⁷ Sadrism battalion sizes juxtaposed with the limitations of its area of responsibility suggest that most of the force is held in reserve, likely to control the cost of maintaining a large militia in a resource-constrained environment. The Sadrism trend has reportedly been undergoing serious financial difficulties forcing it to cut the salaries of its members by half.³⁸⁸ This comes as the trend's leader cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has increasingly distanced himself from Iran's policies in both Iraq and Syria, calling for the incorporation of the Iranian-backed PMF into the ISF and on Assad to step down as Syria's president.³⁸⁹

- **Rapid Intervention Brigade.** This unit is equipped with tanks, Humvees, MLRS, and high-level equipment. It is likely the best equipped force in Saraya al-Salam.³⁹⁰ The following locations are attributed to Saraya al-Salam generally, not the Rapid Intervention Brigade specifically. The Rapid Intervention Brigades's resourcing and eminence suggests it was likely the sub-unit of to Saraya al-Salam on the ground, however.
 - Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 23, 2017]
 - West of Karbala [as of May 1, 2017]

- Balad, Salah al-Din Province [as of July 8, 2016]
- Suleiman Beg, eastern Salah al-Din Province [as of September 2, 2014]
- **PB 1st Division.** Haidar Abu Zainab³⁹¹
 - Baghdad / Rusafa [as of August 31, 2017]
- **PB 2nd Division.** Abu Tammar al-Utaibi³⁹²
 - Wasit Province [as of May 30, 2017]
 - Babil Province [as of October 24, 2013]
- **PB 3rd Division.** Abu Hassan al-Zubaidi,³⁹³ possibly replaced Abu Mustafa al-Khazali³⁹⁴
 - Najaf Province [as of April 27, 2017]
 - Karbala Province [as of January 17, 2016]
 - Diwaniyah, Qadisiyah Province [as of December 2015]
- **PB 4th Division.** Abu Jaafar³⁹⁵
 - Maysan Province [as of April 20, 2017]
- **PB 5th Division.** Nabil al-Ghazi³⁹⁶
 - Basra Province [as of June 1, 2017]
- **PB 6th Division.** Ali Ibrahim³⁹⁷ or Muhammad Ramadan³⁹⁸
 - Muthanna Province [May 7, 2017]
 - Dhi Qar Province [as of April 6, 2016]
- **PB 7th Division.** Haitham Abbas al-Bahadli³⁹⁹
 - Baghdad / Karkh [as of May 26, 2017]

Co-opted Sadrist Militias

Numerous PMF fighters and their leaders have roots in the defunct Jaish al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army), Muqtada al-Sadr's first militia, mobilized to fight the U.S. presence in 2004. The movement evolved, so that many fighters who view Sadr's venerated deceased father, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, now serve in pro-Iranian or Iranian proxy groups.⁴⁰⁰

Jaish al-Mu'amil – 99th PMF Brigade⁴⁰¹ - Hajj Saad Sawar.⁴⁰²

Jaish al-Mu'amil is a Sadrist offshoot that joined Iranian proxy militias in the PMF.⁴⁰³ Jaish al-Mu'amil illustrates Iranian efforts to split the Sadrist movement and reduce Tehran's primary political and paramilitary rival. Some of the unit's fighters likely remain active in Syria.⁴⁰⁴ Its commander, Saad Sawar, was a Jaish al-Mahdi member who fought in Syria under Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas.⁴⁰⁵ He may have done so as a member of the Sadrist Trend but without Muqtada al-Sadr's permission, leading to his eventual expulsion from the movement.⁴⁰⁶ He likely returned and formed his new unit, Jaish al-Mu'amil, around June 2016. At that time, an offshoot of the Sadrist Trend began accusing Muqtada al-Sadr of leading Iraq into "civil war" and denounced his refusal to commit Saraya al-Salam fighters to operations to recapture Fallujah.⁴⁰⁷ Jaish al-Mu'amil's formation sparked an uproar within the Sadrist Trend. Senior Sadrist leaders at the time claimed that there was no split within the Sadrist Trend, but the facts prove otherwise.⁴⁰⁸

- Makhoul mountains, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 29, 2017]
- Al-Zawiya, northern Salah al-Din [as of May 1, 2017]
- Near Qayyarah, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 29, 2017]
- Siniya-Hadith road, near Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 6, 2017]
- Near Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of February 2, 2017]

Islamic Supreme Council (ISCI) Brigades

ISCI brigades are militias linked with several leaders of the ISCI, the most prominent of which was Ammar al-Hakim before he split off in July 2017 to form the Hikma Trend. ISCI has close historical ties to Iran but does not respond to Iranian command and control in the manner of other Iranian proxies. ISCI Brigades nevertheless exhibit close ties with Iranian proxy leaders, and are interoperable with Iranian proxy militias.



ABOVE: *The senior-most leaders in the PMF met with Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr at his home on October 18, 2016.⁴⁰⁹ The units led by the above commanders are the most prominent of the PMF groups and demonstrate how thoroughly the organization is compromised by Iranian proxies. From left to right: Badr Organization Council of Representatives member for Ninewa Province Hanin Qado; Kata'ib al-Imam Ali Secretary General Shibl al-Zaidi; Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa; Kata'ib Jund al-Imam Secretary General and Official Popular Mobilization Forces Spokesperson Ahmed al-Asadi; Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq Secretary General Qais al-Khazali; Kata'ib al-Tiyyar al-Risali Secretary General Adnan al-Shahmani; Unknown.; Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr; Kata'ib Babilun Secretary General Rian al-Kaldi; Popular Mobilization Forces Deputy Chairman and probable Kata'ib Hezbollah commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis; Shi'a Endowment Administrative and Financial Agent for Samarra Sami al-Masoudi (Obstructed); Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al-Ameri; Popular Mobilization Commission Central Operations Director Abu Muntadhir al-Husseini; Nujaba Movement Secretary General Akram al-Kaabi; Minister of Interior and senior Badr Organization member Qasim al-Araji; and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada official spokesperson Faleh al-Khazali.*

Saraya Ansar al-Aqida – 28th PMF Brigade⁴¹⁰ – Jalal al-Din al-Saghir⁴¹¹

- Ansar al-Aqida is known for its unique improved armored vehicles.
- Tel Safuq, Iraq-Syrian border, Ninewa Province [as of August 2, 2017]
- Sakkar, west of Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of June 1, 2017]
- Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 29, 2017]
- Tel Abtah, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 20, 2017]
- Siniyah, west of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of October 1, 2016]
- Hamrin Mountains, east of Tikrit, Salah al-Din Province [as of February 6, 2016]

Liwa al-Muntadhir – 7th PMF Brigade – Daghir al-Mousawi⁴¹²

Liwa al-Muntadhir is an armed wing of Harakat al-Shahid al-Shuhada.⁴¹³ Liwa al-Muntadhir has worked closely with pro-Iranian militias including Badr. It is unknown if the brigade will remain with ISCI or join the Hikma Trend as the two sides continue to compete for ISCI's resources.⁴¹⁴

- Likely north of al-Walid, western Anbar Province [as of June 20, 2017]
- Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of May 23, 2017]
- Shirqat / Outskirts of Mosul Operations area, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of October 21, 2016]
- Saqlawiyah, northwest of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of June 6, 2016]

Saraya Ashura – 8th PMF Brigade⁴¹⁵ – Kadhim al-Jabiri⁴¹⁶

Saraya Ashura is an armed wing of ISCI. The brigade, while seen to be mostly affiliated with Hakim, allowed its members the choice between joining Hakim or ISCI.⁴¹⁷

- Tulul al-Baj, west of Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 11, 2017]
- Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 3, 2017]
- Al-Hadhar District, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of May 30, 2017]
- Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 13, 2017]

Other Politically Affiliated Militias

Saraya al-Jihad – 17th PMF Brigade⁴¹⁸ – Hassan al-Sari.⁴¹⁹

Saraya al-Jihadh is affiliated with Harakat al-Jihad wa al-Bina. The militia was part of ISCI before splitting away in September 2017.⁴²⁰ Saraya al-Jihad fighters are active inside of Syria, but likely only in a limited capacity, as they had only one fighter confirmed killed inside of Syria as of June 2017.⁴²¹ Saraya al-Jihad is known for its homemade IRAMs.

- Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 7, 2017]
- Tel al-Harada, near Mosul and Tel Afar, Ninewa Province [as of June 3, 2017]
- Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of April 29, 2017]
- Aziz Balad, near Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of January 19, 2017]
- Al-Siniyah, near Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 24, 2016]
- Shirqat, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of August 19, 2016]

Liwa Ansar Allah al-Awfiyah (LA4) – 19th PMF Brigade⁴²² – Haidar al-Gharawi.

- Notable subordinate unit: Kata'ib al-Shahid al-Awal, also known as Quqat al-Buraq⁴²³ – Wathiq al-Fartousi.

Liwa Ansar Allah al-Awfiyah is a pro-Iranian militia created to be the military wing of the Kayan al-Sadiq wa al-Ata' political party in Maysan Province.⁴²⁴

It works closely with Iranian proxies, self-identifying as a component of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. The group also attempts to appeal to the followers of the Sadrism trend – prominent in Maysan – by incorporating pictures of the late Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr. LA4 is small and its missions are limited, comparable to newer pro-Iranian militias like Kata'ib al-Tiyyar al-Risali. LA4's social media presence demonstrates how mixed PMF-political party entities can operate in a post-Mosul environment. LA4 focuses on political messaging, including propaganda, glitzy graphics, association with top Iranian proxy figures such as Qais al-Khazali, and promotion of Gharawi as a leader.⁴²⁵ However, it shows almost no actual military activity. LA4 units are reportedly active in Syria, though it is unclear how many fighters are in Syria and where they are specifically.⁴²⁶

- Kilo 160, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of May 30, 2017]
- Quwat al-Buraq, Al-Baghdadi, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of October 1, 2016]
- Quwat al-Buraq, Sagar and Kilo 160, west of Ramadi, Anbar Province [as of April 23, 2017]
- Garma, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of March 16, 2016]

Kata'ib al-Tiyyar al-Risali – 31st PMF Brigade⁴²⁷ – Adnan al-Shahmani.

Kata'ib al-Tiyyar al-Risali is the armed wing of the Risali Trend, a small party within the SLA that is aligned with Maliki and largely draws personnel from Wasit Province. Shahmani is the head of the small "Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc" formed of 5 members of the State of Law (SLA), using the same name as the Lebanese Hezbollah bloc within Lebanese parliament.⁴²⁸ The Risali Trend is the best example of how a small political party can capitalize on militia activity for political gain. Shahmani maneuvered himself into a position of influence within the PMF, give his frequent attendance of meetings with senior proxy leaders, despite leading a small militia with limited capabilities.⁴²⁹

- Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of May 3, 2017]
- Siniyah, near Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 10, 2017]



ABOVE: FP-patterned Humvees acquired by Liwa Ansar Allah al-Awfyah, a pro-Iranian Iraqi Shi'a militia next to an American-made Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle.⁴³⁰ A wide range of PMF groups now deploy assets like Humvees, a capability that historically was limited to a select few Iranian proxy militias.

Quwat Waad Allah / al-Shabab al-Risali (QWA) – 33rd PMF Brigade⁴³¹ – Sami al-Masoudi.

QWA is the armed wing of al-Fadhila Party, the Sadrist break-away party in Basra. It pays deference to the spiritual leader of Fadhila, the controversial Ayatollah Muhammad al-Yaqoubi.⁴³² Fadhila advertises the martyrdom of QWA members.⁴³³ It draws its base from Basra, the Fadhila Party stronghold. It formerly operated under the name Liwa al-Shabab al-Risali. Masoudi is the Deputy Head of the Shi'a Waqf and “General Supervisor” of QWA. Masoudi is a high-profile PMF member who is close to pro-Iranian figures.⁴³⁵ His high rank within the Shi'a Waqf is troubling because this PMF group can secure access to resources from the Shi'a religious establishment through his position.

- Umm Gharba, southwest of Shirqat, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 9, 2017]
- Al-Hadhar, south of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of June 3, 2017]
- Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of January 29, 2017]
- Al-Taji gas plant, north of Baghdad [as of May 5, 2016]
- Jazeera Samarra, west of Samarra, Salah al-Din Province [as of April 18, 2016]
- Garma, northeast of Fallujah, Anbar Province [as of April 4, 2016]

Quwat al-Shahid al-Sadr – 35th PMF Brigade – Abu Aqil al-Mousawi.⁴³⁶

Quwat al-Shahid al-Sadr is the armed wing of the Islamic Dawa Party–Iraq Organization, an off-shoot

of the Islamic Dawa Party headed by Maliki.⁴³⁷ The militia is rarely mentioned in official PMF media, indicating its low profile and capabilities. Other Dawa Party offshoots, like the Dawa Party - Internal Organization (Kata'ib al-Ghadhab), have their own militias with minimal capabilities.⁴³⁸

- Siniyah, near Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of September 12, 2016]

Quwat al-Shahid al-Sadr al-Awal (QSSA) – 25th PMF Brigade⁴³⁹ – Abu Jassim al-Nasiri.⁴⁴⁰

Quwat al-Shahid al-sadr al-Awal is a small militia linked to the Dawa Party and Maliki.⁴⁴¹ Dawa Party militias frequently use the distinctive domed Dawa Party-style logo.⁴⁴²

- Makhoul Mountains, north of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of May 20, 2017]
- Shakran, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of December 31, 2016]

Kata'ib Jund al-Imam – 6th PMF Brigade – Ahmad al-Asadi.⁴⁴³

Kata'ib Jund al-Imam, often referred to as Jund al-Imam, is the militia of Ahmed al-Asadi, the official spokesperson of the PMF and a parliamentarian with the SLA. Jund al-Imam was one of the first militias to produce a persistent, high-quality social media campaign featuring high-definition videos and images. Its social media portrayed Jund al-Imam as far larger and more active than it ever was. Asadi, in his role as the official PMF spokesperson, is one of the most visible officials within the PMF, making overseas visits to garner support for the PMF, including one visit to Dearborn, Michigan in June 2015.⁴⁴⁴

- Ain Talawi, west of Tel Afar, west of Mosul, Ninewa Province [as of August 17, 2017]
- Al-Siniyah, west of Baiji, Salah al-Din Province [as of June 6, 2017]

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAH	Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq	KAAH	Kata'ib Ansar al-Hojja
AOC	Anbar Operations Command	KAIA	Kata'ib al-Imam Ali
BabOC	Babil Operations Command	KH	Kata'ib Hezbollah
BasOC	Basra Operations Command	KSAS	Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada
BOC	Baghdad Operations Command	KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
CTS	Counter Terrorism Services	LA4	Liwa Ansar Allah al-Awfiyah
DOC	Dijla Operations Command	MEOC	Mid-Euphrates Operations Command
ERD	Emergency Response Division	MoD	Ministry of Defense
FPS	Facilities Protection Service	MoI	Ministry of Interior
FAQ	Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliyah	NOC	Ninewa Operations Command
FIAQ	Firqat al-Imam Ali al-Qitaliyah	OCINC	Office of the Commander in Chief
FP	Federal Police	PMC	Popular Mobilization Commission
IA	Iraqi Army	PMF	Popular Mobilization Forces
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps	PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
ISOF	Iraqi Special Operations Forces	QSOJ	Quwat al-Shahida Omayyat al-Jibara
ISCI	Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq	QWA	Quwat Waad Allah / al-Shabab al-Risali
JAM	Jaish al-Mahdi	ROC	Rafidain Operations Command
JBOC	Jazeera and Badia Operations Command	SaDaSH	Saraya al-Difaa al-Shaabi
JOC	Joint Operations Command	SDOC	Salah al-Din Operations Command
		SFD	Special Forces Division
		SOC	Samarra Operations Command
		STaK	Saraya Talia al-Khorasani


Appendix B: Operations Commands: Areas of Responsibility

ISW Operations Command	Operations Commands: Areas of Responsibility
Operations Command	Area of Responsibility
Anbar Operations Command (AOC)	Ramadi, Fallujah, surrounding desert areas in eastern Anbar Province
Babil Operations Command (BabOC)	Babil Province, southern Baghdad Belts
Baghdad Operations Command (BOC)	Baghdad Province—split into Karkh (Western) and Rusafa (Eastern) area commands—majority of Baghdad Belts
Basra Operations Command (BasOC)	Basra Province
Dijla Operations Command (DOC)	Diyala Province, eastern Salah al-Din Province, Disputed Internal Boundaries of Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salah al-Din Provinces
Jazeera and Badia Operations Command (JBOC)	Anbar Province west of Ramadi, much of Jazeera and Badia Deserts
Mid-Euphrates Operations Command (MEOC)	Karbala, Najaf, and surrounding desert areas, Nukhaib District of Anbar Province
Ninewa Operations Command (NOC)	Ninewa Province's high population centers
Salah al-Din Operations Command (SDOC)	Northern half of Salah al-Din Province
Samarra Operations Command (SOC)	Samarra, much of the Jazeera Desert west of Samarra, southern Salah al-Din Province including part of the northern Baghdad Belts
Rafidain Operations Command (ROC)	Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Qadisiyah, and Wasit Provinces


Appendix C: Graphics




Iraqi Security Forces - September 2014



ISW Popular Mobilization Forces Affiliations



Informal Chain of Command




ISW Popular Mobilization Forces Chain of Command Legend


Updated as of August 17, 2017

- Badr Organization Member.
- Faleh al-Fayadh is nominally the Popular Mobilization Commission's most senior official, however Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis is the de-facto head of the PMC hierarchy. He oversees the operational, administrative, and financial aspects of the PMF.
- Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi likely attempted to sideline Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, head of the PMCF's military operations, by appointing Lt. Gen. Mohsen al-Kaabi as a co-spy Chairman of finances and monitoring all PMU institutions. Muhandis has successfully sidelined Kaabi, however.
- Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri's position as head of Diyala Security renders this position inert.
- Unofficial executive commission, or "Shura Council," dominated by senior leaders of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, and other pro-Iranian figures.
- + Popular Mobilization Forces brigades report to leaders of their affiliation, therefore some report to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi just as they are intended to according to the official chain of command. This graphic depicts Popular Mobilization Forces brigades as subordinate to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the unofficial chain of command because the majority of its brigades are Iranian-co-opted.

Formal Chain of Command



Appendix D: Iraqi Security Forces Commanders

 Iraqi Security Forces High Commanders		
Position	Commander—as of November 2017	Predecessor
Prime Minister and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces	Haider al-Abadi	Nouri al-Maliki
Minister of Defense	Maj. Gen. Irfan Mahmoud al-Hayali (January 2017 – present)	Khalid al-Obaidi (2014 – 2016)
Minister of the Interior	Qasim al-Araji (January 2016 – present)	Mohammed al-Ghabban (2014 – 2016)
Joint Operations Command (JOC) Commander	Lt. Gen. Talib Shughaiti al-Kinani (2014 – present)	Gen. Abboud Qanbar (2013 – 2014)
Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) Field Commander	Lt. Gen. Abdul-Ghani al-Asadi	No Predecessor, Created in 2014
Combined JOC Director, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations	Lt. Gen. Abdul-Amir Rashid Yarallah (2014 – present)	Unknown
Iraqi Ground Forces Commander	Lt. Gen. Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq (2014 – present)	Lt. Gen. Ali Ghaidan (2006 – 2014)
Iraqi Army Chief of Staff	Lt. Gen. Uthman al-Ghanimi (2015 – present)	Lieutenant General-Staff Khorshid Rashid Doski (2014 – 2015)
Iraqi Army Aviation Commander	Lt. Gen. Hamid Atiyah al-Maliki	Unknown
Iraqi Air Force Commander	Lt. Gen. Anwar Hama Amin	Unknown
Iraqi Navy and Coastal Defense Commander	Marine General Ahmed Jasim Maarij (2015 – present)	Marine General Salam Mohammed Ahmed
Iraqi Air Defense Commander	Lt. Gen. Jabar Obeid Kadhim	Unknown
Federal Police Commander	Maj. Gen. Raid Shakir Jawdat (2014 – present)	Muhsin al-Kaabi (2014)
Border Guards Commander	Lt. Gen. Hamid Abdullah	Unknown
Emergency Response Division Commander	Brig. Gen. Thamir Muhammad Ismail (2013 – present)	Unknown

Iraqi Army Divisions Commanders

Iraqi Army Division	Area of Operations	Current Commander	Previous Commander
1st Iraqi Army Division	Anbar Province, Ninewa Province	Musa Kata Kadhim (2015–present) ⁴⁴⁵	Hasan Abbas Tofan (2014–2015)
2nd Iraqi Army Division	Dissolved and replaced with 15th and 16th Divisions.		
3rd Iraqi Army Division			
4th Iraqi Army Division	Dissolved	Dissolved	Dissolved
5th Iraqi Army Division	Diyala Province, northern Salah al-Din Province	Akram Saddam Mudannaf; (2016–present)	Ali Fadhil Imran (2014–2016)
6th Iraqi Army Division	Western belts of Baghdad Province	Ahmed Salim Bahjat; (2014–present) ⁴⁴⁶	Najim Abdullah al-Sudani (Unknown)
7th Iraqi Army Division	Western Anbar	Nauman Abdul-Zobaie (2015–present) ⁴⁴⁷	Qasem al-Mohammadi (2013–2015) ⁴⁴⁸
8th Iraqi Army Division	Anbar Province, Babil Province	Ali al-Maliki (2015–present)	Hassan Mohamed Mowhoush (2012–2015) ⁴⁴⁹
9th Iraqi Army Division	Salah al-Din Province, Ninewa Province, Anbar Province, Salah al-Din Province	Qassim Jassim Nazal al-Maliki (Unknown)	Abdulla Mohammed Khamis al-Dafi (Unknown)
10th Iraqi Army Division	Jazeera Desert North of Ramadi, Anbar Province	Hamid al-Fatlawi (2014–present)	Mahmoud al-Felahi (2015–2017) ⁴⁵⁰
11th Iraqi Army Division	Baghdad Province	Sa'ib Obeid Mohsin Alwan (2014–present)	Imad Yasin al-Zuhayri (Unknown–2014) ⁴⁵¹
12th Iraqi Army Division	Dissolved	Dissolved	Dissolved
14th Iraqi Army Division	Basra Province, Anbar Province	Abdul Muhsin al-Abbas (2015–present) ⁴⁵²	Ali ghazi haidar al-Hashemi (2014–2015) ⁴⁵³
15th Iraqi Army Division	Salah al-Din Province, Ninewa Province	Imad al-Silawi	N/A
16th Iraqi Army Division	Salah al-Din Province, Ninewa Province	Jabbar al-Daraji (2017–present) ⁴⁵⁴	Sabah Fadhil Matar al-Azzawi (Unknown–2017) ⁴⁵⁵
17th Iraqi Army Division	Baghdad province, Salah al-Din Province, Anbar Province	Ali Abdul-Hussein Kadhim al-Majidi (2017–present) ⁴⁵⁶	Jabbar Naima al-Tai'i (Unknown–2017)

ENDNOTES

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