Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide monetary and military assistance to Ukraine, including air defense systems. The Estonian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 11 that Estonia will provide an undisclosed number of Mistral man-portable short-range air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as part of a new military assistance package.[1] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced during the Ukrainian Recovery Conference in Berlin on June 11 that the European Union (EU) will transfer roughly 1.5 billion euros ($1.6 billion) worth of profits from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine in July, of which Ukraine will allocate 90 percent to defense spending and 10 percent to reconstruction.[2] Von der Leyen stated that the EU will also transfer an additional 1.9 billion euros ($2 billion) to Ukraine from the EU's Ukraine Facility mechanism, which is a separate fund that provides for the EU to transfer up to 50 billion euros ($53.7 billion) to Ukraine between 2024 and 2027.[3] German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reiterated during the Ukrainian Recovery Conference that Germany will deliver a Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in the coming weeks and announced that Germany will also deliver an IRIS-T air defense system, an unspecified number of Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, and an unspecified number and type of missiles and ammunition to Ukraine in the coming weeks and months.[4] The German MoD initially announced the transfer of this third Patriot system in April 2024.[5] The New York Times, citing senior US administration and military officials, reported on June 11 that US President Joe Biden recently approved the transfer of another Patriot system to Ukraine following a series of high-level meetings and internal debates regarding the best ways to meet Ukraine's need for additional air defenses.[6] Unnamed US officials stated that the new system could be deployed to the frontline within several days depending on any maintenance or modifications that the system may need, as the system is currently stationed in Poland.
The Kremlin continues efforts to codify legal instruments and repressive measures intended to broadly censor foreigners and foreign organizations in Russia. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading on June 11 that seeks to codify the Russian government's ability to recognize "any" foreign organization as "undesirable."[7] The Duma first approved the draft version of this bill on May 27.[8] The Duma also adopted an additional bill in its first reading that introduces criminal penalties including fines and imprisonment for someone's participation in "any" organization classified as "undesirable."[9] Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin noted that this new bill will fill a gap in the existing legislation, which only has provisions to class foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as "undesirable."[10] The new bill will extend the undesirable classification to any foreign and international organizations, thereby broadening the Kremlin's discretion to target and censor a wide range of foreign organizations operating within Russia. The Kremlin has previously used the "undesirable" designation to block opposition media outlets, civil society organizations, and human rights-focused organizations from entering or operating within Russia, as ISW has previously reported.[11] Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatiana Moskalkova also notably called on June 11 for the establishment of a legal mechanism that would allow the Russian government to prosecute foreigners for "Russophobia as a manifestation of extremism."[12] Russian authorities widely use accusations of "Russophobia" in an attempt to undermine any undesirable policy or rhetoric they deem to be "anti-Russian," and have similarly used charges of extremism with broad discretion to suppress and discourage domestic opposition.[13]

A prominent Kremlin-appointed Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a second "media school" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, likely to support Kremlin efforts to expand its influence in the international information space, particularly in Central Asia. The Rybar Telegram channel claimed on June 11 that it is opening the "Rybar Media School" in Bishkek because Kyrgyzstan lacks military-political and industry expertise as well as a "blogosphere" and opinion journalism.[14] Rybar framed its establishment of a "media school" in Bishkek as an effort to coordinate and assert Russia's position in Central Asia and warned that Russia could be "expelled" from Central Asia in three to five years if Russia fails to assert itself and manage its informational influence in the region. Rybar's founder and manager Mikhail Zvinchuk gave a lecture to students at the Kyrgyz National University about the benefits of using Telegram to "solve problems" in the current information environment. Rybar claimed that Zvinchuk's lecture was only the first in a series of lectures and trainings for Kyrgyz media workers, students, public relations professionals, and press services to learn how to use multimedia to develop local Kyrgyz journalism. Rybar claimed that journalists from the Kyrgyz-branch of the official Russian government outlet Rossiyskaya Gazeta, "complained" about the lack of Russian journalistic work in Central Asia and claimed that the West outbalances Russia in its support for Kyrgyz journalism. Zvinchuk gave a masterclass in December 2023 on the importance of Telegram and other social media to press heads at Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec likely in an effort to normalize the war without directly involving the Kremlin or other official state bodies. Rybar announced that it opened a media school in an unspecified location in the Balkans in April 2024.[15] Rybar claimed that multiple Serbian and Republika Srpska (the Serbian entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) outlets highlighted Rybar's "debut" in the Balkans, while notably no Kyrgyz Russian- or Kyrgyz-language news outlets reported on the new "media school" in Bishkek as of this publication.[16] Rybar will likely attempt to expand its media influence in other foreign countries, and the Kremlin will likely seek to use coopted milbloggers like Rybar to expand Russian influence in international media.
Danish authorities arrested a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of having connections to Russian intelligence services, which is likely part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to re-intensify its hybrid campaign against Western countries. The Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) reported on June 11 that Danish authorities arrested an unidentified woman with dual Danish-Russian citizenship related to a recent investigation into the woman's connections to Russian foreign intelligence.[17] DR reported on June 3, citing leaked documents from Western intelligence services, that the women's legal aid clinic for Russian speakers received at least 338,000 Danish kroner (about $49,000) from the Russian Fund for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond), which DR describes as closely linked to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[18] The Guardian, which saw the same leaked documents, reported that Pravfond's leadership has multiple Russian intelligence agents, including longtime SVR officers Vladimir Pozdorovkin and Anatoly Sorokin.[19] The Guardian reported that Pravfond operates throughout Europe and that Pozdorovkin specifically oversees Pravfond's operations in Nordic and Baltic countries while Sorokin oversees operations in the Middle East, Moldova, and Transnistria.[20] DR reported and that the woman is a "central figure" in Denmark's Russian-speaking community and noted she has traveled to Russia and elsewhere for conferences with Pravfond participation or sponsorship.[21] The Kremlin has recently intensified its hybrid campaigns in Europe, and the Kremlin has been leaning into a narrative about protecting Russians and Russian-speakers outside of Russia — often called "compatriots abroad" — as part of its wider toolkit of hybrid manipulations.[22] The "compatriots abroad" narrative sets informational conditions for the Kremlin to justify hybrid operations or even direct interference against countries it claims do not adequately protect so-called Russian "compatriots" should these countries take actions unfavorable to the Kremlin. DR noted that several European intelligence sources stated that the Kremlin aims to use counseling and assistance centers — of which Pravfond funds at least 34 in 21 countries — to justify direct interference in other countries.[23]

Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 11 that the former Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Academy, Grigory Molchanov, was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.[24] Russian outlet RBK stated that Molchanov has served in the Russian military since 1973 and noted that the Security Council's first new appointment since former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu became Security Council Secretary on May 13.[25] Russian outlet RTVI noted that there are currently eight deputy secretaries and one first deputy secretary in addition to Shoigu.[26]

Key Takeaways:

- Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide monetary and military assistance to Ukraine, including air defense systems.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to codify legal instruments and repressive measures intended to broadly censor foreigners and foreign organizations in Russia.
- A prominent Kremlin-appointed Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a second "media school" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, likely to support Kremlin efforts to expand its influence in the international information space, particularly in Central Asia.
- Danish authorities arrested a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of having connections to Russian intelligence services, which is likely part of the
Kremlin's continued efforts to re-intensify its hybrid campaign against Western countries.

- Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 11 that the former Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Academy, Grigory Molchanov, was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.
- Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Avdiivka.
- Russia may have suffered a damaged or destroyed military naval vessel in the Barents Sea.
- Belarusian officials continue to implicate themselves in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus and their re-education in Belarusian programs.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

**Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City) amid continued fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 11. Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows that Ukrainian forces have regained positions along the O-212553 Lyptsi-Kharkiv City road southeast of Hlyboke (northeast of Lyptsi).[27] The Russian MoD and several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the Lyptsi direction, particularly near Hlyboke, which is consistent with the available geolocated evidence.[28] Russian and Ukrainian sources also reported continued fighting in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), particularly in the area of the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant, and near Tykhe and Vovchanski Khutory (both east of Vovchansk) on June 9 and 10.[29]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid continued Russian ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 11. Geolocated footage published on June 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[30] The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the disincorporated settlement of Tymkivka (just west of Orlyanka [east of Kupyansk]) and Myasozharivka (west of Svatove).[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and Andriivka (west of Svatove).[32] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of any of these claims. Fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Berestove, Stepova Novoselivka, and Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna near Duzhelyubivka, Hrekivka, and Nevske; west of Kreminna near Torske and Terny; and southwest of Kreminna near Hryhorivka and the Serebryanske forest area on June 10 and 11.[33] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Berestove.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Siversk direction on June 11, but there were no confirmed advances in the area. Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized positions within the chalk quarry south of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces were attacking Rozdolivka (south of Siversk) from the south and seized positions on the southeastern outskirts of the settlement.[36] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vyimka (southeast of Siversk) but did not specify the outcome of the counterattack. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Ivano-Darivka on June 10 and 11.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on June 11, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn reported on June 11 that Russian forces are still not operating within Chasiv Yar, but are continuing efforts to advance in the Kanal and Novyi microraions (eastern Chasiv Yar).[38] Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Russian forces seized a large area of Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar) and that fighting is ongoing in western Kanal Microraion, but ISW has not observed evidence of further Russian advances in the area.[39] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division recently advanced within Kanal Microraion up to the intersection of Koshovoho and Zrazkova streets, which is consistent with ISW’s assessed front line.[40] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 11th VDV Brigade continued assaults towards Novyi Microraion, and that elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and Russian Volunteer Corps are attacking in the Bohdanivka-Kalynivka direction (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[41] Russian forces continued attacks east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[42] Elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC), 83rd Separate VDV Brigade, and the "Russian Legion" volunteer battalion are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[43]
Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Avdiivka amid continued offensive operations in the area on June 11. Geolocated footage published on June 11 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced on the northeastern outskirts of Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka).[44] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD), and the 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) seized Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and Russian milbloggers made similar claims, indicating that Russian forces have likely seized the settlement.[45] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in western...
Novooleksandriivka, however.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) advanced to the eastern outskirts of Novopokrovskoe (northwest of Avdiivka and south of Novooleksandriivka) and that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Yasnobrodovka (west of Avdiivka), from Umanske (west of Avdiivka) towards Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka), and in the dacha area on the outskirts of Karlivka (southwest of Avdiivka).[47] Mashovets warned that Russian forces could make more significant advances in the Pokrovsk (Avdiivka) direction if the Russian military command transfers additional forces to this direction.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces also continued attacks near Yevhenivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and Kalynove (southwest of Avdiivka) on the evening of June 10.[49] Elements of the "Somalia" Assault Battalion (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Karlivka.[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 11 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within southwestern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[51] Russian forces continued assaults west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, and Vodyane on June 10 and 11.[52]
Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on June 11 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 300 meters in northeastern Staromayorske and several hundred meters in Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka), although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[53]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Limited fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 11, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Robotyne, Shcherbaky, Kopani, (both northwest of Robotyne), Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne), Verbove (east of Robotyne), Mala Tokmachka, and Charivne (northeast of Robotyne) on June 10 and 11.[54] Ukrainian Volunteer Army Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk stated that Russian forces cannot conduct significant ground assaults in this area due to Ukrainian forces' drone use, which has led to a high degree of visibility of the battlefield.[55] Bratchuk described Russian operations in this area as not tactically or operationally "decisive" but stated these operations may be "emotional...to demonstrate some kind of victory on the battlefield," suggesting that Russian forces are likely mostly pursuing offensive operations here for informational, as opposed to significant physical, effects. Russian sources familiar with this area have similarly complained about how Ukrainian drone use is inhibiting Russian forces' ability to operate in this sector of the front.[56] Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[57]
Fighting continued on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on June 10 and 11, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[58]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukraine's Eastern Air Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two Russian Kh-59/69 cruise missiles over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during the day on June 11.[59] The Russian MoD posted
footage purportedly showing a Russian strike against a Ukrainian Su-25 aircraft at the Dovhyntseve airfield in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[60]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure has severely damaged Ukraine's electricity generation. Zelensky stated on June 11 at the Ukraine Restoration Conference in Berlin that Russian strikes against Ukraine have destroyed 80 percent of Ukraine's thermal electricity generation and one third of its hydroelectric generation.[61] Zelensky reiterated that Russian drone and missile strikes against energy infrastructure, presumably in 2024, have destroyed nine gigawatts of Ukraine's energy generation capacity and noted that Ukraine's peak energy consumption was 18 gigawatts in Winter 2023-2024.[62] Zelensky stated that Ukraine will generate up to one gigawatt of gas-fired power generation by the end of 2024 and another four gigawatts in coming years.[63] Advisor to Ukraine's Energy Minister Lana Zerkal noted that Ukraine will not be able to build up to one gigawatt of gas-fired power generation by the end of 2024 and that building up to four gigawatts is an unrealistic expectation given the limited energy equipment manufacturers.[64]

**Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts** (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia may have suffered a damaged or destroyed military naval vessel in the Barents Sea. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on June 10 that the Russian *Admiral Levchenko* Udaloy-class destroyer caught fire in the Barents Sea.[65] Pletenchuk stated that the fire was the result of sanctions preventing Russia from servicing the engines of its naval vessels. ISW has observed no verification of Pletenchuk’s report.

The Russian MoD reported that a tactical strike group of the Russian Northern Fleet, including the *Kazan* Project 885M multi-purpose nuclear-powered missile submarine and the *Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov* Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, are conducting precision missile exercises in the Atlantic Ocean.[66]

*BBC Russian Service* reported that Russia's penal recruitment campaign was so extensive that it forced some Russian penal colonies to close.[67] *BBC Russian Service* published an investigation on June 11 showing that Wagner Group and later Russian MoD recruitment from penal colonies for the war in Ukraine caused a sharp decline in prison populations that led to some Russian penal colonies closing. *BBC Russian Service* reported that all 27 penal colonies of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service combined had a combined population of 12,530 as of January 1, 2024 — a reduction from the January 1, 2023, population of 15,182. *BBC Russia Service* noted that Wagner recruitment was most intense, particularly in Krasnoyarsk Krai. The investigation reported that Wagner recruited over 2,800 prisoners just from Krasnoyarsk Krai and that three penal colonies plan to completely close while two have already partially closed. *BBC Russian Service* reported that other penal colonies in Krasnoyarsk Krai only have populations of 250-500 prisoners despite having maximum capacities of 1,200-1,500 prisoners.

**Russian Technological Adaptations** (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Russian defense companies continue to modify their equipment based on lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. Director of Russian vehicle manufacturer Remdizel, Alexander Zakharov, stated on June 11 that Remdizel has begun producing an updated version of the Z-STS "Akhmat" armored vehicle based on feedback from soldiers using the vehicle in Ukraine.[68] Zakharov stated that Ramdizel will begin serial production of this updated vehicle in 2025.

**Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts** (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

*ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.*

**Activities in Russian-occupied areas** (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Belarusian officials continue to implicate themselves in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus and their re-education in Belarusian programs. Chairman of the Russian-Belarusian "Union" civil initiative Sergei Lushch met with a group of 32 Ukrainian children from occupied Melitopol on June 10 during an "educational trip" to Minsk, Belarus.[69] Lushch noted that the "Union" organization has been working with the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration to organize the trip and emphasized the "patriotic education" of the children during their visit to Belarus. Such "patriotic education" reportedly involves teaching the children about Russian and Belarusian military history within the Kremlin's framing of the Great Patriotic War (World War II). The US Department of State and Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab confirmed in November 2023 that Belarusian officials are involved in Russian efforts to systematically deport Ukrainian children to both Russia and Belarus and facilitate their re-education through various programs in Belarus.[70] ISW has long assessed that Belarusian officials, including Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, are directly involved in the Russian campaign to deport and re-educate Ukrainian children.[71]

Russian officials and media personalities continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia using summer "vacation" camps and "patriotic education" schemes. Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova advertised a summer camp for children from occupied Donetsk Oblast in Russia's Voronezh Oblast and framed the camp as an opportunity for children to rest and recover from living in a war zone.[72] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) media channel *Luhanmedia* reported on June 9 that a group of children aged 8 to 17 from occupied Pervomaisk Raion, Luhansk Oblast, arrived in Kaluga Oblast to attend the "Druzhba" sports and fitness summer camp.[73] *WarGonzo* media project head Semyon Pegov announced on June 9 that he organized a program for teenagers from occupied Ukraine, Belarus, and Abkhazia to visit Smolensk Oblast and gain a "love" for the Russian "Motherland."[74] Pegov noted that the teenagers will learn basic military skills such as tactical medicine and how to operate drones. ISW has continually observed that Russian officials use vacation and military training camps to deport Ukrainian children to Russia and re-educate them according to Russian standards and narratives.[75]

**Russian Information Operations and Narratives**
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov amplified the baseless and boilerplate Kremlin narrative accusing Ukraine and NATO of orchestrating terror attacks against Russia, including the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack.[76] Bortnikov claimed during a Russian National Anti-Terrorism Committee meeting on June 11 that Ukraine, with the support of the United States and NATO, is "increasing efforts to commit terrorist attacks and sabotage on Russian territory" and falsely implicated Ukrainian intelligence in the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack.[77] ISW assessed that the Islamic State's Afghan affiliate IS-K conducted the attack, and there is no evidence that Ukraine was involved in any capacity.[78] The Kremlin frequently weaponizes accusations of terrorism against Ukraine and the West to undermine Western support for Ukraine and pose itself as a victim of Western and Ukrainian aggression.[79]

**Significant activity in Belarus** (*Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus*)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated on June 11 that Belarus will hold its next presidential elections no later than July 20, 2025.[80] Belarus held its last presidential election, which Lukashenko rigged, in August 2020.[81] The Kremlin exploited the 2020 Belarus protest movement to substantially increase Russia’s influence and control over Belarus, and the Kremlin may be planning to exploit any similar protest movement that may occur in 2025.[82]

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that it held the first verification event as part of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) 2011 Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures on Belarusian territory in four years.[83] The Belarusian MoD stated that Serbian representatives assessed and verified the activities of the Belarusian 38th Air Assault Brigade.

**Note:** ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


ook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034UD1aFtwHYBtFLK1aBtoxKUttc3R3Kwd2wb3G2vqCrbm6Qww9hBZZii8cRRbSYwl


[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/39610; https://t.me/vrogov/16077; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18053

[32] https://t.me/motopatriot/23815; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11685

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoNr6ngjud33mwkEGJz5E5NDrSpk7dVqxpAnBK8kyYC1XZRTLg52RzVXHHKH2Hm5H1; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2pS3nxnuuy72Hkb5BX7EqVVzLgX8fHXzKx02prjuyi4W7B3jilLxyUCjh75W6wEKZBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2Zjszjx9gDqYd85Zdw1878rBszgJyvkJwJfxcxv9g8Zaw3kyrZhlQFL6aDAz2xyce5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido34UD1aFtwHYBtFLK1aBtoxKUttc3R3Kwd2wb3G2vqCrbm6Qww9hBZZii8cRRbSYwl; https://t.me/dva_majors/44854

[34] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/14896

[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/44854; https://t.me/rybar/60826; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18049; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56853

[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11713

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido34UD1aFtwHYBtFLK1aBtoxKUttc3R3Kwd2wb3G2vqCrbm6Qww9hBZZii8cRRbSYwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2Zjszjx9gDqYd85Zdw1878rBszgJyvkJwJfxcxv9g8Zaw3kyrZhlQFL6aDAz2xyce5l


[40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1940; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbido5gegRRVtwtZNihwBzqytrvQZVQ2NXHA3WrJYE0SkQLhQY3gsLx2P013CfpNhEkK3l

[41] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1940; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbido5gegRRVtwtZNihwBzqytrvQZVQ2NXHA3WrJYE0SkQLhQY3gsLx2P013CfpNhEkK3l

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2pS3nxnuuy72Hkb5BX7EqVVzLgX8fH XzKx02prjuyi4W7B3jjLyxUCJh75W6wEKZBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pf
[55] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/765769-virisalnu-rol-dla-armii-rf-ci-rubezi-ne-
vidigraut-bratcuk-pro-situaciu-v-rajoni-robotinogo/
[56] https://t.me/philoquist_zov/1020; https://t.me/philoquist_zov/1011
; https://t.me/rogozin_aleksey/2117; https://t.me/rogozin_do/5863
; https://t.me/dva_majors/44185; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-
offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2024
[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/44919 (Western Zaporizhia Oblast)
[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034UD1aFtwHYBtFLK1aBtoxKUttc3R3
Kwdf2wb3G2vqCrbm6Qww9hBZZii8cRRbSYwl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/9903;
[59] https://www.facebook.com/pvkshid/posts/pfbid033yNnWkeSCL9RhmAz6SQ16tC5JMoZgZwRe
MJKYRqoUUkKCLbZeJ4zrofxMspHMcSk
[60] https://t.me/mod_russia/39613 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/254082
[61] https://suspilne dot media/765441-sili-bezpilotnih-sistem-zsu-otrzymali-komanduvaca-u-
brusseli-vibudetsa-zasidanna-ramstajn-839-den-vijni-
onlajn/?anchor=live_1718106504&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[62] https://suspilne dot media/765441-sili-bezpilotnih-sistem-zsu-otrzymali-komanduvaca-u-
brusseli-vibudetsa-zasidanna-ramstajn-839-den-vijni-
onlajn/?anchor=live_1718106504&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/11/zaraz-ukrayina-strazhdaye-vid-najbilsh-
destruktivyanoi-formy-rosijskogo-bachennyia-energiyi-yak-zbroyi-prezydent/
[63] https://suspilne dot media/766235-u-minenergo-zaperecili-zaavu-zelenskogo-pro-te-so-
ukraina-do-kinca-roku-pobude-do-1gvt-gazovoi-manevrenoigeneracii/
[64] https://suspilne dot media/766235-u-minenergo-zaperecili-zaavu-zelenskogo-pro-te-so-
ukraina-do-kinca-roku-pobude-do-1gvt-gazovoi-manevrenoigeneracii/
[65] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/10/ekipazhu-kilka-soten-na-rosiyi-zagorivsyavelykyj-
protychovnovyy-korabel-admiral-levchenko/;
https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=7650262741720728&set=a.1172959746117759
[66] https://t.me/mod_russia/39614
[67] https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c722xqnzog50
[68] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/21064923
[69] https://www.sb dot by/articles/molodezh-iz-melitopolya-priekhala-v-belarus.html;
https://t.me/BalitskyEV/3335


[72] https://t.me/malvovabelova/3429; https://t.me/govrn36/16913

[73] https://t.me/luganmedia/63476

[74] https://t.me/wargonzo/20393


[76] https://t.me/tass_agency/254047; https://t.me/tass_agency/254048; https://t.me/tass_agency/254050; https://t.me/tass_agency/254060

[77] https://www.kommersant.dot.ru/doc/6761779


[82] https://www.understandingwar.org/belarus-warning-updates

[83] https://t.me/modmilby/39423