Russia claimed that Ukraine conducted a series of drone strikes against Moscow on May 30 as Russia again targeted Ukraine with Iranian-made Shahed drones. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of attacking Moscow with eight drones on the morning of May 30, and claimed that Russian forces shot down five of the drones and suppressed three drones with electronic warfare systems.[1] Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyev, however, claimed that Ukraine launched 32 drones of which some targeted the prestigious neighborhood of Rublyovka in Moscow Oblast.[2] A Russian independent outlet claimed that the drone strikes predominantly targeted areas near Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Novo-Ogaryovo and other elite neighborhoods in Moscow Oblast.[3] Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin stated that several buildings in Moscow suffered minor damage, and Russian sources amplified footage of a minor explosion in the Novaya Moskva neighborhood.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed that drones flying over Moscow resembled Ukrainian attack drones.[5] Geolocated footage shows Russian forces shooting down drones identified as Ukrainian by OSINT accounts in several different areas of Moscow and Moscow Oblast.[6] Ukrainian presidential aide Mykhailo Podolyak denied that Ukraine was directly involved in the drone strike but forecasted that there could be an increase in such attacks in the future.[7]

Russian forces conducted another Shahed 131 and 136 drone strike against Kyiv overnight on May 29 to May 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 29 of 31 Russian Shahed 131 and 136 drones that targeted Kyiv.[8] Senior Russian officials claimed that Russian forces struck high profile targets in Kyiv during recent strikes, likely to appear successful in retaliation for the recent Belgorod Oblast incursion.[9] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed that Russian forces struck a Patriot air defense system in recent days. [10] Ukrainian Air Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat denied Shoigu’s claim, however. [11] Russian milbloggers’ recent complaints about the perceived lack of Russian escalation in response to the Belgorod border raid and Moscow drone strikes do not give Russian forces credit for the unprecedented scale of their air campaign against Kyiv. Many milbloggers, including high-profile voices like former Russian officer Igor Girkin and Wagner Group financier Evgeny Prigozhin have frequently and recently complained about the lack of full scale general and economic mobilization in Russia, the only feasible measure...
likely to satisfy the broader information space outcry.[12]

**Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to downplay the drone attack on Moscow to avoid exposing the limited options he has to retaliate against Ukraine.** Putin claimed that Russian forces struck the Ukrainian military intelligence headquarters “two [to] three days ago” and claimed that the Russian Armed Forces continue to respond to Ukraine’s “war against Donbas” by striking Ukrainian military infrastructure.[13] Putin insinuated that the drone strike on Moscow was Kyiv’s response to Russian strikes, and the Russian MoD conveniently claimed on May 30 that Russian forces carried out “a group of strikes with long-range high-precision air-launched weapons at main decision-making centers” in Ukraine.[14] The Russian MoD did not claim that it had struck the Ukrainian military intelligence headquarters recently and there is no available confirmation of Putin’s claim.[15] Putin stated that Ukraine is trying to provoke a response and make Russia “mirror” its actions. Putin’s emphasis on past and ongoing missile strikes is likely an attempt to signal that Russia is already actively retaliating and does not need to respond to further Ukrainian provocations. Putin has consistently retaliated against genuine and purported Ukrainian actions by ordering massive missile and drone campaigns, likely due to Russian forces’ inability to achieve any decisive effects on the battlefield.[16]

Putin additionally pushed numerous Kremlin boilerplate narratives aimed at maintaining domestic support for the Russian war effort and villainizing the West. Putin also noted that, while the Moscow air defense systems “worked normally,” Russia still needs to “work” on improving these systems – a notable attempt to preempt criticism from Russian ultra-nationalists who have been criticizing Russia’s ineffective air defense systems in Moscow and along the Russian border regions with Ukraine.[17] Putin also accused Ukraine of threatening to destabilize the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and using “dirty devices” – both default Russian false narratives that the Kremlin uses during Russian military failures.[18]

**The drone attack on Moscow generated varied responses from the Russian information space.** Moscow Duma Deputy Andrey Medvedev claimed that the Ukrainian forces hurriedly executed the drone attack as part of an information operation with negligible kinetic effects.[19] Some Russian milbloggers used the drone attacks to criticize the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts in April 2022.[20] Igor Girkin used the strikes against Rublyovka to criticize Russian elites who he claimed have “never thought about the country and never will” and will not respond to Ukrainian attacks in Moscow, Belgorod Oblast, or Russian-occupied Ukraine.[21] Girkin also mocked Putin for continuing to assert that the war is a “special military operation,” despite drone attacks on the Russian capital.[22] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin reprimanded the Russian MoD and called on Russian officials to actually defend Russia instead of “sitting quietly.”[23] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov threatened the European countries, claiming that, if they continue to supply Ukraine with weapons, they will not have the weapons needed to defend themselves when Russia “knocks on their doors.”[24]

**The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is likely attempting to conceal the high Russian losses in Ukraine by artificially inflating Ukrainian casualties in the war.** Defense Minister Shoigu claimed on May 30 that Russian forces had destroyed an absurdly high number of Western-provided Ukrainian weapons, including long range missiles, in the past month.[25] Shoigu celebrated claimed successes and training efforts, including by awarding Russian formations and bragging about the upcoming summer military exercises. A Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger criticized Shoigu,
implying that Shoigu’s statements are so unrealistic that they appear to be fake to readers.[26] Dutch open-source group Oryx reported on May 29 that it confirmed that Russia has lost over 2,000 tanks and 2,366 infantry fighting vehicles (including over 850 BMPs) since the war began.[27]

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell stated that Russia will not enter negotiations while trying to win the war, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russian statements expressing willingness to negotiate are part of an ongoing information operation intending to weaken Western willingness to aid Ukraine.[28] Reuters reported on May 29 that Borrell said that Russia has repeatedly signaled that it would not end the war until it achieved its military goals and that it has over 300,000 personnel in Ukraine — twice as many as when the invasion started.[29]

Key Takeaways

• Russia claimed that Ukraine conducted a series of drone strikes against Moscow on May 30 as Russia again targeted Ukraine with Iranian-made Shahed drones.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to downplay the drone attack on Moscow to avoid exposing the limited options he has to retaliate against Ukraine.
• The drone attack on Moscow generated varied responses from the Russian information space.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is likely attempting to conceal the high Russian losses in Ukraine by artificially inflating Ukrainian casualties in the war.
• EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell stated that Russia will not enter negotiations while trying to win the war.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupynas and northwest of Svatove, and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted a ground attack south of Kremmina.
• The tempo of Russian and Ukrainian offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction remains low as of May 30.
• Russian forces made marginal advances amid continued ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks along the southern axis.
• Russian officials are establishing domestic veteran support programs which likely aim to advertise the perks of military service in Russia.
• Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of providing pediatric healthcare.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and
specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

**Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Svatove on May 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk), Krokhmalne (20km northwest of Svatove), and Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove).[30] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor reported that Russian forces conducted offensive actions near Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove).[31] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces are gradually advancing in Masyutivka.[32] ISW has still not observed visual confirmation of any Russian advances in or control over Masyutivka. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks south of Kreminna on May 30. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are storming Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and encircling the Ukrainian forces.[33] ISW has not seen visual confirmation supporting a Russian advance near Bilohorivka. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russian forces face difficulties in staffing regular units and instead use Chechen Akhmat forces, Cossacks, territorial defense units, BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) formations, and Storm-Z units.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group unsuccessfully attempted to cross the border between Ukraine and Russia near Zelene (34km northeast of Kharkiv City).[35]
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansks Oblast as of May 30, 2023, 3:00 PM ET

Map by Geovir Barros, Katerina Stempelaar, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Meaux, Thomas Regan, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

The tempo of Russian and Ukrainian offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction remains low as of May 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on May 30.[36] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are replacing and regrouping their forces in the Bakhmut direction, and that Ukrainian forces are focusing on other tasks and have not advanced in the northern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut for several days.[37] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces obliterated Wagner Group’s offensive capabilities and that Ukrainian strikes against Russian forces inflict significant casualties – 80 killed and 119 injured as of May 30 – as Wagner forces conduct their relief in place.[38] Cherevaty stated that only two or three engagements occurred in the Bakhmut direction in recent days and no combat clashes occurred on May 30. Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks, however. The Russian Southern Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadim Astafyev claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian ground attacks in the Soledar-Bakhmut direction, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks near Andriivka and Klishchiivka (both within 7km south of Bakhmut).[39] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and Orihovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[40]

Russian forces made marginal advances amid continued ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on May 30. Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces made marginal advances southwest of Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) near the E50 highway as of May 29.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Sievne (5km west of Avdiivka), Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City), and in the city of Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[42] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted 12 ground attacks in the Avdiivka direction and 12 attacks in the Marinka direction in the past day.[43] Ukrainian Defense Forces Tavriisk Direction Spokesperson Valeriy Shershen stated that Russian “Storm” and “Storm-Z” units are mainly storming Marinka.[44] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 30. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempted to advance near Velyka Novosilka (32km northwest of Vuhledar) and fighting intensified near Vuhledar.[45] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces forced Russian forces to retreat from the southwestern dacha area of Mykilske (4km southwest of Vuhledar) across the Kashlahach River. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.[46]
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of May 30, 2023, 3:00 PM ET

Map by George Barros, Katerina Stepantenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Medalie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Ukrainian Control over Russian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks along the southern axis on May 30. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are conducting defensive operations in the southern operational direction in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian forces continued to conduct regular indirect fire against Ukrainian-
held settlements across the southern frontline.[48]

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck objects along the southern axis. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on May 30 that Ukrainian forces are striking roads and bridges in Russian-occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and struck the road connecting Russian-occupied Vasylivka and Dniprorudne.[49] Rogov also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Mykhailivka (about 45km north of Melitopol) on May 30.[50] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that Ukrainian forces struck Mykhailivka on May 29 and 30.[51] Geolocated images posted on May 29 reportedly show damage from a Ukrainian HIMARS strike against a parking lot with Russian cars in Mykhailivka.[52] Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian-occupied building in Yurivka (on the coast of the Sea of Azov, about 30km west of Mariupol).[53] Images that surfaced on May 30 reportedly show a destroyed Russian 55K6A command post vehicle for the S-400 air defense system which Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed in an unspecified area in Kherson Oblast on May 20.[54]

Chechen elements are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv area in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of May 30. Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov posted footage on May 29 and 30 reportedly showing the Yug-Akhmat Battalion operating in the Orikhiv direction.[55]
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of May 30, 2023, 3:00 PM ET

Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelson, Daniel Mosley, Thomas Bergeron, and Michel Bedelger – © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Pakistani Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

Legend:
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials are establishing domestic veteran support programs, which likely aim to advertise the perks of military service in Russia. A Kremlin-affiliated source claimed that the first branches of
the “Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation” will open on June 1 and over 3,000 coordinators will help veterans apply for social benefits.[56] The source claimed that the foundation was created on behalf of Russian President Vladimir Putin and that no similar foundations existed in Russia after World War II, Afghanistan, or the Chechen wars. The wife of the Kemerovo Oblast Governor, Anna Tsivileva, is the chairperson of the “Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation.” Russian opposition sources previously revealed that Tsivileva is Putin’s great niece.[57]

The Russian MoD is reportedly continuing to recruit prisoners from regional penitentiaries. A Russian independent outlet reported that Russian Penitentiary Service employees opened recruitment points in prisons and are recruiting prisoners who committed less serious crimes for contract service.[58] The penitentiary service employees reportedly recruit prisoners with alcoholism and drug problems.

Russian military spending has reportedly (and unsurprisingly) increased since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The UK MoD cited research from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute that found that Russian military spending grew by 9.2 percent in 2022 to $86.4 billion – or an estimated 4.1 percent of Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[59] The UK MoD assessed that Russian military spending is likely higher than stated because the Russian federal budget information lacks transparency.

The Wagner Group continues to weaponize social media to facilitate global recruitment campaigns. Politico, citing UK disinformation research group Logically, reported that Wagner is using Twitter and Facebook to recruit personnel.[60] The report showed that Wagner posted sixty recruitment posts in dozens of languages, including French, Vietnamese, and Spanish, advertising combat, medical, and IT jobs in the Wagner private military company (PMC). Wagner is also launching a new project called the “Second Front” aimed at mobilizing Russian society and the information space to resolve issues on the frontlines.[61] Wagner-affiliated sources claimed that the “Second Front” will bring attention to “subjective reality” on the frontlines and fight against fake information in the Russian information space.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of providing pediatric healthcare. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate children from occupied Ukraine to Russia for treatment and use prophylactic medical examinations to coerce children's parents and legal guardians to apply for Russian citizenship.[62] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that Russian occupation authorities are forcing parents to submit Russian citizenship applications for their children under 14 years old seeking treatment under threat of terminating parental rights. The Kherson Oblast Occupation Ministry of Health claimed that Russian doctors have performed 15,287 examinations on children in occupied Kherson Oblast since November 2022, resulting in 81 children referred for treatment in federal medical facilities in Russia.[63] ISW has previously reported on Russian occupation authorities deporting Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of needing more advanced healthcare.[64]
Russian sources claimed that Russian law enforcement arrested a Ukrainian woman in Moscow who attempted to retrieve her godchildren from Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast. Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti reported on May 30 that Russian law enforcement arrested a woman who claimed to be visiting Moscow to retrieve two Ukrainian children “without parental care” from Henichesk, occupied Kherson Oblast, on the instructions of the Save Ukraine Foundation, which helps return Ukrainian children from Russia and Russian occupied areas.[65] BBC’s Russia service reported that the woman was attempting to retrieve her godchildren and that Russian law enforcement released the woman but did not allow her to take her two godchildren with her.[66]

Russian authorities continue attempts to integrate Ukrainian children into Russian culture and society in Russian occupied areas of Ukraine. Kherson Oblast Occupation Ministry of Education and Science claimed that 29 child members of the Russian Movement of Children and Youth of Kherson Oblast attended the “Movement of the First” festival in Moscow.[67] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation authorities plan to open branches of the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) in Donetsk Oblast in an attempt to promote Kremlin ideology among youth and encourage them to obtain Russian passports.[68] ISW has previously reported on Russia’s efforts to Russify Ukrainian youth in occupied territories.[69]

The Kremlin is likely attempting to forcibly populate occupied Ukraine with Russian citizens while also bolstering the number of medical workers near the front. First Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma's Committee on International Affairs Leonid Slutsky reportedly stated that the Russian State Duma is discussing legislation that would distribute graduates of medical universities to occupied Ukraine.[70] The law would require graduates of medical universities to work for one and a half years in the Russian Far East and in Russian-occupied Ukraine.[71] ISW has previously reported that Russian officials reduced the training periods for Russian healthcare workers to compensate for a lack of medical workers among Russian forces in Ukraine.[72]

**Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).**

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Unspecified Belarusian missile force elements operating Russian-provided Iskander missiles – likely of Belarus 465th Missile Brigade – conducted a command-and-control training lesson for conducting missile strikes in an unspecified location in Belarus on May 30.[73] Belarus’ 465th Missile Brigade reportedly began operating Russian-provided Iskander systems as of February 1, 2023.[74]

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**
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