



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

**Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, and George Barros
with Nate Trotter and William Runkel**

March 9, 2025, 6:00 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on March 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.


Russian forces are collapsing the northern part of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast following several days of intensified Russian activity in the area. Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces seized Novaya Sorochina (northwest of Sudzha), Malaya Loknya (just south of Novaya Sorochina), and Lebedevka (south of Malaya Loknya), and the fields between the settlements.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Malaya Loknya and that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) seized Lebedevka.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pravda and Ivashkovshyi (both north of Sudzha) and positions along an unspecified area of the railway line between Malaya Loknya and Sudzha.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) participated in the seizure of Kubatkin (north of Sudzha) and Pravda and that additional elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are advancing into Kazachya Loknya (north of Sudzha) from Lebedevka.[4] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops hold limited positions in Malaya Loknya, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Martynovka (north east of Sudzha) but that most Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from positions in the northern part of the salient towards Kazachya Loknya and Sudzha.[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that preparatory Russian efforts to destroy the bridges north and south of Sudzha have significantly complicated Ukraine's ability

to withdraw back to Sudzha.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Malaya Loknya.[7]

Russian forces reportedly advanced in Sudzha itself with support from North Korean forces. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into the industrial area in northeastern Sudzha and that Russian forces maintain positions in the town along the east bank of the Sudzha River.[8] One Russian milblogger claimed that some areas of the industrial zone are a contested "gray zone." [9] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to advance into central Sudzha and crossed to the west bank of the Sudzha River in at least one place in the town.[10] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced into Knyazhiy 1 and Knyazhiy 2 (both northwest of Sudzha) and the Zamoste Microraion in southeastern Sudzha.[11] Ukrainian sources told the Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* on March 9 that up to two battalions of North Korean forces operating near Sudzha appear to be better trained and "acting more coherently." [12]

Russian forces recently advanced just across the international border of the Kursk Oblast salient into Sumy Oblast and reportedly advanced south of Sudzha City. Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Novenke (northeast of Sumy City and just across the international border in Sumy Oblast).[13] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced to Melavoy (south of Sudzha) and Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha).[14] A Ukrainian soldier operating in Kursk Oblast stated that Russian forces advanced south of Sudzha due to support from North Korean forces and Russian forces' "massive" use of first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked near the Sudzha border checkpoint (southwest of Sudzha along the H-07 highway) and that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) attacked near Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[16] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Melovoy and Goncharovka (immediately west of Sudzha).[17]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction March 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



The temporal correlation between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine and the start of Russia's collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk salient is noteworthy. Russia has been attempting to push Ukrainian forces from the salient in Kursk Oblast through slow, grinding advances since the incursion began in August 2024. Russia later deployed roughly 12,000 North Korean military personnel in October 2024 to assist in repelling the incursion, but Russian forces continued to make only gradual gains.[18] The Trump administration suspended US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 5, although there continue to be conflicting reports about the details about the US suspension.[19] Russian forces intensified offensive operations to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on March 6 and 7.[20] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence started reporting more rapid Russian advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5.[21] A source in the Ukrainian government stated in a March 8 *Time* article that the US

intelligence sharing suspension has impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most.[22] The Russian military has not previously prioritized the effort to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast over making further advances in eastern Ukraine despite concentrating a sufficient force grouping to do so in late 2024.[23] A direct link between the suspension of US intelligence sharing and the start of the collapse of Ukraine's salient in Kursk Oblast is unclear, although Kremlin officials have recently announced their intention to take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to "inflict maximum damage" to Ukrainian forces "on the ground" during the limited time frame before the possible future resumption of US intelligence sharing and military aid to Ukraine.[24]

Reports about the extent of the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine continue to indicate that the suspension will likely affect Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia. *Forbes* stated on March 7 that the Trump administration has halted US support for Ukraine's F-16 fighter jet radar jammers.[25] The *Wall Street Journal* reported on March 8 that a source familiar with the matter stated that Ukraine is currently able to fire one artillery shell for every three that Russian forces fire – even with Ukraine's current supplies of US shells.[26] The suspension of US support to Ukrainian F-16 radar jammers will likely hamper Ukraine's ability to continue to use the aircraft to defend against Russian strikes into Ukraine's rear.[27] Ukrainian officials indicated in December 2024 that Ukrainian forces had been able to gain an artillery advantage of 1.5 to one or three-to-one in some areas of the front, and Russia's current artillery advantage over Ukraine will likely continue to grow as Ukraine's stockpiles of US ammunition decrease further following the US suspension of military aid.

Ukraine's European allies continue to provide material and financial aid to Ukraine. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu announced on March 8 that France will use accrued interest from frozen Russian assets to provide Ukraine with military aid worth 195 million euros (roughly \$211 million).[28] Lecornu noted that the funds will facilitate France's delivery of 155mm artillery shells and AASM Hammer missiles to Ukraine, which are compatible with Ukraine's French-supplied Mirage 2000 fighter jets. Lecornu added that France is accelerating the transfer of unspecified older armored fighting vehicles to Ukraine. Norway's Parliament agreed on March 6 to increase military aid to Ukraine to a total of 85 billion Norwegian kroner (roughly \$7.8 billion) in 2025 - an increase from Norway's November 2024 pledge to allocate roughly 35 billion Norwegian kroner (roughly \$3.2 billion).[29]

Ukraine's European partners may be able to independently supply commercially available satellite imagery to Ukraine amid the suspension of Ukraine's access to US portals with such imagery. The *Financial Times* reported on March 8 that Anders Linder, the head of the international division of commercial satellite imagery supplier Maxar Technologies, stated that any of Maxar's commercial customers – including US allies and partners – can use the data that they purchase from Maxar "however they see fit," including by "sharing it with their allies, such as Ukraine." [30] *Politico* reported on March 7 that Maxar stated that the Trump administration had "decided to temporarily suspend Ukrainian accounts in G-EGD" - the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's (NGA) Global Enhanced GEOINT Delivery System, which is the main portal for accessing commercial imagery that the US government has purchased.[31] European states have reportedly been discussing ways to compensate for the intelligence that the US has stopped providing Ukraine.[32]


Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite ongoing bilateral talks between the United States and Russia. Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran announced on March 9 the opening of their annual trilateral “Maritime Security Belt – 2025” naval exercise in Chabahar Port, Iran.[33] Iranian state-affiliated media outlet *Mehr News Agency* stated that the exercises will begin on March 11.[34] Russia, the PRC, and Iran conducted the exercise in 2019, 2022, 2023, and 2024, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the objective of the exercise is to “ensure maritime security, combat piracy and terrorism at sea, and protect sea communications.”[35] The PRC MoD claimed that the exercises are aimed at “deepening mutual trust and pragmatic cooperation between the armed forces of the three countries.”[36]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian forces are collapsing the northern part of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast following several days of intensified Russian activity in the area.**
- **The temporal correlation between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine and the start of Russia's collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk salient is noteworthy.**
- **Reports about the extent of the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine continue to indicate that the suspension will likely affect Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia.**
- **Ukraine's European allies continue to provide material and financial aid to Ukraine.**
- **Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite ongoing bilateral talks between the United States and Russia.**
- **Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kursk oblasts and near Siversk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Robotyne.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

March 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for updates on Russian offensive operations in Kursk and Sumy oblasts.

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against oil and industry infrastructure in Russia on the night of March 8 to 9. Head of Ukraine’s Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on March 9 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant (NLMK) in Lipetsk Oblast.[37] Kovalenko noted that the NLMK is one of the largest metallurgical enterprises in Russia and supplies the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). The NLMK reportedly produces steel and rolled products for military equipment, armored vehicles, and shipbuilding and metal used in combat vehicle hulls, aircraft, and missiles. The NLMK also repairs and modernizes armored vehicles. Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamanov claimed on the night of March 8 that there was a drone strike against Lipetsk Oblast and that specialists were working at the drone crash site at an unspecified location.[38] Chuvashia Republic Head Oleg Nikolaev claimed on March 9 that Russian authorities found a drone at the "Burevestnik Combine" oil depot in Cheboksary, Chuvashia Republic, which Nikolaev stated is currently undergoing reconstruction.[39] *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*’s northwestern Russia service *Sever Realii* reported that this was the first time a Ukrainian drone flew to the Chuvashia Republic.[40] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces shot down 13 drones over Lipetsk Oblast overnight but did not report the downing of any drones over Chuvashia Republic.[41]


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 9.[42]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated that Russian convict recruits with a maximum of two weeks of training are operating in the Kharkiv direction.[43]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 9 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) advanced between Fyholivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and the Oskil River within the last several days.[44]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Petro-Ivanivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on March 8 and 9.[45]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are accumulating forces in the area to conduct an assault during future favorable weather conditions.[46] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces usually conduct small infantry assaults and rarely use motorcycles, buggies, or armored vehicles. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces conduct five to seven attacks in the area per day and that the infantry suffers casualties of 80 to 90 percent during the assaults.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast March 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of northeast of Borova near Lozova, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove on March 8 and 9.[47]


Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are attacking toward Zahryzove and Kolysnykivka (both northeast of Borova).[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the 4th Tank Division and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st GTA, MMD) are operating along the Lozova-Kopanky line (northeast and east of Borova).

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman toward Nove and Zelena Dolyna and northeast of Lyman near Myrne, Yampolivka, Zhuravka (formerly Nevske), Ivanivka, and Kolodyazi, and toward Novomykhailivka; and east of Lyman near Torske on March 8 and 9.[49]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd and 144th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Makiivka (northeast of Lyman) and Ivanivka.[50] Mashovets reported that elements of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division and 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating along the Terny-Yampolivka-Torske line (northeast to east of Lyman). Mashovets stated that the seam between the areas of responsibility (AoRs) of the 1st GTA and the 20th CAA is located near Lozova and that the 1st GTA is attacking the Kruhlyakivka salient (northeast of Borova) while the 20th CAA is attacking toward Lyman.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction March 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk).[51]

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, in the direction of Serebryanka, and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on March 9.[52]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued assaults in Chasiv Yar itself, including in the Zakhidne Selishche Microraiion in western Chasiv Yar; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka; and south of Chasiv Yar towards Stupochky and Bila Hora on March 8 and 9.[53]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 9 that elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are unsuccessfully attacking in northern Chasiv Yar and near Hryhorivka.[54] Mashovets stated that elements of the 299th and 331st VDV regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division) and the Russian Volunteer Corps are attacking in Chasiv Yar.

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in central Toretsk and retook the Avanhard Stadium in central Toretsk.[55]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Toretsk.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Toretsk itself and northeast of Toretsk near Druzhba and Dachne on March 8 and 9.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in unspecified areas of Toretsk and that there are many contested "gray zones" in the settlement.[58]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on March 9 that Russian forces are attempting to use motorcycles – instead of slow-moving tanks – to evade Ukrainian drone strikes while traveling within and near Toretsk.[59]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments and 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[60]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Toretsk March 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Polova Street in southeastern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and south of the settlement.[61]


Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Vidrozhenya (formerly Novyi Trud); southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, Novooleksandrivka, Troitske, and Bohdanivka; and northwest of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on March 8 and 9.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that a column of eight pieces of Russian

equipment attacked towards Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk).[63] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Uspenivka[64] (southwest of Pokrovsk) and Shevchenko.[65]

Mashovets reported on March 9 that elements of the Russian 41st and 2nd CAAs (both CMD) are trying to regain positions near Kotlyne, Pishchane, Shevchenko, Uspenivka, and Dachenske that Russian forces lost after successful Ukrainian counterattacks.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have the initiative south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Novyi Trud, and Zelene.[67] The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are mostly using civilian vehicles and that Ukrainian forces are striking Russian vehicles operating on the ground lines of communications (GLOCs) running between Selydove (south of Pokrovsk in the Russian rear) and the frontline.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Shevchenko, and elements of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Uspenivka.[69]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction March 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 9 shows Russian servicemembers raising Russian flags in central and southwestern Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[70] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 9 that Russian forces seized Kostyantynopil.[71]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Ulakly, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 8 and 9.[72]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 9 that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) do not fully occupy Andriivka (north of Kostyantynopil).[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) and 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in and near Kostyantynopil.[74]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya and Skudne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on March 8 and 9.[75]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in the Hulyaipole direction on March 9.


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Hulyaipole.[76]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Robotyne.[77]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Pyatykhatky and toward Kamyanske and northeast of Robotyne near Charivne on March 8 and 9.[78]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction March 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in the Kherson direction on March 9.

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on March 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system in an unspecified location in southern Ukraine.[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[80]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction March 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 119 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[81] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 73 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 37 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian

officials reported that Russian drones damaged energy and civilian infrastructure in Donetsk, Cherkasy, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[82]

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on March 9 that Russian forces recently launched one Kh-31P anti-radiation missile at Odesa Oblast on an unspecified date.[83]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on March 9 that Russian forces launched 1,200 glide bombs, almost 870 drones, and over 80 missiles of various types at Ukrainian targets over the past week (from March 2 to March 9).[84]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion stated on March 9 that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables have several disadvantages.[85] Russian forces cannot remotely detonate the drone if the fiber optic cable breaks, Ukrainian armored vehicles equipped with nets often catch the drones, and Russian forces often have to launch three to four strikes in order to hit one armored vehicle.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



BABEL STREET

[1] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8583; <https://t.me/epoddubny/22733>; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8585; <https://t.me/sashakots/52379>; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8569; https://t.me/joLa16gzq_MoYjAy/6437

[2] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87555>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87607>; https://t.me/dva_majors/66248; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25064>; https://t.me/voin_dv/13805; https://t.me/frontline_pvt/6677; https://t.me/dva_majors/66213

[3] https://t.me/rusich_army/21480; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33237>; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22378; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33239>

[4] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157148; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33239>

[5] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21687>; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/50624; <https://t.me/rybar/68675>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62696>; https://t.me/veterany_60omsb/2286; https://t.me/rusich_army/21480; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21687>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25052>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33206>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21668>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21669>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21637>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21675>

[6] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/50624; <https://t.me/rybar/68675>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21687>; https://t.me/ne_rybar/6247; <https://t.me/rybar/68687>

[7] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21687>

[8] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62696>; https://t.me/veterany_60omsb/2286; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21687>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33208>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21632>

[9] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62696>; https://t.me/veterany_60omsb/2286

[10] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21687>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21660>

[11] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21632>; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20787; <https://t.me/milinfo/143506>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21632>

[12] <https://suspilne dot media/965967-situaciu-zminili-vijskovi-z-kndr-so-vidbuvaetsa-u-kurskij-oblasti/>; <https://suspilne dot media/sumy/965923-u-kurskij-oblasti-rf-trivaut-vazki-boi-so-narazi-vidomo-pro-situaciu/>

[13] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8567; https://t.me/alkor_aero/123

[14] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21656>; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20786

[15] <https://suspilne dot media/965967-situaciu-zminili-vijskovi-z-kndr-so-vidbuvaetsa-u-kurskij-oblasti/>

- [16] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62696> ; https://t.me/veterany_600msb/2286 ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33228> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25052> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21632>
- [17] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21660> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21687>
- [18] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar101124> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar102424> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar102824>
- [19] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2025>
- [20] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2025>
- [21] <https://deepstatemap dot live/en#11/51.2526759/35.1933289>
- [22] <https://time.com/7265679/satellites-front-failing-hundreds-dead-fallout-trump-ukraine-aid-pause/> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2025>
- [23] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-kursk-incursion-six-month-assessment>
- [24] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030525>
- [25] <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2025/03/07/france-to-the-rescue-french-made-mirage-2000-jets-could-become-ukraines-most-important-aerial-radar-jammers/>
- [26] <https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-russia-ukraine-arms-intelligence-32855af8>
- [27] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725>
- [28] <https://www.latribune dot fr/la-tribune-dimanche/politique/sebastien-lecornu-ministre-des-armees-nous-ne-sommes-pas-en-guerre-nous-voulons-garantir-la-paix-1020145.html>
- [29] <https://t.me/verkhovnaradaukrainy/78009>
- [30] <https://www.ft.com/content/80197b97-c9a0-4dd2-ba26-2a43116e9228>
- [31] <https://www.politico.eu/article/us-satellite-company-maxar-cuts-off-ukraine-access-imagery-report-says/>
- [32] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2025>

- [33] <https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23346799> ; <http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16373805.html> ; https://t.me/mod_russia/49913 ; <https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-russia-china-to-hold-joint-military-exercises/8004134.html>
- [34] <https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/229405/Iran-China-Russia-to-hold-joint-naval-drill> ; <https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/09/rossiya-kitay-i-iran-provedut-sovmestnye-ucheniya-v-indiyskom-okeane>
- [35] <https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/09/rossiya-kitay-i-iran-provedut-sovmestnye-ucheniya-v-indiyskom-okeane>
- [36] <https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/09/rossiya-kitay-i-iran-provedut-sovmestnye-ucheniya-v-indiyskom-okeane> ; <http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16373805.html>
- [37] <https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8947>
- [38] https://t.me/igor_artamonov48/4093; https://t.me/igor_artamonov48/4094 ; https://t.me/igor_artamonov48/4096
- [39] <https://t.me/oanikolaev/8290>
- [40] <https://t.me/severrealii/29871>
- [41] https://t.me/mod_russia/49893
- [42] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoqyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21815>
- [43] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/09/na-harkivskomu-napryamku-vorog-prosytsya-v-polon-cherez-holod-ta-nestachu-yizhi-rechnyk-pro-diyi-protyvnyka/>
- [44] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2610>
- [45] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoqyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21815> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2puPfysraYDwoyVviQi8UFyKb1PRqGhvL8YpedrgtwK61SjzfAr2wX7Aiqx7MHYbml>
- [46] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/09/chekayut-shhob-vse-pidsohlo-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-taktyku-nakopychennya-zs-rf-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/>
- [47] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoqyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21815> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2puPfysraYDwoyVviQi8UFyKb1PRqGhvL8YpedrgtwK61SjzfAr2wX7Aiqx7MHYbml>

[48] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2610>

[49] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoqyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl>

; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21815> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2puPphysraYDwoyVviQi8UFyKb1PRqGhvL8YpedrgtwK61SjfzAr2wX7Aiqx7MHYbml>

[50] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2611>

[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8577; https://t.me/spear_group_b/34

[52] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoqyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66202

[53] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoqyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21815> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2puPphysraYDwoyVviQi8UFyKb1PRqGhvL8YpedrgtwK61SjfzAr2wX7Aiqx7MHYbml> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66202 ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/25171>

[54] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2611>

[55] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1898704854001832209>; <https://t.me/KykyshkaBpLA/790>

[56] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1898528880966701219>

[57] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoqyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21815>

; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2puPphysraYDwoyVviQi8UFyKb1PRqGhvL8YpedrgtwK61SjfzAr2wX7Aiqx7MHYbml>

[58] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62706>

[59] https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2025/03/09/sumnivne-shhastya-rechnyk-pro-sproby-okupantiv-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-shturmuvaty-nashi-pozycziyi-na-motoczyklah/

[60] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13520

[61] <https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1898670121947988181>; https://t.me/Sib_army/4132 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26273 ; <https://t.me/Airborne1126/24009>

[62] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoqyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl> https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26273 ; <https://t.me/Airborne1126/24009> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21815> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2puPphysraYDwoyVviQi8UFyKb1PRqGhvL8YpedrgtwK61SjfzAr2wX7Aiqx7MHYbml> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33229> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62699> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/21685>

[63] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33260>

[64] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2612>

[65] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2612>

[66] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2612>

[67] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21685>

[68] https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2025/03/09/skoro-yizdytymut-na-vislyukah-68-brygada-pro-zabezpechenist-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/

[69] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21685>

[70] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8578; https://t.me/voin_dv/13803

[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/49900 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/49901 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/49907

[72] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoqyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21815> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2puPfysraYDwoyVviQi8UFyKb1PRqGhvL8YpedrgtwK61SjfzAr2wX7Aiqx7MHYbml> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/25171> ; <https://t.me/sashakots/52376>

[73] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25055>

[74] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13519

[75] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoqyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21815> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2puPfysraYDwoyVviQi8UFyKb1PRqGhvL8YpedrgtwK61SjfzAr2wX7Aiqx7MHYbml> ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12206 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/304720

[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/13797

[77] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26278; https://t.me/Ronins44_65/466;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8575

[78] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoqyyFETrhmXEuC53rRVYkQFAJ6uEKumxeGApzsEGQxgXvrQk21sRL4ejec9fnRqsGl>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21815>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2puPfysraYDwoyVviQi8UFyKb1PRqGhvL8YpedrgtwK61SjfzAr2wX7Aiqx7MHYbml>
; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12206; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87561>; https://t.me/dva_majors/66202;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25058>

[79] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12204

[80] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12620

[81] <https://t.me/kpszsu/30278>

[82] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02puPfysraYDwoyVviQi8UFyKb1PRqGhVl8YpedrgtwK61SjfzAr2wX7Aiqx7MHYbml> ; <https://t.me/synegubov/13400> ; <https://t.me/synegubov/13400> ; https://suspilne dot media/966023-prosuvanna-rf-u-kurskij-oblasti-nazvanij-sklad-delegacii-ukraini-na-peregovorah-u-saudivskij-aravii-1110-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1741505718&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; <https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/21479> ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/17088 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/17089 ; <https://t.me/kpszsu/30278>

[83] <https://www.facebook.com/PvKPivden/posts/pfbid028jPqHCE1cb2ktD3zEVwPFe4NtC6VUdBtUd6hgmZ7rDEsvk2yyVJS4wuyPRN7kRZl>

[84] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13514

[85] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/09/perevaga-staye-nedolikom-u-zsu-poyasnyly-chomu-optovolokonni-drony-buvayut-vkraj-neeefektyvnym/> ; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PL5TmMV8NU>