The Russian military reportedly redeployed a battalion of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division to Kursk Oblast as part of a larger ongoing Russian effort to gather an operationally significant force for a possible future Russian offensive operation against northeastern Ukraine and Kharkiv City. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 5 that the Russian military has gathered roughly 50,000 personnel in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts as part of its Northern Grouping of Forces.[1] Mashovets stated that the Russian military has concentrated over 31,000 troops in Belgorod Oblast; over 10,000 troops in Kursk Oblast; and over 8,000 troops in Bryansk Oblast.[2] Mashovets noted that an unspecified VDV battalion is part of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast, and a Russian milblogger, who has an avowed bias against the VDV and “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, claimed on May 5 that the Russian 104th VDV Regiment’s (76th VDV Division) 3rd VDV battalion is currently in Kursk Oblast.[3] Elements of the 104th Regiment were previously operating in Zaporizhia Oblast as of February and March 2024, suggesting that elements of the 104th Regiment recently redeployed from southern Ukraine to Russia’s border with northeastern Ukraine.[4] ISW recently observed unconfirmed reports that the Russian military is redeploying elements of the 76th and 7th VDV divisions from Zaporizhia Oblast to various new directions, including eastern Ukraine, but has not observed visual confirmation that elements of the 104th VDV Regiment are operating in Kursk Oblast.[5][6]

The Russian military is reportedly preparing and forming the Northern Grouping of Forces from elements of the Leningrad Military District (LMD) to primarily operate in the Belgorod-Kharkiv operational direction. Mashovets noted that Russian forces are continuing to transfer newly formed military units of the Russian 44th Army Corps [AC] (LMD) to the Northern Grouping of Forces. Mashovets stated that the Russian military transferred manpower and
equipment of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) and the 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade to the Northern Grouping of Forces as of May 3.[7] Mashovets stated that the Russian military is pretending to unload troops and equipment redeploying to the Northern Grouping of Forces at railway stations in isolated areas of Kursk Oblast, only to then have Russian forces march to their deployment points in Belgorod Oblast. Mashovets noted that elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment first redeployed to the Kursk Railway Station but then deployed further to Belgorod Oblast, to possibly head to staging areas near Kharkiv Oblast. Mashovets also observed that Russian forces recently intensified air, drone, and missile strikes against northeastern Ukrainian border regions such as Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts. Mashovets echoed ISW’s assessment that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces would likely be unable to conduct a successful offensive operation to seize Kharkiv City and suggested that elements of the Russian 11th AC, 44th AC, and 6th CAA (all LMD) may attempt to conduct limited offensive actions or cross border raids into Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts in the future.[8] Ukrainian officials have increasingly warned about the threat of a possible future Russian offensive operation to seize Kharkiv City.[9] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military lacks the forces necessary to seize the city but that Russian offensive operations against Kharkiv or Sumy cities would draw and fix Ukrainian forces from other, more critical parts of the frontline.[10]

**US officials continue to signal their support for new Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2025, although ISW continues to assess that Ukraine should contest the theater-wide initiative as soon as possible because ceding the theater-wide initiative to Russia for the entirety of 2024 will present Russia with several benefits.** The Financial Times (FT) reported on May 5 that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that Ukraine will look to conduct a counteroffensive operation to recapture Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory in 2025 after using US military assistance to blunt further Russian advances in 2024.[11] Sullivan stated that he expects Russian forces to continue making marginal advances for an unspecified time and noted that US military assistance will not “instantly flip the switch” on the battlefield situation in Ukraine. Sullivan stated that US military assistance will empower Ukrainian forces to “hold the line” and withstand Russian assaults throughout the rest of 2024. ISW continues to assess that it will likely take several additional weeks for Western weapons and ammunition to arrive to frontline Ukrainian units and begin to have tangible battlefield impacts and that the arrival of US military aid to Ukraine will likely allow Ukrainian forces to stabilize the frontline and seize the initiative.[12]

FT reported in January 2024 that US officials advocated for Ukraine to conduct a more “conservative” “active defense” in 2024 and prepare for a counteroffensive in 2025.[13] ISW has previously argued at length that a Ukrainian “active defense” into 2025 would cede the theater-wide initiative to Russian forces for over a year, allowing the Russian command to shape preferable conditions by determining the timing, location, and intensity, of Russian attacks, and in by doing so control the resources that Ukrainian forces expend over this protracted period.[14] A Russian milblogger positively responded to FT’s May 5 report and stated that Russian forces can simply conduct glide bomb air strikes against Ukrainian positions for the remainder of 2024 if Ukrainian forces are not going to launch a counteroffensive operation that pressures Russian forces this year.[15] Tactically significant Russian advances northwest of Avdiivka and the potential threat of a Russian offensive operation against Kharkiv Oblast are directly linked to Russian forces’ ability to indiscriminately conduct glide bomb
strikes along the frontline, constrained and degraded Ukrainian defensive operations, and Russia’s control over the theater-wide initiative. Ukrainian forces will of course have to receive and integrate US military assistance to frontline units, stabilize the frontline, defend against the predicted summer Russian offensive effort, prevent operationally significant Russian advances, and address their ongoing manpower challenges before they will be able to contest the theater-wide initiative and conduct a counteroffensive operation later in 2024 or 2025.[16] Ukraine’s ability to liberate its territory and conduct counteroffensive operations rests on a number of unmade decisions in the West, Russia, and Ukraine and any external efforts to impose a timeline on Ukrainian counteroffensive operations ignore the reality of the battlefield situation.

European intelligence agencies reportedly warned their governments that Russia is planning to conduct “violent acts of sabotage” across Europe as part of a “more aggressive and concerted effort” against the West. The Financial Times (FT) reported on May 5, citing unspecified European intelligence officials, that Russia has been actively preparing “covert bombings, arson attacks, and damage to infrastructure” in Europe using its own forces and proxies.[17] German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) Thomas Haldenwang stated that the BfV assesses that there is a “significantly increased” risk of Russian state-controlled acts of sabotage on European territory. An unspecified senior European government official stated that NATO-member security services’ information sharing indicated coordinated Russian sabotage efforts “at scale.” NATO recently reported that it is “deeply concerned” about intensifying Russian hybrid operations on NATO member territory and that these operations constitute a threat to the alliance’s security.[18] FT reported that German authorities recently arrested two individuals on charges of allegedly planning to attack German military and logistics sites for Russia and that the United Kingdom (UK) accused two individuals of working for Russia after they were charged with setting fire to a warehouse containing aid for Ukraine.[19] ISW also observed recent reports that the Kremlin is pursuing hybrid operations against NATO member states using GPS jamming and sabotage on military logistics.[20] Russian milbloggers have widely celebrated incidents of sabotage in Western countries, most recently celebrating the factory fire at German arms company Diehl in Berlin, Germany, even though German officials have not speculated on the causes of the fire.[21]

The Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) seized on the Orthodox Easter holiday on May 5 to further its efforts to garner domestic support for the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine. ROC MP Head Patriarch Kirill delivered an Easter message in which he stated that Russia is going through “difficult” and “fateful” trials and labeled Russian lands as “sacred.”[22] Patriarch Kirill called on people to pray for Russian authorities and the Russian military and expressed hope that God would bring about an end to the “internecine” war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who attended the service, thanked Patriarch Kirill for his “fruitful collaboration” during the “current difficult period.”[23] Putin claimed that the ROC MP and “other Christian denominations” are preserving Russian heritage and societal values.[24] Russian independent outlet Mozhem Obyasnit (We Can Explain) reported that Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-run television network Zvezda broadcasted the service and deleted any comments from viewers with calls for peace.[25] Russian authorities have systematically repressed religious freedom in Russia as a matter of state policy and have persecuted certain Christian denominations within Russia.[26] Russian authorities are also systematically persecuting the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU),
Protestants, Roman Catholics, and other non-ROC faiths in occupied Ukraine. The ROC MP has consistently supported the war in Ukraine, and the ROC MP leadership has reportedly defrocked several clergy members who refused to promote Kremlin-introduced prayers supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The ROC MP has also recently cast Russia’s war in Ukraine as an existential “holy war” and approved an ideological policy document tying several Kremlin ideological narratives together in an apparent effort to form a wider nationalist ideology around the war in Ukraine and Russia’s expansionist future.

Kremlin officials also used the Orthodox Easter holiday to spread narratives that the West indirectly threatens Russian Orthodoxy in post-Soviet states, particularly in the Baltics, likely as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to set information conditions to justify future Russian aggression abroad. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador-at-Large Gennady Askaldovich published an article in the Kremlin outlet Izvestiya on May 5 in which he alleged that the US and its allies use religion as a foreign policy tool to influence other states. Askaldovich claimed that some churches with “American patrons” politicize religion and falsely accused the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople of allegedly splitting Orthodoxy in Ukraine and trying to displace the ROC from Eastern Europe and former Soviet states. The Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople granted autocephaly (independence) to the OCU from the Kremlin-controlled Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) in 2019. Askaldovich accused the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople of trying to take over small Orthodox autocephalous churches, including churches in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Key Takeaways:

- The Russian military reportedly redeployed a battalion of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division to Kursk Oblast as part of a larger ongoing Russian effort to gather an operationally significant force for a possible future Russian offensive operation against northeastern Ukraine and Kharkiv City.

- The Russian military is reportedly preparing and forming the Northern Grouping of Forces from elements of the Leningrad Military District (LMD) to primarily operate in the Belgorod-Kharkiv operational direction.

- US officials continue to signal their support for new Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2025, although ISW continues to assess that Ukraine should contest the theater-wide initiative as soon as possible because ceding the theater-wide initiative to Russia for the entirety of 2024 will present Russia with several benefits.

- European intelligence agencies reportedly warned their governments that Russia is planning to conduct “violent acts of sabotage” across Europe as part of a “more aggressive and concerted effort” against the West.

- The Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) seized on the Orthodox Easter holiday on May 5 to further its efforts to garner domestic support for the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine.

- Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Robotyne.
• Bureaucratic issues continue to constrain frontline Russian units’ ability to conduct strikes on Ukrainian targets.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently seized Kotlyarivka (southeast of Kupyansk) no later than May 4 and made other confirmed advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna amid continued Russian attacks in the area on May 5. Geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western Kotlyarivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and south of Novoselivske (northwest of Svatove).[32] Russian milbloggers continued to credit elements of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District) for seizing all of Kotlyarivka.[33] Russian forces conducted attacks northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pischane and Kyslivka; northwest of Svatove near Berestove and Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novosadove; west of Kreminna near Torske and Terny; southwest of Kreminna near Serebyranske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to attack in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) on May 5 but reportedly did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 5 but did not make confirmed territorial gains. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces advanced in the direction of the dacha area north of the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar) and drove Ukrainian forces to the southern outskirts of the microraion, although ISW had not observed visual evidence confirming this claim.[36] The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the northern and western administrative boundaries of Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) and that Russian forces are continuing to consolidate their positions in the Stupky-Holubovski 2 nature reserve (south of the Kanal Microraion).[37] Russian and Ukrainian forces also continued to fight near Chasiv Yar, specifically near the Kanal Microraion and the Novyi Microraion (southeastern Chasiv Yar); east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[38]
Social media sources amplified footage of a destroyed bridge over the Siversky-Donets Donbas Canal purportedly near the Kanal Microraion, but it is unclear whether Ukrainian or Russian forces destroyed the bridge.[39] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces destroyed the bridge after Ukrainian forces attempted to rebuild it following a previous Russian strike on an unspecified date.[40] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that Russian forces have concentrated 20,000 to 25,000 personnel in the Chasiv Yar direction.[41] Drone operators of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly supporting Russian assaults near Chasiv Yar.[42]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 5 that Russian forces seized Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka).[43] Ukrainian National Guard Captain Volodymyr Cherniak stated that
Russian brigades bypassed new Ukrainian defenses in Ocheretyne and were able to form a small salient because Ukrainian forces lacked engineering personnel to construct defensive positions quickly in response to Russian advances.[44] Cherniak stated that Russian forces are advancing slowly but noted that even gradual Russian advances are difficult to defend against because costly Russian “meat assaults” are “simple, bloody, inhuman, and effective.” Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Ocheretyne near Arkhanhelske; east of Ocheretyne near Novokalynove; northwest of Ocheretyne near Novooleksandrivka; south of Ocheretyne near Berdychi and Semenivka; and southwest of Ocheretyne near Novopokrovsk, Sokil, and Solovyove.[45] Elements of the Russian “Lavina” Battalion of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) reportedly continue to operate in the Arkhanhelske area after seizing Arkhanhelske no later than May 4.[46]
Russian forces also continued offensive operations west and southwest of Avdiivka on May 5, but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made tactical advances in Netaylove (southwest of Avdiivka) and advanced 300 meters in the settlement.[47] Russian forces launched ground attacks west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Yasnobrodivka and southwest of Avdiivka near Nataylove.[48] Geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces may have regained positions in Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka) on an unspecified date.[49] Elements
of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka direction.\footnote{50}

Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on May 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made marginal gains east of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) and in eastern Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk City).\footnote{51} Russian forces also attacked west of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka and Vodyane.\footnote{52} Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.\footnote{53}
Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, but there were no confirmed changes to this area of the frontline on May 5. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 4 that Russian forces advanced up to 500 meters near Novomayorske (southeast of Velyka Novosilka), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[54] Positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Novodarivka.[55] Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are
Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project reportedly operating near Staromayorske, and elements of the 43rd Spetsnaz Company reportedly continue operating near Vuhledar.[56]

**Assessed Control of Terrain in Western Donetsk Oblast as of May 5, 2024, 3:00 PM ET**

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces recently advanced in Robotyne amid continued positional engagements in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 5. Geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Urozhaine.[57] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[58] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Staromayorske, and elements of the 43rd Spetsnaz Company reportedly continue operating near Vuhledar.
Ukrainian forces recently expanded their positions in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast amid continued positional engagements in the area on May 5. Geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces expanded their positions in Krynky. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that Russian forces conducted several unsuccessful assaults near Nestryha Island in the Dnipro River Delta. Drone operators of the Russian “Margelov” Volunteer Battalion reportedly continue operating in Kherson Oblast.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of limited drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 4 to 5. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk stated that Russian forces launched 24 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 23 Shaheds over Kharkiv, Kherson, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[64] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhii Lysak reported that falling drone debris damaged infrastructure facilities in Dnipro City.[65] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drone
strikes against Kharkiv City damaged civilian infrastructure and wounded several civilians.[66] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command clarified that Russian forces likely used Iskander-K missiles in the May 4 strike against Odesa Oblast.[67]

Russian forces also conducted strikes against Ukraine during the day on May 5. Poltava Oblast Military Administration Head Filip Pronin stated that an unspecified Russian missile strike damaged a grain elevator in Poltava Hromada.[68] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that Russian forces conducted guided glide bomb strikes against Kharkiv City injuring civilians and damaging civilian infrastructure.[69] Mykolaivka City Deputy Military Administration Head Volodymyr Proskunin reported that Russian forces struck the Slovyansk Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in Donetsk Oblast with four multiple rocket launch system (MLRS) rockets with cluster munitions and one high-explosive rocket.[70]

Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated on May 5 that recent waves of large-scale Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure have caused over one billion dollars’ worth of damage.[71] Halushchenko stated that Russian strikes have mainly targeted TPPs, hydroelectric power plants (HPPs), and electricity transmission systems. Halushchenko noted that the Ukrainian energy system is stable but called the situation “complicated.”

**Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

Bureaucratic issues continue to constrain frontline Russian units’ ability to conduct strikes on Ukrainian targets. A Russian milblogger, who previously served as a “Storm Z” instructor, amplified a report from an employee of Russia’s Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Military Counterintelligence Department on May 5 claiming that Russian field operatives are providing strike coordinates directly to company commanders to circumvent poor communication between higher-level commanders and lengthy approval processes to conduct strikes.[72] The employee stated that many drone operators also relay target coordinates to the Counterintelligence Department in an attempt to create pressure at the senior policy level of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to direct commanders to expedite approving fire missions. The milblogger claimed that he recently learned that a Russian unit missed an opportunity to strike several Ukrainian grenade launchers because they had to wait for their commander to double-check the coordinates and approve the strike. The milblogger stated that this report is further confirmation that there are ongoing communication and bureaucratic issues in the Russian military.

Exiled Russian opposition outlet *Novaya Gazeta Europe* reported on May 3 that the Russian MoD is preparing to expand the Russian military’s main cemetery into a nearby forest in Moscow Oblast because the cemetery is running out of space.[73] *Novaya Gazeta Europe* reported that residents at unhappy that the cemetery’s expansion will result in the destruction of a nearby forest and noted that one woman stated that the Russian MoD should cremate the bodies of serviceman to save space.

**Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Nothing significant to report.

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**Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts** (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

*ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.*

**Activities in Russian-occupied areas** (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

*ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.*

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<th>Russian Information Operations and Narratives</th>
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Kremlin officials continue to invoke narratives about the need to protect Russian “compatriots” in the Baltic states as part of efforts to set information conditions justifying possible future Russian aggression. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are persecuting Russian “compatriots” and that the closure of Russian consular offices in the Baltic states have left Russian citizens and compatriots unprotected against alleged police brutality.[74] Zakharova threatened that Russia will continue to exert diplomatic pressure and will respond to the Baltic states’ “hostile” actions with asymmetric measures, primarily in the economic and transit spheres.

**Significant activity in Belarus** (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

*Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.*
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[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoP8LMuEdqBozrL26q49phR6gVDmuDPuJZmLLbJVGwzPYy7fuzeD9kjTGSCw8dRnel; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2temMK2N6dNYxNyPRqc9ESP624UVUBrJAGD1ja6UNvdMYgJHgMQXTuFam4TQJvxxI; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoR7MHiw4PtdmBwukTSiWDZWCzr1orMj2rHWyg9rAQHfEUDv5EsWqEMVrLHy4e3a11ql; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbidoznTraLSDkrkcAVAmkJKjs8QsX18HRqWw2FE1CtDKucgy5tP17FSYbsTr8EUL5k8zL; https://t.me/dva_majors/41599; https://t.me/rvbar/59786

[56] https://t.me/voin_dv/8313; https://t.me/vrogov/15574

[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5379; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/67430

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoR7MHiw4PtdmBwukTSiWDZWCzr1orMj2rHWyg9rAQHfEUDv5EsWqEMVrLHy4e3a11ql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoP8LMuEdqBozrL26q49phR6gVDmuDPuJ