



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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
April 20, 2025, 5:00 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11am ET on April 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on the previous day to 0800 on the current day, and the 2200 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200. ISW is unable to assess whether Russian attacks reported in these SITREPs occurred after Russia's 30-hour unilateral Easter truce that started at 1800 Moscow time on April 19. The Ukrainian General Staff's 1600 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600, and any reports of Russian ground activity in the Ukrainian General Staff's April 20, 1600 SITREP are by default an accusation of truce violations.]

The snap Russian-proposed Easter truce underscores the necessity that the text of any ceasefire or peace agreement be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and include robust monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported at 2000 local time April 20 that Russian forces in "all main frontline directions" conducted ground attacks and drone and artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in violation of Russian President Vladimir Putin's 30-hour unilateral truce from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 to 0000 Moscow time on April 21.^[1] Zelensky also stated on April 20 that Russian forces conducted attacks in the Siversk, Toretsk, and Zaporizhia directions and are conducting offensive operations most intensely in the Pokrovsk direction.^[2] Zelensky's statement from 1600 local time April 20 also reported Russian truce violations in Kursk Oblast, although Zelensky stated earlier at 0000 local time April 20 that Putin did not extend the truce to Kursk or Belgorod oblasts.^[3] Zelensky reiterated that an effective ceasefire agreement must provide monitoring mechanisms of potential violations and that Ukrainian forces will respond "symmetrically" to Russian assaults.^[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 20 that Russian forces had "strictly" observed the truce and claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted drone and artillery strikes against Russian positions and Russian-occupied settlements since the truce began.^[5] Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that fighting abated but did not fully cease in some directions, including the Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk directions, and that fighting in other directions temporarily ceased around 1800 on April 19 but has since resumed with variable frequency and intensity.^[6] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows satellite-detected heat anomalies along the frontline on April 20 that may suggest military activity, but ISW is unable to independently verify the specific reports of violations made by Russian or Ukrainian sources.

**Satellite-detected Fires during the Easter Truce
between 1900 on April 19 and 1900 on April 20
(Source: NASA)**



Zelensky reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.[7] Zelensky stated that Ukraine and Russia achieved a long-range strikes ceasefire between April 19 and 20 and during the day on April 20 and such a ceasefire is the easiest to extend. Zelensky proposed a temporary ceasefire on long-range missile and drone strikes against civilian infrastructure for a minimum of 30 days, with the opportunity to extend the ceasefire beyond 30 days. Russia and Ukraine repeatedly accused each other of violating the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire, but Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the March 13 joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal over the last five weeks.[8] A temporary civilian infrastructure strikes ceasefire agreement — and especially a general ceasefire agreement — would require robust monitoring mechanisms, public and formal terms, and a clearly defined time frame. The Kremlin may continue to leverage any vague future ceasefire agreements to obfuscate Russia's rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals and to accuse Ukraine of violating such ceasefire terms.[9]


Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Russia's systematic persecution of religious communities throughout occupied Ukraine, including against Christians. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 20 that Russian forces have killed or tortured 67 Ukrainian priests, pastors, and monks and destroyed 640 religious sites, most of which are Christian sites, since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.[10] ISW has previously reported on Russia's religious oppression in occupied Ukraine, including arbitrary detention and assassinations of Ukrainian clergy or religious leaders and the looting, desecration, and deliberate destruction of places of worship.[11] ISW has also reported at length on Russia's systematic repression of Orthodox Church of Ukraine and other religious minorities, particularly Ukrainian Protestants and Baptists, who have faced Russian brutality and other repressions throughout Ukraine.[12]

The Kremlin continues to repurpose narratives that Russian officials have repeatedly used to justify Russia's invasions of Ukraine in an effort to further militarize Russian society in the long term, likely in preparation for a potential future protracted conflict with NATO. Russian state journalist Pavel Zarubin asked Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov a question on April 20 about the EU's recommendation that European leaders refrain from attending Russia's May 9 Victory Day Parade in Moscow.[13] (Victory Day is Russia's principal patriotic holiday and commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War, known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War.) Lavrov accused the EU of stoking "neo-Nazi ideology" in Europe and stated that Russia "will make every effort to ensure that this ideology does not raise its head," and will destroy Nazism "once and for all." Lavrov's statements are part of a long-standing Kremlin effort to invoke the Soviet Union's contributions to victory over Nazi Germany and the wider mythos of the Great Patriotic War and vilify Europe and NATO. These efforts aim to exacerbate negative sentiments among Russia's population and drum up support for the militarization of Russian society in the long term.[14] The Kremlin has previously appealed to the mythos of the Great Patriotic War to persuade the Russian population that their increasing social and economic sacrifices for the Russian war effort in Ukraine can help achieve overwhelming victory.[15] Russian President Vladimir Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials regularly invoke the vague term of "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government, and Putin leveraged claims that supposed Nazis control the Ukrainian government to justify the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[16] The Kremlin is increasingly employing the same playbook that it used against Ukraine towards Finland and former Soviet states, including Estonia and Moldova to justify its attempts to control independent countries and set informational conditions for possible future Russian aggression.[17]

Key Takeaways:

- **The snap Russian-proposed Easter truce underscores the necessity that the text of any ceasefire or peace agreement be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and include robust monitoring mechanisms.**
- **Zelensky reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.**
- **Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Russia's systematic persecution of religious communities throughout occupied Ukraine, including against Christians.**
- **The Kremlin continues to repurpose narratives that Russian officials have repeatedly used to justify Russia's invasions of Ukraine in an effort to further militarize Russian society in the long term, likely in preparation for a potential future protracted conflict with NATO.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk before the start of the Easter truce.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War April 20, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

See topline and axis sections for reports of Easter truce violations.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast's border areas prior to the Easter truce.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha).[18] The footage was posted prior to the beginning of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral Easter truce at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.

Unconfirmed claims: Several Russian milbloggers questioned on April 20 Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov's April 19 claim that Russian forces seized Oleshnya.[19]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 19 2200 situation report (SITREP) and April 20 1600 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast.[20] The Russian attacks reported in the Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 SITREP occurred after the start of Russia's Easter truce at 1800 Moscow time on April 19. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 20 that Putin did not extend the Easter truce to offensive operations in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts, although the exact terms of the truce remain unclear as of this report.[21]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are launching drone strikes but have not conducted any assaults in the Kursk direction since the beginning of the truce.[22]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces violated the Easter truce and attacked in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 20.


Russian milbloggers claimed on April 20 that fighting continued near Demidovka and Popovka (both northwest of Belgorod City) and accused Ukrainian forces of unsuccessfully attacking into Popovka in violation of the Easter truce.[23]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast.[24]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian milbloggers issued contradictory claims about supposed Ukrainian truce violations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 20.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction April 20, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in unspecified areas in northern Sumy Oblast on April 20 in violation of the Easter truce, but another milblogger claimed that there were no reports of combat activity near Vodolahy (north of Sumy City).^[25]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Kharkiv direction in the evening of April 19 and on April 20.




A Ukrainian regiment commander operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on April 19 that Russian forces continued to fire on Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast after the start of Russia's unilateral Easter truce at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.[26] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated that Russian forces are using the Easter truce to accumulate forces and continue to conduct drone strikes.[27]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 20 that Ukrainian forces continued to operate artillery and drones near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) but that the intensity of these strikes has decreased.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Kupyansk direction in the evening of April 19 and on April 20.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast April 20, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on April 20 that Russian forces conducted three guided glide bomb strikes against Kupyansk on the morning of April 20.^[29]

Russian milbloggers claimed on April 20 that fighting continued north of Kupyansk near Mala Shapkvivka and Kindrashivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka.^[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on the evening of April 19 that Ukrainian forces shelled Russian forces near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).^[31]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 19 2200 SITREP and April 20 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on April 19 and possibly on April 20.[32] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.


Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces of violating the Easter truce in the Borova direction in the evening of April 19 and on April 20.

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking east of Borova near Nadiya on April 20.[33]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 19 2200 SITREP and April 20 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Olhivka and Hrekivka on April 19 and possibly on April 20.[34] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Lyman direction in the evening of April 19 and on April 20.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction April 20, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 20 that Russian forces seized Novomykhailivka before the start of the Easter truce.[35]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking northeast of Lyman near Myrne on April 20.[36] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on April 20 that Russian forces continue to shell Ukrainian positions in the area and that Russian forces are using the ceasefire to regroup, transfer infantry to frontline positions, and attempt to clear crossings across the Zherebets River.[37] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on April 20 that Russian forces have not been conducting


drone, air, artillery, or MLRS strikes in the area, however.[38]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 20 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian forces near Kreminna (east of Lyman in the Russian forces' rear) on the night of April 19 to 20.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Katerynivka (northeast of Lyman) and that Ukrainian forces shelled the area near Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman).[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are evacuating wounded and dead personnel in the Lyman direction.[41]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 19 2200 SITREP and April 20 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Novomykhalivka, Nove, Yampolivka, Hlushchenkove, and Zelena Dolyne and east of Lyman near Torske on April 19 and possibly on April 20.[42] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast April 20, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Siversk direction in the evening of April 19 and on April 20.

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 20 that Ukrainian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and that Russian forces are evacuating dead personnel in the Siversk direction.[43]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 19 2200 SITREP and April 20 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske.[44] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Chasiv Yar direction in the evening of April 19 and on April 20.

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar toward Bila Hora and Stupochky.[45]


Russian security forces claimed on April 20 that Ukrainian forces shelled the outskirts of Chasiv Yar with MLRS and mortars.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting drone strikes near Stupochky.[47] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are evacuating dead personnel in the Chasiv Yar direction.[48]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 19 2200 SITREP and April 20 800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar toward Stupochky.[49] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 78th "Sever-Akhmat" Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[50]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction before the start of the Easter truce as Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the truce.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction April 20, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on April 19 before the start of the Easter truce indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[51]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking near Toretsk, east of Toretsk near Druzhba, and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka.[52]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on April 20 that Ukrainian forces violated the Easter truce by attacking near Sukha Balka.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on

April 20 that Russian forces advanced in northern Toretsk at an unspecified time possibly on April 19 before the start of the truce.[54]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 19 2200 SITREP and April 20 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka on April 19 and possibly on April 20.[55] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Pokrovsk direction in the evening of April 19 and on April 20.

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Yelyzavetivka, southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on April 20.[56] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on the afternoon of April 20 that Russian forces violated the Easter truce and that Russian combat activity was highest in the Pokrovsk direction.[57] Zelensky stated on the morning of April 20 that Russian forces conducted three assaults in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions in violation of the truce.[58]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 20 that Russian forces are evacuating wounded personnel near Lysivka and that Ukrainian forces fired mortars against Novotroitske (southwest of Pokrovsk).[59] Another Russian milblogger claimed on April 20 that Ukrainian forces conducted first-person view (FPV) drone strikes in the Pokrovsk direction but that there have been no attacks in the area.[60]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 19 2200 SITREP and April 20 800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novotoretske, and Svyrydonivka and toward Stara Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove on April 19 and possibly on April 20.[61] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.

Ukrainian military observers Kostyantyn Mashovets and Yuriy Butusov responded the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) April 19 claim that Russian forces seized Shevchenko and stated that that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the Shevchenko south of Pokrovsk and that there are no Russian forces in the settlement.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka, and elements of the 1435th

Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) are reportedly operating near Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk).[63]

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Novopavlivka direction in the evening of April 19 and on April 20.

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka and Uspenivka and east of Novopavlivka near Preobrazhenka on April 20.[64]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 20 that Ukrainian forces violated the Easter truce near Uspenivka and conducted FPV, mortar, and artillery strikes against Russian forces in the area.[65] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are evacuating dead personnel along the Nadiivka-Preobrazhenka-Bohdanivka line.[66]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 19 2200 SITREP and April 20 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka and Kotlyarivka; east of Novopavlivka near Preobrazhenka, Novooleksandrivka, and Sribne; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka and Troitske on April 19 and possibly on April 20.[67] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Kurakhove direction in the evening of April 19 and on April 20.

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking west of Kurakhove near Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv.[68] A Ukrainian source stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Rozlyv at 1900 on April 19 in apparent violation of the Easter truce.[69]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) on April 20 in violation of the Easter truce.[70]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 19 2200 SITREP and April 20 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces also attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka and Kostyantynopil on April 19 and possibly on April 20.[71] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[72]

Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces of violating the Easter truce in the Velyka Novosilka direction on the evening of April 19 and on April 20.

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and toward Odradne.[73]


The Ukrainian General Staff's April 19 2200 SITREP and April 20 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces also attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on April 19 and possibly on April 20.[74] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske direction.[75]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in western Zaporizhia Oblast in the evening of April 19 and on April 20.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction April 20, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 1600 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove on April 20.[76] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on the evening of April 19 that Russian forces continued to conduct drone and mortar strikes against Ukrainian positions.[77]

Russian milbloggers claimed on April 19 and April 20 that Ukrainian forces continued shelling Russian positions in the Pyatykhatky direction (southwest of Orikhiv) and other unspecified areas of western

Zaporizhia Oblast.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 20 that some Russian forces are evacuating dead personnel in the Zaporizhia direction.[79]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka on April 19 and possibly April 20.[80] ISW is unable to assess whether these attacks occurred after the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire at 1800 Moscow time on April 19.

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Dnipro direction in the evening of April 19 and on April 20.



Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin stated on April 19 and 20 that Russian forces continued to shell and launch airstrikes against Ukrainian settlements in Kherson Oblast.[81]

Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo and other Russian sources claimed on the evening of April 19 that Ukrainian forces conducted mortar and drone strikes against Russian positions in occupied Kherson Oblast.[82]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces did not conduct a long-range strike series against Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click [here](#) to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click [here](#) to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



BABELSTREET

- [1] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1914022645160399147>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925>;
<https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1913955872209768479> ;
https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13923
- [2] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/191380723987111169>;
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- [4] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/191380723987111169>
- [5] https://t.me/mod_russia/51521
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