

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

February 22, 2025, 4:00 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Note:** The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on February 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.


ISW is not reporting on the status or prospects of negotiations regarding Ukrainian minerals and US aid for Ukraine today because the discussions and situation appear to be extremely dynamic, and the information space contains too many contradictory and partially outdated rumors to permit drawing firm conclusions.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on February 22 that US and Russian officials are planning to meet within the next two weeks in an unspecified third country about bilateral relations. Ryabkov claimed that the United States and Russia are undertaking two "parallel" but "politically interconnected" negotiation tracks that will discuss the war in Ukraine and US-Russian bilateral relations.[1] Ryabkov added that Russia is prioritizing its demand for the United States to return six Russian diplomatic properties, likely referring to properties US authorities previously seized on charges of being used for intelligence purposes.[2] Ryabkov also stated that the United States and Russian delegations may discuss other international topics such as arms control and the situation in the Middle East.[3] US and Russian officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18.[4]

### Key Takeaways:

- **Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on February 22 that US and Russian officials are planning to meet within the next two weeks in an unspecified third country about bilateral relations.**

- Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
- Russian forces continue to deploy wounded and medically unfit soldiers to the frontline in an effort to address personnel shortages.



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian***

***violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

**Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**


**Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.** Russian forces continued attacking along the international border and into northeastern Sumy Oblast; northwest of Sudzha near Nikolskyi, Sverdlikovo and Lebedevka; and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Ulanok.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Bilovod and Yunakivka, Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City).[6]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Cherkasskaya Konopelka and north of Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha).[7]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured Cherkasskaya Konopelka and half of Lebedevka in Kursk Oblast and are advancing near Zhuravka in Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City).[8]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1140th Artillery Regiment (76th Airborne [VDV] Division) and drone operators of the Chechen "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[9] Elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Novenkoye, and elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Lebedevka.[10]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction February 22, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 22 but did not advance.** Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 21 and 22.[11]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 22 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of two unspecified positions along the Vovcha River and reportedly advanced up to 60 meters in Vovchansk.[12]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction February 22, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




### Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

**Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.** Russian forces continued attacks north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and Dvorichna and northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka on February 21 and 22.[13] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful platoon-sized mechanized counterattack from Kutkivka (north of Kupyansk) towards Dvorichna.[14]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Topoli (north of Kupyansk near the international border).[15]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized all of Topoli, advanced south of Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) towards Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk), and advanced towards Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk) along the Oskil River.[16]





## Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast February 22, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 22 but did not advance.** Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Borova near Zahryzove on February 21 and 22.[17]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 22 but did not make any confirmed advances.** Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Lyman near Ivanivka, Terny, Yampolivka, Novolyubivka, and Kolodyazi and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on February 21 and 22.[18]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 22 that Russian forces seized Novolyubivka.[19]

A commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Lyman direction stated on February 22 that Russian forces recently increased their use of fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones in this direction.[20] The commander noted that Russian forces are attempting to advance in small groups of five to seven personnel.

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 22 but did not advance.** Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on February 22.[21]


**Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.** Russian forces attacked northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasylivka and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on February 21 and 22.[22]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 22 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the fields north and northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[23]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[24]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction February 22, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on February 22 but did not advance.** Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyliivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 21 and 22.[25]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments and 163rd Tank Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) deployed in the Pivnichne-Shumy-Zalizne area and intend to attack towards Pleshchiivka (northwest of Toretsk) and Kleban-Byk as part of a future offensive operation against Kostyantynivka.[26] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[27]

**Russian forces recently advanced south and southeast of Pokrovsk.** Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, Novotoretske, Yelyzavetivka, Svyrydonivka, and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske and Pishchane; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, Serhiivka, Nadiivka, Novooleksandriivka, Preobrazhenka, and Zaporizhzhia on February 21 and 22.[28] A Ukrainian brigade posted footage on February 22 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian platoon-sized mechanized assault in an unspecified area of the Pokrovsk direction.[29]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Pishchane and on the southern outskirts of Zaporizhzhia.[30]


Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Nadiivka, advanced in central and eastern Uspenivka, and are advancing towards Bohdanivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[31]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are using charges equipped with chemical compounds banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in this direction.[32]

Recent statements from Ukrainian and Russian sources indicate that the frontline near Pokrovsk is hotly contested and that Russian forces may not currently hold positions in every area where ISW has recently observed Russian forces operating. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces recently seized Pishchane and are pushing Russian forces from positions in Dachenske and Lysivka.[33] A Russian milblogger insinuated that Russian forces have not advanced into Lysivka and are still attacking south of the settlement.[34] ISW recently observed geolocated footage indicating that Russian forces at least temporarily advanced in Pishchane and Lysivka and therefore mapped the extent of confirmed and assessed Russian advances in these areas.[35] ISW cannot independently confirm that Russian forces currently maintain positions in these areas, however, and Ukrainian forces may maintain positions in these settlements. ISW will continue to update its control of terrain (CoT) assessments as more open-source information becomes available.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that the Russian military command recently redeployed the 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA [Combined Arms Army], CMD [Central Military District]) from positions south of Pokrovsk to offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction.[36] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command also recently withdrew "battered" elements of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) from the Uspenivka-Shevchenko area to an unspecified rear area and that elements of the 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) are operating near Dachenske and Lysivka. Mashovets stated that elements of the 90th Tank Division, including its 6th, 80th, and 239th tank regiments and 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and additional elements of the 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment are attacking along the Nadiivka-Sribne (south of Nadiivka) line.[37]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction February 22, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




**Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.** Russian forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Ulakly, and Kostyantynopil on February 21 and 22.[38]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Andriivka.[39]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 67th Tank Regiment (both 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are fighting toward Andriivka.[40]




## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kurakhove Direction February 22, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on February 22 but did not advance.** Russian forces continued attacking north of Velyka Novosilka near Novoocheretuvate and northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske, Pryvilne, and Novosilka on February 21 and 22.[41]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 57th and 60th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced to the outskirts of Burlatske.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Dniproenerhiia (north of Velyka Novosilka) and east of Novoocheretuvate.[43]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast February 22, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




### Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 22 but did not advance.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne towards Orikhiv and northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky, Kamyanske, and Pyatykhatky on February 21 and 22.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "BARS-Sarmat" volunteer detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[45]



Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported activity in the Kherson direction on February 22.



**Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 162 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[46] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 82 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and that 75 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to



Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones damaged warehouses and enterprises in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[47]

### **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

Russian forces continue to deploy wounded and medically unfit soldiers to the frontline in an effort to address personnel shortages. A Russian milblogger published a video on February 21 showing injured personnel of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) complaining that the Russian command is sending them to conduct infantry assaults despite their injuries.[48] The soldiers claimed that they are members of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division's "150th Motorized Rifle Regiment" – which ISW has not observed engaged in combat in Ukraine or Kursk Oblast. The soldiers claimed that frontline Russian commanders removed them from their original units after they were injured and that they are in Kursk Oblast to prepare for redeployment into combat. It is unclear if the injured soldiers are currently in Kursk undergoing medical treatment or if the Russian military command intends to introduce elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division into combat in Kursk Oblast. ISW has recently observed reports that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions from the Kurakhove direction to the eastern Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions but has not observed discussions of these formations redeploying to Kursk Oblast.[49]

### **Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Kremlin newswire *TASS* reported on February 20 that Uralvagonzavod, Russia's primary tank manufacturer, announced that it will equip Russian T-72B3M and T-90M tanks with Arena-M active protection systems to intercept rockets, missiles and high explosive anti-tank shells.[50]

### **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

*ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.*

### **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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[1] <https://ria dot ru/20250222/vstrecha-2000956123.html> ; <https://ria dot ru/20250222/dialog-2000969038.html>

[2] <https://iz ot ru/1843261/2025-02-22/riabkov-nazval-vozvrashchenie-rf-obektov-dipsobstvennosti-prioritetom-v-dialoge-s-ssha> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925>

[3] <https://ria dot ru/20250222/dialog-2000969038.html>

[4] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825>

[5] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/65109](https://t.me/dva_majors/65109) ; [https://t.me/belarusian\\_silovik/49893](https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/49893) ;  
[https://t.me/dva\\_majors/65122](https://t.me/dva_majors/65122) ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24269> ;  
<https://t.me/yurasumy/21321> ; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/155398](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/155398) ; <https://t.me/rybar/68240>

[6] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/65109](https://t.me/dva_majors/65109) ; <https://t.me/rybar/68240>

[7] <https://t.me/zsu82odshbr/788> ; <https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1893178550556975453> ;  
[https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/8455](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8455) ; [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/8457](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8457) ;  
[https://t.me/alkor\\_aero/121](https://t.me/alkor_aero/121)

[8] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/32587> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/32596> ;  
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/32606> ; <https://t.me/rybar/68240>

[9] <https://t.me/wargonzo/24914>; [https://t.me/philologist\\_zov/2073](https://t.me/philologist_zov/2073);  
<https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43925>

[10] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21321>

[11]  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PZdkN97qRsJWTLjQSjsGU3McZDa5VivmXuasShxaz2AEMAtq2iTpEsmgMafUgf6Vl> ;  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EPnJ98pTs4VMUQEqoi288VX7duU7u7dJrFxdH1EY1AXL6m24r2u3k2PjTRovHSgUl> ;  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LZ7kgGK3Vafhn6ZuT8b7AHucK3Ap5ey5NrF5VpyguazEpQnyURRnVHmTvmhpTYKrl> ; [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/5559](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5559) ;  
<https://t.me/otukharkiv/4505> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24230> ;  
<https://t.me/synegubov/13196>

[12] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24275> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24230>

[13]  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PZdkN97qRsJWTLjQSjsGU3McZDa5VivmXuasShxaz2AEMAtq2iTpEsmgMafUgf6Vl>; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/65109](https://t.me/dva_majors/65109)

[14] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/32604>

[15] [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/8454](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8454); [https://t.me/army\\_3otbr/1687](https://t.me/army_3otbr/1687)

[16] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21320>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24252>

[17] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2PZdkN97qRsJWTLjQSjsGU3McZDa5VivmXuasShxaz2AEMAtq2iTpEsmgMafUgf6Vl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoEPnJ98pTs4VMUQEiqoi288VX7duU7u7dJrFxdH1EY1AXL6m24r2u3k2PjTRovHSgUl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoLZ7kgGK3VAfhn6ZuT8b7AHucK3Ap5ey5NrF5VpyguazEpQnyURRnVHmTvmhpTYKrl>; [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/5559](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5559)

[18] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2PZdkN97qRsJWTLjQSjsGU3McZDa5VivmXuasShxaz2AEMAtq2iTpEsmgMafUgf6Vl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoEPnJ98pTs4VMUQEiqoi288VX7duU7u7dJrFxdH1EY1AXL6m24r2u3k2PjTRovHSgUl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoLZ7kgGK3VAfhn6ZuT8b7AHucK3Ap5ey5NrF5VpyguazEpQnyURRnVHmTvmhpTYKrl>; [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/5559](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5559)

[19] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/302006](https://t.me/tass_agency/302006) ; [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/49206](https://t.me/mod_russia/49206) ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/32589>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86720> ; <https://t.me/vrogov/19280>

[20] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/02/22/na-lymanskomu-napryamku-vorog-zbilshyv-vykorystannya-fpv-droniv-na-optovolokni/>

[21] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2PZdkN97qRsJWTLjQSjsGU3McZDa5VivmXuasShxaz2AEMAtq2iTpEsmgMafUgf6Vl>

[22] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2PZdkN97qRsJWTLjQSjsGU3McZDa5VivmXuasShxaz2AEMAtq2iTpEsmgMafUgf6Vl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoEPnJ98pTs4VMUQEiqoi288VX7duU7u7dJrFxdH1EY1AXL6m24r2u3k2PjTRovHSgUl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoLZ7kgGK3VAfhn6ZuT8b7AHucK3Ap5ey5NrF5VpyguazEpQnyURRnVHmTvmhpTYKrl>

[23] [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/8456](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8456) ; [https://t.me/SOF\\_Genius\\_drones/418](https://t.me/SOF_Genius_drones/418)

[24] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24241>

[25] [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/5559](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5559) ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoLZ7kgGK3VAfhn6ZuT8b7AHucK3Ap5ey5NrF5VpyguazEpQnyURRnVHmTvmhpTYKrl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoEPnJ98pTs4VMUQEiqoi288VX7duU7u7dJrFxdH1EY1AXL6m24r2u3k2PjTRovHSgUl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2PZdkN97qRsJWTLjQSjsGU3McZDa5VivmXuasShxaz2AEMAtq2iTpEsmgMafUgf6Vl>

[26] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2582>



[27] [https://t.me/nm\\_dnr/13423](https://t.me/nm_dnr/13423)

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0LZ7kgGK3VAfhn6ZuT8b7AHucK3Ap5ey5NrF5VpyguazEpQnyURRnVHmTvmhpTYKrl> ; [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/5559](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5559) ;  
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[31] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62335> ; [https://t.me/notes\\_veterans/22089](https://t.me/notes_veterans/22089)

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[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc&ab\\_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8)

[33] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2580>

[34] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/32595>

[35] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2025>

[36] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2580>

[37] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2581>

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[40] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2581>

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[42] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62346> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62342> ;  
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