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February 24, 2025, 7:40 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on February 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression. Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a failed attempt to seize Kyiv City, overthrow Ukraine's democratically elected government, and forcibly install a pro-Russian proxy government in three days. Ukrainian forces, supported by a coalition of allies including the United States and European partners, have since successfully pushed Russian forces out of northern Ukraine and liberated significant territory in southern and northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Ukrainian forces have regained more than 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces have occupied since February 24, 2022.[1] ISW has observed confirmation that Ukrainian forces have regained 50.03 percent of the territory that Russian forces had seized since February 24, 2022. Russian forces have spent the last year making slow and incremental but steady advances in eastern Ukraine as a result of significant Russian manpower and materiel advantages and Russia's ability to leverage delays in Western aid to Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are using their technological advantages and integrating technological innovations with ground operations in order to slow Russian gains. Ukraine continues to improve and innovate its warfighting capabilities and is working to become self-sufficient in the long-term, but Western and international military support for Ukraine in the short- and medium-term remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian aggression. The defense of Ukraine and the preservation of Ukraine as an independent, sovereign, and democratic country capable of defending itself against Russia is a critical part of deterring broader

Russian aggression against the West. The United States, Europe, and other Western allies must demonstrate commitment to Ukraine through timely and reliable military assistance, continue to enable Ukrainian forces to impose significant pressure on Russia, and force Putin to abandon his conquest of Ukraine and his wider ambitions in Europe in order to bring about sustainable peace.

Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicle losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Russian forces have lost over 10,100 tanks, 21,100 armored combat vehicles, and 23,300 artillery systems presumably destroyed and damaged in the three years of Russia's full-scale invasion.[2] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently estimated that Russia had lost about 14,000 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers since February 2022.[3] (IISS's numbers likely differ from those from Syrskyi as IISS data likely only accounts for destroyed vehicles.) Syrskyi stated on February 24 that Russian forces have lost almost 870,000 personnel, including about 250,000 dead.[4] Russian opposition outlets *Meduza* and *Mediazona* published a joint report on February 24 wherein they used the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) to estimate that at least 160,000 to 165,000 Russian servicemembers have died in the past three years of the war.[5] Syrskyi previously reported that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 alone, and *Meduza* and *Mediazona* estimated in February 2024 that Russia had lost at least 66,000 to 88,000 personnel during the first two years of the war — suggesting that Russian losses significantly increased in 2024.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have suffered vehicle and artillery system losses on the battlefield that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term given the limitations of Russia's defense industrial capacity and Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks, and that Russia's force generation apparatus is struggling to recruit enough soldiers to sustain Russia's current rate of offensive operations and loss rates.[7]

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[8] The United States, Russia, Belarus, North Korea, and 14 other countries voted against the Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution, while 93 countries supported it.[9] The People's Republic of China and Iran abstained. The United States also abstained from a second resolution about the third anniversary of the war that it had proposed after European countries amended the resolution to add language supporting Ukraine's "sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity." [10] The US-backed draft resolution — prior to the European amendments — reportedly did not acknowledge Russia's role as the aggressor and referred to Russia's war against Ukraine as the "Russian Federation-Ukraine conflict." [11]

Recent polling indicates that Russians are increasingly supportive of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine until it achieves complete Ukrainian capitulation but are simultaneously starting to feel the economic toll of the three years of Russia's war — casting doubt on Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to continue to balance "butter and guns" at home in the medium- to long-term. A recent poll conducted by independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles between February 5 and 13 showed

that 46 percent of respondents do not support the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine without Russia having achieved its war goals.[12] The number of respondents who do not support such a Russian withdrawal had consistently decreased between February 2023 (47 percent) and September 2024 (31 percent) but then jumped back to February 2023 levels in February 2025. Fifty-four percent of respondents in February 2025 stated that the war had negatively affected their daily lives. Thirty-six percent of respondents stated that their financial situation had worsened — an increase from 27 percent in September 2024. Thirty-six percent of respondents in February 2025 stated that the Russian government should prioritize military spending in the budget — a decrease from 43 percent in September 2024. The number of respondents who stated that the most important area for Russian spending is the social sphere increased from 38 percent in September 2024 to 48 percent in February 2025.

Kremlin rhetoric about the relatively faster Russian tempo of advances on the battlefield in recent months and continued official statements about the need for Ukraine to "denazify," "demilitarize," and declare neutrality — Putin's original stated war aims — are likely influencing more Russians to reject a withdrawal in the belief that Russia can achieve these objectives through continued fighting.[13] Russia's protracted war in Ukraine, however, is straining Russia's economy, including by increasing inflation, spending down Russia's sovereign wealth fund, and exacerbating existing labor shortages.[14] Russia will likely face a number of materiel, manpower, and economic issues in 12 to 18 months if Ukrainian forces continue to inflict damage on Russian forces on the battlefield at the current rate — likely increasing the economic burden that the Russian population will feel in the future.[15]

Russian President Vladimir Putin currently remains committed to continuing his war in Ukraine despite rising domestic political and economic pressure and has shown no indication that he is rethinking his determination to compel Ukraine to surrender.

Russian state media largely ignored the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion during programming on February 24 and instead highlighted a meeting in which the Russian Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims Chairman Supreme Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin praised Putin for announcing and conducting the war in Ukraine.[16] Putin and other Kremlin officials have not abandoned their original war aims in Ukraine and continue to invoke their goals of "denazifying" and "demilitarizing" Ukraine and banning Ukraine's ability to join any security blocs in the future, despite Russia's failure to defeat Ukraine militarily over the last three years.[17]

Putin does not appear deterred by the idea of protracting the war further despite suffering significant and likely unsustainable personnel and materiel losses over the last three years.[18] ISW recently noted that the Russian military appears to be employing a method of advance in Ukraine based on the assumption that the war will continue indefinitely and that the Russian military does not need to make rapid or significant territorial gains in a single offensive operation.[19] ISW recently assessed that it would take Russian forces over 83 years to capture the remaining 80 percent of Ukraine, assuming that they can sustain their current rate of advance and massive personnel losses indefinitely — which is unlikely.[20] Putin has articulated a theory of victory, however, that assumes that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West and continue to advance on the battlefield until Russia defeats Ukraine. Putin's recent statements rejecting the possibility of a peace agreement with Ukraine are indications of his willingness to protract the war.[21] Putin continues to signal to the Russian military and society that he will not end the war until Ukraine capitulates completely and that he has no interest in a negotiated

peace agreement that requires Russia to compromise its long-standing war aims, despite Putin's efforts to signal interest in peace negotiations to Western leaders.

Kremlin officials formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than the complete capitulation of Ukraine and the West on February 24, further underscoring Russia's unwillingness to make compromises during future peace negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on February 24 during a press conference in Turkey that Russia will only stop military activity in Ukraine when peace negotiations bring about a "solid, stable result that suits Russia" and account for the "realities" of the battlefield.[22] Lavrov noted that any peace agreement must include provisions banning Ukraine from joining NATO in the future.[23] Russian state media TV channel *Channel One (Pervyi Kanal)* summarized Lavrov's statements as "[Russia] will only end combat operations" when negotiations end in a way that satisfies Russia.[24] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russian state newswire *RIA Novosti* on February 24 that Russia will not agree to a ceasefire that does not address the "root causes" of the war.[25] Ryabkov stated that a ceasefire that does not address the war's "root causes" is a path to a "quick resumption" of the war and reiterated that Russia considers NATO's post-1991 eastward expansion a root cause of the war. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also claimed on February 24 that it would be "impossible" to resolve the war in Ukraine without understanding and addressing its "root causes." [26] Kremlin officials have repeatedly alluded to the need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians within Ukraine.[27]

Russian officials also continue to frame Russia's demand for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from territory that Ukrainian forces currently control in eastern and southern Ukraine as a "compromise." Ryabkov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 2024 demand that Ukraine "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and abandon its goal of joining NATO contains "significant compromises" that could serve as the base of a future peace agreement.[28] Ryabkov claimed that Putin's June 2024 demands highlight Russia's desire to find a resolution to the war that "balances" Russia's and Ukraine's interests, despite the fact that Putin called for Ukraine to concede significant areas in exchange for no Russian concessions. ISW has previously noted that Ukrainian authorities rejected the 2022 Istanbul protocol as its terms effectively amounted to a full Ukrainian surrender, and Ukrainian authorities are likely to reject any future ceasefire or peace agreement that amounts to the same.[29]


European leaders announced a series of new aid packages during their visit to Kyiv on February 24 for the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion on February 24. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced a new military aid package for Ukraine consisting of 25 infantry fighting vehicles, two armored combat vehicles, a landing system for F-16 fighter jets, four F-16 flight simulators, ammunition, drone camera components, and first aid kits.[30] Swedish officials recently announced plans to provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Robotsystem-70 and Tridon Mk2 air defense systems valued at approximately \$113 million.[31] Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda announced plans to deliver an unspecified number of RBS-70 short-range air defense systems to Ukraine, and Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal announced a military aid package consisting of 10,000 rounds of artillery ammunition and 750,000 rations packages.[32] Irish Prime

Minister Micheal Martin announced plans to supply Ukraine with an unspecified number of older air defense radar systems.[33] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced an EU financial aid package for Ukraine valued at 3.5 billion euros (\$3.6 billion) that the EU will distribute in March 2025.[34] British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK will provide Ukraine with 4.5 billion pounds (\$5.6 billion) in military aid.[35] Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez pledged that Spain will deliver a new military aid package for Ukraine worth an estimated one billion euros (\$1.05 billion) as part of a broader 10-year bilateral security and defense agreement that Ukraine and Spain signed in May 2024.[36] Icelandic Prime Minister Kristrún Mjöll Frostadóttir pledged to increase Iceland's monetary support to Ukraine by roughly 14.4 million euros (\$15 million).[37]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression.**
- **Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicles losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.**
- **The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.**
- **Recent polling indicates that Russians are increasingly supportive of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine until it achieves complete Ukrainian capitulation but are simultaneously starting to feel the economic toll of the three years of Russia's war – casting doubt on Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to continue to balance "butter and guns" at home in the medium- to long-term.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin currently remains committed to continuing his war in Ukraine despite rising domestic political and economic pressure and has shown no indication that he is rethinking his determination to compel Ukraine to surrender.**
- **Kremlin officials formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than the complete capitulation of Ukraine and the West on February 24, further underscoring Russia's unwillingness to make compromises during future peace negotiations.**
- **European leaders announced a series of new aid packages during their visit to Kyiv on February 24 for the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion on February 24.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.**

- The Kremlin continues to use Muslim religious and cultural structures in Russia for military recruitment.



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation


Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces attacked near the international border in northeastern Sumy Oblast near Zhuravka; northwest of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo, Lebedevka, Nikolskiy, Malaya Loknya, and Pogrebki; and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka.[38] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on February 24 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the H-07 Yunakivka-Sudzha road.[39]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Lebedevka.[40]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced near Pogrebki; that elements of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment and 137th VDV Regiment (both of the 106th VDV Division) advanced within Lebedevka; and that elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) advanced near Kositsa (north of Sudzha).[41]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 119th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Sverdlikovo.[42] Elements of the 1st Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki.[43] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) and 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Sudzha.[44] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and "Kamerton" Detachment of Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast, and drone operators of the Rubicon Center for Advanced Technologies are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[45]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction February 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Ryazan and Tula oblasts on February 23 and the night of February 23 and 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and other Ukrainian forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City on the night of February 23 to 24.[46] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the five largest oil refineries in Russia with a processing capacity of 17.1 million tons of oil per year and that the refinery produces gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oil, jet fuel, and petrochemicals.[47] Kovalenko noted that Ukrainian forces previously struck the Ryazan Oil refinery on the nights of January 23 to 24 and January 25 to 26.[48] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that drone debris landed on the territory of an unspecified enterprise in Ryazan Oblast.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that the Ukrainian

Unmanned Systems Forces struck an oil depot and caused a fire near the “8 Marta” Plant near Uzlovaya, Tula Oblast on February 23.[50] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milayev claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) repelled two drones over Uzlovsky and Kireevsky raions on the night of February 22 to 23.[51]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 24 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 23 and 24.[52]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District) and the "Bati" group of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Kupyansk

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 24 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Zapadne, northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Fyholivka, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 23 and 24.[54] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in Dvorichna.[55]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 24 that Russian forces seized Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk).[56]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating on the Kupyansk-Lyman line reported that Russian forces are attempting to advance in small infantry groups but that Ukrainian forces are destroying about 70 to 80 percent of Russian assault groups on their way to the frontline or at accumulation points.[57] The commander noted that Russian forces are using a large number of first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber-optic cables.

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating near Dvorichna and Novomylnsk (northeast of Dvorichna).[58] Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 24 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and toward Novoplatonivka, Borivska, Andriivka, and Bohuslavka; east of Borova near Kopanky and toward


Shyikivka; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and toward Cherneshchyna on February 23 and 24.[60]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st GTA) are operating in Kruhlyakivka.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 24 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked north of Lyman toward Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Yampolivka, and Torske and toward Nove; and east of Lyman near Kuzmyne and the Serebryanske forest area on February 23 and 24.[62]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd and 144th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Makiivka and Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman).[63] Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near the Serebryanske forest area.[64]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast February 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 24 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on February 23 and 24.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still maintain limited positions within Bilohorivka.[66]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian force advanced north of Ivano-Darivka, south of Fedorivka (southwest of Siversk), one kilometer near Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk), and 2.25 kilometers west of Bilohorivka.[67]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Bilohorivka.[68]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar toward Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechyne on February 23 and 24.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking south of Chasiv Yar.[70]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0504 Chasiv Yar-Kostyantynivka highway east of Chasiv Yar.[71]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, north of Zaliznyanske (northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka), and northwest of Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar).[72]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces are attacking during fog and precipitation and are struggling to cross the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal, especially with mechanized equipment.[73] The spokesperson noted that Russian drone protection nets over the Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut road are not new and that Russian forces installed these nets in 2024.

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA), 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 85th and 88th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd CAA), and 217th and 331st airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division) are operating near Chasiv Yar.[74]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Chasiv Yar Direction February 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on February 24 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself and east of Toretsk near Krymske on February 23 and 24.[75]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Toretsk, and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[76]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces continued assaults north Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Promin, and the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway junction; southeast of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka; south of

Pokrovsk near Leontovychi (formerly Pershe Travhya); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, Nadiivka, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, Slovyanka, Troitske, Uspenivka, Preobrazhenka, Zaporizhzhia, Yasenove, and Bohdanivka on February 23 and 24.[77] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks south and southwest of Pokrovsk.[78]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Shevchenko (southwest of Pokrovsk) along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Andriivka highway.[79]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 800 meters from Vodyane Druhe toward Tarasivka (northeast of Vodyane Druhe) and 500 meters near Udachne.[80] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the direction of Preobrazhenka and Bohdanivka.[81]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces have intensified rocket and air strikes against Pokrovsk as Ukrainian forces continue to successfully defend against Russian ground attacks in the area.[82] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 55th and 74th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD), 27th Motorized Rifle Division, and 87th Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA) have lost between 30 and 50 percent of their personnel during offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction in an unspecified time frame.[83]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 239th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 6th Tank Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division) are reportedly clearing Ukrainian forces from Nadiivka, and elements of the 228th and 428th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 90th Tank Division) are reportedly operating near Nadiivka.[84] Elements of the Russian 506th and 433rd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Novooleksandrivka.[85]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction February 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 24 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Ulakly on February 23 and 24.[86]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within eastern Kostyantynopil, east of Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove), and north of Rozdolne (southwest of Kurakhove).[87]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (69th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil.[88]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kurakhove Direction February 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction. Russian forces continued attacking north of Velyka Novosilka near Novoocheretuvate, Skudne, and Dniproenerhiia; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on February 23 and 24.[89]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Vremivka (just west of Velyka Novosilka).[90]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Velyka Novosilka, south of Novosilka, and east of Pryvilne (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[91]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) and 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) are attacking along the Burlatske-Vilne Pole line (northwest and west of Velyka Novosilka) and that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 5th Tank Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, EMD) are operating along the Novoocheretuvate-Dniproenerhiia line.[92] Elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Burlatske.[93]



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 24 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Shcherbaky,

Kamyanske, and Pyatykhatky on February 23 and 24.[94] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces occasionally attack from Robotyne and along the T-0803 Novofedorivka-Novodanylivka road.[95]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on February 24 that Russian forces are accumulating manpower and trying to bring up heavy equipment but that Ukrainian forces have not observed active Russian offensive actions..[96] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces will not concentrate a large amount of equipment in the area because the Russian military command does not consider the Orikhiv direction to be a priority.


Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating near the Novofedorivka-Novodanylivka line (east and north of Robotyne).[97]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction February 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on February 24 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked in the direction of Sadove (east of Kherson City on west (right) bank Kherson Oblast) on February 24.[98]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction February 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 23 to 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 185 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[99] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 113 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts as of 0800 local time and that 71 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Kyiv, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.[100]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported on February 24 that Ukrainian forces have shot down 26,525 Russian air targets since February 24, 2022, including 370 aircraft, 331 helicopters, 40 Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles, 95 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; 550 Kalibr cruise missiles; 95 Iskander-K cruise missiles, 1,801 Kh-101/Kh-55/Kh-555 cruise missiles; 460 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles; 25 missiles of other types; 14,285 Shahed drones, and 6,900 reconnaissance drones.[101]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues to use Muslim religious and cultural structures in Russia for military recruitment. Russian Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims Chairperson Supreme Mufti Talgat Tadzhuiddin and Russian President Vladimir Putin met on February 24.[102] Tadzhuiddin stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims have an agreement to support imams who are serving in the Russian military in Ukraine. Tadzhuiddin also stated that the directorate has been recruiting military personnel through its regional branches since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[103] ISW continues to assess that Russia has disproportionately targeted ethnic and religious minorities in its force generation efforts.[104]

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov visited a command post of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces on February 22.[105] Gerasimov heard reports from Southern Grouping of Forces and Southern Military District (SMD) commander Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik. The Russian Southern Grouping of Forces is operating in the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kurakhove directions.[106]

A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on February 23 that there are rumors that Gerasimov is attempting to blame Russian failures in the Pokrovsk direction on Russian Central Grouping of Forces and Central Military District (CMD) Commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev.[107] The milblogger claimed that there are additional rumors that the Russian MoD transferred Mordvichev to Kursk Oblast. The milblogger previously noted that the senior military command likely placed pressure on Mordvichev to report Russian successes near Pokrovsk and insinuated that this pressure is contributing to the practice of Russian commanders near Pokrovsk submitting false reports about Russian successes.[108] Russian ultranationalist outlet *Tsargrad* also speculated about Mordvichev's alleged failure by framing his difficulties in the Pokrovsk direction as a personal feud with Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces and Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi.[109]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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