

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 11, 2023

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July 11, 2023, 8:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:00pm ET on July 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed 131 and 136 drone strikes across Ukraine on July 11, likely in a demonstrative response to the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius and to threaten the Black Sea grain deal. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 26 of the 28 Russian Shahed 131 and 136 drones launched from the Primorsk-Akhtarsk (Krasnodar Krai) direction.[1] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces tried to strike the grain terminal in Odesa Oblast, and that two drones struck an administrative building at a port facility.[2] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces targeted port infrastructure to disrupt the Black Sea Grain deal.[3] Russia's drone strikes on port infrastructure also coincide with the first day of the NATO summit in Vilnius and are likely intended to discourage NATO members from providing more military aid to Ukraine. Russia may be threatening the Black Sea grain deal to message the deal's original broker, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, that his recent statement of support for Ukraine's NATO membership and the return of the five Ukrainian Azovstal commanders on July 7 has not gone unnoticed and is not appreciated by the Kremlin.[4]

Germany and France pledged to provide Ukraine more weapons systems during the first day of the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated that Germany will provide Ukraine with two Patriot air defense launchers, 40 Marder infantry fighting vehicles, 25 Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks, and five Bergepanzer 2 armored recovery vehicles over an unspecified time period.[5] France will reportedly send Ukraine Storm Shadow missiles. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that he decided to send Ukraine weapons to allow Ukrainian forces to conduct deep strikes.[6] *Reuters* reported that a French diplomatic source said that France will provide Ukraine with about 50 SCALP missiles (the French name for Storm Shadow missiles) with a range of 250km.[7]

A coalition of 11 states signed a memorandum with Ukraine outlining the terms for training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 aircraft at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov announced on July 11 that 11 partner states signed a memorandum on the terms for the coalition to train Ukrainian pilots on the F-16.[8] Reznikov noted that the training program may include other fighter aircraft types and expressed his thanks to Denmark and the Netherlands for their "outstanding leadership" in the process.[9]

The Kremlin’s and Russian milbloggers’ reactions to the first day of the NATO Summit were relatively muted. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov took a predictably dim view of the NATO Summit’s first day, complaining that the summit has a ”pronounced, concentrated anti-Russian character.”[10] Peskov reiterated boilerplate rhetoric about how the West’s continued security assistance to Ukraine and Ukraine’s promised future membership in NATO would result in grave consequences.[11] Russian milbloggers expressed general discontent about new weapons deliveries to Ukraine but have not voiced any major reactions at the time of this publication.[12] The milbloggers are likely waiting to react to the main events that will occur on the summit’s second day when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will meet with US President Joe Biden and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on July 12.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attempted to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort against the backdrop of the NATO Summit. Shoigu implausibly claimed on July 11 that Ukrainian forces have lost 26,000 servicemembers and 1,244 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles since starting counteroffensive operations on June 4.[13] Shoigu also tried to present possible Ukrainian interdiction efforts in southern Ukraine as similarly ineffective by claiming that Russian air defenses have intercepted 176 HIMARS rockets and 27 Storm Shadow cruise missiles since the start of the counteroffensive.[14] ISW assesses that Russian MoD reporting on Ukrainian losses is likely highly inflated, and even Russian milbloggers have recently accused the MoD of counting strikes on already damaged and destroyed vehicles as new Ukrainian equipment losses.[15] Shoigu’s rhetoric about the Ukrainian counteroffensive notably contradicts the Kremlin’s reported media guidance instructing Russian state media not to downplay the counteroffensive or overstate Russian successes.[16] Shoigu may be increasingly ignoring established Kremlin guidance on covering the counteroffensive in a renewed effort to portray the MoD as an effective manager of the war in Ukraine following the Wagner Group’s rebellion.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 11 and made gains in some areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Berdyansk directions (Zaporizhia Oblast-Donetsk Oblast border area), and Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing counteroffensive operations around Bakhmut.[17] Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv).[18] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces established control over new positions northwest of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and advanced up to 1.5km near Rozdolivka (19km northeast of Bakhmut).[19]

A Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike reportedly killed Deputy Commander of the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Oleg Tsokov at the command post of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[20] Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian sources reported Tsokov’s death on July 11, and social media users reported that Tsokov died in a strike on a local hotel according to preliminary information.[21] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov published footage purportedly showing smoke plumes resulting from Ukrainian missile strikes on Berdyansk but did not offer any information regarding Tsokov’s death.[22] Tsokov was previously wounded during a Ukrainian strike on Svatove, Luhansk Oblast, in late September 2022 when he commanded the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District (WMD).[23] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that locals knew about Tsokov’s arrival and noted that Ukrainian forces have been systematically targeting Russian-occupied infrastructure in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblast – specifically recreation centers that Russian forces use as

headquarters and command posts.[24] Ukrainian military officials have repeatedly signaled that Ukrainian forces are conducting an interdiction campaign as part of their counteroffensives to disrupt Russian logistics and command.[25] ISW has observed the 58th CAA's 42nd Motorized Rifle Division operating south of Orikhiv and the 58th CAA's 19th Motorized Rifle Division operating southwest of Orikhiv.[26] Tsokov's presence at the reported command post of the 58th CAA suggests that he was personally overseeing the army responsible for repelling Ukrainian counteroffensives in key sectors of western Zaporizhia Oblast stretching from near Polohy (90km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) to the Kakhovka Reservoir.

Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for failing to defend against Ukrainian strikes on Russian headquarters. One milblogger claimed that Russia lacks professional military analysts who would improve the Russian military command's decision-making processes and adequately analyze information to develop risk assessments.[27] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to underestimate Ukrainian intelligence capabilities that set conditions for the strike.[28] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger complained that Russian officers have poor operational security procedures despite knowing about the dangers of operations in occupied southern Ukraine.[29]

Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov reportedly fired Commander of the 58th CAA Major General Ivan Popov after Popov voiced his concerns over the need for troop rotations in western Zaporizhia Oblast amidst Ukrainian counteroffensives.[30] A source reportedly affiliated with the Russian security services claimed that Popov notified Gerasimov that elements of the 58th CAA – which are attempting to prevent Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast – are in need of rotation after fighting in combat for a long time and suffering significant casualties.[31] Gerasimov reportedly accused Popov of alarmism and blackmailing the Russian military command. The source added that Gerasimov dismissed Popov and sent him to forward positions after Popov threatened to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin with his complaint. Another Russian source who appears to be in contact with Russian forces in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast stated that his sources confirmed Popov's dismissal after he raised a "real" question about the lack of rotations in Polohy Raion on the Orikhiv frontline.[32] These reports, if true, may support ISW's previous assessments that Russian forces lack operational reserves that would allow them to carry out rotations of personnel defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives and that Russian defensive lines may be brittle.[33]

An unknown actor killed the Krasnodar City Deputy Head for Mobilization, Captain Stanislav Rzhitsky, on July 10.[34] Russian media reported that an unknown person shot Rzhitsky several times in Krasnodar and then fled the scene.[35] The Investigative Committee of Russia posted footage of Russian authorities detaining a man in Kurban, Krasnodar Krai on July 11 on suspicion of murdering Rzhitsky.[36] A Russian citizen previously attempted to kill a Russian officer at a recruitment office in Irkutsk shortly following the start of partial mobilization in Russia in late September 2022.[37] Rzkitsky's killing could be associated with continued discontent with mobilization, but ISW cannot definitively identify the motivation behind his killing at this time. Russian milbloggers claimed without offering evidence that Ukrainian operatives conducted the killing and compared it to previous high-profile killings of Russian ultranationalist figures in Russia.[38]

Key Takeaways:

- Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed 131 and 136 drone strikes across Ukraine on July 11, likely in a demonstrative response to the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius and to threaten the Black Sea grain deal.
- Germany and France pledged to provide Ukraine more weapons systems during the first day of the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11.
- A coalition of 11 states signed a memorandum with Ukraine outlining the terms for training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 aircraft at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11.
- The Kremlin's and Russian milbloggers' reactions to the first day of the NATO Summit were relatively muted.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attempted to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort against the backdrop of the NATO Summit.
- Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 11 and made gains in some areas
- A Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike reportedly killed Deputy Commander of the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Oleg Tsokov at the command post of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast
- Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for failing to defend against Ukrainian strikes on Russian headquarters.
- Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov reportedly fired Commander of the 58th CAA Major General Ivan Popov after Popov voiced his concerns over the need for troop rotations in western Zaporizhia Oblast amidst Ukrainian counteroffensives.
- An unknown actor killed the Krasnodar City Deputy Head for Mobilization, Captain Stanislav Rzhitsky, on July 10.
- Russian forces are conducting offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and made territorial gains.
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut's northern and southern outskirts.
- Russian forces launched assaults on Ukrainian positions on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka frontline.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- The Kremlin continues measures to gradually mobilize Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) to meet Russian military demands in Ukraine without conducting a wider economic mobilization.
- The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 11 that the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) is struggling to establish regional branches in occupied territories in Ukraine.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of July 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on July 11 and recently made territorial gains west of Kreminna. Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows Ukrainian artillery strikes against Russian forces in eastern Torske (15km west of Kreminna), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced along the Torske-Kreminna highway and entered eastern Torske.[39] Russian sources reported on July 11 that Russian elements of the Central Grouping of Forces are conducting an offensive in Luhansk Oblast along the Svatove-Kreminna line in forested areas near Kreminna and that elements of the Russian 21st Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) expelled Ukrainian forces from an unspecified height near the Zherebets River, defeated a local Ukrainian counterattack, and captured over 10 Ukrainian positions.[40] A Russian source claimed that the Ukrainian military deployed forces to reinforce Ukrainian positions near the Svatove-Kreminna line.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces in this area are conducting defensive operations and holding the line.[42]

Russian forces did not make any confirmed territorial gains in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 11. A prominent Russian milblogger reported on July 10 that there were no significant changes in the Kupyansk direction.[43]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of July 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



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- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source reported on July 11 that Ukrainian forces established new positions northwest of Klishchiivka and advanced 1.5 kilometers into Russian defenses near Rozdolivka. A Russian source reported on July 11 that Russian forces advanced up to a depth of one kilometer, a width of eight kilometers, and occupied sections of the R-66 highway near Novoselivske. A Russian source reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces control all dominant heights around Bakhmut. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces advanced more than four square kilometers in the last week and have captured 24 square kilometers since the beginning of offensive operations near Bakhmut. ISW is unable to confirm the geometry of the advance at this time.


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operation on Bakhmut’s northern and southern outskirts on July 11. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks northwest of Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to attack in the directions of Klishchiivka, Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces still control these settlements and hold a tactically significant height near Klishchiivka.[45] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing counteroffensive operations and control all heights around Bakhmut.[46] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are continuing to attack tactical heights around Klishchiivka and reduced their counteroffensive activities near Rozdolivka (19km northeast of Bakhmut) due to an unsuccessful attack.[47] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces established new positions northwest of Klishchiivka and advanced up to 1.5km near Rozdolivka .[48] A Russian source affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) claimed that BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) volunteers are operating alongside VDV elements to repel Ukrainian counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s flanks.[49]

Russian forces continued to counterattack Ukrainian positions in the Bakhmut area on July 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in the vicinity of Hryhorivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut) and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (12km northwest of Bakhmut).[50] Geolocated footage published on July 11 also showed Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian attack on the eastern outskirts of Orikhovo-Vasylivka.[51] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces successfully counterattacked Ukrainian positions in the direction of Berkhivka, while unsuccessfully counterattacking from Dubrovo-Vasylivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut).[52] Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen ”Akhmat” Spetsnaz forces are operating alongside the Luhansk People’s Republic’s (LNR) 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Army Corps, 8th Guards Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District (SMD) in the Klishchiivka area.[53]

Russian forces launched assaults on Ukrainian positions on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka frontline on July 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian offensives near Avdiivka, Pervomaiske (12km west of Avdiivka), Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka), and Sieverne (6km northwest of Avdiivka).[54] Ukrainian military officials also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian offensives near Marinka (20km southwest of Donetsk City), Pobieda (24km southwest of Donetsk City) Russian forces launched assaults on Ukrainian positions on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka frontline on July 11. Novomykhailivka (27km southwest of Donetsk City), and Krasnohorivka (20km west of Donetsk City).[55] Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows that Russian infantrymen retreated following an unsuccessful assault north of Avdiivka and abandoned a wounded Russian serviceman who later committed suicide.[56] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized a new position south of Sieverne and advanced closer to the settlement.[57] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced into Ukrainian defenses near the railway area in Krasnohorivka and unsuccessfully attempted to assault dacha areas near Avdiivka. Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensives on Novomykhailivka, Marinka, and the southwestern approaches to Avdiivka.[58] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking Russian-occupied positions near Nevelske, Pervomaiske, Sieverne, Krasnohorivka, Vodyane (7km west of Avdiivka), Opytne (4km southwest of Avdiivka).[59]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of July 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours	Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory	Major Railroads
Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24	Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory	Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*	Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives	

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source reported on July 11 that Ukrainian forces established new positions northwest of Klishchiivka and advanced 1.5 kilometers into Russian defenses near Rozdolivka. A Russian source reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces control all dominant heights around Bakhmut. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces captured over 10 square kilometers within the last week and 169 square kilometers since the beginning of offensive operations in the Melitopol and Berdyansk directions. ISW is unable to confirm the geometry of the advance at this time.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of July 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Bakhmut City Limits
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source reported on July 11 that Ukrainian forces established new positions northwest of Klishchiivka and advanced 1.5 kilometers into Russian defenses near Rozdolivka. A Russian source reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces control all dominant heights around Bakhmut. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces advanced more than four square kilometers in the last week and have captured 24 square kilometers since the beginning of offensive operations near Bakhmut. ISW is unable to confirm the geometry of the advance at this time.


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts on July 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk direction (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area).[60] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have established control over positions near the Hrusheva Gully (around 15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked Russian positions west of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[62] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Blahodatne (5km south of Velyka Novosilka).[63] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valery Shershen stated that Russian forces deployed Chechen "Akhmat" forces, "Vostok" battalion elements, and unspecified "Storm Z" detachments to unspecified areas of Zaporizhia Oblast because of pressure from Ukrainian artillery units.[64] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that units of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Rivnopil (8km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[65]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 11. Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows Ukrainian advances northeast of Robotyne (15km south of Orikhiv).[66] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces were able to advance in the Robotyne vicinity because they attacked a frontline area where Russian forces had the least number of Russian mines and fewer fortifications.[67] Several milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces focused their attack on a seam of the Russian defensive lines between the positions of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both part of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) east of Robotyne.[68] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced into the Russian defensive lines near Robotyne to a depth of 400 meters.[69] Several milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment counterattacked Ukrainian positions along the Novodanylivka-Robotyne line (6km south to 15km south of Orikhiv).[70] Another milblogger posted footage claiming to show unspecified elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division striking Ukrainian armored vehicles near Robotyne.[71] Another milblogger amplified footage claiming to show elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations towards Zherybyanky (27km southwest of Orikhiv) and near Pyatykhatky (23km southwest of Orikhiv) but have made no significant progress.[73]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have abandoned their positions in the dacha area on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain a limited position near the Antonivsky Bridge and that two new Ukrainian groups deployed to the area on speed boats from Antonivka (9km west of Kherson City) on the night of July 10.[74] Another milblogger claimed that Russian artillery units continue to strike Ukrainian positions despite the fact that Russian command ordered Russian forces to leave their positions in the dacha area on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River on the night of July 10.[75] The milblogger claimed that the Russian command's decision to withdraw Russian forces is "justified and measured" due to how difficult it has been for Russian forces to defend the swampy area against continued Ukrainian shelling.[76]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of July 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces advanced 400 meters into Russian defenses near Robotyne. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces captured over 10 square kilometers within the last week and 169 square kilometers since the beginning of offensive operations in the Melitopol and Berdyansk directions. ISW is unable to confirm the geometry of the advance at this time.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of July 11, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues measures to gradually mobilize Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) to meet Russian military demands in Ukraine without conducting a wider economic mobilization. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated on July 11 that the amount of weapons and equipment supplied to the Russian military under the Russian state defense order has almost doubled since March 2022.[77] Shoigu claimed that the MoD increased deliveries of Orlan-10/30 reconnaissance drones by a factor of 53, deliveries of T-72 and T-90 tanks by a factor of 3.6, deliveries of Mi-28 helicopters by a factor of three, and deliveries of Ka-52 helicopters by a factor of two.[78] Shoigu did not specify what percentage of these increased deliveries came from existing stocks or from new production. Shoigu claimed that Russian enterprises have increased the production of ammunition by a factor of 10 since the start of 2022.[79] Shoigu also visited DIB facilities in the Republic of Tatarstan on July 11, including the Kamskiy Avtomobilnyy Zavod (KAMAZ) plant and a KAMAZ subsidiary Remdiesel facility in Naberezhnye Chelny.[80] Shoigu claimed that KAMAZ is ahead of schedule on fulfilling the state defense order and suggested that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Armored Vehicle Department form a working group with KAMAZ to maintain vehicles on the frontline in Ukraine.[81] Shoigu visited the Kazan Helicopter Plant in Kazan, Republic of Tartarstan, and heard reports about the production of "Ansat" light helicopters and modifications to Mi-8 helicopters.[82] Shoigu also inspected the Gorbunov Kazan Aviation Plant and claimed that the plant will produce two modernized Tu-150 strategic missile carriers by the end of 2023 in accordance with the state defense order.[83] A Russian milblogger also claimed on July 11 that the Kurganmashzavod joint stock company in Kurgan Oblast recently shipped another batch of BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles to Russian forces as part of the state defense order.[84] These claims of Russian DIB activity do not suggest an increase in efforts to mobilize the DIB, and Russia appears to be prioritizing the production of certain armaments and equipment due to DIB constraints.[85] ISW assesses that the Kremlin is unlikely to start a wider economic mobilization due to fears that such a mobilization would create further domestic economic disruptions and corresponding discontent within Russia.[86]

A Russian source claimed that former Roscosmos (state space corporation) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin is promoting a proposal to launch high-explosive aerial bombs from the Vostochny and Plesetsk cosmodromes in Amur and Arkhangelsk oblasts.[87] Russian sources claimed on July 10 that Rogozin met with Progress Rocket Space Center Regional Director Dmitry Baranov to discuss the possibility of launching Soviet FAB-500 aerial bombs with ballistic systems produced by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology.[88] Rogozin was reportedly interested in retrofitting the FAB-500 bombs to survive reentry into the atmosphere, and Baranov reportedly stated that the modification process would take six to nine months.[89] A Moscow affiliate of the Russian source claimed that a source close to Rogozin confirmed the meeting between Baranov and Rogozin and added that the two also discussed the possibility of adapting high-power volumetric detonating bombs (ODAMs) for use in ballistic strikes.[90] The source reportedly stated that dense Ukrainian air defenses prevent Russian forces from using the ODAms extensively and that ballistic delivery systems may allow Russian forces to fire the ODAms at a distance of 700 to 1200km.[91] Rogozin may be using former connections with the Russian aerospace field to amplify these proposals and promote himself and the "Tsarkiye Volky" volunteer battalion he is affiliated with, although it is unclear if Russian officials are seriously considering these proposals.[92] These proposals regardless of their seriousness are reflective of Russian concerns about their lack of long-range strike capabilities in Ukraine.

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on July 11 that Moscow municipal authorities are threatening to withdraw contracts with construction firms if the firms fail to achieve the MoD's volunteer recruitment quotas.[93]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 11 that the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) is struggling to establish regional branches in occupied territories in Ukraine.[94] The Resistance Center reported that a lack of personnel has prevented VGTRK from establishing propaganda channels in occupied territories.[95] The Resistance Center also reported that Russian occupation officials are creating Kremlin-financed training centers to recruit young journalists to staff these regional VGTRK branches.[96]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 11 that it is preparing unspecified Belarusian training grounds to receive more unspecified Russian troops for joint training within the framework of the combined Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces in the near future.[97] The MoD stated that Russian forces in Belarus completed their previous combat training rotation in June 2023. ISW previously reported that Ukrainian officials' assessment of the number of Russian servicemen training in Belarus increased between early June and early July after initially decreasing over spring 2023.[98]

The Belarusian MoD also reported that Belarusian forces will cooperate with unspecified Wagner Group forces for training upon the Wagner forces' arrival in Belarus, indicating that Belarusian authorities still expect some Wagner forces to deploy to Belarus in the near future.[99] ISW previously reported that the status of the Wagner Group's reorganization and possible redeployment to Belarus may not be clear until fall 2023.[100]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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