The lack of Russian milblogger reaction to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge represents a notable inflection in Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine and may suggest that the Kremlin has directed Russian milbloggers to refrain from covering certain topics. The Ukrainian Armed Forces announced on July 29 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck the Chonhar bridge on the M-18 (Dzhankoi-Melitopol) highway between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast.[1] ISW has not observed any Russian milblogger discussion about the Ukrainian strike or Russian milbloggers promoting Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo’s claim that Russian forces intercepted 12 Ukrainian Strom Shadow cruise missiles targeting the bridge.[2] The only other Russian source to comment on the strikes was a local Russian news Telegram channel, which amplified alleged claims from Russian tourists in the area about the bridge being closed to traffic.[3] Russian milbloggers responded to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge on June 22 with widespread outrage and concern, and Russian milbloggers routinely comment on both successful and allegedly unsuccessful Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics.[4] The Chonhar bridge is a notable bottleneck along a critical Russian ground line of communication (GLOC), and it is highly unlikely that Russian milbloggers would voluntarily ignore a successful or unsuccessful Ukrainian strike on the bridge. ISW has previously assessed that select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their coverage of the war in Ukraine in ways more favorable to Kremlin narratives out of fear of Kremlin punishment following the removal of prominent critical voices in the Russian information space, particularly pro-war critic Igor Girkin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.[5] General fear of Kremlin punishment would not likely result in such near-universal lack of coverage of a dramatic event, however, and it is more likely that a specific Kremlin directive not to cover disruptions to critical GLOCs caused this lack of reporting.

Russian President Vladimir Putin disingenuously framed the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive as inhibiting prospects for negotiations. During a press conference at the Russia-Africa Summit on July 29, Putin accused Ukraine of launching a large-scale offensive so that Russia cannot discuss a ceasefire while its troops are defending against Ukrainian attacks.[6] Russian officials have previously weaponized the mention of negotiations in order to accuse Ukraine of being the party unwilling to enter into negotiations discussions, and Putin is likely using discussions of the Ukrainian counteroffensive to undermine reports of Ukrainian battlefield successes and accuse Ukraine of continued lack of interest in a potential negotiations process.[7] Russian forces have been conducting their own attacks in Luhansk and around Donetsk City almost continuously since before the Ukrainian counter-offensive began, moreover, a fact that Putin did not, naturally, mention. Putin also notably
lauded the work of Central Military district Commander Lieutenant General Andrey Mordvichev for repelling Ukrainian attacks and securing advances, likely in Luhansk Oblast.[8]

**Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and made claimed advances in some areas.** Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces are achieving small successes on the southern flank of Bakhmut and are gradually advancing in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (in western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[9]

**Key Takeaways:**

- The lack of Russian milblogger reaction to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge represents a notable inflection in Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine and may suggest that the Kremlin has directed Russian milbloggers to refrain from covering certain topics.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin disingenuously framed the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive as inhibiting prospects for negotiations.
- Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and made claimed advances in some areas.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kremina and Avdiivka-Donetsk City lines and did not make any confirmed gains in these areas.
- Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations southwest and northwest of Bakhmut and made claimed gains in this direction.
- Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast and made claimed marginal advances.
- Russian sources claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and regained lost positions in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.
- Russian sources claimed that Russian officials plan to regulate civilian volunteers who take supplies to Russian forces in Ukraine.
- Ukrainian partisans reportedly sabotaged Russian military equipment in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast on July 29.
Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of July 30, 2023, 3:00 PM ET

Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, Christopher Hoeft, and Cole Quick
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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-
covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are
assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of
these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and
specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian
violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even
though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

**Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast** (Russian objective: Capture the
remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and
northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on July 30 but did not
make confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted
unsuccessful offensive operations east of Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove) and near
Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove) and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[10] Ukrainian
Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that there were seven combat
engagements along the Svatove-Kreminna line and that Russian forces are trying to gain the initiative
in the area.[11] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western
Grouping of Forces continued offensive operations in the direction of Novoselivske (16km northeast of
Svatove) and advanced 300m into Ukrainian defenses.[12] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian
forces have established a bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Zherebets River near Karmazynivka
(13km southwest of Svatove) and advanced along a front 8km wide and 7km in depth in the area in the
past week.[13] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are degrading Ukrainian defenses in the
Serebryanske forest area south of Kreminna and near Torske (14km west of Kreminna), although he
acknowledged that Russian forces are currently not able to launch significant attempts to capture
Torske.[14] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd
Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) are participating in
ongoing Russian offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[15]

A Ukrainian official suggested that the increased Russian offensive activity along the Svatove-Kreminna
line is a part of a prepared major offensive operation. Cherevaty stated on July 29 that Russian forces
planned to conduct a “strategic” operation in the Kupyansk direction this summer and consider it a
“major offensive.”[16] Cherevaty stated that Russian forces deployed a considerable amount of poorly
trained personnel to the area for this effort.[17] Cherevaty added that Russian forces are relying on
available infantry, Russian Airborne (VDV), and BARS (Russian Combat Reserves) formations and
units as well as paramilitary companies (PMCs) like ”Veterany” and ”Tigr“ and unspecified Chechen
”Akhmat“ forces to conduct this offensive effort.[18] Russian forces have only made limited gains since
increasing offensive activity in the area, and ISW has not observed visual confirmation of recent
Russian claims of extensive advances along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[19] Russian forces may have
recently increased offensive activity on this axis to take advantage of Ukraine’s operational focus on more critical areas of the front, but are unlikely to make significant offensive progress.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance. The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces repelled three Ukrainian attacks near Kovalivka (10km southwest of Svatvoe) and in the Serebryanske forest area.[20]
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of July 30, 2023, 3:00 PM ET

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Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
Claimed Ukrainian Countereffensive
Russian Ground Lines of Communication
Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on July 30 that Russian forces advanced 300 meters in the direction of Novosvitlivske. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on July 28 that Russian forces penetrated three kilometers into Ukrainian defensive lines near Zhytlyka. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on July 28 that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers into Ukrainian defenses in the Svatove direction. A Ukrainian source claimed on July 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced over 1200 meters in the Bakhmut direction. A Russian source claimed on July 28 that Russian forces advanced several kilometers along a 12 kilometer front from Serhiivka to Novovolynske. The Russian Ministry of Defense stated on July 27 that the Russian Center Grouping of Forces advanced 12 kilometers in the Lyman direction and three kilometers near Serhiivka. A Russian source claimed on July 27 Russian forces advanced more than one kilometer per day in the Svatove direction. Russian sources claimed on July 26 that Russian forces advanced along an eight kilometer deep and seven kilometer wide front on the Svatove-Kreminka line.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut area on July 30 and did not make any confirmed gains. Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian troops are achieving small but continued successes on the southern flank of Bakhmut and that Russian forces continue pulling reserves to the area.\[21\] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops continued ground attacks southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (6km southwest), and one milblogger reported that Russian forces have retreated east of the railway line in the Klishchiivka area.\[22\] Several Russian sources amplified footage reportedly showing elements of the “Pryzrak” Battalion of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade attacking Ukrainian positions on the outskirts of Klishchiivka.\[23\] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking Russian positions northwest of Bakhmut near Minkivka (15km northwest), Berkhivka (1km northwest), Bohdanivka (6km northwest), Yahidne (1km northwest), and Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest).\[24\]

Russian forces did not make any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on July 30. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian troops are continuing efforts to hold back Ukrainian advances southwest and northwest of Bakhmut.\[25\] The Ukrainian General Staff notably did not confirm any Russian ground attacks near Bakhmut throughout the day.\[26\]
Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of July 30, 2023, 3:00 PM ET

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- Bakhmut City Limits
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Ukrainian source claimed on July 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced over 1,200 meters in the Bakhmut direction.
Russian forces continued ground attacks on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City on July 30 but did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka and Pobieda (both on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[27] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen noted on July 30 that Russian forces have increased assault operations in Marinka and are more intensely using "Storm-Z" assault detachments.[28] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces have increased the use of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in assaults on Marinka.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued in the western outskirts of Marinka but that Russian forces were unable to advance.[30]
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of July 30, 2023, 3:00 PM ET

Geolocated footage posted on July 28 indicates Ukrainian forces advanced to the outskirts of Kurdymirivka.

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces captured Staromaysorske on July 27.

Geolocated footage posted on July 29 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions north of Pryyutne.

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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed on July 28 that Russian forces penetrated three kilometers into Ukrainian defensive lines near Zhytliivka. A Ukrainian source claimed on July 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced over 1,200 meters in the Bakhmut direction. A Ukrainian source reported on July 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced within 10 to 12 kilometers of the first Russian defensive line in the Berdyansk direction. The Russian Ministry of Defense stated on July 27 that the Russian Center Grouping of Forces advanced 12 kilometers in the Lyman direction.
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make confirmed advances on July 30. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on July 29 that Ukrainian forces are gradually advancing in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area).[31] The Russian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov and another Russian source claimed on July 30 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the direction of Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[32]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and made claimed advances on July 30. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District), 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District), and “Storm-Z” units of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) counterattacked near Staromayorske and pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions in the settlement.[33] The milbloggers claimed that elements of the 247th Airborne Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), also conducted assault operations near Staromayorske, but withdrew after the attack to restore combat capabilities, while another milblogger claimed that the formation is still in Staromayorske.[34] Differing Russian claims about the whereabouts of the 247th VDV Regiment may suggest that the unit suffered significant losses while trying to restore lost positions in Staromayorske.

A Russian source erroneously likened Ukrainian efforts to liberate Staromayorske to Ukrainian control over Pyatykhatky.[35] The source claimed that Russian forces shell Ukrainian positions in Staromayorske every day, but Ukrainian forces refuse to withdraw.[36] The milblogger is drawing an inaccurate comparison between the situations in Staromayorske and Pyatykhatky, as Russian forces have much deeper and more complex lines of defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast than they do in western Donetsk Oblast, and the terrain and general Russian and Ukrainian force composition differ significantly.
Assessed Control of Terrain Around the Vremivka Salient as of July 30, 2023, 3:00 PM ET

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces captured Staromayorske on July 27.

Geolocated footage posted on July 29 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions north of Pryutne.

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Ukrainian source reported on July 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced within 10 to 12 kilometers of the first Russian defensive line in the Berdiansk direction.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances on July 30. Malyar reported on July 29 that Ukrainian forces are gradually advancing in the Melitopol direction (in western Zaporizhia Oblast).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have advanced northeast of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) in the Verbov direction (17km southeast of Orikhiv) in the past week.[38] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne.[39] Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made claimed advances on July 30. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Robotyne and regained previously lost positions northeast of Robotyne.[40] Footage amplified on July 29 and 30 purportedly shows elements of the “Osman” Spetsnaz formation operating in the Zaporizhia direction and elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) operating near Robotyne.[41]
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Pyatykhatky and Robotyne as of July 30, 2023, 3:00 PM ET

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Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir
Russian Field Fortifications

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on July 26 that Ukrainian forces advanced to within 800 to 1000 meters from Robotyne.
Russian forces appear to be unwilling or unable to forcibly stop and search neutral vessels headed to Ukraine through the Black Sea despite ostensibly setting conditions to do so. Naval tracking imagery published on July 30 shows three civilian ships advertising their destination of Ukraine over their ships’ automatic identification system (AIS) and sailing to Ukraine without the Russian Black Sea Fleet stopping and searching the vessels. ISW previously forecast that Russian naval elements in the Black Sea appeared to be setting conditions to stop and search neutral vessels at will, and Russian media has reported several such instances over the past week. Reports of three civilian ships sailing to Ukraine unhindered may suggest that Russia is either unwilling or unable to enforce such searches at this time.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of July 30, 2023, 3:00 PM ET

Map by George Barros, Katerina Stepenenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Meatie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Fechter, Christopher Hoff, and Cole Quick

*Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Ukrainian source reported on July 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced within 10 to 12 kilometers of the first Russian defensive line in the Berdiansk direction. A Russian source claimed on July 26 that Ukrainian forces advanced to within 800 to 1,000 meters from Robytne.
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of July 30, 2023, 3:00 PM ET

Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir

0 20 40 80 Kilometers

Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, Christopher Hoefe, and Cole Quick

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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian opposition news outlet *Mobilization News* claimed on July 29 that Russian military registration and enlistment officials are calling men under the guise of needing their updated personal information and asking the men to come into their offices, only to give the men summons for military training when they arrive.[44] *Mobilization News* claimed that Russian authorities called one man to the military enlistment office to verify his personal information and handed him a summons upon his arrival.[45] *Mobilization News* claimed that the enlistment office official did not specify what would happen to the man during or after the training and only told the man that he would receive a military rank.[46]

Russian sources claimed that Russian officials plan to regulate civilian volunteers who take supplies to Russian forces in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities plan to implement regulations for volunteers in September 2023 that include requiring volunteers to submit letters from the units they supply with a list of exactly what the units received and requiring volunteers to pay taxes on any money they save purchasing supplies at a lower price than anticipated.[47] A prominent Russian milblogger noted that most civilian volunteers have Telegram channels with millions of followers and typically present a different narrative of the war in Ukraine from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[48] The milblogger suggested that Russian authorities, Russian MoD leadership, and Russian state media would benefit from the regulation of civilian volunteers and their subversive narratives regarding the war in Ukraine.[49] This initiative, if real, is consistent with the Russian MoD’s efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space.[50]

A Russian insider source claimed to have posted floor plans of the Shahed drone assembly factory in Tatarstan, Russia.[51] The source claimed that the plant is offering to pay local Alabuga Polytech students up to 70,000 rubles (approximately $760) per month to assemble drones at the plant. The source also claimed that local students must participate in physical and psychological tests to qualify for jobs at the plant and claimed that Russian officials will fine the students up to two million rubles ($21,700) and expel them from school if the students reveal information about the plant and their work.[52]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans reportedly sabotaged Russian military equipment in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast on July 29. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated that Ukrainian partisans damaged three military vehicles and a Russian engineering unit’s deployment point on the western outskirts of Mariupol.[53]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on July 30 that at least several thousand Wagner troops have likely arrived at a military camp in Tsel, Belarus, since mid-July 2023.[54] The UK MoD reported that satellite imagery indicates that hundreds of vehicles, mostly trucks and minibuses, have arrived at the previously empty camp, but that Wagner forces appear to have a few armored combat vehicles, which is consistent with the satellite imagery ISW observed on July 23.[55]
The UK MoD stated that it is possible that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forced Wagner to return its heavy equipment that was used in Ukraine, which is consistent with the Russian MoD’s announcement on July 12 that Wagner had almost completely handed over its weapons and military equipment.[56] The UK MoD reported that Wagner’s future combat effectiveness will depend on its ability to secure heavy equipment and enablers such as air transport.[57] ISW maintains that Wagner forces in Belarus pose no military threat to Poland or Ukraine, for that matter, until and unless they are re-equipped with mechanized equipment. They pose no meaningful threat to NATO even then.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/AFUkraine/posts/pfbid031yerC9QAoA54turHzk1SQRFN...
[3] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/38024
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...
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[12] https://t.me/mod_russia/28749

[13] https://t.me/wargonzo/14104

[14] https://t.me/wargonzo/14104

[15] https://t.me/rybar/50215; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/9193


[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/28748


[22] https://t.me/grey_zone/19744; https://t.me/multi_XAM/597; https://t.me/wargonzo/14104; https://t.me/readovkanews/63410


[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/14104; https://t.me/grey_zone/19744; https://t.me/multi_XAM/597

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[57] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1685528480107188224?s=20