

Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Daria Novikov, Christina Harward, and Kateryna Stepanenko

June 1, 2025, 10:30 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15 pm ET on June 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine conducted a large-scale and simultaneous series of drone strikes against multiple air bases in Russia on June 1. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told various media outlets that the SBU conducted widespread first-person view (FPV) drone strikes that struck four air bases in Russia.[1] The SBU sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. The SBU sources confirmed that Ukrainian drone operators struck 41 Russian strategic aircraft, including A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft and Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers – fixed-wing aircraft that Russia uses to detect Ukrainian air defenses and launch cruise missiles against Ukraine. The SBU reported that the operation inflicted roughly \$7 billion worth of damage on Russia.[2] The SBU sources confirmed that the SBU facilitated drone strikes by transporting the FPV drones to Russia at an unspecified time; storing the FPV drones in trucks carrying cargo units with retractable roofs; parking the trucks near the Russian air bases; and remotely opening the truck roofs and launching the FPVs. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that the operation used 117 drones and destroyed 34 percent of Russia's strategic cruise missile carriers.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities withdrew the people who "assisted" Ukraine with the operation from Russia before the operation.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted FPV drone strikes against air bases in Irkutsk, and Murmansk oblasts, causing several aircraft to catch fire.[5] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled all strikes against air bases in Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur oblasts and that Russian authorities reportedly linked Russian opposition outlet *Mediazona* reported that Ukrainian authorities planned to conduct FPV drone strikes against an air base in Amur Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that a truck carrying FPV drones near the Ukrainika Air Base in Amur Oblast caught fire before Ukrainian forces could launch the drones.[6]



Ukraine continues to innovate its drone technology and tactics to achieve operational surprise and successfully target Russian military infrastructure in the rear. The SBU was reportedly able to launch the FPV drones close to the targeted Russian air bases, which likely enabled the FPV drones to evade Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and deny Russian air defenders enough time to detect the drones.[7] The SBU innovative use of semi-trucks to launch the FPV drones directly in Russian territory enabled Ukrainian drone operators to strike targets deep in Russia's rear and conduct the first drone strike during the war against a target in Siberia. The SBU's tactics to use FPV drones and not aircraft-type long-range drones also allowed drone operators to maintain operational surprise to inflict maximum damage and minimize Russia's response window.

Ukraine's drone strike operation against strategic Russian aircraft may at least temporarily constrain Russia's ability to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes into Ukraine. Ukraine's June 1 operation targeted aircraft that Russia uses to launch cruise missiles against Ukraine and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems that Russia uses to identify Ukrainian air defense systems and coordinate Russian fighter jet targeting.[8] Russia regularly deploys Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 to launch Kh-101/Kh-555 and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles against Ukraine.[9] The downing of Russian A-50 aircraft has previously temporarily constrained Russian aviation activities over Ukraine.[10] The June 1 Ukrainian drone operation will force Russian officials to consider redistributing Russia's air defense systems to cover a much wider range of territory and possibly deploying mobile air defense groups that can more quickly react to possible similar Ukrainian drone strikes in the future.[11]

Russia will likely struggle to replace the aircraft that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed. *Forbes* reported in September 2023 that a single A-50 aircraft costs roughly \$500 million,

and the *Kyiv Independent* reported on June 1 that Russia has fewer than 10 A-50s in operation.[12] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on June 1 that Ukrainian forces destroyed some strategic aircraft that Russia does not currently produce.[13] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russia no longer produces chassis for the Tu-95 and Tu-22 bombers and noted that the chassis are impossible to replace.[14] *The Economist* reported on June 1 that Russia likely has fewer than 90 operational Tu-22, Tu-95, and Tu-160s in total.[15] Ukrainian sources have recently noted that Russia is increasingly using Sukhoi aircraft — and not strategic bombers — to launch cruise missiles.[16] Russia likely turned to Sukhoi aircraft so as to not risk their strategic bombers, suggesting that Russia is concerned about its limited quantities of strategic bombers.

Russian officials and milbloggers continue to blame Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes — a widespread complaint throughout the war after successful Ukrainian strikes. Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev (who has previously criticized the Russian MoD and whom the Duma subsequently voted to remove from his position on the Duma Defense Committee) blamed Russian special services for not sufficiently protecting the air bases and allowing the trucks to move close to the targets.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian senior military leadership continues to disregard the need to protect military facilities and has been relying on the fact that many critical military infrastructure facilities are located far from Ukraine.[18] Milbloggers claimed that this attitude has repeatedly led to "massive" failures and Ukraine's ability to violate Russia's borders and airspace.[19] Milbloggers specifically criticized the Russian military command's decision to store strategic aircraft in open-air facilities with insufficient defenses.[20] Milbloggers have repeatedly complained about the Russian military's failure to adapt to repeated successful Ukrainian strikes against Russia and to learn from wartime mistakes.[21]

Russian state media and milbloggers attempted to frame Ukraine's strikes against legitimate Russian military targets as undermining Russia's nuclear stability and as grounds for a Russian nuclear response — mirroring the Kremlin's repeated nuclear saber-rattling throughout the war that has aimed to prevent Western support for Ukraine. Moscow-based state media outlet *Moskovsky Komsomolets* amplified claims from Russian political scientist Sergei Markov that the Ukrainian strikes against the air bases in Russia are grounds for the use of nuclear weapons under Russia's nuclear doctrine because the strikes targeted Russia's strategic nuclear potential.[22] Many Russian milbloggers, including Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers, made similar claims about Russia's doctrinal nuclear use and explicitly called for Russia to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine in response to the strikes.[23] Russia has attempted to use nuclear rhetoric throughout the war in order to influence the West to limit aid to Ukraine or limit Ukraine's ability to develop its own strike capabilities.[24] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Russia's updated nuclear doctrine in November 2024 after the United States greenlit Ukraine's long-range strikes into Russia, and ISW assessed that these doctrinal updates were part of Russia's efforts to push Western decision makers to shy away from providing additional support to Ukraine.[25] ISW continues to assess that Russia's changes to its nuclear doctrine did not represent a substantial change in Russia's nuclear posture, doctrine, or the threat of the employment of nuclear weapons and that Russian nuclear use in Ukraine remains unlikely.[26] Ukraine has notably previously destroyed Russian strategic bombers

and conducted long-range strikes against Russian air bases that house strategic bombers and strategic bomber production enterprises.[27]


Russian officials blamed Ukraine for the collapse of two bridges and subsequent train derailments in western Russia on May 31, likely as part of efforts to justify the recent launch of Russian offensive operations in Sumy Oblast and the Kremlin's disinterest in peace negotiations to end the war. Two railway bridges in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts collapsed on the night of May 31, causing two trains to derail.[28] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko responded to the derailments, stating that Russia may be conducting false flag operations to disrupt the peace process and prolong the war.[29] Russian officials and milbloggers largely blamed Ukraine for the collapsed bridges but did not provide any evidence to support these claims.[30] Russian State Duma Deputy Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Russia should respond harshly and not limit its response to the train derailments.[31] Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Andrei Klishas claimed that the derailments indicate that a "terrorist group" controls Ukraine, which Klishas claimed has turned into a "terrorist enclave" without borders or legitimate authorities.[32] Klishas called for Russia to create a "vast" buffer zone in Ukraine to protect Russia from Ukrainian attacks and for Russia to "denazify" and "demilitarize" Ukraine and "reestablish" the Ukrainian state (a reference to Russia's original war aims to replace the current legitimate Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian proxy government and to prevent Ukraine from being able to defend itself in the future). A Russian milblogger responded to Klishas, claiming that Russia should establish a "buffer zone" that extends to western Ukraine and that Ukraine should exist as a rump state with its capital in Lviv City.[33] The milblogger's claim mirrored Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's recent call for Russia to control a buffer zone encompassing nearly all of Ukraine, apart from a relatively small part of Volyn and Lviv oblasts.[34]

Ukrainian authorities recently reported that Russia has deployed 125,000 personnel to the borders of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts — two oblasts in which Russian forces are conducting offensive operations that Russian officials have framed as part of efforts to create buffer zones in Ukraine.[35] ISW continues to assess that Russian offensive efforts in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts demonstrate that the Kremlin's territorial ambitions are not limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Russia is attempting to delay negotiations and prolong the war in order to make additional battlefield gains.[36] Russian officials appear to be claiming that Ukraine is responsible for the train derailments at least partly in order to justify Russia's recent launch of offensive operations in Sumy Oblast as necessary and defensive in nature. Russian officials may be trying to frame Ukraine as the party that is not interested in peace negotiations and to justify Russia's prolongation of the war in order to achieve its original war goals.

Russian forces conducted their largest combined drone and missile strike of the war that included over 400 drones against Ukraine on the night of May 31 to June 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts and four Kh-101 and Iskander-K air and ground-based cruise missiles from unspecified directions.[37] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 472 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air

Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Kh-101/Iskander-K missiles and 213 drones over northern, eastern, southern, western, and central Ukraine and that 172 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW). Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa oblasts and damaged civilian and military infrastructure.[38]

Ukrainian forces were notably unable to down any of the three ballistic missiles that Russia launched overnight.[39] Ukrainian forces have struggled to intercept ballistic missiles due to the limited supply of US-made Patriot air defense systems and interceptors.[40] ISW continues to assess that Russia's ballistic missile strikes are forcing Ukraine to make difficult decisions about which areas of Ukraine to protect with its limited Patriot systems.[41] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are struggling to use Patriot air defense systems to down modified Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles due to recent Russian improvements, including enhancements that enable the missile to change trajectory and perform maneuvers rather than flying in a straight line.[42] *The Economist* reported on May 25 that Ukrainian government sources estimate that the Kremlin has a stockpile of 500 ballistic missiles.[43]



Graphic by Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, and Angelica Evans
© 2025 Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi submitted his resignation following a Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit on June 1. Ukraine's Ground Forces reported that a Russian missile strike on a training unit in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on June 1 killed 12 and wounded over 60 servicemembers.[44] Drapatyi stated on June 1 that he submitted a request to resign from his position due to a personal sense of responsibility for the death of Ukrainian servicemembers.[45] Drapatyi stated that his decision to resign came as the result of being unable to ensure the proper execution of his orders and that Ukraine's military is disadvantaged by a command culture that is unwilling to accept personal responsibility for and learn from battlefield failures. Drapatyi stated that he must take responsibility and resign, as his efforts to root out this attitude among Ukraine's Ground Forces failed.

Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Russia launched its highest number of drones in the war on the night of May 31 to June 1. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 1 that Russia is increasing the number of drones per strike each week.[46] *The Economist* recently reported that Russia is able to produce approximately 100 Shaheds per day, and Russia's increasingly large drone strike packages are a direct result of this increased production.[47] Ukrainian forces reportedly were unable to down 67 out of 355 drones on the night of May 25 to 26, and Ukrainian forces reportedly were unable to down 87 out of 472 Russian drones on the night of May 31 to June 1, indicating that the Russian tactic of using huge numbers of drones is proving effective.[48]


Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky established a delegation to participate in peace negotiations to end the war as Russian officials continue to flout their own proposed negotiation mechanisms. Zelensky issued a decree on June 1 authorizing Ukrainian political and military officials to negotiate on Ukraine's behalf at the upcoming bilateral Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul on July 2.[49] Ukrainian Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov will lead the delegation, whose other members include deputies and representatives from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ukrainian Navy and Air Force, the Verkhovna Rada's Human Rights Commissioner's Office, Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU), the Office of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' Chief of Staff and Office of the President, and the Ukrainian General Staff. Zelensky explicitly authorized the delegation to negotiate a peace settlement with Russia and Ukraine's Western partners. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told *Fox News* on May 31 that the Russia has failed to deliver a memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement and that Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to deliver the memorandum to US President Donald Trump during Putin's proposed timeline.[50] Zelensky also stated on June 1 that Russia had yet to present its memorandum to US, Ukrainian, or Turkish officials.[51]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukraine conducted a large-scale and simultaneous series of drone strikes against multiple air bases in Russia on June 1.**
- **Ukraine continues to innovate its drone technology and tactics to achieve operational surprise and successfully target Russian military infrastructure in the rear.**
- **Ukraine's drone strike operation against strategic Russian aircraft may at least temporarily constrain Russia's ability to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes into Ukraine.**
- **Russia will likely struggle to replace the aircraft that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed.**
- **Russian officials and milbloggers continue to blame Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes — a widespread complaint throughout the war after successful Ukrainian strikes.**

- **Russian state media and milbloggers attempted to frame Ukraine's strikes against legitimate Russian military targets as undermining Russia's nuclear stability and as grounds for a Russian nuclear response – mirroring the Kremlin's repeated nuclear saber-rattling throughout the war that has aimed to prevent Western support for Ukraine.**
- **Russian officials blamed Ukraine for the collapse of two bridges and subsequent train derailments in western Russia on May 31, likely as part of efforts to justify the recent launch of Russian offensive operations in Sumy Oblast and the Kremlin's disinterest in peace negotiations to end the war.**
- **Russian forces conducted their largest combined drone and missile strike of the war that included over 400 drones against Ukraine on the night of May 31 to June 1.**
- **Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi submitted his resignation following a Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit on June 1.**
- **Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.**
- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky established a delegation to participate in peace negotiations to end the war as Russian officials continue to flout their own proposed negotiation mechanisms.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War June 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on May 31 and June 1 but did not advance.[52]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 1.

See topline text for reports of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[53]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed on June 1 that Russian forces seized Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), but one Russian milblogger alleged that these claims are premature.[54] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City) and near Zapsillya (just west of Myropillya).[55] Russian sources claimed on June 1 that Russian forces in Sumy Oblast have nearly advanced to within artillery range of Sumy City.[56] ISW has seen geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces are roughly 35 kilometers from Sumy City at their closest point.

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Oleksandriya, and toward Yablunivka on May 31 and June 1.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near the international border in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.[58] Drone operators of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast,

including near Atynske (northwest of Sumy City).[59] Elements of the Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion (reportedly of the Southern Military District [SMD]); elements of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) from Kurchaloyevsky Raion, Republic of Chechnya; and elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[60] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kindrativka.[61] Elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly continue to operate near Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City).[62]




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanskyi Khutory on May 31 and June 1.[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv Oblast border area.[64]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Kupyansk.[65]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka, north of Kupyansk near Zapadne, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on May 31 and June 1.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 1 but did not advance.


Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on May 31 and June 1.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, Novomykhailivka, and Novyi Myr and toward Shandryholove; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on May 31 and June 1.[68]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces continue to conduct infantry-led, highly attritional assaults and are leveraging prisoner recruits.[69] The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are using prisoner recruits, recently mobilized servicemembers (likely referring to forces generated through Russia's crypto mobilization schemes), and servicemembers who recently signed Russian MoD contracts.[70] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are using summer foliage to hide from Ukrainian drone strikes and observed that elements of two unspecified Russian divisions operate in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast June 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Zolotarivka and Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on May 31 and June 1.[71]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast June 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 1 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar.[72]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on May 31 and June 1.[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Reconnaissance Battalion, reportedly continue to operate in the Chasiv Yar direction.[74]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 31 and June 1 shows Russian servicemembers holding Russian flags in northern Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and central Zorya (west of Toretsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized these settlements.[75]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]), Southern Military District [SMD]), seized Dachne (just southeast of Dyliivka).[76]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Krymske; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Poltavka, Yablunivka, and Rusyn Yar; and west of Toretsk near Zorya and Nova Poltavka on May 31 and June 1.[77] Ukraine's Khortytsia Grouping of Forces reported that Russian forces attacked with six motorcycles near Leonidivka (southwest of Toretsk).[78]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 13th "Rusich" Detachment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade) are reportedly operating within and near Dyliivka.[79] Elements of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandro-Shulyne (northwest of Toretsk).[80] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Valentynivka (southwest of Toretsk).[81] Elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Zorya.[82] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA), including drone operators from its 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 102nd Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating near Popiv Yar and in the direction of Katerynivka and Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[83] Elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) and 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[84]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction June 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on May 31 and June 1.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th "Sparta" Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Boikivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[86] Drone operators of the 55th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[87]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka and toward Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Zaporizhzhia on May 31 and June 1.[88]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Grouping of Forces reported that Ukrainian drone operators destroyed a Russian Zoopark-1 counter-battery radar system in the Novopavlivka direction.[89]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[90]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Oleksiivka, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on May 31 and June 1.[91] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoukrainka (northwest of Kurakhove).[92]

Russian forces continued offensive operation in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Vesele, northwest of Vilne Pole (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and west of Zelene Pole (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[93]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novopil on May 31 and June 1.[94] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[95]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[96]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka, west of Orikhiv toward Pavlivka, and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Mali Shcherbaky on May 31 and June 1.[97]

A Russian source claimed on May 31 that Russian forces destroyed the bridge over the T-0803 Zaporizhzhia City-Mariupol highway in Orikhiv.[98]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly


operating near Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[99] Elements of the "Viking" Drone Detachment are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[100]



Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 31 and June 1 but did not advance.[101]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[102]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports of Russian strikes in Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other

geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



BABEL STREET

[1] <https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/1/7515052/> ; https://suspilne dot media/1031653-nevidomo-z-cim-delegacia-rf-poide-na-peregovori-do-stambulu-udar-po-harkivsini-1194-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748776105&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; <https://kyivindependent dot com/enemy-bombers-are-burning-en-masse-ukraines-sbu-drones-hit-more-than-40-russian-aircraft/> ; <https://suspilne dot media/1031945-udar-po-vijskovih-letovisah-rf-gotuvali-ponad-pivtora-roku-dzerela/> ; <https://t.me/suspilnenews/50766>

[2] <https://t.me/SBUkr/14947>

[3] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14442

[4] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1929279221710664143>

[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/53366

[6] https://t.me/mediazona_exclusive/3441

[7] <https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/1/7515052/> ; https://suspilne dot media/1031653-nevidomo-z-cim-delegacia-rf-poide-na-peregovori-do-stambulu-udar-po-harkivsini-1194-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748776105&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; <https://kyivindependent dot com/enemy-bombers-are-burning-en-masse-ukraines-sbu-drones-hit-more-than-40-russian-aircraft/> ; <https://suspilne dot media/1031945-udar-po-vijskovih-letovisah-rf-gotuvali-ponad-pivtora-roku-dzerela/> ; <https://t.me/suspilnenews/50766>

[8] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022324>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar011524>

[9] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2024> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2024>

[10] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar062824>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030824>

[11] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2025>

[12] <https://forbes dot ua/ru/company/poizdka-za-160-mln-forbes-ukraine-pobuvav-zalashtunkami-ugodi-z-kupivli-uklon-kiivstarom-shcho-otrimali-obidvi-kompanii-28052025-30033>; <https://kyivindependent dot com/enemy-bombers-are-burning-en-masse-ukraines-sbu-drones-hit-more-than-40-russian-aircraft/>

- [13] <https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20247>
- [14] <https://t.me/rybar/70909>
- [15] <https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/06/01/an-astonishing-raid-deep-inside-russia-rewrites-the-rules-of-war>
- [16] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021125>
- [17] <https://www.chita dot ru/text/world/2025/06/01/75532148/>
- [18] <https://t.me/rybar/70909>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64745>;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64744>; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19799>;
https://t.me/notes_veterans/23646
- [19] <https://t.me/rybar/70909>; <https://t.me/rybar/70911>; <https://t.me/rybar/70914>;
<https://t.me/yurasumy/23257>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64745>;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64746>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64744>;
https://t.me/notes_veterans/23646; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23646
- [20] <https://t.me/apwagner/41638>; <https://t.me/sashakots/54028>;
<https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19800>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64746>;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64745>; <https://t.me/rybar/70909>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/23257>
- [21] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar071424>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar100924>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar060424>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2023>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar111023>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar101523>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar112324>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar110724>
- [22] <https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2025/06/01/markov-ataka-na-strategicheskuyu-aviaciyu-rossii-yavlyaetsya-osnovaniem-dlya-primeneniya-yao.html>
- [23] <https://t.me/rybar/70911>; https://t.me/dva_majors/72453; https://t.me/dva_majors/72460;
https://t.me/dva_majors/72466; https://t.me/dva_majors/72477;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64748> ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31719 ;
<https://t.me/SergeyKolyasnikov/69180>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64745>;
https://t.me/notes_veterans/23650; <https://t.me/sashakots/54028>
- [24] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2024>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2024>
- [25] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar111924>
- [26] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar111924>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9>

- [27] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2025>; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66573842>
- [28] <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/53734>; <https://t.me/Hinshtein/12107>;
https://t.me/tass_agency/317714 ; <https://t.me/avbogomaz/12699> ; <https://t.me/avbogomaz/12705> ;
<https://t.me/avbogomaz/12703>; <https://t.me/avbogomaz/12697>
- [29] <https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9340>
- [30] <https://lenta.ru/news/2025/06/01/v-gosdume-zhestko-otreagirovali-na-podryv-mosta-v-belgorodskoy-oblasti/>; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/7645 ; <https://t.me/BalitskyEV/5465> ;
<https://t.me/razvozhayev/12097> ; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/3774 ;
<https://t.me/PushilinDenis/6587> ; <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonov/45905>; <https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2025/06/01/25927250.shtml>; <https://t.me/sashakots/54018>;
<https://t.me/yurasumy/23249>; <https://t.me/andreykliskas/4142>; <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19794>;
<https://www.chita.ru/text/world/2025/06/01/75532148/>
- [31] <https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2025/06/01/25927250.shtml>
- [32] <https://t.me/andreykliskas/4142>
- [33] https://t.me/notes_veterans/23643; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23639
- [34] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525>
- [35] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125>
- [36] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025> ;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050125>
- [37] <https://t.me/kpszsu/35425>
- [38] https://www.facebook.com/oda.odessa/posts/1124136293081086?ref=embed_post ;
https://suspilne.media/1031653-nevidomo-z-cim-delegacia-rf-poide-na-peregovori-do-stambuludar-po-harkivsini-1194-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748764585&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/5599 ; https://suspilne.media/1031653-nevidomo-z-cim-delegacia-rf-poide-na-peregovori-do-stambuludar-po-harkivsini-1194-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1748759002&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
<https://t.me/synegubov/14641>; <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/24232> ; <https://suspilne.media/1031835-armia-rf-vdarila-raketou-po-roztasuvannu-odnogo-z-navcalnih-pidrozdiliv-zsu-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni/>
- [39] <https://t.me/kpszsu/35425>

[40] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025>; <https://kyivindependent.com/us-approves-transfer-of-125-long-range-missiles-100-patriots-from-germany-to-ukraine-nyt-reports/>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar041125>

[41] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar040625>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar030425>;

[42] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052425>

[43] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025>

[44] [https://www.facebook.com/UALandForces/posts/pfbidokGtjsQMyM47Yeh2oWE5L7awY1X4SCS2BnxKYkD1JqakuXkrCFfFsCgifSDCDT7mml?__cft__\[o\]=AZVRujTiG779IehRfbaQ9XAVSuoOd-34zf_DHqCRCpNUvF8V1luyrZfX9EDLIg8TB3po_fBCp7hMmXQGwoay-QRUfCDDlcaFVKGWazcowooksxpP4G_ZCjoJE-XRKcbq6wHsMAKoJHtonoVM5y2B88kGO3GL2WvPvlxzokUUdpDmpBQCKAerOf2EoHITiKQAao0q174m1vElUpCC9eH2rX_ALGvXZmKxpMgl1yElx4xV5277riJSmILmdbyQwADTSTf-8y1F5OFGIEZDYxSoJtAS&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-y-R](https://www.facebook.com/UALandForces/posts/pfbidokGtjsQMyM47Yeh2oWE5L7awY1X4SCS2BnxKYkD1JqakuXkrCFfFsCgifSDCDT7mml?__cft__[o]=AZVRujTiG779IehRfbaQ9XAVSuoOd-34zf_DHqCRCpNUvF8V1luyrZfX9EDLIg8TB3po_fBCp7hMmXQGwoay-QRUfCDDlcaFVKGWazcowooksxpP4G_ZCjoJE-XRKcbq6wHsMAKoJHtonoVM5y2B88kGO3GL2WvPvlxzokUUdpDmpBQCKAerOf2EoHITiKQAao0q174m1vElUpCC9eH2rX_ALGvXZmKxpMgl1yElx4xV5277riJSmILmdbyQwADTSTf-8y1F5OFGIEZDYxSoJtAS&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-y-R)

[45] <https://www.facebook.com/61570267831027/posts/122142207560675594/?rdid=66h7b2AY882cNJou>; <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c5yk67y6re10>

[46] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1929279390480773565>

[47] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025>

[48] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025>

[49] <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3592025-55161>; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/01/stalo-vidomo-hto-uvijde-do-skladu-ukrayinskoyi-delegaciyi-na-peregovorah-uturechchyni/>

[50] <https://www.foxnews.com/video/6373726376112>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051925>

[51] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1929279732777910393>

[52] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25004>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001>

[53] <https://x.com/moklasen/status/1929125362186740133>; https://t.me/chorny_stryzh/143

[54] <https://t.me/sashakots/54022>; https://t.me/mod_russia/53361;
https://t.me/mod_russia/53362; https://t.me/notes_veterans/23644; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31728;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64741>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/26895>;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166796

- [55] <https://t.me/yurasumy/23245>; <https://t.me/rybar/70881>
- [56] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64732>
- [57] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64732>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36591>;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/26895>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/23245>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166813;
<https://t.me/sashakots/54022>; https://t.me/mod_russia/53361; https://t.me/mod_russia/53362;
https://t.me/notes_veterans/23644; <https://t.me/rybar/70881>
- [58] <https://t.me/epoddubny/23637>
- [59] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92626>
- [60] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5763; <https://militarydotcom/en/news/ukrainian-forces-capture-russian-marines-from-810th-brigade-in-sumy-region/>
- [61] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36591>
- [62] <https://t.me/milinfo/149497>
- [63] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25004>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001>;
<https://t.me/otukharkiv/6445>; https://t.me/Khorthytsky_wind/11256
- [64] <https://t.me/epoddubny/23637>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92660>;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92628>
- [65] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29402>
- [66] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25004>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001>; https://t.me/Khorthytsky_wind/11256;
https://t.me/dva_majors/72433; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64749>
- [67] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25004>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001>; https://t.me/Khorthytsky_wind/11256
- [68] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25004>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001>; https://t.me/Khorthytsky_wind/11256
- [69] <https://armyinformdotcom.ua/2025/06/01/takyh-myasnyh-shturmiv-ne-bulo-z-zhovtnya-rosiyany-aktyvizuvalysya-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/>; https://t.me/ombr_63/1239
- [70] <https://suspilne.media/donbas/1031895-rosijski-vijska-zoseredili-na-limanskomu-napramku-dvi-divizii-60-brigada/>
- [71] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25004> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001> ; https://t.me/Khorthytsky_wind/11256
- [72] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31725
- [73] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25004> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001> ; https://t.me/Khorthytsky_wind/11256 ;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64750>

[74] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29389> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29409> ;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92612>

[75] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9280 ; <https://t.me/rusich13sho/904> ;
<https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1929198405403705789>;
<https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1929200695158161454>; <https://t.me/SolovievLive/324107>

[76] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31720 ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64750>

[77] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25004> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11256 ;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64750> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64754> ;
<https://t.me/t3mny/2276>

[78] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11256

[79] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64742> ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166811

[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/53343

[81] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13864 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166784

[82] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64754>

[83] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64754> ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166781

[84] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166784

[85] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11256 ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25004> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001> ;

[86] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13865

[87] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166783

[88] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25004> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11256

[89] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11260 ; https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2025/06/01/istoty-zalyshylysya-bez-zooparku-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-znyshhyly-rosijsku-rls-za-24-mln/

[90] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92625>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/26895>
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166796

[91] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11256 ;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92625>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166796; <https://t.me/wargonzo/26895>

[92] https://t.me/voin_dv/15262

[93] https://t.me/voin_dv/15262; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166796

[94] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001>; https://t.me/voin_dv/15262

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/15254

[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/15254

[97] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25004>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001>; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12516

[98] <https://t.me/vrogov/20497>

[99] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166770

[100] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166766

[101] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25021>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25004>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25001>; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12516

[102] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/166742