Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied Crimea overnight on June 9 to 10, likely with ATACMS. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defense battery near occupied Dzhankoi and two S-300 batteries near occupied Chornomorske and Yevpatoria.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes hit the radar stations of each battery and caused secondary ammunition detonations and that Russian air defenses did not intercept any of the Ukrainian missiles. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces launched at least 10 ATACMS missiles and that each targeted air defense installation was an element of the Russian 31st Air Defense Division (4th Guards Air Force and Air Defense Army, Southern Military District [SMD] and Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]).[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted multiple Ukrainian ATACMS missiles overnight but largely did not report that any of the missiles hit their targets, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not commented on the strikes as of the time of this publication.[3] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the extent of damages from the Ukrainian strikes. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Schemes project published satellite imagery of burn marks at a Russian military object near a railway junction in Dzhankoi but noted that the imagery’s resolution is too low to determine specific damage.[4] A Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian air and air defense and has been largely critical of the Russian MoD criticized the Russian MoD in response to the strikes, claiming that Russian officers are falsely reporting no losses to their superiors despite actually suffering heavy losses.[5]

Ukrainian strikes against Russian military and logistics assets in connection to the United States’ partial removal of Russian sanctuary in Belgorod Oblast may have compelled Russian forces to change their deployment and transport patterns. The Crimea-based Atesh Ukrainian partisan movement reported on June 10 that Russian forces recently redeployed air defense systems from occupied Crimea to Belgorod Oblast and that Russian air defenses are not completely covering Crimea as a result.[6] Footage dated June 8 shows that Russia has begun transporting fuel across the Kerch Strait across the railway bridge.[7] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on April 29 that Russian authorities have not transported fuel across the Kerch Strait railway bridge since March 2024 due to the threat of a Ukrainian strike against the bridge as a fuel transport crossed, which could ignite and possibly destroy the bridge.[8] Ukrainian military–focused news outlet Militarnyi assessed on June 10 that Ukrainian strikes against railway barges across the Kerch Strait on May 30 prompted Russian authorities to begin transporting fuel across the railway bridge again.[9] It is unclear whether Russian authorities will continue to use the Kerch Strait railway bridge for fuel and logistics transport to occupied Crimea in the near to medium term. Doing so would likely alleviate some logistics constraints as Russia struggles to compensate for lost ferries across the strait but would leave the Kerch Strait bridge increasingly vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes, particularly if Russian air defense coverage of Crimea is degraded as Atesh reported.

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk denied on June 10 a Sky News report that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship in the Sea of Azov on the night of June 8 to 9.[10] Pletenchuk also stated that there are three large Russian amphibious assault ships and three Buyan-M-class corvettes in the Sea of Azov as of May 10.[11] Sky News reported on June 9, citing a Ukrainian military source, that Ukrainian forces sunk or damaged a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship that Russian forces had recently moved from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov, which ISW amplified.[12]
New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with a select group of Russian milbloggers and military commentators on June 10, suggesting that the Kremlin seeks to partially use Belousov's replacement of widely unpopular former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to build bridges and cultivate ties with a broader milblogger community via a cadre of coopted and loyal military commentators. Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti reported on June 10 that Belousov met with several military correspondents (also known as voyenkory or milbloggers) covering the war in Ukraine and claimed that the conversation was "frank and constructive." TASS and RIA noted that Belousov hopes to hold such meetings regularly. Russian insider sources and milbloggers claimed in late May and early June that Belousov was planning to meet with select milbloggers, and some of the more critical milbloggers criticized Belousov for reportedly not inviting them to the meeting. [14] Russian media confirmed on June 10 that several prominent and generally Kremlin-aligned milbloggers attended Belousov's meeting, including head of the WarGonzo social media military project Semyon Pegov, Komsomolskaya Pravda military correspondent and Kremlin-appointed member of the Human Rights Council Alexander Kots; Vzizada military correspondent Anatoly Brodkin; Russia Today (RT) military correspondent Murad Gazdiev, Readovka correspondent Maxim Dolgov, and others. [15] Gazdiev claimed on his personal Telegram channel on June 10 that the milbloggers delivered good and bad news from the front to Belousov and promised unspecified "huge changes." [16]

The Kremlin likely attempted to falsely portray Belousov as more attentive to milbloggers' criticisms than his predecessor in an effort to co-opt a larger non-Kremlin affiliated milblogger community. The Kremlin and Shoigu previously appeared at odds over milblogger reproachment—Russian President Vladimir Putin met with select milbloggers in July 2022 and June 2023 to discuss the situation on the frontline in Ukraine, while the Russian MoD continuously tried to crack down against critical milbloggers, who often used Shoigu as an informational scapegoat for Russian operational failures in Ukraine. [17] The Kremlin has long endeavored to coopt milbloggers, especially those critical of the Russian military leadership, in an effort to control the information space, as ISW previously assessed. [18] Belousov's meeting represents MoD outreach to several milbloggers who have had the Kremlin's favor for some time now and likely intended to court this group of commentators and ensure their continued loyalty to a new MoD under Belousov. Belousov's milblogger outreach is more likely to be a performative attempt to secure their loyalty than introduce systemic changes within the Russian MoD, as several Russian milbloggers who were not invited to the meeting previously noted. [19] Both the Kremlin and the Russian MoD have a vested interest in appearing open to dialogue with milbloggers, who represent a major pro-war constituency, and the Kremlin is likely aiming to portray Belousov as more cognizant of this fact than his predecessor.

Officials from Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) held bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke at the BRICS meeting and highlighted the organization's recent expansion. [20] Lavrov reiterated standard Kremlin narratives about how the Western rules-based order is detrimental to other states and about the supposed merits of the creation of a multipolar world. Lavrov claimed that the "winds of change" are driving BRICS forward. Lavrov met with officials from Brazil, South Africa, Ethiopia, Laos, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt during the BRICS event as well. [21]

Lavrov met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS meeting on June 10. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Chinese MFA both stated that Lavrov and Wang discussed diplomatic coordination in international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). [22] The Chinese MFA stated that developing Russo-Chinese relations are a "strategic choice" by both parties and that Lavrov and Wang "exchanged views" on the war in Ukrainian war. [23] The Russian MFA labeled the Russo-Chinese relationship as a "strategic partnership" and stated that Lavrov thanked Wang for the PRC's "balanced" line on the war in Ukraine and for not sending a representative to the June 15-16 Ukrainian peace summit in Switzerland. [24] The Russian MFA also stated that Lavrov and Wang discussed stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where they accused the US of allegedly creating anti-Russian and anti-Chinese military-political structures. [25] Lavrov also met with acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani on June 10 and discussed efforts to form a Russo-Iranian "strategic partnership" and create a new comprehensive intergovernmental agreement. [26] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Kani stated that Iran "sees enormous potential for expanding and strengthening [Russo-Iranian] interaction." [27] Kani and Wang also met on June 10 and reportedly discussed increasing cooperation. [28] Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on June 9 that Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit North Korea, and an unspecified diplomatic source reportedly stated that the visit will occur in the coming weeks after Putin visits Vietnam. [29] ISW continues to assess that Russia, the PRC, Iran, North Korea, and Belarus are deepening their multilateral partnerships in order to confront the West. [30]
The Armenian National Assembly will likely hold an emergency session by June 17 during which the Armenian opposition parties will demand Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Armenian Service Radio Azatutyun reported on June 10 that 33 members of the Armenian opposition factions "Armenian Alliance" and "I Have Honor" supported convening an emergency session of the National Assembly to discuss passing a resolution calling for Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation and the formation of a new government. The opposition factions blame Pashinyan for what they see as failures to defend and secure the territorial integrity and borders of Armenia. Radio Azatutyun noted that Armenian law stipulates that the National Assembly needs the support of 27 members of the 107-seat National Assembly to call an emergency session. Pashinyan's Civil Contract Party's National Assembly leader Hayk Konjoryan stated that Civil Contract National Assembly members will not participate in the June 17 emergency session.

The US Department of State announced on June 10 that the US and Poland jointly launched the Ukraine Communications Group (UCG) in Warsaw to counter Russian disinformation by offering fact-based reporting about the war in Ukraine. Representatives of unspecified countries will reportedly collaborate with the UCG. The US Department of State emphasized that Russia often uses false narratives to obfuscate its war aims and try to fracture worldwide solidarity with Ukraine.

Finnish authorities reported that a Russian military aircraft temporarily violated Finnish airspace on June 10 amid continued Russian efforts to undermine Finnish sovereignty. The Finnish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that it is investigating an incident in which an unspecified Russian military aircraft flew roughly 2.5 kilometers deep into Finnish airspace over the Gulf of Finland for two minutes on the morning of June 10. The Russian MoD has not responded to the Finnish report as of this publication but claimed on June 10 that Russian Tu-95MS missile carriers and Tu-22M3 bombers conducted flights over neutral waters of the Baltic, Barents, and Norwegian seas. This reported incursion likely forwards the ongoing Kremlin effort to undermine Finnish sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Russian MoD proposed on May 21 that the Russian government should reassess Russia's maritime borders in the Gulf of Finland, which some Western officials have warned may be part of an effort to revise maritime zones in the Baltic Sea. The Kremlin has also been running a number of information operations aimed at portraying Finland as an enemy to Russia and Russians, ultimately setting information conditions to justify potential future aggression against Finland.

Key Takeaways:

- Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied Crimea overnight on June 9 to 10, likely with ATACMS.
- Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk denied on June 10 a Sky News report that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship in the Sea of Azov on the night of June 8 to 9.
- New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with a select group of Russian milbloggers and military commentators on June 10, suggesting that the Kremlin seeks to partially use Belousov's replacement of widely unpopular former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to build bridges and cultivate ties with a broader milblogger community via a cadre of coopted and loyal military commentators.
- Officials from Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) held bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10.
- The Armenian National Assembly will likely hold an emergency session by June 17 during which the Armenian opposition parties will demand Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation.
- The US Department of State announced on June 10 that the US and Poland jointly launched the Ukraine Communications Group (UCG) in Warsaw to counter Russian disinformation by offering fact-based reporting about the war in Ukraine.
- Finnish authorities reported that a Russian military aircraft temporarily violated Finnish airspace on June 10 amid continued Russian efforts to undermine Finnish sovereignty.
- Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
- Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov appears to be focusing on healthcare programs for Russian servicemembers in his new role.
Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 10, 2024, 3:00 PM ET

Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

**Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

Russian forces conducted a limited cross-border incursion into Sumy Oblast on June 9 but likely have not established a significant or enduring presence in this area. Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows Russian infantry crossing the Russia-Sumy Oblast border and entering Ryzhivka (immediately on the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border), advancing a total of about 730 meters deep into Ukrainian territory. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of the Chechen "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment participated in the incursion and seized the whole settlement, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating beyond the northeastern part of Ryzhivka. Ukrainian Northern Operational Command Spokesperson Vadym Mysynk stated on June 10 that Ukrainian forces have been aware of Chechen units operating in the border area since the winter. Mysynk stated that the Chechen unit that conducted the raid is a small sabotage and reconnaissance group and that Ryzhivka is a contested "gray zone" because of its proximity to the international border. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accused Russian forces of conducting a "propaganda operation" in Ryzhivka and stated that Ukrainian forces eliminated the Russian presence in the settlement. Some Russian milbloggers amplified Kadyrov's claim while others described the incursion as a "raid" or denied reports that Russian forces actually seized the village. One Russian milblogger noted that Ryzhivka is connected to the Russian border settlement of Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, and that residents of the two villages freely walked between the two villages before the war. ISW has previously observed reports of limited Russian ground attacks near the international border with Sumy Oblast, and available reporting suggests that the June 9 limited incursion is consistent with prior limited cross-border incursions.
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Sumy Oblast as of June 10, 2024, 3:00 PM ET

Map by George Bryars, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelson, Daniel Meadie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker
© 2024 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project

Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.
Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counterattacks north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 10 amid limited Russian ground attacks in these areas. Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks in the Kharkiv direction, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to counterattack north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchansk. A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces’ numerical advantage in drones is facilitating the counterattacks. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City), Hlyboke, and Vovchansk on June 9 and 10. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 10 that Russian forces are also attacking near Zelene (on the international border northeast of Kharkiv City and west of Vovchansk).
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 10, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in a forest area southwest of Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk) towards the Oskil River and seized two railway stations between Synkivka (also northeast of Kupyansk) and Lyman Pershyi, which is consistent with ISW's current control of terrain assessment of the area.[51] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane; northwest of Svatove near Berestove and Stelmakhiivka; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka, Nevske, and Terny; west of Kreminna near Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near Hryhorivka and the Serebryanske forest area on June 9 and 10.[52] Elements of the Russian 375th Anti-tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction, and elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating near Terny.[53]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction on June 10 but did not make any confirmed advances in this area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Spirne, Vymka, and Ivano-Darivka on the evening of June 9 and throughout the day on June 10.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the chalk quarry area south of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of recent Russian advances in the chalk quarry.[55] One Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced towards the outskirts of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk) and that Russian forces are heavily shelling the settlement to prepare for further attacks.[56] Elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating along the Rozdolivka-Vasyukivka line south of Siversk.[57]
Russian forces are reportedly advancing in eastern Chasiv Yar. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are making gains in the Kanal Microraiion (eastern Chasiv Yar), have seized high-rise buildings in southeastern Kanal Microraiion, and are moving west towards the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal (which runs through eastern Chasiv Yar).[58] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control almost all of the Kanal Microraiion, but ISW has only observed visual evidence indicating that Russian forces remain between 700 to 800 meters east of the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal and still have not advanced in the western part of the microraiion towards or across the canal water feature.[59] Russian forces will need to either traverse the canal from the west or bypass the canal from the Novyi Microraiion (southwest of Kanal Microraiion) where the canal runs underground in order to begin fighting to central Chasiv Yar. Ukrainian Khortytysia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn emphasized that Russian forces have not yet crossed the canal.[60] This canalizing terrain benefits Ukraine’s tactical defense. Russian and Ukrainian sources also reported heavy fighting in the Kanal and Novyi microraiions; north of Chasiv Yar near Kalyivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andrivka on June 9 and 10.[61] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division, 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC), and "Pyatnashka" volunteer battalion (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[62]
Russian forces reportedly advanced northwest and west of Avdiivka on June 10, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near the pond area in northern Novooleksandrivka, south of Sokil, and north of Novopokrovskoe (all northwest of Avdiivka) as well as west, north, and south of Umanske (west of Avdiivka). One milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1-kilometer-deep northwest of Umanske. Another milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) entered Novopokrovskoe and gained a foothold in the settlement. ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of any of these claimed Russian gains northwest and west of Avdiivka, however. Russian milbloggers also claimed that heavy fighting continued on the outskirts of Karlivka (southwest of Avdiivka). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Avdiivka near Yevhenivka, Novooleksandrivka, Novopokrovskoe, Novoselivka Persha, Prohres, and Sokil; west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka and Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Karlivka on the evening of June 9 and during the day on June 10. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) for their role in offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain Northwest of Avdiivka as of June 10, 2024, 3:00 PM ET

Map by George Barros, Katherine Stupar, Alex DeHawkes, Daniel Lange, Thomas Benjamin, Mitchell Behr, and Tom Thacker

© 2024 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City, but Ukrainian forces appear to have successfully counterattacked and regained lost positions. Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows that Russian forces advanced up to a windbreak northwest of Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City), but that Ukrainian forces then assaulted and regained positions in the windbreak area.\[^{66}\] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are also counterattacking near Paraskoviyivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and that Russian forces continued advancing near Kostyantynivka (also southwest of Donetsk City).\[^{70}\] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviyivka and Kostyantynivka on the evening of June 9 and throughout the day on June 10.\[^{71}\] Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) reportedly continue operating in Krasnohorivka, and elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Vuhledar (southeast of Donetsk City).\[^{72}\] Belousov credited the 10th Tank Regiment (3rd AC) for seizing Paraskoviyivka.\[^{73}\]

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Geolocated footage published on June 10 shows that Russian forces advanced to northern Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) and have likely seized the whole settlement.\[^{74}\] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completely seized the settlement, a claim which several Russian officials and milbloggers amplified.\[^{75}\] Additional geolocated footage posted on June 10 shows that Russian forces advanced in southern Urozhaine (just east of Staromayorske).\[^{76}\] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that elements of the Russian 5th CAA (EMD) seized Staromaysorsk.\[^{77}\] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (EMD and Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) continue to operate in this area.\[^{78}\]

---

**Assessed Control of Terrain in Western Donetsk Oblast as of June 10, 2024, 3:00 PM ET**

---

*Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.*
**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis** (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 10, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), Kopani (northwest of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on June 9 and 10. [79]
Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on June 10, including near Krynky, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[80] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces crossed “water obstacles,” implying that Russian forces continue attempts to operate on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[81]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov appears to be amplifying his efforts to showcase his work on developing healthcare programs for Russian servicemembers in his new role. Belousov met with Russian Health Minister Mikhail Murashko and representatives of Russian veteran advocacy organizations on June 10 to discuss medical treatment for Russian soldiers who have fought in Ukraine, particularly regarding rehabilitation and prosthetic limbs. Belousov visited the Russian MoD's Central Military Clinical Hospital in Moscow and met with medical staff to discuss developing its diagnostic and treatment facilities and increasing its rehabilitation facilities to speed up the healing process for Russian military personnel. The head of the Central Military Clinical Hospital’s cardiac surgery center claimed that doctors have performed over 300 heart surgeries since the start of the full-scale invasion and that many treated Russian soldiers are already returning to military service.

BBC Russian Service and Russian investigative outlet Mediazona reported on June 10 that at least 19,547 Wagner Group personnel died in infantry-led “meat assaults” in the battle for Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast between January and August 2023. BBC Russian Service and Mediazona used Wagner records of posthumous payments to fighters' relatives to determine that Wagner forces lost over 20,000 personnel between January 2022 and August 2023 (likely including Wagner operations outside of Ukraine prior to the full-scale invasion), including at least 19,547 deaths during fighting for Bakhmut from June 2022 to June 2023. BBC Russian Service and Mediazona noted that penal recruits comprised about 90 percent of the Wagner deaths during fighting for Bakhmut. BBC Russian Service and Mediazona confirmed that Wagner recruited at least 48,000 penal recruits, two thirds of whom were from maximum security penal colonies. BBC Russian Service and Mediazona reported that Wagner suffered its highest casualties in January 2023, losing between 200-213 personnel per day on the days with highest casualties.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian drone designer Stratim Design Bureau displayed drones that the Russian military is reportedly using in Ukraine at the HeliRussia-2024 exhibition in Moscow on June 10. Stratim Design Bureau displayed the "Vorobei" ("Sparrow") light reconnaissance drone, which can reportedly operate at "non-standard frequencies" that make it more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems and can be controlled through a smartphone. The Stratim Design Bureau also displayed the "Golub" ("Pigeon") munition-dropping drone, which reportedly uses artificial intelligence (AI) to automatically identify infantry. The Stratim Design Bureau stated that it has started mass-producing both the "Vorobei" and "Golub" drones.

Belarusian drone designer "Unmanned Systems" Minsk Design Bureau also presented a reconnaissance and strike rotary-wing drone at the HeliRussia-2024 exhibition on June 10. The "Hunter" drone is reportedly equipped with a remote-controlled turret with a 7.62mm machine gun capable of holding 550 rounds, eight rockets, and 16 anti-tank bombs. The "Hunter" can reportedly destroy surface drones, low-speed air targets, and armored vehicles. Russian investigative opposition outlet Dossier Center reported on June 10 that the Rus Design Bureau has also developed the "NRV-3800" rotary-wing drone, which reportedly is capable of carrying a supersonic missile. ISW has not observed any other reports about the NRV-3800 drone.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine’s Western partners continue efforts to support Ukraine’s war effort. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stated on June 3 that Italy will send a second SAMP/T air defense system to Ukraine as part of Italy’s ninth military aid package to Ukraine, which the Italian government is currently preparing. The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 6 that the German government reached an agreement with an unspecified German arms company to produce almost
The Dutch MoD stated on June 7 that the Netherlands and Denmark will jointly provide 400 million euros (about $430 million) to a Swedish fund to produce CV90 infantry fighting vehicles for Ukraine. The Dutch MoD also stated that the Netherlands is contributing to the creation of an assembly line to produce Patriot air defense missiles in Germany. French defense company Thales Group stated on June 7 that it signed a contract for the delivery of a second ControlMaster 200 air defense system to Ukraine. The British and Latvian governments announced on June 3 the start of bidding for companies to supply first-person view (FPV) drones to Ukraine as part of the UK and Latvian-led Drone Capability Coalition. Finnish Deputy Chief of Staff for Armaments and Logistics Lieutenant General Mikko Heiskanen stated on June 8 that Finland is sending materiel from Finnish stockpiles as well as innovations to Ukraine. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Dmytro Klimenkov stated on June 10 that the Ukrainian MoD is introducing direct contracting with weapons manufacturers to more quickly and effectively modernize the Ukrainian military.

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to support Ukraine’s domestic defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 7 that Ukrainian and French defense industrial companies signed an agreement to produce ammunition under the license of defense industrial holding company KNDS. Zelensky also stated that Ukrainian and French companies signed statements of intent to create a service and repair center for KNDS equipment in Ukraine. French media reported on June 7 that KNDS formalized an agreement to create a subsidiary to produce military equipment and ammunition in Ukraine.

Ukraine continues its own efforts to develop and strengthen its domestic DIB. Chief of Aviation of the Ukrainian Air Force Brigadier General Serhii Holubtsov stated on June 9 that Ukraine is developing high-precision kits for Soviet-era bombs that are analogous to American Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) guidance kits. Holubtsov stated that Ukraine will begin tests of the guidance kits in a few weeks. Ukraine’s Army of Drones initiative stated on June 4 that Ukrainian company Pegasus Arms created the Pegasus Arms 25, a new strike drone with an anti-electronic warfare (EW) system. The Ukrainian MoD stated on June 8 that the Ukrainian military has admitted more than 110 types of vehicles including armored cars, trucks, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and electric motorcycles into service, a third of which is domestically produced in Ukraine.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials continue attempts discredit Ukrainian and Western documentation of Russian human rights violations perpetrated against Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine and Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). Russian Duma Deputy and former Commissioner of Children’s Rights Anna Kuznetsova attempted to undermine widespread documentation that Russia is forcibly deporting Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia by claiming that 161 children allegedly abducted by Russia were “found in Germany.” Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova, who has also been directly implicated in the forced deportations of Ukrainian children to Russia by the International Criminal Court (which has a warrant out for her arrest), claimed in July 2023 that Russia “accepted” over 700,000 children from occupied Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab conducted an independent investigation published in February 2023 that found that Russian authorities have likely deported over 14,700 Ukrainian children to Russia, and First Lady Olena Zelenska stated in June 2024 that Ukrainian authorities have verified the names of close to 20,000 Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have forcibly deported to Russia. Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatiana Moskalkova met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 10 and claimed that she is in contact with Ukrainian Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinetz and that they mutually agreed to begin transferring packages to each other’s POWs in 2023. Moskalkova recently blamed Ukraine for making “far-fetched demands” that caused a pause in POW exchanges over the past several months, however. Moskalkova’s attempts to portray Russia’s and Ukraine’s POW coordination positively and shift the blame onto Ukraine for a pause in POW exchanges is likely an attempt to draw attention away from a series of apparent Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs in recent months.
Russian officials continue to threaten to strike NATO member states in response to the Western provision of military aid to Ukraine in an attempt to deter further security assistance to Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force's Aviation Chief Brigadier General Serhiy Holubtsov stated that Ukrainian forces will store an unspecified number of Western-provided F-16 aircraft “at secure bases outside of Ukraine” after Ukrainian forces receive F-16s.[106] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed that the Russian military would consider any F-16s used to strike Russian territory and their bases as legitimate targets, including those outside of Ukraine.[107]

Russian government officials and Kremlin mouthpieces largely framed the results of the June 6 to 9 European Union (EU) Parliamentary elections as evidence of European distrust in elected leaders, likely in an attempt to sow division in Europe and foment suspicion against European officials.[108]

**Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)**

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on June 10 that Belarusian forces are conducting the second stage of tactical nuclear weapons exercises.[109]

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksander Gusev on June 10 and discussed increasing economic cooperation, including in the construction, agricultural, and radio-electronic industries.[110] Russian Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Viktor Evtukhov stated on March 31 that Belarus and Russia are developing joint projects to manufacture radio electronics – likely as part of Russian sanctions evasion schemes.[111]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/253975 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/248886


[16] https://t.me/msgazdiev/1335


[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052824

[20] https://t.me/MID_Russia/41532

[21] https://t.me/MID_Russia/41520 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41536; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41539; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41542; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41546; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41548; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41551; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41552; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41555 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41556 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41557; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41562; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41574

[22] https://t.me/MID_Russia/41527; https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202406/t20240610_11416079.shtml


[84] https://zona dot media/article/2024/06/10/42174 ; https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cv22vjjw10eo
[85] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/21059093 ;
[86] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/21060811
[87] https://t.me/dossiercenter/333


[89] https://www.bmvg dot de/de/aktuelles/bundeswehr-beschafft-mehr-artilleriegeschosse-5788634
[95] https://t.me/V Zelenskiy official/10660 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/07/v-ukrayini-budutvygotovlyaty-boyeprepasy-po-francuzkogo-liczeniyi/}
[98] https://t.me/armyofdrones/1135
[99] https://www.mil.gov dot ua/news/2024/06/08/ponad-110-zrazkiv-a/
[100] https://tass dot ru/politika/21059057
[101] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/30/07/2023/64c6c3119a794777ebce7766