Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on March 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A Ukrainian military observer offered assessments of Russian force generation and defense industrial base (DIB) capacities that are consistent with ISW's previous assessments. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command is aiming to create a "strategic reserve" for offensive operations in spring–summer 2024 but is not planning to equip these newly formed units and formations with the doctrinally required quantities of weapons and equipment due to current Russian DIB production constraints.[1] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command only plans to equip the 27th Motorized Rifle Division — which Russia is reportedly in the process of standing up on the basis of the Central Military District's existing 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade — with up to 87 percent of its doctrinally required amounts of weapons and equipment by the second and fourth quarters of 2024 and implied that the Russian military command has a similar goal for other new formations and units. Mashovets assessed that it is unlikely that Russian forces will be able to meet this equipment goal by the fourth quarter of 2024 given that many Russian regiments, brigades, and divisions currently operating in Ukraine only have about 30 percent of the doctrinally required amounts of weapons and equipment. Several Western and Ukrainian military officials and analysts noted that Russia's reported tank production numbers largely reflect restored and modern tanks drawn from storage rather than new production.[2]

Mashovets' assessment is consistent with ISW's assessment that the Russian DIB is capable of sustaining Russia's current tempo of operations, although not likely able to fully support a potential operational or strategic-level offensive operation using a strategic reserve of manpower 2024.[3] Reports that the Russian military is prioritizing creating new underequipped units and formations are consistent with ISW's assessment that Russia is prioritizing the quantity of manpower and materiel over the quality of its forces.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia would have the opportunity to expand its DIB and amass resources if it maintains the theater-wide initiative throughout 2024, thus allowing Russia to set conditions for a future offensive operation using a larger reserve of manpower and equipment.[5]

Mashovets stated that the Russian military command intends to form the bulk of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division from the newly formed 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly staffed by degraded elements of the 21st Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment), 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment.[6] Mashovets stated that Russia is currently forming its 433rd, 506th, and 589th motorized rifle regiments at the Totskove training ground in Orenburg Oblast and the "Trekhizbenovsky" training ground in occupied Luhansk Oblast and plans to have these units ready for combat by late spring or early summer 2024.[7] These newly formed regiments are likely meant to rapidly deploy to Ukraine to offset frontline losses and are unlikely to be staffed with high-quality recruits or operating at doctrinal end strength.[8] Although Russia likely does not have the capacity to staff and equip these new units near their intended end strength in the near term. the Russian military command almost certainly has long-term intentions to fully equip these and similar units. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command has already been forced to reconsider the formation of a number of units due to "discrepanc[ies]" between Russia's force-generation ambitions and realities and that Russia's ability to deploy its strategic reserves in practice are likely limited "to a certain point."[9] The Russian military command appears to be prioritizing shortterm benefits, such as limited territorial gains, over long-term sustainability and large-scale operationally meaningful undertakings in Ukraine amid ongoing Russian reformation and reconstitution efforts. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command's use of ongoing force structure changes to rush newly created and understrength formations into combat in Ukraine will likely constrain the immediate efficacy of these units on the battlefield but is enough to maintain the current pace of operations.[10] The major variable likely to determine the rate at which such partially replenished Russian forces can advance this summer is the availability of materiel to Ukraine, which in turn depends heavily on the continued provision of US military assistance.

Russia's increased defense industrial base (DIB) production is likely not sustainable in the medium- and long-term as it will likely suffer from labor shortages, decreased weapons and equipment stockpiles, and an inability to completely compensate for military and dual-use items it can no longer acquire due to sanctions. The *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) reported on March 11 that a senior NATO official stated that Russia can likely sustain its current war effort for two to five more years.[11] WSJ noted that some Russian production figures, such as those for military vehicles, do not differentiate between newly produced items and refurbished ones brought out of storage, such as older, lower quality T-62 and T-54/-55 tanks. ISW has observed that reports of Russia's reported tank "production" numbers in recent years largely reflect restored and modernized tanks drawn from storage rather than new production.[12] Open-source researchers recently analyzed satellite imagery and assessed that Russia has reportedly removed 25 to 40 percent of its tank strategic reserves, depending on the model, from open-air storage facilities since

2022.[13] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Russia and Eurasia Program Senior Fellow Dara Massicot assessed on March 8 that Russia's "remaining inventory will dwindle in the next couple of years" if Russia continues its current tempo of operations.[14] WSJ reported that the Bank of Finland concluded that Russia may not be able to sustain its increased DIB production as the DIB takes personnel and material resources away from other sectors of the Russian economy.[15] WSJ reported that Kremlin official statements suggest that the Russian DIB is suffering from a personnel shortage of about 20 percent and that some DIB enterprise employees have recently complained about the lack of training and tools. ISW has previously assessed that Russia's labor shortage, which is partially a result of its war in Ukraine and partially a symptom of Russia's ongoing demographic crisis, will likely continue to complicate Kremlin efforts to balance increasing Russian economic capacity and force generation while catering to select members of the Russian ultranationalist community by disincentivizing migrant workers from working in Russia.[16] The Bank of Finland also reportedly found that Russia's increased DIB production has focused on low-tech products, such as fabricated steel, and that Russia is still reliant on foreign suppliers for higher-tech items such as semiconductors.[17] WSJ stated that while Russia has successfully evaded sanctions and imported some products, Russia is struggling to source some necessary specialized items, such as tank optics, from third countries.

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported that Russia currently has about three million rounds of old artillery ammunition in its stockpiles, but that much of it is in poor condition.[18] WSJ reported that RUSI and other Western analysts have assessed that Russia's current domestic ammunition production is not sufficient for its war in Ukraine, so Russia will likely continue relying on supplies from partners.[19] CNN reported on March 11 that NATO intelligence estimates that Russia is producing about 250,000 artillery munitions of unspecified caliber per month totaling about three million shells per year.[20] A senior European intelligence official reportedly told CNN the US and Europe can collectively produce only about 1.2 million shells of unspecified calibers per year for Ukraine. CNN stated that the US military set a goal to produce 100,000 shells per month by the end of 2025 and noted that this is less than half of Russia's current monthly production, but US Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology Doug Bush stated on February 5 that this goal of 100,000 shells per month by 2025 only refers to 155mm artillery shells and does not include shells of other calibers that the US produces and that Ukrainian forces use.[21] NATO intelligence estimates of Russian artillery munition production cited by CNN likely include various calibers of munitions, not just 152mm shells that are the analogue to Western 155mm shells, and is likely not a direct comparison to the West's goals for the production of 155mm shells.

Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea have apparently resumed after a pause since mid-February 2024. North Korea–focused outlet *NK Pro* reported on March 11 that satellite imagery indicates that a ship resembling the Russian *Lady R* cargo ship arrived at North Korea's Rajin Port on March 10 and appears to be loaded with containers that crews will likely fill with arms for delivery back to Russia.[22] *NK Pro* stated that objects, likely delivered to the port by train from inside North Korea, appeared at the pier at Rajin Port where ships are usually loaded before departing to Russia. The *Lady R* ship reportedly delivered cargo from North Korea to Russia twice in October 2023 and once in February 2024. *NK Pro* reported on February 29 that satellite imagery indicated that Russian ships involved in the maritime transport of North Korean ammunition and weaponry to Russia had not docked at the Rajin Port since February 12.[23]

A Ukrainian military source noted that Russian forces are increasingly using grenades equipped with chemical substances in the Zaporizhia direction, in potential violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to which Russia is a signatory. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi stated on March 11 that Russian forces used at least 60 grenades equipped with a suffocating and tear-inducing substance on Ukrainian positions in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast) between March 4 to March 10 alone, noting that most of these attacks occurred in the Zaporizhia direction.[24] Lykhovyi suggested that Russian forces are most likely equipping grenades with chloropicrin (PS) or a similar substance. PS is a lung-damaging riot control agent (RCA) that shares the characteristics of tear gas — it is not necessarily lethal but can have extremely irritating and harmful impacts when inhaled.[25] The CWC prohibits the use of PS and other RCAs in warfare, and Russia has been a signatory to the CWC since 1997.[26]

The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has summoned Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov in response to claims that Russia will operate polling stations in pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria during the Russian presidential election. The Moldovan MFA summoned Vasnetsov to appear on March 12 in response to Moldova's "disapproval" of claims that Russia will operate polling stations in Transnistria.[27] Regional outlet *Transnistrian News* claimed on March 11 that Russian citizens will be able to vote in the Russian presidential election at six polling stations in Transnistria on March 17 despite previous Moldovan rulings that Russia can only operate one polling station at the Russian embassy in Chisinau.[28] Russian Embassy Press Secretary Anatoly Loshakov appeared to deny *Transnistrian News*' claim, stating that the embassy is only organizing voting at the polling station at the embassy.[29] These claims may be part of the Kremlin's efforts to use Transnistria and pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region Gagauzia in information operations to support hybrid operations aimed at sabotaging Moldova's EU accession process and keeping Moldova within Russia's sphere of influence.[30]

Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt – 2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11–15.[31] Kremlin-affiliated outlet *Izvestia* reported on March 11 that a detachment ships of Russia's Pacific Fleet, including the *Varyag* Slava-class cruiser, arrived at Iran's Chabahar Port to participate in Maritime Security Belt-2024 alongside Iranian and Chinese naval detachments.[32] The exercise, which was first held in 2019, is intended to practice safe joint naval maneuvers to ensure safe maritime economic activity.[33] The Russian *Marshal Shaposhnikov* Udaloy-class destroyer; the Chinese *Ürümqi* destroyer, *Linyi* frigate, *Dongpinghu* replenishment ship; and 10 unnamed Iranian ships, boats, and supply vessels and three naval helicopters are taking part in the exercise.[34] Representatives of Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, India, and South Africa will observe the exercise.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that the West intends to use Armenia as a tool against Russia, a notable escalation in its information operations criticizing Armenian efforts to distance itself from security relations with Russia. UK Minister of State for the Armed Forces James Heappey stated on March 10 that the UK recognizes Armenia's decision to "essentially" freeze its participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) "in the face of threats of relation from Russia," while acknowledging that Armenia is not officially leaving the CSTO.[35] The Russian MFA claimed that Heappey's statement was "direct confirmation" of the West's intent to "turn Armenia into a tool against Moscow" and its wider "anti-Russian" efforts in the post-Soviet space and the South Caucasus.[36] The Russian MFA called on Armenian officials to "think seriously." Senior Russian government officials have acknowledged and criticized Armenia's lack of participation in the CSTO since Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan's February 22 announcement that Armenia "essentially" froze its participation in the CSTO.[37] The Kremlin is likely preparing a harsher and more concerted response as Armenia continues to take measures to distance itself from Russia and signal interest in strengthening relations with the West.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill on March 11 that allows Russian authorities to further restrict actors it deems "foreign agents" to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the presidential election. Putin signed a bill that bans Russians from advertising the content of individuals and organizations legally designated as "foreign agents" and from advertising their own content on platforms that "foreign agents" own.[38] ISW previously assessed that this law will impact Russian opposition media's ability to operate and report reliably in Russia and reported that at least one Russian opposition journalist has already suspended their work in Russia due to the new advertising ban.[39] ISW recently observed reports that large Russian advertising agencies have already included unilateral termination clauses in their advertising contracts in case the Kremlin designates a client as a foreign agent during the term of their contract.[40] The Russian Cabinet of Ministers also announced its support for a draft bill that would allow the Russian government to designate foreign organizations whose founders or participants are allegedly affiliated with foreign governments as "undesirable" and fine or imprison individuals found guilty of participating in their events.[41]


France is reportedly prepared to build a coalition of countries that are open to potentially sending Western military personnel to Ukraine.[42] French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné announced on March 9 during a meeting with Baltic and Ukrainian officials that Ukraine could use foreign troops for operations such as demining or similar efforts and that Western personnel in Ukraine would not necessarily fight.[43] Séjourné emphasized that "it is not for Russia to tell us how we [the West] should help Ukraine in the coming months or years," noting that Russia should not be able to control how the West responds to Russia by setting arbitrary "red lines." Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski similarly stated on March 8 that the "presence of NATO forces in Ukraine is not unthinkable."[44] Séjourné reiterated on March 11 that France seeks to "send strong signals" to Russia and speak to the Kremlin in the "language of balance of power."[45]

Key Takeaways:

- A Ukrainian military observer offered assessments of Russian force generation and defense industrial base (DIB) capacities that are consistent with ISW's previous assessments.
- Russia's increased defense industrial base (DIB) production is likely not sustainable in the medium and long-term as it will likely suffer from labor shortages, decreased weapons and equipment stockpiles, and an inability to completely compensate for military and dual-use items it can no longer acquire due to sanctions.
- Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea have apparently resumed after a pause since mid-February 2024.
- A Ukrainian military source noted that Russian forces are increasingly using grenades equipped with chemical substances in the Zaporizhia direction, in potential violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to which Russia is a signatory.
- The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has summoned Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov in response to claims that Russia will operate polling stations in pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria during the Russian presidential election.

- Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt 2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11–15.
- The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that the West intends to use Armenia as a tool against Russia, a notable escalation in its information operations criticizing Armenian efforts to distance itself from security relations with Russia.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill on March 11 that allows Russian authorities to further restrict actors it deems "foreign agents" to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the presidential election.
- France is reportedly prepared to build a coalition of countries that are open to potentially sending Western military personnel to Ukraine.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Donetsk City.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues efforts to cater to Russian servicemembers and their families with the promise of various social benefits.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of March 11, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



^{*} Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

<u>Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine</u>


<u>Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Luhansk Oblast</u> (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna amid continued positional engagements in the area on March 11. Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that recent footage of Ukrainian forces' attempted attacks in the Terny direction confirms that Ukrainian forces control Terny and refutes claims that Russian forces entered the settlement.[47] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces may launch a simultaneous attack on Terny and Yampolivka at an unspecified point in the future to eliminate the Ukrainian bridgehead on the right bank of the Zherebets River that Ukrainian forces have held since autumn 2022. Ukrainian and Russian forces stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[48] Elements of the Russian 7th and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[49]



<u>Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Donetsk Oblast</u> (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas)


Positional fighting continued in the Bakhmut area on March 11. Geolocated footage published on March 6 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced in a field north of Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut), though Ukrainian forces did not likely recently advance.[50] A Ukrainian company commander operating in the Bakhmut direction stated that Russian forces captured positions on the outskirts of Ivanivske in early March and have not advanced further since then.[51] ISW observed geolocated footage on March 3 indicating that Russian forces have advanced as far as the center of Ivanivske.[52] ISW has not observed visual evidence that Ukrainian forces have recaptured the center of Ivanivske, but they may have done so. Positional fighting continued northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and east of Chasiv Yar; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[53] Positional fighting also continued northeast of Bakhmut near Spirne and Rozdolivka.[54] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Ivanivske; the Russian "Varvara" group of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces and the "Maestro" Separate Reconnaissance Detachment of the "Terek" Cossack Brigade (reportedly of the volunteer Cossack Assault Corps) are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction; and elements of the 1436th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]] are reportedly operating south of Bakhmut near Niu York.[55]



Positional fighting continued west of Avdiivka on March 11, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on March 10 that Russian forces advanced 280 meters along Myr Street in Orlivka, which is consistent with recent confirmed Russian advances in the settlement.[56] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have captured most of Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[57] A milblogger claimed on March 10 that the pace of Russian assaults in the Avdiivka direction slowed between March 3 to 10 but that Russian forces continue offensive operations west of Avdiivka on the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke line despite Ukrainian counterattacks.[58] Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka and Berdychi; west of Bakhmut near Orlivka and Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[59] Elements of the Russian 21st and 30th motorized rifle brigades (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) continue to operate on the Berdychi-Stepove area, and elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka area.[60]


A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces fighting on the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke line west of Avdiivka are degraded and struggling to make significant advances.[61] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are focusing on the Orlivka-Tonenke area and are making steady tactical advances but that Russian forces overall are struggling. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces here are struggling due to degraded staff work, poor training of command staff, poor organization, and lack of coordination and communication particularly between different units. The milblogger claimed that different Russian units entrenched in basements close to each other do not communicate with each other and struggle with surveillance of their areas. The milblogger advised that Russian forces should not get bogged down on the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke line but should focus on the Berdychi area instead of the entire Orlivka-Tonenke line as they are now.

Assessed Control of Terrain near Avdiivka as of March 11, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Note: A Russian source claimed on March 8 that Russian forces advanced up to 1.27 kilometers wide and 500 meters deep south of Orlivka. A Russian source claimed on March 8 that Russian forces advanced 1.35 kilometers deep in the southwestern part of Tonenke.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west and southwest of Donetsk City amid continued fighting in the area on March 11. Geolocated footage published on March 11 shows that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Heorhiivka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka (all southwest of Donetsk City).[62] Additional geolocated footage published on March 10 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced southeast of Shevchenko (southwest of Donetsk City and southwest of Vuhledar), and a Russian milblogger claimed on March 11 that Russian forces advanced in the area.[63] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and near Heorhiivka, Pobieda, and Novomykhailivka on March 11.[64] Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Heorhiivka; elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pobieda; and elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, EMD) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[65]



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Velyka Novosilka amid positional fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 11. Geolocated footage published on March 7 and 10 shows that Russian forces advanced southeast of Chervone (southwest of Velyka Novosilka and southeast of Hulyaipole).[66] Positional fighting continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske on March 11.[67] Elements of the Russian 11th Air and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) continue to operate in the south Donetsk direction; elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are operating near Staromayorske; and elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are operating near Chervone.[68]




* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

<u>Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis</u> (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 11, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in these areas. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured several unspecified positions between Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these clams.[69] Positional engagements continued near Zherebyanky (northwest of Robotyne), Pyatykhatky (northwest of Robotyne), Robtoyne, Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne), and northwest of Verbove.[70] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Palantin-K electronic warfare (EW) system and a Leyer EW system in the Zaporizhia direction (likely referring to western Zaporizhia Oblast).[71]




Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhia as of March 11, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Note: A Russian source claimed on March 7 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer northwest of Verbove.

Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of March 11. Positional engagements continued in left bank Kherson Oblast, particularly near Krynky.[72] Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed that only scattered groups of Ukrainian servicemen remain in Krynky.[73]



<u>Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign</u> (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 25 Shahed-136/131 drones on the night of March 10-11 and that Ukrainian forces shot down 15 drones.[74] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian drones damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Odesa cities.[75]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 11 that Russian forces have launched 175 Shahed drones at Ukraine since March 1 and that Ukrainian forces have shot down 151 of the drones.[76]

<u>Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts</u> (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues efforts to cater to Russian military personnel and their families with the promise of social benefits. Putin instructed the Russian Cabinet of Ministers on March 11 to create a new section of the Unified Public Services Portal (Gosuslugi) that provides Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine and their family members with information about social benefits, assistance, and services that are available to them.[77] The Cabinet of Ministers is also reportedly considering a proposal that will exempt the children of deceased servicemembers from paying for utilities and allows a one time payment of 20,000 rubles (about \$220) to dependents of deceased soldiers who received the "Hero of Russia" award.[78] Putin additionally signed a decree on March 11 that extends the five-million-ruble (\$55,000) payment made in the event of a soldier's death in Ukraine to families of civilian Ministry of Defense (MoD) personnel and employees of law enforcement bodies.[79] The decree will provide the five-million-ruble payment to the families of civilian employees of the Russian MoD, any federal government agency, internal affairs agencies, the Federal Penitentiary Service, the Federal Bailiff Service, federal communications authorities, or Federal Customs Service in the event of the employee's death in the combat zone in Ukraine. The Kremlin has previously used the promise of social benefits to incentivize participation in the war and soothe domestic discontent using financial means.[80]

<u>Russian Technological Adaptations</u> (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

<u>Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts</u> (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

European Union (EU) High Commissioner Josep Borrell stated on March 11 that the EU may use the profits from frozen Russian assets to purchase weapons for Ukraine or to help strengthen Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), should the EU agree to use the profits from the frozen funds.[81] The EU previously adopted a decision that would allow the EU to use the profits of frozen Russian funds for the reconstruction of Ukraine.[82]

Ukraine's European partners continue efforts to aid and supply Ukraine. British Defense Secretary Grant Shapps stated on March 7 that the United Kingdom (UK) will allocate 125 million pounds (about \$160 million) to purchase 10,000 drones for Ukraine in 2024.[83] Officials from Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, and France announced recently that they will join the Czech initiative to fund the provision of artillery ammunition from outside the EU to Ukraine.[84] The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on March 7 that Norway will provide \$150 million to the Czech artillery ammunition initiative.[85] French President Emmanuel Macron stated on March 8 that France is negotiating with Qatar and Saudi Arabia on the return of French weapons exported to Saudi Arabia and Qatar and that France will no longer supply artillery shells and systems to these countries as part of French efforts to increase supplies to Ukraine.[86] Macron stated that Germany and Italy are also negotiating the return of weapons from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia.

Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) are reportedly considering a "ring exchange" of German Taurus missiles for British Storm Shadow missiles as part of European efforts to arm Ukraine. British Foreign Secretary David Cameron stated on March 9 that the UK is ready to acquire German Taurus missiles to replace at least some of its stock of British Storm Shadow missiles, which the UK would then send to Ukraine.[87] German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated on March 11 that the ring exchange proposal would be an "option" and noted that Germany has previously conducted similar weapons exchanges.[88]

The lack of US funding for American-Canadian military aid provision agreements are reportedly delaying weapons supplies to Ukraine. Canadian Defense Minister Bill Blair stated on March 10 that the lack of US funding to finalize contracts has delayed the American and Canadian delivery of National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) that Canada and the US promised to Ukraine in January 2023.[89]

The *New York Times* reported on March 11 that Ukraine may receive six F-16 fighter jets in summer 2024 and that 12 Ukrainian pilots will likely be ready to fly F-16s in combat by then.[90]

Ukraine's European allies continue efforts to shift aspects of DIB production to Ukrainian territory to support Ukraine's DIB domestically. French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu announced on March 8 that three unnamed French companies will establish factories for the joint production of drone, vehicle parts, and potentially ammunition in Ukraine.[91] Lecornu noted that France and Ukraine aim to launch the first of these production facilities in Summer 2024.[92] Czech industrial-technology holding group Czechoslovak Group (CSG) is negotiating with various Ukrainian state-owned companies to transfer some part of joint munition and heavy equipment manufacturing to Ukraine by 2027.[93] CSG owner Michal Strnad stated that the Czech-Ukrainian model should follow the analogue of German arms concern Rheinmetall's joint venture with Ukrainian state-owned DIB conglomerate Ukroboronprom, which operates exclusively within Ukraine and provides for the maintenance, assembly, and production of military vehicles.[94]

<u>Activities in Russian-occupied areas</u> (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on March 11 that the US plans to conduct cyberattacks against the Russian remote electronic voting system and use non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to attempt to reduce voter turnout in the Russian presidential election.[95] Russian authorities are likely setting conditions to blame a potential low voter turnout on alleged Western election tampering and for escalation with the West.

<u>Significant activity in Belarus</u> (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian First Deputy Defense Minister Major General Viktor Gulevich stated on March 11 that the Belarusian military is conducting combat readiness exercise, in part as a response to the NATO Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises.[96] ISW continues to assess that Russia and Belarus are attempting to misrepresent these exercises as a threat against Russia and Belarus despite the exercises' defensive nature in response to real Russian aggression against Ukraine and overt Russian threats against NATO states.[97] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko warned that unspecified actors may spread false information about the start of a new Russian offensive operation in the direction of Kyiv in tandem with the Belarusian military exercises.[98] Kovalenko reported that the Russian military does not have "reserves or a sufficient presence [in Belarus]" to conduct an invasion from Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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