

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 31, 2023
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Frederick W. Kagan
March 31, 6:30pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new Russian Foreign Policy Concept on March 31 that likely aims to support the Kremlin’s attempts to promote a potential anti-Western coalition. The new Foreign Policy Concept paints the West as an anti-Russian and internationally destabilizing force to a far greater extent than Russia’s previous 2016 Foreign Policy Concept and explicitly states that the US and its “satellites” have unleashed a hybrid war aimed at weakening Russia.¹ The new document also heavily stresses Russia’s goal of creating a multipolar world order and subordinates under that goal Russia’s broad foreign policy objectives, which include ending the United States’ supposed dominance in world affairs.² The document asserts that most of humanity is interested in constructive relations with Russia and that a desired multi-polar world will give opportunities to non-Western world powers and regional leading countries.³ Putin previously used meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping on March 20 through 22 to increase attempts to rhetorically rally the rest of the world against the West, and the new document likely aims to support the Kremlin’s attempts to intensify proposals to non-aligned countries to form a more coherent anti-Western bloc.⁴ ISW assessed that Putin’s proposal to form an anti-Western bloc during Xi’s visit to Moscow was not positively received as Xi refused to align China with Putin’s envisioned geopolitical conflict with the West.⁵ Russia’s declining economic power and degraded military effort in Ukraine continue to offer little incentive to countries to express serious interest in the proposal. The Kremlin likely decided to release the new Foreign Policy Concept on the eve of assuming the presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in order to set informational conditions for future rhetorical efforts at the UN aimed at forming an anti-Western coalition.⁶ ISW previously assessed that Russia will likely weaponize its presidency of the UNSC as a method of Russian power projection.⁷

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to use high-profile public statements to portray Belarus as a sovereign state despite its current de-facto occupation by Russian forces. Lukashenko reiterated boilerplate rhetoric about how he is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s equal partner in defense of Russia and Belarus by explicitly painting Belarus as the target of a Western hybrid war – a narrative Lukashenko has promoted since 2020.⁸ Lukashenko stated that he and Putin mutually agreed to deploy Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus to protect Belarus’ “sovereignty and independence.”⁹ Lukashenko also stated that he and Putin mutually decided to partially deploy elements of the Union State’s Regional Grouping of Troops (RGV) to an unspecified area.¹⁰ Lukashenko stated that nobody should worry that Russia “captured something” in Belarus and stated the Russian forces training in Belarus under Belarusian officers are subordinated to Belarusian forces.¹¹ Lukashenko likely seeks to use the narrative that Belarus is a fully sovereign state and Russia’s

equal partner in the Union State so that he can use informational leverage to request that Russian forces leave Belarus after Russia's invasion of Ukraine concludes. Lukashenko also stated that he supports peace negotiations "as soon as possible" and offered to help mediate negotiations.¹²

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov promptly rejected Lukashenko's suggestion of a ceasefire and indicated that the Kremlin is not interested in serious negotiations. Peskov responded to a question about Lukashenko's suggestion on March 31 and stated that Russian forces will continue to carry out their missions in Ukraine.¹³ Peskov emphasized that Russian military operations in Ukraine are the only means by which Russia can achieve its goals.¹⁴ Peskov likely aimed to leave open the possibility for launching new information operations about Russian interests in a ceasefire by stating that Putin and Lukashenko may discuss the proposal for a truce in Ukraine.¹⁵ The Kremlin may decide to promote ceasefire narratives in coming weeks in an attempt to freeze the frontlines in Ukraine out of fears that a Ukrainian counteroffensive could result in Ukrainian forces liberating more territory.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev leveraged comments about sending peacekeeping forces to Ukraine to continue information operations that portray the West as escalatory. Medvedev likely responded to Viktor Orban's March 31 statements regarding alleged European discussions about sending peacekeeping forces to Ukraine and stated that Russian forces would target the hypothetical peacekeepers.¹⁶ Medvedev argued that a Western-led peacekeeping mission to Ukraine would end in tragedies reminiscent of Yugoslavia and other conflicts.¹⁷ There are no indications outside of Orban's comments that Western officials are seriously discussing such a proposal, and Medvedev likely used Orban's comments to construct a straw man proposal to paint the West as trying to escalate the war in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new Russian Foreign Policy Concept on March 31 that likely aims to support the Kremlin's attempts to promote a potential anti-Western coalition.**
- **Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to use high-profile public statements to portray Belarus as a sovereign state despite its current de-facto occupation by Russian forces.**
- **Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov promptly rejected Lukashenko's suggestion of a ceasefire and indicated that the Kremlin is not interested in serious negotiations.**
- **Russian Security Council deputy chairman Dmitry Medvedev leveraged comments about sending peacekeeping forces to Ukraine to continue information operations that portray the West as escalatory.**
- **Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.**
- **Russian forces made gains within Bakhmut and Ukrainian forces regained positions in the Bakhmut area.**
- **Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk frontline.**
- **Ukrainian strikes against Russian concentration areas in southern Ukraine are likely causing the Russian grouping in the area to change tactics to avoid the risk of strikes.**

- Russian officials continue to state that Russian forces have no plans for a formal second wave of mobilization.
- Russian officials continue to send Ukrainian children to camps in Russia.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of March 31, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on March 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove), Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Kreminna itself, Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna), Hryhorivka (9km south of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and Berestove (30km south of Kreminna).¹⁸ Ukraine's Luhansk Oblast Military Administration noted on March 31 that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in 20 skirmishes in this direction over the past day.¹⁹ A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks towards Stelmakhivka and Nevske (20km northwest of Kreminna).²⁰ Former Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Interior Minister Vitaly Kiselev posted footage reportedly of snipers of the 3rd Separate Special Purpose (Spetsnaz) Brigade of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU) operating near Kreminna.²¹ Circulation of footage of the 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade over the past few may suggest they deployed to this area more recently and are helping support exhausted Western Military District (WMD) elements that have been committed to decisive operations in this area since the beginning of 2023.²² Footage released by Ukrainian soldiers in late February 2023 shows the aftermath of Ukrainian troops repelling an attack by the 237th Guards Airborne Regiment (76th Guards Air Assault Division) near Kreminna.²³ The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces (Central Military District) defeated Ukrainian troops near Dibrova.²⁴

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of March 31, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Key Ukrainian Roads
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut and have made gains within the city as of March 31. Geolocated footage posted on March 31 shows a Wagner Group flag on a building in the center of Bakhmut within a few blocks (within 400 meters) of the city administration building.²⁵ Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner forces continued attacks in northern and southern Bakhmut and unsuccessfully attempted to attack westwards towards Khromove.²⁶ One prominent milblogger noted that Wagner is failing to make significant progress in Bakhmut and that all attacks in and around the city are without success.²⁷ Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that there are no signs that Ukrainian troops are leaving Bakhmut, claimed that Wagner does not report out on the full extent of its own gains in Bakhmut, and called for conventional Russian forces around Bakhmut to continue to hold the flanks and support Wagner’s operations within the city.²⁸ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops continued storming the city of Bakhmut and conducted additional unsuccessful offensive operations northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (12km northwest).²⁹

Ukrainian troops regained positions around Bakhmut, and Ukrainian officials continue to emphasize the importance of Ukraine’s continued defense in this area on March 31. Geolocated footage posted on March 31 indicates that Ukrainian troops conducted a counterattack southwest of Bakhmut and regained lost positions south of Ivanivske (about 7km southwest of Bakhmut).³⁰ Deputy Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on March 31 that Ukraine’s committed defense of Bakhmut has made it “the most expensive” Russian effort of the war and noted that “the time, weapons, equipment, and huge number of casualties spent by the enemy on the capture of Bakhmut do not justify themselves from the point of view of military expediency.”³¹ Malyar’s statement supports ISW assessment that the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut remains strategically sound as long as Ukrainian troops force Russian troops to attrit manpower and equipment without Ukrainian troops suffering excessive losses.³² Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi relatedly reported on March 31 that Russian forces in certain sectors of Bakhmut are noticeably nervous because time is against them, and they have fewer human resources with which to storm Ukrainian positions.³³

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk frontline on March 31. Geolocated footage published on March 31 indicates that Russian force advanced in Vesele (6km north of Avdiivka).³⁴ A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults near Stepove (9km northwest of Avdiivka) and Keramik (15km northwest of Avdiivka) and launched offensive operations on western parts of Avdiivka.³⁵ The milblogger claimed that battles continued near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka) and that Russian forces stormed Ukrainian positions in western Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).³⁶ The milblogger also claimed that the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Somalia” Battalion of the 1st Army Corps is operating near Vodyane (8km southwest of Avdiivka) and that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults in the direction of Pisky (9km southwest of Avdiivka).³⁷ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka itself; within 14km northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Novokalynove, and Stepove; and within 27km southwest of Avdiivka near Severne, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Krasnohorivka, and Marinka.³⁸

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on March 31. Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Aleksandr Gordeev claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operations in unspecified areas of western Donetsk Oblast.³⁹ A Russian milblogger claimed that BARS-23 (Russian Combat Reserve of the Country) elements are fighting near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).⁴⁰

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of March 31, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



A Russian source claimed on March 27 that Russian forces entered Novokalynove.


Geolocated footage posted on March 31 indicates Russian forces captured Vesele.

Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kielm, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of March 31, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian strikes against Russian concentration areas in southern Ukraine are likely causing the Russian grouping in the area to change tactics to avoid the risk of strikes. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command stated on March 31 that Russian forces in this area are spreading themselves out and dispersing troops and equipment to avoid presenting targets.⁴¹ Ukraine's Southern Operational Command also noted that Ukrainian aviation and missile and artillery units hit two Russian concentration areas over the last day.⁴² Geolocated footage posted on March 30 shows a Ukrainian strike against a Russian electronic warfare (EW) system in Nova Kakhovka.⁴³ Russian sources claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in mutual shelling across the Dnipro River and that Ukrainian forces shelled Russian positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.⁴⁴

Russian forces continued routine fire in Kherson, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts on March 31.⁴⁵ Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials noted that Russian troops used Shahed drones to strike Nikopol on the evening of March 30.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhia as of March 31, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of March 31, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials continue to state that Russian forces have no plans for a formal second wave of mobilization. Head of the Department of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the Russian General Staff Rear Admiral Vladimir Tsimlyansky, claimed on March 31 that the Russian General Staff is not planning to conduct a second wave of mobilization because volunteers and currently mobilized personnel are enough to perform all necessary tasks.⁴⁶ Tsimlyansky also claimed that the number of Russian citizens who decided to become contract soldiers has “increased significantly” and that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) increased the number of military instructors to train contract soldiers. Tsimlyansky also claimed that the Russian MoD will conduct military registration and enlistment through electronic summonses for the first time and announced the creation of a database which registered over 700,000 Russians aged 18 to 27.⁴⁷ Russia, however, continues to conduct mobilization using alternative methods in order to avoid conducting another formal mobilization call-up. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andrii Chernyak stated that Russian forces continue crypto-mobilization efforts recruiting up to 20,000 per month.⁴⁸ Russian President Vladimir Putin additionally signed a decree on March 30 to authorize the conscription of 147,000 Russians between April 1 and July 15.⁴⁹ ISW has assessed that Putin remains unlikely to deploy newly conscripted troops to Ukraine due to concerns over the stability of his regime and noted that Putin did not deploy conscripts from the spring 2022 conscription cycle at scale to Ukraine.⁵⁰

A Russian milblogger claimed that some mobilized Russian personnel train in occupied Ukraine. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian mobilized personnel train with the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Somalia Battalion in occupied Ukraine.⁵¹ The training of Russian mobilized personnel within DNR units, which have previously been accused of abuse and mistreatment of mobilized servicemen from all across Russia, is likely to continue to generate frictions within such units.⁵²

US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated on March 30 that Russia is looking to procure weapons from North Korea.⁵³ Kirby stated that the Kremlin may be attempting to trade food and other commodities for over 24 types of weapons and munitions and wants to send a delegation to North Korea to pursue this offer. Kirby reported on December 22, 2022, that the Wagner Group received an arms shipment from North Korea and reported on November 2, 2022, that North Korea covertly supplies artillery shells to Russia.⁵⁴

Ukrainian and Russian sources claim that Russian actors continue to form new private military companies. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andrii Chernyak stated that Russia is forming private military companies (PMCs) in Crimea in preparation for fighting there. ISW has previously reported on the formation of the “Convoy” PMC by Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov.⁵⁵ Chernyak stated that Russian state-owned energy corporation Gazprom is creating a PMC to secure looted property and provide personal protection and referenced Russian PMC Yastreb posted a recruitment advertisement on Russian social media site Vkontakte on March 8 encouraging men and women from Russia and “other friendly countries” to join Yastreb.⁵⁶ The post outlines positions open and the qualifications necessary to join. Yastreb claimed that it would provide bonuses of up to 15 million rubles (about \$194,000) to individuals who destroy Western equipment such as Leopard tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and HIMARS. Yastreb claimed on its website that it

is not associated with the Wagner Group or its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and was founded in 2014.⁵⁷ ISW has not observed Yastreb forces operating in Ukraine.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to intensify pressure on vulnerable communities to obtain Russian passports. The Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Penitentiary Service claimed on March 31 that convicts in the pre-trial detention center #2 prison of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service in Luhansk Oblast received Russian passports, allowing convicts to receive social benefits from Russia upon their release as well as to register for employment services.⁵⁸

Russian officials continue to send Ukrainian children to camps in Russia. The Kherson Oblast Occupation Ministry of Labor and Social Policy claimed on March 31 that Ukrainian children returned from the "Day After Tomorrow" camp in Moscow.⁵⁹ Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Maria Lvova-Belova continues to claim that "Day After Tomorrow" camps seek to provide psychological support for Ukrainian children affected by hostilities.⁶⁰ ISW continues to assess that Russian officials and occupation authorities are using the guise of psychiatric services and medical rehabilitation to bring Ukrainian children deeper into Russian-controlled territory in Ukraine or deport them to Russia.⁶¹

Russian occupation authorities continue to paint greater integration of occupied territories into the Russian economy as advantageous for the average Ukrainian citizen. Zaporizhia occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on March 31 that residents in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast will receive compensation for housing and personal property lost as a result of hostilities.⁶² Balitsky claimed that Russia has already provided 34 billion rubles to those claiming damage to their homes and personal property since October 2022, and stated that all proposals for compensation are due by April 1.⁶³ Occupation Governor of Sevastopol Mikhail Razvozhayev claimed on MAR 31 that he awarded 11 families in occupied Crimea housing certificates as part of a broader effort to allow young families to buy or build houses or close a mortgage.⁶⁴ The Kherson Oblast Occupation Ministry of Agriculture claimed on March 31 that farmers in occupied Kherson Oblast expect to produce 1,300 tons of strawberries by August 2023, of which 400-500 tons will go directly to Russia.⁶⁵

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian and Russian troops continued training in Belarus. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the Belarusian Special Operations Forces completed training and that Russian troops continue training at Belarusian military facilities.⁶⁶ Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated on March 31 that 500 Belarusian officers are training some of the Russian forces that have been conducting training rotations in Belarus since fall 2022.⁶⁷

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that elements of the 103rd Vitebsk Separate Guards Airborne Brigade is conducting brigade-level tactical exercises at the Losvido Training Ground in Vitebsk Oblast.⁶⁸ The Belarusian MoD additionally stated that logistics elements of the Minsk-based 120th Separate Mechanized Brigade went on alert to perform planned combat and equipment storage tasks.⁶⁹

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

¹ <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70811>

² <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70811>

³ <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70811>

⁴ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032023>

⁵ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032023>

⁶ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123>

⁷ <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123>

⁸ <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-forced-integration-russia%E2%80%94not-protest-movement%E2%80%94lukashenko%E2%80%99s>

⁹ <https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/poslanie-aleksandra-lukashenko-belorusskomu-narodu-i-nacionalnomu-sobraniyu-sostoitsya-31-marta>

¹⁰ <https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/poslanie-aleksandra-lukashenko-belorusskomu-narodu-i-nacionalnomu-sobraniyu-sostoitsya-31-marta>

¹¹ <https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/poslanie-aleksandra-lukashenko-belorusskomu-narodu-i-nacionalnomu-sobraniyu-sostoitsya-31-marta>

¹² <https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/poslanie-aleksandra-lukashenko-belorusskomu-narodu-i-nacionalnomu-sobraniyu-sostoitsya-31-marta>

¹³ <https://tass dot ru/politika/17416823>

¹⁴ <https://tass dot ru/politika/17416823>

¹⁵ <https://tass dot ru/politika/17416823>

¹⁶ https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/301 ; <https://www.newsweek.com/europe-eu-peacekeeping-troops-ukraine-viktor-orban-1791732>

¹⁷ https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/301

¹⁸

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aPK1kXjJg4BsAZ4HnMZJz3jQPMN9UuS3ZiQLGx1vpn5eUrX1KB3KxJFZhtKhx4JjI;>

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZYpcMJzGe2SnzeuGHtFEFNzdd8poP5ETtoFiGLHEZKHspVEKRARYy1BWyn64yQExI>

¹⁹ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/9578>

²⁰ <https://t.me/wargonzo/11686>

²¹ <https://t.me/kommunist/16709>

²² <https://www.understandingwar.org/background/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2023>

²³ <https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1641833527309205504?s=20>;

<https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1641837086931054592?s=20>

²⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/25251

²⁵ https://twitter.com/War_cube/status/1641856051224903690?t=6dOmcvhwrxIOQugjRUKxVg&s=19;

https://t.me/razgruzka_vagnera/58

²⁶ https://t.me/orchestra_w/5881; https://t.me/basurin_e/448; <https://t.me/readovkanews/55817>;

<https://t.me/kommunist/16710>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/11686>

²⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/11686>

²⁸ https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/2969; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/670

²⁹

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZYpcMJzGe2SnzeuGHtFEFNZdd8poP5ETtoFiGLHEZKHspVEKRARYy1BWyn64yQExl>;

³⁰ <https://twitter.com/herooftheday10/status/1641764485202411521>;

https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1641784570604339201

³¹ <https://www.unian.net.ua/war/boji-za-bahmut-sogodni-u-minoboroni-ukrajini-poyasnili-chomu-chas-graye-proti-rosijan-12199866.html>; <https://armyinform.com.net.ua/2023/03/31/u-bahmuti-chas-graye-proty-voroga-ganna-malyar/>

³² <https://isw.pub/UkrWar03052023>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021423>

³³ <https://t.me/osirskiy/29>

³⁴ <https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1641818307237126144>

https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1641816697643450368 ;

<https://twitter.com/slavaukrainewin/status/1641815225132535808>;

https://twitter.com/cyber_boroshno/status/1641821711204069376

³⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/11686>

³⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/11686>

³⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/11686>

³⁸

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aPK1kXjJg4BsAZ4HnMZj3jQPMN9UuS3ZiQLGx1vpn5eUrX1KB3KxJFZhtKhx4Jjl> ;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZYpcMJzGe2SnzeuGHtFEFNZdd8poP5ETtoFiGLHEZKHspVEKRARYy1BWyn64yQExl>

³⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/25253

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/wargonzo/11700>

⁴¹

<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02f9qB1gifJsPeFwfoLDFhzddZbWDVq8x5cJtQbMnyr8CCg5WgvPLBk5Scr5a1G1upl>

⁴²

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