

## Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 10, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, Nicole Wolkov, and  
Frederick W. Kagan

May 10, 2023, 4pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Ukrainian forces conducted successful limited counterattacks around Bakhmut on May 9.**

Geolocated footage published on May 9 and 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely conducted successful limited counterattacks north of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) and northwest of Bila Hora (14km southwest of Bakhmut) and made marginal advances in these areas.<sup>[1]</sup> Ukrainian sources claimed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces destroyed the 6th and 8th companies of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 3rd Army Corps near Bakhmut and advanced 2.6km along a 3km frontline in the area, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these reported wider Ukrainian advances.<sup>[2]</sup> A prominent Russian milblogger<sup>[3]</sup> claimed on May 10 that the Ukrainian forces tried to advance further in the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade's zone of responsibility in the Bakhmut area following Ukrainian counterattacks on May 9 but that formations of an unspecified Russian paramilitary company (PMC) prevented a Ukrainian breakthrough.<sup>[4]</sup> The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) are constraining the actions of Ukrainian forces on the flanks around Bakhmut.<sup>[5]</sup> ISW has previously assessed that reports of Ukrainian counterattacks throughout Donetsk Oblast appear to be a part of an ongoing pattern of localized and limited counterattacks.<sup>[6]</sup>

**Pervasive issues with Russian combat capability, exacerbated by continued attritional assaults in the Bakhmut area, are likely considerably constraining the ability of Russian forces in this area to defend against localized Ukrainian counterattacks.** The 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade itself is emblematic of many of the endemic force generation issues constantly faced by

the Russian military. ISW reported on August 7, 2022, that the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade was forming in Orenburg Oblast as part of the 3rd Army Corps, a new formation created in 2022 and largely comprised of volunteer battalions.<sup>[7]</sup> *Forbes* reported in September of 2022 that the 3rd Army Corps deployed to Kharkiv Oblast and that the Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive largely destroyed the corps' constituent elements, likely including the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.<sup>[8]</sup> Ukrainian media suggested that the surviving elements of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade may have redeployed to Mykolaiv Oblast following the Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive, where they once again suffered losses during Ukraine's southern counteroffensive in October 2022.<sup>[9]</sup> ISW cannot confirm where the 72nd Brigade deployed to following the withdrawal of Russian forces from the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, but it is highly likely that whatever elements of the 72nd Brigade that deployed to the Bakhmut area more recently are not operating at anywhere near full strength. The Russian military command's apparent commitment of elements of a formation that has suffered two successive defeats to the Bakhmut axis alongside already attrited Wagner elements likely offer Ukrainian forces opportunities to exploit with limited counterattacks. A Russian milblogger, citing a Wagner commander active in the Bakhmut area, additionally reported that the alleged withdrawal of the 72nd Brigade was the result of severe miscommunication between command of the 72nd Brigade and the Wagner Group.<sup>[10]</sup> Issues with the *ad hoc* commitment of various depleted force groupings to the Bakhmut axis, alongside apparent command and control failures, are likely preventing Russian forces in the area from conducting sound defensive operations.

**Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck a command center where high-ranking Ukrainian military commanders and officials were located, likely to support an ongoing effort to frame Russian operations as constraining Ukrainian capabilities to launch a counteroffensive.** Russian milbloggers claimed on May 10 that Russian forces struck the command post near Chasiv Yar (12km west of Bakhmut), killing Ukrainian Chief Advisor to the Directorate for Domestic and Humanitarian Policy Alexei Titarenko.<sup>[11]</sup> Russian milbloggers speculated that the strike may have killed other high-ranking Ukrainian commanders and officials and stated that the strike has prompted completely unsubstantiated rumors, which Ukrainian officials have explicitly denied, that it killed Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Valery Zaluzhnyi.<sup>[12]</sup> Milbloggers acknowledged that the strike likely did not kill Zaluzhnyi but argued that it may be affecting his decisions to attend certain events.<sup>[13]</sup> Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that all the Ukrainian commanders in question are alive and that claims about the killing of Ukrainian commanders are a part of a Russian information operation aimed at degrading Ukrainian morale.<sup>[14]</sup> ISW assessed that Russian ultranationalists

recently claimed that Russian forces struck a vehicle carrying Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces Commander General Ihor Tantsyura to frame Russian operations as limiting Ukrainian abilities to conduct counterattacks in the Bakhmut area.<sup>[15]</sup> Russian sources have also largely framed increasingly routine series of Russian air and missile strikes as similarly constraining potential upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.<sup>[16]</sup> There is no evidence to support these Russian claims.


**The US Department of Defense (DoD) confirmed on May 9 that Ukrainian forces successfully used the Patriot missile defense system to shoot down a Russian missile for the first time.**<sup>[17]</sup> Ukrainian Air Force Commander Mykola Oleshchuk had reported that Ukrainian forces used the Patriot system to shoot down a missile in the air over Kyiv Oblast at night on May 4.<sup>[18]</sup> The Biden administration also announced a new \$1.2 billion military aid package to Ukraine on May 9.<sup>[19]</sup> The package includes additional air defense systems, 155-mm artillery rounds, and equipment to integrate Ukrainian air defense systems with Western-supplied equipment.<sup>[20]</sup>

### **Key Takeaways**

- **Ukrainian forces conducted successful limited counterattacks around Bakhmut on May 9.**
- **Pervasive issues with Russian combat capabilities, exacerbated by continued attritional assaults in the Bakhmut area, are likely considerably constraining the ability of Russian forces in this area to defend against localized Ukrainian counterattacks.**
- **Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck a command center where Ukrainian military commanders and officials were located, likely to support an ongoing effort to frame Russian operations as constraining Ukrainian capabilities to launch a counteroffensive.**
- **The US Department of Defense (DoD) confirmed that Ukrainian forces successfully shot down a Russian missile using the Patriot missile defense system. The Biden administration also announced a new \$1.2 billion military aid package to Ukraine.**
- **Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Kupyansk and Kreminna areas.**
- **Russian and Wagner Group forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut on May 10, despite Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's previous threat that Wagner would withdraw from the area at midnight.**
- **Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front.**

- **Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an annual decree calling up citizens from reserves for military training.**
- **Russian occupation authorities are continuing the removal of Ukrainian residents from their homes in occupied areas under the guise of humanitarian evacuations.**

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of May 10, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kielm, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian***

***military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas


## **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Kupyansk on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction attempted to improve their tactical positions and conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyukivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and Stelmakhivka (33km southeast of Kupyansk).[21] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) struck Ukrainian force concentrations in the Kupyansk area.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted positional battles near Hryanykivka (25km northeast of Kupyansk) and Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk).[23] Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synhubov stated that Russian forces struck Kupyansk itself with Iskander short-range ballistic missiles.[24]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Kreminna on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near the Serebrianske forest area and Bilohorivka, both about 10km south of Kreminna.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that fierce fighting is ongoing in the industrial zone in Bilohorivka.[26] Ukrainian Severodonetsk City Head Roman Vlasenko stated that Russian forces are using S-300 surface-to-air missiles to strike Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk Oblast.[27] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted that Russian forces writ large are less active along the entire Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and that only three combat clashes occurred in this area over the past day.[28]

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of May 10, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Key Ukrainian Roads
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

## **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**


Russian and Wagner Group forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut on May 10, despite Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s previous threat that Wagner would withdraw from the area at midnight. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions within Bakhmut and in the direction of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and Stupochky (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[\[29\]](#) Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that there were 28 combat clashes in the Bakhmut area.[\[30\]](#) The Russian MoD claimed that Russian assault detachments continued offensive operations to capture blocks in northwestern and western Bakhmut.[\[31\]](#) A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted assaults in the direction of Chasiv Yar (12 km west of Bakhmut).[\[32\]](#)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front on May 10. The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia published geolocated footage on May 10 likely confirming previous Russian claims that Russian forces captured Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka) as early as March 20.[\[33\]](#) Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing north of Avdiivka and that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults in Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and on the southern approaches towards Avdiivka.[\[34\]](#) The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[\[35\]](#)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on May 10.[\[36\]](#)



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of May 10, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Geolocated footage posted on May 10 indicates Russian forces captured Kam'yanka on an unspecified prior date.


Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kielm, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours	Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory	Major Railroads
Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24	Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory	Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*	Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives	

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of May 10, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




## Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts on May 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes along the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast and struck Hulyaipole, Mala Tokmachka, Orikhiv, and Stepanohirsk, as well as Kizomys and Stanislav, southwest of

Kherson City.[\[37\]](#) A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted strikes using high-explosive FAB-500 and KAB-1500-LG-F bombs on Ukrainian storage facilities in Kherson Oblast in an attempt to prevent Ukrainian forces from potentially crossing the Dnipro River.[\[38\]](#)

Russian sources continue to speculate about potential Ukrainian counteroffensive preparations in southern Ukraine. A Russian milblogger amplified claims that Ukrainian forces hold positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River despite another milblogger claiming that Ukrainian forces had no presence on the east (left) bank.[\[39\]](#) Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces along the Zaporizhia frontline are pulling artillery and personnel back to regroup, which is affecting the density of fire.[\[40\]](#) Geolocated footage published on May 9 confirms that artillery elements of the 503rd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are active in this area near Nesterianka (11km southwest of Orikhiv).[\[41\]](#)

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of May 10, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Will Kielm, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of May 10, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

## Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an annual decree calling up citizens from the reserves for military training on May 10. The law states that reservists can be called for training no more than every 3 years for no more than two months, privates and sergeants can be called for training up to the age of 35, junior officers up to the age of 50, and senior officers up to the age of 55.[\[42\]](#) The law also states that failure to show up for training is an administrative offense punishable by fine. The reservists will undergo training in the Russian Armed Forces, the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia), the Federal Security Service (FSB) and other state security agencies. Russian opposition news outlet *Mobilization News* claimed that Russian authorities may attempt to coerce individuals who show up for training into signing contracts with the Russian military.[\[43\]](#) A Russian media aggregator *Baza* reported that Putin signed a similar decree on February 18, 2022.[\[44\]](#)

**Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

Russian occupation authorities are continuing the removal of Ukrainian residents from their homes in occupied areas under the pretext of humanitarian evacuations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 10 that Russian occupation authorities have evacuated the families of Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) workers located in Enerhodar but continue to prohibit ZNPP personnel from leaving the city.[\[45\]](#) The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation authorities are luring Ukrainians to evacuate to recreation centers and hotels in Berdyansk and Kyrylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, but in actuality are bringing them to “tent towns” in Rostov Oblast, Russia.[\[46\]](#) Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov continues to claim that evacuated citizens will receive one-time payments and comfortable accommodation.[\[47\]](#)

Russian sources claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) thwarted a Ukrainian partisan attack in Zaporizhia Oblast on May 10. Russian sources claimed that the FSB arrested a Ukrainian citizen under accusations the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) ordered him to assassinate occupied Kyrylivka police department head.[\[48\]](#)

**Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)**

**ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.**

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on May 10 that the 103rd Vitebsk Separate Guards Airborne Brigade conducted combat training exercises as a part of ongoing combat readiness checks.<sup>[49]</sup>

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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[1] <https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1656198583928930304?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1656027032034197510?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/LvivJournal/status/1655995126475259923?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/SugarEgor/status/1655988034725085200> ; <https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1656298247311294464?s=20> ; <https://twitter.com/Monstas/status/1656300703285932034?s=20> ; <https://t.me/zedigital/3124>; [https://twitter.com/bayraktar\\_1love/status/1656298732973948928?s=20](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1656298732973948928?s=20); <https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1656322131511091200?s=20>; <https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1656212159477477376?s=20>; [https://twitter.com/auditor\\_ya/status/1656288491859222529?s=20](https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1656288491859222529?s=20)

[2] <https://t.me/BiletskyAndriy/5117> ; <https://t.me/ab3army/2520> ;

[3] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/85334](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85334)

[4] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/85334](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85334)

[5] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/26454](https://t.me/mod_russia/26454)

[6] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2023> ; Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 9, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

[7] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign...>

[8] <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/09/15/the-russians-spent-mont...>

[9] <https://www.stopcor.org/section-uaneews/news-u-rajoni-snigurivki-zsu-rozbil-kolonu-tehniki-72-i-brigadi-z-orenburgu-informnapalm-20-10-2022.html>; <https://t.me/informnapalm/13644>

[10] <https://t.me/akashevarova/6372>

[11] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/85319](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85319) ; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/85338](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85338) ; [https://t.me/russkiy\\_opolchenec/36533](https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36533) ; <https://t.me/rybar/46855>

- [12] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/85319](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85319) ; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/85338](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85338) ; [https://t.me/russkiy\\_opolchenec/36533](https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36533) ; <https://t.me/rybar/46855>
- [13] <https://t.me/rybar/46855> ; [https://t.me/basurin\\_e/1467](https://t.me/basurin_e/1467) ; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/85319](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85319) ; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/85338](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85338) ; [https://t.me/russkiy\\_opolchenec/36533](https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36533)
- [14] <https://t.me/annamaliar/714>
- [15] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050223>
- [16] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2023> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050223>
- [17] <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3996387-pentagon-confirms-ukraine-downed-russian-missile-with-patriot-system/>; <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3390136/pentagon-press-secretary-air-force-brig-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/>
- [18] <https://t.me/MykolaOleshchuk/43>
- [19] <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3388890/biden-admi...>
- [20] <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3388890/biden-admi...>
- [21] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Nx6nbxVELpgWuEha8HQ4Gb9sYwjgbm2TGRfU134agkGrCcC3RYbfYcrEU9oNwZEXl>
- [22] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/26450](https://t.me/mod_russia/26450)
- [23] <https://t.me/wargonzo/12414>; <https://t.me/rybar/46843>
- [24] <https://t.me/synegubov/6152>; <https://t.me/milinfoLive/100438>
- [25] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidokw2ANMoVQMZp2hnnjhwczePZ6HzhPgT79kNvWYjnRDITf7k9E4ZpDThySsg8LFcbl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Nx6nbxVELpgWuEha8HQ4Gb9sYwjgbm2TGRfU134agkGrCcC3RYbfYcrEU9oNwZEXl>
- [26] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/85259](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/85259); <https://t.me/readovkanews/58599>
- [27] <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10390>
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- [30] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/05/10/na-bahmutskom-ukrainy-od-okupanty-shhodoby-vtrachayut-blyzko-100-vbytymy-sergij-cherevatyj/>
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- [32] <https://t.me/wargonzo/12414>
- [33] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20->



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[34] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/47443> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/12414>  
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