

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 31, 2023

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May 31, 2023, 7:30pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on May 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military command has likely ordered Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's forces to begin offensive operations in Ukraine following the withdrawal of Wagner Group forces from Bakhmut. Kadyrov claimed on May 31 that Chechen forces received a new order and assumed responsibility over the Donetsk Oblast frontline.[1] Kadyrov claimed that Chechen units need to start "active combat activities" and "liberate a series of settlements." Kadyrov added that Chechen "Akhmat" Special Forces (Spetsnaz) and the "Sever-Akhmat" Special Purpose Regiment transferred to the Marinka direction southwest of Donetsk City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed that assault detachments of the 5th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 1st Army Corps and Akhmat Spetsnaz conducted offensive operations in the Marinka direction.[2] Kadyrov noted that the Russian military command ordered Russian, Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard), and Chechen Akhmat forces to begin offensive actions along the front line in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts as well.[3] Kadyrov claimed that these units have already begun tactical preparations for these offensive actions and claimed that "Akhmat" units' offensive operations began before Ukrainian forces launched a counteroffensive. ISW has observed no indications of Chechen offensive operations in Zaporizhia or Kherson as of this writing.

The claimed return of Chechen forces to offensive operations would break Kadyrovites from a nearly yearlong hiatus from participating in high-intensity combat operations. Chechen forces have been largely operating in the rear after participating in the battles for Mariupol, Severodonetsk, and Lysychansk - with the exception of some offensive activities around Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast.[4] ISW also observed Kadyrov's forces operating as a police force in the rear in southern Ukraine and performing localized reconnaissance-in-force operations in Zaporizhia Oblast.[5] Kadyrov also claimed that 3,300 personnel of the "Sever-Akhmat" Regiment were in Chechnya as of May 8, and ISW assessed that Kadyrov may have been conserving his forces instead sending them to the frontlines.[6] Chechen units' limited participation on the frontlines alongside Kadyrov's heavy emphasis on recruitment may suggest that Kadyrov is hesitant to commit his forces to grinding offensive operations in Ukraine despite his ultranationalist narratives.[7]

The Kremlin may be attempting to reintroduce Kadyrovites as the main offensive force following the culmination of Wagner forces and their withdrawal from the frontlines. ISW had previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin had been attempting to pressure Kadyrov into increasing the role of Chechen fighters in combat operations since at least Putin's public meeting with Kadyrov on March 13.[8] Kadyrov also claimed on May 20 to have met with Putin in Pyatigorsk, Stavropol Krai, around the time of Wagner Group's claimed victory in Bakhmut.[9] The Kremlin did not publish a readout from this meeting, and Kadyrov claimed that he boasted to Putin that there are seven Chechen regiments and four battalions operating in Ukraine.[10] Kadyrov later clarified on May 26 that there are 7,000 Chechen personnel in Ukraine.[11] The Russian MoD's mention of "Akhmat" operations in the Marinka direction a day prior to Wagner's initial claimed withdrawal date on June 1 indicates that Putin may have coerced Kadyrov into assuming an offensive role in the war to compensate for Wagner's likely culmination.[12] The Kremlin may perceive Chechen units as an untapped assault force that can restore Russia's ability to sustain simultaneous offensive efforts on multiple axes of advance. If Kadyrov's claims that he has 7,000 troops in Ukraine are close to accurate his forces will not be able to mount multiple significant offensive operations successfully.

The Kremlin may also be attempting to sever Kadyrov's relationship with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and re-emphasize federal authority over Chechen forces. Prigozhin responded on May 31 to reports of Chechen forces transferring to occupied Donetsk Oblast, stating that he is confident that Kadyrov's forces will be successful in capturing some settlements in the region but emphasized that Kadyrov was not tasked with capturing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast.[13] Prigozhin also noted that he is not aware of Chechen units' new positions as this information is secret. Kadyrov participated in Prigozhin's blackmail attempt in early May aimed at coercing the Russian MoD to allocate additional military supplies to Wagner in Bakhmut.[14] Kadyrov claimed that his forces would relieve Wagner forces on May 6 and even directly asked Putin to authorize the transfer of Chechen forces from other directions to Bakhmut.[15] Putin may have

perceived Kadyrov's behavior as a threat to his control given that Kadyrov and Prigozhin had conducted a successful joint information campaign in early October 2022 to facilitate military command changes.[16] Putin or the Russian military command may have ordered Kadyrov to increase the presence of his units on the battlefield in retaliation for Kadyrov's blackmail attempt.

The official Russian responses to recent attacks against Russia remain likely insufficient to satisfy the Russian ultranationalist information space's desire for escalation in the war. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov called on Russian forces on May 29 to capture Kharkiv City and Kharkiv Oblast to create a barrier between Belgorod Oblast and Ukraine.[17] Gladkov later announced on May 31 the evacuation of children from the border areas of Shebekino and Grayvoron raions — including 300 children relocated to Voronezh Oblast — in response to the “deteriorating” border situation.[18] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov refused to comment on Gladkov's statements on May 29, igniting some ire in the Russian information space.[19] Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin criticized Peskov, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu for their reluctance to address attacks against Russian territory.[20] Russian milbloggers have complained about the lack of Russian military escalation to secure border areas in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts since at least September 2022, often criticizing the Kremlin for underreacting to attacks against Russian territory and failing to fully dedicate itself to the war effort.[21] The evacuations and Peskov's comments are largely consistent with Putin's unwillingness and inability to meaningfully escalate the war short of full-scale general and economic mobilization, as ISW has previously assessed.[22]

Key Takeaways:

- **The Russian military command has likely ordered Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's forces to begin offensive operations in Ukraine following the withdrawal of Wagner Group forces from Bakhmut.**
- **The claimed return of Chechen forces to offensive operations would break Kadyrovites from a nearly yearlong hiatus from participating in high-intensity combat operations.**
- **The Kremlin may be attempting to reintroduce Kadyrovites as the main offensive force following the culmination of Wagner forces and their withdrawal from the front lines.**
- **The Kremlin may also be attempting to sever Kadyrov's relationship with Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and re-emphasize federal authority over Chechen forces.**
- **The official Russian responses to recent attacks against Russia remain likely insufficient to satisfy the Russian ultranationalist information space's desire for escalation in the war.**
- **Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Svatove and south of Kreminna.**
- **Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.**
- **Russian forces continue to concentrate in southern Ukraine.**
- **The Russian State Duma appears to be considering measures to legalize the military recruitment of current or formerly incarcerated Russian men.**
- **Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced that Ukraine has a new avenue to repatriate Ukrainian children abducted to Russia.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of May 31, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Svatove and south of Kreminna on May 30. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in 13 clashes in the Kupyansk and Kreminna directions.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks northwest of Svatove near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk); near Novoselivske and Stelmakhivka (both about 15km northwest of Svatove); and south of Kreminna near Kuzmyne (2km southwest) and Bilohorivka (10km south).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces failed to advance near Krokhmalne (20km northwest of Svatove) but that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances northeast of Bilohorivka.[25] Another Russian milblogger posted footage showing Russian forces firing on Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction with incendiary munitions.[26]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempted to infiltrate Ukrainian lines near Zelene (34km northeast of Kharkiv City), Kharkiv Oblast for the second consecutive day.[27]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian rear areas in Luhansk Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Karpaty, Luhansk Oblast (on the eastern outskirts of Alchevsk) with four HIMARS rockets overnight on May 30 to 31.[28] Geolocated imagery published on May 31 shows damage to a building in Karpaty.[29]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of May 31, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click [here](#) to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.


Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut on May 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northeast of Bakhmut) and Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces aim to capture Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut) to set conditions for future efforts to advance in the Kramatorsk direction (34km northwest of Bakhmut) and that Russian forces have increased artillery strikes in this direction.[31] The milblogger also claimed that fighting is ongoing between Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) and Klishchiiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut) and that positional battles continue near Klishchiiivka. The milblogger claimed that conventional Russian forces, volunteer formations and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) security forces are establishing positions in Bakhmut as Wagner forces continue their ongoing relief-in-place. Geolocated footage published on May 31 shows the irregular formation 1st “Wolves” Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade, previously active in the Avdiivka area, operating near Zaliznyanske (9km northwest of Bakhmut).[32] This unit’s presence near Zaliznyanske supports ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are likely transferring irregular forces and DNR elements from the Avdiivka area to the Bakhmut area.[33]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on May 31. Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces made a limited advance north of Krasnohorivka (8km north of Avdiivka) as of May 30.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka) and that Ukrainian forces repelled all Russian attacks in Marinka.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks from Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka) and advanced to new positions northeast of Avdiivka, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[36] Another milblogger claimed that skirmishes continued near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[37]

Russian forces targeted Ukrainian positions in western Donetsk Oblast on May 31. Geolocated footage published on May 31 shows artillery units of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) striking Ukrainian positions near Novopil (45km west of Vuhledar).[38] Russian milbloggers published footage on May 31 purportedly showing the Operational-Combat Tactical Formation “Kaskad” (a DNR element) operating near Vuhledar.[39] Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike on Kalininsky Raion in Donetsk City on May 31.[40] A Ukrainian source published an image on May 31 showing a smoke plume in Mariupol.[41]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of May 31, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- + Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of May 31, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



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- Bakhmut City Limits
- ▬ Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- ▬ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▬ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

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Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces continue to concentrate in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian forces are replacing old and worn equipment — including T-72 and T-62 tanks and air defenses — in southern Ukraine. Andryushchenko reported that Russian forces are moving the equipment towards Manhush (14km southwest of Mariupol) and Berdyansk out of fear of Ukrainian strikes on Mariupol.[42] Geolocations of Andryushchenko’s imagery confirm that Russian forces are moving the equipment in Mariupol.[43]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 31 that Russian forces destroyed the final remaining Ukrainian warship at port in Odesa City on May 29.[44] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on May 29 that Russian drone strikes caused a fire at port infrastructure in Odesa on May 29 but did not mention the warship.[45] ISW is unable to confirm the MoD’s claims.[46]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike areas in southern Ukraine. Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses activated over Melitopol and Tokmak on May 30.[47] Geolocated footage shows Ukrainian forces targeting Russian military trucks west of Vynohradne, Kherson Oblast (34km southwest of Kherson City).[48]

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to increase physical control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Ukrainian Representative to the UN Serhiy Kyslytsya stated on May 31 that Russian forces continue using the ZNPP for military purposes and have deployed 500 personnel and 50 pieces of military equipment to the plant. Kyslytsya reported that the Russians store military equipment and ammunition in the turbine halls of ZNPP reactors No. 1, No. 2, and No. 4.[49] Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom reported that Russian occupation authorities are torturing Ukrainian ZNPP personnel to coerce the personnel into signing contracts with Russian nuclear energy operator Rosatom, which has its own presence at the ZNPP.[50] International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi called on all parties to agree to five principles for ensuring safety at the ZNPP: no attacks against the ZNPP or critical infrastructure; no storing military equipment or personnel at the ZNPP; guarantee power to the ZNPP; protect all critical infrastructure from attacks; take no actions to undermine these principles.[51] Kyslytsya called on Grossi to include in his principles: the complete withdrawal of Russian military and ZNPP personnel from the ZNPP; insuring that the ZNPP is connected to Ukrainian power grids; and insuring that the passage of management and maintenance personnel to and from the ZNPP is safe.[52]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of May 31, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian State Duma appears to be considering measures to legalize the military recruitment of current or formerly incarcerated Russian men. Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapolov submitted a bill on May 31 that would allow Russia to recruit contract servicemen from prisons during the periods of mobilization, martial law, and war.[53] This bill will also allow Russian military officials to offer contracts to individuals who have been released from prison but whose convictions remain on their criminal records. The draft notes that individuals convicted of political crimes such as terrorism, treason, and extremism will not be granted the opportunity to sign military contracts. The draft law also notes that prisoners and convicts who enlist will be pardoned.

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian officials are building two massive facilities in Kursk City and Rostov-on-Don to sort and store dead Russian soldiers retrieved from frontlines in Ukraine.[54] The GUR reported that Russian officials are spending nearly 1.4 billion rubles (about \$17.1 million) in total to purchase refrigeration equipment and construct these facilities.

Leningrad Oblast will provide financial compensation to fighters of private military companies (PMC) or their families in case of injury or death during the war.[55] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko signed a law on May 31 that offers regional compensation of 500,000 rubles to one million rubles (about \$6,130 to \$12,260) to an injured mercenary and two million rubles (about \$24,500) to the family of a dead mercenary.[56] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 31 that he is working with Drozdenko to ensure that the Leningrad Oblast government issues payments to Wagner fighters and their families.[57]

Russian military personnel are illegally transporting weapons home to Russia from the front in Ukraine. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's* North Caucasus service *Kavkaz Reali* reported that the number of criminal investigations into cases of theft of weapons among Russian military personnel increased in southern Russia and the North Caucasus.[58] *Kavkaz Reali* reported that Russian courts have launched at least 42 criminal cases for theft of weapons, ammunition, and explosive devices since the beginning of the war in February 2022.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubynets announced that Ukraine has a new avenue to repatriate Ukrainian children abducted to Russia.[59] Lyubynets stated that an unspecified intermediary facilitates indirect contact between Ukrainian and Russian officials to return the children. Lyubynets stated that Ukraine is aware of 19,400 deported Ukrainian children and 27,000 adult Ukrainian civilians in Russian detention, and that Russia is deporting Ukrainians through Belarus with help from the Belarusian government. Ukrainian Presidential Children's Rights Advisor Darya Hersymchuk stated that 200,000–300,000 Ukrainian children remain in Russia and Belarus, and Russia claims that over 700,000 Ukrainian children are in Russia.[60] Hersymchuk noted that Ukraine has returned 371 children from Russia.

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to use infrastructure projects to integrate occupied territories into Russia. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin signed an order on May 31 creating the federal state unitary enterprise "Railways of Novorossiia" to unite railways in occupied territories. Khusnullin stated that Railways of Novorossiia will connect logistics in occupied territories, update existing fleets of trains, and create a unified transportation process management system.[61] Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated that he took part in an expanded board meeting with the Russian Ministry of Labor and Trade to discuss reconstructing industrial enterprises in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[62] Pushilin stated that the Regional Industrial Development, which the Russian Ministry of Labor and Trade sponsors, will begin operations in June.[63]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the Russian and Belarusian representatives of the Joint Advisory Group on Arms Control met to discuss arms control and regional security issues in Minsk on May 31.[64] Belarusian Defense

Minister Viktor Khrenin stated on May 31 that signing regulations on maintaining nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory is an effective measure to “cool the aggressive and belligerent rhetoric” of neighboring states.[65]

Geolocated video footage posted on May 30 shows an explosion at the “Three Sisters” monument near Senkivka, Chernihiv Oblast at the intersection of the Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian borders.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified actors struck the road to prevent Ukrainian forces from crossing into Russia.[67]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3662

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/26993

[3] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3662

[4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%2021%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%2023%2C%202023.pdf>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20April%2016.pdf>

[5] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023>; <https://sprotyv.mod.gov.ua/kadyrivtsi-vykradayut-silgosptehniku-na-tot-hersonshhyny/>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%2013%2C%202023.pdf>

[6] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2023>

[7] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2023>

[8] <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%2013%2C%202023.pdf>

[9] <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%2021%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf>

[10] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3643; <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%2021%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf>

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/May%2026%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF_o.pdf

[12] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut>

[13] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1099

[14] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2023>;

[15] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2023>

[16] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2>

[17] <https://t.me/milinfoolive/101382>

[18] <https://t.me/rybar/47805>; <https://t.me/vvgladkov/2371>

[19] <https://tass dot ru/politika/17868981>

[20] <https://t.me/strelkovii/5124>; <https://t.me/strelkovii/5114>

[21] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023>; <https://t.me/vrogov/7564>; <https://t.me/strelkovii/3970>;

https://t.me/notes_veterans/8756; https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2666; <https://t.me/strelkovii/4590>;
https://t.me/grey_zone/18372 ; https://t.me/grey_zone/18383; <https://t.me/romagolovanov/11310> ;
<https://t.me/sashakots/39453>; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9133; https://t.me/notes_veterans/9139

[22] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2023>

[23] <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10930>; <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10931>

[24] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoqh7gHHgZpv5H5N5MKAmGR4Xk4Qe59vQ3vNF5MwceVUJwK1FQ4rzPmsrxEiYRin8Yl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoem9hfZokocxdKgEPjiPDinKnbnjNziiiUZHdPtycVnVW1eoWoRPF2oGrRduZKzJDgl>

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