

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2023

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September 2, 2023, 5:00pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on September 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[1] Russian milbloggers who have recently maintained that Russian forces hold positions in the southern part of Robotyne claimed that Russian forces withdrew from the southern outskirts of the settlement to unspecified positions further south.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on September 1 that Ukrainian forces have overcome the Russian “first line of defense” in some areas of the Zaporizhia direction, but that the situation remains difficult due to additional Russian concrete fortifications and dense minefields.[3]

The *New York Times* reported on September 2 citing Ukrainian military personnel that Russian forces are spreading inflammable agents on mined fields and igniting them with drone-launched grenades while Ukrainian forces clear mines from the areas in an effort to hinder Ukrainian mine clearing efforts that have allowed Ukrainian forces to advance in certain areas.[4] Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Commander Colonel Margo Grosberg reported on September 1 that Ukrainian artillery capabilities are “equal or even better” than those of Russian forces and have been able to push Russian artillery units back from the frontline, preventing them from supporting Russian forces.[5] This observation is not universally true across the frontline, as Ukrainian units regularly report coming under heavy Russian artillery fire corrected by Russian drones. Grosberg also stated that Ukrainian forces have been successful at severely damaging Russian artillery radars since July.[6] Russian sources have repeatedly expressed concerns since mid-July over the lack of Russian counterbattery artillery capabilities, particularly in southern Ukraine.[7]

Select Russian sources claimed that Russian officers of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) defending in Zaporizhia Oblast contacted former 58th CAA commander Major General Ivan Popov due to the worsening situation at the Russian frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Popov has maintained contact with his former subordinates in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and a Russian insider source claimed that these officers turned to Popov for help instead of their new commander.[8] The Russian military command dismissed Popov as the commander of the 58th CAA (Southern Military District) in early July after he engaged in clear insubordination by attempting to bypass Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and bring his complaints about poor counterbattery capabilities, heavy losses, and a lack of rotations directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[9] Russian sources have routinely expressed

concern about the issues that Popov highlighted and their detrimental impacts on the Russian defensive effort in southern Ukraine.[10] Popov partially established a precedent for insubordination, and his conduct reportedly prompted the Russian military command to begin removing similarly insubordinate commanders from frontline units, although not all reports of commanders removed were confirmed.[11] Russian sources claimed that Popov encouraged his former subordinates to report the truth about the front to the higher Russian command, possibly encouraging them to replicate his insubordination.[12] Popov's contact with his former subordinates, if true, suggests that Popov's replacement has not won the trust of his subordinates either because he is less competent or because he is less forthright with senior Russian leadership about continuing challenges facing the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia.

The Russian ultranationalist information space response to a Russian critique of anti-Western mindsets and Russian propaganda demonstrates that the ultranationalist community retains the ability to coalesce around certain issues. Director of the Russian think tank the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, Valery Garbuzov, published an article on August 29 criticizing Russian ruling elites who, he argues, have created and perpetuated a series of “utopian myths” about Russian hegemony, the “crisis of capitalism,” and Russia's claimed leadership of a global anti-Western coalition.[13] Prominent voices within the Russian ultranationalist information space levied largely coherent criticisms against Garbuzov's article on September 2, criticizing Garbuzov's argument and the Russian political and informational structures that allowed Garbuzov to hold a prominent position in the Russian political sphere.[14] One prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Telegram channels have filled an analytical gap in the Russian information space following the onset of the war in Ukraine that think tanks should fill and continue to do so 18 months later.[15]

Prominent Russian milbloggers likely have a monetary incentive to regularly report information about the war in Ukraine that is uncritical of Russian authorities. *BBC* reported on September 1 that prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that they can make between about 48,000 and 188,000 rubles (about \$500 to 1,950) per advertisement on their Telegram channels.[16] *BBC* reported that an advertising agent working with Wagner-affiliated channels claimed that a prominent Wagner Group-affiliated source made around 31,500 rubles (about \$330) per advertisement.[17] The advertising agent told *BBC* that several employees of *RIA FAN*, a now-shuttered media outlet affiliated with former Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, received only about 10,500 to 21,800 rubles (about \$108 to \$226) per advertisement due to their lower subscriber count.[18] *BBC* noted that Russia's average monthly salary is about 66,000 rubles (about \$685). Prominent milbloggers' monthly salaries are thus likely much higher than the Russian average. Russian milbloggers are likely economically incentivized to maintain and grow audiences through war reporting that is uncritical of Russian authorities, as criticism of the Russian authorities, resistance to attempted censorship, and potential legal problems could lead to a decrease in advertisements, although milbloggers who present themselves as telling unpleasant truths can also gain large followings. Alexander “Sasha” Kots, a prominent milblogger who also serves on the Kremlin's Human Rights Council, claimed that milbloggers have a “direct channel to privately communicate information” to the Russian MoD.[19]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 2.**
- **Select Russian sources claimed that Russian officers of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) defending in Zaporizhia Oblast contacted former 58th CAA**

commander Major General Ivan Popov due to the worsening situation at the Russian frontline.

- **The Russian ultranationalist information space response to a Russian critique of anti-Western mindsets and Russian propaganda demonstrates that the ultranationalist community retains the ability to coalesce around certain issues.**
- **Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 2.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along at least one sector of the front on September 2 and advanced near Bakhmut, in western Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.**
- **The Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) has formed its own Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) units, elements of which reportedly operate both on the front line and in far rear areas of occupied Ukraine.**
- **Russian and occupation authorities are encouraging residents of occupied Ukraine who are residing in Russia to vote in the occupation regional elections, likely to increase voter turnout and the perception of electoral legitimacy.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of September 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on September 2 and recently advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 1 and 2 shows that Russian forces advanced south of Vilshana (14km northeast of Kupyansk) and southeast of Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured several Ukrainian positions north of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), west of Svatove toward the Oskil River, and near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk).[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoyehorivka and Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove).[22] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on September 1 that Russian forces continue unsuccessful attempts to advance in the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[23] Footage published on September 2 purportedly shows elements of the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) operating along the Svatove-Kreminna line, elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps) operating near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and artillery elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR Army Corps) operating in the Lysychansk direction.[24]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks south of Kreminna near Dibrova (7km southwest) and Hryhorivka (11km south) on September 2.[25]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of September 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 2 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced near Klishchiivka, although these gains are likely not recent.[26] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on September 1 that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified successes near Kurdyumivka, Klishchiivka, and Andriivka (all 7-13km southwest of Bakhmut), which Malyar characterized as the center of hostilities in the Bakhmut direction.[27] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian assault groups unsuccessfully attacked near Bakhmut.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked along the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line.[29]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 2 and reportedly advanced. Russian sources claimed on September 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Kurdyumivka.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 2 that Russian forces counterattacked near Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka and that elements of the Russian 4th Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) are operating near Klishchiivka.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kurdyumivka, and Malyar stated on September 1 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked on the northern flank of Bakhmut.[32]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of September 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



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Bakhmut City Limits	Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory	Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*	Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory	Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on September 1 that Russian forces recaptured the dominant heights west of Klishchiivka. A Russian source claimed on August 31 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back several kilometers near Klishchiivka.

The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) on September 2.[33]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not advance on September 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Novomykhailivka and Marinka.[35]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of September 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



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- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Major Railroads

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Note: A Russian source claimed on August 30 that Ukrainian forces advanced in the Volodyne direction. A Russian source claimed on August 29 that Russian forces have only 400 meters left until they capture Marinka.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger claimed on September 2 that fighting is ongoing in western Donetsk Oblast amid evidence of further Ukrainian gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on September 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces made gains north of Pavlivka (30km southwest of Donetsk City), although these gains are likely not recent.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are ongoing battles near Shevchenko (35km southwest of Donetsk City) and noted that the settlement is an important Russian logistics hub in the area.[37]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited unsuccessful offensive operations along the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 2. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[38] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified the shelling of Russian positions along the Staromayorske-Pryyutne line.[39] The *New York Times* reported that Ukrainian personnel fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area stated that Russian forces are deploying reinforcements to this sector of the front due to concerns about further Ukrainian advances.[40] The *New York Times* also reported that Russian forces have established defensive positions along the T0518 (Velyka Novosilka to Nikolske) highway and are constantly surveilling the section of the highway closer to the frontline with drones.[41]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around the Vremivka Salient as of September 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, and Mitchell Belcher - © 2023 Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Russian Field Fortifications


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on September 1 that Russian forces advanced approximately 100 to 200 meters north of Pryyutne over the past two days. A Russian source claimed on August 30 that Ukrainian forces advanced in the Volodyne direction.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 2 and reportedly advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[42] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces repelled four Ukrainian assaults near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[43] Russian milbloggers who have previously maintained that Russian forces hold positions in the southern part of Robotyne claimed that Russian forces withdrew from the southern outskirts of the settlement to unspecified positions further south.[44] Another milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing in forest areas south of Robotyne.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Russian positions east of Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv) and that fighting is ongoing between Novoprokopivka and Verbove.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to attack Russian defensive positions near Verbove and that there is ongoing fighting in fields west of the settlement.[47]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces counterattacked in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 2 but did not specify an outcome. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a series of counterattacks southwest and south of Robotyne.[48]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Pyatykhatky and Robotyne as of September 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine* | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | Russian Field Fortifications |

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to target Russian rear areas and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast and occupied Crimea on September 1 and 2. Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted an unspecified Ukrainian projectile targeting Berdyansk.[49] Ukrainian Berdyansk City Military Administration Head Viktoriia Haliystyna stated that residents reported a large explosion in Berdyansk.[50] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that two explosions occurred near a Russian military base in Kyrylivka (50km south of Melitopol) on September 1.[51] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces destroyed three Ukrainian naval drones in the Black Sea that were allegedly targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge on the night of September 1 to 2.[52]



A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast as of September 2. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces hold limited positions between Kozachi Laheri (23km northeast of Kherson City) and Pidstepne (13km east of Kherson City).[53] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces fired on Ukrainian groups that tried to replenish a Ukrainian grouping on the left bank near the Antonivsky bridge on September 1.[54]



Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) has formed its own Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) units, elements of which reportedly operate both on the front line and in far rear areas of occupied Ukraine. Russian state news outlet *RIA Novosti* reported on September 2 that the DNR formed its own branch of Rosgvardia based on the Russian "Vostok" Battalion, a DNR formation that currently operates near Novodonetske and Novomayorske in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[55] *RIA Novosti* reported that the DNR Rosgvardia's main strike force is made up of special rapid response (SOBR) forces, currently roughly a motorized rifle platoon, and is training in an unspecified Russian rear area.[56] The formation of a dedicated Rosgvardia branch to assist with security in occupied Ukraine may free up some conventional Russian or DNR units and allow them to deploy to the front line, although not enough to matter at the reported scale. DNR officials may also recruit for Rosgvardia under the premise of operating in deep rear areas and later deploy these units to the frontline anyway.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian and occupation authorities are encouraging residents of occupied Ukraine who are residing in Russia to vote in the occupation regional elections, likely to increase voter turnout and the perception of electoral legitimacy. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration published a list of polling stations in over 45 Russian federal subjects for displaced Ukrainians to vote for the occupation regional elections.[57]

Russian authorities continue targeting Ukrainian civilians, including medically fragile civilians, for forcible deportation to Russia. Russian Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova stated on September 2 that she invited disabled young adults in occupied Kherson Oblast to live at an assisted living facility in Penza Oblast.[58] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities have detained over 1,000 Ukrainian civilians in southern Ukraine since the start of 2023 and currently hold these Ukrainians in filtration camps without trial or investigation.[59]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov reported on September 2 that the first Russian tactical nuclear weapons recently arrived in Belarus. Budanov stated that the risk of Russian forces using nuclear weapons from Belarusian territory is "zero." [60] Budanov reported that Russian forces transferred an unspecified number of tactical nuclear warheads for Tochka-U missiles as well as for Su-24m aircraft to Belarusian forces.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko relieved Major General Valery Gnizozub from his post as Belarusian Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Combat Control due to his retirement on September 1.[61]

The Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) continued the "Combat Brotherhood 2023" operational-strategic command staff exercises in Belarus on September 2.[62]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02st4xiFpobCFwmxKEdDhkg3GTvtUdQO6QC1sQKYh2SdqKoC9zy6GifYARjhueeSil> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WsPoRvNqkcSH48AZ2xRzuW29sKDG38j54so2erimjeoyvvE73NxbWuoDYJimZaUul>

[2] https://t.me/dva_majors/24774 ; <https://t.me/batalyon15/2836> ; <https://t.me/milinfo/105893>

[3] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/09/01/na-bahmutskom-ua-tryvayut-garyachi-boyi-na-pivdni-krayiny-ukrayinski-pidrozdily-prosuvayutsya-vpered-ganna-malyar/>

[4] <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/02/world/europe/ukraine-russia-counteroffensive.html>

[5] <https://www.err.ee/1609085522/grosberg-ukraina-on-pannud-lounarindel-vene-vaed-surve-alla> ; <https://news.err.ee/1609085732/intelligence-chief-ukraine-has-put-russian-troops-under-pressure-in-south>

[6] <https://www.err.ee/1609085522/grosberg-ukraina-on-pannud-lounarindel-vene-vaed-surve-alla> ; <https://news.err.ee/1609085732/intelligence-chief-ukraine-has-put-russian-troops-under-pressure-in-south>

[7] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar071323> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar082123> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar082023> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2023>

[8] https://t.me/Separ13_13/18565 ; <https://t.me/apwagner/12175> ; https://t.me/Separ13_13/18566 ; <https://t.me/vchkogpu/41535>

[9] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar071323> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar071623>

[10] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar071323> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar082123> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar082023> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar081223> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar081423>

[11] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar071323> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar071623>

[12] https://t.me/Separ13_13/18565 ; <https://t.me/apwagner/12175> ; <https://t.me/vchkogpu/41535>

[13] https://www.ng.ru/ideas/2023-08-29/7_8812_illusions.html

[14] <https://t.me/rybar/51440>; <https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/15141>; https://t.me/tasmanian_diablo/1433

[15] <https://t.me/rybar/51440>

[16] <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66653837>

[17] <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66653837>

[18] <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66653837>

[19] <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66653837>

[20] <https://t.me/natoptishh/1854> ; <https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1697695901123330487?s=20> ; <https://t.me/osirskiy/311> ; <https://www.facebook.com/4tankova/videos/838676094543760> ; <https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1697883596239810945?s=20> https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/4628

[21] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/96492; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/50277>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/96500

[22] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02st4xiFpobCFwmxKEdDhkg3GTvtUdQQ6QC1sQKYh2SdqKoC9zy6GifpYARjhueeSil>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WsPoRvNqkcSH48AZ2xRzuW29sKDG38j54so2erimjeoyvE73NxbWuoDYJimZaUul>

[23] https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2023/09/01/na-bahmutskom-tryvayut-garyachi-boyi-na-pivdni-krayiny-ukrayinski-pidrozdily-prosuvayutsya-vpered-ganna-malyar/

[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/24807; https://t.me/dva_majors/24825; https://t.me/sons_fatherland/10927;

[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/30074 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/30080

[26] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/4638

[27] https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2023/09/01/na-bahmutskom-tryvayut-garyachi-boyi-na-pivdni-krayiny-ukrayinski-pidrozdily-prosuvayutsya-vpered-ganna-malyar/

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/30073 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/30078

[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/24774 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/96500 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/96523 ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/52444>

[30] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/50277> ; <https://t.me/readovkanews/65305>

[31] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/96500 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/96523

[32] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02st4xiFpobCFwmxKEdDhkg3GTvtUdQQ6QC1sQKYh2SdqKoC9zy6GifpYARjhueeSil> ; https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2023/09/01/na-bahmutskom-tryvayut-garyachi-boyi-na-pivdni-krayiny-ukrayinski-pidrozdily-prosuvayutsya-vpered-ganna-malyar/

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[37] <https://t.me/wargonzo/14778>

[38] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/50277>

[39] https://t.me/voin_dv/4702

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[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/24774 ; <https://t.me/batalyon15/2836> ; <https://t.me/milinfoive/105893>

[45] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/52446>

[46] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/52446> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/14778>

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[49] <https://t.me/readovkanews/65328> ; <https://t.me/vrogov/11932>

[50] <https://t.me/berdmisk/4429>

[51] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/3054

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