

# Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 25, 2023, 7:55 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00 pm ET on August 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Russian President Vladimir Putin’s August 24 remarks about Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death established the Kremlin-approved narrative on the issue, and Russian government officials, Kremlin affiliates, and the Russian information space continued to toe this line on August 25.** Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov lambasted suggestions and claims that Putin was involved in the death of Prigozhin, calling them “an absolute lie.”<sup>1</sup> Peskov stated that there are no official forensic details on Prigozhin’s death yet and claimed that Putin had not met with Prigozhin in the Kremlin in recent days.<sup>2</sup> Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov mirrored some of Putin’s language about Wagner and Prigozhin by stating that Prigozhin “undoubtedly made a great contribution” to the Russian war effort in Ukraine.<sup>3</sup> The Russian information space largely followed the Kremlin-approved narrative and continues to refrain from linking the Kremlin to the plane crash.<sup>4</sup>

**Some prominent voices in the Russian information space notably deviated from Putin’s established narrative, however.** Former Putin bodyguard and current Tula Oblast Governor Alexey Dyumin stated that it is possible to “forgive mistakes and even cowardice, [but] never betrayal,” and claimed that Prigozhin and Wagner Group founder Dmitry Utkin were not “traitors.”<sup>5</sup> Dyumin’s statement implies that the Wagner June 24 rebellion was not actually a rebellion. Some Russian sources floated Dyumin as a possible replacement for Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu after the rebellion, and Putin made a public point that Shoigu retains a dominant position.<sup>6</sup> Russian “Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky stated on August 25 that some groups of sources, excluding imprisoned ardent nationalist Igor Girkin, are trying to use Prigozhin’s death to discredit Russian authorities to sow instability and argued that these claimed discreditation campaigns are a sign of instability within Russia.<sup>7</sup> Khodakovsky called for Girkin’s release following Prigozhin’s death on August 23 on the grounds that more (presumably good) people were needed to defend Russia.<sup>8</sup> Girkin’s official Telegram account published a statement from him via his lawyer on August 24, wherein Girkin claims that Prigozhin’s plane crash is indicative of deepening unrest within Russia - mirroring Khodakovsky’s complaint.<sup>9</sup> Girkin also claimed that the “[19]90s are back,” implying that Putin’s broad effort to restore order to Russia following the chaos and gangsterism following the fall of the Soviet Union has failed — a direct attack on a central tenet of Putin’s claimed legitimacy.<sup>10</sup>

**Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko issued a statement on Prigozhin’s death on August 25 that likely aimed at balancing his relationship with the Kremlin with maintaining domestic control, but that also directly contradicted his previous statements concerning the deal he**


**brokered between the Kremlin and Prigozhin.** ISW incorrectly forecasted yesterday that Lukashenko would refrain from publicly speaking about Prigozhin's death to avoid exacerbating his tenuous position with the Kremlin.<sup>11</sup> Lukashenko's likely desire to maintain the appearance of being a sovereign leader appears to have outweighed any such concerns. Lukashenko asserted that Wagner would continue to operate within Belarus according to a system that he and Prigozhin had built in recent months and that 10,000 Wagner personnel will be in the country within a few days.<sup>12</sup> The Wagner contingent in Belarus has been reportedly declining in recent weeks, likely due to the Kremlin's and Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) apparently successful effort to weaken Wagner.<sup>13</sup> Lukashenko directly responded to satellite imagery showing that up to a third of the tents at the Wagner camp in Tsel, Asipovichy, Belarus had been dismantled in the previous month and claimed that Wagner and Belarusian officials had only dismantled unnecessary tents not needed for the expected number of Wagner fighters.<sup>14</sup> It is extremely unlikely that 10,000 Wagner fighters will arrive in Belarus, nor are that many Wagner personnel needed as advisors and trainers to help Lukashenko build an unspecified Belarusian "contract army."<sup>15</sup> Lukashenko has routinely attempted to portray himself as a sovereign leader despite Russia's current de-facto occupation of the country, and he likely hopes to prevent his domestic audience from viewing Putin's almost certain assassination of Prigozhin as the Kremlin's unilateral cancellation of agreements that he had made with Wagner.<sup>16</sup>

Lukashenko also expanded on his role in the negotiations that led to the agreement that ended Wagner's June 24 rebellion. Lukashenko stated that over a series of several calls he warned both Prigozhin and Utkin that pressing the rebellion would result in their deaths, portraying himself again as the one who convinced Prigozhin to end the rebellion.<sup>17</sup> Lukashenko likely hoped to underscore the initial deal and Wagner's arrival in Belarus as examples of his ability to make high-level security decisions outside of the Kremlin's dictates. Lukashenko endorsed the Kremlin narrative line that Putin had absolutely nothing to do with Prigozhin's "accident," dismissed assertions that a missile brought down the plane, and even claimed that he had warned Prigozhin via Putin about an unspecified assassination attempt.<sup>18</sup> Lukashenko notably tried to absolve himself of any responsibility for failing to protect Prigozhin by claiming that safety guarantees were never a part of the conversations he had with Wagner and the Kremlin.<sup>19</sup> Lukashenko had indicated on June 27, however, that Putin "promised" both Lukashenko and Prigozhin that Prigozhin and the Wagner would enjoy unspecified "security guarantees" in Belarus.<sup>20</sup>

**The *Financial Times* reported on the bleak future of the Wagner Group's operations in Africa following Prigozhin's death.** The *Financial Times* (*FT*) cited people familiar with the matter as saying that Prigozhin's recent trip to Africa may have aimed to prevent the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) from taking control of Wagner's operations in Africa.<sup>21</sup> This report is consistent with ISW's previous assessment that Prigozhin was likely attempting to counter efforts by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin to weaken and destroy Wagner following the rebellion.<sup>22</sup> *FT* reported that a longtime acquaintance of Prigozhin stated that Wagner's operations in Africa will likely struggle without Prigozhin's leadership.<sup>23</sup> An *FT* source close to the Russian MoD stated that it is unlikely the Russian military would be able to fully replicate Wagner's operations in Africa under Prigozhin if the Russian MoD did take over Wagner.<sup>24</sup>

**Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 25 and reportedly advanced as Russian milbloggers expressed concern over a lack of reinforcements and troop rotations in the area.** The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified successes in the directions of the Novodanylivka-Novopokropivka (5-13km south of Orikhiv) line and the Mala Tokmachka-Ocheretuvate (9-25km southeast of Orikhiv) line.<sup>25</sup> A prominent Russian milblogger expressed concern about the ability of battle-weary Russian forces to defend against possible future renewed Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) amid claims that fighting shifted to southern Robotyne.<sup>26</sup> The milblogger claimed that many of the Russian servicemen fighting

near Robotyne have been on the frontline since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and that these units struggle with a shortage of frontline reinforcements.<sup>27</sup> This claim supports ISW’s assessment that Russian forces fighting in the western Zaporizhzhia Oblast area have been defending against Ukrainian attacks since the start of the counteroffensive without rotation or significant reinforcement.<sup>28</sup>



**Reports of a Russian unit suffering significant losses with inadequate support on an unspecified island in the Dnipro River delta sparked outrage against the Russian military command in some parts of the Russian information space.** Russian milbloggers amplified a complaint allegedly from

personnel of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) claiming that elements were suffering significant casualties under Ukrainian artillery fire on an island in the Kherson direction and that commanders were ignoring the personnel's calls for artillery fire.<sup>29</sup> The personnel claimed that a company commander tried to evacuate his unit from the island, but senior commanders stopped the evacuation, sent away the commander, and dismissed two other commanders who supported the withdrawal.<sup>30</sup> Russian milbloggers quickly jumped to criticize the Russian military command for failing to solve systemic issues among Russian forces on the Kherson frontline, including a lack of supplies and frontal assaults against Ukrainian east-bank positions under heavy artillery fire and with no support.<sup>31</sup> Milbloggers heavily criticized Russian commanders for failing to take accountability and for not resolving these issues.<sup>32</sup> The Russian information space previously eviscerated the Russian military command for similar failures combating a limited Ukrainian presence near the Antonivsky Bridge on the Kherson frontline in late June, and some milbloggers claimed that this widespread criticism was the only factor that compelled the Russian military command to fix the issues at the time.<sup>33</sup> The current round of criticism follows recent complaints about the failure to adequately respond to a limited Ukrainian presence on the east bank of the Dnipro River and criticism that Russian authorities never provided promised boats to Russian forces in the area.<sup>34</sup>

**Ukrainian drones likely struck a Russian duty station in occupied Crimea on August 25.** Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov stated that Ukrainian drones targeted the base of the Russian 126th Guards Coastal Defense Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) near Perevalne, Simferopol Raion.<sup>35</sup> Crimean Tatar Resource Center Head Eskander Bariev also stated that residents reported explosions throughout occupied Crimea, particularly near Perevalne.<sup>36</sup> The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 42 drones at targets in Crimea but that Russian air defense and electronic warfare (EW) systems downed all 42 Ukrainian drones.<sup>37</sup> A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that this was the largest Ukrainian drone strike in recent months.<sup>38</sup> GUR Chief Major General Kyrylo Budanov reiterated on August 24 that Ukrainian forces have the ability to strike any part of occupied Crimea.<sup>39</sup>

**Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful missile and drone strike against targets in Odesa Oblast overnight on August 24-25.** Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 missiles, two Kalibr missiles, and one Shahed-136/131 drone and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all five projectiles.<sup>40</sup> The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that the Russian missiles targeted Odesa City and a port in Odesa Oblast.<sup>41</sup>

#### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin's August 24 remarks about Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's death established the Kremlin-approved narrative on the issue, and Russian government officials, Kremlin affiliates, and the Russian information space continued to toe this line on August 25.**
- **Some prominent voices in the Russian information space notably deviated from Putin's established narrative, however.**
- **Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko issued a statement on Prigozhin's death on August 25 that likely aimed at balancing his relationship with the Kremlin with maintaining domestic control, but that also directly contradicted his previous statements concerning the deal he brokered between the Kremlin and Prigozhin.**
- **The Financial Times reported on the bleak future of the Wagner Group's operations in Africa following Prigozhin's death.**

- **Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 25 as Russian milbloggers expressed concern over a lack of reinforcements and troop rotations in the area.**
- **Reports of a Russian unit suffering significant losses with inadequate support on an unspecified island in the Dnipro River delta sparked outrage against the Russian military command in some parts of the Russian information space.**
- **Ukrainian drones likely struck a Russian duty station in occupied Crimea on August 25.**
- **Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Donetsk Oblast on August 25 and advanced.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on August 25 and reportedly advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.**
- **Russian authorities are likely setting conditions to falsify the results of the September 2023 regional elections in occupied Ukraine.**

***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

### **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

#### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 25 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on August 25 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Kovalivka (14km southwest of Svatove).<sup>42</sup> The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoyehorivka (17km southwest of Svatove).<sup>43</sup> Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are transferring newly formed brigades and divisions to the Kupyansk and Lyman directions after a month of fierce fighting and significant Russian losses in order to resume active offensive operations in these directions.<sup>44</sup> ISW has not observed evidence of new Russian units or formations arriving in this sector of the front, however.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 25 but did not advance. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) in Kharkiv Oblast and Serhiivka (12km southwest of Svatove) and Kuzmyne (4km southwest of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast.<sup>45</sup> Russian Western Grouping of Forces Press Officer Yaroslav Yakimkin claimed that Russian forces repelled four Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction.<sup>46</sup> Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian armored assaults near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and an attack near the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).<sup>47</sup>

### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on August 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut.<sup>48</sup> Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Kurdyumivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).<sup>49</sup> The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Zaliznyanske (12km northwest of Bakhmut) and Klishchiiivka.<sup>50</sup> A Ukrainian commander reported on August 24 that Russian forces are transferring “fresh” units to the Bakhmut direction from other areas of the front due to heavy fighting in the Bakhmut area.<sup>51</sup> ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of this report; ISW last observed new Russian units transferring to the Bakhmut area in early-to-mid-July, including the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, Akhmat Spetsnaz units, and an unspecified BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) unit.<sup>52</sup>

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Bakhmut area and reportedly made marginal advances on August 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Klishchiivka.<sup>53</sup> A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Vesele (19km north of Bakhmut), and another Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced in the area.<sup>54</sup>

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not advance on August 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful operations south of Avdiivka, near Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), near Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and northeast of Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).<sup>55</sup>

### **Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled a Ukrainian assault near Solodke (17km southwest of Donetsk City) in western Donetsk Oblast on August 25.<sup>56</sup>

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) in western Donetsk Oblast on August 25.<sup>57</sup>

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful limited ground attacks along the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on August 25. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and in the direction of Staromlynivka (14km south of Velyka Novosilka).<sup>58</sup> Russian sources, including the “Vostok” Battalion operating in the area, continue to

express concerns about Russian vulnerabilities to possible future Ukrainian offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.<sup>59</sup>

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on August 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and achieved unspecified success in the direction of Novodanylivka to Novopokropivka (5-13km south of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka to Ocheretuvate (9-25km southeast of Orikhiv).<sup>60</sup> The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces repelled five Ukrainian assaults in unspecified areas in western Zaporizhia Oblast.<sup>61</sup> Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations east of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and in the direction of Russian “rear” lines of defense west of Verbove (18km south).<sup>62</sup> Russian milbloggers widely claimed that fighting within Robotyne has moved closer to the southern outskirts of the settlement, and several milbloggers claimed that there was fighting south of Robotyne.<sup>63</sup> One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are entrenched in Robotyne and are conducting attacks on Novopokropivka to the south.<sup>64</sup> Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces maintain positions in southern Robotyne as of the evening of August 25, however.<sup>65</sup> Another Russian milblogger amplified footage on August 25 purporting to show Russian forces repelling a small Ukrainian assault with armored vehicle support in an unspecified part of the Polohy area (35km southeast of Orikhiv) on an unspecified date.<sup>66</sup>

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 25 that Russian forces repelled a small Ukrainian landing attempt on an island in the Dnipro River south of Veletenske, Kherson Oblast (15km southwest of Kherson City).<sup>67</sup>

### **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on August 25 requiring members of Russian volunteer formations and other state-run security entities to swear allegiance to Russia and swear to obey the Russian military chain-of-command.<sup>68</sup> Russian authorities will require soldiers in volunteer formations and personnel of the state-run security entity “Okhrana,” which reportedly guards infrastructure and strategic assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, to swear an oath of allegiance to Russia and the Russian Constitution and to “strictly follow the orders of commanders and superiors.”<sup>69</sup> The Russian military has recently suffered from multiple public instances of insubordination, and ISW has previously assessed that the Russian military chain of command is deteriorating.<sup>70</sup>

### **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

Russian authorities are likely setting conditions to falsify the results of the September 2023 regional elections in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 25 that Zaporizhia Oblast occupation authorities will allow voters to vote both at polling stations and at home, and occupation authorities will begin visiting residential areas on August 30 to collect votes for the September 8-10 regional elections.<sup>71</sup> The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that Russian occupation authorities are allowing voters to vote from home in order to explain low turnout at polling stations.<sup>72</sup> The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian authorities are resettling Russians to abandoned residences in occupied Ukraine, and the Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities are automatically entering civilians in occupied Ukraine into the voter registration system to increase the claimed voter turnout.<sup>73</sup>

## **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)**

A Ukrainian official stated that Wagner Group forces are leaving Belarus, supporting ISW's prior assessment that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) effort to weaken Wagner may have resulted in Wagner personnel leaving Belarus.<sup>74</sup> Ukrainian State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on August 25 that Ukrainian border guards began observing a gradual decline in the number of Wagner personnel in Belarus prior to the Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's death on August 23. Demchenko stated that the number of Wagner personnel in Belarus has also continued to decline since August 23.<sup>75</sup>

**ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.**

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

<sup>1</sup> <https://tass.ru/politika/18588023>

<sup>2</sup> <https://tass.ru/politika/18587933> ; <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/18588073>

<sup>3</sup> [https://t.me/RKadyrov\\_95/3844](https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3844) ; <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/24/08/2023/64e77eb49a7947f884d4doad>

<sup>4</sup> <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2023> ; <https://t.me/rybar/51136> ; [https://t.me/ok\\_spn/26261](https://t.me/ok_spn/26261) ; [https://t.me/grey\\_zone/20204](https://t.me/grey_zone/20204) ; [https://t.me/grey\\_zone/20210](https://t.me/grey_zone/20210) ; [https://t.me/grey\\_zone/20220](https://t.me/grey_zone/20220) ; [https://t.me/grey\\_zone/20226](https://t.me/grey_zone/20226) ; [https://t.me/grey\\_zone/20230](https://t.me/grey_zone/20230)

<sup>5</sup> [https://t.me/multi\\_XAM/742](https://t.me/multi_XAM/742) ; [https://t.me/grey\\_zone/20246](https://t.me/grey_zone/20246) ; <https://meduza.io/news/2023/08/25/predatelyami-oni-ne-byli-gubernator-tulskoy-oblasti-i-byvshiy-ohrannik-putina-aleksey-dyumin-o-evgenii-prigozhine-i-dmitrii-vagnere-utkine> ; [https://tularegion.ru/presscenter/press-release/?ELEMENT\\_ID=367027](https://tularegion.ru/presscenter/press-release/?ELEMENT_ID=367027)

<sup>6</sup> <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2023> ; <https://t.me/logikamarkova/7077> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2023>

<sup>7</sup> [https://t.me/aleksandr\\_skif/2860](https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2860)

<sup>8</sup> [https://t.me/aleksandr\\_skif/2858](https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2858)

<sup>9</sup> <https://t.me/strelkovii/6285>

<sup>10</sup> <https://t.me/strelkovii/6285>

<sup>11</sup> <https://isw.pub/UkrWar082423>

<sup>12</sup> [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9824](https://t.me/pul_1/9824) ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9822](https://t.me/pul_1/9822) ; <https://www.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-rasskazal-ostanutsja-li-vagnerovtsy-v-belarusi-posle-pokushenija-na-prigozhina-584482-2023/> ; <https://t.me/modmilby/31088> ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9824](https://t.me/pul_1/9824) ; <https://t.me/modmilby/31086> ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9822](https://t.me/pul_1/9822)

<sup>13</sup> <https://isw.pub/UkrWar082423> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar082323>

<sup>14</sup> [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9824](https://t.me/pul_1/9824) ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9822](https://t.me/pul_1/9822) ; <https://www.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-rasskazal-ostanutsja-li-vagnerovtsy-v-belarusi-posle-pokushenija-na-prigozhina-584482-2023/> ; <https://t.me/modmilby/31088> ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9824](https://t.me/pul_1/9824) ; <https://t.me/modmilby/31086> ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9822](https://t.me/pul_1/9822)

<sup>15</sup> <https://isw.pub/UkrWar080123>



- <sup>16</sup> <https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023> ;
- <sup>17</sup> [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9824](https://t.me/pul_1/9824) ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9822](https://t.me/pul_1/9822) ; <https://www.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-rasskazal-ostanutsja-li-vagnerovtsy-v-belarusi-posle-pokushenija-na-prigozhina-584482-2023/> ; <https://t.me/modmilby/31088> ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9824](https://t.me/pul_1/9824) ; <https://t.me/modmilby/31086> ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9822](https://t.me/pul_1/9822)
- <sup>18</sup> [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9824](https://t.me/pul_1/9824) ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9822](https://t.me/pul_1/9822) ; <https://www.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-rasskazal-ostanutsja-li-vagnerovtsy-v-belarusi-posle-pokushenija-na-prigozhina-584482-2023/> ; <https://t.me/modmilby/31088> ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9824](https://t.me/pul_1/9824) ; <https://t.me/modmilby/31086> ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9822](https://t.me/pul_1/9822)
- <sup>19</sup> [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9824](https://t.me/pul_1/9824) ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9822](https://t.me/pul_1/9822) ; <https://www.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-rasskazal-ostanutsja-li-vagnerovtsy-v-belarusi-posle-pokushenija-na-prigozhina-584482-2023/> ; <https://t.me/modmilby/31088> ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9824](https://t.me/pul_1/9824) ; <https://t.me/modmilby/31086> ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/9822](https://t.me/pul_1/9822)
- <sup>20</sup> <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2023> ; <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/vruchenie-pogon-vysshemu-oficerskomu-sostavu>
- <sup>21</sup> <https://www.ft.com/content/0476123a-b726-413b-9c70-0ba1e480fa0f>
- <sup>22</sup> <https://isw.pub/UkrWar082323>
- <sup>23</sup> <https://www.ft.com/content/0476123a-b726-413b-9c70-0ba1e480fa0f>
- <sup>24</sup> <https://www.ft.com/content/0476123a-b726-413b-9c70-0ba1e480fa0f>
- <sup>25</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NuoVn5LrNBYeU6QEirQBcCnVZ3mPSw6bK1KW5n3KVhZxAD4hHtQNGFUUHZTfLoDl>
- <sup>26</sup> [https://t.me/belarusian\\_silovik/20349](https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/20349) ; [https://t.me/rusich\\_army/10535](https://t.me/rusich_army/10535) ; <https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1694772607818555819> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkori/51903>
- <sup>27</sup> [https://t.me/belarusian\\_silovik/20349](https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/20349)
- <sup>28</sup> <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2023>
- <sup>29</sup> [https://t.me/romanov\\_92/41439](https://t.me/romanov_92/41439) ; [https://t.me/grey\\_zone/20241](https://t.me/grey_zone/20241) ; <https://t.me/mobilizationnews/14933> ; <https://t.me/RSaponkov/5832> ; <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/28763> ; [https://t.me/grey\\_zone/20239](https://t.me/grey_zone/20239) ;
- <sup>30</sup> [https://t.me/romanov\\_92/41439](https://t.me/romanov_92/41439) ; [https://t.me/grey\\_zone/20241](https://t.me/grey_zone/20241) ; <https://t.me/mobilizationnews/14933> ; <https://t.me/RSaponkov/5832> ; <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/28763> ; [https://t.me/grey\\_zone/20239](https://t.me/grey_zone/20239) ;
- <sup>31</sup> [https://t.me/Separ13\\_13/18117](https://t.me/Separ13_13/18117) ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/24257](https://t.me/dva_majors/24257) ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/24259](https://t.me/dva_majors/24259) ; <https://t.me/rosgvardeez/4931> ; <https://t.me/osetin20/6983> ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/24268](https://t.me/dva_majors/24268) ; <https://t.me/SergeyKolyasnikov/51544> ; <https://t.me/rybar/51141> ; <https://t.me/epoddubny/17239> ; [https://t.me/notes\\_veterans/11766](https://t.me/notes_veterans/11766) ; [https://t.me/Alekhin\\_Telega/7767](https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/7767)
- <sup>32</sup> [https://t.me/Separ13\\_13/18117](https://t.me/Separ13_13/18117) ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/24257](https://t.me/dva_majors/24257) ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/24259](https://t.me/dva_majors/24259) ; <https://t.me/rosgvardeez/4931> ; <https://t.me/osetin20/6983> ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/24268](https://t.me/dva_majors/24268) ; <https://t.me/SergeyKolyasnikov/51544> ; <https://t.me/rybar/51141> ; <https://t.me/epoddubny/17239> ; [https://t.me/notes\\_veterans/11766](https://t.me/notes_veterans/11766) ; [https://t.me/Alekhin\\_Telega/7767](https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/7767)
- <sup>33</sup> <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/June%2030%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf> ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/24268](https://t.me/dva_majors/24268) ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/10335> ; <https://t.me/rybar/51141>
- <sup>34</sup> <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2023> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2023>
- <sup>35</sup> <https://suspilne dot media/558591-u-gur-pidtvrdili-udar-po-126-j-gvardijskij-brigadi-rf-v-okupovanomu-krimu/>
- <sup>36</sup> <https://suspilne dot media/558591-u-gur-pidtvrdili-udar-po-126-j-gvardijskij-brigadi-rf-v-okupovanomu-krimu/>
- <sup>37</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/29761](https://t.me/mod_russia/29761)
- <sup>38</sup> <https://t.me/rybar/51135>

<sup>39</sup> <https://gur.gov.ua/content/my-zdatni-vrazyty-protyvnyka-v-bud-iakii-tochtsi-okupovanoho-krymu-kyrylo-budanov.html> ; <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-budanov-krym-dosiazhnist/32562036.html>

<sup>40</sup> <https://t.me/kpszsu/4593> ;  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido33p1cNft8MMYjfzNRJ76DB6kQeyrW5kh44QrCNdaBKsXuNUTjHrVUhPVWSjx6px2l>

<sup>41</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbido2MzMWLZ1bKpwNymjfKsQkpLTD75bwwWnEaDvvo9ahhTivGhi92up7WQc11FLY76UZl> ; [https://t.me/SJTF\\_Odes/287](https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/287)

<sup>42</sup> <https://t.me/shershni68/48>; <https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1695105409550356813?s=20>;

<https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1695105612323975267?s=20>;

<https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1695105792481923367?s=20>;

<https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/169510597672511118?s=20>;

<https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1695106193901949175?s=20>;

<https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1695106596756496870?s=20>;

<https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1695107079369892023?s=20>;

<https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1695107285196972343?s=20>;

<https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1695107791638196378?s=20>

<sup>43</sup>

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido6QrsJLdNCE13NxjgkRccKGcYK1xeyy6U2bduonp5GoRbJNYr1A8XJ71XtgCE1mLFl> ;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2KYGjJt6oWy466A9eAyw1xnxwfeU9c52vVaFBaYnSctEdCkSZEEJ1dM477i4sqqKl> ; <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/13152>

<sup>44</sup> <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/08/25/obstanovka-napruzhenia-oleksandr-syrskij-rozviv-pro-sytuaciyu-na-shidnomu-fronti/>

<sup>45</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/29773](https://t.me/mod_russia/29773) ; [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/29774](https://t.me/mod_russia/29774)

<sup>46</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/29767](https://t.me/mod_russia/29767)

<sup>47</sup> <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/51968> ; <https://t.me/btr80/10030>

<sup>48</sup>

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido34NuoVn5LrNBYeU6QEirQBcCnVZ3mPSw6bK1KWsn3KVhzxAD4hHtQNGFUUHZTfLoDl>

<sup>49</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/14580>; <https://t.me/readovkanews/64835>

<sup>50</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/29773](https://t.me/mod_russia/29773)

<sup>51</sup> <https://suspilne.media/558193-pid-bahmut-rf-perekidae-boezdatni-pidrozdili-tehniku-ta-artilerijski-sistemi-zorin-rozkazav-pro-situaciu/>

<sup>52</sup> <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2023>;  
<https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/July%2010%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2023>

<sup>53</sup>

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2KYGjJt6oWy466A9eAyw1xnxwfeU9c52vVaFBaYnSctEdCkSZEEJ1dM477i4sqqKl>

<sup>54</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/14580>; <https://t.me/readovkanews/64835>

<sup>55</sup>

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido6QrsJLdNCE13NxjgkRccKGcYK1xeyy6U2bduonp5GoRbJNYr1A8XJ71XtgCE1mLFl>;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2KYGjJt6oWy466A9eAyw1xnxwfeU9c52vVaFBaYnSctEdCkSZEEJ1dM477i4sqqKl>;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido34NuoVn5LrNBYeU6QEirQBcCnVZ3mPSw6bK1KWsn3KVhzxAD4hHtQNGFUUHZTfLoDl>

<sup>56</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/29773](https://t.me/mod_russia/29773)

57

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2KYGjJt6oWy466A9eAyw1xnwfeU9c52vVaFBaYnSctEdCkSZEeEJ1dM477i4sqqKl>

58 <https://t.me/wargonzo/14580> ; <https://t.me/rybar/51145>

59 <https://t.me/rybar/51145> ; [https://t.me/batalyon\\_vostok/146](https://t.me/batalyon_vostok/146)

60

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido34NuoVn5LrNBYeU6QEirQBcCnVZ3mPSw6bK1KW Sn3KVhZxAD4hHtQNGFUUHZTfLoDl>

61 [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/29773](https://t.me/mod_russia/29773)

62 <https://t.me/wargonzo/14580> ; <https://t.me/batalyon15/2732> ; <https://t.me/rybar/51140>

63 [https://t.me/belarusian\\_silovik/20349](https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/20349) ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/24256](https://t.me/dva_majors/24256) ;

[https://t.me/rusich\\_army/10533](https://t.me/rusich_army/10533) ; <https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1695019241076854922> ;

<https://t.me/wargonzo/14580> ; <https://t.me/readovkanews/64835> ; <https://t.me/rybar/51140>

64 <https://t.me/wargonzo/14580>

65 [https://t.me/belarusian\\_silovik/20397](https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/20397) ; <https://t.me/batalyon15/2741> ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/24290](https://t.me/dva_majors/24290) ;

[https://t.me/romanov\\_92/41466](https://t.me/romanov_92/41466)

66 <https://t.me/zhivoff/10638>

67 <https://t.me/rybar/51144>

68 [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/29777](https://t.me/mod_russia/29777) ; <http://publication> dot

[pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202308250004?index=1](http://pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202308250004?index=1)

69 <https://tass> dot ru/obschestvo/17995257 ; [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/29777](https://t.me/mod_russia/29777) ; <http://publication> dot

[pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202308250004?index=1](http://pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202308250004?index=1)

70 <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2023> ;

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2023>

71

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido6QrsJLdNCE13NxjgkRccKGcYK1xeyy6U2bduonp5GoRbJNYr1A8XJ71XtgCE1mLFl>

72 <https://sprotyv.dot.mod.gov.ua/okupanty-gotuyutsya-do-imitatsiyi-vyboriv/>

73 <https://sprotyv.dot.mod.gov.ua/okupanty-gotuyutsya-do-imitatsiyi-vyboriv/>

74 <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2023>

75 <https://t.me/DPSUkr/13080>