Introduction: This is the first in a series of reports profiling the units of the 6th Iraqi Army Division. The units discussed here located west and south of Baghdad. Based on open-source information, these reports will describe Iraqi Army operational activities, capabilities, and partner relationships with US units where appropriate. The picture painted by these reports is mixed for the 6th IA; some units have made tremendous strides operating with US partner units, others still face significant challenges.

4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division

The 4th Brigade of the 6th Iraqi Army Division (4-6th IA), commanded by Brigadier General Ali Jassim Al-Frejee, is located along Highway 8 south of Baghdad, part of the so-called “Triangle of Death.” The brigade consists of approximately 5,000 soldiers, divided into five infantry battalions. Of these five battalions, four are “in the lead,” planning and executing their own operations, and the fifth battalion is expected to take the lead sometime in the next six months. Elements of the 4-6th IA are regularly partnered with two US units, the 4-31st Infantry and the 2-15th Field Artillery, also known as Task Force 2-15FA (TF 2-15FA).  

The battlespace of the 4-6th includes three major population centers: Mahmudiyah, Yusufiyah, and Latifiyah. The sectarian balance in this area is mixed; the population centers are predominantly Shia while the rural areas are predominantly Sunni. As such, the 4-6th has been conducting operations against both Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Sunni insurgents, and rogue elements of Jaish Al-Mahdi (JAM). The brigade itself is mixed; the officer corps is 50% Shia, 50% Sunni, while the enlisted ranks around 90% Shia. The leader of TF 2-15 FA, one of the principal US partner units, has praised the command of the 4-6th, indicating that he has seen little evidence of sectarianism and that the 4-6th operates well in both Shia Mahmudiyah and in the rural Sunni areas off Highway 8.

The principal aim of the 4-6th and its US partner units has been to disrupt insurgent operations and deny insurgent forces use of the battlespace, while clearing operations proceed further to the east in Arab Jabour and in Baghdad itself. July and August have witnessed a transition to a mix of clear-and-hold and disruption operations, although these clear-and-hold operations seem to be local, rather than systematic.
The partnering system with the 4-6\textsuperscript{th} is unique, insofar as entire American units (the 4-31\textsuperscript{st} Infantry and 2-15\textsuperscript{th} Field Artillery of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10\textsuperscript{th} Mtn. and the 1-40\textsuperscript{th} Cavalry of the 4\textsuperscript{th} BCT, 25\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division (ID)) have partnered with Iraqi battalions in order to conduct training and joint operations. US units have run several brigade-wide training programs to improve the tactical proficiency of Iraqi soldiers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). TF 2-15FA is running a Warrior Leaders Course, four weeks in length, aimed at improving basic NCO skills in the 4\textsuperscript{th} Brigade, a critical weakness in many IA units. This course has apparently paid off, with visible improvements in NCO performance.\textsuperscript{4} They are also running an Iraqi Commando Course, which combines elements of American Ranger School and Air Assault School. This course has enabled US units to conduct joint air-assault operations with Iraqi forces, greatly improving mobility across the canals in the region.\textsuperscript{5} These training programs have been reinforced with unit-level training.\textsuperscript{6}

1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion, 4\textsuperscript{th} Brigade

The 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion, 4\textsuperscript{th} Brigade (1-4-6) has partnered with the 2-15\textsuperscript{th} FA to conduct operations between Mahmudiyah and Latifiyah, at the southern end of the 4\textsuperscript{th} Brigade’s area of operations. Until recently, these operations were a mix of cordon/sweep and raid missions.

In March, the 1-4-6 planned and executed Operation EAGLE DIVE I, an operation near the Al-QaaQaa weapons facility that netted nine weapons caches and 68 detainees. According to the executive officer (XO) for the 2\textsuperscript{nd} BCT, 10\textsuperscript{th} Mtn., these weapons caches were likely part of a larger weapons smuggling network in the area. The XO, Lt. Col. Frank Andrews, rated the 1-4-6 as highly capable and argued that EAGLE DIVE I demonstrated that the 1-4-6 was capable of planning and executing its missions.\textsuperscript{7}

In May and June, the 1-4-6 and TF 2-15FA executed a series of ground-based sweep operations and west of Latifiyah, including EAGLE SWEEP (Early June) and GOLDEN EAGLE II (Late June) that aimed to disrupt insurgent activities.\textsuperscript{8} These operations resulted in detentions and weapons seizures, but they did not hold any of the ground.\textsuperscript{9} As a result, insurgents were able to reinfiltreate these areas. The chief of current operations for the 2\textsuperscript{nd} BCT, 10\textsuperscript{th} Mtn., Maj. Robert Horney acknowledged this problem when discussing EAGLE SWEEP, admitting that “we have been in this area before, but we wanted to go back and do a follow-up to make sure insurgents weren’t hiding caches in a previously cleared area.”\textsuperscript{10}

In July, through a combination of air assaulting and ground operations, the 1-4-6 and TF 2-15 FA shifted gears, clearing Shaka, a western suburb of Latifiyah, of AQI fighters and Sunni extremists. Shaka had been a Shia neighborhood, until Sunni extremists began a campaign of intimidation, kidnapping, and execution in the spring and summer of 2006, forcing the Shia residents out. Unlike Operations EAGLE SWEEP and GOLDEN EAGLE II, these clearing operations were conducted with the intention of holding the ground and securing Latifiyah, in order to enable the residents of Latifiyah to return to their homes. The 1-4-6 and TF 2-15 FA built static battle positions in Shaka and on August 18\textsuperscript{th}, they brought forty former residents of Latifiyah to inspect the damage to their homes and to prepare to return permanently.\textsuperscript{11}

2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion, 4\textsuperscript{th} Brigade

The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion, 4\textsuperscript{th} Brigade (2-4-6) has also partnered with the 2-15\textsuperscript{th} FA from Latifiyah north through Mahmudiyyah into the rural terrain separating Mahmudiyyah and Yusufiyah. Based the tempo, varied profile, and independence of 2-4-6 operations, it appears to be one of the more capable units in the brigade. The 2-4-6 has been responsible for operations against both AQI and JAM targets, particularly in Latifiyah where sectarian fighting has been intense, and plans and executes its own operations with US support.
In April 2007, the 2-4-6 launched a series of disruption operations, including Operations EAGLE LIGHTNING. Operation EAGLE LIGHTNING was a joint operation between the 2-4-6 and the 2-15th FA on April 16th to disrupt AQI operations in the aforementioned Shaka neighborhood of west Latifiyah, resulting in the detention of 33 suspected insurgents and the seizure of six weapons caches. The caches included an 14.5 mm heavy machine gun, a sniper rifle, five improvised explosive devices (IED), rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers and RPG rounds, loose ammunition, homemade explosives, an artillery round, grenades, AK-47s, and propaganda materials. On its own initiative, the 2-4-6 also seized a rocket cache in Mahmudiyah in late April.

The 2-4-6 continued disruption operations in May, launching Operation COMMANDO EAGLE RAZOR II, a joint air-assault with the 2-15th FA against Sunni insurgents near Al-QaaQaa, an area that had been targeted before by the 1-4-6.

Operation COMMANDO EAGLE, timed concurrent with Operation MARNE TORCH, a major MND-C operation to the east in Arab Jabour, was launched on June 21st, 2007. It included a mix of air assault and ground movements targeting AQI safe houses in the Mahmudiyah area, resulting in the seizure of several weapons caches and the detention of suspected insurgents. This operation was a joint mission between the 2-4-6 and their American partners.

In early July, 2-4-6 operations shifted slightly, with Operation EAGLE VENTURE IV, the construction of a static battle position in the farmland between Mahmudiyah and Yusufiyah. The battle position, manned jointly by the IA and the 2-15th FA, was intended to deny AQI transit through this area. It also functions as an operations center for US-Iraqi patrols in the area. They continued to conduct air assault operations with the aim of disrupting the activities of AQI-affiliates, including Operation EAGLE ARES, a night air assault with the 2-15th into an area east of Latifiyah that resulted in the detention of 14 known terrorists and 32 “persons of interest.”

The 2-4-6 has recently conducted operations against both JAM and AQI affiliates in Mahmudiyah and Latifiyah. On August 12th, they discovered an apparent JAM torture facility near Mahmudiyah and detained 6 suspected JAM members. Improved relations with local residents east of Latifiyah resulted in Operation EAGLE DIVE III, an operation driven by local tips that rescued four Sunni men from Al Qaeda in Iraq.

In an encouraging episode, the 2-4-6 responded to a rocket attack on their compound in Mahmudiyah on August 24th by dispatching a patrol to investigate. They discovered additional rockets, of Iranian origin, and dismantled the timing devices without the assistance of American explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians. A quick reaction force (QRF) from the 2-15th FA was placed on alert, along with an EOD team, but the Iraqi unit was able to handle the situation without any American support or assistance.

The 2-4-6 has been able to independently plan and execute missions independently, and it has been able to conduct some operations without American QRF or EOD assistance. The geographic scope of 2-4-6 operations suggests that the American partner unit feels confident in working with the 2-4-6 in a variety of environments. The conduct of air assault missions suggests that the tactical skills of 2-4-6 enlisted soldiers and non-commissioned officers are decent, as these missions usually occur at night under conditions that call for good small-unit leadership. The ability to handle EOD missions independently is significant; EOD requires additional technical skills that some Iraqi units, including other elements of the 6th IA, lack. Operating in areas of sectarian tension, the 2-4-6 has executed missions against both Sunni and Shia targets, although the August raid on the JAM torture facility was not planned in advance.
**3rd Battalion, 4th Brigade**

Known as the “Mountain Lions,” the 3rd Battalion, 4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army (3-4-6) was more active in early 2007; they do not appear to have played a role in any operations since April. Partnering with a variety of units, including the 2-14th Infantry (Golden Dragons), the 1-18th Infantry, and the 1-89th Cavalry (Wolverines), elements of the 3-4-6 participated in operations in Baghdad, in Rashid, and to the south in Yusufiyah and Mahmudiyah.

In January, soldiers from the 3-4-6 accompanied the 2-14th Golden Dragons on a mission in southwest Mahmudiyah. Several days later they accompanied the 1-89th Cav. and the 1-18th Infantry on two raids in the Dora neighborhood of the Rashid district of Baghdad, but there is no evidence that the 3-4-6 took the lead in planning or executing the mission. 21

The 3-4-6 appears to be less capable than either the 1st, 2nd, or 4th battalions. In January, a MiTT (Military Transition Team) from the 1-89th Wolverines provided basic medical training to the battalion, which lacks organic medics and apparently has difficulty obtaining basic medical supplies. 22 Reliance on US forces for medical support places serious constraints on the ability of this battalion to operate independently.

While they have participated in a variety of operations alongside US forces, there is little evidence that they have taken the lead in planning or executing operations. While the spokesman for the 2nd BCT, 10th Mtn. argued that the 3-4-6 was “fully integrated” into Operation WOLVERINE ALESI A, an ongoing operation in February to secure Yusufiyah, other operations touted as joint have actually included only token Iraqi presence. 23 In particular, the 2-14th Golden Dragons carried out an air assault operation south of Az-Zaidon on February 3rd with 3-4-6 participation, but only four soldiers from the 3-4-6 participated. 24 Of these four soldiers, one had air assaulted with American forces seven times. 25

The 3-4-6 did conduct an independent operation in Yusufiyah in February, seizing several IEDs and IED-making materials. 26 There is no record of operational activity in March, but the 3-4-6 did partner with the 1-89th Wolverines in Khatad in late April to conduct a basic medical engagement, and it participated in Operation TRIDENT IV with the 2-14th in Shubayshen south of Baghdad, a cordon and sweep operation that resulted in the seizure of IED materials. 27

There is no record of 3-4-6 participation in recent operations. It is possible that the 3-4-6, lacking a consistent US partner, has received less training from US forces than other battalions in the 4-6th.

**4th Battalion, 4th Brigade**

The 4th Battalion, 4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army (4-4-6) has been partnered with the 4-31st Infantry (“Polar Bears”) since September of 2006 in the area around Yusufiyah. Commanded by Colonel Aman Ibrahim Mansur, the 4-4-6 took control of 75 square miles of battlespace around Yusufiyah in May 2007 and may be the most capable battalion in the brigade. 28 The commander of the 4-31st Infantry has said that the 4-4-6 is the best Iraqi army unit he has worked with. 29

The 4-4-6 has been a model for the strategy of partnering US and Iraqi units, rather than relying on embedded MiTT teams. The two units have been co-located, with 4-31st Polar Bears providing training in air-assault and river-borne operations, civil affairs and humanitarian missions, and weapons and communications. 30 In addition to schoolhouse training, the 4-31st and the 4-4-6 have conducted joint operations. Initially, these missions had a training as well as an operational function; the 4-4-6 was in a position to observe American tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) in a live-fire environment. As the 4-
4-6 became more proficient in carrying out operations, it took the lead in planning and executing operations, while the American partner unit fell back into an assistance/advisory role. 31

Operating from a series of patrol bases in and around Yusufiyah, the 4-4-6 and the 4-31st have conducted a series of operations that have only increased in intensity since the disappearance of two US soldiers in May near Yusufiyah. In April, they launched Operation POLAR DIVE, a joint operation targeting an IED-making cell in Shubayshen south of Baghdad. 32 A joint raid later in the month targeted an apartment complex in Mahmudiyah, yielding a cache of rocket munitions with Iranian markings. The targets of the raid were taken into Iraqi Army custody. 33 4-4-6 soldiers, operating independently, also discovered a series of IEDs near Yusufiyah in late April. 34 In a recent operation, POLAR SCHISM III, the 4-4-6 participated in an air assault with the 4-31st targeting the leaders of an insurgent cell with knowledge of the May kidnappings. As the target of the air assault was a mosque, the US forces established a perimeter, while Iraqi forces cleared the target and detained several insurgents. 35

Operation POLAR SCRUM, a sweep operation in early May, discovered an IED near Yusufiyah. While this is not uncommon, local residents tipped off the joint US-Iraqi patrol to the presence of insurgents nearby, who were then detained. 36 This is consistent with the population-centric strategy of the new counterinsurgency manual (FM3-24), in which human intelligence from local residents is critical to identifying insurgent forces and separating them from the population. Soldiers of the 4-31st have said that the flow of human intelligence has picked up substantially in 2007, as the US forces and their Iraqi counterparts moved out into patrol bases and engaged with the local population. 37

This engagement has included a number of civil affairs operations in which 4-4-6 soldiers and medical personnel and 4-31st soldiers have provided medical care to residents of Karguli, near Arab Jassim, and Hayy Al-Jazair, near Mahmudiyah. 38 In the latter operation, the Iraqis took the lead and US personnel assisted only when required. These engagements have generated positive feedback from tribal leaders and local residents, and there has been some intelligence payoff. 39 Organic medical capabilities within Iraqi units are thus dual-purpose. They improve the combat capabilities of Iraqi units by enabling them to operate independent of US support, and more importantly, they allow the Iraqi Army to build relationships and goodwill with the local population.

Like US units to the west in Al-Anbar, the 4-31st has worked hard to improve relations with tribal leaders in the area around Yusufiyah. In mid-July, a tribal sheikh near Yusufiyah was kidnapped by a rival affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq. He escaped and made contact with 4-4-6 forces, who escorted him to Patrol Base Shanghai in Yusufiyah. After questioning him about his detention, the 4-4-6 and the 4-31 launched a joint raid to detain the AQI affiliate. 40 Just as the excesses of AQI in Al-Anbar and Diyala provinces laid the basis for a tribal rebellion against them, the tribes of the Yusufiyah region may be turning to support US and Iraqi Army forces. 41

5th Battalion, 4th Brigade

The 5th Battalion, 4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division (5-4-6) partnered with the 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry, 4th BCT, 25th ID from January through May of this year, but there is no operational record for the 5-4-6 since then. Recent accounts of 1-40th operations south of Baghdad suggest minimal involvement by Iraqi Army units, raising questions about the effectiveness of the 5-4-6.

In January and February, the 5-4-6 conducted joint raids and patrols with the 1-40th Cavalry in Mulla Abbud and Hawr Rajab, south of Baghdad. 42 These raids were part of Operation LION’S ROAR, aimed at ending sectarian fighting south of Baghdad. In March, they led a series of raids, including Operation WHITE ROCKETS, targeting insurgents in Bin Mohammed and in Arab Jabour. 43
In April, they conducted Operation YUKON RIVER with the 1-40th Cavalry, a clearing operation in Adwaniyah. These operations resulted in the detention of five insurgents and the seizure of several weapons caches. Since May, Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) has provided no additional information about the activities of the 5-4-6. A recent extensive profile of 1-40th Cavalry, the partner unit for the 5-4-6, makes only passing mention of Iraqi Army forces, depicting Iraqi soldiers as passive participants. In fact, the profile suggests that the 1-40th Cavalry has turned to local provisional security forces provided by tribal leaders in order to stabilize its area of operations around Hawr Rajab. This suggests that the 5-4-6 has either been redeployed, without public notice, or that it has proven an ineffective partner for US forces in this area.

Conclusions and Challenges

The 4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army provides a good snapshot of the challenges facing the Iraqi Army. There are elements of the brigade that are highly capable, namely the 1st, 2nd and 4th battalions. They are capable of planning and executing operations independently. They can operate without quickly calling in US QRF or close air support (CAS). The 2nd has organic EOD capabilities and the 4th has organic medical capabilities for both combat and civil affairs missions. They have the tactical proficiency to conduct a wide variety of movements, including air assaults on US helicopters. They have operated against both rogue JAM and AQI targets. They have received high praise from their US partners. The sectarian influence that has rendered other brigades in the 6th IA combat ineffective is not a major problem.

There are, however, elements of the brigade that have a mixed record, or about which there is insufficient evidence to make any judgments. The 3rd and 5th battalions have a sparse and dated operational record. In the case of the 3rd battalion, available reporting suggests that Iraqi participation in joint operations may have been minimal, and as of January, it lacked even basic medical supplies and personnel. There is no recent evidence to suggest that this situation has changed. At the very least, these units have played no public role in coalition operations over the summer.

Several units in the 4-6th have made significant progress over the last year as they have partnered with elements of the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division. This BCT has extended its deployment until December, at which time the partner units for the 4-6th will begin rotating out of Iraq. The ability of the Iraqi forces to manage this transition, whether or not they are paired with new US units, will be a key test of their operational readiness and capabilities.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
5 Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable w/Col. Robert Morschauser. August 8th, 2007
9 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
31 Ibid.


