Authors: Grace Mappes, Kelly Campa, and Karolina Hird, with Nicholas Carl

Data cutoff: 10:00 AM ET, July 29

Key takeaways:

• Russia launched another communications satellite into orbit for Iran as part of the countries’ growing space relationship. This Russian support likely represents the limit of military-adjacent assistance that the Kremlin is currently prepared to provide Iran with.
• The PRC has become primarily responsible for sustaining the Russian drone industry, as PRC parts have become irreplaceable components in Russian drone development, production, and operation. North Korea and Iran have continued to provide critical support to the Russian drone industry as well.
• Russia and North Korea have continued to increase their logistical and transit connections. This underscores the strategic partnership that Moscow and Pyongyang have been developing since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
• Belarus and other authoritarian states have indicated interest in acquiring PRC technologies related to social control and internal security. This highlights the role that the PRC plays as an exporter of techno-authoritarianism.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks to exploit the US interest in economic cooperation with the PRC to portray himself as a peacemaker and secure concessions on the war in Ukraine.

Defense and Military-Technical Cooperation

Russia launched another communications satellite into orbit for Iran as part of the countries’ growing space relationship. The Iranian Space Agency announced that Russia launched the Nahid-2 satellite into orbit from the Vostochny Cosmodrome on July 25 and that Iran has received data from the satellite.[1] The Iranian Space Agency director said that Iran is using the satellite to establish broadband communications across the country and test its ability to transmit information on the Ku frequency band, which would enable Iran to transmit data faster and on a greater scale.[2] Iran could use this ostensibly civilian satellite for military communications and systems networking.[3] Russia has now launched five satellites into orbit for Iran since August 2022. Moscow and Tehran have additionally agreed to jointly produce Khayyam satellites, which Iran uses for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).[4] This Russian support to the Iranian space program likely represents the limit of defense-adjacent assistance that the Kremlin is currently prepared to provide. Russia has failed to provide meaningful political and military support to Iran in recent weeks despite Iranian requests and the extensive provision of lethal military equipment to support the Russian war against Ukraine.[5] The Russian ability to give Iran material support at any meaningful scale outside the space program is severely constrained since the Kremlin has committed virtually all its weapons and other military equipment to the war against Ukraine. Russia has likely offered Iran technical support to its space program to partially compensate Tehran.

Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cooperation 

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become primarily responsible for sustaining the Russian drone industry. Reuters published an investigative report on July 23 detailing how PRC companies have made drone engines and covertly shipped them to Russian military manufacturers—namely the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant, which is a subsidiary of the Russian state-owned Almaz Antey military industrial giant.[6] PRC companies have labeled the drone engines as “industrial refrigeration units” to hide their actual military purpose, according to Reuters. Russia has used those engines to scale up its production of Garpiya-A1 one-way attack drones, which are reportedly a Russian version of the Iranian Shahed-type drones made with PRC parts.

Ukrainian intelligence sources told Reuters that Russian forces have used around 500 Garpiya-type drones per month against Ukrainian civilian and military targets. The Russian Defense Ministry published footage on July 22 purporting to show Garpiya-type drones striking Ukrainian equipment near Horlivka, Sumy Oblast—the first known footage of the Garpiya-type drone in operation.[7] A Russian Telegram channel posted footage on July 25 reportedly showing a Garpiya-type drone strike on Khortytsya Island in Zaporizhzhia City.[8] Russia is developing the more advanced Garpiya-3 at a factory in the PRC and with the help of PRC technicians.[9]

PRC-origin parts have become an irreplaceable component of the broader Russian drone industry. Ukrainian officials have warned in recent months that the PRC has increasingly provided material support to scale up Russian drone production. The PRC has included technologies that allow Russia to integrate artificial intelligence and machine learning abilities into some drones and extend the range of fiber-optic drones.[10] ISW recently reported that Russian forces have fielded a new reconnaissance and decoy drone that resembles the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 one-way attack drone but is comprised entirely of PRC-origin parts.[11] The drone can carry a warhead of up to 15 kilograms.[12] Russian forces have used the drone to detect and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses as part of larger strike packages. Almost half the components in these drones come from the PRC CUAV Technology Company, which is based in Guangdong Province and brands itself as specializing in “open-source unmanned systems technology.”[13] ISW has found that most PRC companies that send drone parts to Russia are based in Hong Kong and Guangdong Province, which is an electronics manufacturing hub.[14]

North Korea and Iran have continued to provide critical support to the Russian drone industry as well, helping Russia sustain its war against Ukraine. The Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) published a report on July 28 examining the state of the Russian DIB and the roles that the PRC, Iran, and North Korea play there.[15] The report classified PRC support to Russia as “indispensable,” noting that PRC-origin parts “dominate” Russian DIB imports. The report also found that North Korea has sent “hundreds of thousands of tons” of explosives and ammunition to Russia. North Korean ammunition shipments to Russia now account for nearly 40 percent of all Russian ammunition needs, according to Ukrainian military intelligence sources.[16] KSE noted that Iran has sent a smaller amount of ammunition to Russia via the Caspian Sea and that Iran has also provided Russia with the extensive drone capabilities that Russia uses daily.[17]

Economic and Financial Cooperation

Russia and North Korea have continued to increase their logistical and transit connections. The first direct commercial flight from Moscow to Pyongyang arrived on July 28.[18] The flight carried a delegation headed by Russian Natural Resources Minister Alexander Kozlov.[19] Russian state aviation regulator Rosaviatsia approved in early July 2025 Russian airline Nordwind to operate a direct Moscow-Pyongyang flight once a month.[20] North Korean External Economic Relations Minister Yun Jeong-ho described the launch of direct Russia-North Korean flights as evidence of deepening Russia-North Korea ties that will expand further.[21] Kozlov said that Russia and North Korea are expanding logistics links in all areas, including freight and passenger rail service and a road bridge across the international border along the Tumen River, and said that Russia is considering resuming commercial maritime routes with North Korea.[22]

Increased logistical interconnectivity underscores the strategic partnership that has developed between Russia and North Korea in recent years. Russia and North Korea have significantly increased bilateral cooperation since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. They signed a strategic partnership agreement, which includes a mutual defense clause, in June 2024.[23] Russian President Vladimir Putin has, in recent years, only increased his aggressive posturing toward Ukraine and the West while pursuing stronger cooperation with revisionist actors, such as North Korea. A Russian victory in Ukraine, including freezing the war along its current frontlines, would only highlight that the Kremlin could wage a full-scale illegal war, make provocative threats, and build ties with sanctioned actors with minimal resistance from the West. That lesson could embolden not only Russia but also North Korea—an outcome which could in turn fundamentally alter the security dynamics in the Korean Peninsula and the wider Indo-Pacific.

Belarus and other authoritarian states have continued to indicate interest in acquiring PRC technologies related to social control and internal security. Belarusian Internal Affairs Minister Ivan Kubrakov met with PRC Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong in Beijing on July 22.[24] Kubrakov said that Belarus was interested in learning from PRC efforts against organized crime, “extremism and terrorism,” and drug trafficking, with a particular focus on PRC video surveillance and “analysis” units.[25] The PRC continues to widely export techno-authoritarian tools to willing states seeking to maintain repressive control over their populations. Iranian imports of equipment from PRC surveillance companies spiked during the Mahsa Amini protests in late 2022, for example.[26] US officials alleged that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its paramilitary Basij forces used PRC facial recognition and video technologies to surveil and suppress protesters during the 2022 mass demonstrations.[27] The PRC benefits economically from its exports of tools of repression under the guise of helping states “maintain political security,” which Wang gave as the reason for the PRC-Belarusian meeting.[28]

It is unclear precisely which tools or technologies Belarus seeks to import from the PRC. Belarus has not faced considerable social unrest since widespread electoral protests in early 2021, but still relies on a robust internal security apparatus to maintain social control. Belarus relied upon Russian intervention to crack down on the protests, including the unconfirmed deployment of plainclothes Russian security forces to Belarus.[29] Belarus may seek to offset some of its reliance on Russia as its primary security partner through its engagement with the PRC and has generally attempted to diversify its diplomatic contacts with other authoritarian states since 2022. Kubrakov also called for increased PRC-Belarusian personnel training, likely referring to law enforcement or security forces.[30]

Belarus and the PRC have intensified security, defense, and economic cooperation since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Lukashenko recently met with Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping in Beijing in June 2025, during which Xi praised Belarus as a “true friend” of the PRC.[31] The two countries conducted combined military exercises for the first time in Belarus in 2024, shortly after Belarus joined the PRC and Russia-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).[32] Belarus has likely sought economic and logistical cooperation with the PRC in order to counterbalance its economic reliance on Russia. Increased PRC-Belarus cooperation on internal security issues is likely part of this wider Belarusian effort.

Belarus’s independent economic relationships with other members of the Adversary Entente ultimately benefit Russia and support Russia’s ability to continue fighting in Ukraine. Sino-Belarusian economic cooperation that reinforces the Belarusian economy bolsters Russia’s ability to leverage Belarus as a key sanctions evasion partner. Western sanctions do not target Belarus as strictly as Russia, and the Kremlin uses Belarus to procure sanctioned dual-use goods to support Russian operations in Ukraine.[33] Russia likely seeks to absorb the Belarusian defense industrial base and labor pool to further support Russian operations in Ukraine.[34]

Belarus has also broadened its relationship with Iran since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Iran-Belarus parliamentary friendship group—an official interparliamentary body that facilitates legislative diplomacy and bilateral ties between the two countries—met Belarusian Council of the Republic Speaker Natalia Kochanova in Minsk, Belarus, on July 24.[35] Belarusian parliamentary member Sergei Rachkov confirmed that Belarus seeks to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) in reference to Iran and Belarus’s April 2025 agreement to expand bilateral trade along the INSTC.[36] The INSTC, when completed, will allow Russia and Iran to engage in direct overland trade and avoid sea-based routes vulnerable to international sanctions.[37] Belarus likely seeks to expand trade of Belarusian goods in international markets through its involvement in the INSTC and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which signed a free trade agreement with Iran and went into effect in May 2025.[38] Belarusian-Iranian economic cooperation may also offset Belarus’s economic reliance on Russia but strengthen its economy, which will allow the Kremlin to use Belarus as a more effective sanctions evasion partner.

Political and Diplomatic Cooperation 

Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks to exploit US interest in economic relations with the PRC to portray himself as a peacemaker to the United States and secure concessions on the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on July 21 that it is “possible” that Putin and US President Donald Trump will meet in Beijing in September 2025 and that Putin is preparing to travel to Beijing, but that the Kremlin has not heard news that Trump will also travel to Beijing in September.[39] Peskov reiterated on July 28 that a meeting between Trump and Putin cannot be ruled out if Trump and Putin are in Beijing at the same time.[40] The Trump administration has signaled in recent days and weeks that it seeks to pursue a trade deal with the PRC in the near future. Russia appears to be seeking to capitalize on the shift in the United States’ immediate focus away from a Russia-Ukraine peace deal and an Iranian nuclear deal.[41] Putin likely hopes to use the US-PRC relationship to renew his effort to portray himself to Trump as a peacemaker after his failure to do so for the Iranian nuclear program and the 12-day Israel-Iran war, and therefore aims to improve US-Russian bilateral relations without pursuing a meaningful diplomatic peace in Ukraine.[42]

[1] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/03/3360817 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/765147; https://www irna dot ir/news/85896767/; https://www irna dot ir/news/85896767/; https://www irna dot ir/news/85896534/; https://www irna dot ir/news/85896762/

[2] https://www irna dot ir/news/85896762/

[3] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf

[4] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-18-2025

[6] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/chinese-engines-shipped-cooling-units-power-russian-drones-used-ukraine-2025-07-23/

[7] https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/24717; https://t.me/mod_russia/54887

[8] https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/24792

[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-produces-new-kamikaze-drone-with-chinese-engine-say-european-intel-2024-09-13/; https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-secret-war-drones-project-china-intel-sources-say-2024-09-25/

[10] https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-july-25-2025

[12] https://war-sanctions.gur dot gov.ua/page-uav-4800

[13] https://www.cuav dot net/en/about-us-en/

[14] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Strengthening%20China-Russia%20Nexus.pdf

[15] https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/disassembling-russia-s-war-machine-new-kse-institute-report-exposes-chokepoints-in-russia-s-military-industrial-logistics/

[16] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-11/ukraine-spy-chief-says-40-of-russian-ammunition-is-north-korean?embedded-checkout=true

[17] https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/KSEInstitute_RussianMIC_2.pdf

[18] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24643245

[19] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24643245

[20] https://tass.ru/ekonomika/24643245

[21] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24642433

[22] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24642391; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24623039

[23] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-11-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120524;

[24] https://belta dot by/society/view/kitaj-zainteresovan-v-izuchenii-belorusskogo-opyta-v-borbe-s-kiberprestupnostjju-i-obmene-informatsiej-727798-2025; https://en.people dot cn/n3/2025/0723/c90000-20343953.html

[25] https://belta dot by/society/view/kitaj-zainteresovan-v-izuchenii-belorusskogo-opyta-v-borbe-s-kiberprestupnostjju-i-obmene-informatsiej-727798-2025

[26] https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-weighs-sanctions-for-chinese-companies-over-iran-surveillance-buildup-11675503914

[27] https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-weighs-sanctions-for-chinese-companies-over-iran-surveillance-buildup-11675503914

[28] https://belta dot by/society/view/kitaj-zainteresovan-v-izuchenii-belorusskogo-opyta-v-borbe-s-kiberprestupnostjju-i-obmene-informatsiej-727798-2025

[29] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%27s%20Quiet%20Conquest%20Belarus.pdf

[30] https://belta dot by/society/view/kitaj-zainteresovan-v-izuchenii-belorusskogo-opyta-v-borbe-s-kiberprestupnostjju-i-obmene-informatsiej-727798-2025

[31] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/eng./xw/zyxw/202506/t20250605_11641419.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-meets-with-lukashenko-all-weather-partner-belarus-2025-06-04/

[32] https://apnews.com/article/belarus-china-military-drill-poland-8558b0e413351caa89cfbb3c4441f016

[33] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%27s%20Quiet%20Conquest%20Belarus.pdf

[34] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%27s%20Quiet%20Conquest%20Belarus.pdf

[35] https://farsnews dot ir/MaryamKarami/1753354130539654281

[36] https://belta dot by/economics/view/rachkov-belarus-razvivaet-strategicheskoe-partnerstvo-s-iranom-728039-2025

[37] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf

[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russian-backed-union-free-trade-deal-with-iran-goes-into-effect-2025-05-15/

[39] https://tass dot ru/politika/24567883

[40] https://tass dot ru/politika/24645797

[41] https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/society-equity/us-democrats-republicans-plan-bills-pressure-china-trump-pushes-trade-2025-07-28/; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/several-us-executives-visit-china-this-week-sources-2025-07-28/; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-pauses-export-controls-bolster-china-trade-deal-ft-says-2025-07-28/; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-says-us-is-close-reaching-trade-deal-with-china-2025-07-27/

[42] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-9-2025