Toplines

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s official Telegram account implicitly instructed Iranian officials on August 28 to avoid making statements that highlight Iran’s worsening economic conditions, likely to prevent such statements from fueling public frustration against the regime.[1] It is unclear whether Mojtaba himself or individuals close to him operate Mojtaba’s Telegram channel, given reports that Mojtaba was seriously wounded or incapacitated during the war.[2] Mojtaba’s account issued a statement on August 28 that warned officials against using “disappointing speech” and artificial binaries such as “war or negotiation” and “compromise or warmongering.”[3] The account added that anything detrimental to social cohesion is prohibited.[4] These comments likely refer to recent statements by members of the pro-concessions camp, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who have recently publicly warned about Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions.[5] Pezeshkian stated on August 21 that “it would be better to end [the war] now.”[6] Ghalibaf warned on August 21 that Iran cannot endure, regardless of its military strength, if its population is hungry and the country lacks financial circulation, economic growth, and domestic production.[7]

Mojtaba’s Telegram account acknowledged that Iran faces inflation, unemployment, high prices, and other economic problems but emphasized that domestic production, “resistance economy” policies, and better economic management are the solutions to such problems.[8] This statement suggests that individuals close to Mojtaba support resisting US economic pressure instead of granting concessions to the United States in return for economic relief. Increasing domestic production and improving economic “management” are long-standing solutions that hardline officials have historically proposed to improve the Iranian economy, but these solutions have not translated into actual economic improvement.[9]

The Voice of Iran, an outlet historically tied to former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s office, similarly warned officials on August 25 against discussing Iran’s economic and social problems in ways that could “benefit the enemy.”^[10] The outlet also acknowledged that Iran is struggling with economic, infrastructure, social, and cultural problems but argued that Iranian officials should not highlight these issues in their public statements.^[11] It is unclear whether Voice of Iran currently reflects the views of Mojtaba’s inner circle. Mojtaba’s younger brother Massoud Khamenei has overseen, at least as of November 2025, the office responsible for preserving and publishing Ali Khamenei’s works and the media apparatus that publishes Voice of Iran.[12] It is unclear if Massoud still heads this office. The similarity between the outlet’s warning and Mojtaba’s message on August 28 may indicate that figures close to Mojtaba are trying to prevent worsening economic conditions from strengthening the position of pro-concessions camp officials who argue that Iran should make concessions to secure economic relief.

Pezeshkian reiterated the severity of Iran’s economic situation in an address to the Iranian public on August 28 that was broadcast shortly after Mojtaba’s account warned officials against discussing Iran’s poor economic conditions.[13] Pezeshkian linked Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions to the war, US sanctions, and the naval blockade.[14] It is unclear whether Pezeshkian delivered his address live or recorded it before Mojtaba’s account issued the warning, but the publication of his remarks after the warning is nevertheless noteworthy. Other members of Pezeshkian’s administration have highlighted Iran’s poor economic conditions with a seemingly increased sense of urgency in recent days. Iranian Vice President for Executive Affairs and adviser to Pezeshkian, Mohammad Jafar Ghaempanah, stated on August 28 that Iran should stop enrichment if doing so would prevent the United States from striking Iranian industries, roads, refineries, and electricity infrastructure, which he said would further increase unemployment.[15] Ghaempanah also warned on August 27 that disruptions to gasoline imports have made Iran’s fuel subsidy system unsustainable and implicitly argued for raising gasoline prices.[16]

The regime appears increasingly focused on preventing worsening economic grievances from producing renewed unrest, including by targeting alleged networks that helped drive the Winter 2025-2026 protests and reinforcing ties with traditionally pro-regime elements of Iranian society. The Iranian Intelligence Ministry announced on August 28 that it arrested 30 alleged leaders and participants of the December-January protests.[17] This new round of arrests is notable because the regime has not publicized large-scale arrests tied to that protest wave in recent months. The regime may be trying to preemptively disrupt networks and actors that could initiate renewed protests. The regime may also be using the most recent protest movement as a pretext to further securitize society, create fear among potential protesters, or disrupt small networks before they can develop into broader grassroots mobilization.

Basij Commander Hossein Taeb separately emphasized during a “Basij of Traders Week” meeting in Qom on August 28 that traders and bazaar merchants helped maintain social stability and prevent shortages during the recent wars.[18] Taeb’s emphasis on bazaaris is significant because the Winter 2025-2026 protests began among bazaar merchants despite this group’s traditional ties to the regime.[19] Taeb’s remark suggests that the regime is paying particular attention to groups and networks that previously helped transform economic grievances into broader unrest.[20] Taeb specifically sharing this message in Qom, which is home to an important pro-regime and clerical demographic, may also reflect a regime effort to reinforce support among social groups that the regime would normally expect to remain aligned with it.[21] Mojtaba’s August 17 appointment of Taeb as Basij commander tasked Taeb with strengthening the Basij’s “public information network” and expanding Basij networks among social groups and neighborhoods, including through mosque-centered activities.[22]

The United States reportedly rejected a proposal by five Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to pause their military operations for two years instead of fully disarming.[23] Multiple Iraqi sources told Iraqi Kurdish media on August 28 that the United States labeled the proposal a “trick.”[24] The United States has applied intense financial pressure on Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi to disarm the militias due to militia attacks on US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region in recent months.[25] The Iraqi federal government, in response, has set a September 30 deadline to restrict arms to the state and considered options such as integrating the militias into the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF is a state security service that already includes Iraqi militias who answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[26] The five Iraqi militias that reportedly submitted the proposal included Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, which have been the most kinetically active militias in recent months and are historically closest to Iran.[27]

One Iraqi source told Iraqi Kurdish media that the five Iraqi militias had initially offered to integrate into the PMF on an “individual basis” if the Iraqi Parliament passed a stalled bill to regulate PMF service and pensions, likely in reference to the draft PMF Service and Retirement Law.[28] Qatari media reported on August 25 that unspecified actors, likely referring to Zaydi’s administration, have made several amendments to the draft PMF law.[29] The PMF law likely refers to the Popular Mobilization Authority Law that former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew from parliament, reportedly due to US pressure.[30] The amended PMF law reportedly includes elements of the PMF Service and Retirement law, including provisions on retirement.[31] ISW-CTP assessed on August 26 that Zaydi is attempting to use the amended law to carry out a fundamental reform of the PMF that would consolidate his personal power as prime minister.[32] The Iraqi militias are unlikely to support this amended legislation, as it could fulfill US objectives regarding militia disarmament. The Iraqi Parliament is also unlikely to approve the amended law, given that parliamentarians affiliated with Iraqi militias that control PMF brigades are members of the parliamentary committee that must review and approve the draft law before Parliament can convene and vote on the law.[33]

The Iraqi federal government continues to affirm its September 30 disarmament deadline despite limited indications of progress toward disarming the Iraqi militias. Iraqi Commander-in-Chief Spokesperson Sabah Numan affirmed on August 28 the government’s commitment to applying laws, including the Counterterrorism law, to the use of weapons outside of the state after the deadline.[34] Iran and other Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have attempted to pressure the federal government to push back the deadline.[35] Numan also said that the militias have handed over half of their weapons thus far to the government.[36] It is virtually impossible for the federal government to verify this information given the covert nature of the militias. Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba have all continuously refused to disarm.[37] Other Iraqi militias providing weapons to the government have deliberately sought to circumvent the disarmament campaign, including by handing over inoperable weapons.[38] The main militias that have appeared to somewhat comply with the disarmament campaign, Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali, both announced their willingness to disarm on June 2, likely to lessen US opposition to their involvement in Iraqi politics.[39] Militia access to weapons from Iran and stockpiles left over in Syria, both of which aided militia attacks in March and April, further complicate the federal government’s ability to obtain accurate information on the type and quantity of militia weapons.[40] Numan noted on August 28 that the militias have surrendered some “locally manufactured and simple-to-use drones.”[41] Iraqi authorities arrested three individuals who operated a first-person view (FPV) drone factory in Baghdad on July 21.[42] The factory is likely located in an area of eastern Baghdad in which Kataib Hezbollah maintains a presence, highlighting the militias’ access to advanced drone technology.[43]