Tetiana Trach, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros with Jennie Olmsted and Jessica Sobieski

May 30, 2025, 9 AM 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on May 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the next Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Report. 

Russian recruiters continue to offer Russian recruits low-quality and ineffective military training before deploying them to Ukraine. A Russian military observer visited a Moscow Military District (MMD) training center and reported on May 18 that Russian contract servicemen undergo only a week-long basic military training and spend another two weeks in training centers in occupied Ukraine.[1] The observer stated that Russian instructors have limited combat knowledge and cannot adequately prepare servicemen for war. The observer stated that Russian recruits train in small groups of four to five men due to the continuous threat of Ukrainian drones and Russia’s inability to establish tactical air superiority. The observer stated that Russian military commanders expect recruits to know how to operate machine guns and mortars, conduct successful assaults on Ukrainian positions, recognize minefields, learn tactical medicine techniques, and familiarize themselves with radio communications. The observer stated that recruits would realistically need at least seven days to learn how to use one weapon and at least four days to learn engineering and assault techniques.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and its Main Directorate of Combat Training have not reprioritized improving military training since at least 2024. Russian milbloggers similarly observed in 2024 that recruits received 14 to 16 days of training, of which only four or five days constituted real training.[2] Russian milbloggers also observed in December 2024 that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov did not issue a decree formalizing training requirements and timeframes, meaning that Russian tactical training levels depend on whether a given unit received orders from operational-level groupings of forces (GOFs) commands.[3]

The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is reportedly not producing sufficient military equipment for recruit training. The observer stated that Russian training grounds lack military equipment for training purposes, such as machine guns and sights for grenade launchers. The observer attributed these equipment shortages to bureaucratic bottlenecks that emerged because the Russian MoD has failed to conclude long-term contracts with weapon manufacturers. The observer noted that Russian manufacturers are unwilling to risk scaling up their weapon production before obtaining contracts and implied that Russia’s high interest rate of 21 percent is further impeding independent weapon production initiatives.[4] The observer highlighted that the Russian 333rd Training Center in Mulino, Nizhny Novgorod, does not have a streamlined training methodology or competent instructors. The observer added that a Russian colonel stated several times during the visit that recruits “don’t need to be taught anything special” and that “if these [recruits] run out, [the military command] will send others.” The observer claimed that Russian units have serious shortages of electronic warfare (EW) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities at the company level.

Russian recruits appear to be suffering significant casualties because of poor training, equipment shortages, and systematic misuse of assault units in combat. A former Storm-Z instructor and milblogger claimed on April 13 that poor training of recruits is limiting Russia’s ability to conduct any other operations aside from “meat” assaults and that Russia is suffering high losses because the Russian military command does not have sufficient time to properly train recruits.[5] The Storm Z instructor also noted that Russian forces lack training for drone specialists and that the Russian military command is misusing such specialists as infantry.[6] Another milblogger complained that the Russian military’s commitment of junior officers and military specialists to assaults is reducing Russia’s training capacity and is eliminating junior Russian command staff.[7] The Russian milblogger observed that Russian military doctrine reserves assault operations for highly experienced personnel, as assault units often have to seize important infrastructure such as airports and military bases. The milblogger implied that poor training and ineffective military leadership diluted the function of assault units and degraded the appeal of service in specialized assault units.[8]

Russia is reportedly facing significant short- and long-term economic burdens because of a lack of allocated military equipment and a high number of casualties among Russian recruits. The observer estimated that the death of 15 Russian recruits from a single senseless assault without artillery or EW support costs the Kremlin around 225 million rubles ($2.8 million). The observer noted that this estimate does not include long-term state compensations over 15 to 20 years promised to families of deceased Russian servicemen. The observer argued that Russia’s economy would benefit if the Kremlin invested one billion rubles ($18.8 million) in division-level EW and SIGINT capabilities instead. The Kremlin offers heavily wounded Russian personnel up to four million rubles ($50,080) and compensates family members of deceased servicemen five million rubles ($62,600) in addition to other social and financial compensations.[9]

Key Takeaways:

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts

• Russian recruiters continue to offer Russian recruits low-quality and ineffective military training before deploying them to Ukraine.

Russian Force Centralization

• Russian officials indicated their intent to severely limit independent crowdfunding efforts as part of an ongoing force centralization campaign, an effort that may negatively impact Russia’s organic crowdfunding efforts that emerged in response to the Russian war in Ukraine.

Integration of Veterans into Russian Society

• Russian President Vladimir Putin may be setting information conditions to extend combat veteran statuses to the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) clergy who participated in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in apparent violation of world Orthodox canons.
• The Kremlin and high-ranking regional officials are using veteran appointments as a way to conduct a large-scale purge of Russian officials and businessmen who do not align with the Kremlin’s pro-war and ultranationalist objectives.

Militarization of Society and Youth

• Russian officials approved a textbook that will teach 8th and 9th-grade schoolchildren to operate drones.

Russian Command Changes and Chain of Command

• The Russian high military command reportedly removed a popular commander of an assault battalion fighting in southwestern Donetsk Oblast, sparking outrage among Russian servicemen and ultranationalists.

Russian Defense Industrial Base

• The Russian Defense Industrial Base (DIB) continues to scale up the modernization of optical systems and increase missile production amid ongoing sanctions, persistent quality issues, and manufacturing delays.

Russian Technological Adaptations

• Ukrainian officials and Russian milbloggers reported that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones armed with rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) warheads can now reach Kharkiv City and can operate over 40 kilometers into the rear.
• The Kremlin is attempting to create a new command and control system to improve interoperability among Russian air, space, and relevant cyberspace domain assets, likely in an effort to improve Russian systems’ interoperability and improve Russian defenses against Ukrainian long-range drone attacks.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Assessed Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization and undermining regime stability)

Russia is trying to increase combat manpower by deceiving Russians into signing military service contracts and increasing one-time enlistment bonuses. Russian opposition outlet Verstka, citing a source in the Moscow City mayor’s office, reported that Moscow City’s Yablochkova military recruitment center began recruiting men under false pretenses in May 2025 by offering them millions of rubles and jobs in the rear.[10] The source noted that Russians find these job offers through Russian job search engines and on the Russian “Avito” online advertisement board. Verstka found that these ads offered recruits to serve as humanitarian aid drivers, fortification builders, and law enforcement in occupied Ukraine, and that job advertisers affiliated with these job offers registered between March and May 2025. Two interlocutors from the Moscow City Mayor’s Office noted that these ads are a lie and that this is part of a military recruitment campaign facilitated by the Yablochkova military recruitment center. The sources also revealed that the Russian MoD then directed recruits to the Avangard military training center in Moscow Oblast where volunteers receive their combat assignments.

The Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug temporarily increased a one-time enlistment bonus on May 26 from 2.2 million rubles ($27,540) to 2.65 million rubles ($33,180).[11] The Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug introduced dynamic pricing until the end of July 2025. Recruits will receive a total of 3.2 million rubles ($40,065) with federal payments of 400,000 rubles ($5,007) and municipal payments of 150,000 rubles ($1,878).

Russian Force Centralization (Assessed Russian objective: Centralize the state’s control over informal volunteer-based units that emerged in early 2022 after the Kremlin failed to declare general mobilization)

Russian officials indicated their intent to severely limit independent crowdfunding efforts as part of an ongoing force centralization campaign, an effort that may negatively impact Russia’s organic crowdfunding efforts that emerged in response to the Russian war in Ukraine. Russian State Duma Committee on Civil Society Development Deputy Chairperson Olga Zanko announced at the Saint Petersburg International Legal Forum on May 20 that Russian officials are preparing to establish new special charitable accounts for collecting donations, which will formally allow the Russian government to prohibit the use of personal cards for crowdfunding efforts.[12] Zanko added that the new charitable cards will ensure transparency of crowdfunding efforts and will make it possible for the state to control the funds and monitor fraudulent schemes. Russian officials are likely introducing these measures to further centralize control over funds independently generated by Russian milbloggers and activists as part of the Kremlin’s campaign to reduce their influence in Russia and ensure regime stability.

A Kremlin insider source claimed that the proposed State Duma bill is the Kremlin’s attempt at changing the nature of civilian mobilization and crowdfunding amidst Russia’s war in Ukraine.[13] The insider source claimed that independent crowdfunding allows thousands of Russians to bypass bureaucratic procedures and procure equipment, clothing, and medicine for Russian forces. The insider source claimed that independent crowdfunding efforts are often faster and can supply individual military units more accurately than the Russian MoD. The insider source added that many crowdfunders are concerned that the new state-controlled crowdfunding mechanism will require the registration of crowdfunders as legal entities, which will automatically put an additional strain on Russia’s bureaucratic capacity. The insider source concluded that if Russian officials introduce such strict restrictions, then it would be a “blow” to a significant part of Russia’s pro-war civil society. Russian milbloggers who are involved with delivering military and humanitarian aid to the frontlines also interpreted this bill as an attack on Russian pro-war civil society.[14] ISW previously reported that Russian officials have begun introducing restrictions on independent equipment procurement and restricting Russian non-state volunteer organizations’ operations on the frontlines in an effort to monopolize Russian procurement processes.[15] Russian milbloggers involved with non-state volunteer organizations also tend to be more critical of the Russian government as they witness frontline realities, and it is likely that the Kremlin is trying to suppress their access to military units in the interests of regime stability.

The Russian military command reportedly introduced a new officer guide to commanding prisoner recruits in the Russian military. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) obtained and published a Russian officer training guide that seeks to educate Russian officers on working with prisoners and convicts.[16] The GUR claimed that the Russian MoD distributed the manual to deputy political officers to help them decipher prison tattoos, analyze nicknames and the prison hierarchy, and explain the behavior of influential prisoners. The GUR observed that the document recognizes that normal military protocol does not effectively work with commanding prisoners. The GUR added that the increased reliance on convicts in the Russian military resulted in an increase in internal conflicts and armed clashes between prisoners and other groups of military personnel. The GUR noted that the campaign to re-educate Russian officers to deal with convicts is part of the Kremlin’s force centralization campaign as it attempts to integrate convicts into the Russian military under different rules.

Integration of Veterans into Russian Society (Assessed Russian objective: Mitigate the risk of veterans emerging as a political group in a way that could erode the stability of the Russian state)

Russian President Vladimir Putin may be setting information conditions to extend combat veteran statuses to the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) clergy who participated in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in apparent violation of world Orthodox canons. Putin stated during a working visit to Kursk Oblast on May 20 that clergymen are in high demand during both peacetime and in combat.[17] Putin acknowledged that clergymen of almost all “traditional confessions” in Russia are currently serving in combat in Ukraine. Russia adopted the Yarovaya Law in 2016, which requires all religious organizations to register with the state, and Putin’s mention of “traditional confessions” refers to clergymen belonging to religious sects that the Russian government permits to exist in Russia.[18] Putin also stated that Russian clergymen are currently operating on the front lines, providing assistance in the rear, and participating in military operations. Russian State Duma officials previously proposed an amendment to the Russian “On Veterans” law that would give combat veteran status to clergy who performed religious services for more than four months in Ukraine or served in combat zones along Russia’s international border with Ukraine.[19] Granting clergymen combat veteran status would give them access to monetary and social benefits from the state but would contradict the 66th Apostolic Canon, which requires that any priest who kills a person (even accidentally or in self-defense) be defrocked.

The Kremlin accepted an additional 85 Russian veterans into the second cohort of the “Time of Heroes” program, which serves as a mechanism to select and appoint loyal veterans into positions of power. The official website of the “Time of Heroes” program announced on May 21 that the program selected 85 veterans who will undergo professional government training starting in June 2025.[20] The “Time of Heroes” website reported that 37 of the selected veterans applied during the first registration period in Spring 2024 and that 48 registered during the second registration cycle in November 2024 through January 2025. These timeframes suggest that it takes the Kremlin around a year to recruit and prepare veterans for government service.

The Kremlin continues to appoint loyal veterans to regional government positions via the “Time of Heroes” program. The official website of the “Time of Heroes” program announced on May 20 that another veteran and “Time of Heroes” participant, Vladimir Anisimov, became deputy head of the Nizhny Novgorod City Administration.[21] Nizhny Novgorod head and Anisimov’s mentor Yuri Shalabayev stated that Anisimov will oversee youth policy, promote military-patriotic education, and support Russian veterans and their families in his new position. The “Time of Heroes” website reported that Anisimov is the 42nd participant of the first “Time of Heroes” cohort to receive a political appointment. The “Time of Heroes” Telegram channel announced on May 26 that the Kremlin appointed Russian veteran and “Time of Heroes” participant Alexei Bondarev as director of the Russian Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Public Utilities’ Department of Strategic Programs.[22] Bondarev stated that his responsibilities include the implementation of strategic housing and utilities projects and the development of state policies for capital repairs of apartment buildings. Verstka reported that 23 of the 58 veterans who applied to participate in the United Russia regional parliamentary elections in Fall 2025 won their primaries.[23]

The Kremlin and high-ranking regional officials are using veteran appointments as a way to conduct a large-scale purge of Russian officials and businessmen who do not align with the Kremlin’s pro-war and ultranationalist objectives. Vologda Oblast Governor Georgy Filimonov fired the head of the Nyuksensky Municipal Okrug, Yulia Shevtsova, on May 19 after her daughter published a social media video in which she threatened to send a young man to fight in Ukraine on May 17.[24] Shevtsova’s removal followed outrage from local ultranationalists and milbloggers.[25] Filimonov stated that a Russian veteran from the regional “Time of Heroes” branch, “Heroes of Russian North,” will likely take over Shevtsova’s position.[26] Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on May 26 that the Kremlin is gradually marginalizing the old “business elite” by appointing veterans, repressing businessmen, and nationalizing businesses.[27] The SZRU reported that there is an ongoing conflict between Filimonov and the owner of Russian steel company Severstal, billionaire Alexei Mordashov. Filimonov reportedly accused Mordashov of “un-patriotism,” reduced investment in Severstal, and initiated a purge of local authorities affiliated with Severstal after banning the use of migrants for construction. The SZRU also implied that the Kremlin is replacing officials and businessmen with veterans in an effort to nationalize their businesses and riches. The SZRU reported that Russian law enforcement detained the founder of the Rusagro agricultural holding Vadim Moshkovich, and the CEO of the “Blago Invest” company, Dmitry Fosman, and arrested the owner of Moscow City’s Domodedovo airport, Dmitry Kamenshchik, as part of the nationalization campaign.

The Kremlin continued efforts to appease veterans and their families by offering them financial and social benefits at the expense of Russia’s budget and long-term economic stability. Russian state media outlet Izvestia reported on May 19 that the Russian State Duma is preparing a new package of social benefits for Russian veterans and their families, including increasing monthly allowances from 4,500 rubles to at least 20,000 rubles, lowering the retirement age to 60 years old for men and 55 years old for women, and granting free travel to rehabilitation and recreation centers.[28] Izvestia reported that the Committee on Family Protection, Fatherhood, Motherhood and Childhood Chairperson Nina Ostanina will discuss the implementation of proposed initiatives with Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister Anna Tsivileva at the end of May 2025. Izvestia reported that the State Duma is also discussing writing off mortgage loans and improving housing conditions for veterans’ families. Moscow Oblast Social Development Minister Andrey Kiryukhin announced on May 20 that Moscow Oblast will offer one-time annual payments of 24,000 rubles for taxi services to disabled veterans from July 1, 2025.[29] Putin also signed a law on May 23 establishing a quota for free college education for children of Russian veterans and signed a decree on May 21 issuing six percent annual preferential mortgage rates for families of Russian veterans with minors.[30]

Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov told Izvestia that the Kremlin will prioritize social security for Russian veterans over other government expenditures in 2024-2026. Committee on Labor, Social Policy and Veterans’ Affairs First Deputy Chairperson Elena Tsunaeva told Izvestia, however, that the State Duma failed to adopt several initiatives on social benefits to veterans due to federal funding shortages. A Kremlin insider source interpreted proposed social benefits to veterans as the Kremlin’s effort to build a new social system where military service is an important motivator and basis for state support and compensation.[31] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to balance stimulating volunteer recruitment and appeasing veterans and their families with the health of the Russian economy.

The Russian Ministry of Labor and Social Protection reportedly ordered more than 1.5 million combat veteran certificates for Russian servicemen and over 300,000 combat veteran certificates for families of deceased servicemen since 2022. Verstka calculated on May 27, using data from a Russian public procurement portal, that the Russian Ministry of Labor and Social Protection ordered more than 1.56 million certificates for combat veterans and 307,900 certificates for relatives of dead soldiers.[32] Verstka reported that certificate purchases skyrocketed in 2023 when the Ministry ordered over 1.05 million certificates for combat veterans and their families.[33] Verstka reported that the number of issued certificates plunged to 312,000 in 2024 and reached 357,000 in 2025.[34] Verstka reported that 16 Russian federal agencies are in charge of distributing combat veteran certificates, including the Russian Ministry of Labor, MoD, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and Rosgvardia. Verstka added that relatives of Wagner Group soldiers have struggled to obtain certificates and the state benefits associated with veteran status.

Militarization of Society and Youth: (Assessed Russian objective: Condition Russian society and youth for military service and raise societal support for Russian war efforts)

The Kremlin continues to invest in and expand military-patriotic education in Russia and occupied Ukraine to militarize children and youth. Putin met with the Board Chairman of Rusnano, a Russian state nanotechnology company, Sergey Kulikov, on May 21 and discussed the company’s performance and contributions to federal education.[35] Kulikov noted that Rusnano holds a non-profit fund for educational programs that work closely with hundreds of institutions, 2.5 million schoolchildren, and school leagues. Kulikov stated that Rusnano is synchronizing the fund’s outreach with the Movement of the First—a Russian youth movement aimed at promoting military-patriotic education in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Kulikov stated that Rusnano oversees 40 scientific schools and majors and has launched a federal entrepreneurial project for 800,000 students across 430 universities. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko also reported to Putin on May 22 that the Russian government will sponsor one billion rubles ($1.7 million) worth of summer camp vacations in Russia and occupied Ukraine for 175,000 children of Russian servicemen and over 5.8 million children.[36]

Russian officials approved a textbook that will teach 8th and 9th-grade schoolchildren to operate drones. Russian drone development company Geoskan told Russian newswire TASS that Russian officials granted federal approval as an official textbook to a school manual on unmanned aircraft systems (UAVs) designed for children in 8th and 9th grades.[37] Geoskan reported that Geoskan published the manual jointly with the Russian pedagogical publishing company Prosvescheniye, and TASS observed that Russian schools may now procure this textbook. TASS added that this textbook is part of the Kremlin’s “Personnel for UAVs” federal project that aims to attract young people to drone operations. Geoskan reportedly designed the textbook to support the mandatory labor and technology school subject in Russia as part of the UAV module.

Russian Desertion Reduction Measures (Assessed Russian objective: Reduce desertion rates among Russian servicemen by intensifying punishments and expanding law enforcement’s authority)

Russian officials reportedly recorded nearly 50,000 cases of desertion between early 2022 and late 2024. A Russian Telegram channel posted in December 2024 a leaked database with the names of over 26,000 Russian soldiers who deserted from Southern Military District (SMD) units.[38] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted in March 2025 another database listing 36,000 names of Russian military personnel whom the Kremlin prosecuted on charges of desertion.[39] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (IStories) verified these datasets and reported on May 20 that at least 49,000 Russian servicemen abandoned their units without authorization.[40] IStories noted that the list does not accurately reflect the number of desertions among Russian personnel, as at least 300 listed people were later identified as captured, killed in action (KIA), or missing in action (MIA). IStories reported that Russian soldiers appear on the list largely in cases of leaving frontline positions, escaping from military units, and refusing to return to service after treatment. Ukrainian OSINT community Frontelligence Insight calculated in March 2025, citing confidential data from the Russian MoD obtained by the Inform Napalm OSINT community, that the number of Russian deserters reached 50,554 as of December 15, 2024.[41]

Russian Command Changes and Chain of Command (Russian command appointments, dismissals, and casualties among senior Russian military commanders)

The Russian high military command reportedly removed a popular commander of an assault battalion fighting in southwestern Donetsk Oblast, sparking outrage among Russian servicemen and ultranationalists. A serviceman of the 139th Separate Assault Battalion (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) recorded a video appeal to Putin in which he revealed that he had abandoned his unit after Russian “Vostok” Group of Forces (GoF) Commander Lieutenant General Andrey Ivanayev and EMD Deputy Commander – Military-Political Work Directorate Chief Lieutenant General Roman Grekov dismissed the battalion’s commander, Alexei Kvachkov.[42] The serviceman stated that Kvachkov was highly respected in the battalion and prioritized preserving the lives of Russian servicemen. The serviceman stated that Ivanayev and Grekov replaced Kvachkov with Kurabek Karayev, who reportedly has a suspended sentence for exceeding his responsibilities and has a close relationship with EMD and Vostok GOF leadership.[43] The serviceman alleged that Karayev steals equipment and funds raised via crowdfunding efforts and embezzles funds allocated for Russian servicemen. The serviceman also accused Karayev of sharing his profits with Ivanayev, Grekov, and other senior military leadership. The Russian MoD attributed the seizure of numerous settlements to the 139th Separate Assault Battalion in the Summer and Fall of 2024, often using the unit in state media propaganda reports.[44] ISW last observed elements of the 139th Separate Assault Battalion operating near Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[45] The Russian military command previously dismissed and arrested popular 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Commander Major General Ivan Popov after he expressed grievances against the Russian military command in July 2023.[46]

Russian milbloggers indicated that the issue of embezzlement is a systematic problem among Russian military commanders across different sectors of the frontline. Two prominent Russian milbloggers complained that there are frequent reports that “red commanders” (likely a nickname for corrupt commanders) are extorting humanitarian aid and volunteer-provided equipment from Russian servicemen to benefit their interests or out of fear that cooperation with volunteers would threaten their command position.[47] The two milbloggers observed reports that the Russian military command extorted volunteer-provided humanitarian aid from units of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and are preparing to commit servicemen who received the aid to assault operations on the eastern flank of the Kupyansk direction near Stepova Novoselivka.

Russian Defense Industrial Base (Assessed Russian objective: Increase Russia’s defense industrial base production to support Russian war efforts)

The Russian Defense Industrial Base (DIB) continues to scale up the modernization of optical systems and increase missile production amid ongoing sanctions, persistent quality issues, and manufacturing delays. An OSINT analyst posted an extensive investigation on May 19, citing leaked Russian confidential documents, into the current operation and expansion efforts of the Russian defense conglomerate Rostec and its key holding Shvabe, which produces optical-electronic technology for the Russian military.[48] The OSINT analyst reported that Shvabe is intensifying modernization efforts of various optical systems and is working on developing laser counter-drone systems and integrating UAVs into tank fire control systems. The analyst cited the investigative group InformNapalm reporting that Shvabe has been circumventing international sanctions by purchasing critical components and industrial equipment through intermediary firms, including those of Chinese origin. The OSINT analyst reported that Russian defense companies are incrementally expanding the production of military equipment despite Western sanctions, manufacturing delays, and quality control issues.

The private analytics company Dallas similarly reported on May 20 that the Russian MoD is increasing missile production (missile type unspecified) up to 1,000 missiles per year despite large-scale sanctions against Russia.[49] (Russia reportedly produced Kh-101 missiles at a rate of 600 missiles per year in Summer 2024, for example.)[50] Dallas reported that the Russian MoD invested $270 million into the refurbishment of six additional Tu-95 strategic bombers. Dallas reported that the Kazan Aviation Plant is launching a large-scale modernization and manufacturing campaign for all Russian strategic bombers, including Tu-160 and Tu-22M. Dallas estimated that the Russian strategic bombing fleet could grow by nearly two dozen aircraft within the next few years, boosting Russia’s bomber sortie rate and air-launched cruise missile firing capacity to over 100 missiles. Dallas stressed that Russia is bolstering its missile production capabilities as part of larger preparations for a potential conflict with NATO.

Russia is reportedly discussing joint weapons and military equipment production with 20 countries and has signed over 20 weapon export agreements since early 2025. The head of Russia’s military exports state agency Rosoboronexport, Alexander Mikheev, stated on May 21 that Rosoboronexport is actively involved in more than 100 technological projects worth over $30 billion for joint military production with 20 countries from Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region, Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia.[51] Mikheev stated that projects provide for the joint production and licensing of small arms and ammunition; air defense systems; helicopters, including Ka-226T; Su-57E fighter jets; aircraft engines; the latest aviation weapons; Orlan-10E, Orlan-30, and Orion-E drones; Kub loitering munitions; and anti-drone electronic warfare (EW) equipment. The CEO of Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, Sergey Chemezov, claimed on May 20 that Russian weapon export orders have exceeded $60 billion and reached a record high in 25 years.[52] Chemezov stated that Rosoboronexport has signed more than 20 major contracts worth $7 billion with over 15 countries since 2025. Putin stated during the Committee on Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States on May 23 that Russia must increase its exports of domestically produced military equipment and strengthen military-technological cooperation with other states as part of the long-term modernization effort of the Russian Armed Forces and Navy.[53]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Assessed Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Ukrainian officials and Russian milbloggers reported that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones armed with rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) warheads can now reach Kharkiv City and can operate over 40 kilometers into the rear. Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported on May 20 that an unidentified Russian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) struck the forest belt in Shevchenkivskyi Raion in Kharkiv City.[54] A Ukrainian serviceman claimed on May 20 that it was a Russian FPV drone armed with an RPG warhead.[55] Terekhov later revealed in his weekly report on May 26 that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City with an FPV with an RPG warhead for the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that such drones are a new “insidious” threat to the city. Terekhov added that Russian forces are using FPV drones with RPGs to find weak spots in the city’s defense.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 20 and 21 that “regular” FPV drones are now able to reach Kharkiv City and implied that some Russian FPV drones have increased their flight ranges to over 40 kilometers, which enabled them to reach Kharkiv City, western Donetsk Oblast, and Zaporizhzhia City.[57] Ukrainian military journalist Andriy Tsapliyenko reported on May 18 that Russian drones have been successfully striking targets on the T0514 highway between Kramatorsk and Dobropillya — over 40 kilometers from Russian positions.[58] Tsapliyenko hypothesized that Russian forces could be using a large drone flying at high altitudes, which then releases fiber-optic FPV drones; that Russian forces are using improved EW-resistant Molniya model “cruise FPV drones” or that Russian forces are using new EW-resistant Tyuvik drones with an advanced autonomous homing system and flight range of over 30 kilometers.

Russian forces reportedly used the new drone-launched Banderol missiles at least 20 times in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on May 24 and 27 that Ukrainian forces observed Russian forces use new air-launched Banderol missiles in southern Ukraine at least 20 times, which Ukrainian forces assessed could strike targets at a range of 310-to-320-kilometers.[59] Voloshyn added that Banderols are dangerous because they have a powerful explosive of around 150 kilograms and a high speed of 480 to 680 kilometers per hour. The GUR previously reported that the Russian MoD-sponsored Kronstadt enterprise developed a new S8000 Banderol cruise missile, which can be carried by the Russian Orion UAV.[60]

Russian defense manufacturers presented new anti-drone systems and modifications of Russian UAVs at the MILEX 2025 international weapons and military equipment forum in Minsk, Belarus, on May 21. Rostec presented on May 21 four new anti-drone cartridges—IGLA 30, 50, 100, and Tracer 75—at the MILEX-2025 forum in Minsk.[61] Rostec also reportedly presented a new 45-kilogram radar station that detects medium UAVs within 7.5 kilometers and can be placed on building facades or transported by all types of vehicles.[62] The radar station is reportedly a part of the large-scale airspace control system (ATSC) comprising up to 24 radio stations capable of tracking up to 20 air targets (drones and small aircraft) simultaneously and transmitting data to air defense and EW systems. Russia also reportedly presented a new Lancet-E loitering munition that can carry Izdelie 51-E, Izdelie 52-E, and Z-16-E guided munitions.[63]

The Russian state United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) reportedly introduced a new air-to-air missile system. Online defense and security magazine Army Recognition reported on May 19 that the UAC integrated the KS-172 air-to-air, long-range missile system into the MiG-31 interceptor aircraft.[64] Army Recognition quoted Russian military analyst Konstantin Sikov as stating that the KS-172 system is more compact than the previous R-37M missile and has a range of 400km.[65]

The Kremlin is attempting to create a new command and control system to improve interoperability among Russian air, space, and relevant cyberspace domain assets, likely in an effort to improve Russian systems’ interoperability and improve Russian defenses against Ukrainian long-range drone attacks. Russian state media outlet RBC reported on May 22 that Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation system and the Russian state National Technological Initiative (NTI) Corporation developed a draft concept for creating a system called the “Digital Sky of Russia,” which would establish a single network and information technology system for Russian air, space, and related cyberspace systems.[66] RBC reported that the “Digital Sky of Russia” seeks to make interoperable currently unconnected air, space, and drone systems and disjointed regulatory frameworks into a single artificial intelligence- and human-operated system for the transmission and processing of satellite and drone data. The initiative also envisions the creation of a new type of law to regulate unmanned aircraft and create unified inter-industry government regulations on the usage of unmanned aircraft. Russia’s current satellite and airborne sensor systems are not fully interoperable, and Russian air and space traffic control does not uniformly regulate Russia’s air, space, and relevant digital communications. RBC reported that Russian developers are planning to complete and submit the project proposal to Russia’s Ministry of Transport, Roscosmos (Russian space corporation), the Ministry of Economic Development, and other agencies by July 16, 2025.

A GLONASS official told RBC that the new “Digital Sky of Russia” system proposes to create a Russian low-orbit satellite constellation, hybrid communication networks, a trusted information exchange environment, and use artificial intelligence to develop secure communications with unmanned vehicles. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is trying to improve interoperability among spaceborne and airborne assets, including drones, while improving Russian defenses against Ukrainian long-range drone attacks.

Russian Demographic Problems (Assessed Russian objective: Fix persistent demographic problems by incentivizing immigration, disincentivizing emigration, and promoting pronatalist policies to support long-term force generation and economic initiatives)

Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) is reportedly trying to conceal Russia’s ongoing demographic problems. A Russian independent demographer reported on May 19 that Rosstat has abstained from publishing detailed data on Russia’s demography since March 2025.[67] The demographer noted that a monthly Rosstat report published on May 16 excludes all regional statistics and presents only cumulative data on the number of births and deaths in Russia since 2025.[68] The demographer reported that Russia’s birth rate plunged to a historic low between January and March 2025, which stands in sharp contrast with official Rosstat’s reports of a consistently growing birth rate. The demographer noted that Rosstat had already concealed mortality rate statistics in Russia in March 2022, shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The demographer added that Rosstat previously concealed all data on causes of death in 2024 in an effort to obscure data on Russian army losses.

Combined Military Exercises (Russian objective: Improve interoperability among Russia and its allies and partners, expand Russia’s global military influence, and support Russia’s information operations about Russia’s conventional military capabilities)

The Russian Pacific Fleet recently participated in the International Naval Exhibition LIMA 2025 and completed its stay in Malaysia.[69] The Russian MoD announced on May 22 and May 27 that the Russian Pacific Fleets’ Rezky and Aldar Tsydenzhapov corvettes participated in the International Naval Exhibition LIMA 2025 on the Langkawi Island in Malaysia.[70] The Russian MoD reported that Russian Navy Deputy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Vorobyov met with senior Malaysian military and defense officials and discussed the prospects for Russian-Malaysian cooperation in the naval field. The Russian MoD reported on May 27 that the Russian Pacific Fleet’s corvettes completed their stay in Malaysia as part of the exhibition. The Russian MoD reported that Russian ships practiced maneuvering in the wake and front formations and diverging from the joint formation to the established angles with the support of deck helicopters.

Russian State Recognition of Officers and Military Units: (Assessed Russian objective: Honor specific Russian units for service, achievements, and hardships in Ukraine and incentivize service in distinguished units)

Republic of Chechnya officials are continuing to give awards to Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s 17-year-old son, likely as part of Kadyrov’s efforts to establish his son as his successor. Chechen State Television and Radio Company Grozny reported on May 21 that Kadyrov’s son, Adam Kadyrov, received the Rosgvardia’s Akhmat-Krepost special police unit (OMON) medal for his contributions to the development of Chechnya’s Rosgvardia.[71] Adam received this award only 10 days after he received a medal for the 25th anniversary of the OMON Akhmat-Grozny on May 12.[72] Adam Kadyrov has been reportedly involved in multiple scandals, including the assault of a detained man accused of burning a Quran.[73] Ramzan Kadyrov has appeared to favor Adam as his successor over the older son Akhmat, giving Adam preferential military appointments, including the post of Secretary of Chechnya’s Security Council, as recently as April 2025.[74] Kadyrov expressed his desire on May 5 to resign from his post but acknowledged that only Putin has the authority to make that decision.[75] A Russian insider source claimed on May 23 that Kadyrov made the resignation statement shortly after Putin overtly distanced himself from Kadyrov when the Chechen leader began advocating for Adam’s succession. It is currently unclear how serious Kadyrov is about this request, as Kadyrov has periodically expressed his desire to resign as Chechen Republic head since 2016 and has consistently walked back from these statements.[76]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/glockmeister_lj/3851 ; https://t.me/glockmeister_lj/3852 ; https://t.me/glockmeister_lj/3853

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024

[4] https://www.cbr dot ru/eng/press/keypr/#:~:text=On%2025%20April%202025%2C%20the,to%20decline%2C%20although%20remaining%20high.

[5] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2304

[6] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2388

[7] https://t.me/filatovcorr/4933

[8] https://t.me/filatovcorr/4826

[9] https://www.vbr dot ru/sovety/help/people-and-economic/viplati-v-slycae-gibeli-svo-2023-polnii-spisok/; https://verstka dot media/skolko-rossijskie-vlasti-platyat-za-ranenie-uchastnikam-vojny-v-ukraine

[10] https://verstka dot media/kak-rossiyan-zamanivayut-na-voinu-s-ukrainoi

[11] https://t.me/horizontal_russia/46768; https://t.me/sotaproject/98388; https://admhmao dot ru/documents/pravovye-akty/npa/11358002/

[12] https://iz dot ru/1888837/ana-sturma-valeria-misina/dengi-na-tocku-sbory-pozertvovanii-na-licnye-karty-hotat-zapretit

[13] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/17714

[14] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2471; https://t.me/vrachivyneodni_channel/8498; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2472; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2473

[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations

[16] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/blatnyie-muzhyki-kozly-pietukhi-ofitseriv-armii-rf-vchat-pravyl-povodzhennia-z-tiuremnym-kontynhentom.html

[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/315990; https://t.me/tass_agency/315991; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76966

[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023

[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025

[20] //t.me/RVvoenkor/92409; https://t.me/vremyageroev2024/1302; https://времягероев dot рф/news/tpost/zc2pzc24d1-85-uchastnikov-otobrano-na-vtoroi-potok; https://pobedarf dot ru/2025/05/22/nazvany-novye-uchastniki-programmy-vremya-geroev/; https://t.me/epoddubny/23516

[21] https://времягероев dot рф/news/tpost/96xxo9c6s1-kavaler-ordena-muzhestva-uchastnik-progr ; https://t.me/rybar/70556 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92019 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/45712 ; https

[22] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92364

[23] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6878

[24] https://t.me/severrealii/30477; https://tass dot ru/politika/23987383; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/20/05/2025/682bcba09a7947f2d0c67371?from=short_news; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/05/18/ty-che-fraer-poputal-glava-okruga-vologodskoy-oblasti-izvinilas-za-svoyu-doch-kotoraya-prigrozila-komu-to-otpravkoy-na-svo-skazav-chto-ee-mama-mer; https://t.me/filimonov_official/19346

[25] https://t.me/severrealii/30477

[26] https://t.me/filimonov_official/19346

[27] https://szru dot gov.ua/news-media/news/u-rosii-tryvaie-zachystka-elit-kreml-posylyuie-tysk-na-oliharkhiv-i-pererozpodilyaie-ikhni-aktyvy

[28] https://iz dot ru/1887797/maksim-bazanov/v-gosdume-gotovyat-novye-lgoty-veteranam-svo ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91929 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28863 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/97993 ; https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/17677

[29] https://social dot mosreg.ru/article/v-podmoskove-vvedut-novuyu-meru-podderzhki-dlya-uchastnikov-svo-88492 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28943

[30] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202505230001 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/316477 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/98211 ; http://kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/76989

[31] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/17677

[32] https://verstka dot media/mintrud-za-tri-goda-vojny-zakazal-bolee-300-tysyach-udostoverenij-dlya-chlenov-semej-pogibshih-voennyh ; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6889

[33] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/2957

[34] https://zakupki dot gov.ru/epz/contract/contractCard/document-info.html?reestrNumber=1771091497124000042&contractInfoId=91175243

[35] kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76967

[36] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/30943 ; https://t.me/malvovabelova/5302 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24021997

[37] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24048289

[38] https://t.me/mobdnrlive/8966

[39] https://t.me/hochu_zhyt/3126

[40] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/stories/2025/05/20/pod-gruzom-pyatisotikh/index.html ; https://t.me/istories_media/9600 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30486

[41] https://frontelligence dot substack.com/p/desertions-and-loss-ratios-trends

[42] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/22972

[43] https://dailybriefs dot online/news/prays-armii-za-skolko-mozhno-kupit-otpusk/

[44] https://vk. dot com/wall-70187376_6646461; https://www.1tv dot ru/shows/chasovoy/vypuski/svo-otdelnyy-shturmovoy-batalon-chasovoy-vypusk-ot-21-07-2024; https://www.chita dot ru/text/world/2024/10/04/74168513/

[45] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025

[46] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin-sentenced-popular-russian-general-lead-penal-assault-detachment-ukraine

[47] https://t.me/rybar/70631 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71772

[48] https://frontelligence dot substack.com/p/through-the-optics-of-war-how-shvabe ; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1924540782117323027

[49] https://dallas-park dot com/russia-modernizes-its-strategic-aviation-is-europe-a-new-target/

[50] https://www dot rbc.ua/rus/news/teroru-gotovi-skilki-rosiya-nakopichila-raket-1732135982.html ; https://www dot armyrecognition.com/focus-analysis-conflicts/army/conflicts-in-the-world/ukraine-russia-conflict/ukrainian-intelligence-reveals-russias-missile-production-surge-despite-sanctions ; https://en.defence-ua dot com/news/ukrainian_intelligence_reveals_how_russia_increased_its_missile_stockpile_over_the_year-13009.html ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025

[51] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23995009 ; https://www dot kommersant.ru/doc/7736900 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/315968

[52] https://t.me/rostecru/9321 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/18903

[53] kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77016

[54] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2518

[55] https://t.me/romandonik/4672

[56] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2530

[57] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91996 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23619 ; https://t.me/athlete_axc/103 ; https://eadaily dot com/ru/news/2025/05/18/na-ukraine-lomayut-golovu-kak-rossiyskie-drony-okazalis-v-40-km-ot-fronta

[58] https://t.me/Tsaplienko/74212

[59] https://www.unian dot net/war/banderol-v-vsu-rasskazali-ob-opasnosti-oruzhiya-kotorym-rf-atakuet-ukrainu-13021101.html#goog_rewarded; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/24/rechnyk-syl-oborony-pivdnya-rozpoviv-yaki-novi-typy-boyeprypasiv-zastosuvav-vorog/

[60] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025

[61] https://rostec dot ru/media/news/rostekh-vpervye-predstavlyaet-v-belorussii-novuyu-lineyku-antidronovykh-patronov/?sphrase_id=5190760 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24002133 ; https://t.me/sashakots/53851 ; https://rg dot ru/2025/05/23/rosteh-predstavil-probivaiushchie-drony-do-platy-patrony-igla.html

[62] https://t.me/c/1741239504/12821 ; https://t.me/mil_hub/103911 ; https://iz dot ru/1889516/roman-krecul-bogdan-stepovoi/prismotr-za-malymi-razrabotana-rls-dla-obnaruzenia-bespilotnikov

[63] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24006819

[64] https://www.armyrecognition dot com/news/aerospace-news/2025/alert-new-russian-ks-172-air-to-air-missile-extends-mig-31s-engagement-range-to-400-km

[65] https://www.armyrecognition dot com/news/aerospace-news/2025/alert-new-russian-ks-172-air-to-air-missile-extends-mig-31s-engagement-range-to-400-km; https://www1 dot ru/news/2025/05/19/dlia-rossiiskix-istrebitelei-razrabotali-novuiu-raketu-ks-172-radiusom-deistviia-400-km.html

[66] https://www dot rbc dot ru/technology_and_media/22/05/2025/682d7c9e9a7947bc47395812 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/98157

[67] https://t.me/RakshaDemography/4989 ; https://t.me/idelrealii/41229 ; https://www dot idelreal.org/a/rosstat-zasekretil-statistiku-po-demografii-posle-obvala-rozhdaemosti-do-minimuma-za-dva-veka/33417522.html

[68] https://rosstat dot gov.ru/storage/mediabank/EDN_03-2025.htm

[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/52972 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53173

[70] https://t.me/mod_russia/52972 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53173 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52972

[71] https://vk.com/wall-42535075_137757 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/316121 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24009167 ; https://www dot rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/682dca729a79470cffab18ae ;

[72] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5727 ; https://www dot rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/682256929a7947624419d2dc?ysclid=maxy1u0qd6504985833

[73] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2023

[74] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2023 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/chechnya-leaders-son-17-becomes-head-chechen-security-council-2025-04-23/ ; https://www dot themoscowtimes.com/2025/04/23/kadyrov-appoints-teenage-son-as-secretary-of-chechen-security-council-a88844 ; hww.sovbez-chr dot ru/index.php/2015-09-10-06-08-39/sostav-soveta-bezopasnosti-chechenskoj-respubliki.html

[75] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025

[76] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/06/05/2025/6819ff4d9a7947b627111f9e; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/2025/05/06/20993624.shtml; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2022/09/04/939111-ramzan-kadirov-zayavil-o-vozmozhnosti; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2025/05/06/1108636-kadirov-poprosil