Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 26, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 26, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan
April 26, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russia appears to be continuing a deliberate depopulation campaign in occupied areas of Ukraine in order to facilitate the repopulation of Ukrainian territories with Russians. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on April 26 that Russia is trying to change the ethnic composition of Ukraine by actively conducting a large-scale resettlement of people mainly from poorer and remote regions of Russia into Ukraine.[1] Malyar noted that the most intensive efforts are ongoing in occupied Luhansk Oblast and remarked that Russia is also deporting Ukrainians and forcibly resettling them in Russia.[2] ISW previously reported on specific instances of Russian authorities overseeing the depopulation and repopulation of areas of occupied Ukraine, particularly in occupied Kherson Oblast over the course of 2022. Ukrainian sources remarked in October 2022 that Russian authorities in then-occupied parts of Kherson Oblast deported large groups of Ukrainian residents to Russia under the guise of humanitarian evacuations and then repopulated their homes with Russian soldiers.[3] Russia may hope to import Russians to fill depopulated areas of Ukraine in order to further integrate occupied areas into Russian socially, administratively, politically, and economically, thereby complicating conditions for the reintegration of these territories into Ukraine. ISW has previously assessed that such depopulation and repopulation campaigns may amount to a deliberate ethnic cleansing effort and apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[4]

Competition among Russian private military companies (PMCs) is likely increasing in Bakhmut. A video appeal addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin by personnel of the “Potok” PMC (reportedly one of three volunteer detachments from Russian-state owned energy company Gazprom) claims that Gazprom officials told members of “Potok” that they would be signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) but then forced personnel to sign contracts with PMC “Redut.”[5] One Potok soldier claimed that Gazprom created two other units — “Fakel” and “Plamya,” which were attached to the Russian MoD.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that ”Potok“ is not a PMC, but a BARS (Combat Reserve) unit, however.[7] The ”Potok” personnel also reported poor treatment by Wagner fighters who threatened to shoot ”Potok” personnel if they withdrew from the line of contact. A Wagner fighter claimed in an interview published on April 26 that ”Potok” fighters abandoned Wagner’s flanks at night.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that “Potok” fighters abandoned their positions in Bakhmut due to a lack of ammunition.[9] ISW previously assessed that Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin likely views the proliferation of PMCs around Bakhmut as competition, and it appears that the increased prevalence of other PMCs around Bakhmut may be causing substantial friction.[10]

The Kremlin continues measures to codify conditions for domestic repression. The Russian Federation Council approved three bills on April 26 which would allow for the deprivation of Russian citizenship for discrediting the Russian Armed Forces and for actions that threaten national security, allow for life sentences for high treason, and allow for five-year sentences for those who promote the decisions of international organizations in which Russia does not participate.[11] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin has supported laws strengthening punishments for trespassing at facilities run by certain federal bodies, misappropriation of Russian military assets, and discreditation of all Russian personnel fighting in Ukraine to expand pretexts for the arrests of Russian citizens and the removal of officials who have fallen out of favor.[12] The Kremlin is likely setting numerous conditions for domestic crackdowns to give Russian officials carte blanche in prosecuting anyone perceived to be against Russian President Vladimir Putin‘s war in Ukraine. The harsh punishments stipulated by these laws likely aim to promote widespread self-censorship amongst the Russian population. ISW has also assessed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs, and Russian authorities may use these new laws to support these efforts.[13]

Comments made by Russian officials and prominent voices in the Russian information space continue to highlight a pervasive anxiety over potential Ukrainian counteroffensive actions. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin remarked on April 26 that as soon as weather conditions improve in Bakhmut, Ukraine will launch a counteroffensive, which may coincide with Russia’s May 9 Victory Day holiday (the commemoration of Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in 1945).[14] A prominent Russian milblogger insinuated that Ukraine may be planning counteroffensive actions in order to ruin May 9 celebrations in Russia.[15] The invocations of May 9 suggest that the Russian information space continues to place symbolic importance on dates associated with Russia’s Great Patriotic War, which continues to shape discourse on the prospects of the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated during a press conference in New York on April 25 that discussions about the potential for negotiations after a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive are ”schizophrenic.”[16] Increasingly despondent and panicked rhetoric emanating from prominent information space figures suggests that the Russian information space has not yet settled on a line about how to address significant and growing concerns about the near future.

Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity are foundational to Ukrainian-Chinese relations in a conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Xi’s statement made China’s position on Ukrainian independence clear, rejecting Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye’s April 22 statements that post-Soviet states lack a basis for sovereignty.[17] Both Ukrainian and Chinese government readouts of the call mentioned a possible role China could play in negotiating nuclear issues.[18] Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova expressed broad agreement with China’s peace plan and blamed Ukraine for rejecting it.[19] The tepid Russian response to Zelensky and Xi’s call is likely further evidence of Russia’s displeasure at China's unwillingness to establish a no-limits bilateral partnership. It is not clear that Chinese actions match Chinese rhetoric, however. According to US government statements and investigative journalism reports, China may be providing non-lethal military assistance to Russia.[20]

The Kremlin is likely attempting to reassure Armenia that it is a reliable partner despite the fact that the war in Ukraine is limiting Russia’s ability to play a larger role in mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on April 26 in which they reportedly discussed the development of the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh.[21] The brief Kremlin readout for the conversation called for strict compliance with the agreements made by Russian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani leaders considering the increasing tensions in the Lachin corridor.[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 26 that Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Colonel General Alexander Lentsov is the new commander of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh and will oversee operations at the 30 observation posts that Russian forces operate in the area.[23] The Russian MoD likely announced the appointment to signal to Armenia a commitment to meet Russia's peacekeeping responsibilities and to augment Putin’s effort to reassure Pashinyan.

The Kremlin may attempt to use conscripts to maintain peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh and preserve relations with Armenia and other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s redeployment of elements of its peacekeeping force from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine is likely eroding Russia’s influence with Armenia.[24] Pashinyan accused Russian peacekeeping forces of not meeting their obligations in December 2022 and stated on March 16, 2023, that Armenia should appeal to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) if Russia is unable to uphold the November 9, 2020, ceasefire agreement.[25] The Kremlin's efforts are likely failing to convince Armenia that it will uphold its obligations under the ceasefire agreement, and Russia’s potential inability to do so may severely degrade Russia’s standing with other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states. The Russian State Duma approved on April 4 the first draft of a bill that would allow all Russian personnel, including conscripts, to participate in Russian peacekeeping operations, likely in an effort to send conscripts to sustain the peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh.[26] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on April 24 that the Kremlin made a decision to replace the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh with a contingent of conscripts, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian conscripts serving in Nagorno-Karabakh.[27]

Key Takeaways

• Russia appears to be continuing a deliberate depopulation campaign in occupied areas of Ukraine in order to facilitate the repopulation of Ukrainian territories with Russians.
• Competition among Russian private military companies (PMCs) is likely increasing in Bakhmut.
• The Kremlin continues measures to codify conditions for domestic repression.
• Comments made by Russian officials and prominent voices in the Russian information space continue to highlight a pervasive anxiety over potential Ukrainian counteroffensive actions.
• Chinese President Xi Jinping explicitly recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence, stating that mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity are foundational to Ukrainian-Chinese relations in a conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
• The Kremlin is likely attempting to reassure Armenia that it is a reliable partner despite the fact that the war in Ukraine is limiting Russia’s ability to play a larger role in mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Kremlin may attempt to use conscripts to maintain peacekeeping operations in Nagorno Karabakh and preserve relations with Armenia and other Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states.
• Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces made gains within Bakhmut and north of Avdiivka.
• Russian milbloggers continue to argue amongst themselves about Ukrainian activity along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian authorities have started sending military registration summonses that include threats of “restrictive measures.”
• Russian sources claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) prevented an attempted attack in Crimea.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 26.[28] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Russian forces have not conducted offensive operations along this sector of the front for “some time” but that Russian forces are continuing to conduct heavy indirect fire in this sector of the front.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna), Nevske (19km northwest of Kreminna), Torske (16km west of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[30] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed back Ukrainian forces from positions on the eastern outskirts of Spirne (24km south of Kreminna) on Apri 25, although ISW assessed that Russian forces likely occupied these positions at an earlier date.[31]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued reconnaissance activity northeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Svatove. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces suppressed four Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Masyutivka (12km northeast of Kupyansk) and Krokhmalne (21km northwest of Svatove) in Kharkiv Oblast and Novoselivske, Luhansk Oblast (15km northwest of Svatove).[32] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Yaroslav Yakimkin claimed that Russian forces destroyed two Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Novoselivske and Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk).[33]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued making gains in Bakhmut as of April 26. Geolocated footage posted on April 26 shows that Russian troops have advanced to Persha Lisova Street in western Bakhmut (within a few blocks of the Yuvileina 00506 road that runs into Khromove).[34] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner fighters reached the intersection of Tchaikovskyi and Yuvileina Streets, which would hypothetically allow them to advance up Yuvileina Street towards Khromove and cut remaining Ukrainian logistics lines into Bakhmut.[35] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin denied these claims, however, and played down the significance of Wagner’s capture of that intersection, stating that Ukrainian forces are continuing to use roads under Wagner’s fire control anyways.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner is continuing to fight in northern, western, and southern Bakhmut.[37] One Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner controls up to 85 percent of the city, which is consistent with ISW’s control of terrain calculations including territory covered by Russian claims.[38] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in 17 combat clashes in the Bakhmut direction over the past day.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive actions northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest) and Bohdanivka (6km northwest); west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west) and Khromove (3km west); and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (7km southwest).[40]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on April 26 and have made a marginal advance north of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage posted on April 26 shows that Russian forces have made limited gains west of the N20 Donetsk City-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk highway about 10km north of Avdiivka.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 26 that Russian forces successfully advanced west of Novobakhmutivka and pushed Ukrainian forces away from the N20 highway, which appears consistent with available footage confirming these positions.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks towards Avdiivka itself; west of Avdiivka near Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka); on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Pervomaiske; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued fighting along the outskirts of Donetsk City and advanced towards Sieverne.[44]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on April 26. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade are conducting small arms engagements on the outskirts of Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[45] Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces have increased their use of FAB-500 airdropped bombs to target Ukrainian strongholds in urban areas of Bakhmut, and several Russian sources posted footage of Russian airstrikes on Vuhledar.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that there were no confirmed ground attacks in this area on April 26.[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian milbloggers continue to argue amongst themselves about Ukrainian activity along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast as of April 26. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on April 25 that Ukrainian reconnaissance and river crossing activity is most prevalent on Velykiy Potemkin island (6km south of Kherson City), south of Kindyika (8km east of Kherson City), and west of Veletenske (18km southwest of Kherson City).[48] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions on Velykiy Potemkin island as well as in coastal areas near Kindyika on April 25.[49] Another Russian milblogger amplified geolocated footage on April 25 of the ”Kherson” volunteer detachment on a section of the E58 highway south of the Antonivsky Bridge on an unspecified date and argued that reports about Ukrainian forces establishing positions on the east (left) bank are false.[50] This milblogger has previously reported demonstrably false information, and it is possible that he may have purposefully posted old footage of the area to refute reports about Ukrainian forces holding positions on the east (left) bank. ISW has not observed any new additional visual evidence to validate or confirm Russian claims about Ukrainian positions or activity on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. ISW expanded Russian claims northward closer to the dacha area south of Antonivka (9km west of Kherson City) on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River based on claims from the prominent milblogger. ISW has not observed visual evidence of Ukrainian forces operating south of the Antonivsky Bridge since April 22.

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian logistics on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated on April 26 that Ukrainian forces are already quietly conducting counteroffensive activities in Kherson Oblast by targeting Russian ammunition depots as well as equipment and manpower concentration areas.[51] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on April 25 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian manpower and concentrations areas as well as an observation post.[52]

Russian officials are continuing efforts to secure rear ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in occupied Crimea. Head of the Russian Federal Road Agency Nikita Khrapov claimed on April 26 that Russian builders have finished the most difficult stages of the restoration of the railway section of the Kerch Strait Bridge and that railway traffic across the bridge will resume ahead of schedule on an unspecified date in May.[53] A Russian Transport Ministry representative stated on April 26 that Russian officials plan for more than 80 inspection points to operate at entrances to the Kerch Strait bridge by April 28.[54] Russian officials are likely increasing efforts to secure and improve the GLOC across the Kerch Strait into Crimea in preparation for potential Ukrainian counteroffensives.

Satellite imagery indicates that Russian forces have transferred armored vehicles and artillery systems from occupied Crimea to an unspecified area as of April 25. Geolocated satellite imagery shows a military depot near Turhenieve (21km northeast of Dzhankoi) with armored fighting vehicles, tanks, and artillery systems on February 11 noticeably empty on April 25.[55] Russian forces may have transferred the military equipment to support ongoing Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast or to other sectors of the front in preparation for potential Ukrainian counteroffensives.

 

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities have started sending military registration summonses that include threats of “restrictive measures.” Multiple Russian opposition news outlets reported on April 26 that Russian anti-war project “Walk in the Forest” head Grigory Sverdlin stated that Russian authorities in St. Petersburg have started issuing military registration summonses that warn that failure to register will lead to “restrictive measures.”[56] ISW reported on April 11 that the Kremlin passed legislation banning individuals who are 20 days delinquent in reporting to a military office from driving vehicles, buying or selling real estate, or taking out loans.[57] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the Western Military District press service confirmed that military registration summonses included warnings of restrictive measures.[58]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian sources claimed on April 26 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) prevented an attempted attack in Crimea. Russian milbloggers claimed that the FSB arrested a Russian citizen planning to explode two improvised explosive devices (IED) on a Russian naval hospital in Simferopol, Crimea.[59]

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to discuss measures to improve infrastructure in occupied territories. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik stated that LNR representatives met with Russian Minister of Energy Sergey Mochalnikov on April 25 to discuss developing the coal industry in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[60] Pasechnik claimed that coal mines in occupied Luhansk Oblast have retained their potential throughout the war and that investors are prepared to invest in mines that have been closed since 2013 to bring them to the necessary levels of productivity.[61] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin stated on April 26 that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin met with DNR officials, where the participants emphasized the importance of patronage between Russian federal subjects and occupation authorities when developing roads and restructuring the coal industry in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[62]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian missile forces began combat training with Iskander-M missile systems at a Russian training ground on April 26.[63]

Belarusian forces began deploying conscripts into armed formations of the Belarusian Army, Ministry of Internal Affairs, border service, and security bodies on April 26. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) noted that this is part of the February to May conscription call-up and that 10,000 conscripts will deploy to various formations.[64]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/annamaliar/672

[2] https://t.me/annamaliar/672

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102922

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111622

[5] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1651163200732254208?s=20; https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1651163208646901761?s=20   

[6] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1651163204255461376?s=20

[7] https://t.me/evilsailor/313; https://t.me/grey_zone/18415

[8] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1651163202565152770?s=20

[9] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1651163206302179328?s=20

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2023

[11] https://t.me/bbcrussian/45245 ; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/2023/04/26/16616899.shtml ; https://newizv dot ru/news/2023-04-26/sovfed-odobril-pozhiznennoe-lishenie-svobody-za-gosizmenu-405519

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar0318723; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032823

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041923

[14] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/852

[15] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83939

[16] https://tass dot ru/politika/17610689

[17] https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-ambassador-to-france-says-ex-soviet-states-lack-basis-for-sovereignty-8a46ad7d

[18] https://www.president.gov.ua/news/vidbulasya-telefonna-rozmova-prezidenta-ukrayini-z-golovoyu-82489; tps://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202304/t20230426_11066785.html;

[19] https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova/5335

[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/any-china-lethal-aid-russia-would-come-real-costs-us-says-2023-02-26/; https://www.politico.eu/article/chinese-companies-are-shipping-rifles-body-armor-to-russia/

[21] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70988

[22] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70988

[23] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/17620815

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031623

[25] https://infocom dot am/en/article/95533; https://www.panarmenian dot net/eng/news/304636/Pashinyan_Russian_peacekeepers_becoming_silent_witnesses_to_Karabakh_depopulation; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2022/12/22/armenia-russias-peacekeepers-failed-mission-in-nagorno-karabakh ; https://ria dot ru/20230316/karabakh-1858258784.html; https://www.panorama dot am/ru/news/2023/03/16/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1%88%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%8F%D0%BD-%D0%90%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B4%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%85%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BC%D1%8B-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%89%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%B2/2807734

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2023

[27] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/kirilo-budanov-viyti-kordoni-1991-roku-tsilkom-1682282231.html; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/vyity-na-kordony-1991-roku-tsilkom-dosiazhne-zavdannia-tsoho-roku.html

[28] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/10079 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M4zTv2MTx7qDMTUBcnSLkVxg3zrQfZhu4VCKiu5ajszDeQW7kuD9pXd8rd7MUy71l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QPrdwwDTT9cvHtEfhkkFKFREDWGn3fTazw3MaLxv1nqvTVqzKsSpJyoS7aKj2w9bl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/26/oborona-bahmuta-mynuloyi-doby-okupanty-324-razy-zavdavaly-udariv-zi-stvolnoyi-artyleriyi-ta-rszv-sergij-cherevatyj/

[29] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/26/oborona-bahmuta-mynuloyi-doby-okupanty-324-razy-zavdavaly-udariv-zi-stvolnoyi-artyleriyi-ta-rszv-sergij-cherevatyj/

[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/12154

[31] https://t.me/rybar/46269

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/25959

[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/25958

[34] https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1651092204977287168?s=20; https://twitter.com/M0nstas/status/1651146925306007553?s=20

[35] https://t.me/milchronicles/1823; https://t.me/kommunist/17092

[36] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/853

[37] https://t.me/readovkanews/57545; https://t.me/rybar/46269; https://t.me/wargonzo/12154

[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/83951

[39] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/26/oborona-bahmuta-mynuloyi-doby-okupanty-324-razy-zavdavaly-udariv-zi-stvolnoyi-artyleriyi-ta-rszv-sergij-cherevatyj/

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M4zTv2MTx7qDMTUBcnSLkVxg3zrQfZhu4VCKiu5ajszDeQW7kuD9pXd8rd7MUy71l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QPrdwwDTT9cvHtEfhkkFKFREDWGn3fTazw3MaLxv1nqvTVqzKsSpJyoS7aKj2w9bl

[41] https://twitter.com/operativno_ZSU/status/1650858094648516610?s=20; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1650919413988589571?s=20; https://t.me/operativnoZSU/93060

[42] . https://t.me/wargonzo/12154

[43]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M4zTv2MTx7qDMTUBcnSLkVxg3zrQfZhu4VCKiu5ajszDeQW7kuD9pXd8rd7MUy71l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QPrdwwDTT9cvHtEfhkkFKFREDWGn3fTazw3MaLxv1nqvTVqzKsSpJyoS7aKj2w9bl

[44] https://t.me/rybar/46269; https://t.me/wargonzo/12154

[45] https://t.me/rybar/46283

[46] https://t.me/grey_zone/18455; https://t.me/rybar/46283; https://t.me/milinfolive/99805

[47]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02M4zTv2MTx7qDMTUBcnSLkVxg3zrQfZhu4VCKiu5ajszDeQW7kuD9pXd8rd7MUy71l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02QPrdwwDTT9cvHtEfhkkFKFREDWGn3fTazw3MaLxv1nqvTVqzKsSpJyoS7aKj2w9bl

[48] https://t.me/rybar/46266

[49] https://t.me/rybar/46266

[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/12152; https://twitter.com/cyber_boroshno/status/1651130525187178496?s=20; https://twitter.com/cyber_boroshno/status/1651130523438202882?s=20

[51] https://t.me/hueviyherson/38469

[52]https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0fi4fCh1m9qFh9AH7p3evxjRUuX7E8s2kn7Rs7mLSacBM2ZEyBWUnPL5eDEmVd9PKl

[53] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/17613353

[54] https://tass dot ru/v-strane/17617369

[55] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1651167988089847809

[56] https://t.me/sotaproject/57810; https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-65242026 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/45240; https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=10226005142908437&amp%3Bset=a.3199682044241; https://t.me/bbcrussian/45250; https://t.me/astrapress/25543

[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2023

[58] https://t.me/tass_agency/189529

[59] https://t.me/Aksenov82/2413; https://t.me/kommunist/17094; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/11405; https://t.me/epoddubny/15712; https://t.me/sashakots/39513; https://t.me/sashakots/39513

[60] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1035

[61] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1035

[62] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3367

[63] https://t.me/modmilby/26343; https://t.me/mod_russia/25953

[64] https://t.me/modmilby/26341; https://t.me/modmilby/26366 ; https://t.me/modmilby/26371