Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 13, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 13, 2024

Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 13, 2024, 7:10pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on February 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The US Senate passed a supplemental appropriations bill that would provide roughly $60 billion of security assistance to Ukraine, the vast majority of which would go to US companies and personnel. The Senate passed a $95.3 billion aid package for assistance to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, $60.6 billion of which is for Ukraine, by a 70-29 vote on February 13.[1] Roughly 16 percent of the Ukraine-related appropriations in the bill would go directly to support the Ukrainian government and economy whereas the remaining 84 percent of the appropriations are specifically marked for US manufacturers and US or allied government entities supporting Ukraine.[2]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attempting to restore maneuver to the battlefield through Soviet deep battle theory but are struggling with implementing Soviet deep battle so far due to current Ukrainian capabilities. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are attempting to implement Soviet deep battle theory for operational planning to rapidly break through Ukrainian defenses but are failing to achieve the effects of Soviet deep battle operations.[3] Deep battle theory is a product of Soviet operational art developed in the 1920s and 1930s that was designed to restore maneuver to battlefield after World War I by engaging the enemy on multiple fronts and in depth at the tactical and operational levels by attacking enemy assets at all echelons with artillery, airstrikes, and attacks against the enemy’s rear in concert with frontal attacks to penetrate the enemy’s defensive lines.[4] Deep battle theory also posits that successful operational design includes sequenced plans for successive operations to prevent the defender from re-establishing coherent defensive positions following a penetration and its exploitation.[5] Deep battle theory’s key operational tenets are still valid in modern war, and the Russian military could restore maneuver to the battlefield and overcome Ukrainian defenses if it could successfully plan and execute operationally sound campaigns using deep battle theory. Ukrainian forces could also use deep battle theory to restore maneuver to the battlefield to their advantage if their Western supporters properly resourced them.

Mashovets, however, noted that Russian forces’ current limited capabilities, specifically in conducting effective counterbattery fire, striking targets at operational depth, concealing force concentrations from the enemy, and combating Ukrainian technological parity, are preventing Russian forces from achieving the operational level surprise necessary to break through Ukrainian lines and conduct deep battle operations.[6] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command is failing to implement certain technological innovations into operational planning, including remote mine laying; large scale drone operations; command-and-control; and communications using modern technology.[7]

The current Ukrainian battlefield capabilities that are denying Russian forces the ability to restore maneuver to the battlefield on Russian terms largely depend on the provision of Western military assistance in key systems, many of which only the US can provide at scale. Ukrainian forces currently have advantages in counterbattery technology and medium-to-long-range strike capabilities due to Western-provided military assistance.[8] Western states have provided NATO 155mm artillery systems and ammunition capable of striking targets at longer ranges than Soviet equipment, and superior counterbattery radar systems that have provided Ukrainian forces with targeting advantages.[9] Western-provided medium- and long-range systems including HIMARS, ATACMS, and Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles have enabled Ukrainian forces to achieve the significant impacts of liberating west bank Kherson Oblast and severely degrading the Russian Black Sea Fleet, among others.[10] Western provided air defense systems have denied Russian forces the air superiority necessary to safely operate aircraft to support Russian offensive operations, including hypothetical deep battle operations.[11]

Ukrainian forces will not be able to retain these advantages and deny Russian forces the ability to restore maneuver to the battlefield on Russian terms without further assistance from the United States and its partner countries in the near and medium term. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have previously touted their hopes of outlasting Western security assistance to Ukraine on the battlefield, and Russian forces are attempting to develop technology to adapt to current Ukrainian capabilities.[12] Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is learning and currently demonstrating greater operational flexibility than earlier in the war, including by establishing new artillery batteries to increase fire capabilities, bolstering intelligence capabilities, using disinformation to feed false intelligence on Russian force movements, and fragmenting the movements of its larger formations.[13] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are also actively developing their own technology to counter Ukrainian capabilities and develop their own capabilities, including electronic warfare (EW) systems, sea drones, combat control systems.[14] Ukraine will lose its current battlefield advantages if Western states, particularly the United States, prematurely cease security assistance to Ukraine before Ukraine’s ongoing defense industrial base (DIB) revitalization efforts render its DIB largely self-sufficient.[15] If the US cuts off military aid now Russian forces may regain battlefield capabilities necessary to restore maneuver to the battlefield on Russian terms and would place Russia in a much better position militarily in the medium to long term.

Russian sources are purposefully exaggerating Ukrainian casualties in a Russian strike near Selydove, Donetsk Oblast on February 13.[16] Other Russian sources claimed that the strike caused far fewer casualties and published footage purportedly of a Russian strike against Tsukuryne (just south of Selydove) that is not consistent with the high number of casualties that other Russian sources claimed.[17] Ukrainian military officials reported on February 13 that Russian sources began purposefully spreading disinformation about Ukrainian losses after the Russian strike near Selydove and stated that Russian forces conducted a multiple rocket launch system (MLRS) strike against Tsukuryne, Donetsk Oblast on February 13 that damaged civilian infrastructure but did not cause any casualties.[18] Kremlin newswire TASS amplified a claim from an alleged unofficial Telegram channel of a Ukrainian brigade confirming Ukrainian personnel losses in the strike.[19] This unofficial Telegram channel later denied its initial claim.[20] The official Ukrainian brigade’s Facebook page has not published anything regarding the purported strike at the time of this publication.[21] The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation reported in December 2023 that Russian actors planned to promote information operations aimed at degrading Ukrainian morale through a network of fake Telegram channels disguised as official accounts of Ukrainian regional officials and military brigades.[22]

The Kremlin appears to be asserting the right to enforce Russian Federation law on officials of governments in NATO member states over actions taken in the performance of their official duties within the territories of their own countries. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) has put dozens of government officials from NATO countries on Russia’s wanted list because of alleged violations of Russian federal law committed outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona stated on February 13 that it gained access to the MVD’s wanted list and that the Russian MVD put Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, Estonian Secretary of State Taimar Peterkop, Latvian Justice Minister Inese Libina-Egnere, Latvian Finance Minister Arvils Aseradens, Latvian Agricultural Minister Armands Krauze, and former Latvian Interior Minister Marija Golubeva on the wanted list for allegedly destroying Soviet monuments in Estonia and Latvia — which Kremlin newswire TASS confirmed.[23] Mediazona stated that 59 Lithuanian Seimas deputies, 15 Riga municipal deputies, Lithuanian Mayor of Klaipeda Arvydas Vaitkus, Vaitkus’s deputy, 13 members of the Klaipeda city council, six deputies of the Vilnius city council, Polish Mayor of Walbrzych Roman Szelemey, and Polish Deputy Minister of State Assets Karol Rabenda also appear on the Russian MVD’s wanted list in connection with the destruction of Soviet monuments in the Baltic states and Poland.[24] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated the Baltic officials are wanted for “hostile actions against historical memory and Russia.”[25] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Kallas is “actively pursuing a policy of demolishing monuments and mocking the memory of Soviet soldiers” and that she must be held accountable for “blasphemy.”[26] Zakharova called on Russian law enforcement agencies to conduct investigations “within the framework of their powers and responsibilities in accordance with the legislation of Russia.” Zakharova claimed that the officials must “answer for their crimes” and that “this is just the beginning.”[27]

Article 243 of the Russian Criminal Code states that the destruction or damage of cultural heritage sites and monuments is punishable by up to six years in prison.[28] Russia, however, does not have the legal authority to prosecute foreign citizens for allegedly violating Russian laws in foreign states. Russia has notably used the issue of Soviet monuments to justify hybrid warfare tactics against NATO countries in the past when Russia launched large-scale cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007 after Estonia moved a Soviet World War II war memorial and the remains of Soviet soldiers from central Tallinn to the Tallinn Defense Cemetery.[29] Although it is unclear if the Russian government had planned to publicize its inclusion of the European officials on the list before Mediazona disclosed this information, this may be part of ongoing Russian effort to set informational conditions justifying possible Russian escalations against NATO states in the future, as ISW has extensively reported.[30] The Kremlin has also invoked narratives related to the historical memory of World War II to justify and sustain its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[31]

US sanctions are reportedly constraining Russian efforts to skirt the G7 oil cap amid continued indications that India may be rethinking its growing position as a customer of Russian oil. Bloomberg reported on February 13 that at least 21 of the 50 oil tankers that the US has sanctioned since October 2023 for carrying Russian crude oil priced above the G7’s $60 price cap have stopped transporting Russian oil and petroleum products.[32] Bloomberg also reported that in the past two months roughly half of 14 idling oil tankers carrying Russian oil to India have since turned around from their destination without unloading.[33] Indian government sources have recently reportedly stated that India wants to distance itself from Russia due to the war in Ukraine, limiting Russia’s ability to provide India with munitions.[34] Increased energy exports to Indo-pacific states, primarily India and China, and widespread Russian efforts to skirt the G7 price cap through a fleet of oil tankers with obscure ownership and insurance allowed Russia to significantly increase oil revenues in 2023.[35] Russia relied on oil revenues to buoy federal budgets amid increased spending on its war in Ukraine in 2023, and effective US sanctions and Indian reconsiderations of its trade relationship with Russia may complicate this effort in 2024.[36]

Key Takeaways:

• The US Senate passed a supplemental appropriations bill that would provide roughly $60 billion of security assistance to Ukraine, the vast majority of which would go to US companies and personnel.
• Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attempting to restore maneuver to the battlefield through Soviet deep battle theory but are struggling with implementing Soviet deep battle so far due to current Ukrainian capabilities.
• The current Ukrainian battlefield capabilities that are denying Russian forces the ability to restore maneuver to the battlefield on Russian terms largely depend on the provision of Western military assistance in key systems, many of which only the US can provide at scale.
• Ukrainian forces will not be able to retain these advantages and deny Russian forces the ability to restore maneuver to the battlefield on Russian terms without further assistance from the United States and its partner countries in the near and medium term.
• Russian sources are purposefully exaggerating Ukrainian casualties in a Russian strike near Selydove, Donetsk Oblast on February 13.
• The Kremlin appears to be asserting the right to enforce Russian Federation law on officials of governments in NATO member states over actions taken in the performance of their official duties within the territories of their own countries.
• US sanctions are reportedly constraining Russian efforts to skirt the G7 oil cap amid continued indications that India may be rethinking its growing position as a customer of Russian oil.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna and in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
• The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank stated on February 12 that Russia is likely able to sustain its current rate of vehicle losses for at least two to three years by producing new vehicles and reactivating vehicles from storage.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to solidify control of occupied Ukraine through institutionalizing social benefits and services.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced west of Kreminna amid continued positional fighting on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on February 13. Geolocated footage published on February 12 shows that Russian forces recently advanced in a field east of Torske (west of Kreminna).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 12 that Russian forces advanced 300 meters further into eastern Bilohorivka (south of Kreminna) and seized a segment of the Shypylivka-Bilohorivka road, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[38] Positional fighting continued on February 13 northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman; southeast of Kupyansk near Tymkivka and Tabaivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and near Bilohorivka.[39]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Bakhmut amid continued positional fighting in the area on February 13. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Bakhmut area stated that Russian forces are partially advancing near Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and are capturing whole windbreaks or forest areas near the settlement.[40] The Ukrainian spokesperson stated that Russian milbloggers are falsely claiming that Russian forces have advanced within two kilometers of Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed on February 12 and 13 that elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including elements of its 331st VDV Regiment, advanced towards Bohdanivka, west of the O0506 (Khromove-Chasiv Yar) highway, and towards Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[42] Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Bilohorivka and Vesele, northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka, west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske, southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, and south of Bakhmut near Shumy and Pivdenne.[43] Elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade and the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction.[44]

 

Russian forces reportedly continued to advance within Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on February 13. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern and central Avdiivka and on the southeastern and southern outskirts of the settlement, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of further Russian gains within Avdiivka.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Avdiivka near Lastochkyne and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims either.[46] Positional fighting continued within and near Avdiivka, west of Avdiivka near Tonenke, and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[47] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces are intensifying assaults in the Tavriisk direction (Avdiivka through western Zaporizhia Oblast) and conducted their highest number of air and artillery strikes in the area since the start of 2024.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed on February 13 that Russian forces conducted up to 60 glide bomb strikes on Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka over the past day.[49] Elements of the Russian 1st “Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk Peoples Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka direction.[50]

 

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on February 13. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[51] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and the 5th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Heorhiivka and elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[52]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on February 13 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked south of Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and north of Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[53] Elements of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) reportedly continue to operate in the Vuhledar direction (east of Velyka Novosilka).[54]

 

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements on February 13. Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Robotyne.[55] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Robotyne, northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and Novoprokovka, east of Robotyne near Verbove, and south of Robotyne near Novoprokopivka.[56] Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) reportedly continue to operate near Robotyne.[57]

 

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky.[58] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian Storm-Z, Naval Infantry, Airborne (VDV), and mobilized units conduct two-to-three assaults in left bank Kherson Oblast per day.[59] Humenyuk also reported that Russian forces are increasingly using first-person view (FPV) drones in assaults in left bank Kherson Oblast and that Russian assault units lose up to 70 percent of their personnel in such attacks.

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on February 13 that Russian forces launched 23 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 16 Shaheds in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[60] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Kh-59 missile near Odesa City and that Russian forces struck Kirovohrad Oblast with a likely Iskander-K missile.[61] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Ukrainian forces are using a large number of foreign air defense systems in parallel with Soviet-era S-300 and Buk-M1 air defense systems.[62] Ihnat stated that foreign air defense systems, such as NASAMS, IRIS-T, and Patriot systems, should become the basis of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella.[63]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank stated on February 12 that Russia is likely able to sustain its current rate of vehicle losses for at least two to three years by producing new vehicles and reactivating vehicles from storage.[64] IISS estimated that Russia has lost over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles in 2023 and close to 8,000 armored fighting vehicles since February 2022. IISS stated that Russia likely reactivated at least 1,180 main battle tanks and about 2,470 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers pulled from storage in 2023. IISS stated that Russia has 10 Central Tank Reserve Bases, at least 37 mixed equipment and armaments storage bases, and at least 12 artillery storage bases. Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko stated on February 11 that Russia’s reported tank production numbers in recent years largely reflect restored and modernized tanks drawn from storage rather than new production.[65]

Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian government to address issues related to Russian military personnel, likely as part of Putin’s continued efforts to portray himself as an involved, caring, wartime leader before the March 2024 presidential election. Putin ordered the Russian government to change the process of examining injured miliary personnel who fought in Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) militias and military formations since May 2014 and to analyze existing frameworks for providing benefits and payment to Russian military personnel.[66]

Russia is trying to nationalize certain defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises. Russian news outlet Kommersant reported on February 13 that the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office filed a lawsuit with the Sverdlovsk Oblast Arbitration Court to seize the shares of three industrial enterprises of the Chelyabinsk Electrometallurgical Plant, claiming that the privatization of these enterprises from 1993 to 1999 was illegal and required the Russian government’s permission.[67] The Prosecutor General’s Office claimed that residents of unspecified “unfriendly” states control the enterprises and that the enterprises export products at a reduced cost to the US, France, and the United Kingdom (UK). Kommersant reported that the Prosecutor General’s Office stated that the enterprises are Russia’s largest producers of ferroalloys specifically for high-quality steel for military equipment, heat-resistant aircraft engines, weapon barrels, and armor-piercing projectiles.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine continues efforts to domestically produce drones. Ukrainian Prime Minster Denys Shmyhal stated on February 13 that Ukraine has about 200 private drone production companies.[68] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated on February 12 that Ukraine allocated about $2.5 million in grants to military tech startups in 2023 and that Ukraine is set to increase this amount by tenfold in 2024.[69]

Ukraine reportedly created a nationwide electronic warfare (EW) system that can disrupt Russian drones’ satellite navigation.[70] The “Pokrova” system reportedly jams navigation systems, like the Russian GLONASS, with “spoofing,” causing the drones to relay an incorrect location. Ukrainian forces have reportedly used spoofing to down Russian drones at a short range, but Pokrova works on a larger scale. Forbes stated that Ukrainian forces may already be using Pokrova to down Russian Shahed drones.[71]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Kremlin continues efforts to solidify control of occupied Ukraine through institutionalizing social benefits and services. Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a list of instructions on February 12 instructing the Russian government to ensure the extension of preferential mortgage lending programs in occupied Ukraine, to develop health infrastructure in occupied territories through offering medical workers from Russia money, and to guarantee insurance payments to volunteers operating in occupied Ukraine.[72] These instructions notably aim to attract Russian citizens, businesses, and volunteers to occupied Ukraine, likely to permanently change Ukraine’s demographics. These measures support longstanding Russian efforts to establish economic and social control over occupied territories while also likely supporting Russian repopulation efforts that seek to bring ethnic Russians to occupied Ukraine as part of the Kremlin’s ethnic cleansing campaign.[73]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

US-sanctioned pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor reiterated boilerplate claims that the US intends to directly interfere in Moldovan politics by finding a “replacement” for current Moldovan President Maia Sandu.[74] Shor is likely attempting to further a common Russian information operation aimed at portraying any perceived pro-Western political sentiment in post-Soviet countries as Western-manufactured and not endogenously generated.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024 ; https://www.senate.gov/legislative/floor_activity_pail.htm ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/senate-approves-ukraine-israel-foreign-aid-package/

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024

[3] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1622; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1623; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1624; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1625

[4] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA232954.pdf; https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/images/LSCO%20DeepOps%20book%20interactive%20with%20cover%20spread%2012Nov21.pdf

[5] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA232954.pdf; https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/images/LSCO%20DeepOps%20book%20interactive%20with%20cover%20spread%2012Nov21.pdf

[6] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1622; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1623; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1624; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1625

[7] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1622; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1623; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1624; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1625

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-%E2%80%94-military-threat-and-beyond; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-%E2%80%94-military-threat-and-beyond; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/it%E2%80%99s-time-west-embrace-ukraine%E2%80%99s-way-war-not-doubt-it; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-west-leans-ukraine-can-win; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-sustained-counteroffensive-denying-russia%E2%80%99s-prolongation-war

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2023 ;https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-west-leans-ukraine-can-win

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-west-leans-ukraine-can-win ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2024

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-west-leans-ukraine-can-win; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-%E2%80%94-military-threat-and-beyond; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/putin-vows-to-press-on-with-ukraine-invasion-despite-heavy-russian-losses; https://apnews.com/article/putin-russia-press-conference-moscow-ukraine-ef4e88fda50e6ad75b8a1979b95d9fcc; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023

[13] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1622; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1623; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1624; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1625

[14] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1622; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1623; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1624; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1625

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-west-leans-ukraine-can-win

[16] https://t.me/dva_majors/34522 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/14785 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/7789; https://t.me/milinfolive/116241 ; https://t.me/vrogov/14289 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/62002 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34524 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34529

[17] https://t.me/yuzhny_front_ZOV/4126 ; https://t.me/rybar/57072

[18] https://t.me/otarnavskiy/488 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037V6WwvLRMp79uXAd2Z7GqmHZhFQFir1XXYYMhxDv8mz7QXqT34cThgB7zqBPJ3eWl ; https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/posts/pfbid02NbWRRYyxxLXWnY48Zw7QzKLGpm3qotCvZLKhC1KowSVrxm8sUPsej1BLXuyUXQAkl ; https://www.facebook.com/selidovomva/posts/pfbid02mhJDft56CAFzQNZ7YSz7y3e4Hfm53UGhAJttVKufj3BdV163CLXrHDQoi5pAZC9yl

[19] https://t.me/tass_agency/231528 ; https://t.me/zsu35obrmp/2230

[20] https://t.me/zsu35obrmp/2239

[21] https://t.me/zsu35obrmp/2230 ; https://archive dot ph/X9esU

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2023

[23] https://t.me/tass_agency/231469; https://t.me/tass_agency/231484 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/231464; https://t.me/tass_agency/231461

[24] https://zona dot media/article/2024/02/13/wanted

[25] https://t.me/tass_agency/231479

[26] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1931679/

[27] https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova/7078

[28] https://www.consultant dot ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/1fb96b14cf73fbc0d19e9674dd18a7dafd6867f2/

[29] https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/analysis-of-the-2007-cyber-attacks-against-estonia-from-the-information-warfare-perspective/

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011823

[32] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-13/tankers-tied-to-the-russian-oil-trade-grind-to-a-halt-following-us-sanctions

[33] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-13/tankers-tied-to-the-russian-oil-trade-grind-to-a-halt-following-us-sanctions

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724

[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012024

[36] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120623

[37] https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1757198213717647464; https://t.me/zsuSMILE/96; https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1757198218788511894

[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7272

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl; https://t.me/mod_russia/35601 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35605; https://t.me/mod_russia/35597; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7269; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7307; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/16991; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0j9KS1FfXr5xParWKb6cr56H7dhh3c1kriV3JtcapJu3KVEoS8KDYq7HwpmxBNLNrl

[40] https://suspilne dot media/683158-armia-rf-prosunulasa-na-bahmutskomu-napramku-aka-situacia-poblizu-bogdanivki-i-u-napramku-casovogo-aru/

[41] https://suspilne dot media/683158-armia-rf-prosunulasa-na-bahmutskomu-napramku-aka-situacia-poblizu-bogdanivki-i-u-napramku-casovogo-aru/

[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7273 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7300 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7309 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112755 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61961

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0j9KS1FfXr5xParWKb6cr56H7dhh3c1kriV3JtcapJu3KVEoS8KDYq7HwpmxBNLNrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/35595 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34489

[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/35610 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/116226

[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/18140 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18152 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61983 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1320 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1321 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112721 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7293 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7311 ; https://t.me/rybar/57048

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/18140 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61968 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53953

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0j9KS1FfXr5xParWKb6cr56H7dhh3c1kriV3JtcapJu3KVEoS8KDYq7HwpmxBNLNrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl ; . https://t.me/wargonzo/18140 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61983 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1320 ;  https://t.me/dva_majors/34489 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7293 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7311 ;

[48] https://t.me/otarnavskiy/486

[49] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/14783 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/62015 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/116249 ; https://t.me/rybar/57066 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/10144 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34526

[50] https://t.me/fronttyagach82/341 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34479

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0j9KS1FfXr5xParWKb6cr56H7dhh3c1kriV3JtcapJu3KVEoS8KDYq7HwpmxBNLNrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18140 ;

[52] https://t.me/voin_dv/7010 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/8060 (Novomykhailivka) ;

https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61996; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11751; https://t.me/kubanArta/610 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/116227 (Heorhiivka)

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18140

[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/7014 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/7009

[55] https://t.me/ombrstarichi65/67; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1757178798292766981; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1757178802755538989

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0j9KS1FfXr5xParWKb6cr56H7dhh3c1kriV3JtcapJu3KVEoS8KDYq7HwpmxBNLNrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18140 ; https://t.me/vrogov/14277

[57] https://t.me/ombrstarichi65/67; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1757178798292766981; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1757178802755538989 ; https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1757151848224477682

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0j9KS1FfXr5xParWKb6cr56H7dhh3c1kriV3JtcapJu3KVEoS8KDYq7HwpmxBNLNrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06rd22g429MPsu6aAUe6NZwTXsY9ooLQ4etPzMv7vjRwU8cZ1uBprsZtoJUn5xxvjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02sWYBmih8zw35rCyRW8YtEPXTxAz9c55Xao6buh3G3REc9p8sBL9gUGbGSQG22ZTUl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/34489 ; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/2200; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/18366

[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/13/vorog-prodovzhuye-myasni-shturmy-na-hersonshhyni-na-2-3-za-dobu-nashkryabuyut-nataliya-gumenyuk/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/12/gumenyuk-nazvala-vidsotok-vtrat-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-na-livomu-berezi/

[60] https://t.me/kpszsu/10662

[61] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/6240 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/6235

[62] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/13/u-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-yak-zminylasya-systema-ppo-ukrayiny-za-dva-roky-vijny/

[63] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/13/u-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-yak-zminylasya-systema-ppo-ukrayiny-za-dva-roky-vijny/

[64] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/02/equipment-losses-in-russias-war-on-ukraine-mount/

[65] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021124

[66] http://kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/73431

[67] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6508794 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/02/13/genprokuratura-potrebovala-natsionalizirovat-tri-chelyabinskih-zavoda-ih-yakoby-nezakonno-privatizirovali-v-1990-e

[68] https://www.kmu dot gov.ua/news/promova-premier-ministra-ukrainy-denysa-shmyhalia-na-zasidanni-uriadu-13022024?fbclid=IwAR1zwtxhGXG2-9YKwnVhgpC8e1qi2xn5WbpoNDZ_prjyznvBuY4rWqRb7-o

[69] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-produce-thousands-long-range-drones-2024-minister-says-2024-02-12/

[70] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/02/12/ukraines-pokrova-spoofing-system-tells-shaheds-to-get-lost/?sh=28715a5ffea7 ; https://www.newscientist.com/article/2415318-ukraine-will-spoof-gps-across-the-country-to-stop-russian-drones/

[71] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/02/12/ukraines-pokrova-spoofing-system-tells-shaheds-to-get-lost/?sh=28715a5ffea7

[72] http://kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/73431

[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf

[74] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19966267