Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 5, 2025

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, and George Barros

January 5, 2025, 7:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on January 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 5 shows that Russian forces advanced in western and southern Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha).[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) elements pushed Ukrainian forces from Makhnovka and Dmitryukov (immediately northeast of Makhnovka).[8] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces may have advanced into Makhnovka “some time ago,” however.[9] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 4 that Russian and North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near Makhnovka on January 3 and 4.[10] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced southeast of Makhnovka and along a road into southeastern Kurilovka (immediately southwest of Makhnovka).[11] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced during counterattacks against Ukrainian assaults east of Leonidovo towards Nikolskiy and in the direction of Malaya Loknya (northeast of Sudzha) on January 5.[12] Another Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian mechanized column unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Malaya Loknya, however.[13] The milblogger complained that Ukrainian forces destroyed most Russian mechanized columns in Kursk Oblast. Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), Chechen Akhmat “Aida” Spetsnaz group, former Wagner Group personnel, and unspecified BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) units reportedly defended against the Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast.[14]

Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military’s ability to react to Ukraine’s ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on January 5 that Ukrainian EW interference during Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast prevented Russian forces from operating drones in the area, degrading Russian forces’ ability to defend against Ukrainian mechanized attacks.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that drones with fiber optic cables are one of the few Russian drone variants that consistently resist Ukrainian EW countermeasures, although some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were able to use some first-person view (FPV) and Lancet drones.[16] Russian officials claimed on January 5 that Russian forces downed three unspecified Ukrainian missiles over Kursk Oblast, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may be attempting to integrate longer-range strike capabilities with ground operations and tactical EW systems.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes near Bolshoye Soldatskoye and other unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast to prevent Russian forces from deploying reinforcements, artillery systems, and drone operators.[18] Widespread Russian concern over Russia’s ability to respond to improved Ukrainian EW technology and long-range strike capabilities indicates that Russian forces may be struggling to quickly adapt to Ukrainian battlefield innovations. Reports that Ukrainian forces are using long-range fires to interdict Russian rear areas and EW to degrade Russian drones in support of Ukrainian mechanized advances indicate that Ukrainian forces operating in Kursk are employing more effective combined arms tactics.

The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA’s area of responsibility (AoR) east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 5 that Russian forces intensified offensive operations east of Pokrovsk over the last week (since December 29), and ISW started observing reports of renewed Russian activity in the area on December 27.[24] Recent Russian advances near Vozdvyzhenka and Yelyzavetivka and claims that Russian forces are advancing further north towards Vodyane Druhe and Baranivka indicate that Russian forces may be forming a salient that they intend to leverage to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast. Elements of the Russian 41st CAA have reportedly been regrouping and reconstituting in this area for several months, and Mashovets assessed in late December 2024 that the Russian military command was preparing to activate elements of the 41st CAA east and northeast of Pokrovsk.[25] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will have to make significant and rapid advances toward Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) or towards and into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) if Russian forces intend to envelop Pokrovsk from both the northeast and southwest in the near future.[26] The Russian military command may assess that advancing through the fields and small settlements along the Vozdvyzhenka-Yelyzavetivka-Myrne-Razine line will be an easier path of advance than attempting to fight through the more urban and heavily defended settlements of Novoekonomichne and Myrnohrad closer to Pokrovsk.

Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance. ISW previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have instructed the Russian military command to delay the seizure of Pokrovsk in favor of making further gains through open fields and small settlements, particularly as Russian forces advance closer to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary.[27] Russian advances east of Pokrovsk may be opportunistic, aimed at seizing additional territory regardless of its tactical significance, and the beginning of a concerted Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast. Russian advances towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary may also be part of an opportunistic exploitation of weaker Ukrainian positions south of Pokrovsk, while also contributing to Russia’s long-term objective of advancing to the administrative boundaries of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[28] The Russian military command likely intends to exploit opportunities to advance east and south of Pokrovsk so long as such advances remain expedient and Ukrainian forces continue to repel Russian attacks immediately near and into Pokrovsk itself.

Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia’s two most prioritized sectors of the frontline. Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently advanced to southeastern Yelyazavetivka and seized Svyrydonivka and Tymofiivka (all east of Pokrovsk).[29] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade also reportedly participated in the seizure of Vozdvyzhenka as of January 2.[30] The 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly also participated in the seizure of Kurakhove and the Kurakhivske Thermal Power Plant (TPP) and is conducting clearing operations within the settlement, indicting that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade are currently split between at least two sectors of the frontline.[31] ISW has not observed reports of other elements of the Russian 51st CAA operating east of Pokrovsk in the 41st CAA’s AoR within the past month. The Russian military’s decision to split the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade along two prioritized sectors of the frontline and reports of their participation in the seizure of several settlements indicates that the Russian military may be using elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade as a tactical penetration force.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5.
• Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5.
• Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military’s ability to react to Ukraine’s ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations.
• Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast.
• The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA’s area of responsibility east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area.
• Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance.
• Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia’s two most prioritized sectors of the frontline.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient and regained lost positions near Chasiv Yar.
  
  
  

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus
  
  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for updates on Ukrainian ground operations in Kursk Oblast.

A Russian source claimed on January 5 that a Ukrainian missile strike near Lgov, Kursk Oblast killed Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division’s Communications Head Lieutenant Colonel Valery Tereschchenko on December 30.[34] A Ukrainian source stated that Ukrainian forces launched an unspecified number of Storm Shadow missiles at a 76th VDV Division command post and killed eight senior commanders and wounded 20 personnel.[35]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Note: ISW is now orienting Russian activity along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions to reflect Russian forces’ priority operational goals in these areas.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this.[38] Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on January 4 and 5.[39] Ukrainian Kupyansk City Administration Head Andriy Besedin stated on January 4 that Russian forces are conducting glide bomb, multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), and drone strikes on Kupyansk and that the frontline is approximately two kilometers from the city’s center.[40]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields northwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova) during a roughly company-sized mechanized assault.[41] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 5 that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon near Zahryzove (north of Borova) and that Ukrainian forces damaged two armored vehicles while repelling the assault.[42] Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya, Pershotravneve, Novoserhiivka, Novoyehorivka, and Tverdokhlibove; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka on January 4 and 5.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Note: ISW will be incorporating data previously reported as the Vuhledar direction as part of the Kurakhove direction moving forward to reflect the shifting operational situation in this area.

Russian forces attacked in the Siversk direction on January 5 but did not advance.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on January 5 but did not make confirmed advances. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 218th Tank Regiment (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attacking along the Velyka Novosilka-Hulyaipole road.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Velyka Novosilka near Neskuchne, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[67] Russian forces also continued assaults north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar on January 5.[68]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the afternoon and evening on January 4 and overnight on January 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 30 Shahed and decoy drones from the northeastern direction during the afternoon and evening on January 4.[75] The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed 14 drones and that 16 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, as of 2000 local time. The Ukrainian National Police reported on January 5 that a Russian drone strike damaged an infrastructure facility in Zaporizkyi Raion, Zaporizhia Oblast during the day on January 4.[76] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 5 that Russian forces launched 103 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk and Oryol oblasts and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast overnight on January 4 to 5.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed 61 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts and that 42 drones were ”lost” as of 0900 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that debris from downed drones damaged several houses in Kharkiv Oblast overnight.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://t.me/yurasumy/20297; https://t.me/yurasumy/20300; https://t.me/yurasumy/20304; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31109; https://t.me/sashakots/51107; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61223; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150255; https://t.me/iamsniper/9786; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20229; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20230; https://t.me/dva_majors/61882 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9792; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21978; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21980; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21981; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20228; https://t.me/voenacher/76341 ; https://t.me/rybar/66918; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61224; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150246 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9777; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150248; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150262; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150257; https://t.me/iamsniper/9788

[2] https://t.me/yurasumy/20297; https://t.me/yurasumy/20300; https://t.me/yurasumy/20304; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31109; https://t.me/sashakots/51107; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61223; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150255; https://t.me/iamsniper/9786; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20229; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20230; https://t.me/dva_majors/61882 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9792; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21978; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21980; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21981; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20228; https://t.me/voenacher/76341 ; https://t.me/rybar/66918; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61224; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150246 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9777; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150248; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150262; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150257; https://t.me/iamsniper/9788

[3] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1875880843513934279; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83924; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1875949210413224109; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1875947064149819772; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1875987969469018405 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31123

[4] https://t.me/rybar/66922; https://t.me/dva_majors/61851; https://t.me/dva_majors/61881; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21987; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21978

[5] https://t.me/rybar/66922; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61223; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21987; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31082

[6] https://t.me/notes_veterans/21298 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21299 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/21300; https://t.me/rusich_army/19869 ; https://t.me/rybar/66916; https://t.me/rybar/66922; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150247; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150270; https://t.me/rusich_army/19878 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18470; https://t.me/yurasumy/20297; https://t.me/yurasumy/20304; https://t.me/rybar/66929

[7] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24346; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8026; https://t.me/assaultregiment33/236; https://t.me/assaultregiment33/237

[8] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31101; https://t.me/rusich_army/19882; https://t.me/rusich_army/19877 

[9] https://t.me/rybar/66926

[10] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2025/01/4/7492051/; https://suspilne dot media/917979-u-kurskij-oblasti-za-dva-dni-rf-vtratila-do-bataljonu-pihoti-zelenskij/

[11] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31104

[12] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21971; https://t.me/rybar/66922; https://t.me/yurasumy/20297; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150250; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31101 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31104 

[13] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1875873948942139747 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31099

[14] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/47358 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61885; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83929; https://t.me/dva_majors/61882 ; https://t.me/iamsniper/9792; https://t.me/rusich_army/19869 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18464

[15] https://t.me/rybar/66922 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83908 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/61851 ; https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/12692 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21974 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20297 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18468 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/14006 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61228

[16] https://t.me/rybar/66922 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61228 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/139205

[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/294755 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294759

[18] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18467

[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12188

[21] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8020 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12216 

[22] https://t.me/yurasumy/20296 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20311 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61222 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21964

[23] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2473 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02BgVUTVSbXTfUGwaKvwVXP97n3K6ynkBGZNAdF8tXqgKE7bWqGwrDrJoJDLgbh6dZl 

[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2024

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324

[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122324 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine

[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8020; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12216

[30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025

[31] https://t.me/vrogov/18604 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83905 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61220 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150245 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12627 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22091 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024

[32] https://t.me/andriyshTime/31623; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31623; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31634; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31641; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31633 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/31639; https://t.me/severrealii/29058; https://t.me/vchkogpu/53768 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/139173

[33] https://t.me/tass_agency/294698 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294699 ; https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/1730 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/294711

[34] https://t.me/ohliga/11154

[35] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/16372

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937

[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/boyi-na-shodi-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-vidminnosti-v-taktyczi-voroga-na-riznyh-napryamkah/

[38] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30400

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl

[40] https://www.youtube.com/live/j5TqaWCCdUg?si=91fF0E-yrfaQl69C ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/909821-linia-frontu-prohodit-za-dva-kilometri-vid-centru-kupanska-nacalnik-mva/

[41] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24320 ; https://t.me/fedorenkoys/873 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8016 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1875630388774891556 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/zgority-pid-zagryzovym-rosiyany-dvichi-atakuvaly-na-kupyanshhyni/

[42] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937

[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl

 

[44] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl

[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8017; https://t.me/mobilizirovan2022/5380

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937

[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/24112

[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21969

[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8027; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LFwAKtGYUEY; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1875681559061393726; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DEYbyaqI7lP/

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937; https://t.me/wargonzo/24112 

[52] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/918133-aku-taktiku-zastosovue-armia-rf-na-toreckomu-napramku/

[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61218

[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2473; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02BgVUTVSbXTfUGwaKvwVXP97n3K6ynkBGZNAdF8tXqgKE7bWqGwrDrJoJDLgbh6dZl

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61218   

[56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/shturmovyky-za-try-tyzhni-yak-rosiya-navchaye-soldat-za-prynczypom-trymaj-zbroyu-i-jdy/

[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/pokrovskyj-napryamok-pid-tyskom-rosiyany-shturmuyut-malymy-grupamy-j-haotychno-byut-po-mistah/

[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/918061-rf-nakopicue-vijska-na-okolicah-pokrovska/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/vorog-robyt-stavku-na-motoczyklistiv-ta-fpv-drony-sytuacziya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/

[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8024; https://t.me/mo114rf/86 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83921 

[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8028; https://t.me/mechanized33/699

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/3937 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61218

[62] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/05/boyi-na-shodi-u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-vidminnosti-v-taktyczi-voroga-na-riznyh-napryamkah/

[63] https://suspilne dot media/918015-ssa-tiho-peredavali-ukraini-zbrou-ataka-gur-na-rosijski-servisi-1047-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1736094340&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83905 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61220 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150245 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/12627 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22091

[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83886 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/83892 ;

[66] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2472 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02BgVUTVSbXTfUGwaKvwVXP97n3K6ynkBGZNAdF8tXqgKE7bWqGwrDrJoJDLgbh6dZl

[67] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30397

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gMDVh6YMYVEYWtfnjDFgQ5US3ikdakqn5383DYvQeju6HppMaeV1ouDFf3JLXGhxl

[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21982

[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21982; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/21964;

[71] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/fpv-zasidka-rozvidnyky-likviduvaly-nachalnyka-shtabu-batalionu-okupantiv-shtorm-osietiia.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5161

[72] https://t.me/batalyon15/5227

[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uWvRcN9G3RFHzxoUkNTLkKwsxiVn7artgssqC9pLXyQG2vkj5ovebtuGTrJ5jCJrl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02mZHo4TEoyyRTpWZaLLXhtDc6fQVetbgomdPyym2PoeZkQv6omnDs1LfDr8SDFEnml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023yGxSLAQ1iXkWzBRZDJPCpyEuWRjH86ygec4okqHvaVVCKGqddYTgsMb2br1zjCpl

[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/61826; https://t.me/dva_majors/61848

[75] https://t.me/kpszsu/26239

[76] https://suspilne dot media/918015-ssa-tiho-peredavali-ukraini-zbrou-ataka-gur-na-rosijski-servisi-1047-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1736082659&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/police_zp_news/18707

[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/26301