Toplines
Russian forces’ rate of advance marginally increased in August 2026, but Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive has failed to achieve operational maneuver or rapidly collapse Ukrainian lines. Russian gains remain slow and limited. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces consolidated positions in or seized about 90.35 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine in August 2026, averaging 2.91 square kilometers seized per day. Including Russian infiltrations, Russian forces advanced or infiltrated into about 123.53 square kilometers — an average pace of 3.98 square kilometers per day. Russian forces’ main territorial gains in August 2026 have been in the Fortress Belt area, Donetsk Oblast. Even there, Russian forces managed to achieve only marginal tactical gains and have thus far failed to complete the seizure of Kostyantynivka. Russian forces maintain a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in 72.23 percent of Kostyantynivka and have failed to completely seize the settlement, even after months of increased infiltrations and urban fighting.[1] Russian advances in August 2026 remain a fraction of Russia’s gains during the same period in 2025, even when including infiltrations. Russian forces seized 505.55 square kilometers in August 2025, for example, highlighting how Russian forces’ rate of advance continues to slow. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations across the theater in August 2026, notably in the Lyman and Oleksandrivka directions, and ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces liberated at least 129.81 square kilometers in August 2026.[2] This figure is very likely conservative, as ISW’s methodology underestimates the extent of likely Ukrainian gains in the ongoing counteroffensive in the Lyman direction, and additional collection will likely reveal the full extent of Ukrainian gains in the Lyman direction in Fall 2026. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more evidence becomes available.
Russian forces continued to suffer a high casualty rate in August 2026 for the second month in a row, paying an increasingly high price for limited battlefield gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 1 that Russian forces suffered 42,020 casualties in August 2026 — the second month in a row that Russian forces suffered over 40,000 casualties in a single month.[3] Russian forces suffered an average of 340 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized or infiltrated and 465 casualties per square kilometer seized in August 2026. Russia’s current force generation system based on volunteer recruitment continues to struggle to recruit enough soldiers to replace current losses, and it remains unclear how long Russian forces will be able to sustain their current footpace offensive tempo at their current loss rate without some form of mobilization.[4]
Senior German officials and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen explicitly attributed the August 5 drone attack targeting Germany’s Leipzig/Halle Airport to Russia.[5] German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stated on September 1 that Russia is responsible for the attack at the Leipzig/Halle Airport. Dobrindt stated that Germany and its European partners clearly identified Russian involvement in planning and executing this “hybrid operation” and noted that the perpetrators employed tactics consistent with known Russian modus operandi, including the drone‘s configuration, components, ignition technology, and explosive payload. German authorities discovered a drone containing explosives near a Ukrainian Antonov cargo plane overnight on August 4 to 5 and reported that a second drone collided with another cargo plane that was aborting its landing due to the first drone incident.[6] This attack is not simply a “hybrid operation” but one attack in a series of attacks, all part of Russia‘s larger continued “Phase Zero” campaign, which aims to set informational and psychological conditions for potential future conventional threat against NATO by conducting attacks that test the limits of Western responses.[7]
Other recent incidents in Germany and Poland fit within the Russian pattern of provocations against European and NATO states but have yet to be officially attributed to Russia. German Brandenburg State Interior Minister Jan Redmann confirmed on September 1 that German police and emergency services found and defused a “double-digit” number of explosive devices near the Janschwalde coal-fired power plant in Brandenburg, Germany.[8] Polish Interior Minister Marcin Kierwinski stated on September 1 that a fire at the Polish WB Electronics production facility in Skarzysko-Kamienna on August 31 was likely arson.[9] Polish media outlet Defence 24 reported on August 31 that a large fire broke out at the JFG Composites warehouse in Lublin, Poland, marking two significant fire incidents (likely arson events) at defense industrial sites in Poland in less than 24 hours.[10] Such incidents fit within the known pattern of Russian sabotage attacks against European defense industrial base entities that Russia has been intensifying since 2025.[11]
Additional details regarding Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi’s efforts to erect new operational commands to defend Donetsk Oblast are emerging. Ukrainian news outlet Hromadske reported on September 1 that the formation that Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky will command will have an area of responsibility (AoR) spanning from the Lyman direction to the Kramatorsk-Kostyantynivka area in the Fortress Belt, and that the formation under the command of Commander Brigadier General Denys Prokopenko will have an AoR over the Dobropillya sector to the south.[12] Hromadske reported that Drapatyi appointed former Deputy Commander of the Air Assault Forces’ 7th Rapid Reaction Corps Colonel Emil Ishkulov as the 11th Army Corps commander and acting 19th Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Valeriy Skred to command the 19th Army Corps. Both the 11th and 19th Army Corps are responsible for the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk area (the Fortress Belt) and will report to Biletsky’s command. Hromadske quoted a Ukrainian General Staff source who said that the new formations’ priority is to stop Russian forces’ advances. Zelensky announced the creation of two new formations to support the Ukrainian defense in Donetsk Oblast under the command of Biletsky and Prokopenko on August 26.[13]
Russian forces are shifting their strike tactics to maximize civilian harm by leveraging jet-powered drones over slower and less effective piston-engine-driven drones, likely because jet-powered drones are more difficult to intercept. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on September 1 that Russian forces launched five times more jet-powered drones in July 2026 compared to June 2026 and over 2,800 jet-powered drones in August 2026.[14] Ihnat noted that Ukraine’s interception rate against standard piston-engine-driven drones is between 90 and 95 percent, whereas the interception rate against jet-powered drones is lower at around 60 percent. Russian forces began regularly using jet-powered drones as part of daily strike packages for the first time in August 2026. Russia began intensifying its use of jet-powered drone strikes in late April 2026 in response to Ukraine’s high intercept rate against piston-engine drones. Russia increased the proportion of jet-powered drones within its strike packages to around 56 percent in August 2026, despite decreasing the total number of long-range drones launched against Ukraine. Russia used 6,583 long-range drones against Ukraine in April 2026, whereas Russia only used 4,943 such drones in August 2026 when Russia had prioritized production of Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet-powered drones.
Russian forces have recently adopted new tactics by striking Ukrainian cities continuously throughout the day in addition to conducting overnight strike packages. Russia’s previous strikes concentrated most strikes in the evening while not launching large drone salvos during the day. Russia is notably not significantly increasing the overall number of strike vehicles as part of the new daytime strikes but is using a comparable number of vehicles throughout the day. Russia has been conducting continuous daytime and overnight drone strike waves against Ukraine, particularly targeting Kyiv City, since August 27.[15] Russian strike packages since late Summer 2026 have been increasingly targeting shopping centers, food warehouses, and other private civilian facilities.[16] Russia’s continued use of these tactics likely aims to increase civilian damage and force Ukrainians to seek shelter more often, resulting in significant disruptions in daily life and the Ukrainian economy, likely to demoralize Ukraine’s population.[17]
Russian President Vladimir Putin is augmenting the force that ensures his personal safety and the security of Russian high-ranking officials. Putin signed a decree on August 31 expanding Russia’s Federal Protective Service (FSO) staff, the Russian state security agency responsible for the physical protection of high-ranking government officials, from 785 to 812 personnel — the fourth increase of the FSO’s staff since February 2022.[18] The FSO sharply increased security around Putin and his senior officials in Spring 2026 amidst Ukrainian drone strikes and intensified assassinations and assassination attempts against senior Russian officials across Russia.[19] There have been at least five assassination attempts against high-ranking Russian military officials since December 2025, including an improvised explosive device (IED) detonation targeting Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Colonel General Alexander Chayko on August 1.[20] Putin is likely responding by increasing personal security to support regime stability and the safety of his inner circle. Putin has taken several other measures to enhance his personal safety, including spending time in underground bunkers, moving air defense systems closer to his residences, and censoring the Russian information space en masse.[21]
Putin conducted a substantial reshuffle within Russian law enforcement agencies on August 31, likely in preparation for potential mobilization following the State Duma elections. Putin dismissed 13 Russian officials, including Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations’ Main Directorate Head Alexey Anikin, Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Main Directorate Criminal Investigation Department Head Sergey Kuzmin, Ministry of Justice’s Department Deputy Director Anastasia Leletina, Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Criminal Investigation Main Directorate Deputy Head Sergey Savochkin, and Kursk Oblast Investigate Committee Head Andrey Guzev, among others, according to Russian insider source VChK-OGPU.[22] The source reported that Putin appointed 15 Russian officials to various law enforcement apparatuses, including Russian Ministry of Justice’s Protection of National Interests from External Influence Department Deputy Director Aleksandr Akulov, Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Main Directorate Criminal Investigation Moscow Department Head Mikhail Vanichkin, Moscow Oblast Ministry of Emergency Situations’ Main Directorate Deputy Head Vladimir Lavrushenko, Investigative Committee Deputy Chairman Andrey Maslov, and Penza Oblast Investigative Committee’s Investigative Directorate Head Andrei Fishman. ISW is unable to confirm the report at this time. If true, such a law enforcement reshuffling would be substantial, especially given that the shuffle concerned officials responsible for Kursk and Penza oblasts, which could be particularly vulnerable to civil unrest in the event of a potential mobilization. ISW has observed Russian law enforcement officers conducting coercive recruitment efforts in Penza and Kursk oblasts since at least June 2026.[23] The Kremlin has been setting conditions for involuntary reserve call-ups since at least October 2025, although the presence of such conditions does not mean Putin himself has decided to conduct mobilization.[24] ISW continues to assess that any compulsory mobilization is a personal decision for Putin and is contingent on his perception of battlefield realities and regime stability.[25]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces’ rate of advance marginally increased in August 2026, but Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive has failed to achieve operational maneuver or rapidly collapse Ukrainian lines. Russian gains remain slow and limited.
- Russian forces continued to suffer a high casualty rate in August 2026 for the second month in a row, paying an increasingly high price for limited battlefield gains.
- Senior German officials and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen explicitly attributed the August 5 drone attack targeting Germany’s Leipzig/Halle Airport to Russia.
- Additional details regarding Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi’s efforts to erect new operational commands to defend Donetsk Oblast are emerging.
- Russian forces are shifting their strike tactics to maximize civilian harm by leveraging jet-powered drones over slower and less effective piston-engine-driven drones, likely because jet-powered drones are more difficult to intercept.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin is augmenting the force that ensures his personal safety and the security of Russian high-ranking officials.
- Putin conducted a substantial reshuffle within Russian law enforcement agencies on August 31, likely in preparation for potential mobilization following the State Duma elections.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 1.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries and military assets.
- Russia launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M, KN-23, and S-400 ballistic missiles, Zirkon anti-ship missiles, Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles, Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and Banderol-type loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight.
- Russian forces also launched 218 Shahed-type strike drones overnight on August 31 to September 1 and 99 strike drones during the day on September 1.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries and military assets. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 1 that Ukrainian forces struck Novatek’s Ust-Luga oil export terminal in Leningrad Oblast (roughly 864 kilometers from the international border).[26] An image published on September 1 purportedly shows smoke rising above the Ust-Luga oil export terminal after a Ukrainian strike.[27] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozhdenko acknowledged on August 31 that a Ukrainian strike damaged the Ust-Luga port area.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on September 1 that Ukrainian strikes on August 30 destroyed a Russian drone launcher and drone storage site at the Tsimbulov Drone Port in Tsimbulov, Oryol Oblast.[29]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 1 but did not make confirmed advances.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed on September 1 that Russian forces entered Ulanove and advanced near Potapivka and Sadky (all northwest of Sumy City).[31]
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military logistics in Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a fuel and lubricants warehouse in Borisovka, Belgorod Oblast (one of multiple settlements between four and 49 kilometers from the international border).[32]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 31 and September 1 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[33]
Russian forces are reportedly establishing denser positions in some areas in the Velykyi Burluk direction. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 1 that the distance between Russian units is decreasing between Vasylivka and Vilkhuvatka (north and northeast of Velykyi Burluk, respectively), implying that Russian forces are establishing the same or more positions in a smaller area.[34] The milblogger did not specify a reason for this change, and ISW is unable to confirm the milblogger’s claim.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 1 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[35] Russian sources published footage on August 31 claiming to show Russian servicemembers operating in Velyka Shapkivka (northwest of Kupyansk) and north of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) to claim that Russian forces have advanced in the area.[36] ISW has reason to assess that this footage may have been doctored or artificial intelligence (AI) generated.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 1 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[37] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 1 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Shykivka (west of Borova), near Ridkodub and Nove, and towards Katerynivka (all southeast of Borova).[38] Some Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces advanced and made tactically significant gains in the area.[39]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military vehicle concentration in occupied Verknokamyanka (roughly 116 kilometers from the frontline).[40] Ukrainian forces struck a Buk-M3 surface-to-air missile launcher near the M-30 Luhansk-Donetsk City highway east of occupied Yurivka (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline) reportedly on August 13, according to geolocated footage published on August 31.[41]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 31 and September 1 but did not advance.[42] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces and a Russian milblogger acknowledged on September 1 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking both north and south of Lyman (northeast of Slovyansk).[43]
Order of Battle: Geolocated footage published on August 31 shows the Russian Argos Unmanned Systems Battalion striking a Ukrainian communications tower in Donetske, Donetsk Oblast.[44] This is the first evidence ISW has observed of this battalion operating in Ukraine.
Russian forces are reportedly reinforcing in the Slovyansk direction and are striking Slovyansk with tube artillery. An officer from Ukraine’s 11th Army Corps stated that Russia redeployed elements of the 123rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) from near Siversk to reinforce the Slovyansk effort.[45] Slovyansk Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh stated that Russian forces are now seven to 10 kilometers from Slovyansk and within artillery range of Slovyansk.[46] Lyakh’s statements suggest that Russian forces are shelling Slovyansk with tube artillery, likely in preparation for offensive operations in the area.
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission south of Druzhkivka. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember in Raiske (south of Druzhkivka), according to geolocated footage published on August 31, which ISW assesses occurred after a Russian infiltration mission.[47]
A Russian milblogger claimed on September 1 that Russian forces seized Fedorivka (north of Kostyantynivka) on an unspecified date since August 1.[48]
Russian forces have begun shelling the approaches to Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka with tube artillery, likely to prepare for offensive operations in the area. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on September 1 that Russian forces began using tube artillery to shell the approaches to Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka after previously only using multi-launch rocket systems (MLRS).[49] The brigade reported that Russian forces seek to interdict Ukrainian logistics to Druzhkivka and are conducting heavy airstrikes from the western outskirts of Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka toward Raiske (south of Druzhkivka).
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission near Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in Hannivka (just northeast of Dobropillya) after a likely Russian infiltration mission, according to geolocated footage published on August 31.[50]
Russian milbloggers continue to exaggerate Russian advances in the Dobropillya tactical area as part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian gains. Russian sources published footage on August 31 claiming to show Russian forces raising a flag in Novoandriivka (northeast of Dobropillya).[51] ISW has reason to assess that the footage was likely doctored or AI-altered. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 31 that the footage supports the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) claim that Russian sources seized Novoandriivka on August 29.[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions on September 1 but did not advance.[53]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on September 1 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[54]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military equipment in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 1 that Ukrainian forces struck storage, preparation, and launch sites for strike drones in occupied Donetsk City (about 60 kilometers from the frontline) on August 31 or overnight into September 1.[55] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military cargo truck east of occupied Vasylivka (around 38 kilometers from the frontline) and another vehicle near occupied Horlivka (around 31 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on August 31.[56]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 31 and September 1 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kopany and Verkhnya Tersa and advanced southwest of Dolynka (all northwest of Hulyaipole) since August 1.[57]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near occupied Polohy (south of Hulyaipole, about 15 kilometers from the frontline) on August 31 or overnight into September 1.[58]
The Russian MoD effectively claimed that Russian forces have partially encircled Orikhiv from the southwest and east, but these claims are not consistent with available open-source evidence of the battlefield. The Russian MoD claimed on September 1 that elements of the Dnepr Grouping of Forces seized Novopavlivka (northwestern outskirts of Orikhiv) and that elements of the Eastern Grouping of Forces, which are operating from the Hulyaipole direction to the east, seized Chervona Krynytsya (northeast of Orikhiv).[59] The MoD’s claims amount to a partial encirclement of Orikhiv. Russian sources published footage claiming to show Russian forces waving flags in Novopavlivka and elements of the 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) raising flags in Chervona Krynytsya, to bolster the MoD’s claims.[60] ISW has reason to assess that the footage is AI-altered. The pattern of recent Russian ground and strike activity in western Zaporizhia Oblast is not consistent with the MoD’s claims. The Ukrainian General Staff only reported one engagement near Mala Tokmachka (immediately southeast of Orikhiv) and six or fewer engagements northwest of Hulayipole in both its 10:00 PM August 31 and 8:00 AM September 1 situation reports — too little activity to be consistent with a Russian push that seized two settlements.[61] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces were infiltrating in some areas of Orikhiv itself and Mala Tokmachka in late August 2026 but have not indicated that Russian forces have firm control over any part of these settlements or on Orikhiv’s immediate flanks.[62] The Russian MoD has severely exaggerated the extent of claimed Russian advances in the Orikhiv direction in particular because of “beautiful reports,” which exaggerate the extent of Russian advances such that these exaggerations hinder Russian operational planning in affected areas. A leaked map from April 2026 demonstrated that the MoD’s perception of advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast was far beyond even the most extensive Russian milblogger claims at that time.[63] The Russian objective in western Zaporizhia Oblast has been Orikhiv since retaking Robotyne (south of Orikhiv) in May 2024.[64] The Russian MoD is likely attempting to set conditions to capitalize on an informational victory of the claimed seizure of Orikhiv after such a long and bloody effort.
Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign interdicting Russian logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian drones struck vehicles along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway east of Novoivanivka (about 80 kilometers from the frontline) and along the H-30 Berdyansk-Tokmak-Vasylivka highway north of Tokmak (about 28 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on August 23 and 31, respectively.[65]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 31 or September 1.
Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea and interdicting logistics to Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone storage, preparation, and launch sites near occupied Hvardiiske (roughly 195 kilometers from the frontline) and a communications hub in Myrne (either about 143 or 209 kilometers from the frontline) on August 31 or overnight on August 31 into September 1.[66] A Crimea-based Telegram channel published footage on August 31 of trucks broken down and on fire on the sides of highways to occupied Crimea and implied that Ukrainian forces hit the vehicles.[67] The Crimea-based channel also published an image on September 1 of a destroyed Pantsir-S1 air defense system near Kerch (roughly 290 kilometers from the frontline) after Ukrainian forces reportedly hit the system on August 29.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that the destroyed Pantsir had been defending the Kerch Strait Bridge since Summer 2024.[69]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[70]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 31 into September 1 and during the day on September 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces overnight launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M, S-400, or KN-23 ballistic missiles and Zirkon cruise missiles from Bryansk, Kursk, Voronezh, and Rostov oblasts; Kalibr cruise missiles from Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai; Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from over the Black Sea; and S8000 Banderol loitering munitions from Bryansk Oblast and over the Sea of Azov.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 218 Shahed-type strike drones (about a third of which are jet-powered) and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian forces reported that Ukrainian forces downed five Iskander-M, KN-23, or S-400 ballistic missiles, two S8000 Banderol loitering munitions, five Kalibr cruise missiles, and 187 Shahed- and Gerbera-type and other drones; that an unspecified number of drones and missiles struck 28 locations; and that drone debris fell on 10 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that some Russian missiles did not reach their targets. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, commercial, energy, and sports infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Odesa, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[72]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 99 strike drones, of which 72 were jet-powered, during the day on September 1, and that Ukrainian forces downed 82 drones, of which 57 were jet-powered.[73]
Russian forces continued strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure overnight on August 31 to September 1. Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported on September 1 that Russian forces struck a railway depot and other railway facilities in Kyiv Oblast with ballistic missiles overnight on August 31 into September 1, killing at least seven people (including six Ukrzaliznytsia employees) and destroying a workshop.[74]
Russian forces continued strikes against Ukrainian-Romanian border infrastructure. Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on September 1 that Russian forces struck the international crossing for the Orlivka ferry service on the Ukrainian-Romanian border.[75]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/
[3] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42088
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/
[5] https://www.euractiv dot com/news/germany-blames-russia-for-drone-attack-at-leipzig-airport/; https://x.com/vonderleyen/status/2094812082172493830?s=48; https://www.dw dot com/en/germany-says-russia-behind-attempted-drone-attack-at-leipzig-airport/a-78584589; https://www.facebook.com/deutschewellenews/videos/the-german-government-formally-blamed-russia-for-an-incident-involving-an-explos/1396947991950082/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/
[8] https://www.maz-online dot de/brandenburg/brandenburg-raketen-anschlag-auf-umspannwerk-am-kraftwerk-jaenschwalde-stromausfall-verhindert-QZIRYWEMBRGHRFAT6YQ3R7HRAI.html; https://www.reuters dot com/world/german-police-probe-unexploded-incendiary-device-brandenburg-power-substation-2026-09-01/
[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/fire-polish-drone-plant-likely-caused-by-sabotage-minister-says-2026-09-01/; https://www.samaa dot tv/2087356126-fire-at-polish-drone-plant-likely-caused-by-sabotage-minister
[10] https://defence24 dot pl/przemysl/tajemniczy-pozar-fabryki-w-lublinie-produkuje-komponenty-lotnicze#google_vignette; https://defence-blog dot com/poland-sees-two-fires-at-defense-plants-in-24-hours/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/
[12] https://hromadske dot ua/en/viyskovi/270269-drapatyis-big-reshuffle-ukraine-reshapes-donetsk-front-command-as-russia-closes-in-on-sloviansk-and-weighs-new-mobilization
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/
[14] https://suspilne dot media/1392716-vnoci-ppo-znisila-vsi-krilati-raketi-ta-kilka-balisticnih-dla-krasih-rezultativ-brakue-raket-do-patriot-ignat/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/;
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2026/;
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/
[18] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202608310009 ; https://ru dot themoscowtimes.com/2026/08/31/putin-v-chetvertii-raz-s-nachala-voini-uvelichil-shtat-rukovodstva-svoei-ohrani-a204844 ; https://www dot kommersant.ru/doc/8922647
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2026/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/
[22] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2381
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/ ; https://www.svoboda dot org/a/srochnikov-pod-pytkami-zastavili-podpisatj-kontrakty/33829870.html ; https://x.com/RALee85/status/2091155771790876950 ; https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/stories/2026/08/21/zhitelei-penzenskoi-oblasti-otlavlivayut-na-voinu-vse-novimi-sposobami/index.html
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/ ; ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/
[26] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9298
[27] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/30178; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2094665583811813711
[28] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/11937
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42087; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2026/
[30]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42084 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36615 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47121 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9188 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/33776
[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33776
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42087
[33]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42081 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42084 ; https://t.me/synegubov/25377 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98329 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9188 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36615
[34] https://t.me/wargonzo/36615
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42084 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36615 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47121
[36] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12841 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3438 ; https://t.me/kcaebirds/3496
[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/36615 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98329
[38] https://t.me/grvZapad/19639
[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/98329; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47106
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42087
[41] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2094670670596575537?s=20; https://t.me/WS_videos/4315
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42081; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42084; https://t.me/wargonzo/36615; https://t.me/red_war_machina/870
[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47106; https://t.me/grvZapad/19639
[44] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2094614908742824266; https://t.me/hB1Qfe0kuFxiZGMy/48
[45] https://hromadske dot ua/en/viyskovi/270269-drapatyis-big-reshuffle-ukraine-reshapes-donetsk-front-command-as-russia-closes-in-on-sloviansk-and-weighs-new-mobilization
[46] https://hromadske dot ua/en/viyskovi/270269-drapatyis-big-reshuffle-ukraine-reshapes-donetsk-front-command-as-russia-closes-in-on-sloviansk-and-weighs-new-mobilization
[47] https://t.me/skala425/972 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12845
[48] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33776
[49] https://www.facebook.com/93OMBr/posts/pfbid021itdZuVbeteY61HZDNKJvKkWzYYi931wAuADyPAfWW48ziazLTvirarRCifnNSpjl?rdid=H2jF9krNxIsrVAY9
[50] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2094497210637414774 ; https://x.com/Skelya425/status/2094455169291288669
[51] https://t.me/Osintpen/3437
[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/98310 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42081; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42084; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/122365
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42081; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42084; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47121; https://t.me/voin_dv/20926
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42087
[56] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2094424994801418415/photo/2; https://t.me/umftteam/1099; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2094356040150073693?s=20
[57] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33776
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42087
[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/66941; https://t.me/mod_russia/66939
[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12846; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2094714231379898573; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2094714749770674631 https://t.me/Osintpen/3441; https://t.me/voin_dv/20928
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42081 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42084
[62] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/
[63] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/
[64] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_20-6/
[65] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2094526241114136746; https://x.com/GloOouD/status/2094498978725286253 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2094766707466256844?s=20; https://www.instagram.com/kristina__bocharova_/reel/DcZb-sjKms6/; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2094767907293032954?s=20
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42087
[67] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108481
[68] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/108517
[69] https://t.me/milinfolive/178563
[70] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[71] https://t.me/kpszsu/75719
[72] https://www.facebook.com/61563587056322/posts/122206997492452901/?rdid=YYcOqD90lVPsPqus; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31488; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31483; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31765; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31782; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31781; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28437; https://t.me/synegubov/25377; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2771; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/20167; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/73326; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7375; https://t.me/kyivoda/55659; https://t.me/kyivoda/55673; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1392458-u-lubenskomu-rajoni-vpav-rosijskij-bpla-aki-naslidki/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/19438; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/11127; https://t.me/NaftogazUA/2959; https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/18211
[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/75795
[74] https://www.facebook.com/oleksandr.pertsovskyi/posts/pfbid0vQ3Yzm6xE7RLxFiagVwUiDBswibnkoJqP9wZPTKKHL5Rxaufb6dTzdyi1pSwEQcQl?rdid=l44VCi1ZafGlhvx4#
[75] https://t.me/odeskaODA/19438; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/62536
