Toplines
Several recent incidents in Europe, including drone incursions and acts of sabotage, were conducted by Russia or are likely attributable to Russia, as Western officials are increasingly warning of intensified Russian kinetic activity against Europe in the near future. A Russian Gerbera-type drone crashed in Moldova and another in Romania on September 24. Russian forces conducted combined drone and missile strikes against Ukraine, including against western Ukrainian oblasts, on the night of September 23 to 24.[1] A Russian Gerbera-type drone subsequently crashed in Cernita, Moldova, according to geolocated footage published on September 24 and statements from the Moldovan police.[2] The Romanian Ministry of National Defense reported that an unspecified aerial vehicle entered Romanian airspace for approximately four minutes on September 24 and crashed near Solca, Romania, and geolocated footage confirmed that a Russian Gerbera-type drone crashed in the area.[3] Chernivtsi Oblast Military Administration Head Ruslan Osypenko reported on September 24 that four Russian drones flew over Bukovyna in western Ukraine and targeted Ukrainian border crossings with Moldova and Romania.[4] Osypenko noted that Ukrainian forces shot down three drones in Ukraine and that one drone flew toward Suceava County in Romania. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated that Polish authorities evacuated the Zosin and Dorohusk crossings at the Polish-Ukrainian border for 30 minutes as a preventative measure during Russian strikes against Ukraine on September 24.[5] The September 24 evacuations of Polish border crossings are in line with the preventative security posture that Poland adopted in response to Russian strikes near the Polish-Ukrainian border crossings and recent drone incursions into Poland.[6] Intentional and accidental Russian drone incursions into NATO and Moldovan airspaces are likely part of the Kremlin’s efforts to normalize airspace violations by intensifying their frequency.[7]
Other recent incidents in Poland and Germany fit the Russian pattern of provocations against European defense and logistical infrastructure, but authorities have yet to officially attribute them to Russia. A fire broke out at the Starlink satellite communications ground base station in Wola Krobowska, Poland on the evening of September 23.[8] Polish Deputy Prime Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski confirmed on September 24 that the fire was the result of sabotage and aimed to disrupt internet services.[9] Gawkowski noted that Polish authorities have not established the responsible actor, but that many signs suggest that this act aligns with Russia’s “new” doctrine of attacks. German authorities temporarily suspended operations at the Berlin-Brandenburg airport on the evening of September 23 after German Air Traffic Control detected an unidentified drone flying in the area.[10] German authorities have also not yet linked the drone to Russia. Both the Polish and German incidents fit within Russia’s wider pattern in recent years of sabotage attacks against European defense assets and infrastructure in order to degrade Europe’s will and ability to provide aid and support for Ukraine.[11]
Western defense and intelligence sources continue warning about potential future Russian attacks in Europe. A source within the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense reported on September 23 that Russia could and may choose to launch Gerbera-type drones from a shipping container in the Mediterranean Sea against Spain, France, and Italy.[12] The Danish Defense Intelligence Service reported on September 24 that Russia will likely intensify its ”hybrid war” against the West in the coming months, including through cyber and sabotage attacks, but noted that Russia is unlikely to launch a limited military attack against one or several NATO countries bordering Russia.[13] The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reportedly also warned Poland that Russia may conduct a provocation against underwater telecommunications infrastructure to disrupt the Polish banking system.[14] The Kremlin likely used shadow fleet vessels as launch platforms for drone incursions into NATO airspace in recent months, and NATO thwarted Russian attempts to sabotage sea lines of communication and underwater cables near the Svalbard archipelago in Arctic waters in Spring 2026.[15] The increasing frequency of such warnings suggests that Western intelligence agencies are picking up indicators that the Kremlin is looking to diversify its platforms and means for conducting attacks against NATO and European states and is considering conducting such attacks. ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russia has yet conducted attacks like those described in the warnings.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to baselessly claim a Russian encirclement of Dobropillya as part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian battlefield successes and portray Ukrainian defenses as collapsing. The Russian MoD published a map on September 24 purporting to show how the Russian Central Grouping of Forces (GoF) encircled Ukrainian forces in Dobropillya, likely in an attempt to substantiate its initial claim about the encirclement on September 22 and to strengthen the false narrative that Russian encirclements in various sectors of the front prove that Ukrainian defenses are on the verge of collapse.[16] The MoD map claims significant Russian advances that do not correspond to the observed Russian presence in the area, particularly north of Dobropillya. The MoD claimed that the complete seizure of the strongly fortified settlement of Dobropillya will threaten key Ukrainian supply lines running from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast towards the Fortress Belt.
There has been no evidence from the battlefield in recent weeks suggesting significant Russian advances toward Dobropillya, and recent Ukrainian reports refute the Russian claims. ISW has observed no evidence to support these Russian MoD claims of advances within or surrounding Dobropillya, and recent statements from Ukrainian officials directly refute them.[17] ISW has in fact observed evidence to assess that the nearest Russian-held territory is 10.2 kilometers from the southeastern outskirts of Dobropillya. ISW observed evidence of Russian infiltrators operating east and northeast of Dobropillya on September 19 and 20 but does not assess that these infiltrators consolidated these positions.[18] The chief of staff of a Ukrainian artillery reconnaissance battalion stated on September 22 that Russian forces have not made major advances in the Dobropillya direction, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 20 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions south and northeast of Dobropillya.[19] One Russian milblogger on September 22 described the alleged Russian encirclement of Dobropillya as only the establishment of fire control over Ukrainian logistics, including over the roads west of Dobropillya and toward Svyatohorivka (west of Dobropillya), rather than a continuous infantry presence.[20] The Russian military’s pervasive culture of lying, on which Russian milbloggers have frequently commented for many months by criticizing the military’s ”beautiful reports,” has simultaneously degraded the Russian MoD’s ability to accurately understand the battlefield situation and allowed Russian forces to present aggrandized claims like the encirclement of Dobropillya.[21] The repeated Russian encirclement claims on September 22 and 24 also aim to divert attention from Ukraine’s elimination of the Russian salient north of Lyman in recent months, which has likely forced the Russian military command to rethink its wider plans to use Russian offensive activity in the Lyman and Dobropillya directions to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt and all of Donetsk Oblast.[22]
Ukraine and the United States remain committed to limited ceasefires and peace negotiations to end the war. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 24 that the Trump administration is proposing three immediate steps to de-escalate the war and resume diplomacy: a Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire of long-range strikes on energy infrastructure; the reopening of the Black Sea grain corridor; and a trilateral meeting between the United States, Ukraine, and Russia, possibly in Abu Dhabi.[23] Zelensky added that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s invitation for Russia to participate in the G20 Summit in December 2026 may provide a venue for trilateral talks. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that it is premature to talk about Russian President Vladimir Putin traveling to the G20 or meeting with US President Donald Trump.[24]
Key Takeaways
- Several recent incidents in Europe, including drone incursions and acts of sabotage, were conducted by Russia or are likely attributable to Russia, as Western officials are increasingly warning of intensified Russian kinetic activity against Europe in the near future.
- Other recent incidents in Poland and Germany fit the Russian pattern of provocations against European defense and logistical infrastructure, but authorities have yet to officially attribute them to Russia.
- Western defense and intelligence sources continue warning about potential future Russian attacks in Europe.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to baselessly claim a Russian encirclement of Dobropillya as part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian battlefield successes and portray Ukrainian defenses as collapsing.
- There has been no evidence from the battlefield in recent weeks suggesting significant Russian advances toward Dobropillya, and recent Ukrainian reports refute the Russian claims.
- Ukraine and the United States remain committed to limited ceasefires and peace negotiations to end the war.
- Russian officials reported that Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian energy and industrial infrastructure in Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai. Russia launched an unspecified number of Zircon anti-ship missiles and Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles and 282 drones against Ukraine overnight.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 24.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian officials reported Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian energy and industrial infrastructure in Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai. Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar claimed on September 24 that Ukrainian drone debris damaged an unspecified oil depot in Kagalnitsky Raion, Rostov Oblast (roughly 111 kilometers from the international border) but caused no fire.[25] The Krasnodar Krai Regional Headquarters claimed on September 24 that Ukrainian drone debris caused a fire at an unspecified industrial facility in Dinsky Raion, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 220 kilometers from the international border).[26] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev declared a regional state of emergency on September 24 due to Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian logistics infrastructure, halting grain exports and causing a domestic grain oversupply.[27]
Open-source imagery provided an updated battlefield damage assessment (BDA) of a recent Ukrainian strike against the Tobolskneftekhim plant in Tyumen Oblast. Geolocated imagery published on August 14 shows damage to the central gas fractionation unit at the Tobolskneftekhim petrochemical plant in Tobolsk, Tyumen Oblast, following a Ukrainian drone strike on August 10.[28] The source assessed that the strike caused the plant to halt operations.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 23 and 24 but did not advance.[29]
Ukrainian forces reportedly maintain very limited positions in Kursk Oblast. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 24 that fighting has resumed near Otruba, Kursk Oblast (northeast of Sumy City and just across the international border), which the source described as one of the final areas where Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Kursk Oblast.[30]
Ukrainian control of dominant heights and high drone saturation are reportedly complicating Russian advances northeast of Sumy City. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 23 that Russian forces are struggling to advance near Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City) because Ukrainian forces control elevated terrain and are camouflaging their personnel in forested areas.[31] The milblogger added that the high volume of Ukrainian drones is significantly complicating Russian advances northeast of Sumy City.
Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 23 and 24 but did not advance.[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 23 and 24 but did not make confirmed advances.[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 24 that Russian forces seized Khyzhniakove and Buzove (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[34] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the seizure of Buzove and elements of the Russian 344th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) with the seizure of Khyzhniakove.[35]
Russian sources continued to make baseless claims that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City. The Russian MoD claimed on September 24 that Russian forces’ seizure of Khyzhniakove and Buzove indicates that Russian forces are “tightening” their encirclement of Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City.[36] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are either tightening their encirclement or creating smaller encirclements within the already existing larger encirclement.[37] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged, however, that there is no visual evidence of a ”complete” encirclement and that there is little footage showing Russian control over the settlements that the Russian MoD has claimed as seized.[38] ISW has observed no evidence to support the Russian MoD’s and milbloggers’ claims of a Ukrainian encirclement in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and recent Ukrainian statements continue to refute these Russian claims.[39]
Order of Battle: A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on September 24 that elements of the Russian 46th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion are operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction – the first evidence ISW has observed of this unit’s existence.[40]
Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission north of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember southeast of Radkivka (north of Kupyansk), according to geolocated footage published on September 18, during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 24 that Russian forces advanced in northern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[42]
Autumnal weather is straining Russian forces’ ability to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on September 24 that the intensity of Russian offensive operations in the area has greatly decreased with the beginning of the rainy season as Russian forces struggle to launch drones during such weather conditions.[43] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces continue to conduct small-group infiltrations with artillery support, are using foliage for cover, and regularly use guided glide bombs to strike large Ukrainian manpower concentrations. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces constantly use reconnaissance and strike drones to attempt to cut Ukrainian logistics in the area. The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian forces have replaced logistics trucks with motorcycles and bicycles to reduce their visibility to Russian drones and preclude Russian strikes.
A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 24 that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[44]
Russian forces continue to conduct flag-raising missions to generate informational effects that do not correspond to reality. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on September 24 that the Russian military command has instructed the Russian 1432nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) to conduct a flag-raising mission in Novoplatonivka (northeast of Borova) in order to claim the seizure of the settlement.[45] The source added that there is a gas pipeline north of the settlement that Russian forces use to conduct infiltration missions but noted that Ukrainian forces regularly block the pipeline exits. ISW continues to assess that flag-raising tactics are a part of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate Russian gains and create a false perception of military strength.[46]
Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest
Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces concentrated offensive operations northeast of Lyman on September 23 and 24 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[47]
Ukrainian military officials continue to provide additional details about the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Lyman direction – Operation Vivaldi. The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps stated on September 24 that Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) demined 30 kilometers of routes toward Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman) in two nights during the first stage of Operation Vivaldi.[48] The Ukrainian corps stated that it is the first Ukrainian formation that is systematically using UGVs and drones to conduct remote mining operations to disrupt Russian logistics in the area.[49] The Ukrainian corps reported that UGVs can currently neutralize about 60 percent of the Russian anti-personnel mines in the corps’ area of responsibility (AoR). Ukrainian forces previously liberated Shandryholove, Derylove, and Drobysheve (all northwest of Lyman), liberating 50 square kilometers as part of the second phase of Operation Vivaldi.[50]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east
Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces concentrated offensive operations east of Slovyansk on September 23 and 24 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[51]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south
Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in northern and northwestern Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position northwest of Fedorivka (north of Kostyantynivka), according to geolocated footage published on September 24, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[52] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember in northwestern Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on September 24, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 24 that Russian forces are advancing toward Fedorivka from the east.[54]
Russian forces are focusing on striking the Ukrainian near rear in the Druzhkivka direction in order to cut off Ukrainian logistics and personnel rotations in the area.[55] A Ukrainian company operating in the area stated that Ukrainian forces move very cautiously and quickly between their positions in Druzhkivka due to the constant threat of Russian drones.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest
Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements
See topline text for additional claims of Russian advances in the Dobropillya direction.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction but did not make confirmed advances.[56] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 24 that elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Dobropillya (the smaller settlement southwest of Dobropillya).[57]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone storage, preparation, and launch site in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline) on September 23 or the night of September 23 to 24.[58]
Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Novopavlivka, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Novopavlivka.[59] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position northeast of Bilyakivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), according to geolocated footage published on September 23, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[60]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Oleksandrivka direction on September 24.
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr Grouping of Forces
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 23 and 24 but did not make confirmed advances.[61] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 24 that Russian forces seized Svitla Dolyna (northeast of Hulyaipole).[62] ISW has evidence to assess that Svitla Dolyna is at least 12 kilometers from the closest Russian infiltration point and roughly 16 kilometers from the closest assessed Russian advance.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 23 and 24 but did not advance.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 24 that Russian forces are attempting to push Ukrainian forces out of the pocket between Novodanylivka and Novoandriivka (both southwest of Orikhiv) and are attempting to advance from Novopavlivka to the T-08 Orikhiv-Polohy highway.[64] The milblogger noted that Russian forces are struggling to advance between Novodanylivka and Novoandriivka due to Ukrainian positions overlooking a sand quarry in the area.
Muddy terrain and Ukrainian drones are hindering Russian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported on September 24 that wet and muddy terrain is restricting Russian forces’ ability to use heavy equipment in the area and forcing them to resort to movement on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and on foot.[65] The commander stated that Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance remains one of the main obstacles for Russian forces and that Ukrainian forces continue to intercept Russian drones, hindering Russian advances in the area. The commander stated that Russian forces deploy small groups of poorly trained personnel to clear mines but that Ukrainian forces often restore their lost positions when Russian servicemembers detonate Ukrainian mines. The commander noted that Russian forces are not using heavy equipment and are barely using artillery in the area.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 35N6 Kasta radar station in occupied Chekhohrad (roughly 85 kilometers from the frontline) and a P-18 mobile long-range radar station in occupied Yakymivka (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline).[66]
Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics, purposefully hunting civilians in Zaporizhia City. Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Mykhailo Semikin reported on September 24 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a civilian bus in Zaporizhzhia City, and geolocated footage published on September 24 shows the aftermath of the strike.[67] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s use of FPV drones to strike civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear is indicative of a pervasive culture within the Russian military that seeks to both weaponize and institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a purposeful tool of war.[68]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on September 23 and 24 but did not advance.[69]
Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets near the frontline in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Kherson Oblast branch of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on September 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone manufacturing laboratory in Radensk (roughly 17 kilometers from the front line) and an ammunition depot in Oleshky (roughly six kilometers from the frontline).[70]
Ukrainian forces conducted an operation targeting Russian fuel logistics in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine. The commander of a Ukrainian regiment reported on September 24 that Ukrainian forces conducted a months-long operation targeting Russian fuel and lubricant depots and logistics along the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway.[71] The commander noted that Ukrainian strikes decreased Russian gasoline and diesel reserves, forcing Russian forces to switch to using gas generators.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[72]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 23 to 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on September 24 that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Zirkon anti-ship missiles from the directions of Kursk, Rostov, and Oryol oblasts and an unspecified number of Iskander-M, S-400, or KN-23 ballistic missiles from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.[73] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 282 Shahed-type (including jet-powered ones) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; and the Azov Sea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed four Zircon anti-ship missiles, three Iskander-M/S-400/KN-23 ballistic missiles, one Banderol or Dan-T loitering munition, and 219 drones; that an unspecified number of air vehicles struck 13 locations; and that debris fell on 10 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, civilian, medical, educational, and logistical infrastructure in Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Zhytomyr, and Rivne oblasts.[74]
Russia’s overnight combined drone and missile strikes heavily targeted Kyiv City. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported that Russian forces struck logistical, administrative, residential, transport, energy, religious, and commercial infrastructure, including a maternity hospital and a church in Kyiv City, injuring at least six people and killing at least two people.[75] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian air defenses intercepted 60 percent of the Russian ballistic missiles during three waves of strikes against Kyiv City on the night of September 23 to 24.[76] Ukrainian postal service Nova Poshta reported on September 24 that Russian forces struck a logistics branch and sorting depot in Kyiv City.[77]
Russian strikes against Ukrainian internet providers’ data centers continued to cause internet disruptions in Kyiv City. Ukrainian internet provider Etherlink reported on September 24 issues providing internet services to some users in Kyiv City due to Russian strikes damaging the company’s core network.[78] Ukraine’s National Commission for Electronic Communications, Radio Frequency Spectrum, and Postal Services (NKEK) reported on September 23 that Russian strikes damaged telecommunications infrastructure in Kyiv City, leading to temporary network disruptions.[79]
Russian strikes are heavily targeting Ukraine’s metallurgical industry. Metinvest Group Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Oleksandr Vodoviz reported on September 23 that Russian strikes destroyed five Metinvest furnaces and two ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih furnaces and caused the Arcelor and Petrovsky plants to halt operations.[80] Vodoviz noted that Ukraine did not produce a single ton of steel during an unspecified week in September 2026 for the first time in 100 years, indicating the heavy damage that Russian strikes have inflicted on Ukrainian steel production.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/prezident-obgovoriv-iz-chlenami-palati-predstavnikiv-ssha-po106557 ; https://t.me/I_Vyhivskyi/335 ; https://www.facebook.com/sergii.tiurin.public/posts/pfbid0253SZwVvPQ1wBGiDoytPwAxZJpr3Yg3q1WHdEaoqDjSZDwGGNR7FfyAR2j7Eu2L3bl?cft[0]=AZjHmFXgngSsOWUvDkNi8X3pGvGYdtcgTNrcyfndkpK80myEFeqouo1Vr938gBUszFXdVrV1E8vpQKAWH7gGuQcTw0K18ABW41laqj0_ZTt7FMj9j0xAGokFUALPatsOeTtIXBqoM493o_ySjVBHqJJyDZaAjHp&tn=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/kpszsu/79861
[2] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2103114863622983734?s=20; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17gxqRJLX6o ; https://t.me/Politia_Republicii_Moldova/16914
[3] https://english.mapn dot ro/cpresa/6871_update-%E2%80%93-press-release ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2103146279295459746?s=20 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yebM-nO_whA
[4] https://t.me/chernivetskaODA/20079
[5] https://www.rmf24 dot pl/fakty/polska/news-premier-ewakuowalismy-dwa-przejscia-graniczne%2CnIdn%2C1019028 ; https://x.com/DowOperSZ/status/2102723364439679215
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/; https://www.rmf24 dot pl/rozmowy/poranna-rozmowa/news-atak-rosji-przy-granicy-z-polska-wiceszef-mswia-zwraca-uwage,nIdn,1017487
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/ ; https://infosecurity24 dot pl/bezpieczenstwo-wewnetrzne/polska-wzmacnia-przejscia-graniczne-z-ukraina-musimy-dzialac?utm_source=chatgpt.com https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/
[8] https://www.rmf24 dot pl/regiony/warszawa/news-pozar-stacji-bazowej-starlinkow-na-mazowszu-ustalenia-rmf-fm,nIdn,1018956
[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/poland-suspects-fire-starlink-station-was-act-sabotage-2026-09-24/
[10] https://www.zeit dot de/news/2026-09/23/drohnensichtung-am-ber-flugbetrieb-kurzzeitig-eingestellt
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/ ; https://x.com/michaeldweiss/status/2103145221907173626?s=46
[12] https://www.elmundo dot es/internacional/2026/09/23/6ab411e9fdddff35028b4598.html
[13] https://www.fe-ddis dot dk/globalassets/fe/dokumenter/2026/trusselsvurderinger/-assessment-of-the-threat-from-russia-.pdf
[14] https://www.newsweek dot pl/swiat/rosjanie-zmapowali-podmorskie-kable-cia-ostrzega-polske/epfztyl ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/09/23/newsweek-tsru-predupredili-polshu-chto-rossiya-mozhet-povredit-podvodnye-kabeli-mezhdu-evropoy-i-ssha
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[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/67602; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2026/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/;
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2026/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ;
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/
[23] https://www.axios.com/2026/09/24/zelensky-ukraine-russia-war-energy-ceasefire-grain
[24] https://tass dot ru/politika/28146453
[25] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/7259 ; https://meduza dot io/en/news/2026/09/24/ukrainian-drones-strike-russia-s-rostov-region-and-krasnodar-krai-damaging-oil-depot-and-industrial-facility
[26] https://t.me/opershtab23/17194; https://meduza dot io/en/news/2026/09/24/ukrainian-drones-strike-russia-s-rostov-region-and-krasnodar-krai-damaging-oil-depot-and-industrial-facility
[27] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1118183; https://t.me/tass_agency/397140; https://admkrai.krasnodar dot ru/upload/iblock/dae/p08uof21g9d653x90xah7irh8fg7hs4i.pdf
[28] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2088218350346191225; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2102770612556972160; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2102785550675828968; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42349; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42351; https://t.me/wargonzo/37153; https://t.me/dva_majors/99476; https://t.me/severnnyi/9416 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47951
[30] https://t.me/severnnyi/9416
[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47951
[32]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42351 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42349 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/99476 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9416 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37153
[33]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42349; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42351
[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/67595
[35] https://t.me/epoddubny/29205
[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/67595
[37]https://t.me/RVvoenkor/123836; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56213; https://t.me/epoddubny/29205; https://t.me/sashakots/64636;
[38] https://t.me/rybar/83406
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/
[40] https://t.me/severnnyi/9417
[41] https://t.me/Brigade126TDF/1589 ; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2102819506225656197
[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56201
[43] https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/24/%c2%abdrony-rozvidka-i-znyshhennya%c2%bb-u-116-j-brygadi-rozpovily-pro-boyi-na-kup%e2%80%99yanskomu-napryamku/;
[44] https://t.me/grvZapad/19868
[45] https://t.me/grvZapad/19867
[46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42349 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42351 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37153 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47955 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19868
[48] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/operatsiya-vivaldi-nrk-3-go-korpusu-rozminuvaly-30-km-marshrutiv-pered-nastupom-na-shandrygolove/
[49] https://t.me/ab3army/7503
[50] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2026/
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42349 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42351 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56206 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/56224
[52] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23860 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13037
[53] https://t.me/Volyn100obrTrO/4041; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2103065599488471273
[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56224
[55]https://www.facebook.com/93OMBr/posts/pfbid0bco6XAvk1rPh42bHKQX9kYUhUAnHkgzr5fLozZGQJTmFzdcQ1o7c54WAwAbKGdmul ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/23/zajty-u-druzhkivku-i-vyzhyty-yak-nashi-piloty-zahodyat-na-pozycziyi/
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42349 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42351 ; https://t.me/divgen/84153 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37153
[57] https://t.me/mod_russia/67597
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42354
[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47955
[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13031 ; https://t.me/armyUA59/373
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42349; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42351; https://t.me/voin_dv/21258; https://t.me/dva_majors/99476
[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/67599
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42351; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42349; https://t.me/wargonzo/37153; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47990
[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47990
[65] https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/24/jdut-bez-broni-ta-navit-kydayut-avtomaty-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-zachyshhayut-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku/
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42354
[67] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67845; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2103021795544863051; https://t.me/c/1469100833/9631
[68] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42349; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42351
[70] https://suspilne dot media/1410866-rf-vdarila-po-ukrainskih-data-centrah-ukraina-uklala-oboronni-ugodi-z-dvoma-krainami-1674-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1790249208&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1411324-sili-oboroni-znisili-laboratoriu-droniv-ta-sklad-boepripasiv-na-livoberezzi-hersonsini/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1406657127499400
[71] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/24/%c2%abcze-stalo-zakonnoyu-czillyu%c2%bb-%c2%abtajson%c2%bb-rozpoviv-yak-ukrayinski-drony-%c2%abvynesly%c2%bb-energetyku-okupantam-na-pivdni/ ; https://youtu.be/xKMxZ8M4aBg?t=1942
[72] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/79861
[74] https://www.facebook.com/sergii.tiurin.public/posts/pfbid0253SZwVvPQ1wBGiDoytPwAxZJpr3Yg3q1WHdEaoqDjSZDwGGNR7FfyAR2j7Eu2L3bl?cft[0]=AZjHmFXgngSsOWUvDkNi8X3pGvGYdtcgTNrcyfndkpK80myEFeqouo1Vr938gBUszFXdVrV1E8vpQKAWH7gGuQcTw0-K18ABW41laqj0_ZTt7FMj9j0xAGokFUALPatsOeTtIXBqoM493o_ySjVBHqJJyDZaAjHp&tn=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1Js5bs6tcw/; https://www.facebook.com/andriy.raykovich/posts/pfbid0zR191LnMToRZvNXukXW3pQXz5UDVCc7NdKzRbFMbExNufgajjd6TXvpMgwjUgo12l?cft[0]=AZgIt1b4eoTqzTd3UwGPCFGs2iEJi5PE7TRNpEcxrO-6kI4hqBp3T0w6DxgoBJhmK9KfcioJOz8iarCq3XF6GULvGH_nbGTmycVlUrwXWEo1ZKSQk0HG3d2155Qg0ndZS47WL9tC5hPa4QfG1mkRjIG7UQ&tn=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02u63e9Y6fqWWeLZ86eqJ3dNnAsRUT7VrgnUrD3ES9MDj8Js2LUEwH2QsDVutmBkrkl?rdid=K82PAbXIYYcwzdYf#; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3327; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/63846; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/4130; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20754 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20769 ; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/63853 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3328; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/63872 ; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3329; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75604; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/11880; https://t.me/I_Vyhivskyi/335; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7612; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75617; https://t.me/synegubov/25912 ; https://t.me/synegubov/25913
[75] https://suspilne dot media/1410866-rf-vdarila-po-ukrainskih-data-centrah-ukraina-uklala-oboronni-ugodi-z-dvoma-krainami-1674-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1790223440&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75560 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7604 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/58560; https://suspilne dot media/1410866-rf-vdarila-po-ukrainskih-data-centrah-ukraina-uklala-oboronni-ugodi-z-dvoma-krainami-1674-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1790235906&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/Nakonechnyi_Volodymyr/7282; https://www.facebook.com/Church.ua/posts/pfbid036ngJL9fJZZuprbzW6yxHbWzC7KnKXTFMkkNDNRjurwMUWwntYzvL5DALPqnp4kVZl; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1411422-cerez-rosijsku-ataku-poskodzenij-pokrovskij-hram-na-priorci-u-kievi/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7603; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/prezident-obgovoriv-iz-chlenami-palati-predstavnikiv-ssha-po-106557; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7610
[76] https://t.me/novynylive/213985; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/ppo-perehopyla-60-balistychnyh-raket-pid-chas-ataky-rf-na-kyyiv-zelenskyj/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7607 ; https://t.me/kyiv_pro_office/11010 ; https://suspilne dot media/1410866-rf-vdarila-po-ukrainskih-data-centrah-ukraina-uklala-oboronni-ugodi-z-dvoma-krainami-1674-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1790227816&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;
[77] https://t.me/novapostcorp/5059 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1410932-e-zagibli-i-travmovani-rosia-atakuvala-kiiv-ta-oblast-balistikou-i-bezpilotnikami/?anchor=live_1790236839&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[78] https://suspilne dot media/1410866-rf-vdarila-po-ukrainskih-data-centrah-ukraina-uklala-oboronni-ugodi-z-dvoma-krainami-1674-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1790239433&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[79]https://www.facebook.com/NCEC.gov.ua/posts/pfbid021xE9Kgm86sWJWLz4vJWWBrwZf4Z9ubqN3LibvoT1PXxoLUYcfo73WMpCBAqAVgHGl#
[80] https://interfax dot com.ua/news/economic/1208936.html
