March 30, 2023 - ISW Press Iraq and Syria. ISIS remains a viable insurgency in Syria that aspires to reestablish a territorial caliphate. The US presence in Syria enables the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to maintain sufficient pressure to prevent ISIS’s insurgency from increasing in strength rapidly, but deficiencies in the SDF’s capabilities and a lack of coordination with counterinsurgent forces in regime-held Syria means the SDF is unlikely to be able to defeat ISIS. The SDF remains the most reliable counter-ISIS partner for the United States in Syria. The Syrian regime is incapable of containing ISIS and often tacitly allows ISIS resurgence in select areas.
Somalia. Al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate al Shabaab has retained its vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) capabilities in central Somalia, which could help it overturn recent counterterrorism gains. The group will likely continue manufacturing VBIEDs because Somali counterterrorism forces cannot adequately disrupt its supply chains and likely lack the capacity to degrade its havens in the area as the government gives more priority to opening a second front in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab will likely use VBIEDs to target and overrun vulnerable holding forces. Meanwhile, seasonal flooding in Somalia could affect the timeline and scope of the next phase of the Somali Federal Government’s (SFG) offensive in southern Somalia.
Mali. An al Qaeda–linked shadow governor in northern Mali indirectly threatened to attack the US, UK, and EU countries, underscoring the transnational Salafi-jihadi threat emanating from the Sahel. CTP continues to assess that the al Qaeda–linked group in the Sahel is unlikely to pursue transnational attack targets in the West in the near future, although there are signs and past patterns that indicate this could change. The group’s growing freedom in northern Mali increases its ability to host and support transnational attack cells, should it choose to pursue such aims.
Pakistan. The integration of new groups into the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) could foreshadow TTP attacks in high-population areas, which would likely have a more deadly and destructive effect and pressure the Pakistani military to respond. The TTP has increasingly integrated independent jihadi groups into its fold since December 2022. The groups likely have not previously played a major role in TTP, unlike TTP splinter groups that rejoined it between 2020 and 2021. However, the location in which the new mergers operate poses a challenge to the Pakistani government.
Afghanistan. The Taliban supreme leader removed the Taliban minister of finance, which may open new rifts in the Taliban’s traditional support base. The Taliban supreme leader’s efforts to form his own military forces may exacerbate concerns he is monopolizing power and further escalate Taliban government infighting.
