Publications

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 18, 2023

December 18, 2023 - ISW Press

A combination of artillery ammunition shortages and delays in the provision of Western security assistance is likely causing Ukrainian forces to husband materiel and may delay future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated in an interview with Reuters published on December 18 that Ukrainian forces have shortages of 122mm and 152mm shells along the entire frontline. Tarnavskyi stated that the shortages are prompting Ukrainian forces to redistribute artillery ammunition and replan military tasks. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister General Ivan Havrylyuk also acknowledged on December 18 that Ukrainian artillery ammunition shortages will continue. Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces are also having issues with artillery ammunition, although Ukrainian and Western officials have reportedly assessed that the Russian forces are currently conducting artillery fire at a rate five to seven times greater than the Ukrainian forces.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 17, 2023

December 17, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened Finland and the wider NATO alliance in a statement ostensibly meant to dismiss concerns about the threat that Russia poses to NATO. Putin gave an extended interview with Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 on December 17, wherein he attempted to deny US President Joe Biden’s December 6 warning that Russia would attack a NATO country in the future if it won the war in Ukraine. Putin argued that Russia does not have any geopolitical, economic, military, or territorial reason to fight NATO and that Russia is interested in developing relations with NATO member states. Putin followed this supposed reassurance with an accusation that NATO member states artificially created conflict between Russia and Finland and “dragged“ Finland into the NATO alliance. Putin stated that “there will be problems” with Finland and that Finland’s NATO accession prompted Russian officials to start forming the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and concentrating military units in northwestern Russia. The Russian military is currently redividing the Western Military District (WMD) to reform the LMD and the Moscow Military District (MMD) as part of a long-term restructuring and expansion effort that aims to prepare Russia for a potential future large-scale conventional war against NATO. The WMD is responsible for the Russian border with NATO members Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland but has largely been committed to the fight in Ukraine, where it has incurred significant losses. The restoration of the LMD and MMD is likely intended to balance Russian operational requirements in Ukraine with Russian military posturing along the Russian border with NATO. Putin’s justification for the formation of the LMD, which will be responsible for an area bordering Finland, Sweden, and the Arctic, suggests that he sees the LMD as a military response to the “problems” of current and future NATO members in Scandinavia.

Iran Update, December 17, 2023

December 17, 2023 - ISW Press

Israeli forces uncovered an advanced and extensive Hamas tunnel system in the northern Gaza Strip. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on December 17 that its forces had uncovered four kilometers of the tunnel near the Erez crossing in recent weeks. The tunnel is wide enough for vehicles to pass through it, reinforced with concrete, and connected to electricity and communications infrastructure. Israel said one section of the tunnel is the largest that it has discovered in the Gaza Strip and 400 meters from Israeli territory. The IDF stated that it was not familiar with the tunnel route nor its enormous scope prior to the war. The Wall Street Journal published a map of the tunnel system that Hamas has created below the Gaza Strip based on data from 2014, which includes a singular tunnel running south of the Erez checkpoint. The IDF published a map on December 17 of the entire tunnel network that it has uncovered, which shows a notable expansion of the tunnels’ coverage and complexity compared to the 2014 data.

Ukrainian Strikes Have Changed Russian Naval Operations in the Black Sea

December 16, 2023 - ISW Press

Key takeaway: Ukrainian strikes against Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets have changed Russian naval operating patterns, causing the BSF to move some ships away from its main base in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea and hampering the BSF’s ability to interfere with maritime trade in the western part of the Black Sea. Ukrainian strikes have likely caused the BSF to set conditions for a more permanent basing pattern along the eastern Black Sea coast as it transfers naval assets away from Crimea and expands a small port in de facto Russian-controlled Ochamchire, Abkhazia. Ukrainian strikes against BSF assets have successfully facilitated the use of Ukraine’s Black Sea grain corridor as international support for the corridor continues to increase despite Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and military threats against it.

Iran Update, December 16, 2023

December 16, 2023 - ISW Press

The Houthis refocused their attack campaign to target Israel directly rather than international shipping and may have concluded that they achieved their objective of halting shipping through the Red Sea.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 16, 2023

December 16, 2023 - ISW Press

Ukrainian forces continue operations on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast amid reported difficult conditions in the area as part of an apparent effort to set conditions for future Ukrainian operations and the resettlement of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. The New York Times published a series of interviews with Ukrainian military personnel operating on the east bank and along the Dnipro River on December 16, wherein the commander of a Ukrainian regiment stated that Ukrainian drone strikes have heavily suppressed Russian long-range artillery on the east bank in recent months. Ukrainian officials previously stated that Ukrainian forces established several bridgeheads on the east bank as part of an operation that aims to push Russian forces out of artillery range of west bank Kherson Oblast. The reported suppression of long-range Russian artillery may allow Ukrainian forces to operate more freely in near rear areas in west bank Kherson Oblast, which may partially explain intensified Russian glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian targets on the west bank.The much more abundant 152mm tube artillery systems that Russian forces widely operate in Ukraine have an approximate range of 25km, although Russian forces are unlikely to deploy these systems to immediate frontline areas due to the threat of Ukrainian counterbattery fire.

Iran Update, December 15, 2023

December 15, 2023 - ISW Press

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are exploiting the Israel-Hamas war to demonstrate their capability to control a key maritime route and chokepoint in the Middle East. The Houthis have conducted almost daily drone and missile attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Bab al Mandeb since December 9.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 15, 2023

December 15, 2023 - ISW Press

German outlet BILD stated on December 14 that unspecified intelligence findings and sources indicate that Russia plans to occupy Ukrainian territory beyond the four (illegally) annexed Ukrainian oblasts throughout 2024-2026. BILD stated that Russia plans to capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and up to the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast by the end of 2024.

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, December 15, 2023

December 15, 2023 - ISW Press

Al Qaeda­–linked militants are increasing their rate of attack in central Mali, likely to coerce civilians into submission to strengthen support zones and gain more resources to help the group isolate Malian forces in the area. Malian security forces and their Kremlin-funded Wagner Group auxiliaries will likely fail to protect civilians from the attacks because Malian forces cannot effectively contest insurgents in central Mali as they continue to give priority to fighting Tuareg rebels in northern Mali. UN forces that helped secure roads in the region are also no longer around to mitigate security gaps after withdrawing in early December. The insurgents will likely use strengthened support zones in central Mali to besiege major population centers and attack isolated security forces in Mali and Burkina Faso to delegitimize both countries’ governments.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 14, 2023

December 14, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin displayed notable confidence in publicly discussing Russia’s war on Ukraine during a joint event combining his annual press conference and “Direct Line” forum on December 14 but did not clearly define his envisioned end state for the full-scale invasion he launched on February 24, 2022. The “Direct Line” is an annual highly staged forum in which Putin answers pre-selected questions from the Russian public. Putin notably skipped the “Direct Line” in 2022, the first time he did not hold it since 2012. Putin routinely abstained from discussing the war in depth at high profile events throughout 2022, suggesting that he was uncertain about his ability to shape the Russian information space on this topic. Putin used the December 14, 2023, event to discuss his objectives in Ukraine, specific operational and tactical situations along the front, and specific concerns from Russian military personnel and volunteers in a much more public and prolonged fashion than in his previous statements about the war since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s willingness to center large portions of the event on the war in Ukraine suggests an increased confidence in his ability to address the Russian public on the subject, which may be indicative of his own personal confidence in Russia’s prospects in Ukraine following the relatively successful Russian defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and perceived wavering Western support for Ukraine. Putin did not offer a new approach to the war, describe how Russia intends to achieve victory in Ukraine or specify what a Russian victory would look like. Many of Putin’s statements on December 14 are similar to the boilerplate claims about the Russian war in Ukraine that he made during a speech at a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium meeting almost a year ago, for example.

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